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SubscribePosition Auctions in AI-Generated Content
We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.
Ad Auctions for LLMs via Retrieval Augmented Generation
In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.
Optimizing What Matters: AUC-Driven Learning for Robust Neural Retrieval
Dual-encoder retrievers depend on the principle that relevant documents should score higher than irrelevant ones for a given query. Yet the dominant Noise Contrastive Estimation (NCE) objective, which underpins Contrastive Loss, optimizes a softened ranking surrogate that we rigorously prove is fundamentally oblivious to score separation quality and unrelated to AUC. This mismatch leads to poor calibration and suboptimal performance in downstream tasks like retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). To address this fundamental limitation, we introduce the MW loss, a new training objective that maximizes the Mann-Whitney U statistic, which is mathematically equivalent to the Area under the ROC Curve (AUC). MW loss encourages each positive-negative pair to be correctly ranked by minimizing binary cross entropy over score differences. We provide theoretical guarantees that MW loss directly upper-bounds the AoC, better aligning optimization with retrieval goals. We further promote ROC curves and AUC as natural threshold free diagnostics for evaluating retriever calibration and ranking quality. Empirically, retrievers trained with MW loss consistently outperform contrastive counterparts in AUC and standard retrieval metrics. Our experiments show that MW loss is an empirically superior alternative to Contrastive Loss, yielding better-calibrated and more discriminative retrievers for high-stakes applications like RAG.
Provable Multi-instance Deep AUC Maximization with Stochastic Pooling
This paper considers a novel application of deep AUC maximization (DAM) for multi-instance learning (MIL), in which a single class label is assigned to a bag of instances (e.g., multiple 2D slices of a CT scan for a patient). We address a neglected yet non-negligible computational challenge of MIL in the context of DAM, i.e., bag size is too large to be loaded into {GPU} memory for backpropagation, which is required by the standard pooling methods of MIL. To tackle this challenge, we propose variance-reduced stochastic pooling methods in the spirit of stochastic optimization by formulating the loss function over the pooled prediction as a multi-level compositional function. By synthesizing techniques from stochastic compositional optimization and non-convex min-max optimization, we propose a unified and provable muli-instance DAM (MIDAM) algorithm with stochastic smoothed-max pooling or stochastic attention-based pooling, which only samples a few instances for each bag to compute a stochastic gradient estimator and to update the model parameter. We establish a similar convergence rate of the proposed MIDAM algorithm as the state-of-the-art DAM algorithms. Our extensive experiments on conventional MIL datasets and medical datasets demonstrate the superiority of our MIDAM algorithm.
MOHAF: A Multi-Objective Hierarchical Auction Framework for Scalable and Fair Resource Allocation in IoT Ecosystems
The rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems has intensified the challenge of efficiently allocating heterogeneous resources in highly dynamic, distributed environments. Conventional centralized mechanisms and single-objective auction models, focusing solely on metrics such as cost minimization or revenue maximization, struggle to deliver balanced system performance. This paper proposes the Multi-Objective Hierarchical Auction Framework (MOHAF), a distributed resource allocation mechanism that jointly optimizes cost, Quality of Service (QoS), energy efficiency, and fairness. MOHAF integrates hierarchical clustering to reduce computational complexity with a greedy, submodular optimization strategy that guarantees a (1-1/e) approximation ratio. A dynamic pricing mechanism adapts in real time to resource utilization, enhancing market stability and allocation quality. Extensive experiments on the Google Cluster Data trace, comprising 3,553 requests and 888 resources, demonstrate MOHAF's superior allocation efficiency (0.263) compared to Greedy (0.185), First-Price (0.138), and Random (0.101) auctions, while achieving perfect fairness (Jain's index = 1.000). Ablation studies reveal the critical influence of cost and QoS components in sustaining balanced multi-objective outcomes. With near-linear scalability, theoretical guarantees, and robust empirical performance, MOHAF offers a practical and adaptable solution for large-scale IoT deployments, effectively reconciling efficiency, equity, and sustainability in distributed resource coordination.
Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: Evaluating Strategic Planning and Execution of LLM Agents in an Auction Arena
Can Large Language Models (LLMs) simulate human behavior in complex environments? LLMs have recently been shown to exhibit advanced reasoning skills but much of NLP evaluation still relies on static benchmarks. Answering this requires evaluation environments that probe strategic reasoning in competitive, dynamic scenarios that involve long-term planning. We introduce AucArena, a novel simulation environment for evaluating LLMs within auctions, a setting chosen for being highly unpredictable and involving many skills related to resource and risk management, while also being easy to evaluate. We conduct several controlled simulations using state-of-the-art LLMs as bidding agents. We find that through simple prompting, LLMs do indeed demonstrate many of the skills needed for effectively engaging in auctions (e.g., managing budget, adhering to long-term goals and priorities), skills that we find can be sharpened by explicitly encouraging models to be adaptive and observe strategies in past auctions. These results are significant as they show the potential of using LLM agents to model intricate social dynamics, especially in competitive settings. However, we also observe considerable variability in the capabilities of individual LLMs. Notably, even our most advanced models (GPT-4) are occasionally surpassed by heuristic baselines and human agents, highlighting the potential for further improvements in the design of LLM agents and the important role that our simulation environment can play in further testing and refining agent architectures.
Coordinated Dynamic Bidding in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Budgets
In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.
Learning to Bid in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Budgets
Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.
Pairwise Ranking Losses of Click-Through Rates Prediction for Welfare Maximization in Ad Auctions
We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.
Tides on Lava Worlds: Application to Close-in Exoplanets and the Early Earth-Moon System
Understanding the physics of planetary magma oceans has been the subject of growing efforts, in light of the increasing abundance of Solar system samples and extrasolar surveys. A rocky planet harboring such an ocean is likely to interact tidally with its host star, planetary companions, or satellites. To date, however, models of the tidal response and heat generation of magma oceans have been restricted to the framework of weakly viscous solids, ignoring the dynamical fluid behavior of the ocean beyond a critical melt fraction. Here we provide a handy analytical model that accommodates this phase transition, allowing for a physical estimation of the tidal response of lava worlds. We apply the model in two settings: The tidal history of the early Earth-Moon system in the aftermath of the giant impact; and the tidal interplay between short-period exoplanets and their host stars. For the former, we show that the fluid behavior of the Earth's molten surface drives efficient early Lunar recession to {sim} 25 Earth radii within 10^4{-} 10^5 years, in contrast with earlier predictions. For close-in exoplanets, we report on how their molten surfaces significantly change their spin-orbit dynamics, allowing them to evade spin-orbit resonances and accelerating their track towards tidal synchronization from a Gyr to Myr timescale. Moreover, we re-evaluate the energy budgets of detected close-in exoplanets, highlighting how the surface thermodynamics of these planets are likely controlled by enhanced, fluid-driven tidal heating, rather than vigorous insolation, and how this regime change substantially alters predictions for their surface temperatures.
