Daily Papers

Facing the current debate on whether Large Language Models (LLMs) attain near-human intelligence levels (Mitchell & Krakauer, 2023; Bubeck et al., 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Shiffrin & Mitchell, 2023; Ullman, 2023), the current study introduces a benchmark for evaluating social intelligence, one of the most distinctive aspects of human cognition. We developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for social dynamics and introduced two evaluation tasks: Inverse Reasoning (IR) and Inverse Inverse Planning (IIP). Our approach also encompassed a computational model based on recursive Bayesian inference, adept at elucidating diverse human behavioral patterns. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses revealed that humans surpassed the latest GPT models in overall performance, zero-shot learning, one-shot generalization, and adaptability to multi-modalities. Notably, GPT models demonstrated social intelligence only at the most basic order (order = 0), in stark contrast to human social intelligence (order >= 2). Further examination indicated a propensity of LLMs to rely on pattern recognition for shortcuts, casting doubt on their possession of authentic human-level social intelligence. Our codes, dataset, appendix and human data are released at https://github.com/bigai-ai/Evaluate-n-Model-Social-Intelligence.

We construct evaluation tasks where extending the reasoning length of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) deteriorates performance, exhibiting an inverse scaling relationship between test-time compute and accuracy. Our evaluation tasks span four categories: simple counting tasks with distractors, regression tasks with spurious features, deduction tasks with constraint tracking, and advanced AI risks. We identify five distinct failure modes when models reason for longer: 1) Claude models become increasingly distracted by irrelevant information; 2) OpenAI o-series models resist distractors but overfit to problem framings; 3) models shift from reasonable priors to spurious correlations; 4) all models show difficulties in maintaining focus on complex deductive tasks; and 5) extended reasoning may amplify concerning behaviors, with Claude Sonnet 4 showing increased expressions of self-preservation. These findings suggest that while test-time compute scaling remains promising for improving model capabilities, it may inadvertently reinforce problematic reasoning patterns. Our results demonstrate the importance of evaluating models across diverse reasoning lengths to identify and address these failure modes in LRMs.

In the era of Large Language Models (LLMs), alignment has emerged as a fundamental yet challenging problem in the pursuit of more reliable, controllable, and capable machine intelligence. The recent success of reasoning models and conversational AI systems has underscored the critical role of reinforcement learning (RL) in enhancing these systems, driving increased research interest at the intersection of RL and LLM alignment. This paper provides a comprehensive review of recent advances in LLM alignment through the lens of inverse reinforcement learning (IRL), emphasizing the distinctions between RL techniques employed in LLM alignment and those in conventional RL tasks. In particular, we highlight the necessity of constructing neural reward models from human data and discuss the formal and practical implications of this paradigm shift. We begin by introducing fundamental concepts in RL to provide a foundation for readers unfamiliar with the field. We then examine recent advances in this research agenda, discussing key challenges and opportunities in conducting IRL for LLM alignment. Beyond methodological considerations, we explore practical aspects, including datasets, benchmarks, evaluation metrics, infrastructure, and computationally efficient training and inference techniques. Finally, we draw insights from the literature on sparse-reward RL to identify open questions and potential research directions. By synthesizing findings from diverse studies, we aim to provide a structured and critical overview of the field, highlight unresolved challenges, and outline promising future directions for improving LLM alignment through RL and IRL techniques.

We revisit test-time scaling for language model reasoning and ask a fundamental question: at equal token budget and compute, is it better to run multiple independent chains in parallel, or to run fewer chains that iteratively refine through sequential steps? Through comprehensive evaluation across 5 state-of-the-art open source models and 3 challenging reasoning benchmarks, we find that sequential scaling where chains explicitly build upon previous attempts consistently outperforms the dominant parallel self-consistency paradigm in 95.6% of configurations with gains in accuracy upto 46.7%. Further, we introduce inverse-entropy weighted voting, a novel training-free method to further boost the accuracy of sequential scaling. By weighing answers in proportion to the inverse entropy of their reasoning chains, we increase our success rate over parallel majority and establish it as the optimal test-time scaling strategy. Our findings fundamentally challenge the parallel reasoning orthodoxy that has dominated test-time scaling since Wang et al.'s self-consistency decoding (Wang et al., 2022), positioning sequential refinement as the robust default for modern LLM reasoning and necessitating a paradigm shift in how we approach inference-time optimization.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental variables based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to Theory of Mind reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use rigid, handcrafted Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models, which are more robust but cannot generalize across different domains. In this work, we introduce AutoToM, an automated Bayesian Theory of Mind method for achieving open-ended machine Theory of Mind. AutoToM can operate in any domain, infer any mental variable, and conduct robust Theory of Mind reasoning of any order. Given a Theory of Mind inference problem, AutoToM first proposes an initial BToM model. It then conducts automated Bayesian inverse planning based on the proposed model, leveraging an LLM as the backend. Based on the uncertainty of the inference, it iteratively refines the model, by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Empirical evaluations across multiple Theory of Mind benchmarks demonstrate that AutoToM consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance, offering a scalable, robust, and interpretable approach to machine Theory of Mind.

Traditional multimodal learning approaches require expensive alignment pre-training to bridge vision and language modalities, typically projecting visual features into discrete text token spaces. We challenge both fundamental assumptions underlying this paradigm by proposing Inverse-LLaVA, a novel approach that eliminates alignment pre-training entirely while inverting the conventional mapping direction. Rather than projecting visual features to text space, our method maps text embeddings into continuous visual representation space and performs fusion within transformer intermediate layers. Through selective additive components in attention mechanisms, we enable dynamic integration of visual and textual representations without requiring massive image-text alignment datasets. Comprehensive experiments across nine multimodal benchmarks demonstrate nuanced performance trade-offs: Inverse-LLaVA achieves notable improvements on reasoning-intensive and cognitive tasks (MM-VET: +0.2%, VizWiz: +1.8%, ScienceQA: +0.2%, cognitive reasoning: +27.2%), while showing expected decreases in perception tasks requiring memorized visual-text associations (celebrity recognition: -49.5%, OCR: -21.3%). These results provide the first empirical evidence that alignment pre-training is not necessary for effective multimodal learning, particularly for complex reasoning tasks. Our work establishes the feasibility of a new paradigm that reduces computational requirements by 45%, challenges conventional wisdom about modality fusion, and opens new research directions for efficient multimodal architectures that preserve modality-specific characteristics. Our project website with code and additional resources is available at https://inverse-llava.github.io.

Inverse graphics -- the task of inverting an image into physical variables that, when rendered, enable reproduction of the observed scene -- is a fundamental challenge in computer vision and graphics. Disentangling an image into its constituent elements, such as the shape, color, and material properties of the objects of the 3D scene that produced it, requires a comprehensive understanding of the environment. This requirement limits the ability of existing carefully engineered approaches to generalize across domains. Inspired by the zero-shot ability of large language models (LLMs) to generalize to novel contexts, we investigate the possibility of leveraging the broad world knowledge encoded in such models in solving inverse-graphics problems. To this end, we propose the Inverse-Graphics Large Language Model (IG-LLM), an inverse-graphics framework centered around an LLM, that autoregressively decodes a visual embedding into a structured, compositional 3D-scene representation. We incorporate a frozen pre-trained visual encoder and a continuous numeric head to enable end-to-end training. Through our investigation, we demonstrate the potential of LLMs to facilitate inverse graphics through next-token prediction, without the use of image-space supervision. Our analysis opens up new possibilities for precise spatial reasoning about images that exploit the visual knowledge of LLMs. We will release our code and data to ensure the reproducibility of our investigation and to facilitate future research at https://ig-llm.is.tue.mpg.de/

Formal mathematical reasoning remains a critical challenge for artificial intelligence, hindered by limitations of existing benchmarks in scope and scale. To address this, we present FormalMATH, a large-scale Lean4 benchmark comprising 5,560 formally verified problems spanning from high-school Olympiad challenges to undergraduate-level theorems across diverse domains (e.g., algebra, applied mathematics, calculus, number theory, and discrete mathematics). To mitigate the inefficiency of manual formalization, we introduce a novel human-in-the-loop autoformalization pipeline that integrates: (1) specialized large language models (LLMs) for statement autoformalization, (2) multi-LLM semantic verification, and (3) negation-based disproof filtering strategies using off-the-shelf LLM-based provers. This approach reduces expert annotation costs by retaining 72.09% of statements before manual verification while ensuring fidelity to the original natural-language problems. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art LLM-based theorem provers reveals significant limitations: even the strongest models achieve only 16.46% success rate under practical sampling budgets, exhibiting pronounced domain bias (e.g., excelling in algebra but failing in calculus) and over-reliance on simplified automation tactics. Notably, we identify a counterintuitive inverse relationship between natural-language solution guidance and proof success in chain-of-thought reasoning scenarios, suggesting that human-written informal reasoning introduces noise rather than clarity in the formal reasoning settings. We believe that FormalMATH provides a robust benchmark for benchmarking formal mathematical reasoning.

While a lot of recent research focuses on enhancing the textual reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by optimizing the multi-agent framework or reasoning chains, several benchmark tasks can be solved with 100% success through direct coding, which is more scalable and avoids the computational overhead associated with textual iterating and searching. Textual reasoning has inherent limitations in solving tasks with challenges in math, logics, optimization, and searching, which is unlikely to be solved by simply scaling up the model and data size. The recently released OpenAI GPT Code Interpreter and multi-agent frameworks such as AutoGen have demonstrated remarkable proficiency of integrating code generation and execution to solve complex tasks using LLMs. However, based on our experiments on 7 existing popular methods for steering code/text generation in both single- and multi-turn settings with 14 tasks and 6 types of LLMs (including the new O1-preview), currently there is no optimal method to correctly steer LLMs to write code when needed. We discover some interesting patterns on when models use code vs. textual reasoning with the evolution to task complexity and model sizes, which even result in an astonishingly inverse scaling law. We also discover that results from LLM written code are not always better than using textual reasoning, even if the task could be solved through code. To mitigate the above issues, we propose three methods to better steer LLM code/text generation and achieve a notable improvement. The costs of token lengths and runtime are thoroughly discussed for all the methods. We believe the problem of steering LLM code/text generation is critical for future research and has much space for further improvement. Project Page, Datasets, and Codes are available at https://yongchao98.github.io/CodeSteer/.

In this technical note, we study the problem of inverse permutation learning in decoder-only transformers. Given a permutation and a string to which that permutation has been applied, the model is tasked with producing the original (``canonical'') string. We argue that this task models a natural robustness property across a variety of reasoning tasks, including long-context retrieval, multiple choice QA and in-context learning. Our primary contribution is an impossibility result: we show that an arbitrary depth, decoder-only transformer cannot learn this task. This result concerns the expressive capacity of decoder-only transformer models and is agnostic to training dynamics or sample complexity. We give a pair of alternative constructions under which inverse permutation learning is feasible. The first of these highlights the fundamental role of the causal attention mask, and reveals a gap between the expressivity of encoder-decoder transformers and the more popular decoder-only architecture. The latter result is more surprising: we show that simply padding the input with ``scratch tokens" yields a construction under which inverse permutation learning is possible. We conjecture that this may suggest an alternative mechanism by which chain-of-thought prompting or, more generally, intermediate ``thinking'' tokens can enable reasoning in large language models, even when these tokens encode no meaningful semantic information (e.g., the results of intermediate computations).

Fuzzy reasoning is vital due to the frequent use of imprecise information in daily contexts. However, the ability of current large language models (LLMs) to handle such reasoning remains largely uncharted. In this paper, we introduce a new benchmark, FRoG, for fuzzy reasoning, featuring real-world mathematical word problems that incorporate generalized quantifiers. Our experimental findings reveal that fuzzy reasoning continues to pose significant challenges for LLMs. Moreover, we find that existing methods designed to enhance reasoning do not consistently improve performance in tasks involving fuzzy logic. Additionally, our results show an inverse scaling effect in the performance of LLMs on FRoG. Interestingly, we also demonstrate that strong mathematical reasoning skills are not necessarily indicative of success on our benchmark.

This paper identifies the misinterpretation of the context can be a significant issue during the reasoning process of large language models, spanning from smaller models like Llama3.2-3B-Instruct to cutting-edge ones like DeepSeek-R1. For example, in the phrase "10 dollars per kilo," LLMs might not recognize that "per" means "for each," leading to calculation errors. We introduce a novel, post-training approach called **Stick to the Facts (SIFT)** to tackle this. SIFT leverages increasing inference-time compute to ground LLM reasoning in contexts. At the core of SIFT lies the *Sticker*, which is generated by the model itself to explicitly emphasize the key information within the context. Given the curated Sticker, SIFT generates two predictions -- one from the original query and one from the query augmented with the Sticker. If they differ, the Sticker is sequentially refined via *forward* optimization (to better align the extracted facts with the query) and *inverse* generation (to conform with the model's inherent tendencies) for more faithful reasoning outcomes. Studies across diverse models (from 3B to 100B+) and benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K, MATH-500) reveal consistent performance improvements. Notably, SIFT improves the pass@1 accuracy of DeepSeek-R1 on AIME2024 from 78.33% to **85.67**%, establishing a new state-of-the-art in the open-source community. The code is available at https://github.com/zhijie-group/SIFT.

There is growing excitement about the potential of Language Models (LMs) to accelerate scientific discovery. Falsifying hypotheses is key to scientific progress, as it allows claims to be iteratively refined over time. This process requires significant researcher effort, reasoning, and ingenuity. Yet current benchmarks for LMs predominantly assess their ability to generate solutions rather than challenge them. We advocate for developing benchmarks that evaluate this inverse capability - creating counterexamples for subtly incorrect solutions. To demonstrate this approach, we start with the domain of algorithmic problem solving, where counterexamples can be evaluated automatically using code execution. Specifically, we introduce REFUTE, a dynamically updating benchmark that includes recent problems and incorrect submissions from programming competitions, where human experts successfully identified counterexamples. Our analysis finds that the best reasoning agents, even OpenAI o3-mini (high) with code execution feedback, can create counterexamples for only <9% of incorrect solutions in REFUTE, even though ratings indicate its ability to solve up to 48% of these problems from scratch. We hope our work spurs progress in evaluating and enhancing LMs' ability to falsify incorrect solutions - a capability that is crucial for both accelerating research and making models self-improve through reliable reflective reasoning.

Training on model-generated synthetic data is a promising approach for finetuning LLMs, but it remains unclear when it helps or hurts. In this paper, we investigate this question for math reasoning via an empirical study, followed by building a conceptual understanding of our observations. First, we find that while the typical approach of finetuning a model on synthetic correct or positive problem-solution pairs generated by capable models offers modest performance gains, sampling more correct solutions from the finetuned learner itself followed by subsequent fine-tuning on this self-generated data doubles the efficiency of the same synthetic problems. At the same time, training on model-generated positives can amplify various spurious correlations, resulting in flat or even inverse scaling trends as the amount of data increases. Surprisingly, we find that several of these issues can be addressed if we also utilize negative responses, i.e., model-generated responses that are deemed incorrect by a final answer verifier. Crucially, these negatives must be constructed such that the training can appropriately recover the utility or advantage of each intermediate step in the negative response. With this per-step scheme, we are able to attain consistent gains over only positive data, attaining performance similar to amplifying the amount of synthetic data by 8 times. We show that training on per-step negatives can help to unlearn spurious correlations in the positive data, and is equivalent to advantage-weighted reinforcement learning (RL), implying that it inherits robustness benefits of RL over imitating positive data alone.

Bimanual robotic manipulation, which involves the coordinated control of two robotic arms, is foundational for solving challenging tasks. Despite recent progress in general-purpose manipulation, data scarcity and embodiment heterogeneity remain serious obstacles to further scaling up in bimanual settings. In this paper, we introduce Video Diffusion for Action Reasoning (Vidar), a two-stage framework that leverages large-scale, diffusion-based video pre-training and a novel masked inverse dynamics model for action prediction. We pre-train the video diffusion model on 750K multi-view videos from three real-world bimanual robot platforms, utilizing a unified observation space that encodes robot, camera, task, and scene contexts. Our masked inverse dynamics model learns masks to extract action-relevant information from generated trajectories without requiring pixel-level labels, and the masks can effectively generalize to unseen backgrounds. Our experiments demonstrate that with only 20 minutes of human demonstrations on an unseen robot platform (only 1% of typical data requirements), Vidar generalizes to unseen tasks and backgrounds with strong semantic understanding, surpassing state-of-the-art methods. Our findings highlight the potential of video foundation models, coupled with masked action prediction, to enable scalable and generalizable robotic manipulation in diverse real-world settings.

Visual language models (VLMs) have attracted increasing interest in autonomous driving due to their powerful reasoning capabilities. However, existing VLMs typically utilize discrete text Chain-of-Thought (CoT) tailored to the current scenario, which essentially represents highly abstract and symbolic compression of visual information, potentially leading to spatio-temporal relationship ambiguity and fine-grained information loss. Is autonomous driving better modeled on real-world simulation and imagination than on pure symbolic logic? In this paper, we propose a spatio-temporal CoT reasoning method that enables models to think visually. First, VLM serves as a world model to generate unified image frame for predicting future world states: where perception results (e.g., lane divider and 3D detection) represent the future spatial relationships, and ordinary future frame represent the temporal evolution relationships. This spatio-temporal CoT then serves as intermediate reasoning steps, enabling the VLM to function as an inverse dynamics model for trajectory planning based on current observations and future predictions. To implement visual generation in VLMs, we propose a unified pretraining paradigm integrating visual generation and understanding, along with a progressive visual CoT enhancing autoregressive image generation. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, advancing autonomous driving towards visual reasoning.

Computer use agents (CUAs) need to plan task workflows grounded in diverse, ever-changing applications and environments, but learning is hindered by the scarcity of large-scale, high-quality training data in the target application. Existing datasets are domain-specific, static, and costly to annotate, while current synthetic data generation methods often yield simplistic or misaligned task demonstrations. To address these limitations, we introduce Watch & Learn (W&L), a framework that converts human demonstration videos readily available on the Internet into executable UI trajectories at scale. Instead of directly generating trajectories or relying on ad hoc reasoning heuristics, we cast the problem as an inverse dynamics objective: predicting the user's action from consecutive screen states. This formulation reduces manual engineering, is easier to learn, and generalizes more robustly across applications. Concretely, we develop an inverse dynamics labeling pipeline with task-aware video retrieval, generate over 53k high-quality trajectories from raw web videos, and demonstrate that these trajectories improve CUAs both as in-context demonstrations and as supervised training data. On the challenging OSWorld benchmark, UI trajectories extracted with W&L consistently enhance both general-purpose and state-of-the-art frameworks in-context, and deliver stronger gains for open-source models under supervised training. These results highlight web-scale human demonstration videos as a practical and scalable foundation for advancing CUAs towards real-world deployment.

We report a mixture of expert strategy to create fine-tuned large language models using a deep layer-wise token-level approach based on low-rank adaptation (LoRA). Starting with a set of pre-trained LoRA adapters, we propose a gating strategy that uses the hidden states to dynamically mix adapted layers, allowing the resulting X-LoRA model to draw upon different capabilities and create never-before-used deep layer-wise combinations of adaptations are established to solve specific tasks. The design is inspired by the biological principles of universality and diversity, where neural network building blocks are reused in different hierarchical manifestations. Hence, the X-LoRA model can be easily implemented for any existing large language model (LLM) without a need for modifications of the underlying structure. We develop a tailored X-LoRA model that offers scientific capabilities including forward/inverse analysis tasks and enhanced reasoning capability, focused on biomaterial analysis, protein mechanics and design. The impact of this work include access to readily expandable, adaptable and changeable models with strong domain knowledge and the capability to integrate across areas of knowledge. With the X-LoRA model featuring experts in biology, mathematics, reasoning, bio-inspired materials, mechanics and materials, chemistry, and protein mechanics we conduct a series of physics-focused case studies. We examine knowledge recall, protein mechanics forward/inverse tasks, protein design, and adversarial agentic modeling including ontological knowledge graphs. The model is capable not only of making quantitative predictions of nanomechanical properties of proteins, but also reasons over the results and correctly predicts likely mechanisms that explain distinct molecular behaviors.

We present a complete formalization in Isabelle/HOL of the object part of an equivalence between L-mosaics and bounded join-semilattices, employing an AI-assisted methodology that integrates large language models as reasoning assistants throughout the proof development process. The equivalence was originally established by Cangiotti, Linzi, and Talotti in their study of hypercompositional structures related to orthomodular lattices and quantum logic. Our formalization rigorously verifies the main theoretical result and demonstrates the mutual inverse property of the transformations establishing this equivalence. The development showcases both the mathematical depth of multivalued algebraic operations and the potential for AI-enhanced interactive theorem proving in tackling complex formalization projects.

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have recently demonstrated significant potential in mathematical abilities, providing valuable reasoning paradigm consistent with human natural language. However, LLMs currently have difficulty in bridging perception, language understanding and reasoning capabilities due to incompatibility of the underlying information flow among them, making it challenging to accomplish tasks autonomously. On the other hand, abductive learning (ABL) frameworks for integrating the two abilities of perception and reasoning has seen significant success in inverse decipherment of incomplete facts, but it is limited by the lack of semantic understanding of logical reasoning rules and the dependence on complicated domain knowledge representation. This paper presents a novel method (ChatABL) for integrating LLMs into the ABL framework, aiming at unifying the three abilities in a more user-friendly and understandable manner. The proposed method uses the strengths of LLMs' understanding and logical reasoning to correct the incomplete logical facts for optimizing the performance of perceptual module, by summarizing and reorganizing reasoning rules represented in natural language format. Similarly, perceptual module provides necessary reasoning examples for LLMs in natural language format. The variable-length handwritten equation deciphering task, an abstract expression of the Mayan calendar decoding, is used as a testbed to demonstrate that ChatABL has reasoning ability beyond most existing state-of-the-art methods, which has been well supported by comparative studies. To our best knowledge, the proposed ChatABL is the first attempt to explore a new pattern for further approaching human-level cognitive ability via natural language interaction with ChatGPT.

Recently, Zaremba et al. demonstrated that increasing inference-time computation improves robustness in large proprietary reasoning LLMs. In this paper, we first show that smaller-scale, open-source models (e.g., DeepSeek R1, Qwen3, Phi-reasoning) can also benefit from inference-time scaling using a simple budget forcing strategy. More importantly, we reveal and critically examine an implicit assumption in prior work: intermediate reasoning steps are hidden from adversaries. By relaxing this assumption, we identify an important security risk, intuitively motivated and empirically verified as an inverse scaling law: if intermediate reasoning steps become explicitly accessible, increased inference-time computation consistently reduces model robustness. Finally, we discuss practical scenarios where models with hidden reasoning chains are still vulnerable to attacks, such as models with tool-integrated reasoning and advanced reasoning extraction attacks. Our findings collectively demonstrate that the robustness benefits of inference-time scaling depend heavily on the adversarial setting and deployment context. We urge practitioners to carefully weigh these subtle trade-offs before applying inference-time scaling in security-sensitive, real-world applications.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in reasoning tasks but face limitations in mathematical and complex logical reasoning. Existing methods to improve LLMs' logical capabilities either involve traceable or verifiable logical sequences that generate more reliable responses by constructing logical structures yet increase computational costs, or introduces rigid logic template rules, reducing flexibility. In this paper, we propose Reversal of Thought (RoT), a novel framework aimed at enhancing the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. RoT utilizes a Preference-Guided Reverse Reasoning warm-up strategy, which integrates logical symbols for pseudocode planning through meta-cognitive mechanisms and pairwise preference self-evaluation to generate task-specific prompts solely through demonstrations, aligning with LLMs' cognitive preferences shaped by Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Through reverse reasoning, we ultilize a Cognitive Preference Manager to assess knowledge boundaries and further expand LLMs' reasoning capabilities by aggregating solution logic for known tasks and stylistic templates for unknown tasks. Experiments across various tasks demonstrate that RoT surpasses existing baselines in both reasoning accuracy and efficiency.

While the ``deep reasoning'' paradigm has spurred significant advances in verifiable domains like mathematics, its application to open-ended, creative generation remains a critical challenge. The two dominant methods for instilling reasoning -- reinforcement learning (RL) and instruction distillation -- falter in this area; RL struggles with the absence of clear reward signals and high-quality reward models, while distillation is prohibitively expensive and capped by the teacher model's capabilities. To overcome these limitations, we introduce REverse-Engineered Reasoning (REER), a new paradigm that fundamentally shifts the approach. Instead of building a reasoning process ``forwards'' through trial-and-error or imitation, REER works ``backwards'' from known-good solutions to computationally discover the latent, step-by-step deep reasoning process that could have produced them. Using this scalable, gradient-free approach, we curate and open-source DeepWriting-20K, a large-scale dataset of 20,000 deep reasoning trajectories for open-ended tasks. Our model, DeepWriter-8B, trained on this data, not only surpasses strong open-source baselines but also achieves performance competitive with, and at times superior to, leading proprietary models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5.

Reasoning models have achieved remarkable performance on tasks like math and logical reasoning thanks to their ability to search during reasoning. However, they still suffer from overthinking, often performing unnecessary reasoning steps even after reaching the correct answer. This raises the question: can models evaluate the correctness of their intermediate answers during reasoning? In this work, we study whether reasoning models encode information about answer correctness through probing the model's hidden states. The resulting probe can verify intermediate answers with high accuracy and produces highly calibrated scores. Additionally, we find models' hidden states encode correctness of future answers, enabling early prediction of the correctness before the intermediate answer is fully formulated. We then use the probe as a verifier to decide whether to exit reasoning at intermediate answers during inference, reducing the number of inference tokens by 24\% without compromising performance. These findings confirm that reasoning models do encode a notion of correctness yet fail to exploit it, revealing substantial untapped potential to enhance their efficiency.

We examine how well the state-of-the-art (SOTA) models used in legal reasoning support abductive reasoning tasks. Abductive reasoning is a form of logical inference in which a hypothesis is formulated from a set of observations, and that hypothesis is used to explain the observations. The ability to formulate such hypotheses is important for lawyers and legal scholars as it helps them articulate logical arguments, interpret laws, and develop legal theories. Our motivation is to consider the belief that deep learning models, especially large language models (LLMs), will soon replace lawyers because they perform well on tasks related to legal text processing. But to do so, we believe, requires some form of abductive hypothesis formation. In other words, while LLMs become more popular and powerful, we want to investigate their capacity for abductive reasoning. To pursue this goal, we start by building a logic-augmented dataset for abductive reasoning with 498,697 samples and then use it to evaluate the performance of a SOTA model in the legal field. Our experimental results show that although these models can perform well on tasks related to some aspects of legal text processing, they still fall short in supporting abductive reasoning tasks.

Reverse thinking plays a crucial role in human reasoning. Humans can reason not only from a problem to a solution but also in reverse, i.e., start from the solution and reason towards the problem. This often enhances overall reasoning performance as it enables consistency checks between their forward and backward thinking. To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform reverse thinking, we introduce Reverse-Enhanced Thinking (RevThink), a framework composed of data augmentation and learning objectives. In RevThink, we augment the dataset by collecting structured forward-backward reasoning from a teacher model, consisting of: (1) the original question, (2) forward reasoning, (3) backward question, and (4) backward reasoning. We then employ three objectives to train a smaller student model in a multi-task learning fashion: (a) generate forward reasoning from a question, (b) generate a backward question from a question, and (c) generate backward reasoning from the backward question. Experiments across 12 datasets covering commonsense, math, and logical reasoning show an average 13.53% improvement over the student model's zero-shot performance and a 6.84% improvement over the strongest knowledge distillation baselines. Moreover, our method demonstrates sample efficiency -- using only 10% of the correct forward reasoning from the training data, it outperforms a standard fine-tuning method trained on 10x more forward reasoning. RevThink also exhibits strong generalization to out-of-distribution held-out datasets.

With the emergence of advanced reasoning models like OpenAI o3 and DeepSeek-R1, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities. However, their ability to perform rigorous logical reasoning remains an open question. This survey synthesizes recent advancements in logical reasoning within LLMs, a critical area of AI research. It outlines the scope of logical reasoning in LLMs, its theoretical foundations, and the benchmarks used to evaluate reasoning proficiency. We analyze existing capabilities across different reasoning paradigms - deductive, inductive, abductive, and analogical - and assess strategies to enhance reasoning performance, including data-centric tuning, reinforcement learning, decoding strategies, and neuro-symbolic approaches. The review concludes with future directions, emphasizing the need for further exploration to strengthen logical reasoning in AI systems.

Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have reported high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, it is still unclear whether the observed results arise from true reasoning or from statistical recall of the training set. Inspired by the ladder of causation (Pearl, 2009) and its three levels (associations, interventions and counterfactuals), this paper introduces RE-IMAGINE, a framework to characterize a hierarchy of reasoning ability in LLMs, alongside an automated pipeline to generate problem variations at different levels of the hierarchy. By altering problems in an intermediate symbolic representation, RE-IMAGINE generates arbitrarily many problems that are not solvable using memorization alone. Moreover, the framework is general and can work across reasoning domains, including math, code, and logic. We demonstrate our framework on four widely-used benchmarks to evaluate several families of LLMs, and observe reductions in performance when the models are queried with problem variations. These assessments indicate a degree of reliance on statistical recall for past performance, and open the door to further research targeting skills across the reasoning hierarchy.

Reasoning encompasses two typical types: deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. Despite extensive research into the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), most studies have failed to rigorously differentiate between inductive and deductive reasoning, leading to a blending of the two. This raises an essential question: In LLM reasoning, which poses a greater challenge - deductive or inductive reasoning? While the deductive reasoning capabilities of LLMs, (i.e. their capacity to follow instructions in reasoning tasks), have received considerable attention, their abilities in true inductive reasoning remain largely unexplored. To investigate into the true inductive reasoning capabilities of LLMs, we propose a novel framework, SolverLearner. This framework enables LLMs to learn the underlying function (i.e., y = f_w(x)), that maps input data points (x) to their corresponding output values (y), using only in-context examples. By focusing on inductive reasoning and separating it from LLM-based deductive reasoning, we can isolate and investigate inductive reasoning of LLMs in its pure form via SolverLearner. Our observations reveal that LLMs demonstrate remarkable inductive reasoning capabilities through SolverLearner, achieving near-perfect performance with ACC of 1 in most cases. Surprisingly, despite their strong inductive reasoning abilities, LLMs tend to relatively lack deductive reasoning capabilities, particularly in tasks involving ``counterfactual'' reasoning.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite their remarkable capabilities, rely on singular, pre-dominant reasoning paradigms, hindering their performance on intricate problems that demand diverse cognitive strategies. To address this, we introduce Composite Reasoning (CR), a novel reasoning approach empowering LLMs to dynamically explore and combine multiple reasoning styles like deductive, inductive, and abductive for more nuanced problem-solving. Evaluated on scientific and medical question-answering benchmarks, our approach outperforms existing baselines like Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and also surpasses the accuracy of DeepSeek-R1 style reasoning (SR) capabilities, while demonstrating superior sample efficiency and adequate token usage. Notably, CR adaptively emphasizes domain-appropriate reasoning styles. It prioritizes abductive and deductive reasoning for medical question answering, but shifts to causal, deductive, and inductive methods for scientific reasoning. Our findings highlight that by cultivating internal reasoning style diversity, LLMs acquire more robust, adaptive, and efficient problem-solving abilities.

Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) is a powerful set of techniques for imitation learning that aims to learn a reward function that rationalizes expert demonstrations. Unfortunately, traditional IRL methods suffer from a computational weakness: they require repeatedly solving a hard reinforcement learning (RL) problem as a subroutine. This is counter-intuitive from the viewpoint of reductions: we have reduced the easier problem of imitation learning to repeatedly solving the harder problem of RL. Another thread of work has proved that access to the side-information of the distribution of states where a strong policy spends time can dramatically reduce the sample and computational complexities of solving an RL problem. In this work, we demonstrate for the first time a more informed imitation learning reduction where we utilize the state distribution of the expert to alleviate the global exploration component of the RL subroutine, providing an exponential speedup in theory. In practice, we find that we are able to significantly speed up the prior art on continuous control tasks.

Why do thinking language models like DeepSeek R1 outperform their base counterparts? Despite consistent performance gains, it remains unclear to what extent thinking models learn entirely new reasoning capabilities or repurpose pre-existing base model ones. In this work, we propose a hybrid model where we activate reasoning mechanisms in base models at the right time to elicit thinking-model-level reasoning chains, implying that thinking models exploit already existing capabilities. To ground our analysis, we introduce an unsupervised, bottom-up approach for uncovering human-interpretable reasoning behaviors in thinking models. This approach provides an unbiased method to discover reasoning behaviors without imposing manual or LLM-derived assumptions. Across three base and four thinking models, using GSM8K and MATH500, our hybrid model recovers up to 91% of the performance gap to thinking models without any weight updates while steering only 12% of tokens. Concretely, our empirical setup provides a simple, causal way to test the effectiveness of existing reasoning mechanisms in base models by invoking them directly and measuring the resulting task performance. More broadly, these results reframe our understanding of how thinking models are trained: pre-training is when models acquire most of their reasoning mechanisms, and post-training teaches efficient deployment of these mechanisms at the right time, enabling efficient use of their inference-time compute.

Reasoning is a core capability in artificial intelligence systems, for which large language models (LLMs) have recently shown remarkable progress. However, most work focuses exclusively on deductive reasoning, which is problematic since other types of reasoning are also essential in solving real-world problems, and they are less explored. This work focuses on evaluating LLMs' inductive and abductive reasoning capabilities. We introduce a programmable and synthetic dataset, InAbHyD (pronounced in-a-bid), where each reasoning example consists of an incomplete world model and a set of observations. The task for the intelligent agent is to produce hypotheses to explain observations under the incomplete world model to solve each reasoning example. We propose a new metric to evaluate the quality of hypotheses based on Occam's Razor. We evaluate and analyze some state-of-the-art LLMs. Our analysis shows that LLMs can perform inductive and abductive reasoning in simple scenarios, but struggle with complex world models and producing high-quality hypotheses, even with popular reasoning-enhancing techniques such as in-context learning and RLVR.

Language models can store vast amounts of factual knowledge, but their ability to use this knowledge for logical reasoning remains questionable. This paper explores a language model's ability to manipulate its stored knowledge during inference. We focus on four manipulation types: retrieval (e.g., "What is person A's attribute X"), classification (e.g., "Is A's attribute X even or odd?"), comparison (e.g., "Is A greater than B in attribute X?") and inverse search (e.g., "Which person's attribute X equals T?") We observe that pre-trained language models like GPT2/3/4 excel in knowledge retrieval but struggle with simple classification or comparison tasks unless Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) are employed during both training and inference. They also perform poorly in inverse knowledge search, irrespective of the prompts. Our primary contribution is a synthetic dataset for a controlled experiment that confirms these inherent weaknesses: a language model cannot efficiently manipulate knowledge from pre-training data, even when such knowledge is perfectly stored and fully extractable in the models, and despite adequate instruct fine-tuning.

Logical reasoning is central to complex human activities, such as thinking, debating, and planning; it is also a central component of many AI systems as well. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which encoder-only transformer language models (LMs) can reason according to logical rules. We ask whether those LMs can deduce theorems in propositional calculus and first-order logic; if their relative success in these problems reflects general logical capabilities; and which layers contribute the most to the task. First, we show for several encoder-only LMs that they can be trained, to a reasonable degree, to determine logical validity on various datasets. Next, by cross-probing fine-tuned models on these datasets, we show that LMs have difficulty in transferring their putative logical reasoning ability, which suggests that they may have learned dataset-specific features, instead of a general capability. Finally, we conduct a layerwise probing experiment, which shows that the hypothesis classification task is mostly solved through higher layers.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures within Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive reasoning capabilities by selectively activating experts to facilitate structured cognitive processes. Despite notable advances, existing reasoning models often suffer from cognitive inefficiencies like overthinking and underthinking. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel inference-time steering methodology called Reinforcing Cognitive Experts (RICE), designed to improve reasoning performance without additional training or complex heuristics. Leveraging normalized Pointwise Mutual Information (nPMI), we systematically identify specialized experts, termed ''cognitive experts'' that orchestrate meta-level reasoning operations characterized by tokens like ''<think>''. Empirical evaluations with leading MoE-based LRMs (DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3-235B) on rigorous quantitative and scientific reasoning benchmarks demonstrate noticeable and consistent improvements in reasoning accuracy, cognitive efficiency, and cross-domain generalization. Crucially, our lightweight approach substantially outperforms prevalent reasoning-steering techniques, such as prompt design and decoding constraints, while preserving the model's general instruction-following skills. These results highlight reinforcing cognitive experts as a promising, practical, and interpretable direction to enhance cognitive efficiency within advanced reasoning models.

The ability to derive underlying principles from a handful of observations and then generalize to novel situations -- known as inductive reasoning -- is central to human intelligence. Prior work suggests that language models (LMs) often fall short on inductive reasoning, despite achieving impressive success on research benchmarks. In this work, we conduct a systematic study of the inductive reasoning capabilities of LMs through iterative hypothesis refinement, a technique that more closely mirrors the human inductive process than standard input-output prompting. Iterative hypothesis refinement employs a three-step process: proposing, selecting, and refining hypotheses in the form of textual rules. By examining the intermediate rules, we observe that LMs are phenomenal hypothesis proposers (i.e., generating candidate rules), and when coupled with a (task-specific) symbolic interpreter that is able to systematically filter the proposed set of rules, this hybrid approach achieves strong results across inductive reasoning benchmarks that require inducing causal relations, language-like instructions, and symbolic concepts. However, they also behave as puzzling inductive reasoners, showing notable performance gaps between rule induction (i.e., identifying plausible rules) and rule application (i.e., applying proposed rules to instances), suggesting that LMs are proposing hypotheses without being able to actually apply the rules. Through empirical and human analyses, we further reveal several discrepancies between the inductive reasoning processes of LMs and humans, shedding light on both the potentials and limitations of using LMs in inductive reasoning tasks.

Reasoning is a fundamental cognitive process that enables logical inference, problem-solving, and decision-making. With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), reasoning has emerged as a key capability that distinguishes advanced AI systems from conventional models that empower chatbots. In this survey, we categorize existing methods along two orthogonal dimensions: (1) Regimes, which define the stage at which reasoning is achieved (either at inference time or through dedicated training); and (2) Architectures, which determine the components involved in the reasoning process, distinguishing between standalone LLMs and agentic compound systems that incorporate external tools, and multi-agent collaborations. Within each dimension, we analyze two key perspectives: (1) Input level, which focuses on techniques that construct high-quality prompts that the LLM condition on; and (2) Output level, which methods that refine multiple sampled candidates to enhance reasoning quality. This categorization provides a systematic understanding of the evolving landscape of LLM reasoning, highlighting emerging trends such as the shift from inference-scaling to learning-to-reason (e.g., DeepSeek-R1), and the transition to agentic workflows (e.g., OpenAI Deep Research, Manus Agent). Additionally, we cover a broad spectrum of learning algorithms, from supervised fine-tuning to reinforcement learning such as PPO and GRPO, and the training of reasoners and verifiers. We also examine key designs of agentic workflows, from established patterns like generator-evaluator and LLM debate to recent innovations. ...

Transferring reasoning capabilities from larger language models to smaller ones through supervised fine-tuning often fails counterintuitively, with performance degrading despite access to high-quality teacher demonstrations. We identify that this failure stems from distributional misalignment: reasoning traces from larger models contain tokens that are low probability under the student's distribution, exceeding the internal representation capacity of smaller architectures and creating learning barriers rather than helpful guidance. We propose Reverse Speculative Decoding (RSD), a mechanism for generating student-friendly reasoning traces in which the teacher model proposes candidate tokens but the student model determines acceptance based on its own probability distributions, filtering low probability tokens. When applied to Qwen3-0.6B, direct distillation of s1K-1.1 reasoning trace data degrades average performance across major reasoning benchmarks by 20.5\%, while the same model trained on RSD-generated reasoning traces achieves meaningful improvements of 4.9\%. Our analysis reveals that low probability tokens constitute the critical bottleneck in reasoning ability transfer. However, cross-model experiments demonstrate that RSD traces are model-specific rather than universally applicable, indicating that distributional alignment must be tailored for each student architecture's unique internal representation.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Recent developments, particularly OpenAI's O1 model, have demonstrated the remarkable potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) for complex reasoning tasks. Through analysis of O1's outputs and provided sample Chain-of-Thought (CoT) demonstrations, we observe that it approaches problem-solving in a distinctly human-like manner, systematically brainstorming ideas, testing hypotheses, verifying results, and planning comprehensive solutions. These sophisticated reasoning capabilities remain notably absent in other state-of-the-art language models. In this paper, we hypothesize that this performance gap stems from the limited availability of high-quality reasoning process data in current training sets. We demonstrate that by constructing a specialized dataset focused on explicit problem-solving workflows ("worked solutions"), we can elicit substantially improved planning capabilities from existing models. Additionally, we propose the Reasoning Enhancement Loop (REL), a method for generating synthetic worked solutions.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) denotes a powerful family of algorithms for recovering a reward function justifying the behavior demonstrated by an expert agent. A well-known limitation of IRL is the ambiguity in the choice of the reward function, due to the existence of multiple rewards that explain the observed behavior. This limitation has been recently circumvented by formulating IRL as the problem of estimating the feasible reward set, i.e., the region of the rewards compatible with the expert's behavior. In this paper, we make a step towards closing the theory gap of IRL in the case of finite-horizon problems with a generative model. We start by formally introducing the problem of estimating the feasible reward set, the corresponding PAC requirement, and discussing the properties of particular classes of rewards. Then, we provide the first minimax lower bound on the sample complexity for the problem of estimating the feasible reward set of order {Omega}Bigl( H^3SA{epsilon^2} bigl( log bigl(1{delta}bigl) + S bigl)Bigl), being S and A the number of states and actions respectively, H the horizon, epsilon the desired accuracy, and delta the confidence. We analyze the sample complexity of a uniform sampling strategy (US-IRL), proving a matching upper bound up to logarithmic factors. Finally, we outline several open questions in IRL and propose future research directions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in handling complex reasoning tasks through step-by-step rationale generation. However, recent studies have raised concerns regarding the hallucination and flaws in their reasoning process. Substantial efforts are being made to improve the reliability and faithfulness of the generated rationales. Some approaches model reasoning as planning, while others focus on annotating for process supervision. Nevertheless, the planning-based search process often results in high latency due to the frequent assessment of intermediate reasoning states and the extensive exploration space. Additionally, supervising the reasoning process with human annotation is costly and challenging to scale for LLM training. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose a framework to learn planning-based reasoning through direct preference optimization (DPO) on collected trajectories, which are ranked according to synthesized process rewards. Our results on challenging logical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our learning framework, showing that our 7B model can surpass the strong counterparts like GPT-3.5-Turbo.

The emergent few-shot reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have excited the natural language and machine learning community over recent years. Despite of numerous successful applications, the underlying mechanism of such in-context capabilities still remains unclear. In this work, we hypothesize that the learned semantics of language tokens do the most heavy lifting during the reasoning process. Different from human's symbolic reasoning process, the semantic representations of LLMs could create strong connections among tokens, thus composing a superficial logical chain. To test our hypothesis, we decouple semantics from the language reasoning process and evaluate three kinds of reasoning abilities, i.e., deduction, induction and abduction. Our findings reveal that semantics play a vital role in LLMs' in-context reasoning -- LLMs perform significantly better when semantics are consistent with commonsense but struggle to solve symbolic or counter-commonsense reasoning tasks by leveraging in-context new knowledge. The surprising observations question whether modern LLMs have mastered the inductive, deductive and abductive reasoning abilities as in human intelligence, and motivate research on unveiling the magic existing within the black-box LLMs. On the whole, our analysis provides a novel perspective on the role of semantics in developing and evaluating language models' reasoning abilities. Code is available at {https://github.com/XiaojuanTang/ICSR}.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Logical reasoning is a critical benchmark for evaluating the capabilities of large language models (LLMs), as it reflects their ability to derive valid conclusions from given premises. While the combination of test-time scaling with dedicated outcome or process reward models has opened up new avenues to enhance LLMs performance in complex reasoning tasks, this space is under-explored in deductive logical reasoning. We present a set of Outcome Reward Models (ORMs) for deductive reasoning. To train the ORMs we mainly generate data using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) with single and multiple samples. Additionally, we propose a novel tactic to further expand the type of errors covered in the training dataset of the ORM. In particular, we propose an echo generation technique that leverages LLMs' tendency to reflect incorrect assumptions made in prompts to extract additional training data, covering previously unexplored error types. While a standard CoT chain may contain errors likely to be made by the reasoner, the echo strategy deliberately steers the model toward incorrect reasoning. We show that ORMs trained on CoT and echo-augmented data demonstrate improved performance on the FOLIO, JustLogic, and ProverQA datasets across four different LLMs.

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

Mathematical reasoning---a core ability within human intelligence---presents some unique challenges as a domain: we do not come to understand and solve mathematical problems primarily on the back of experience and evidence, but on the basis of inferring, learning, and exploiting laws, axioms, and symbol manipulation rules. In this paper, we present a new challenge for the evaluation (and eventually the design) of neural architectures and similar system, developing a task suite of mathematics problems involving sequential questions and answers in a free-form textual input/output format. The structured nature of the mathematics domain, covering arithmetic, algebra, probability and calculus, enables the construction of training and test splits designed to clearly illuminate the capabilities and failure-modes of different architectures, as well as evaluate their ability to compose and relate knowledge and learned processes. Having described the data generation process and its potential future expansions, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of models from two broad classes of the most powerful sequence-to-sequence architectures and find notable differences in their ability to resolve mathematical problems and generalize their knowledge.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities in familiar contexts, but struggle when the context conflicts with their parametric knowledge. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce CounterLogic, a dataset containing 1,800 examples across 9 logical schemas, explicitly designed to evaluate logical reasoning through counterfactual (hypothetical knowledge-conflicting) scenarios. Our systematic evaluation of 11 LLMs across 6 different datasets reveals a consistent performance degradation, with accuracies dropping by 27% on average when reasoning through counterfactual information. We propose Self-Segregate, a prompting method enabling metacognitive awareness (explicitly identifying knowledge conflicts) before reasoning. Our method dramatically narrows the average performance gaps from 27% to just 11%, while significantly increasing the overall accuracy (+7.5%). We discuss the implications of these findings and draw parallels to human cognitive processes, particularly on how humans disambiguate conflicting information during reasoning tasks. Our findings offer practical insights for understanding and enhancing LLMs reasoning capabilities in real-world applications, especially where models must logically reason independently of their factual knowledge.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has proven effective in aligning large language models with human intentions, yet it often relies on complex methodologies like Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) that require extensive hyper-parameter tuning and present challenges in sample efficiency and stability. In this paper, we introduce Inverse-Q*, an innovative framework that transcends traditional RL methods by optimizing token-level reinforcement learning without the need for additional reward or value models. Inverse-Q* leverages direct preference optimization techniques but extends them by estimating the conditionally optimal policy directly from the model's responses, facilitating more granular and flexible policy shaping. Our approach reduces reliance on human annotation and external supervision, making it especially suitable for low-resource settings. We present extensive experimental results demonstrating that Inverse-Q* not only matches but potentially exceeds the effectiveness of PPO in terms of convergence speed and the alignment of model responses with human preferences. Our findings suggest that Inverse-Q* offers a practical and robust alternative to conventional RLHF approaches, paving the way for more efficient and adaptable model training approaches.

Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's o1 have demonstrated remarkable abilities in complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute and exhibiting human-like deep thinking. However, we identify a phenomenon we term underthinking, where o1-like LLMs frequently switch between different reasoning thoughts without sufficiently exploring promising paths to reach a correct solution. This behavior leads to inadequate depth of reasoning and decreased performance, particularly on challenging mathematical problems. To systematically analyze this issue, we conduct experiments on three challenging test sets and two representative open-source o1-like models, revealing that frequent thought switching correlates with incorrect responses. We introduce a novel metric to quantify underthinking by measuring token efficiency in incorrect answers. To address underthinking, we propose a decoding strategy with thought switching penalty TIP that discourages premature transitions between thoughts, encouraging deeper exploration of each reasoning path. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves accuracy across challenging datasets without requiring model fine-tuning. Our findings contribute to understanding reasoning inefficiencies in o1-like LLMs and offer a practical solution to enhance their problem-solving capabilities.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

We explore whether Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of logical reasoning with distorted facts, which we call Deduction under Perturbed Evidence (DUPE). DUPE presents a unique challenge to LLMs since they typically rely on their parameters, which encode mostly accurate information, to reason and make inferences. However, in DUPE, LLMs must reason over manipulated or falsified evidence present in their prompts, which can result in false conclusions that are valid only under the manipulated evidence. Our goal with DUPE is to determine whether LLMs can arrive at these false conclusions and identify whether the dominant factor influencing the deduction process is the encoded data in the parameters or the manipulated evidence in the prompts. To evaluate the DUPE capabilities of LLMs, we create a DUPEd version of the StrategyQA dataset, where facts are manipulated to reverse the answer to the question. Our findings show that even the most advanced GPT models struggle to reason on manipulated facts - showcasing poor DUPE skills - with accuracy dropping by 45% compared to the original dataset. We also investigate prompt settings inspired from student simulation models, which mitigate the accuracy drop to some extent. Our findings have practical implications for understanding the performance of LLMs in real-world applications such as student simulation models that involve reasoning over inaccurate information.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced language models' capabilities in complex problem-solving by emulating human-like deliberative thinking. However, these models often exhibit overthinking (i.e., the generation of unnecessarily verbose and redundant content), which hinders efficiency and inflates inference cost. In this work, we explore the representational and behavioral origins of this inefficiency, revealing that LRMs inherently possess the capacity for more concise reasoning. Empirical analyses show that correct reasoning paths vary significantly in length, and the shortest correct responses often suffice, indicating untapped efficiency potential. Exploiting these findings, we propose two lightweight methods to enhance LRM efficiency. First, we introduce Efficiency Steering, a training-free activation steering technique that modulates reasoning behavior via a single direction in the model's representation space. Second, we develop Self-Rewarded Efficiency RL, a reinforcement learning framework that dynamically balances task accuracy and brevity by rewarding concise correct solutions. Extensive experiments on seven LRM backbones across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly reduce reasoning length while preserving or improving task performance. Our results highlight that reasoning efficiency can be improved by leveraging and guiding the intrinsic capabilities of existing models in a self-guided manner.

Recent studies on transformer-based language models show that they can answer questions by reasoning over knowledge provided as part of the context (i.e., in-context reasoning). However, since the available knowledge is often not filtered for a particular question, in-context reasoning can be sensitive to distractor facts, additional content that is irrelevant to a question but that may be relevant for a different question (i.e., not necessarily random noise). In these situations, the model fails to distinguish the knowledge that is necessary to answer the question, leading to spurious reasoning and degraded performance. This reasoning failure contrasts with the model's apparent ability to distinguish its contextual knowledge from all the knowledge it has memorized during pre-training. Following this observation, we propose teaching the model to reason more robustly by folding the provided contextual knowledge into the model's parameters before presenting it with a question. Our method, RECKONING, is a bi-level learning algorithm that teaches language models to reason by updating their parametric knowledge through back-propagation, allowing them to then answer questions using the updated parameters. During training, the inner loop rapidly adapts a copy of the model weights to encode contextual knowledge into its parameters. In the outer loop, the model learns to use the updated weights to reproduce and answer reasoning questions about the memorized knowledge. Our experiments on two multi-hop reasoning datasets show that RECKONING's performance improves over the in-context reasoning baseline (by up to 4.5%). We also find that compared to in-context reasoning, RECKONING generalizes better to longer reasoning chains unseen during training, is more robust to distractors in the context, and is more computationally efficient when multiple questions are asked about the same knowledge.

In this paper, we investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) actively recall or retrieve their internal repositories of factual knowledge when faced with reasoning tasks. Through an analysis of LLMs' internal factual recall at each reasoning step via Knowledge Neurons, we reveal that LLMs fail to harness the critical factual associations under certain circumstances. Instead, they tend to opt for alternative, shortcut-like pathways to answer reasoning questions. By manually manipulating the recall process of parametric knowledge in LLMs, we demonstrate that enhancing this recall process directly improves reasoning performance whereas suppressing it leads to notable degradation. Furthermore, we assess the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a powerful technique for addressing complex reasoning tasks. Our findings indicate that CoT can intensify the recall of factual knowledge by encouraging LLMs to engage in orderly and reliable reasoning. Furthermore, we explored how contextual conflicts affect the retrieval of facts during the reasoning process to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factual recall behaviors of LLMs. Code and data will be available soon.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

While interpretability research has shed light on some internal algorithms utilized by transformer-based LLMs, reasoning in natural language, with its deep contextuality and ambiguity, defies easy categorization. As a result, formulating clear and motivating questions for circuit analysis that rely on well-defined in-domain and out-of-domain examples required for causal interventions is challenging. Although significant work has investigated circuits for specific tasks, such as indirect object identification (IOI), deciphering natural language reasoning through circuits remains difficult due to its inherent complexity. In this work, we take initial steps to characterize causal reasoning in LLMs by analyzing clear-cut cause-and-effect sentences like "I opened an umbrella because it started raining," where causal interventions may be possible through carefully crafted scenarios using GPT-2 small. Our findings indicate that causal syntax is localized within the first 2-3 layers, while certain heads in later layers exhibit heightened sensitivity to nonsensical variations of causal sentences. This suggests that models may infer reasoning by (1) detecting syntactic cues and (2) isolating distinct heads in the final layers that focus on semantic relationships.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs exhibit a basic generalization failure known as the Reversal Curse, where they struggle to learn reversible factual associations. Understanding why this occurs could help identify weaknesses in current models and advance their generalization and robustness. In this paper, we conjecture that the Reversal Curse in LLMs is a manifestation of the long-standing binding problem in cognitive science, neuroscience and AI. Specifically, we identify two primary causes of the Reversal Curse stemming from transformers' limitations in conceptual binding: the inconsistency and entanglements of concept representations. We perform a series of experiments that support these conjectures. Our exploration leads to a model design based on JEPA (Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture) that for the first time breaks the Reversal Curse without side-stepping it with specialized data augmentation or non-causal masking, and moreover, generalization could be further improved by incorporating special memory layers that support disentangled concept representations. We demonstrate that the skill of reversal unlocks a new kind of memory integration that enables models to solve large-scale arithmetic reasoning problems via parametric forward-chaining, outperforming frontier LLMs based on non-parametric memory and prolonged explicit reasoning.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

Recent advances leverage post-training to enhance model reasoning performance, which typically requires costly training pipelines and still suffers from inefficient, overly lengthy outputs. We introduce Speculative Thinking, a training-free framework that enables large reasoning models to guide smaller ones during inference at the reasoning level, distinct from speculative decoding, which operates at the token level. Our approach is based on two observations: (1) reasoning-supportive tokens such as "wait" frequently appear after structural delimiters like "\n\n", serving as signals for reflection or continuation; and (2) larger models exhibit stronger control over reflective behavior, reducing unnecessary backtracking while improving reasoning quality. By strategically delegating reflective steps to a more capable model, our method significantly boosts the reasoning accuracy of reasoning models while shortening their output. With the assistance of the 32B reasoning model, the 1.5B model's accuracy on MATH500 increases from 83.2% to 89.4%, marking a substantial improvement of 6.2%. Simultaneously, the average output length is reduced from 5439 tokens to 4583 tokens, representing a 15.7% decrease. Moreover, when applied to a non-reasoning model (Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct), our framework boosts its accuracy from 74.0% to 81.8% on the same benchmark, achieving a relative improvement of 7.8%.

Inductive reasoning is a core component of human intelligence. In the past research of inductive reasoning within computer science, formal language is used as representations of knowledge (facts and rules, more specifically). However, formal language can cause systematic problems for inductive reasoning such as disability of handling raw input such as natural language, sensitiveness to mislabeled data, and incapacity to handle ambiguous input. To this end, we propose a new paradigm (task) for inductive reasoning, which is to induce natural language rules from natural language facts, and create a dataset termed DEER containing 1.2k rule-fact pairs for the task, where rules and facts are written in natural language. New automatic metrics are also proposed and analysed for the evaluation of this task. With DEER, we investigate a modern approach for inductive reasoning where we use natural language as representation for knowledge instead of formal language and use pretrained language models as ''reasoners''. Moreover, we provide the first and comprehensive analysis of how well pretrained language models can induce natural language rules from natural language facts. We also propose a new framework drawing insights from philosophy literature for this task, which we show in the experiment section that surpasses baselines in both automatic and human evaluations. We discuss about our future perspectives for inductive reasoning in Section 7. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/ZonglinY/Inductive_Reasoning.

Counterfactual reasoning is widely recognized as one of the most challenging and intricate aspects of causality in artificial intelligence. In this paper, we evaluate the performance of large language models (LLMs) in counterfactual reasoning. In contrast to previous studies that primarily focus on commonsense causal reasoning, where LLMs often rely on prior knowledge for inference, we specifically assess their ability to perform counterfactual inference using a set of formal rules. To support this evaluation, we introduce a new benchmark dataset, CounterBench, comprising 1K counterfactual reasoning questions. The dataset is designed with varying levels of difficulty, diverse causal graph structures, distinct types of counterfactual questions, and multiple nonsensical name variants. Our experiments demonstrate that counterfactual reasoning poses a significant challenge for LLMs, with most models performing at levels comparable to random guessing. To enhance LLM's counterfactual reasoning ability, we propose a novel reasoning paradigm, CoIn, which guides LLMs through iterative reasoning and backtracking to systematically explore counterfactual solutions. Experimental results show that our method significantly improves LLM performance on counterfactual reasoning tasks and consistently enhances performance across different LLMs.Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/CounterBench/CounterBench.

In this paper, we propose R^3: Learning Reasoning through Reverse Curriculum Reinforcement Learning (RL), a novel method that employs only outcome supervision to achieve the benefits of process supervision for large language models. The core challenge in applying RL to complex reasoning is to identify a sequence of actions that result in positive rewards and provide appropriate supervision for optimization. Outcome supervision provides sparse rewards for final results without identifying error locations, whereas process supervision offers step-wise rewards but requires extensive manual annotation. R^3 overcomes these limitations by learning from correct demonstrations. Specifically, R^3 progressively slides the start state of reasoning from a demonstration's end to its beginning, facilitating easier model exploration at all stages. Thus, R^3 establishes a step-wise curriculum, allowing outcome supervision to offer step-level signals and precisely pinpoint errors. Using Llama2-7B, our method surpasses RL baseline on eight reasoning tasks by 4.1 points on average. Notebaly, in program-based reasoning on GSM8K, it exceeds the baseline by 4.2 points across three backbone models, and without any extra data, Codellama-7B + R^3 performs comparable to larger models or closed-source models.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success, yet they often suffer from producing unnecessary and verbose reasoning chains. We identify a core aspect of this issue as "invalid thinking" -- models tend to repeatedly double-check their work after having derived the correct answer. To address this specific inefficiency, we move beyond the general principles of Efficacy and Efficiency to propose two new, fine-grained principles: Brevity, which advocates for eliminating redundancy, and Sufficiency, which ensures critical reasoning steps are preserved. Guided by these principles, we introduce LC-R1, a post-training method based on Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). LC-R1 employs a novel combination of a Length Reward for overall conciseness and a Compress Reward that is specifically designed to remove the invalid portion of the thinking process. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that LC-R1 achieves a significant reduction in sequence length (~50%) with only a marginal (~2%) drop in accuracy, achieving a favorable trade-off point on the Pareto frontier that prioritizes high compression. Our analysis further validates the robustness of LC-R1 and provides valuable insights for developing more powerful yet computationally efficient LRMs. Our code is released at https://github.com/zxiangx/LC-R1.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Reasoning models enhance performance by tackling problems in a step-by-step manner, decomposing them into sub-problems and exploring long chains of thought before producing an answer. However, applying extended reasoning to every step introduces substantial redundancy, as sub-problems vary widely in difficulty and complexity: a small number of pivotal steps are genuinely challenging and decisive for the final answer, while many others only involve straightforward revisions or simple computations. Therefore, a natural idea is to endow reasoning models with the ability to adaptively respond to this variation, rather than treating all steps with the same level of elaboration. To this end, we propose MixReasoning, a framework that dynamically adjusts the depth of reasoning within a single response. The resulting chain of thought then becomes a mixture of detailed reasoning on difficult steps and concise inference on simpler ones. Experiments on GSM8K, MATH-500, and AIME show that MixReasoning shortens reasoning length and substantially improves efficiency without compromising accuracy.

Reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence that plays a crucial role in activities such as problem solving, decision making, and critical thinking. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in natural language processing, and there is observation that these models may exhibit reasoning abilities when they are sufficiently large. However, it is not yet clear to what extent LLMs are capable of reasoning. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on reasoning in LLMs, including techniques for improving and eliciting reasoning in these models, methods and benchmarks for evaluating reasoning abilities, findings and implications of previous research in this field, and suggestions on future directions. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful discussion and future work.

Learning from mistakes is a fundamental feature of human intelligence. Previous work has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can also learn from incorrect answers when provided with a comprehensive rationale detailing why an answer is wrong or how to correct it. In this work, we examine whether LLMs can learn from mistakes in mathematical reasoning tasks when these explanations are not provided. We investigate if LLMs are able to implicitly infer such rationales simply from observing both incorrect and correct answers. Surprisingly, we find that LLMs perform better, on average, when rationales are eliminated from the context and incorrect answers are simply shown alongside correct ones. This approach also substantially outperforms chain-of-thought prompting in our evaluations. We show that these results are consistent across LLMs of different sizes and varying reasoning abilities. Further, we carry out an in-depth analysis, and show that prompting with both wrong and correct answers leads to greater performance and better generalisation than introducing additional, more diverse question-answer pairs into the context. Finally, we show that new rationales generated by models that have only observed incorrect and correct answers are scored equally as highly by humans as those produced with the aid of exemplar rationales. Our results demonstrate that LLMs are indeed capable of in-context implicit learning.

Beginning with McCarthy's Advice Taker (1959), AI has pursued the goal of providing a system with explicit, general knowledge and having the system reason over that knowledge. However, expressing the knowledge in a formal (logical or probabilistic) representation has been a major obstacle to this research. This paper investigates a modern approach to this problem where the facts and rules are provided as natural language sentences, thus bypassing a formal representation. We train transformers to reason (or emulate reasoning) over these sentences using synthetically generated data. Our models, that we call RuleTakers, provide the first empirical demonstration that this kind of soft reasoning over language is learnable, can achieve high (99%) accuracy, and generalizes to test data requiring substantially deeper chaining than seen during training (95%+ scores). We also demonstrate that the models transfer well to two hand-authored rulebases, and to rulebases paraphrased into more natural language. These findings are significant as it suggests a new role for transformers, namely as limited "soft theorem provers" operating over explicit theories in language. This in turn suggests new possibilities for explainability, correctability, and counterfactual reasoning in question-answering.

Inductive reasoning is a core problem-solving capacity: humans can identify underlying principles from a few examples, which can then be robustly generalized to novel scenarios. Recent work has evaluated large language models (LLMs) on inductive reasoning tasks by directly prompting them yielding "in context learning." This can work well for straightforward inductive tasks, but performs very poorly on more complex tasks such as the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC). In this work, we propose to improve the inductive reasoning ability of LLMs by generating explicit hypotheses at multiple levels of abstraction: we prompt the LLM to propose multiple abstract hypotheses about the problem, in natural language, then implement the natural language hypotheses as concrete Python programs. These programs can be directly verified by running on the observed examples and generalized to novel inputs. Because of the prohibitive cost of generation with state-of-the-art LLMs, we consider a middle step to filter the set of hypotheses that will be implemented into programs: we either ask the LLM to summarize into a smaller set of hypotheses, or ask human annotators to select a subset of the hypotheses. We verify our pipeline's effectiveness on the ARC visual inductive reasoning benchmark, its variant 1D-ARC, and string transformation dataset SyGuS. On a random 40-problem subset of ARC, our automated pipeline using LLM summaries achieves 27.5% accuracy, significantly outperforming the direct prompting baseline (accuracy of 12.5%). With the minimal human input of selecting from LLM-generated candidates, the performance is boosted to 37.5%. (And we argue this is a lower bound on the performance of our approach without filtering.) Our ablation studies show that abstract hypothesis generation and concrete program representations are both beneficial for LLMs to perform inductive reasoning tasks.

Abductive reasoning is inference to the most plausible explanation. For example, if Jenny finds her house in a mess when she returns from work, and remembers that she left a window open, she can hypothesize that a thief broke into her house and caused the mess, as the most plausible explanation. While abduction has long been considered to be at the core of how people interpret and read between the lines in natural language (Hobbs et al., 1988), there has been relatively little research in support of abductive natural language inference and generation. We present the first study that investigates the viability of language-based abductive reasoning. We introduce a challenge dataset, ART, that consists of over 20k commonsense narrative contexts and 200k explanations. Based on this dataset, we conceptualize two new tasks -- (i) Abductive NLI: a multiple-choice question answering task for choosing the more likely explanation, and (ii) Abductive NLG: a conditional generation task for explaining given observations in natural language. On Abductive NLI, the best model achieves 68.9% accuracy, well below human performance of 91.4%. On Abductive NLG, the current best language generators struggle even more, as they lack reasoning capabilities that are trivial for humans. Our analysis leads to new insights into the types of reasoning that deep pre-trained language models fail to perform--despite their strong performance on the related but more narrowly defined task of entailment NLI--pointing to interesting avenues for future research.

Achieving human-level intelligence requires refining the transition from the fast, intuitive System 1 to the slower, more deliberate System 2 reasoning. While System 1 excels in quick, heuristic decisions, System 2 relies on logical reasoning for more accurate judgments and reduced biases. Foundational Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at fast decision-making but lack the depth for complex reasoning, as they have not yet fully embraced the step-by-step analysis characteristic of true System 2 thinking. Recently, reasoning LLMs like OpenAI's o1/o3 and DeepSeek's R1 have demonstrated expert-level performance in fields such as mathematics and coding, closely mimicking the deliberate reasoning of System 2 and showcasing human-like cognitive abilities. This survey begins with a brief overview of the progress in foundational LLMs and the early development of System 2 technologies, exploring how their combination has paved the way for reasoning LLMs. Next, we discuss how to construct reasoning LLMs, analyzing their features, the core methods enabling advanced reasoning, and the evolution of various reasoning LLMs. Additionally, we provide an overview of reasoning benchmarks, offering an in-depth comparison of the performance of representative reasoning LLMs. Finally, we explore promising directions for advancing reasoning LLMs and maintain a real-time https://github.com/zzli2022/Awesome-Slow-Reason-System{GitHub Repository} to track the latest developments. We hope this survey will serve as a valuable resource to inspire innovation and drive progress in this rapidly evolving field.

Reasoning, as an essential ability for complex problem-solving, can provide back-end support for various real-world applications, such as medical diagnosis, negotiation, etc. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of cutting-edge research on reasoning with language model prompting. We introduce research works with comparisons and summaries and provide systematic resources to help beginners. We also discuss the potential reasons for emerging such reasoning abilities and highlight future research directions. Resources are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/Prompt4ReasoningPapers (updated periodically).

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities given chain-of-thought prompts (examples with intermediate reasoning steps). Existing benchmarks measure reasoning ability indirectly, by evaluating accuracy on downstream tasks such as mathematical reasoning. However, it is unclear how these models obtain the answers and whether they rely on simple heuristics rather than the generated chain-of-thought. To enable systematic exploration of the reasoning ability of LLMs, we present a new synthetic question-answering dataset called PrOntoQA, where each example is generated from a synthetic world model represented in first-order logic. This allows us to parse the generated chain-of-thought into symbolic proofs for formal analysis. Our analysis on InstructGPT and GPT-3 shows that LLMs are quite capable of making correct individual deduction steps, and so are generally capable of reasoning, even in fictional contexts. However, they have difficulty with proof planning: When multiple valid deduction steps are available, they are not able to systematically explore the different options.

This paper investigates the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) using 50 newly constructed high-school-level word problems. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on answer correctness, we rigorously analyze both final answers and solution steps to identify reasoning failures. Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models - including Mixtral, Llama, Gemini, GPT-4o, and OpenAI's o1 variants - we find that while newer models (e.g., o3-mini, deepseek-r1) achieve higher accuracy, all models exhibit errors in spatial reasoning, strategic planning, and arithmetic, sometimes producing correct answers through flawed logic. Common failure modes include unwarranted assumptions, over-reliance on numerical patterns, and difficulty translating physical intuition into mathematical steps. Manual analysis reveals that models struggle with problems requiring multi-step deduction or real-world knowledge, despite possessing broad mathematical knowledge. Our results underscore the importance of evaluating reasoning processes, not just answers, and caution against overestimating LLMs' problem-solving proficiency. The study highlights persistent gaps in LLMs' generalization abilities, emphasizing the need for targeted improvements in structured reasoning and constraint handling.

Language technologies that accurately model the dynamics of events must perform commonsense reasoning. Existing work evaluating commonsense reasoning focuses on making inferences about common, everyday situations. To instead investigate the ability to model unusual, unexpected, and unlikely situations, we explore the task of uncommonsense abductive reasoning. Given a piece of context with an unexpected outcome, this task requires reasoning abductively to generate a natural language explanation that makes the unexpected outcome more likely in the context. To this end, we curate and release a new English language corpus called UNcommonsense. We characterize the differences between the performance of human explainers and the best performing large language models, finding that model-enhanced human-written explanations achieve the highest quality by trading off between specificity and diversity. Finally, we experiment with several online imitation learning algorithms to train open and accessible language models on this task. When compared with the vanilla supervised fine-tuning approach, these methods consistently reduce lose rates on both common and uncommonsense abductive reasoning judged by human evaluators.

Mathematical reasoning has long represented one of the most fundamental and challenging frontiers in artificial intelligence research. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant advances in this area. This survey examines the development of mathematical reasoning abilities in LLMs through two high-level cognitive phases: comprehension, where models gain mathematical understanding via diverse pretraining strategies, and answer generation, which has progressed from direct prediction to step-by-step Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. We review methods for enhancing mathematical reasoning, ranging from training-free prompting to fine-tuning approaches such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, and discuss recent work on extended CoT and "test-time scaling". Despite notable progress, fundamental challenges remain in terms of capacity, efficiency, and generalization. To address these issues, we highlight promising research directions, including advanced pretraining and knowledge augmentation techniques, formal reasoning frameworks, and meta-generalization through principled learning paradigms. This survey tries to provide some insights for researchers interested in enhancing reasoning capabilities of LLMs and for those seeking to apply these techniques to other domains.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have resulted in increasingly anthropomorphic language concerning the ability of LLMs to reason. Whether reasoning in LLMs should be understood to be inherently different is, however, widely debated. We propose utilizing a representation engineering approach wherein model activations are read from the residual stream of an LLM when processing a reasoning task. The activations are used to derive a control vector that is applied to the model as an inference-time intervention, modulating the representational space of the model, to improve performance on the specified task. We publish the code for deriving control vectors and analyzing model representations. The method allows us to improve performance on reasoning benchmarks and assess how control vectors influence the final logit distribution of a model via metrics such as KL divergence and entropy. We apply control vectors to Mistral-7B-Instruct and a range of Pythia models on an inductive, a deductive and mathematical reasoning task. We show that an LLM can, to a certain degree, be controlled to improve its perceived reasoning ability by modulating activations. The intervention is dependent upon the ability to reliably extract the model's typical state when correctly solving a task. Our results suggest that reasoning performance can be modulated in the same manner as other information-processing tasks performed by LLMs and demonstrate that we are capable of improving performance on specific tasks via a simple intervention on the residual stream with no additional training.

While recent success of large reasoning models (LRMs) significantly advanced LLMs' reasoning capability by optimizing the final answer accuracy using reinforcement learning, they may also drastically increase the output length due to overthinking, characterized by unnecessarily complex reasoning paths that waste computation and potentially degrade the performance. We hypothesize that such inefficiencies stem from LRMs' limited capability to dynamically select the proper modular reasoning strategies, termed thinking patterns at the right position. To investigate this hypothesis, we propose a dynamic optimization framework that segments model-generated reasoning paths into distinct thinking patterns, systematically identifying and promoting beneficial patterns that improve the answer while removing detrimental ones. Empirical analysis confirms that our optimized thinking paths yield more concise yet sufficiently informative trajectories, enhancing reasoning efficiency by reducing attention FLOPs by up to 47% while maintaining accuracy for originally correct responses. Moreover, a non-trivial portion of originally incorrect responses are transformed into correct ones, achieving a 15.6% accuracy improvement with reduced length. Motivated by the improvement brought by the optimized thinking paths, we apply a preference optimization technique supported by a pairwise dataset contrasting suboptimal and optimal reasoning paths. Experimental evaluations across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks reveal that our method notably reduces computational overhead while simultaneously improving reasoning accuracy, achieving up to a 12% accuracy improvement and reducing token usage from approximately 5,000 to 3,000 tokens.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve strong performance on diverse tasks but often exhibit cognitive inertia, struggling to follow instructions that conflict with the standardized patterns learned during supervised fine-tuning (SFT). To evaluate this limitation, we propose Inverse IFEval, a benchmark that measures models Counter-intuitive Abilitytheir capacity to override training-induced biases and comply with adversarial instructions. Inverse IFEval introduces eight types of such challenges, including Question Correction, Intentional Textual Flaws, Code without Comments, and Counterfactual Answering. Using a human-in-the-loop pipeline, we construct a dataset of 1012 high-quality Chinese and English questions across 23 domains, evaluated under an optimized LLM-as-a-Judge framework. Experiments on existing leading LLMs demonstrate the necessity of our proposed Inverse IFEval benchmark. Our findings emphasize that future alignment efforts should not only pursue fluency and factual correctness but also account for adaptability under unconventional contexts. We hope that Inverse IFEval serves as both a diagnostic tool and a foundation for developing methods that mitigate cognitive inertia, reduce overfitting to narrow patterns, and ultimately enhance the instruction-following reliability of LLMs in diverse and unpredictable real-world scenarios.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in multi-step reasoning tasks. However, alongside these successes, a more deceptive form of model error has emerged--Reasoning Hallucination--where logically coherent but factually incorrect reasoning traces lead to persuasive yet faulty conclusions. Unlike traditional hallucinations, these errors are embedded within structured reasoning, making them more difficult to detect and potentially more harmful. In this work, we investigate reasoning hallucinations from a mechanistic perspective. We propose the Reasoning Score, which quantifies the depth of reasoning by measuring the divergence between logits obtained from projecting late layers of LRMs to the vocabulary space, effectively distinguishing shallow pattern-matching from genuine deep reasoning. Using this score, we conduct an in-depth analysis on the ReTruthQA dataset and identify two key reasoning hallucination patterns: early-stage fluctuation in reasoning depth and incorrect backtracking to flawed prior steps. These insights motivate our Reasoning Hallucination Detection (RHD) framework, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple domains. To mitigate reasoning hallucinations, we further introduce GRPO-R, an enhanced reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates step-level deep reasoning rewards via potential-based shaping. Our theoretical analysis establishes stronger generalization guarantees, and experiments demonstrate improved reasoning quality and reduced hallucination rates.

Logical reasoning is fundamental for humans yet presents a substantial challenge in the domain of Artificial Intelligence. Initially, researchers used Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR) systems that did not scale and required non trivial manual effort. Recently, the emergence of large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated the ability to overcome various limitations of formal Knowledge Representation (KR) systems. Consequently, there is a growing interest in using LLMs for logical reasoning via natural language. This work strives to understand the proficiency of LLMs in logical reasoning by offering a brief review of the latest progress in this area; with a focus on the logical reasoning datasets, tasks, and the methods adopted to utilize LLMs for reasoning. To offer a thorough analysis, we have compiled a benchmark titled LogiGLUE. This includes 24 varied datasets encompassing deductive, abductive, and inductive reasoning. We have standardized these datasets into Seq2Seq tasks to facilitate straightforward training and evaluation for future research. Utilizing LogiGLUE as a foundation, we have trained an instruction fine tuned language model, resulting in LogiT5. We study single task training, multi task training, and a chain of thought knowledge distillation fine tuning technique to assess the performance of model across the different logical reasoning categories. By this comprehensive process, we aim to shed light on the capabilities and potential pathways for enhancing logical reasoning proficiency in LLMs, paving the way for more advanced and nuanced developments in this critical field.

Reasoning presents a significant and challenging issue for Large Language Models (LLMs). The predominant focus of research has revolved around developing diverse prompting strategies to guide and structure the reasoning processes of LLMs. However, these approaches based on decoder-only causal language models often operate the input question in a single forward pass, potentially missing the rich, back-and-forth interactions inherent in human reasoning. Scant attention has been paid to a critical dimension, i.e., the input question itself embedded within the prompts. In response, we introduce a deceptively simple yet highly effective prompting strategy, termed question "re-reading". Drawing inspiration from human learning and problem-solving, re-reading entails revisiting the question information embedded within input prompts. This approach aligns seamlessly with the cognitive principle of reinforcement, enabling LLMs to extract deeper insights, identify intricate patterns, establish more nuanced connections, and ultimately enhance their reasoning capabilities across various tasks. Experiments conducted on a series of reasoning benchmarks serve to underscore the effectiveness and generality of our method. Moreover, our findings demonstrate that our approach seamlessly integrates with various language models, though-eliciting prompting methods, and ensemble techniques, further underscoring its versatility and compatibility in the realm of LLMs.

Exploiting large language models (LLMs) to tackle deductive reasoning has garnered growing attention. It still remains highly challenging to achieve satisfactory results in complex deductive problems, characterized by plenty of premises (i.e., facts or rules) entailing intricate relationships among entities and requiring multi-hop reasoning. One intuitive solution is to decompose the original task into smaller sub-tasks, and then chain the multiple casual reasoning steps together in a forward (e.g., Selection-Inference) or backward (e.g., LAMBADA) direction. However, these techniques inevitably necessitate a large number of overall stages, leading to computationally expensive operations and a higher possibility of making misleading steps. In addition to stage-by-stage decomposition, we draw inspiration from another aspect of human problem-solving. Humans tend to distill the most relevant information and organize their thoughts systematically (e.g., creating mind maps), which assists them in answering questions or drawing conclusions precisely and quickly. In light of this, we propose a novel reasoning approach named Concise and Organized Perception (COP). COP carefully analyzes the given statements to efficiently identify the most pertinent information while eliminating redundancy. It then prompts the LLMs in a more organized form that adapts to the model's inference process. By perceiving concise and organized proofs, the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs can be better elicited, and the risk of acquiring errors caused by excessive reasoning stages is mitigated. Furthermore, our approach can be combined with the aforementioned ones to further boost their performance. Extensive experimental results on three popular deductive benchmarks (i.e., ProofWriter, PrOntoQA and PrOntoQA-OOD) show that COP significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable improvements in reasoning and many existing benchmarks have been addressed by models such as o1 and o3 either fully or partially. However, a majority of these benchmarks emphasize deductive reasoning, including mathematical and coding tasks in which rules such as mathematical axioms or programming syntax are clearly defined, based on which LLMs can plan and apply these rules to arrive at a solution. In contrast, inductive reasoning, where one infers the underlying rules from observed data, remains less explored. Such inductive processes lie at the heart of scientific discovery, as they enable researchers to extract general principles from empirical observations. To assess whether LLMs possess this capacity, we introduce InductionBench, a new benchmark designed to evaluate the inductive reasoning ability of LLMs. Our experimental findings reveal that even the most advanced models available struggle to master the simplest complexity classes within the subregular hierarchy of functions, highlighting a notable deficiency in current LLMs' inductive reasoning capabilities. Coda and data are available https://github.com/Wenyueh/inductive_reasoning_benchmark.

Recent large language models have shown promising capabilities in long-form reasoning, following structured chains of thought before arriving at a final answer. However, we observe that these reasoning paths tend to include substantial redundancy; analyzing attention patterns reveals that attention scores are widely scattered, particularly incorrect answers exhibit greater attention sparsity. In this paper, we demonstrate that deliberately removing this redundancy in the reasoning process significantly improves performance through clear thinking, i.e., removing distraction. Specifically, we systematically identify reasoning redundancy by measuring token-level attention scores to a special end-of-thinking token, which is appended to an explicit instruction inserted to conclude each intermediate reasoning step. Furthermore, we propose structure-aware pruning that prioritizes removing tokens in low-contributing reasoning chunks over individual tokens. After evicting redundant tokens, we remove the injected end-of-thinking instruction, then resume the reasoning generation. We demonstrate that our method significantly improves overall accuracy across reasoning-intensive benchmarks without any training involved. In particular, our method shows strong performance on challenging mathematical competition benchmarks such as AIME and AMC, where reasoning redundancy is more prevalent.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) can do complex reasoning via long chain-of-thought (CoT) involving cognitive strategies such as backtracking and self-correction. Recent studies suggest that some models inherently possess these long reasoning abilities, which may be unlocked via extra training. Our work first investigates whether we can elicit such behavior without any training. To this end, we propose a decoding-time approach, ThinkLogit, which utilizes logits arithmetic (Liu et al., 2024) to tune a target large LM for long reasoning using a substantially smaller model as guider. We then show that we can further boost performance by training the guider model with preference optimization over correct/incorrect reasoning pairs sampled from both the target and guider model -- a setup we refer to as ThinkLogit-DPO. Our experiments demonstrate that ThinkLogit and ThinkLogit-DPO achieve a relative improvement in pass@1 by 26% and 29%, respectively, over four mathematical datasets using the Qwen2.5-32B when guided by R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B -- a model 21x smaller. Lastly, we show that ThinkLogit can transfer long reasoning skills acquired through reinforcement learning, improving pass@1 by 13% relative compared to the Qwen2.5-32B base model. Our work presents a computationally-efficient method to elicit long reasoning in large models with minimal or no additional training.

Reasoning models have demonstrated remarkable progress in solving complex and logic-intensive tasks by generating extended Chain-of-Thoughts (CoTs) prior to arriving at a final answer. Yet, the emergence of this "slow-thinking" paradigm, with numerous tokens generated in sequence, inevitably introduces substantial computational overhead. To this end, it highlights an urgent need for effective acceleration. This survey aims to provide a comprehensive overview of recent advances in efficient reasoning. It categorizes existing works into three key directions: (1) shorter - compressing lengthy CoTs into concise yet effective reasoning chains; (2) smaller - developing compact language models with strong reasoning capabilities through techniques such as knowledge distillation, other model compression techniques, and reinforcement learning; and (3) faster - designing efficient decoding strategies to accelerate inference. A curated collection of papers discussed in this survey is available in our GitHub repository.

We introduce Phi-4-reasoning, a 14-billion parameter reasoning model that achieves strong performance on complex reasoning tasks. Trained via supervised fine-tuning of Phi-4 on carefully curated set of "teachable" prompts-selected for the right level of complexity and diversity-and reasoning demonstrations generated using o3-mini, Phi-4-reasoning generates detailed reasoning chains that effectively leverage inference-time compute. We further develop Phi-4-reasoning-plus, a variant enhanced through a short phase of outcome-based reinforcement learning that offers higher performance by generating longer reasoning traces. Across a wide range of reasoning tasks, both models outperform significantly larger open-weight models such as DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-70B model and approach the performance levels of full DeepSeek-R1 model. Our comprehensive evaluations span benchmarks in math and scientific reasoning, coding, algorithmic problem solving, planning, and spatial understanding. Interestingly, we observe a non-trivial transfer of improvements to general-purpose benchmarks as well. In this report, we provide insights into our training data, our training methodologies, and our evaluations. We show that the benefit of careful data curation for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) extends to reasoning language models, and can be further amplified by reinforcement learning (RL). Finally, our evaluation points to opportunities for improving how we assess the performance and robustness of reasoning models.

Logical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence and an essential capability for multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Despite the significant advancement in multimodal reasoning, existing benchmarks fail to comprehensively evaluate their reasoning abilities due to the lack of explicit categorization for logical reasoning types and an unclear understanding of reasoning. To address these issues, we introduce MME-Reasoning, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning ability of MLLMs, which covers all three types of reasoning (i.e., inductive, deductive, and abductive) in its questions. We carefully curate the data to ensure that each question effectively evaluates reasoning ability rather than perceptual skills or knowledge breadth, and extend the evaluation protocols to cover the evaluation of diverse questions. Our evaluation reveals substantial limitations of state-of-the-art MLLMs when subjected to holistic assessments of logical reasoning capabilities. Even the most advanced MLLMs show limited performance in comprehensive logical reasoning, with notable performance imbalances across reasoning types. In addition, we conducted an in-depth analysis of approaches such as ``thinking mode'' and Rule-based RL, which are commonly believed to enhance reasoning abilities. These findings highlight the critical limitations and performance imbalances of current MLLMs in diverse logical reasoning scenarios, providing comprehensive and systematic insights into the understanding and evaluation of reasoning capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have succeeded remarkably in various natural language processing (NLP) tasks, yet their reasoning capabilities remain a fundamental challenge. While LLMs exhibit impressive fluency and factual recall, their ability to perform complex reasoning-spanning logical deduction, mathematical problem-solving, commonsense inference, and multi-step reasoning-often falls short of human expectations. This survey provides a comprehensive review of emerging techniques enhancing reasoning in LLMs. We categorize existing methods into key approaches, including prompting strategies (e.g., Chain-of-Thought reasoning, Self-Consistency, and Tree-of-Thought reasoning), architectural innovations (e.g., retrieval-augmented models, modular reasoning networks, and neuro-symbolic integration), and learning paradigms (e.g., fine-tuning with reasoning-specific datasets, reinforcement learning, and self-supervised reasoning objectives). Additionally, we explore evaluation frameworks used to assess reasoning in LLMs and highlight open challenges, such as hallucinations, robustness, and reasoning generalization across diverse tasks. By synthesizing recent advancements, this survey aims to provide insights into promising directions for future research and practical applications of reasoning-augmented LLMs.

Reasoning requires going beyond pattern matching or memorization of solutions to identify and implement "algorithmic procedures" that can be used to deduce answers to hard problems. Doing so requires realizing the most relevant primitives, intermediate results, or shared procedures, and building upon them. While RL post-training on long chains of thought ultimately aims to uncover this kind of algorithmic behavior, most reasoning traces learned by large models fail to consistently capture or reuse procedures, instead drifting into verbose and degenerate exploration. To address more effective reasoning, we introduce reasoning abstractions: concise natural language descriptions of procedural and factual knowledge that guide the model toward learning successful reasoning. We train models to be capable of proposing multiple abstractions given a problem, followed by RL that incentivizes building a solution while using the information provided by these abstractions. This results in a two-player RL training paradigm, abbreviated as RLAD, that jointly trains an abstraction generator and a solution generator. This setup effectively enables structured exploration, decouples learning signals of abstraction proposal and solution generation, and improves generalization to harder problems. We also show that allocating more test-time compute to generating abstractions is more beneficial for performance than generating more solutions at large test budgets, illustrating the role of abstractions in guiding meaningful exploration.

Reasoning quality in large language models depends not only on producing correct answers but also on generating valid intermediate steps. We study this through multiple-choice question answering (MCQA), which provides a controlled setting with fixed answer options. Our analysis shows that when questions are effectively unsolvable for a model, spurious chains of thought (CoTs) are more likely to appear, leading to false positives. By estimating the solvability of each question, we uncover an intermediate regime where learning is most effective. Building on this insight, we adapt outcome-supervised reward models and reinforcement learning with group-relative advantage to incorporate solvability into their objectives. Across experiments on math and multimodal datasets, these modifications consistently yield higher rates of process-correct reasoning and, in reinforcement learning, improved answer accuracy as well. Our results highlight solvability as a key factor for reducing hallucinations and increasing reliability in CoT reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to perform better when asked to reason step-by-step before answering a question. However, it is unclear to what degree the model's final answer is faithful to the stated reasoning steps. In this paper, we perform a causal mediation analysis on twelve LLMs to examine how intermediate reasoning steps generated by the LLM influence the final outcome and find that LLMs do not reliably use their intermediate reasoning steps when generating an answer. To address this issue, we introduce FRODO, a framework to tailor small-sized LMs to generate correct reasoning steps and robustly reason over these steps. FRODO consists of an inference module that learns to generate correct reasoning steps using an implicit causal reward function and a reasoning module that learns to faithfully reason over these intermediate inferences using a counterfactual and causal preference objective. Our experiments show that FRODO significantly outperforms four competitive baselines. Furthermore, FRODO improves the robustness and generalization ability of the reasoning LM, yielding higher performance on out-of-distribution test sets. Finally, we find that FRODO's rationales are more faithful to its final answer predictions than standard supervised fine-tuning.

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit strong reasoning abilities, often attributed to few-shot or zero-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. While effective, these methods require labor-intensive prompt engineering, raising the question of whether reasoning can be induced without reliance on explicit prompts. In this work, we unlock the reasoning capabilities of LLMs without explicit prompting. Inspired by zero-shot CoT and CoT-decoding, we propose a novel decoding strategy that systematically nudges LLMs to continue reasoning, thereby preventing immature reasoning processes. Specifically, we monitor the model's generation and inject a designated phrase whenever it is likely to conclude its response prematurely, before completing the reasoning process. Our experimental evaluations on diverse reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our proposed strategy substantially improves LLM reasoning capabilities, highlighting the potential of decoding-based interventions as an alternative to traditional prompting techniques.

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

Recent advances in model distillation demonstrate that data from advanced reasoning models (e.g., DeepSeek-R1, OpenAI's o1) can effectively transfer complex reasoning abilities to smaller, efficient student models. However, standard practices employ rejection sampling, discarding incorrect reasoning examples -- valuable, yet often underutilized data. This paper addresses the critical question: How can both positive and negative distilled reasoning traces be effectively leveraged to maximize LLM reasoning performance in an offline setting? To this end, We propose Reinforcement Distillation (REDI), a two-stage framework. Stage 1 learns from positive traces via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). Stage 2 further refines the model using both positive and negative traces through our proposed REDI objective. This novel objective is a simple, reference-free loss function that outperforms established methods like DPO and SimPO in this distillation context. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate REDI's superiority over baseline Rejection Sampling SFT or SFT combined with DPO/SimPO on mathematical reasoning tasks. Notably, the Qwen-REDI-1.5B model, post-trained on just 131k positive and negative examples from the open Open-R1 dataset, achieves an 83.1% score on MATH-500 (pass@1). Its performance matches or surpasses that of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B (a model post-trained on 800k proprietary data) across various mathematical reasoning benchmarks, establishing a new state-of-the-art for 1.5B models post-trained offline with openly available data.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to infer an agent's preferences (represented as a reward function R) from their behaviour (represented as a policy pi). To do this, we need a behavioural model of how pi relates to R. In the current literature, the most common behavioural models are optimality, Boltzmann-rationality, and causal entropy maximisation. However, the true relationship between a human's preferences and their behaviour is much more complex than any of these behavioural models. This means that the behavioural models are misspecified, which raises the concern that they may lead to systematic errors if applied to real data. In this paper, we analyse how sensitive the IRL problem is to misspecification of the behavioural model. Specifically, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions that completely characterise how the observed data may differ from the assumed behavioural model without incurring an error above a given threshold. In addition to this, we also characterise the conditions under which a behavioural model is robust to small perturbations of the observed policy, and we analyse how robust many behavioural models are to misspecification of their parameter values (such as e.g.\ the discount rate). Our analysis suggests that the IRL problem is highly sensitive to misspecification, in the sense that very mild misspecification can lead to very large errors in the inferred reward function.

Transformers demonstrate impressive performance on a range of reasoning benchmarks. To evaluate the degree to which these abilities are a result of actual reasoning, existing work has focused on developing sophisticated benchmarks for behavioral studies. However, these studies do not provide insights into the internal mechanisms driving the observed capabilities. To improve our understanding of the internal mechanisms of transformers, we present a comprehensive mechanistic analysis of a transformer trained on a synthetic reasoning task. We identify a set of interpretable mechanisms the model uses to solve the task, and validate our findings using correlational and causal evidence. Our results suggest that it implements a depth-bounded recurrent mechanisms that operates in parallel and stores intermediate results in selected token positions. We anticipate that the motifs we identified in our synthetic setting can provide valuable insights into the broader operating principles of transformers and thus provide a basis for understanding more complex models.

Analytical reasoning is an essential and challenging task that requires a system to analyze a scenario involving a set of particular circumstances and perform reasoning over it to make conclusions. In this paper, we study the challenge of analytical reasoning of text and introduce a new dataset consisting of questions from the Law School Admission Test from 1991 to 2016. We analyze what knowledge understanding and reasoning abilities are required to do well on this task. Furthermore, to address this reasoning challenge, we design two different baselines: (1) a Transformer-based method which leverages the state-of-the-art pre-trained language models and (2) Analytical Reasoning Machine (ARM), a logical-level reasoning framework extracting symbolic knowledge (e.g, participants, facts, logical functions) to deduce legitimate solutions. In our experiments, we find that the Transformer-based models struggle to solve this task as their performance is close to random guess and ARM achieves better performance by leveraging symbolic knowledge and interpretable reasoning steps. Results show that both methods still lag far behind human performance, which leave further space for future research.

Given the intractably large size of the space of proofs, any model that is capable of general deductive reasoning must generalize to proofs of greater complexity. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) possess some abstract deductive reasoning ability given chain-of-thought prompts. However, they have primarily been tested on proofs using modus ponens or of a specific size, and from the same distribution as the in-context examples. To measure the general deductive reasoning ability of LLMs, we test on a broad set of deduction rules and measure their ability to generalize to more complex proofs from simpler demonstrations from multiple angles: depth-, width-, and compositional generalization. To facilitate systematic exploration, we construct a new synthetic and programmable reasoning dataset that enables control over deduction rules and proof complexity. Our experiments on four LLMs of various sizes and training objectives show that they are able to generalize to longer and compositional proofs. However, they require explicit demonstrations to produce hypothetical subproofs, specifically in proof by cases and proof by contradiction.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve remarkable performance via long reasoning chains, but often incur excessive computational overhead due to redundant reasoning, especially on simple tasks. In this work, we systematically quantify the upper bounds of LRMs under both Long-Thinking and No-Thinking modes, and uncover the phenomenon of "Internal Self-Recovery Mechanism" where models implicitly supplement reasoning during answer generation. Building on this insight, we propose Adaptive Self-Recovery Reasoning (ASRR), a framework that suppresses unnecessary reasoning and enables implicit recovery. By introducing accuracy-aware length reward regulation, ASRR adaptively allocates reasoning effort according to problem difficulty, achieving high efficiency with negligible performance sacrifice. Experiments across multiple benchmarks and models show that, compared with GRPO, ASRR reduces reasoning budget by up to 32.5% (1.5B) and 25.7% (7B) with minimal accuracy loss (1.2% and 0.6% pass@1), and significantly boosts harmless rates on safety benchmarks (up to +21.7%). Our results highlight the potential of ASRR for enabling efficient, adaptive, and safer reasoning in LRMs.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Large Language Models have demonstrated strong performance on many established reasoning benchmarks. However, these benchmarks primarily evaluate structured skills like quantitative problem-solving, leaving a gap in assessing flexible, multifaceted reasoning abilities that are central to human intelligence. These abilities require integrating logical deduction with spatial awareness and constraint satisfaction, which current evaluations do not measure well. To address this, we introduce RiddleBench, a benchmark of 1,737 challenging puzzles in English designed to probe these core reasoning capabilities. Evaluation of state-of-the-art models on RiddleBench shows fundamental weaknesses. Even top proprietary models like Gemini 2.5 Pro, o3, and Claude 4 Sonnet achieve accuracy just above 60% (60.30%, 63.37%, and 63.16%). Analysis further reveals deep failures, including hallucination cascades (accepting flawed reasoning from other models) and poor self-correction due to a strong self-confirmation bias. Their reasoning is also fragile, with performance degrading significantly when constraints are reordered or irrelevant information is introduced. RiddleBench functions as a diagnostic tool for these issues and as a resource for guiding the development of more robust and reliable language models.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable reasoning capabilities in tasks such as algorithmic coding and mathematical problem-solving. Recent methods have improved reasoning through expanded corpus and multistage training combining reinforcement learning and supervised fine-tuning. Although some methods suggest that small but targeted dataset can incentivize reasoning via only distillation, a reasoning scaling laws is still taking shape, increasing computational costs. To address this, we propose a data-efficient distillation framework (DED) that optimizes the Pareto frontier of reasoning distillation. Inspired by the on-policy learning and diverse roll-out strategies of reinforcement learning, the key idea of our approach is threefold: (1) We identify that benchmark scores alone do not determine an effective teacher model. Through comprehensive comparisons of leading reasoning LLMs, we develop a method to select an optimal teacher model. (2) While scaling distillation can enhance reasoning, it often degrades out-of-domain performance. A carefully curated, smaller corpus achieves a balanced trade-off between in-domain and out-of-domain capabilities. (3) Diverse reasoning trajectories encourage the student model to develop robust reasoning skills. We validate our method through evaluations on mathematical reasoning (AIME 2024/2025, MATH-500) and code generation (LiveCodeBench), achieving state-of-the-art results with only 0.8k carefully curated examples, bypassing the need for extensive scaling. Our systematic analysis demonstrates that DED outperforms existing methods by considering factors beyond superficial hardness, token length, or teacher model capability. This work offers a practical and efficient pathway to advanced reasoning while preserving general capabilities.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Recent advancements in large language models have showcased their remarkable generalizability across various domains. However, their reasoning abilities still have significant room for improvement, especially when confronted with scenarios requiring multi-step reasoning. Although large language models possess extensive knowledge, their behavior, particularly in terms of reasoning, often fails to effectively utilize this knowledge to establish a coherent thinking paradigm. Generative language models sometimes show hallucinations as their reasoning procedures are unconstrained by logical principles. Aiming to improve the zero-shot chain-of-thought reasoning ability of large language models, we propose Logical Chain-of-Thought (LogiCoT), a neurosymbolic framework that leverages principles from symbolic logic to verify and revise the reasoning processes accordingly. Experimental evaluations conducted on language tasks in diverse domains, including arithmetic, commonsense, symbolic, causal inference, and social problems, demonstrate the efficacy of the enhanced reasoning paradigm by logic.

Conducting contamination-free evaluation of mathematical capabilities can be difficult for two reasons: models may memorize a test set once it is made public, and current mathematical benchmarks are prone to overfitting due to having limited diversity of symbols and rules, coupled with closed-ended answers. This paper proposes a method to leverage these shortcomings as useful features to a construct dynamic, counterfactual benchmark, which can be used to both reveal overfitting and measure true reasoning. We demonstrate this via MatheMagic, which generates math test instances with the interpretations of numbers and operators altered, yet has automatically verifiable answers. Test instances are randomly seeded and constructed at test time to evaluate a model's induction or deduction capability, offering stability, extensibility, comparability, and robustness to overfitting. Our experiments find that models solve deduction more easily than induction, but they revert to standard math. Further analysis reveals that math-adapted models fail to exhibit a general "skill" of reasoning, and fine-tuning on induction tasks generalizes poorly.

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (LLMs) explicitly generate intermediate reasoning steps prior to generating final answers, helping the model excel in complex problem-solving. In this paper, we demonstrate that this emerging generation framework offers a unique opportunity for more fine-grained control over model behavior. We propose Thinking Intervention, a novel paradigm designed to explicitly guide the internal reasoning processes of LLMs by strategically inserting or revising specific thinking tokens. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across multiple tasks, including instruction following on IFEval, instruction hierarchy on SEP, and safety alignment on XSTest and SORRY-Bench. Our results demonstrate that Thinking Intervention significantly outperforms baseline prompting approaches, achieving up to 6.7% accuracy gains in instruction-following scenarios, 15.4% improvements in reasoning about instruction hierarchies, and a 40.0% increase in refusal rates for unsafe prompts using open-source DeepSeek R1 models. Overall, our work opens a promising new research avenue for controlling reasoning LLMs.

Logical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence and a key component of tasks like problem-solving and decision-making. Recent advancements have enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) to potentially exhibit reasoning capabilities, but complex logical reasoning remains a challenge. The state-of-the-art, solver-augmented language models, use LLMs to parse natural language logical questions into symbolic representations first and then adopt external logical solvers to take in the symbolic representations and output the answers. Despite their impressive performance, any parsing errors will inevitably result in the failure of the execution of the external logical solver and no answer to the logical questions. In this paper, we introduce LoGiPT, a novel language model that directly emulates the reasoning processes of logical solvers and bypasses the parsing errors by learning to strict adherence to solver syntax and grammar. LoGiPT is fine-tuned on a newly constructed instruction-tuning dataset derived from revealing and refining the invisible reasoning process of deductive solvers. Experimental results on two public deductive reasoning datasets demonstrate that LoGiPT outperforms state-of-the-art solver-augmented LMs and few-shot prompting methods on competitive LLMs like ChatGPT or GPT-4.

Frontier reasoning models have exhibited incredible capabilities across a wide array of disciplines, driven by posttraining large language models (LLMs) with reinforcement learning (RL). However, despite the widespread success of this paradigm, much of the literature has been devoted to disentangling truly novel behaviors that emerge during RL but are not present in the base models. In our work, we approach this question from a different angle, instead asking whether comparable reasoning capabilites can be elicited from base models at inference time by pure sampling, without any additional training. Inspired by Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques for sampling from sharpened distributions, we propose a simple iterative sampling algorithm leveraging the base models' own likelihoods. Over different base models, we show that our algorithm offers substantial boosts in reasoning that nearly match and even outperform those from RL on a wide variety of single-shot tasks, including MATH500, HumanEval, and GPQA. Moreover, our sampler avoids the collapse in diversity over multiple samples that is characteristic of RL-posttraining. Crucially, our method does not require training, curated datasets, or a verifier, suggesting broad applicability beyond easily verifiable domains.

We present a fundamental discovery that challenges our understanding of how complex reasoning emerges in large language models. While conventional wisdom suggests that sophisticated reasoning tasks demand extensive training data (>100,000 examples), we demonstrate that complex mathematical reasoning abilities can be effectively elicited with surprisingly few examples. Through comprehensive experiments, our proposed model LIMO demonstrates unprecedented performance in mathematical reasoning. With merely 817 curated training samples, LIMO achieves 57.1% accuracy on AIME and 94.8% on MATH, improving from previous SFT-based models' 6.5% and 59.2% respectively, while only using 1% of the training data required by previous approaches. LIMO demonstrates exceptional out-of-distribution generalization, achieving 40.5% absolute improvement across 10 diverse benchmarks, outperforming models trained on 100x more data, challenging the notion that SFT leads to memorization rather than generalization. Based on these results, we propose the Less-Is-More Reasoning Hypothesis (LIMO Hypothesis): In foundation models where domain knowledge has been comprehensively encoded during pre-training, sophisticated reasoning capabilities can emerge through minimal but precisely orchestrated demonstrations of cognitive processes. This hypothesis posits that the elicitation threshold for complex reasoning is determined by two key factors: (1) the completeness of the model's encoded knowledge foundation during pre-training, and (2) the effectiveness of post-training examples as "cognitive templates" that show the model how to utilize its knowledge base to solve complex reasoning tasks. To facilitate reproducibility and future research in data-efficient reasoning, we release LIMO as a comprehensive open-source suite at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/LIMO.

Although counterfactual reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligence, the lack of large-scale counterfactual open-domain question-answering (QA) benchmarks makes it difficult to evaluate and improve models on this ability. To address this void, we introduce the first such dataset, named IfQA, where each question is based on a counterfactual presupposition via an "if" clause. For example, if Los Angeles was on the east coast of the U.S., what would be the time difference between Los Angeles and Paris? Such questions require models to go beyond retrieving direct factual knowledge from the Web: they must identify the right information to retrieve and reason about an imagined situation that may even go against the facts built into their parameters. The IfQA dataset contains over 3,800 questions that were annotated annotated by crowdworkers on relevant Wikipedia passages. Empirical analysis reveals that the IfQA dataset is highly challenging for existing open-domain QA methods, including supervised retrieve-then-read pipeline methods (EM score 36.2), as well as recent few-shot approaches such as chain-of-thought prompting with GPT-3 (EM score 27.4). The unique challenges posed by the IfQA benchmark will push open-domain QA research on both retrieval and counterfactual reasoning fronts.

Large reasoning models exhibit remarkable reasoning capabilities via long, elaborate reasoning trajectories. Supervised fine-tuning on such reasoning traces, also known as distillation, can be a cost-effective way to boost reasoning capabilities of student models. However, empirical observations reveal that these reasoning trajectories are often suboptimal, switching excessively between different lines of thought, resulting in under-thinking, over-thinking, and even degenerate responses. We introduce Retro-Search, an MCTS-inspired search algorithm, for distilling higher quality reasoning paths from large reasoning models. Retro-Search retrospectively revises reasoning paths to discover better, yet shorter traces, which can then lead to student models with enhanced reasoning capabilities with shorter, thus faster inference. Our approach can enable two use cases: self-improvement, where models are fine-tuned on their own Retro-Search-ed thought traces, and weak-to-strong improvement, where a weaker model revises stronger model's thought traces via Retro-Search. For self-improving, R1-distill-7B, fine-tuned on its own Retro-Search-ed traces, reduces the average reasoning length by 31.2% while improving performance by 7.7% across seven math benchmarks. For weak-to-strong improvement, we retrospectively revise R1-671B's traces from the OpenThoughts dataset using R1-distill-32B as the Retro-Search-er, a model 20x smaller. Qwen2.5-32B, fine-tuned on this refined data, achieves performance comparable to R1-distill-32B, yielding an 11.3% reduction in reasoning length and a 2.4% performance improvement compared to fine-tuning on the original OpenThoughts data. Our work counters recently emergent viewpoints that question the relevance of search algorithms in the era of large reasoning models, by demonstrating that there are still opportunities for algorithmic advancements, even for frontier models.

Deductive reasoning is a crucial logical capability that assists us in solving complex problems based on existing knowledge. Although augmented by Chain-of-Thought prompts, Large Language Models (LLMs) might not follow the correct reasoning paths. Enhancing the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs, and leveraging their extensive built-in knowledge for various reasoning tasks, remains an open question. Attempting to mimic the human deductive reasoning paradigm, we propose a multi-stage Syllogistic-Reasoning Framework of Thought (SR-FoT) that enables LLMs to perform syllogistic deductive reasoning to handle complex knowledge-based reasoning tasks. Our SR-FoT begins by interpreting the question and then uses the interpretation and the original question to propose a suitable major premise. It proceeds by generating and answering minor premise questions in two stages to match the minor premises. Finally, it guides LLMs to use the previously generated major and minor premises to perform syllogistic deductive reasoning to derive the answer to the original question. Extensive and thorough experiments on knowledge-based reasoning tasks have demonstrated the effectiveness and advantages of our SR-FoT.

Recent advances in large language models have been driven by reinforcement learning (RL)-style post-training, which improves reasoning by optimizing model outputs based on reward or preference signals. GRPO-style approaches implement this by using self-generated samples labeled by an outcome-based verifier. However, these methods depend heavily on the model's initial ability to produce positive samples. They primarily refine what the model already knows (distribution sharpening) rather than enabling the model to solve problems where it initially fails. This limitation is especially problematic in early-stage RL training and on challenging reasoning tasks, where positive samples are unlikely to be generated. To unlock reasoning ability in such settings, the model must explore new reasoning trajectories beyond its current output distribution. Such exploration requires access to sufficiently good positive samples to guide the learning. While expert demonstrations seem like a natural solution, we find that they are often ineffective in RL post-training. Instead, we identify two key properties of effective positive samples: they should (1) be likely under the current policy, and (2) increase the model's likelihood of predicting the correct answer. Based on these insights, we propose Self-Explanation Policy Optimization (ExPO)-a simple and modular framework that generates such samples by conditioning on the ground-truth answer. ExPO enables efficient exploration and guides the model to produce reasoning trajectories more aligned with its policy than expert-written CoTs, while ensuring higher quality than its own (incorrect) samples. Experiments show that ExPO improves both learning efficiency and final performance on reasoning benchmarks, surpassing expert-demonstration-based methods in challenging settings such as MATH level-5, where the model initially struggles the most.

Logical reasoning consistently plays a fundamental and significant role in the domains of knowledge engineering and artificial intelligence. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a noteworthy innovation in natural language processing (NLP), exhibiting impressive achievements across various classic NLP tasks. However, the question of whether LLMs can effectively address the task of logical reasoning, which requires gradual cognitive inference similar to human intelligence, remains unanswered. To this end, we aim to bridge this gap and provide comprehensive evaluations in this paper. Firstly, to offer systematic evaluations, we select fifteen typical logical reasoning datasets and organize them into deductive, inductive, abductive and mixed-form reasoning settings. Considering the comprehensiveness of evaluations, we include three representative LLMs (i.e., text-davinci-003, ChatGPT and BARD) and evaluate them on all selected datasets under zero-shot, one-shot and three-shot settings. Secondly, different from previous evaluations relying only on simple metrics (e.g., accuracy), we propose fine-level evaluations from objective and subjective manners, covering both answers and explanations. Additionally, to uncover the logical flaws of LLMs, problematic cases will be attributed to five error types from two dimensions, i.e., evidence selection process and reasoning process. Thirdly, to avoid the influences of knowledge bias and purely focus on benchmarking the logical reasoning capability of LLMs, we propose a new dataset with neutral content. It contains 3,000 samples and covers deductive, inductive and abductive settings. Based on the in-depth evaluations, this paper finally forms a general evaluation scheme of logical reasoning capability from six dimensions. It reflects the pros and cons of LLMs and gives guiding directions for future works.

Recent reasoning large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable improvements in mathematical reasoning capabilities through long Chain-of-Thought. The reasoning tokens of these models enable self-correction within reasoning chains, enhancing robustness. This motivates our exploration: how vulnerable are reasoning LLMs to subtle errors in their input reasoning chains? We introduce "Compromising Thought" (CPT), a vulnerability where models presented with reasoning tokens containing manipulated calculation results tend to ignore correct reasoning steps and adopt incorrect results instead. Through systematic evaluation across multiple reasoning LLMs, we design three increasingly explicit prompting methods to measure CPT resistance, revealing that models struggle significantly to identify and correct these manipulations. Notably, contrary to existing research suggesting structural alterations affect model performance more than content modifications, we find that local ending token manipulations have greater impact on reasoning outcomes than structural changes. Moreover, we discover a security vulnerability in DeepSeek-R1 where tampered reasoning tokens can trigger complete reasoning cessation. Our work enhances understanding of reasoning robustness and highlights security considerations for reasoning-intensive applications.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown state-of-the-art performance in a variety of tasks, including arithmetic and reasoning; however, to gauge the intellectual capabilities of LLMs, causal reasoning has become a reliable proxy for validating a general understanding of the mechanics and intricacies of the world similar to humans. Previous works in natural language processing (NLP) have either focused on open-ended causal reasoning via causal commonsense reasoning (CCR) or framed a symbolic representation-based question answering for theoretically backed-up analysis via a causal inference engine. The former adds an advantage of real-world grounding but lacks theoretically backed-up analysis/validation, whereas the latter is far from real-world grounding. In this work, we bridge this gap by proposing the COLD (Causal reasOning in cLosed Daily activities) framework, which is built upon human understanding of daily real-world activities to reason about the causal nature of events. We show that the proposed framework facilitates the creation of enormous causal queries (~ 9 million) and comes close to the mini-turing test, simulating causal reasoning to evaluate the understanding of a daily real-world task. We evaluate multiple LLMs on the created causal queries and find that causal reasoning is challenging even for activities trivial to humans. We further explore (the causal reasoning abilities of LLMs) using the backdoor criterion to determine the causal strength between events.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities, growing evidence suggests much of their success stems from memorized answer-reasoning patterns rather than genuine inference. In this work, we investigate a central question: are LLMs primarily anchored to final answers or to the textual pattern of reasoning chains? We propose a five-level answer-visibility prompt framework that systematically manipulates answer cues and probes model behavior through indirect, behavioral analysis. Experiments across state-of-the-art LLMs reveal a strong and consistent reliance on explicit answers. The performance drops by 26.90\% when answer cues are masked, even with complete reasoning chains. These findings suggest that much of the reasoning exhibited by LLMs may reflect post-hoc rationalization rather than true inference, calling into question their inferential depth. Our study uncovers the answer-anchoring phenomenon with rigorous empirical validation and underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of what constitutes reasoning in LLMs.

We investigate an experiential learning paradigm for acquiring an internal model of intuitive physics. Our model is evaluated on a real-world robotic manipulation task that requires displacing objects to target locations by poking. The robot gathered over 400 hours of experience by executing more than 100K pokes on different objects. We propose a novel approach based on deep neural networks for modeling the dynamics of robot's interactions directly from images, by jointly estimating forward and inverse models of dynamics. The inverse model objective provides supervision to construct informative visual features, which the forward model can then predict and in turn regularize the feature space for the inverse model. The interplay between these two objectives creates useful, accurate models that can then be used for multi-step decision making. This formulation has the additional benefit that it is possible to learn forward models in an abstract feature space and thus alleviate the need of predicting pixels. Our experiments show that this joint modeling approach outperforms alternative methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in natural language processing. Recent advances have led to the developing of a new class of reasoning LLMs; for example, open-source DeepSeek-R1 has achieved state-of-the-art performance by integrating deep thinking and complex reasoning. Despite these impressive capabilities, the internal reasoning mechanisms of such models remain unexplored. In this work, we employ Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), a method to learn a sparse decomposition of latent representations of a neural network into interpretable features, to identify features that drive reasoning in the DeepSeek-R1 series of models. First, we propose an approach to extract candidate ''reasoning features'' from SAE representations. We validate these features through empirical analysis and interpretability methods, demonstrating their direct correlation with the model's reasoning abilities. Crucially, we demonstrate that steering these features systematically enhances reasoning performance, offering the first mechanistic account of reasoning in LLMs. Code available at https://github.com/AIRI-Institute/SAE-Reasoning

Despite their strengths, large language models (LLMs) often fail to communicate their confidence accurately, making it difficult to assess when they might be wrong and limiting their reliability. In this work, we demonstrate that reasoning models-LLMs that engage in extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning-exhibit superior performance not only in problem-solving but also in accurately expressing their confidence. Specifically, we benchmark six reasoning models across six datasets and find that they achieve strictly better confidence calibration than their non-reasoning counterparts in 33 out of the 36 settings. Our detailed analysis reveals that these gains in calibration stem from the slow thinking behaviors of reasoning models-such as exploring alternative approaches and backtracking-which enable them to adjust their confidence dynamically throughout their CoT, making it progressively more accurate. In particular, we find that reasoning models become increasingly better calibrated as their CoT unfolds, a trend not observed in non-reasoning models. Moreover, removing slow thinking behaviors from the CoT leads to a significant drop in calibration. Lastly, we show that these gains are not exclusive to reasoning models-non-reasoning models also benefit when guided to perform slow thinking via in-context learning.

Advanced models such as OpenAI o1 exhibit impressive problem-solving capabilities through step-by-step reasoning. However, they may still falter on more complex problems, making errors that disrupt their reasoning paths. We attribute this to the expansive solution space, where each step has the risk of diverging into mistakes. To enhance language model reasoning, we introduce a specialized training framework called Reasoning Paths Optimization (RPO), which enables learning to reason and explore from diverse paths. Our approach encourages favorable branches at each reasoning step while penalizing unfavorable ones, enhancing the model's overall problem-solving performance. Reasoning Paths Optimization does not rely on large-scale human-annotated rationales or outputs from closed-source models, making it scalable and data-efficient. We focus on multi-step reasoning tasks, such as math word problems and science-based exam questions. The experiments demonstrate that our framework significantly enhances the reasoning performance of large language models, with up to 3.1% and 4.3% improvement on GSM8K and MMLU (STEM) respectively. Our data and code can be found at https://reasoning-paths.github.io.

Numerical reasoning over natural language has been a long-standing goal for the research community. However, cutting-edge language models have proven difficult to reliably generalize to a broad range of numbers, although they have shown proficiency in reasoning over common and simple numbers. In this paper, we propose a novel method to elicit and exploit the numerical reasoning knowledge hidden in pre-trained language models using simple anchor numbers. Concretely, we first leverage simple numbers as anchors to probe the implicitly inferred arithmetic expressions from language models, and then explicitly apply the expressions on complex numbers to get corresponding answers. To inversely elicit arithmetic expressions, we transform and formulate the task as an analytically solvable linear system. Experimental results on several numerical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our approach significantly improves numerical reasoning capabilities of existing LMs. More importantly, our approach is training-free and simply works in the inference phase, making it highly portable and achieving consistent performance benefits across a variety of language models (GPT-3, T5, BART, etc) in all zero-shot, few-shot, and fine-tuning scenarios.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

Intent, typically clearly formulated and planned, functions as a cognitive framework for reasoning and problem-solving. This paper introduces the concept of Speaking with Intent (SWI) in large language models (LLMs), where the explicitly generated intent encapsulates the model's underlying intention and provides high-level planning to guide subsequent analysis and communication. By emulating deliberate and purposeful thoughts in the human mind, SWI is hypothesized to enhance the reasoning capabilities and generation quality of LLMs. Extensive experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks consistently demonstrate the superiority of Speaking with Intent over Baseline (i.e., generation without explicit intent). Moreover, SWI outperforms answer-trigger prompting methods Chain-of-Thought and Plan-and-Solve and maintains competitive performance with the strong method ARR (Analyzing, Retrieving, and Reasoning). Additionally, the effectiveness and generalizability of SWI are solidified on reasoning-intensive question answering (QA) and text summarization benchmarks, where SWI brings consistent improvement to the Baseline generation. In text summarization, SWI-generated summaries exhibit greater accuracy, conciseness, and factual correctness, with fewer hallucinations. Furthermore, human evaluations verify the coherence, effectiveness, and interpretability of the intent produced by SWI. This proof-of-concept study creates a novel avenue for enhancing LLMs' reasoning abilities with cognitive notions.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable problem-solving abilities in mathematics, as evaluated by existing benchmarks exclusively on well-defined problems. However, such evaluation setup constitutes a critical gap, since a genuine intelligent agent should not only solve problems (as a math quiz solver), but also be able~to ask for information when the problems lack sufficient information, enabling proactivity in responding users' requests. To bridge such gap, we proposes a new dataset consisting of two types of incomplete problems with diverse contexts. Based on the dataset, our systematical evaluation of LRMs reveals their inability in proactively asking for information. In addition, we uncover the behaviors related to overthinking and hallucination of LRMs, and highlight the potential and challenges of supervised fine-tuning in learning such ability. We hope to provide new insights in developing LRMs with genuine intelligence, rather than just solving problems.

Logical reasoning remains a challenge for natural language processing, but it can be improved by training language models to mimic theorem provers on procedurally generated problems. Previous work used domain-specific proof generation algorithms, which biases reasoning toward specific proof traces and limits auditability and extensibility. We present a simpler and more general declarative framework with flexible context-sensitive rules binding multiple languages (specifically, simplified English and the TPTP theorem-proving language). We construct first-order logic problems by selecting up to 32 premises and one hypothesis. We demonstrate that using semantic constraints during generation and careful English verbalization of predicates enhances logical reasoning without hurting natural English tasks. We use relatively small DeBERTa-v3 models to achieve state-of-the-art accuracy on the FOLIO human-authored logic dataset, surpassing GPT-4 in accuracy with or without an external solver by 12%.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Knowledge distillation has emerged as an effective strategy for compressing large language models' (LLMs) knowledge into smaller, more efficient student models. However, standard one-shot distillation methods often produce suboptimal results due to a mismatch between teacher-generated rationales and the student's specific learning requirements. In this paper, we introduce the UNDO: UNderstanding Distillation as Optimization framework, designed to bridge this gap by iteratively identifying the student's errors and prompting the teacher to refine its explanations accordingly. Each iteration directly targets the student's learning deficiencies, motivating the teacher to provide tailored and enhanced rationales that specifically address these weaknesses. Empirical evaluations on various challenging mathematical and commonsense reasoning tasks demonstrate that our iterative distillation method, UNDO, significantly outperforms standard one-step distillation methods, achieving performance gains of up to 20%. Additionally, we show that teacher-generated data refined through our iterative process remains effective even when applied to different student models, underscoring the broad applicability of our approach. Our work fundamentally reframes knowledge distillation as an iterative teacher-student interaction, effectively leveraging dynamic refinement by the teacher for better knowledge distillation.

Large language models (LLMs) are capable of answering knowledge-intensive complex questions with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. However, they tend to generate factually incorrect reasoning steps when the required knowledge is not available or up-to-date in models' parameters. Recent works turn to retrieving external knowledge to augment CoT reasoning. Despite being promising, these chain-based methods suffer from: 1) Negative retrieval. Unnecessary or incorrect retrieval may mislead the reasoning; 2) Limited sight. Lacking the ability to look backward or forward, a local error in one step will propagate along the chain. In this paper, we propose a novel approach: Probabilistic Tree-of-thought Reasoning (ProbTree). First, LLMs translate a complex question into a query tree, in which each non-root node denotes a sub-question of its parent node. Then, probabilistic reasoning is conducted over the tree, by solving questions from leaf to root considering the confidence of both question decomposing and answering. During reasoning, for leaf nodes, LLMs choose a more confident answer from Closed-book QA that employs parametric knowledge and Open-book QA that employs retrieved external knowledge, thus eliminating the negative retrieval problem. For non-leaf nodes, with the hierarchical structure, LLMs have broader sights and are able to globally reason with the information from child nodes, thus recovering from local errors. The experiments on three Complex QA datasets under the open-domain setting show that our approach outperforms SOTA methods significantly, demonstrating the effect of probabilistic tree-of-thought reasoning.

Understanding and manipulating the causal generation mechanisms in language models is essential for controlling their behavior. Previous work has primarily relied on techniques such as representation surgery -- e.g., model ablations or manipulation of linear subspaces tied to specific concepts -- to intervene on these models. To understand the impact of interventions precisely, it is useful to examine counterfactuals -- e.g., how a given sentence would have appeared had it been generated by the model following a specific intervention. We highlight that counterfactual reasoning is conceptually distinct from interventions, as articulated in Pearl's causal hierarchy. Based on this observation, we propose a framework for generating true string counterfactuals by reformulating language models as Generalized Structural-equation. Models using the Gumbel-max trick. This allows us to model the joint distribution over original strings and their counterfactuals resulting from the same instantiation of the sampling noise. We develop an algorithm based on hindsight Gumbel sampling that allows us to infer the latent noise variables and generate counterfactuals of observed strings. Our experiments demonstrate that the approach produces meaningful counterfactuals while at the same time showing that commonly used intervention techniques have considerable undesired side effects.

Existing benchmarks for frontier models often test specialized, ``PhD-level'' knowledge that is difficult for non-experts to grasp. In contrast, we present a benchmark based on the NPR Sunday Puzzle Challenge that requires only general knowledge. Our benchmark is challenging for both humans and models, however correct solutions are easy to verify, and models' mistakes are easy to spot. Our work reveals capability gaps that are not evident in existing benchmarks: OpenAI o1 significantly outperforms other reasoning models that are on par on benchmarks that test specialized knowledge. Furthermore, our analysis of reasoning outputs uncovers new kinds of failures. DeepSeek R1, for instance, often concedes with ``I give up'' before providing an answer that it knows is wrong. R1 can also be remarkably ``uncertain'' in its output and in rare cases, it does not ``finish thinking,'' which suggests the need for an inference-time technique to ``wrap up'' before the context window limit is reached. We also quantify the effectiveness of reasoning longer with R1 and Gemini Thinking to identify the point beyond which more reasoning is unlikely to improve accuracy on our benchmark.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

Large language models (LLMs) excel on a variety of reasoning benchmarks, but previous studies suggest they sometimes struggle to generalize to unseen questions, potentially due to over-reliance on memorized training examples. However, the precise conditions under which LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization during text generation remain unclear. In this work, we provide a mechanistic understanding of LLMs' reasoning-memorization dynamics by identifying a set of linear features in the model's residual stream that govern the balance between genuine reasoning and memory recall. These features not only distinguish reasoning tasks from memory-intensive ones but can also be manipulated to causally influence model performance on reasoning tasks. Additionally, we show that intervening in these reasoning features helps the model more accurately activate the most relevant problem-solving capabilities during answer generation. Our findings offer new insights into the underlying mechanisms of reasoning and memory in LLMs and pave the way for the development of more robust and interpretable generative AI systems.

Reasoning models such as OpenAI o3 and DeepSeek-R1 have demonstrated strong performance on reasoning-intensive tasks through extended Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. While longer reasoning traces can facilitate a more thorough exploration of solution paths for complex problems, researchers have observed that these models often "overthink", leading to inefficient inference. In this paper, we introduce ShorterBetter, a simple yet effective reinforcement learning methed that enables reasoning language models to discover their own optimal CoT lengths without human intervention. By sampling multiple outputs per problem and defining the Sample Optimal Length (SOL) as the shortest correct response among all the outputs, our method dynamically guides the model toward optimal inference lengths. Applied to the DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-1.5B model, ShorterBetter achieves up to an 80% reduction in output length on both in-domain and out-of-domain reasoning tasks while maintaining accuracy. Our analysis shows that overly long reasoning traces often reflect loss of reasoning direction, and thus suggests that the extended CoT produced by reasoning models is highly compressible.

Despite the impressive performance of large language models (LLMs), the process of endowing them with new capabilities--such as mathematical reasoning--remains largely empirical and opaque. A critical open question is whether reasoning abilities stem from the entire model, specific modules, or are merely artifacts of overfitting. In this work, we hypothesize that the reasoning capabilities in well-trained LLMs are primarily attributed to the output projection module (oproj) in the Transformer's multi-head self-attention (MHSA) mechanism. To support this hypothesis, we introduce Stethoscope for Networks (SfN), a suite of diagnostic tools designed to probe and analyze the internal behaviors of LLMs. Using SfN, we provide both circumstantial and empirical evidence suggesting that oproj plays a central role in enabling reasoning, whereas other modules contribute more to fluent dialogue. These findings offer a new perspective on LLM interpretability and open avenues for more targeted training strategies, potentially enabling more efficient and specialized LLMs.

Reasoning Language Models, capable of extended chain-of-thought reasoning, have demonstrated remarkable performance on tasks requiring complex logical inference. However, applying elaborate reasoning for all queries often results in substantial computational inefficiencies, particularly when many problems admit straightforward solutions. This motivates an open question: Can LLMs learn when to think? To answer this, we propose Thinkless, a learnable framework that empowers an LLM to adaptively select between short-form and long-form reasoning, based on both task complexity and the model's ability. Thinkless is trained under a reinforcement learning paradigm and employs two control tokens, <short> for concise responses and <think> for detailed reasoning. At the core of our method is a Decoupled Group Relative Policy Optimization (DeGRPO) algorithm, which decomposes the learning objective of hybrid reasoning into two components: (1) a control token loss that governs the selection of the reasoning mode, and (2) a response loss that improves the accuracy of the generated answers. This decoupled formulation enables fine-grained control over the contributions of each objective, stabilizing training and effectively preventing collapse observed in vanilla GRPO. Empirically, on several benchmarks such as Minerva Algebra, MATH-500, and GSM8K, Thinkless is able to reduce the usage of long-chain thinking by 50% - 90%, significantly improving the efficiency of Reasoning Language Models. The code is available at https://github.com/VainF/Thinkless

Reasoning abilities, especially those for solving complex math problems, are crucial components of general intelligence. Recent advances by proprietary companies, such as o-series models of OpenAI, have made remarkable progress on reasoning tasks. However, the complete technical details remain unrevealed, and the techniques that are believed certainly to be adopted are only reinforcement learning (RL) and the long chain of thoughts. This paper proposes a new RL framework, termed OREAL, to pursue the performance limit that can be achieved through Outcome REwArd-based reinforcement Learning for mathematical reasoning tasks, where only binary outcome rewards are easily accessible. We theoretically prove that behavior cloning on positive trajectories from best-of-N (BoN) sampling is sufficient to learn the KL-regularized optimal policy in binary feedback environments. This formulation further implies that the rewards of negative samples should be reshaped to ensure the gradient consistency between positive and negative samples. To alleviate the long-existing difficulties brought by sparse rewards in RL, which are even exacerbated by the partial correctness of the long chain of thought for reasoning tasks, we further apply a token-level reward model to sample important tokens in reasoning trajectories for learning. With OREAL, for the first time, a 7B model can obtain 94.0 pass@1 accuracy on MATH-500 through RL, being on par with 32B models. OREAL-32B also surpasses previous 32B models trained by distillation with 95.0 pass@1 accuracy on MATH-500. Our investigation also indicates the importance of initial policy models and training queries for RL. Code, models, and data will be released to benefit future researchhttps://github.com/InternLM/OREAL.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Reasoning in large language models (LLMs) tends to produce substantially longer token generation sequences than simpler language modeling tasks. This extended generation length reflects the multi-step, compositional nature of reasoning and is often correlated with higher solution accuracy. From an efficiency perspective, longer token generation exacerbates the inherently sequential and memory-bound decoding phase of LLMs. However, not all parts of this expensive reasoning process are equally difficult to generate. We leverage this observation by offloading only the most challenging parts of the reasoning process to a larger, more capable model, while performing most of the generation with a smaller, more efficient model; furthermore, we teach the smaller model to identify these difficult segments and independently trigger offloading when needed. To enable this behavior, we annotate difficult segments across 18k reasoning traces from the OpenR1-Math-220k chain-of-thought (CoT) dataset. We then apply supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning fine-tuning (RLFT) to a 1.5B-parameter reasoning model, training it to learn to offload the most challenging parts of its own reasoning process to a larger model. This approach improves AIME24 reasoning accuracy by 24% and 28.3% while offloading 1.35% and 5% of the generated tokens respectively. We open-source our SplitReason model, data, code and logs.

With powerful large language models (LLMs) demonstrating superhuman reasoning capabilities, a critical question arises: Do LLMs genuinely reason, or do they merely recall answers from their extensive, web-scraped training datasets? Publicly released benchmarks inevitably become contaminated once incorporated into subsequent LLM training sets, undermining their reliability as faithful assessments. To address this, we introduce KUMO, a generative evaluation framework designed specifically for assessing reasoning in LLMs. KUMO synergistically combines LLMs with symbolic engines to dynamically produce diverse, multi-turn reasoning tasks that are partially observable and adjustable in difficulty. Through an automated pipeline, KUMO continuously generates novel tasks across open-ended domains, compelling models to demonstrate genuine generalization rather than memorization. We evaluated 23 state-of-the-art LLMs on 5,000 tasks across 100 domains created by KUMO, benchmarking their reasoning abilities against university students. Our findings reveal that many LLMs have outperformed university-level performance on easy reasoning tasks, and reasoning-scaled LLMs reach university-level performance on complex reasoning challenges. Moreover, LLM performance on KUMO tasks correlates strongly with results on newly released real-world reasoning benchmarks, underscoring KUMO's value as a robust, enduring assessment tool for genuine LLM reasoning capabilities.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental states, is an essential ingredient for developing machines with human-level social intelligence. Recent machine learning models, particularly large language models, seem to show some aspects of ToM understanding. However, existing ToM benchmarks use unimodal datasets - either video or text. Human ToM, on the other hand, is more than video or text understanding. People can flexibly reason about another person's mind based on conceptual representations (e.g., goals, beliefs, plans) extracted from any available data. To address this, we introduce a multimodal Theory of Mind question answering (MMToM-QA) benchmark. MMToM-QA comprehensively evaluates machine ToM both on multimodal data and on different kinds of unimodal data about a person's activity in a household environment. To engineer multimodal ToM capacity, we propose a novel method, BIP-ALM (Bayesian Inverse Planning Accelerated by Language Models). BIP-ALM extracts unified representations from multimodal data and utilizes language models for scalable Bayesian inverse planning. We conducted a systematic comparison of human performance, BIP-ALM, and state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4. The experiments demonstrate that large language models and large multimodal models still lack robust ToM capacity. BIP-ALM, on the other hand, shows promising results, by leveraging the power of both model-based mental inference and language models.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Rule-based reasoning, a fundamental type of legal reasoning, enables us to draw conclusions by accurately applying a rule to a set of facts. We explore causal language models as rule-based reasoners, specifically with respect to compositional rules - rules consisting of multiple elements which form a complex logical expression. Reasoning about compositional rules is challenging because it requires multiple reasoning steps, and attending to the logical relationships between elements. We introduce a new prompting method, Chain of Logic, which elicits rule-based reasoning through decomposition (solving elements as independent threads of logic), and recomposition (recombining these sub-answers to resolve the underlying logical expression). This method was inspired by the IRAC (Issue, Rule, Application, Conclusion) framework, a sequential reasoning approach used by lawyers. We evaluate chain of logic across eight rule-based reasoning tasks involving three distinct compositional rules from the LegalBench benchmark and demonstrate it consistently outperforms other prompting methods, including chain of thought and self-ask, using open-source and commercial language models.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown increasing in-context learning capabilities through scaling up model and data size. Despite this progress, LLMs are still unable to solve algorithmic reasoning problems. While providing a rationale with the final answer has led to further improvements in multi-step reasoning problems, Anil et al. 2022 showed that even simple algorithmic reasoning tasks such as parity are far from solved. In this work, we identify and study four key stages for successfully teaching algorithmic reasoning to LLMs: (1) formulating algorithms as skills, (2) teaching multiple skills simultaneously (skill accumulation), (3) teaching how to combine skills (skill composition) and (4) teaching how to use skills as tools. We show that it is possible to teach algorithmic reasoning to LLMs via in-context learning, which we refer to as algorithmic prompting. We evaluate our approach on a variety of arithmetic and quantitative reasoning tasks, and demonstrate significant boosts in performance over existing prompting techniques. In particular, for long parity, addition, multiplication and subtraction, we achieve an error reduction of approximately 10x, 9x, 5x and 2x respectively compared to the best available baselines.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex reasoning tasks but often suffer from overthinking, generating overly long and redundant reasoning trajectories. To explore its essence, our empirical analysis reveals that LRMs are primarily limited to recognizing task properties (i.e., difficulty levels) like humans before solving the problem, leading to a one-size-fits-all reasoning process. Inspired by this, a pressing and natural question emerges: Can we explicitly bootstrap such ability to alleviate overthinking in LRMs? In this paper, we propose Think-How-to-Think (TH2T), a novel two-stage fine-tuning strategy that progressively inspires LRMs' difficulty cognition and redundancy cognition of LRMs. Specifically, we first inject difficulty hypnosis into output prefixes to guide the model toward adaptive reasoning depth, trained on a hybrid dataset mixing short and long reasoning paths. Then, we incorporate redundancy hypnosis, which supervises the intermediate reasoning steps to identify and eliminate unnecessary reasoning patterns. Experiments on 7B/14B/32B models demonstrate that TH2T significantly reduces inference costs by over 70% on easy tasks and 40% on hard tasks while maintaining performance stability. The resulting outputs exhibit clear signs of difficulty-aware capabilities and reduced redundancy (e.g., reflection and looping).

Regardless of the particular task we want them to perform in an environment, there are often shared safety constraints we want our agents to respect. For example, regardless of whether it is making a sandwich or clearing the table, a kitchen robot should not break a plate. Manually specifying such a constraint can be both time-consuming and error-prone. We show how to learn constraints from expert demonstrations of safe task completion by extending inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) techniques to the space of constraints. Intuitively, we learn constraints that forbid highly rewarding behavior that the expert could have taken but chose not to. Unfortunately, the constraint learning problem is rather ill-posed and typically leads to overly conservative constraints that forbid all behavior that the expert did not take. We counter this by leveraging diverse demonstrations that naturally occur in multi-task settings to learn a tighter set of constraints. We validate our method with simulation experiments on high-dimensional continuous control tasks.

Recent advances in reasoning models have demonstrated significant improvements in accuracy, particularly for complex tasks such as mathematical reasoning, by employing detailed and comprehensive reasoning processes. However, generating these lengthy reasoning sequences is computationally expensive and time-consuming. To address this inefficiency, we leverage the inherent parallelizability of certain tasks to accelerate the reasoning process. Specifically, when multiple parallel reasoning branches exist, we decode multiple tokens per step using a specialized attention mask, processing them within a single sequence, avoiding additional memory usage. Experimental results show that our method achieves over 100% speedup in decoding time while maintaining the answer quality.

Large language models (LLMs) can perform reasoning computations both internally within their latent space and externally by generating explicit token sequences like chains of thought. Significant progress in enhancing reasoning abilities has been made by scaling test-time compute. However, understanding and quantifying model-internal reasoning abilities - the inferential "leaps" models make between individual token predictions - remains crucial. This study introduces a benchmark (n = 4,000 items) designed to quantify model-internal reasoning in different domains. We achieve this by having LLMs indicate the correct solution to reasoning problems not through descriptive text, but by selecting a specific language of their initial response token that is different from English, the benchmark language. This not only requires models to reason beyond their context window, but also to overrise their default tendency to respond in the same language as the prompt, thereby posing an additional cognitive strain. We evaluate a set of 18 LLMs, showing significant performance variations, with GPT-4.5 achieving the highest accuracy (74.7%), outperforming models like Grok-2 (67.2%), and Llama 3.1 405B (65.6%). Control experiments and difficulty scaling analyses suggest that while LLMs engage in internal reasoning, we cannot rule out heuristic exploitations under certain conditions, marking an area for future investigation. Our experiments demonstrate that LLMs can "think" via latent-space computations, revealing model-internal inference strategies that need further understanding, especially regarding safety-related concerns such as covert planning, goal-seeking, or deception emerging without explicit token traces.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in reasoning, exemplified by the success of OpenAI-o1 and DeepSeek-R1. However, integrating reasoning with external search processes remains challenging, especially for complex multi-hop questions requiring multiple retrieval steps. We propose ReSearch, a novel framework that trains LLMs to Reason with Search via reinforcement learning without using any supervised data on reasoning steps. Our approach treats search operations as integral components of the reasoning chain, where when and how to perform searches is guided by text-based thinking, and search results subsequently influence further reasoning. We train ReSearch on Qwen2.5-7B(-Instruct) and Qwen2.5-32B(-Instruct) models and conduct extensive experiments. Despite being trained on only one dataset, our models demonstrate strong generalizability across various benchmarks. Analysis reveals that ReSearch naturally elicits advanced reasoning capabilities such as reflection and self-correction during the reinforcement learning process.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) embed private or copyrighted information not only in their final answers but also throughout multi-step chain-of-thought (CoT) traces, making reliable unlearning far more demanding than in standard LLMs. We introduce Reasoning-TOFU (R-TOFU), the first benchmark tailored to this setting. R-TOFU augments existing unlearning tasks with realistic CoT annotations and provides step-wise metrics that expose residual knowledge invisible to answer-level checks. Using R-TOFU, we carry out a comprehensive comparison of gradient-based and preference-optimization baselines and show that conventional answer-only objectives leave substantial forget traces in reasoning. We further propose Reasoned IDK, a preference-optimization variant that preserves coherent yet inconclusive reasoning, achieving a stronger balance between forgetting efficacy and model utility than earlier refusal styles. Finally, we identify a failure mode: decoding variants such as ZeroThink and LessThink can still reveal forgotten content despite seemingly successful unlearning, emphasizing the need to evaluate models under diverse decoding settings. Together, the benchmark, analysis, and new baseline establish a systematic foundation for studying and improving unlearning in LRMs while preserving their reasoning capabilities.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting enhances reasoning in large language models (LLMs) but often leads to verbose and redundant outputs, thus increasing inference cost. We hypothesize that many reasoning steps are unnecessary for producing correct answers. To investigate this, we start with a systematic study to examine what is the minimum reasoning required for a model to reach a stable decision. We find that on math reasoning tasks like math, models typically converge to their final answers after 60\% of the reasoning steps, suggesting substantial redundancy in the remaining content. Based on these insights, we propose three inference-time strategies to improve efficiency: (1) early stopping via answer consistency, (2) boosting the probability of generating end-of-reasoning signals, and (3) a supervised method that learns when to stop based on internal activations. Experiments across five benchmarks and five open-weights LLMs show that our methods significantly reduce token usage with little or no accuracy drop. In particular, on NaturalQuestions, Answer Consistency reduces tokens by over 40\% while further improving accuracy. Our work underscores the importance of cost-effective reasoning methods that operate at inference time, offering practical benefits for real-world applications.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

Recent advances in multimodal language models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in vision-language reasoning, especially with the emergence of "thinking with images," which integrates explicit visual steps into the reasoning process. While this paradigm strengthens image-based reasoning, a significant challenge remains: models may arrive at correct answers by relying on irrelevant or spurious regions, driven by prior knowledge or dataset biases. Even when the answer is correct, flawed reasoning indicates that the model has not truly understood the image, highlighting the critical importance of reasoning fidelity in multimodal tasks. To address this issue, we propose DeFacto, a counterfactual reasoning framework that jointly enforces accurate answering and faithful reasoning. A key component of our approach is the design of three complementary training paradigms: (i) positive, (ii) counterfactual, and (iii) random-masking. To enable these paradigms, we develop a pipeline that automatically localizes question-relevant evidence and constructs positive, counterfactual, and random variants, resulting in a dataset of about 100k images. Building on this framework, we train multimodal language models with GRPO-based reinforcement learning, where we design three complementary rewards to guide the model toward accurate answering and evidence-grounded reasoning. Experiments on diverse benchmarks demonstrate that DeFacto substantially improves both answer accuracy and reasoning faithfulness, establishing a stronger foundation for interpretable multimodal reasoning. The code is available on GitHub and the dataset is released on HuggingFace.

Reasoning is a cognitive process of using evidence to reach a sound conclusion. The reasoning capability is essential for large language models (LLMs) to serve as the brain of the artificial general intelligence agent. Recent studies reveal that fine-tuning LLMs on data with the chain of thought (COT) reasoning process can significantly enhance their reasoning capabilities. However, we find that the fine-tuned LLMs suffer from an Assessment Misalignment problem, i.e., they frequently assign higher scores to subpar COTs, leading to potential limitations in their reasoning abilities. To address this problem, we introduce an Alignment Fine-Tuning (AFT) paradigm, which involves three steps: 1) fine-tuning LLMs with COT training data; 2) generating multiple COT responses for each question, and categorizing them into positive and negative ones based on whether they achieve the correct answer; 3) calibrating the scores of positive and negative responses given by LLMs with a novel constraint alignment loss. Specifically, the constraint alignment loss has two objectives: a) Alignment, which guarantees that positive scores surpass negative scores to encourage answers with high-quality COTs; b) Constraint, which keeps the negative scores confined to a reasonable range to prevent the model degradation. Beyond just the binary positive and negative feedback, the constraint alignment loss can be seamlessly adapted to the ranking situations when ranking feedback is accessible. Furthermore, we also delve deeply into recent ranking-based alignment methods, such as DPO, RRHF, and PRO, and discover that the constraint, which has been overlooked by these approaches, is also crucial for their performance. Extensive experiments on four reasoning benchmarks with both binary and ranking feedback demonstrate the effectiveness of AFT.

Scientific problem solving poses unique challenges for LLMs, requiring both deep domain knowledge and the ability to apply such knowledge through complex reasoning. While automated scientific reasoners hold great promise for assisting human scientists, there is currently no widely adopted holistic benchmark for evaluating scientific reasoning, and few approaches systematically disentangle the distinct roles of knowledge and reasoning in these tasks. To address these gaps, we introduce SciReas, a diverse suite of existing benchmarks for scientific reasoning tasks, and SciReas-Pro, a selective subset that requires more complex reasoning. Our holistic evaluation surfaces insights about scientific reasoning performance that remain hidden when relying on individual benchmarks alone. We then propose KRUX, a probing framework for studying the distinct roles of reasoning and knowledge in scientific tasks. Combining the two, we conduct an in-depth analysis that yields several key findings: (1) Retrieving task-relevant knowledge from model parameters is a critical bottleneck for LLMs in scientific reasoning; (2) Reasoning models consistently benefit from external knowledge added in-context on top of the reasoning enhancement; (3) Enhancing verbalized reasoning improves LLMs' ability to surface task-relevant knowledge. Finally, we conduct a lightweight analysis, comparing our science-focused data composition with concurrent efforts on long CoT SFT, and release SciLit01, a strong 8B baseline for scientific reasoning.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex problem-solving, yet their internal reasoning mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this paper, we investigate the reasoning trajectories of LRMs from an information-theoretic perspective. By tracking how mutual information (MI) between intermediate representations and the correct answer evolves during LRM reasoning, we observe an interesting MI peaks phenomenon: the MI at specific generative steps exhibits a sudden and significant increase during LRM's reasoning process. We theoretically analyze such phenomenon and show that as MI increases, the probability of model's prediction error decreases. Furthermore, these MI peaks often correspond to tokens expressing reflection or transition, such as ``Hmm'', ``Wait'' and ``Therefore,'' which we term as the thinking tokens. We then demonstrate that these thinking tokens are crucial for LRM's reasoning performance, while other tokens has minimal impacts. Building on these analyses, we propose two simple yet effective methods to improve LRM's reasoning performance, by delicately leveraging these thinking tokens. Overall, our work provides novel insights into the reasoning mechanisms of LRMs and offers practical ways to improve their reasoning capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/ChnQ/MI-Peaks.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Recent advances such as OpenAI-o1 and DeepSeek R1 have demonstrated the potential of Reinforcement Learning (RL) to enhance reasoning abilities in Large Language Models (LLMs). While open-source replication efforts have primarily focused on mathematical and coding domains, methods and resources for developing general reasoning capabilities remain underexplored. This gap is partly due to the challenge of collecting diverse and verifiable reasoning data suitable for RL. We hypothesize that logical reasoning is critical for developing general reasoning capabilities, as logic forms a fundamental building block of reasoning. In this work, we present SynLogic, a data synthesis framework and dataset that generates diverse logical reasoning data at scale, encompassing 35 diverse logical reasoning tasks. The SynLogic approach enables controlled synthesis of data with adjustable difficulty and quantity. Importantly, all examples can be verified by simple rules, making them ideally suited for RL with verifiable rewards. In our experiments, we validate the effectiveness of RL training on the SynLogic dataset based on 7B and 32B models. SynLogic leads to state-of-the-art logical reasoning performance among open-source datasets, surpassing DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B by 6 points on BBEH. Furthermore, mixing SynLogic data with mathematical and coding tasks improves the training efficiency of these domains and significantly enhances reasoning generalization. Notably, our mixed training model outperforms DeepSeek-R1-Zero-Qwen-32B across multiple benchmarks. These findings position SynLogic as a valuable resource for advancing the broader reasoning capabilities of LLMs. We open-source both the data synthesis pipeline and the SynLogic dataset at https://github.com/MiniMax-AI/SynLogic.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

Enhancing the capability of large language models (LLMs) in reasoning has gained significant attention in recent years. Previous studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of various prompting strategies in aiding LLMs in reasoning (called "reasoning actions"), such as step-by-step thinking, reflecting before answering, solving with programs, and their combinations. However, these approaches often applied static, predefined reasoning actions uniformly to all questions, without considering the specific characteristics of each question or the capability of the task-solving LLM. In this paper, we propose DOTS, an approach enabling LLMs to reason dynamically via optimal reasoning trajectory search, tailored to the specific characteristics of each question and the inherent capability of the task-solving LLM. Our approach involves three key steps: i) defining atomic reasoning action modules that can be composed into various reasoning action trajectories; ii) searching for the optimal action trajectory for each training question through iterative exploration and evaluation for the specific task-solving LLM; and iii) using the collected optimal trajectories to train an LLM to plan for the reasoning trajectories of unseen questions. In particular, we propose two learning paradigms, i.e., fine-tuning an external LLM as a planner to guide the task-solving LLM, or directly fine-tuning the task-solving LLM with an internalized capability for reasoning actions planning. Our experiments across eight reasoning tasks show that our method consistently outperforms static reasoning techniques and the vanilla instruction tuning approach. Further analysis reveals that our method enables LLMs to adjust their computation based on problem complexity, allocating deeper thinking and reasoning to harder problems.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has been shown to improve Large Language Model (LLM) performance on various tasks. With this approach, LLMs appear to produce human-like reasoning steps before providing answers (a.k.a., CoT reasoning), which often leads to the perception that they engage in deliberate inferential processes. However, some initial findings suggest that CoT reasoning may be more superficial than it appears, motivating us to explore further. In this paper, we study CoT reasoning via a data distribution lens and investigate if CoT reasoning reflects a structured inductive bias learned from in-distribution data, allowing the model to conditionally generate reasoning paths that approximate those seen during training. Thus, its effectiveness is fundamentally bounded by the degree of distribution discrepancy between the training data and the test queries. With this lens, we dissect CoT reasoning via three dimensions: task, length, and format. To investigate each dimension, we design DataAlchemy, an isolated and controlled environment to train LLMs from scratch and systematically probe them under various distribution conditions. Our results reveal that CoT reasoning is a brittle mirage that vanishes when it is pushed beyond training distributions. This work offers a deeper understanding of why and when CoT reasoning fails, emphasizing the ongoing challenge of achieving genuine and generalizable reasoning.

Recent work has shown that language models (LMs) have strong multi-step (i.e., procedural) reasoning capabilities. However, it is unclear whether LMs perform these tasks by cheating with answers memorized from pretraining corpus, or, via a multi-step reasoning mechanism. In this paper, we try to answer this question by exploring a mechanistic interpretation of LMs for multi-step reasoning tasks. Concretely, we hypothesize that the LM implicitly embeds a reasoning tree resembling the correct reasoning process within it. We test this hypothesis by introducing a new probing approach (called MechanisticProbe) that recovers the reasoning tree from the model's attention patterns. We use our probe to analyze two LMs: GPT-2 on a synthetic task (k-th smallest element), and LLaMA on two simple language-based reasoning tasks (ProofWriter & AI2 Reasoning Challenge). We show that MechanisticProbe is able to detect the information of the reasoning tree from the model's attentions for most examples, suggesting that the LM indeed is going through a process of multi-step reasoning within its architecture in many cases.

Recent work on neural algorithmic reasoning has investigated the reasoning capabilities of neural networks, effectively demonstrating they can learn to execute classical algorithms on unseen data coming from the train distribution. However, the performance of existing neural reasoners significantly degrades on out-of-distribution (OOD) test data, where inputs have larger sizes. In this work, we make an important observation: there are many different inputs for which an algorithm will perform certain intermediate computations identically. This insight allows us to develop data augmentation procedures that, given an algorithm's intermediate trajectory, produce inputs for which the target algorithm would have exactly the same next trajectory step. Then, we employ a causal framework to design a corresponding self-supervised objective, and we prove that it improves the OOD generalisation capabilities of the reasoner. We evaluate our method on the CLRS algorithmic reasoning benchmark, where we show up to 3times improvements on the OOD test data.

One of the challenges in applying reinforcement learning in a complex real-world environment lies in providing the agent with a sufficiently detailed reward function. Any misalignment between the reward and the desired behavior can result in unwanted outcomes. This may lead to issues like "reward hacking" where the agent maximizes rewards by unintended behavior. In this work, we propose to disentangle the reward into two distinct parts. A simple task-specific reward, outlining the particulars of the task at hand, and an unknown common-sense reward, indicating the expected behavior of the agent within the environment. We then explore how this common-sense reward can be learned from expert demonstrations. We first show that inverse reinforcement learning, even when it succeeds in training an agent, does not learn a useful reward function. That is, training a new agent with the learned reward does not impair the desired behaviors. We then demonstrate that this problem can be solved by training simultaneously on multiple tasks. That is, multi-task inverse reinforcement learning can be applied to learn a useful reward function.

Recent advances in deep thinking models have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities on mathematical and coding tasks. However, their effectiveness in embodied domains which require continuous interaction with environments through image action interleaved trajectories remains largely -unexplored. We present Embodied Reasoner, a model that extends o1 style reasoning to interactive embodied search tasks. Unlike mathematical reasoning that relies primarily on logical deduction, embodied scenarios demand spatial understanding, temporal reasoning, and ongoing self-reflection based on interaction history. To address these challenges, we synthesize 9.3k coherent Observation-Thought-Action trajectories containing 64k interactive images and 90k diverse thinking processes (analysis, spatial reasoning, reflection, planning, and verification). We develop a three-stage training pipeline that progressively enhances the model's capabilities through imitation learning, self-exploration via rejection sampling, and self-correction through reflection tuning. The evaluation shows that our model significantly outperforms those advanced visual reasoning models, e.g., it exceeds OpenAI o1, o3-mini, and Claude-3.7 by +9\%, 24\%, and +13\%. Analysis reveals our model exhibits fewer repeated searches and logical inconsistencies, with particular advantages in complex long-horizon tasks. Real-world environments also show our superiority while exhibiting fewer repeated searches and logical inconsistency cases.

Logical reasoning is central to human cognition and intelligence. Past research of logical reasoning within AI uses formal language as knowledge representation~(and symbolic reasoners). However, reasoning with formal language has proved challenging~(e.g., brittleness and knowledge-acquisition bottleneck). This paper provides a comprehensive overview on a new paradigm of logical reasoning, which uses natural language as knowledge representation~(and pretrained language models as reasoners), including philosophical definition and categorization of logical reasoning, advantages of the new paradigm, benchmarks and methods, challenges of the new paradigm, desirable tasks & methods in the future, and relation to related NLP fields. This new paradigm is promising since it not only alleviates many challenges of formal representation but also has advantages over end-to-end neural methods.

Reasoning large language models have recently achieved state-of-the-art performance in many fields. However, their long-form chain-of-thought reasoning creates interpretability challenges as each generated token depends on all previous ones, making the computation harder to decompose. We argue that analyzing reasoning traces at the sentence level is a promising approach to understanding reasoning processes. We present three complementary attribution methods: (1) a black-box method measuring each sentence's counterfactual importance by comparing final answers across 100 rollouts conditioned on the model generating that sentence or one with a different meaning; (2) a white-box method of aggregating attention patterns between pairs of sentences, which identified ``broadcasting'' sentences that receive disproportionate attention from all future sentences via ``receiver'' attention heads; (3) a causal attribution method measuring logical connections between sentences by suppressing attention toward one sentence and measuring the effect on each future sentence's tokens. Each method provides evidence for the existence of thought anchors, reasoning steps that have outsized importance and that disproportionately influence the subsequent reasoning process. These thought anchors are typically planning or backtracking sentences. We provide an open-source tool (www.thought-anchors.com) for visualizing the outputs of our methods, and present a case study showing converging patterns across methods that map how a model performs multi-step reasoning. The consistency across methods demonstrates the potential of sentence-level analysis for a deeper understanding of reasoning models.

When prompted with a few examples and intermediate steps, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance in various reasoning tasks. However, prompting methods that rely on implicit knowledge in an LLM often generate incorrect answers when the implicit knowledge is wrong or inconsistent with the task. To tackle this problem, we present Hypotheses-to-Theories (HtT), a framework that learns a rule library for reasoning with LLMs. HtT contains two stages, an induction stage and a deduction stage. In the induction stage, an LLM is first asked to generate and verify rules over a set of training examples. Rules that appear and lead to correct answers sufficiently often are collected to form a rule library. In the deduction stage, the LLM is then prompted to employ the learned rule library to perform reasoning to answer test questions. Experiments on relational reasoning, numerical reasoning and concept learning problems show that HtT improves existing prompting methods, with an absolute gain of 10-30% in accuracy. The learned rules are also transferable to different models and to different forms of the same problem.

Large language models (LLMs) often struggle with maintaining accuracy across a sequence of intermediate reasoning steps in mathematical reasoning, leading to error propagation that undermines the final result. The current methodology to mitigate this issue primarily involves using a verifier model to assess the correctness of generated solution candidates, focusing either on the overall reasoning path or on an incomplete reasoning path. By rethinking this approach, we argue that assessing potentials of incomplete reasoning paths could be more advantageous as it guides towards correct final answers, transforming the task into a planning problem. Our proposed verifier, the Outcome-supervision Value Model (OVM), employs outcome supervision for training, offering an efficient and intuitive method for planning by prioritizing steps that lead to accurate conclusions over mere per-step correctness. Furthermore, the OVM eschews the need for labor-intensive annotations on step-level correctness, enhancing its scalability. Our experiments on two multi-step mathematical reasoning datasets, GSM8K and Game of 24, demonstrate the superior performance of the OVM model. Notably, in GSM8K, our OVM-7B model achieves state-of-the-art results among LLMs up to 13B parameters; especially it does not utilize GPT-4 or code execution. These findings offer a novel perspective on the role of outcome supervision in training verifiers for multi-step reasoning tasks and provide theoretical justification for its advantage in value estimation for planning.

Recent advances in language models have demonstrated their capability to solve mathematical reasoning problems, achieving near-perfect accuracy on grade-school level math benchmarks like GSM8K. In this paper, we formally study how language models solve these problems. We design a series of controlled experiments to address several fundamental questions: (1) Can language models truly develop reasoning skills, or do they simply memorize templates? (2) What is the model's hidden (mental) reasoning process? (3) Do models solve math questions using skills similar to or different from humans? (4) Do models trained on GSM8K-like datasets develop reasoning skills beyond those necessary for solving GSM8K problems? (5) What mental process causes models to make reasoning mistakes? (6) How large or deep must a model be to effectively solve GSM8K-level math questions? Our study uncovers many hidden mechanisms by which language models solve mathematical questions, providing insights that extend beyond current understandings of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited complex reasoning abilities by generating question rationales and demonstrated exceptional performance in natural language processing (NLP) tasks. However, these reasoning capabilities generally emerge in models with tens of billions of parameters, creating significant computational challenges for real-world deployment. Recent research has concentrated on improving open-source smaller models through knowledge distillation (KD) from commercial LLMs. Nevertheless, most of these studies rely solely on the responses from one single LLM as the gold rationale for training. In this paper, we introduce a novel Mistake-Aware Peer-Review Distillation (MAPD) approach: 1) Instead of merely obtaining gold rationales from teachers, our method asks teachers to identify and explain the student's mistakes, providing customized instruction learning data. 2) We design a simulated peer-review process between teacher LLMs, which selects only the generated rationales above the acceptance threshold. This reduces the chance of teachers guessing correctly with flawed rationale, improving instructional data quality. Comprehensive experiments and analysis on mathematical, commonsense, and logical reasoning tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

Large reasoning models (e.g., R1, o3) have demonstrated remarkable mathematical problem-solving abilities. However, the high reported accuracy of these advanced models on popular datasets, reliance on purely numerical evaluation and potential benchmark leakage, often masks their true reasoning shortcomings. To address this, we propose leveraging the inherent rigor and methodological complexity of mathematical proofs as a diagnostic tool to expose these hidden failures. Specifically, we introduce the RFMDataset (Reveal Failure Modes), a collection of 200 diverse mathematical proof problems, and thoroughly evaluate advanced models' performance on it. Our in-depth analysis of their failures uncovers 10 fine-grained error types, which shows fundamental limitations in current large reasoning models: 1) large reasoning models grapple profoundly with mathematical proofs, with some generating entirely correct proofs for less than 20% of problems and failing even on basic ones; 2) models exhibit a diverse spectrum of reasoning failures, prominently demonstrating the lack of guarantees for the correctness and rigor of single-step reasoning; and 3) models show hallucination and incompleteness during the reasoning process. Our findings reveal that models' self-reflection is insufficient to resolve the current logical dilemmas, necessitating formalized and fine-grained logical training.

Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) at test time, enabling them to solve complex tasks. These reasoning steps in CoT are often assumed as a faithful reflection of the model's internal thinking process, and used to monitor unsafe intentions. However, we find many reasoning steps don't truly contribute to LLMs' prediction. We measure the step-wise causal influence of each reasoning step on the model's final prediction with a proposed True Thinking Score (TTS). We reveal that LLMs often interleave between true-thinking steps (which are genuinely used to produce the final output) and decorative-thinking steps (which only give the appearance of reasoning but have minimal causal impact). Notably, only a small subset of the total reasoning steps have a high TTS that causally drive the model's prediction: e.g., for the AIME dataset, only an average of 2.3% of reasoning steps in CoT have a TTS >= 0.7 (range: 0-1) under the Qwen-2.5 model. Furthermore, we identify a TrueThinking direction in the latent space of LLMs. By steering along or against this direction, we can force the model to perform or disregard certain CoT steps when computing the final result. Finally, we highlight that self-verification steps in CoT (i.e., aha moments) can also be decorative, where LLMs do not truly verify their solution. Steering along the TrueThinking direction can force internal reasoning over these steps, resulting in a change in the final results. Overall, our work reveals that LLMs often verbalize reasoning steps without actually performing them internally, which undermines both the efficiency of LLM reasoning and the trustworthiness of CoT.

This study focuses on improving the performance of lightweight Large Language Models (LLMs) in mathematical reasoning tasks. We introduce a novel method for measuring mathematical logic similarity and design an automatic screening mechanism to construct a set of reference problems that integrate both semantic and logical similarity. By employing carefully crafted positive and negative example prompts, we guide the model towards adopting sound reasoning logic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to utilize retrieval-enhanced generation for mathematical problem-solving. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves a 15.8% improvement over the Chain of Thought approach on the SVAMP dataset and a 21.5 % improvement on the GSM8K dataset. Further application of this method to a large-scale model with 175 billion parameters yields performance comparable to the best results on both aforementioned datasets. Finally, we conduct an analysis of errors during the reasoning process, providing valuable insights and directions for future research on reasoning tasks using large language models.

Recent advanced large reasoning models (LRMs) leverage extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to solve complex tasks, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Despite their success, we identify a critical issue: a substantial portion of simple tasks solved by LRMs can also be addressed by non-reasoning LLMs using significantly fewer tokens, indicating the complex reasoning may not always be necessary. To address this, we systematically analyze the reasoning trajectories of LRMs and present a method utilizing identified paradigms and LLM-Judge to classify these trajectories as either Redundant Reasoning or Essential Reasoning. And we introduce OThink-R1, a method that prunes redundant reasoning steps while preserving logical validity. OThink-R1 dynamically employs the non-thinking mode (fast-thinking) for straightforward problems while engaging in deliberate thinking (slow-thinking) for complex problems. Experiments across mathematical and question-answering tasks demonstrate that OThink-R1 reduces reasoning redundancy by almost 23\% on average without compromising accuracy, offering practical guidelines for efficient reasoning models. The code is available at https://github.com/AgenticIR-Lab/OThink-R1.

Large reasoning models (LRMs), such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, have significantly enhanced their reasoning capabilities by generating longer chains of thought, demonstrating outstanding performance across a variety of tasks. However, this performance gain comes at the cost of a substantial increase in redundant reasoning during the generation process, leading to high computational overhead and exacerbating the issue of overthinking. Although numerous existing approaches aim to address the problem of overthinking, they often rely on external interventions. In this paper, we propose a novel framework, Self-Braking Tuning (SBT), which tackles overthinking from the perspective of allowing the model to regulate its own reasoning process, thus eliminating the reliance on external control mechanisms. We construct a set of overthinking identification metrics based on standard answers and design a systematic method to detect redundant reasoning. This method accurately identifies unnecessary steps within the reasoning trajectory and generates training signals for learning self-regulation behaviors. Building on this foundation, we develop a complete strategy for constructing data with adaptive reasoning lengths and introduce an innovative braking prompt mechanism that enables the model to naturally learn when to terminate reasoning at an appropriate point. Experiments across mathematical benchmarks (AIME, AMC, MATH500, GSM8K) demonstrate that our method reduces token consumption by up to 60% while maintaining comparable accuracy to unconstrained models.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

Despite the increasing effectiveness of language models, their reasoning capabilities remain underdeveloped. In particular, causal reasoning through counterfactual question answering is lacking. This work aims to bridge this gap. We first derive novel metrics that balance accuracy in factual and counterfactual questions, capturing a more complete view of the reasoning abilities of language models than traditional factual-only based metrics. Second, we propose several fine-tuning approaches that aim to elicit better reasoning mechanisms, in the sense of the proposed metrics. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the fine-tuned language models in a variety of realistic scenarios. In particular, we investigate to what extent our fine-tuning approaches systemically achieve better generalization with respect to the base models in several problems that require, among others, inductive and deductive reasoning capabilities.

Mathematical reasoning, a core aspect of human cognition, is vital across many domains, from educational problem-solving to scientific advancements. As artificial general intelligence (AGI) progresses, integrating large language models (LLMs) with mathematical reasoning tasks is becoming increasingly significant. This survey provides the first comprehensive analysis of mathematical reasoning in the era of multimodal large language models (MLLMs). We review over 200 studies published since 2021, and examine the state-of-the-art developments in Math-LLMs, with a focus on multimodal settings. We categorize the field into three dimensions: benchmarks, methodologies, and challenges. In particular, we explore multimodal mathematical reasoning pipeline, as well as the role of (M)LLMs and the associated methodologies. Finally, we identify five major challenges hindering the realization of AGI in this domain, offering insights into the future direction for enhancing multimodal reasoning capabilities. This survey serves as a critical resource for the research community in advancing the capabilities of LLMs to tackle complex multimodal reasoning tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

Transformers have been shown to emulate logical deduction over natural language theories (logical rules expressed in natural language), reliably assigning true/false labels to candidate implications. However, their ability to generate implications of a theory has not yet been demonstrated, and methods for reconstructing proofs of answers are imperfect. In this work we show that a generative model, called ProofWriter, can reliably generate both implications of a theory and the natural language proof(s) that support them. In particular, iterating a 1-step implication generator results in proofs that are highly reliable, and represent actual model decisions (rather than post-hoc rationalizations). On the RuleTaker dataset, the accuracy of ProofWriter's proofs exceed previous methods by +9% absolute, and in a way that generalizes to proof depths unseen in training and on out-of-domain problems. We also show that generative techniques can perform a type of abduction with high precision: Given a theory and an unprovable conclusion, identify a missing fact that allows the conclusion to be proved, along with a proof. These results significantly improve the viability of neural methods for systematically reasoning over natural language.

Human cognition exhibits systematic compositionality, the algebraic ability to generate infinite novel combinations from finite learned components, which is the key to understanding and reasoning about complex logic. In this work, we investigate the compositionality of large language models (LLMs) in mathematical reasoning. Specifically, we construct a new dataset MathTrap by introducing carefully designed logical traps into the problem descriptions of MATH and GSM8K. Since problems with logical flaws are quite rare in the real world, these represent "unseen" cases to LLMs. Solving these requires the models to systematically compose (1) the mathematical knowledge involved in the original problems with (2) knowledge related to the introduced traps. Our experiments show that while LLMs possess both components of requisite knowledge, they do not spontaneously combine them to handle these novel cases. We explore several methods to mitigate this deficiency, such as natural language prompts, few-shot demonstrations, and fine-tuning. Additionally, we test the recently released OpenAI o1 model and find that human-like `slow thinking' helps improve the compositionality of LLMs. Overall, systematic compositionality remains an open challenge for large language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in solving mathematical reasoning tasks, leveraging Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data as a vital component in guiding answer generation. Current paradigms typically generate CoT and answers directly for a given problem, diverging from human problem-solving strategies to some extent. Humans often solve problems by recalling analogous cases and leveraging their solutions to reason about the current task. Inspired by this cognitive process, we propose MetaLadder, a novel framework that explicitly prompts LLMs to recall and reflect on meta-problems, those structurally or semantically analogous problems, alongside their CoT solutions before addressing the target problem. Additionally, we introduce a problem-restating mechanism to enhance the model's comprehension of the target problem by regenerating the original question, which further improves reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the model can achieve reasoning transfer from analogical problems, mimicking human-like "learning from examples" and generalization abilities. Extensive experiments on mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that our MetaLadder significantly boosts LLMs' problem-solving accuracy, largely outperforming standard CoT-based methods (10.3\% accuracy gain) and other methods. Our code and data has been released at https://github.com/LHL3341/MetaLadder.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often produce excessively verbose reasoning traces, a phenomenon known as overthinking, which hampers both efficiency and interpretability. Prior works primarily address this issue by reducing response length, without fully examining the underlying semantic structure of the reasoning process. In this paper, we revisit overthinking by decomposing it into two distinct forms: internal redundancy, which consists of low-contribution reasoning steps within the first correct solution (FCS), and external redundancy, which refers to unnecessary continuation after the FCS. To mitigate both forms, we propose a dual-penalty reinforcement learning framework. For internal redundancy, we adopt a sliding-window semantic analysis to penalize low-gain reasoning steps that contribute little toward reaching the correct answer. For external redundancy, we penalize its proportion beyond the FCS to encourage earlier termination. Our method significantly compresses reasoning traces with minimal accuracy loss, and generalizes effectively to out-of-domain tasks such as question answering and code generation. Crucially, we find that external redundancy can be safely removed without degrading performance, whereas internal redundancy must be reduced more cautiously to avoid impairing correctness. These findings suggest that our method not only improves reasoning efficiency but also enables implicit, semantic-aware control over Chain-of-Thought length, paving the way for more concise and interpretable LRMs.

The capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to reason is fundamental to their application in complex, knowledge-intensive domains. In real-world scenarios, LLMs are often augmented with external information that can be helpful, irrelevant, or even misleading. This paper investigates the causal impact of such auxiliary information on the reasoning process of LLMs with explicit step-by-step thinking capabilities. We introduce SciAux, a new dataset derived from ScienceQA, to systematically test the robustness of the model against these types of information. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability: the model's deliberative "thinking mode" is a double-edged sword. While helpful context improves accuracy, misleading information causes a catastrophic drop in performance, which is amplified by the thinking process. Instead of conferring robustness, thinking reinforces the degree of error when provided with misinformation. This highlights that the challenge is not merely to make models "think", but to endow them with the critical faculty to evaluate the information upon which their reasoning is based. The SciAux dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/billhdzhao/SciAux.

Despite their impressive capabilities, large pre-trained language models (LMs) struggle with consistent reasoning; recently, prompting LMs to generate explanations that self-guide the inference has emerged as a promising direction to amend this. However, these approaches are fundamentally bounded by the correctness of explanations, which themselves are often noisy and inconsistent. In this work, we develop Maieutic Prompting, which infers a correct answer to a question even from the noisy and inconsistent generations of LM. Maieutic Prompting induces a tree of explanations abductively (e.g. X is true, because ...) and recursively, then frames the inference as a satisfiability problem over these explanations and their logical relations. We test Maieutic Prompting for true/false QA on three challenging benchmarks that require complex commonsense reasoning. Maieutic Prompting achieves up to 20% better accuracy than state-of-the-art prompting methods, and as a fully unsupervised approach, performs competitively with supervised models. We also show that Maieutic Prompting improves robustness in inference while providing interpretable rationales.

Recent studies on large language model (LLM) reasoning capabilities have demonstrated promising improvements in model performance by leveraging a lengthy thinking process and additional computational resources during inference, primarily in tasks involving mathematical reasoning (Muennighoff et al., 2025). However, it remains uncertain if longer reasoning chains inherently enhance factual accuracy, particularly beyond mathematical contexts. In this work, we thoroughly examine LLM reasoning within complex open-domain question-answering (QA) scenarios. We initially distill reasoning traces from advanced, large-scale reasoning models (QwQ-32B and DeepSeek-R1-671B), then fine-tune a variety of models ranging from smaller, instruction-tuned variants to larger architectures based on Qwen2.5. To enrich reasoning traces, we introduce factual information from knowledge graphs in the form of paths into our reasoning traces. Our experimental setup includes four baseline approaches and six different instruction-tuned models evaluated across a benchmark of six datasets, encompassing over 22.6K questions. Overall, we carry out 168 experimental runs and analyze approximately 1.7 million reasoning traces. Our findings indicate that, within a single run, smaller reasoning models achieve noticeable improvements in factual accuracy compared to their original instruction-tuned counterparts. Moreover, our analysis demonstrates that adding test-time compute and token budgets factual accuracy consistently improves by 2-8%, further confirming the effectiveness of test-time scaling for enhancing performance and consequently improving reasoning accuracy in open-domain QA tasks. We release all the experimental artifacts for further research.

We introduce S1-Bench, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate Large Reasoning Models' (LRMs) performance on simple tasks that favor intuitive system 1 thinking rather than deliberative system 2 reasoning. While LRMs have achieved significant breakthroughs in complex reasoning tasks through explicit chains of thought, their reliance on deep analytical thinking may limit their system 1 thinking capabilities. Moreover, a lack of benchmark currently exists to evaluate LRMs' performance in tasks that require such capabilities. To fill this gap, S1-Bench presents a set of simple, diverse, and naturally clear questions across multiple domains and languages, specifically designed to assess LRMs' performance in such tasks. Our comprehensive evaluation of 22 LRMs reveals significant lower efficiency tendencies, with outputs averaging 15.5 times longer than those of traditional small LLMs. Additionally, LRMs often identify correct answers early but continue unnecessary deliberation, with some models even producing numerous errors. These findings highlight the rigid reasoning patterns of current LRMs and underscore the substantial development needed to achieve balanced dual-system thinking capabilities that can adapt appropriately to task complexity.