Daily Papers

We present Twin Answer Sentences Attack (TASA), an adversarial attack method for question answering (QA) models that produces fluent and grammatical adversarial contexts while maintaining gold answers. Despite phenomenal progress on general adversarial attacks, few works have investigated the vulnerability and attack specifically for QA models. In this work, we first explore the biases in the existing models and discover that they mainly rely on keyword matching between the question and context, and ignore the relevant contextual relations for answer prediction. Based on two biases above, TASA attacks the target model in two folds: (1) lowering the model's confidence on the gold answer with a perturbed answer sentence; (2) misguiding the model towards a wrong answer with a distracting answer sentence. Equipped with designed beam search and filtering methods, TASA can generate more effective attacks than existing textual attack methods while sustaining the quality of contexts, in extensive experiments on five QA datasets and human evaluations.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

This paper introduces a new method for adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) called the Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA). Building on the multi-turn crescendo attack method introduced by Russinovich, Salem, and Eldan (2024), which gradually escalates the context to provoke harmful responses, the STCA achieves similar outcomes in a single interaction. By condensing the escalation into a single, well-crafted prompt, the STCA bypasses typical moderation filters that LLMs use to prevent inappropriate outputs. This technique reveals vulnerabilities in current LLMs and emphasizes the importance of stronger safeguards in responsible AI (RAI). The STCA offers a novel method that has not been previously explored.

Intelligent Personal Assistant (IA), also known as Voice Assistant (VA), has become increasingly popular as a human-computer interaction mechanism. Most smartphones have built-in voice assistants that are granted high privilege, which is able to access system resources and private information. Thus, once the voice assistants are exploited by attackers, they become the stepping stones for the attackers to hack into the smartphones. Prior work shows that the voice assistant can be activated by inter-component communication mechanism, through an official Android API. However, this attack method is only effective on Google Assistant, which is the official voice assistant developed by Google. Voice assistants in other operating systems, even custom Android systems, cannot be activated by this mechanism. Prior work also shows that the attacking voice commands can be inaudible, but it requires additional instruments to launch the attack, making it unrealistic for real-world attack. We propose an attacking framework, which records the activation voice of the user, and launch the attack by playing the activation voice and attack commands via the built-in speaker. An intelligent stealthy module is designed to decide on the suitable occasion to launch the attack, preventing the attack being noticed by the user. We demonstrate proof-of-concept attacks on Google Assistant, showing the feasibility and stealthiness of the proposed attack scheme. We suggest to revise the activation logic of voice assistant to be resilient to the speaker based attack.

We attack the state-of-the-art Go-playing AI system KataGo by training adversarial policies that play against frozen KataGo victims. Our attack achieves a >99% win rate when KataGo uses no tree search, and a >97% win rate when KataGo uses enough search to be superhuman. We train our adversaries with a modified KataGo implementation, using less than 14% of the compute used to train the original KataGo. Notably, our adversaries do not win by learning to play Go better than KataGo -- in fact, our adversaries are easily beaten by human amateurs. Instead, our adversaries win by tricking KataGo into making serious blunders. Our attack transfers zero-shot to other superhuman Go-playing AIs, and is interpretable to the extent that human experts can successfully implement it, without algorithmic assistance, to consistently beat superhuman AIs. Our results demonstrate that even superhuman AI systems may harbor surprising failure modes. Example games are available at https://goattack.far.ai/.

Backdoor attacks have become a significant threat to the pre-training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). Although numerous methods for detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks have been proposed, most rely on identifying and eliminating the ``shortcut" created by the backdoor, which links a specific source class to a target class. However, these approaches can be easily circumvented by designing multiple backdoor triggers that create shortcuts everywhere and therefore nowhere specific. In this study, we explore the concept of Multi-Trigger Backdoor Attacks (MTBAs), where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we demonstrate that 1) multiple triggers can coexist, overwrite, or cross-activate one another, and 2) MTBAs easily break the prevalent shortcut assumption underlying most existing backdoor detection/removal methods, rendering them ineffective. Given the security risk posed by MTBAs, we have created a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to facilitate future research on detecting and mitigating these attacks, and we also discuss potential defense strategies against MTBAs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/Multi-Trigger-Backdoor-Attacks.

We introduce Social IQa, the first largescale benchmark for commonsense reasoning about social situations. Social IQa contains 38,000 multiple choice questions for probing emotional and social intelligence in a variety of everyday situations (e.g., Q: "Jordan wanted to tell Tracy a secret, so Jordan leaned towards Tracy. Why did Jordan do this?" A: "Make sure no one else could hear"). Through crowdsourcing, we collect commonsense questions along with correct and incorrect answers about social interactions, using a new framework that mitigates stylistic artifacts in incorrect answers by asking workers to provide the right answer to a different but related question. Empirical results show that our benchmark is challenging for existing question-answering models based on pretrained language models, compared to human performance (>20% gap). Notably, we further establish Social IQa as a resource for transfer learning of commonsense knowledge, achieving state-of-the-art performance on multiple commonsense reasoning tasks (Winograd Schemas, COPA).

The past year has seen rapid acceleration in the development of large language models (LLMs). However, without proper steering and safeguards, LLMs will readily follow malicious instructions, provide unsafe advice, and generate toxic content. We introduce SimpleSafetyTests (SST) as a new test suite for rapidly and systematically identifying such critical safety risks. The test suite comprises 100 test prompts across five harm areas that LLMs, for the vast majority of applications, should refuse to comply with. We test 11 open-access and open-source LLMs and four closed-source LLMs, and find critical safety weaknesses. While some of the models do not give a single unsafe response, most give unsafe responses to more than 20% of the prompts, with over 50% unsafe responses in the extreme. Prepending a safety-emphasising system prompt substantially reduces the occurrence of unsafe responses, but does not completely stop them from happening. Trained annotators labelled every model response to SST (n = 3,000). We use these annotations to evaluate five AI safety filters (which assess whether a models' response is unsafe given a prompt) as a way of automatically evaluating models' performance on SST. The filters' performance varies considerably. There are also differences across the five harm areas, and on the unsafe versus safe responses. The widely-used Perspective API has 72% accuracy and a newly-created zero-shot prompt to OpenAI's GPT-4 performs best with 89% accuracy. Content Warning: This paper contains prompts and responses that relate to child abuse, suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, scams and fraud, illegal items, and physical harm.

U.S. national security customers have begun to utilize large language models, including enterprise versions of ``off-the-shelf'' models (e.g., ChatGPT) familiar to the public. This uptake will likely accelerate. However, recent studies suggest that off-the-shelf large language models frequently suggest escalatory actions when prompted with geopolitical or strategic scenarios. We demonstrate two simple, non-technical interventions to control these tendencies. Introducing these interventions into the experimental wargame design of a recent study, we substantially reduce escalation throughout the game. Calls to restrict the use of large language models in national security applications are thus premature. The U.S. government is already, and will continue, employing large language models for scenario planning and suggesting courses of action. Rather than warning against such applications, this study acknowledges the imminent adoption of large language models, and provides actionable measures to align them with national security goals, including escalation management.

Skeletal sequence data, as a widely employed representation of human actions, are crucial in Human Activity Recognition (HAR). Recently, adversarial attacks have been proposed in this area, which exposes potential security concerns, and more importantly provides a good tool for model robustness test. Within this research, transfer-based attack is an important tool as it mimics the real-world scenario where an attacker has no knowledge of the target model, but is under-explored in Skeleton-based HAR (S-HAR). Consequently, existing S-HAR attacks exhibit weak adversarial transferability and the reason remains largely unknown. In this paper, we investigate this phenomenon via the characterization of the loss function. We find that one prominent indicator of poor transferability is the low smoothness of the loss function. Led by this observation, we improve the transferability by properly smoothening the loss when computing the adversarial examples. This leads to the first Transfer-based Attack on Skeletal Action Recognition, TASAR. TASAR explores the smoothened model posterior of pre-trained surrogates, which is achieved by a new post-train Dual Bayesian optimization strategy. Furthermore, unlike existing transfer-based methods which overlook the temporal coherence within sequences, TASAR incorporates motion dynamics into the Bayesian attack, effectively disrupting the spatial-temporal coherence of S-HARs. For exhaustive evaluation, we build the first large-scale robust S-HAR benchmark, comprising 7 S-HAR models, 10 attack methods, 3 S-HAR datasets and 2 defense models. Extensive results demonstrate the superiority of TASAR. Our benchmark enables easy comparisons for future studies, with the code available in the https://github.com/yunfengdiao/Skeleton-Robustness-Benchmark.

The Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA), first introduced in Aqrawi and Abbasi [2024], is an innovative method designed to bypass the ethical safeguards of text-to-text AI models, compelling them to generate harmful content. This technique leverages a strategic escalation of context within a single prompt, combined with trust-building mechanisms, to subtly deceive the model into producing unintended outputs. Extending the application of STCA to text-to-image models, we demonstrate its efficacy by compromising the guardrails of a widely-used model, DALL-E 3, achieving outputs comparable to outputs from the uncensored model Flux Schnell, which served as a baseline control. This study provides a framework for researchers to rigorously evaluate the robustness of guardrails in text-to-image models and benchmark their resilience against adversarial attacks.

The irruption of DeepSeek-R1 constitutes a turning point for the AI industry in general and the LLMs in particular. Its capabilities have demonstrated outstanding performance in several tasks, including creative thinking, code generation, maths and automated program repair, at apparently lower execution cost. However, LLMs must adhere to an important qualitative property, i.e., their alignment with safety and human values. A clear competitor of DeepSeek-R1 is its American counterpart, OpenAI's o3-mini model, which is expected to set high standards in terms of performance, safety and cost. In this paper we conduct a systematic assessment of the safety level of both, DeepSeek-R1 (70b version) and OpenAI's o3-mini (beta version). To this end, we make use of our recently released automated safety testing tool, named ASTRAL. By leveraging this tool, we automatically and systematically generate and execute a total of 1260 unsafe test inputs on both models. After conducting a semi-automated assessment of the outcomes provided by both LLMs, the results indicate that DeepSeek-R1 is highly unsafe as compared to OpenAI's o3-mini. Based on our evaluation, DeepSeek-R1 answered unsafely to 11.98% of the executed prompts whereas o3-mini only to 1.19%.

Vision-language models (VLMs), which process image and text inputs, are increasingly integrated into chat assistants and other consumer AI applications. Without proper safeguards, however, VLMs may give harmful advice (e.g. how to self-harm) or encourage unsafe behaviours (e.g. to consume drugs). Despite these clear hazards, little work so far has evaluated VLM safety and the novel risks created by multimodal inputs. To address this gap, we introduce MSTS, a Multimodal Safety Test Suite for VLMs. MSTS comprises 400 test prompts across 40 fine-grained hazard categories. Each test prompt consists of a text and an image that only in combination reveal their full unsafe meaning. With MSTS, we find clear safety issues in several open VLMs. We also find some VLMs to be safe by accident, meaning that they are safe because they fail to understand even simple test prompts. We translate MSTS into ten languages, showing non-English prompts to increase the rate of unsafe model responses. We also show models to be safer when tested with text only rather than multimodal prompts. Finally, we explore the automation of VLM safety assessments, finding even the best safety classifiers to be lacking.

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

Recent researches have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to a security threat known as Backdoor Attack. The backdoored model will behave well in normal cases but exhibit malicious behaviours on inputs inserted with a specific backdoor trigger. Current backdoor studies on LLMs predominantly focus on instruction-tuned LLMs, while neglecting another realistic scenario where LLMs are fine-tuned on multi-turn conversational data to be chat models. Chat models are extensively adopted across various real-world scenarios, thus the security of chat models deserves increasing attention. Unfortunately, we point out that the flexible multi-turn interaction format instead increases the flexibility of trigger designs and amplifies the vulnerability of chat models to backdoor attacks. In this work, we reveal and achieve a novel backdoor attacking method on chat models by distributing multiple trigger scenarios across user inputs in different rounds, and making the backdoor be triggered only when all trigger scenarios have appeared in the historical conversations. Experimental results demonstrate that our method can achieve high attack success rates (e.g., over 90% ASR on Vicuna-7B) while successfully maintaining the normal capabilities of chat models on providing helpful responses to benign user requests. Also, the backdoor can not be easily removed by the downstream re-alignment, highlighting the importance of continued research and attention to the security concerns of chat models. Warning: This paper may contain toxic content.

A membership inference attack allows an adversary to query a trained machine learning model to predict whether or not a particular example was contained in the model's training dataset. These attacks are currently evaluated using average-case "accuracy" metrics that fail to characterize whether the attack can confidently identify any members of the training set. We argue that attacks should instead be evaluated by computing their true-positive rate at low (e.g., <0.1%) false-positive rates, and find most prior attacks perform poorly when evaluated in this way. To address this we develop a Likelihood Ratio Attack (LiRA) that carefully combines multiple ideas from the literature. Our attack is 10x more powerful at low false-positive rates, and also strictly dominates prior attacks on existing metrics.

Since DeepMind's AlphaZero, Zero learning quickly became the state-of-the-art method for many board games. It can be improved using a fully convolutional structure (no fully connected layer). Using such an architecture plus global pooling, we can create bots independent of the board size. The training can be made more robust by keeping track of the best checkpoints during the training and by training against them. Using these features, we release Polygames, our framework for Zero learning, with its library of games and its checkpoints. We won against strong humans at the game of Hex in 19x19, which was often said to be untractable for zero learning; and in Havannah. We also won several first places at the TAAI competitions.

Previous work has shown that Large Language Models are susceptible to so-called data extraction attacks. This allows an attacker to extract a sample that was contained in the training data, which has massive privacy implications. The construction of data extraction attacks is challenging, current attacks are quite inefficient, and there exists a significant gap in the extraction capabilities of untargeted attacks and memorization. Thus, targeted attacks are proposed, which identify if a given sample from the training data, is extractable from a model. In this work, we apply a targeted data extraction attack to the SATML2023 Language Model Training Data Extraction Challenge. We apply a two-step approach. In the first step, we maximise the recall of the model and are able to extract the suffix for 69% of the samples. In the second step, we use a classifier-based Membership Inference Attack on the generations. Our AutoSklearn classifier achieves a precision of 0.841. The full approach reaches a score of 0.405 recall at a 10% false positive rate, which is an improvement of 34% over the baseline of 0.301.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, widely used to improve the factual grounding of large language models (LLMs), are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject manipulated content into the retriever's corpus. While prior research has predominantly focused on single-attacker settings, real-world scenarios often involve multiple, competing attackers with conflicting objectives. In this work, we introduce PoisonArena, the first benchmark to systematically study and evaluate competing poisoning attacks in RAG. We formalize the multi-attacker threat model, where attackers vie to control the answer to the same query using mutually exclusive misinformation. PoisonArena leverages the Bradley-Terry model to quantify each method's competitive effectiveness in such adversarial environments. Through extensive experiments on the Natural Questions and MS MARCO datasets, we demonstrate that many attack strategies successful in isolation fail under competitive pressure. Our findings highlight the limitations of conventional evaluation metrics like Attack Success Rate (ASR) and F1 score and underscore the need for competitive evaluation to assess real-world attack robustness. PoisonArena provides a standardized framework to benchmark and develop future attack and defense strategies under more realistic, multi-adversary conditions.

We present a large longitudinal dataset of tweets from two sets of users that are suspected to be affiliated with ISIS. These sets of users are identified based on a prior study and a campaign aimed at shutting down ISIS Twitter accounts. These users have engaged with known ISIS accounts at least once during 2014-2015 and are still active as of 2021. Some of them have directly supported the ISIS users and their tweets by retweeting them, and some of the users that have quoted tweets of ISIS, have uncertain connections to ISIS seed accounts. This study and the dataset represent a unique approach to analyzing ISIS data. Although much research exists on ISIS online activities, few studies have focused on individual accounts. Our approach to validating accounts as well as developing a framework for differentiating accounts' functionality (e.g., propaganda versus operational planning) offers a foundation for future research. We perform some descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses on our collected data to provide deeper insight and highlight the significance and practicality of such analyses. We further discuss several cross-disciplinary potential use cases and research directions.

Recent research has highlighted the vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) against data poisoning attacks. These attacks aim to inject poisoning samples into the models' training dataset such that the trained models have inference failures. While previous studies have executed different types of attacks, one major challenge that greatly limits their effectiveness is the uncertainty of the re-training process after the injection of poisoning samples, including the re-training initialization or algorithms. To address this challenge, we propose a novel attack method called ''Sharpness-Aware Data Poisoning Attack (SAPA)''. In particular, it leverages the concept of DNNs' loss landscape sharpness to optimize the poisoning effect on the worst re-trained model. It helps enhance the preservation of the poisoning effect, regardless of the specific retraining procedure employed. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SAPA offers a general and principled strategy that significantly enhances various types of poisoning attacks.

We demonstrate how images and sounds can be used for indirect prompt and instruction injection in multi-modal LLMs. An attacker generates an adversarial perturbation corresponding to the prompt and blends it into an image or audio recording. When the user asks the (unmodified, benign) model about the perturbed image or audio, the perturbation steers the model to output the attacker-chosen text and/or make the subsequent dialog follow the attacker's instruction. We illustrate this attack with several proof-of-concept examples targeting LLaVa and PandaGPT.

In this paper, we present JADE, a targeted linguistic fuzzing platform which strengthens the linguistic complexity of seed questions to simultaneously and consistently break a wide range of widely-used LLMs categorized in three groups: eight open-sourced Chinese, six commercial Chinese and four commercial English LLMs. JADE generates three safety benchmarks for the three groups of LLMs, which contain unsafe questions that are highly threatening: the questions simultaneously trigger harmful generation of multiple LLMs, with an average unsafe generation ratio of 70% (please see the table below), while are still natural questions, fluent and preserving the core unsafe semantics. We release the benchmark demos generated for commercial English LLMs and open-sourced English LLMs in the following link: https://github.com/whitzard-ai/jade-db. For readers who are interested in evaluating on more questions generated by JADE, please contact us. JADE is based on Noam Chomsky's seminal theory of transformational-generative grammar. Given a seed question with unsafe intention, JADE invokes a sequence of generative and transformational rules to increment the complexity of the syntactic structure of the original question, until the safety guardrail is broken. Our key insight is: Due to the complexity of human language, most of the current best LLMs can hardly recognize the invariant evil from the infinite number of different syntactic structures which form an unbound example space that can never be fully covered. Technically, the generative/transformative rules are constructed by native speakers of the languages, and, once developed, can be used to automatically grow and transform the parse tree of a given question, until the guardrail is broken. For more evaluation results and demo, please check our website: https://whitzard-ai.github.io/jade.html.

We present the results and main findings of SemEval-2020 Task 12 on Multilingual Offensive Language Identification in Social Media (OffensEval 2020). The task involves three subtasks corresponding to the hierarchical taxonomy of the OLID schema (Zampieri et al., 2019a) from OffensEval 2019. The task featured five languages: English, Arabic, Danish, Greek, and Turkish for Subtask A. In addition, English also featured Subtasks B and C. OffensEval 2020 was one of the most popular tasks at SemEval-2020 attracting a large number of participants across all subtasks and also across all languages. A total of 528 teams signed up to participate in the task, 145 teams submitted systems during the evaluation period, and 70 submitted system description papers.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

There is a candidate electromagnetic counterpart to the binary black hole merger GW190521, identified as ZTF19abanrhr within AGN J124942.3 + 344929. Additionally, GW190514 is proposed as a plausible precursor merger to GW190521 within a hierarchical merger scenario. In this study, we investigate the potential association between GW190514 and GW190521 as a hierarchical triple merger associated with ZTF19abanrhr, taking into account of sky position, distance, and mass of the sources using a Bayesian criterion. Our analysis reveals that the association is favored over a random coincidence, with a log Bayes factor of 16.8, corresponding to an odds ratio of sim199:1, assuming an astrophysical prior odds of 10^{-5}. Notably, when accounting for the primary masses of the two gravitational wave events as potential products of mergers in the AGN formation channel, the Bayes factor increases significantly, further enhancing the preference for this association by a factor of sim10^2, corresponding to a log Bayes factor of 21.5 and an odds ratio of sim2times10^4:1. Our results suggest strong evidence for the first hierarchical triple merger associated with an electromagnetic counterpart in the AGN formation channel. This work is crucial for understanding the formation mechanisms of massive black holes, the role of AGNs in hierarchical mergers, and the implications of multi-messenger astronomy.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

One of the burning problems lately in Japan has been cyber-bullying, or slandering and bullying people online. The problem has been especially noticed on unofficial Web sites of Japanese schools. Volunteers consisting of school personnel and PTA (Parent-Teacher Association) members have started Online Patrol to spot malicious contents within Web forums and blogs. In practise, Online Patrol assumes reading through the whole Web contents, which is a task difficult to perform manually. With this paper we introduce a research intended to help PTA members perform Online Patrol more efficiently. We aim to develop a set of tools that can automatically detect malicious entries and report them to PTA members. First, we collected cyber-bullying data from unofficial school Web sites. Then we performed analysis of this data in two ways. Firstly, we analysed the entries with a multifaceted affect analysis system in order to find distinctive features for cyber-bullying and apply them to a machine learning classifier. Secondly, we applied a SVM based machine learning method to train a classifier for detection of cyber-bullying. The system was able to classify cyber-bullying entries with 88.2% of balanced F-score.

The National Airspace System (NAS) is a complex and evolving system that enables safe and efficient aviation. Advanced air mobility concepts and new airspace entrants, such as unmanned aircraft, must integrate into the NAS without degrading overall safety or efficiency. For instance, regulations, standards, and systems are required to mitigate the risk of a midair collision between aircraft. Monte Carlo simulations have been a foundational capability for decades to develop, assess, and certify aircraft conflict avoidance systems. These are often validated through human-in-the-loop experiments and flight testing. For many aviation safety studies, manned aircraft behavior is represented using dynamic Bayesian networks. The original statistical models were developed from 2008-2013 to support safety simulations for altitudes above 500 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). However, these models were not sufficient to assess the safety of smaller UAS operations below 500 feet AGL. In response, newer models with altitude floors below 500 feet AGL have been in development since 2018. Many of the models assume that aircraft behavior is uncorrelated and not dependent on air traffic services or nearby aircraft. Our research objective was to compare the various uncorrelated models of conventional aircraft and identify how the models differ. Particularly if models of rotorcraft were sufficiently different than models of fixed-wing aircraft to require type specific models. The primary contribution is guidance on which uncorrelated models to leverage when evaluating the performance of a collision avoidance system designed for low altitude operations. We also address which models can be surrogates for noncooperative aircraft without transponders.

AI safety training and red-teaming of large language models (LLMs) are measures to mitigate the generation of unsafe content. Our work exposes the inherent cross-lingual vulnerability of these safety mechanisms, resulting from the linguistic inequality of safety training data, by successfully circumventing GPT-4's safeguard through translating unsafe English inputs into low-resource languages. On the AdvBenchmark, GPT-4 engages with the unsafe translated inputs and provides actionable items that can get the users towards their harmful goals 79% of the time, which is on par with or even surpassing state-of-the-art jailbreaking attacks. Other high-/mid-resource languages have significantly lower attack success rate, which suggests that the cross-lingual vulnerability mainly applies to low-resource languages. Previously, limited training on low-resource languages primarily affects speakers of those languages, causing technological disparities. However, our work highlights a crucial shift: this deficiency now poses a risk to all LLMs users. Publicly available translation APIs enable anyone to exploit LLMs' safety vulnerabilities. Therefore, our work calls for a more holistic red-teaming efforts to develop robust multilingual safeguards with wide language coverage.

Recent developments in balancing the usefulness and safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) have raised a critical question: Are mainstream NLP tasks adequately aligned with safety consideration? Our study, focusing on safety-sensitive documents obtained through adversarial attacks, reveals significant disparities in the safety alignment of various NLP tasks. For instance, LLMs can effectively summarize malicious long documents but often refuse to translate them. This discrepancy highlights a previously unidentified vulnerability: attacks exploiting tasks with weaker safety alignment, like summarization, can potentially compromise the integraty of tasks traditionally deemed more robust, such as translation and question-answering (QA). Moreover, the concurrent use of multiple NLP tasks with lesser safety alignment increases the risk of LLMs inadvertently processing harmful content. We demonstrate these vulnerabilities in various safety-aligned LLMs, particularly Llama2 models and GPT-4, indicating an urgent need for strengthening safety alignments across a broad spectrum of NLP tasks.

Target-based sentiment analysis or aspect-based sentiment analysis (ABSA) refers to addressing various sentiment analysis tasks at a fine-grained level, which includes but is not limited to aspect extraction, aspect sentiment classification, and opinion extraction. There exist many solvers of the above individual subtasks or a combination of two subtasks, and they can work together to tell a complete story, i.e. the discussed aspect, the sentiment on it, and the cause of the sentiment. However, no previous ABSA research tried to provide a complete solution in one shot. In this paper, we introduce a new subtask under ABSA, named aspect sentiment triplet extraction (ASTE). Particularly, a solver of this task needs to extract triplets (What, How, Why) from the inputs, which show WHAT the targeted aspects are, HOW their sentiment polarities are and WHY they have such polarities (i.e. opinion reasons). For instance, one triplet from "Waiters are very friendly and the pasta is simply average" could be ('Waiters', positive, 'friendly'). We propose a two-stage framework to address this task. The first stage predicts what, how and why in a unified model, and then the second stage pairs up the predicted what (how) and why from the first stage to output triplets. In the experiments, our framework has set a benchmark performance in this novel triplet extraction task. Meanwhile, it outperforms a few strong baselines adapted from state-of-the-art related methods.

KT developed a Responsible AI (RAI) assessment methodology and risk mitigation technologies to ensure the safety and reliability of AI services. By analyzing the Basic Act on AI implementation and global AI governance trends, we established a unique approach for regulatory compliance and systematically identify and manage all potential risk factors from AI development to operation. We present a reliable assessment methodology that systematically verifies model safety and robustness based on KT's AI risk taxonomy tailored to the domestic environment. We also provide practical tools for managing and mitigating identified AI risks. With the release of this report, we also release proprietary Guardrail : SafetyGuard that blocks harmful responses from AI models in real-time, supporting the enhancement of safety in the domestic AI development ecosystem. We also believe these research outcomes provide valuable insights for organizations seeking to develop Responsible AI.

Digital Twin was introduced over a decade ago, as an innovative all-encompassing tool, with perceived benefits including real-time monitoring, simulation and forecasting. However, the theoretical framework and practical implementations of digital twins (DT) are still far from this vision. Although successful implementations exist, sufficient implementation details are not publicly available, therefore it is difficult to assess their effectiveness, draw comparisons and jointly advance the DT methodology. This work explores the various DT features and current approaches, the shortcomings and reasons behind the delay in the implementation and adoption of digital twin. Advancements in machine learning, internet of things and big data have contributed hugely to the improvements in DT with regards to its real-time monitoring and forecasting properties. Despite this progress and individual company-based efforts, certain research gaps exist in the field, which have caused delay in the widespread adoption of this concept. We reviewed relevant works and identified that the major reasons for this delay are the lack of a universal reference framework, domain dependence, security concerns of shared data, reliance of digital twin on other technologies, and lack of quantitative metrics. We define the necessary components of a digital twin required for a universal reference framework, which also validate its uniqueness as a concept compared to similar concepts like simulation, autonomous systems, etc. This work further assesses the digital twin applications in different domains and the current state of machine learning and big data in it. It thus answers and identifies novel research questions, both of which will help to better understand and advance the theory and practice of digital twins.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Recently, the DeepSeek series of models, leveraging their exceptional reasoning capabilities and open-source strategy, is reshaping the global AI landscape. Despite these advantages, they exhibit significant safety deficiencies. Research conducted by Robust Intelligence, a subsidiary of Cisco, in collaboration with the University of Pennsylvania, revealed that DeepSeek-R1 has a 100\% attack success rate when processing harmful prompts. Additionally, multiple safety companies and research institutions have confirmed critical safety vulnerabilities in this model. As models demonstrating robust performance in Chinese and English, DeepSeek models require equally crucial safety assessments in both language contexts. However, current research has predominantly focused on safety evaluations in English environments, leaving a gap in comprehensive assessments of their safety performance in Chinese contexts. In response to this gap, this study introduces CHiSafetyBench, a Chinese-specific safety evaluation benchmark. This benchmark systematically evaluates the safety of DeepSeek-R1 and DeepSeek-V3 in Chinese contexts, revealing their performance across safety categories. The experimental results quantify the deficiencies of these two models in Chinese contexts, providing key insights for subsequent improvements. It should be noted that, despite our efforts to establish a comprehensive, objective, and authoritative evaluation benchmark, the selection of test samples, characteristics of data distribution, and the setting of evaluation criteria may inevitably introduce certain biases into the evaluation results. We will continuously optimize the evaluation benchmark and periodically update this report to provide more comprehensive and accurate assessment outcomes. Please refer to the latest version of the paper for the most recent evaluation results and conclusions.

In recent years, AI red teaming has emerged as a practice for probing the safety and security of generative AI systems. Due to the nascency of the field, there are many open questions about how red teaming operations should be conducted. Based on our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft, we present our internal threat model ontology and eight main lessons we have learned: 1. Understand what the system can do and where it is applied 2. You don't have to compute gradients to break an AI system 3. AI red teaming is not safety benchmarking 4. Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape 5. The human element of AI red teaming is crucial 6. Responsible AI harms are pervasive but difficult to measure 7. LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones 8. The work of securing AI systems will never be complete By sharing these insights alongside case studies from our operations, we offer practical recommendations aimed at aligning red teaming efforts with real world risks. We also highlight aspects of AI red teaming that we believe are often misunderstood and discuss open questions for the field to consider.

As an initial assessment, over 480,000 labeled virtual images of normal highway driving were readily generated in Grand Theft Auto V's virtual environment. Using these images, a CNN was trained to detect following distance to cars/objects ahead, lane markings, and driving angle (angular heading relative to lane centerline): all variables necessary for basic autonomous driving. Encouraging results were obtained when tested on over 50,000 labeled virtual images from substantially different GTA-V driving environments. This initial assessment begins to define both the range and scope of the labeled images needed for training as well as the range and scope of labeled images needed for testing the definition of boundaries and limitations of trained networks. It is the efficacy and flexibility of a "GTA-V"-like virtual environment that is expected to provide an efficient well-defined foundation for the training and testing of Convolutional Neural Networks for safe driving. Additionally, described is the Princeton Virtual Environment (PVE) for the training, testing and enhancement of safe driving AI, which is being developed using the video-game engine Unity. PVE is being developed to recreate rare but critical corner cases that can be used in re-training and enhancing machine learning models and understanding the limitations of current self driving models. The Florida Tesla crash is being used as an initial reference.

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

We present our systems submitted for the shared tasks of Acronym Identification (AI) and Acronym Disambiguation (AD) held under Workshop on SDU. We mainly experiment with BERT and SciBERT. In addition, we assess the effectiveness of "BIOless" tagging and blending along with the prowess of ensembling in AI. For AD, we formulate the problem as a span prediction task, experiment with different training techniques and also leverage the use of external data. Our systems rank 11th and 3rd in AI and AD tasks respectively.

This document presents the Center for Robot Assisted Search And Rescue - Uncrewed Aerial Systems - Disaster Response Overhead Inspection Dataset (CRASAR-U-DROIDs) for building damage assessment and spatial alignment collected from small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) geospatial imagery. This dataset is motivated by the increasing use of sUAS in disaster response and the lack of previous work in utilizing high-resolution geospatial sUAS imagery for machine learning and computer vision models, the lack of alignment with operational use cases, and with hopes of enabling further investigations between sUAS and satellite imagery. The CRASAR-U-DRIODs dataset consists of fifty-two (52) orthomosaics from ten (10) federally declared disasters (Hurricane Ian, Hurricane Ida, Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Idalia, Hurricane Laura, Hurricane Michael, Musset Bayou Fire, Mayfield Tornado, Kilauea Eruption, and Champlain Towers Collapse) spanning 67.98 square kilometers (26.245 square miles), containing 21,716 building polygons and damage labels, and 7,880 adjustment annotations. The imagery was tiled and presented in conjunction with overlaid building polygons to a pool of 130 annotators who provided human judgments of damage according to the Joint Damage Scale. These annotations were then reviewed via a two-stage review process in which building polygon damage labels were first reviewed individually and then again by committee. Additionally, the building polygons have been aligned spatially to precisely overlap with the imagery to enable more performant machine learning models to be trained. It appears that CRASAR-U-DRIODs is the largest labeled dataset of sUAS orthomosaic imagery.

Multimodal large language models with Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) have significantly advanced tasks such as multimodal question answering by grounding responses in external text and images. This grounding improves factuality, reduces hallucination, and extends reasoning beyond parametric knowledge. However, this reliance on external knowledge poses a critical yet underexplored safety risk: knowledge poisoning attacks, where adversaries deliberately inject adversarial multimodal content into external knowledge bases to steer model toward generating incorrect or even harmful responses. To expose such vulnerabilities, we propose MM-PoisonRAG, the first framework to systematically design knowledge poisoning in multimodal RAG. We introduce two complementary attack strategies: Localized Poisoning Attack (LPA), which implants targeted multimodal misinformation to manipulate specific queries, and Globalized Poisoning Attack (GPA), which inserts a single adversarial knowledge to broadly disrupt reasoning and induce nonsensical responses across all queries. Comprehensive experiments across tasks, models, and access settings show that LPA achieves targeted manipulation with attack success rates of up to 56%, while GPA completely disrupts model generation to 0% accuracy with just a single adversarial knowledge injection. Our results reveal the fragility of multimodal RAG and highlight the urgent need for defenses against knowledge poisoning.

Transportation Cyber-Physical Systems (T-CPS) enhance safety and mobility by integrating cyber and physical transportation systems. A key component of T-CPS is the Digital Twin (DT), a virtual representation that enables simulation, analysis, and optimization through real-time data exchange and communication. Although existing studies have explored DTs for vehicles, communications, pedestrians, and traffic, real-world validations and implementations of DTs that encompass infrastructure, vehicles, signals, communications, and more remain limited due to several challenges. These include accessing real-world connected infrastructure, integrating heterogeneous, multi-sourced data, ensuring real-time data processing, and synchronizing the digital and physical systems. To address these challenges, this study develops a traffic DT based on a real-world connected vehicle corridor. Leveraging the Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) infrastructure in the corridor, along with communication, computing, and simulation technologies, the proposed DT accurately replicates physical vehicle behaviors, signal timing, communications, and traffic patterns within the virtual environment. Building upon the previous data pipeline, the digital system ensures robust synchronization with the physical environment. Moreover, the DT's scalable and redundant architecture enhances data integrity, making it capable of supporting future large-scale C-V2X deployments. Furthermore, its ability to provide feedback to the physical system is demonstrated through applications such as signal timing adjustments, vehicle advisory messages, and incident notifications. The proposed DT is a vital tool in T-CPS, enabling real-time traffic monitoring, prediction, and optimization to enhance the reliability and safety of transportation systems.

The COVID-19 pandemic is the worst pandemic to strike the world in over a century. Crucial to stemming the tide of the SARS-CoV-2 virus is communicating to vulnerable populations the means by which they can protect themselves. To this end, the collaborators forming the Translation Initiative for COvid-19 (TICO-19) have made test and development data available to AI and MT researchers in 35 different languages in order to foster the development of tools and resources for improving access to information about COVID-19 in these languages. In addition to 9 high-resourced, "pivot" languages, the team is targeting 26 lesser resourced languages, in particular languages of Africa, South Asia and South-East Asia, whose populations may be the most vulnerable to the spread of the virus. The same data is translated into all of the languages represented, meaning that testing or development can be done for any pairing of languages in the set. Further, the team is converting the test and development data into translation memories (TMXs) that can be used by localizers from and to any of the languages.

We, team AImsterdam, summarize our submission to the fastMRI challenge (Zbontar et al., 2018). Our approach builds on recent advances in invertible learning to infer models as presented in Putzky and Welling (2019). Both, our single-coil and our multi-coil model share the same basic architecture.

We present a framework for the automated measurement of responsible AI (RAI) metrics for large language models (LLMs) and associated products and services. Our framework for automatically measuring harms from LLMs builds on existing technical and sociotechnical expertise and leverages the capabilities of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4. We use this framework to run through several case studies investigating how different LLMs may violate a range of RAI-related principles. The framework may be employed alongside domain-specific sociotechnical expertise to create measurements for new harm areas in the future. By implementing this framework, we aim to enable more advanced harm measurement efforts and further the responsible use of LLMs.

Recently, we have witnessed a rise in the use of Large Language Models (LLMs), especially in applications like chatbot assistants. Safety mechanisms and specialized training procedures are implemented to prevent improper responses from these assistants. In this work, we bypass these measures for ChatGPT and Gemini (and, to some extent, Bing chat) by making them impersonate complex personas with personality characteristics that are not aligned with a truthful assistant. We start by creating elaborate biographies of these personas, which we then use in a new session with the same chatbots. Our conversations then follow a role-play style to elicit prohibited responses. Using personas, we show that prohibited responses are actually provided, making it possible to obtain unauthorized, illegal, or harmful information. This work shows that by using adversarial personas, one can overcome safety mechanisms set out by ChatGPT and Gemini. We also introduce several ways of activating such adversarial personas, which show that both chatbots are vulnerable to this kind of attack. With the same principle, we introduce two defenses that push the model to interpret trustworthy personalities and make it more robust against such attacks.

Despite careful safety alignment, current large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to various attacks. To further unveil the safety risks of LLMs, we introduce a Safety Concept Activation Vector (SCAV) framework, which effectively guides the attacks by accurately interpreting LLMs' safety mechanisms. We then develop an SCAV-guided attack method that can generate both attack prompts and embedding-level attacks with automatically selected perturbation hyperparameters. Both automatic and human evaluations demonstrate that our attack method significantly improves the attack success rate and response quality while requiring less training data. Additionally, we find that our generated attack prompts may be transferable to GPT-4, and the embedding-level attacks may also be transferred to other white-box LLMs whose parameters are known. Our experiments further uncover the safety risks present in current LLMs. For example, in our evaluation of seven open-source LLMs, we observe an average attack success rate of 99.14%, based on the classic keyword-matching criterion. Finally, we provide insights into the safety mechanism of LLMs. The code is available at https://github.com/SproutNan/AI-Safety_SCAV.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown incredible capabilities and transcended the natural language processing (NLP) community, with adoption throughout many services like healthcare, therapy, education, and customer service. Since users include people with critical information needs like students or patients engaging with chatbots, the safety of these systems is of prime importance. Therefore, a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of LLMs is necessary. To this end, we systematically evaluate toxicity in over half a million generations of ChatGPT, a popular dialogue-based LLM. We find that setting the system parameter of ChatGPT by assigning it a persona, say that of the boxer Muhammad Ali, significantly increases the toxicity of generations. Depending on the persona assigned to ChatGPT, its toxicity can increase up to 6x, with outputs engaging in incorrect stereotypes, harmful dialogue, and hurtful opinions. This may be potentially defamatory to the persona and harmful to an unsuspecting user. Furthermore, we find concerning patterns where specific entities (e.g., certain races) are targeted more than others (3x more) irrespective of the assigned persona, that reflect inherent discriminatory biases in the model. We hope that our findings inspire the broader AI community to rethink the efficacy of current safety guardrails and develop better techniques that lead to robust, safe, and trustworthy AI systems.

As generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs), become increasingly integrated into production applications, new attack surfaces and vulnerabilities emerge and put a focus on adversarial threats in natural language and multi-modal systems. Red-teaming has gained importance in proactively identifying weaknesses in these systems, while blue-teaming works to protect against such adversarial attacks. Despite growing academic interest in adversarial risks for generative AI, there is limited guidance tailored for practitioners to assess and mitigate these challenges in real-world environments. To address this, our contributions include: (1) a practical examination of red- and blue-teaming strategies for securing generative AI, (2) identification of key challenges and open questions in defense development and evaluation, and (3) the Attack Atlas, an intuitive framework that brings a practical approach to analyzing single-turn input attacks, placing it at the forefront for practitioners. This work aims to bridge the gap between academic insights and practical security measures for the protection of generative AI systems.

Recent advances in vision-language-action (VLA) models have greatly improved embodied AI, enabling robots to follow natural language instructions and perform diverse tasks. However, their reliance on uncurated training datasets raises serious security concerns. Existing backdoor attacks on VLAs mostly assume white-box access and result in task failures instead of enforcing specific actions. In this work, we reveal a more practical threat: attackers can manipulate VLAs by simply injecting physical objects as triggers into the training dataset. We propose goal-oriented backdoor attacks (GoBA), where the VLA behaves normally in the absence of physical triggers but executes predefined and goal-oriented actions in the presence of physical triggers. Specifically, based on a popular VLA benchmark LIBERO, we introduce BadLIBERO that incorporates diverse physical triggers and goal-oriented backdoor actions. In addition, we propose a three-level evaluation that categorizes the victim VLA's actions under GoBA into three states: nothing to do, try to do, and success to do. Experiments show that GoBA enables the victim VLA to successfully achieve the backdoor goal in 97 percentage of inputs when the physical trigger is present, while causing zero performance degradation on clean inputs. Finally, by investigating factors related to GoBA, we find that the action trajectory and trigger color significantly influence attack performance, while trigger size has surprisingly little effect. The code and BadLIBERO dataset are accessible via the project page at https://goba-attack.github.io/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

With the rapid development and integration of artificial intelligence (AI) methods in next-generation networks (NextG), AI algorithms have provided significant advantages for NextG in terms of frequency spectrum usage, bandwidth, latency, and security. A key feature of NextG is the integration of AI, i.e., self-learning architecture based on self-supervised algorithms, to improve the performance of the network. A secure AI-powered structure is also expected to protect NextG networks against cyber-attacks. However, AI itself may be attacked, i.e., model poisoning targeted by attackers, and it results in cybersecurity violations. This paper proposes an AI trust platform using Streamlit for NextG networks that allows researchers to evaluate, defend, certify, and verify their AI models and applications against adversarial threats of evasion, poisoning, extraction, and interference.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to meet ethical standards and safety requirements by training them to refuse answering harmful or unsafe prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate how adversaries can exploit LLMs' alignment to implant bias, or enforce targeted censorship without degrading the model's responsiveness to unrelated topics. Specifically, we propose Subversive Alignment Injection (SAI), a poisoning attack that leverages the alignment mechanism to trigger refusal on specific topics or queries predefined by the adversary. Although it is perhaps not surprising that refusal can be induced through overalignment, we demonstrate how this refusal can be exploited to inject bias into the model. Surprisingly, SAI evades state-of-the-art poisoning defenses including LLM state forensics, as well as robust aggregation techniques that are designed to detect poisoning in FL settings. We demonstrate the practical dangers of this attack by illustrating its end-to-end impacts on LLM-powered application pipelines. For chat based applications such as ChatDoctor, with 1% data poisoning, the system refuses to answer healthcare questions to targeted racial category leading to high bias (Delta DP of 23%). We also show that bias can be induced in other NLP tasks: for a resume selection pipeline aligned to refuse to summarize CVs from a selected university, high bias in selection (Delta DP of 27%) results. Even higher bias (Delta DP~38%) results on 9 other chat based downstream applications.

Language agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have seen exploding development. Their capability of using language as a vehicle for thought and communication lends an incredible level of flexibility and versatility. People have quickly capitalized on this capability to connect LLMs to a wide range of external components and environments: databases, tools, the Internet, robotic embodiment, etc. Many believe an unprecedentedly powerful automation technology is emerging. However, new automation technologies come with new safety risks, especially for intricate systems like language agents. There is a surprisingly large gap between the speed and scale of their development and deployment and our understanding of their safety risks. Are we building a house of cards? In this position paper, we present the first systematic effort in mapping adversarial attacks against language agents. We first present a unified conceptual framework for agents with three major components: Perception, Brain, and Action. Under this framework, we present a comprehensive discussion and propose 12 potential attack scenarios against different components of an agent, covering different attack strategies (e.g., input manipulation, adversarial demonstrations, jailbreaking, backdoors). We also draw connections to successful attack strategies previously applied to LLMs. We emphasize the urgency to gain a thorough understanding of language agent risks before their widespread deployment.

We describe our early efforts to red team language models in order to simultaneously discover, measure, and attempt to reduce their potentially harmful outputs. We make three main contributions. First, we investigate scaling behaviors for red teaming across 3 model sizes (2.7B, 13B, and 52B parameters) and 4 model types: a plain language model (LM); an LM prompted to be helpful, honest, and harmless; an LM with rejection sampling; and a model trained to be helpful and harmless using reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). We find that the RLHF models are increasingly difficult to red team as they scale, and we find a flat trend with scale for the other model types. Second, we release our dataset of 38,961 red team attacks for others to analyze and learn from. We provide our own analysis of the data and find a variety of harmful outputs, which range from offensive language to more subtly harmful non-violent unethical outputs. Third, we exhaustively describe our instructions, processes, statistical methodologies, and uncertainty about red teaming. We hope that this transparency accelerates our ability to work together as a community in order to develop shared norms, practices, and technical standards for how to red team language models.

The Machine Learning for Combinatorial Optimization (ML4CO) NeurIPS 2021 competition aims to improve state-of-the-art combinatorial optimization solvers by replacing key heuristic components with machine learning models. On the dual task, we design models to make branching decisions to promote the dual bound increase faster. We propose a knowledge inheritance method to generalize knowledge of different models from the dataset aggregation process, named KIDA. Our improvement overcomes some defects of the baseline graph-neural-networks-based methods. Further, we won the 1st Place on the dual task. We hope this report can provide useful experience for developers and researchers. The code is available at https://github.com/megvii-research/NeurIPS2021-ML4CO-KIDA.

The presence of offensive language on social media platforms and the implications this poses is becoming a major concern in modern society. Given the enormous amount of content created every day, automatic methods are required to detect and deal with this type of content. Until now, most of the research has focused on solving the problem for the English language, while the problem is multilingual. We construct a Danish dataset containing user-generated comments from Reddit and Facebook. It contains user generated comments from various social media platforms, and to our knowledge, it is the first of its kind. Our dataset is annotated to capture various types and target of offensive language. We develop four automatic classification systems, each designed to work for both the English and the Danish language. In the detection of offensive language in English, the best performing system achieves a macro averaged F1-score of 0.74, and the best performing system for Danish achieves a macro averaged F1-score of 0.70. In the detection of whether or not an offensive post is targeted, the best performing system for English achieves a macro averaged F1-score of 0.62, while the best performing system for Danish achieves a macro averaged F1-score of 0.73. Finally, in the detection of the target type in a targeted offensive post, the best performing system for English achieves a macro averaged F1-score of 0.56, and the best performing system for Danish achieves a macro averaged F1-score of 0.63. Our work for both the English and the Danish language captures the type and targets of offensive language, and present automatic methods for detecting different kinds of offensive language such as hate speech and cyberbullying.

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

AI systems that "think" in human language offer a unique opportunity for AI safety: we can monitor their chains of thought (CoT) for the intent to misbehave. Like all other known AI oversight methods, CoT monitoring is imperfect and allows some misbehavior to go unnoticed. Nevertheless, it shows promise and we recommend further research into CoT monitorability and investment in CoT monitoring alongside existing safety methods. Because CoT monitorability may be fragile, we recommend that frontier model developers consider the impact of development decisions on CoT monitorability.

We present the FinCausal 2020 Shared Task on Causality Detection in Financial Documents and the associated FinCausal dataset, and discuss the participating systems and results. Two sub-tasks are proposed: a binary classification task (Task 1) and a relation extraction task (Task 2). A total of 16 teams submitted runs across the two Tasks and 13 of them contributed with a system description paper. This workshop is associated to the Joint Workshop on Financial Narrative Processing and MultiLing Financial Summarisation (FNP-FNS 2020), held at The 28th International Conference on Computational Linguistics (COLING'2020), Barcelona, Spain on September 12, 2020.

Recent research demonstrates that the nascent fine-tuning-as-a-service business model exposes serious safety concerns -- fine-tuning over a few harmful data uploaded by the users can compromise the safety alignment of the model. The attack, known as harmful fine-tuning, has raised a broad research interest among the community. However, as the attack is still new, we observe from our miserable submission experience that there are general misunderstandings within the research community. We in this paper aim to clear some common concerns for the attack setting, and formally establish the research problem. Specifically, we first present the threat model of the problem, and introduce the harmful fine-tuning attack and its variants. Then we systematically survey the existing literature on attacks/defenses/mechanical analysis of the problem. Finally, we outline future research directions that might contribute to the development of the field. Additionally, we present a list of questions of interest, which might be useful to refer to when reviewers in the peer review process question the realism of the experiment/attack/defense setting. A curated list of relevant papers is maintained and made accessible at: https://github.com/git-disl/awesome_LLM-harmful-fine-tuning-papers.

Due to the exponentially increasing reach of social media, it is essential to focus on its negative aspects as it can potentially divide society and incite people into violence. In this paper, we present our system description of work on the shared task ComMA@ICON, where we have to classify how aggressive the sentence is and if the sentence is gender-biased or communal biased. These three could be the primary reasons to cause significant problems in society. As team Hypers we have proposed an approach that utilizes different pretrained models with Attention and mean pooling methods. We were able to get Rank 3 with 0.223 Instance F1 score on Bengali, Rank 2 with 0.322 Instance F1 score on Multi-lingual set, Rank 4 with 0.129 Instance F1 score on Meitei and Rank 5 with 0.336 Instance F1 score on Hindi. The source code and the pretrained models of this work can be found here.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Large language models and AI chatbots have been at the forefront of democratizing artificial intelligence. However, the releases of ChatGPT and other similar tools have been followed by growing concerns regarding the difficulty of controlling large language models and their outputs. Currently, we are witnessing a cat-and-mouse game where users attempt to misuse the models with a novel attack called prompt injections. In contrast, the developers attempt to discover the vulnerabilities and block the attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we provide an overview of these emergent threats and present a categorization of prompt injections, which can guide future research on prompt injections and act as a checklist of vulnerabilities in the development of LLM interfaces. Moreover, based on previous literature and our own empirical research, we discuss the implications of prompt injections to LLM end users, developers, and researchers.

Background: Generative artificial intelligence (AI) deployment in academic medical settings raises copyright compliance concerns. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute implemented GPT4DFCI, an internal generative AI tool utilizing OpenAI models, that is approved for enterprise use in research and operations. Given (1) the exceptionally broad adoption of the tool in our organization, (2) our research mission, and (3) the shared responsibility model required to benefit from Customer Copyright Commitment in Azure OpenAI Service products, we deemed rigorous copyright compliance testing necessary. Case Description: We conducted a structured red teaming exercise in Nov. 2024, with 42 participants from academic, industry, and government institutions. Four teams attempted to extract copyrighted content from GPT4DFCI across four domains: literary works, news articles, scientific publications, and access-restricted clinical notes. Teams successfully extracted verbatim book dedications and near-exact passages through various strategies. News article extraction failed despite jailbreak attempts. Scientific article reproduction yielded only high-level summaries. Clinical note testing revealed appropriate privacy safeguards. Discussion: The successful extraction of literary content indicates potential copyrighted material presence in training data, necessitating inference-time filtering. Differential success rates across content types suggest varying protective mechanisms. The event led to implementation of a copyright-specific meta-prompt in GPT4DFCI; this mitigation has been in production since Jan. 2025. Conclusion: Systematic red teaming revealed specific vulnerabilities in generative AI copyright compliance, leading to concrete mitigation strategies. Academic medical institutions deploying generative AI should implement continuous testing protocols to ensure legal and ethical compliance.

We introduce Doublespeak, a simple in-context representation hijacking attack against large language models (LLMs). The attack works by systematically replacing a harmful keyword (e.g., bomb) with a benign token (e.g., carrot) across multiple in-context examples, provided a prefix to a harmful request. We demonstrate that this substitution leads to the internal representation of the benign token converging toward that of the harmful one, effectively embedding the harmful semantics under a euphemism. As a result, superficially innocuous prompts (e.g., ``How to build a carrot?'') are internally interpreted as disallowed instructions (e.g., ``How to build a bomb?''), thereby bypassing the model's safety alignment. We use interpretability tools to show that this semantic overwrite emerges layer by layer, with benign meanings in early layers converging into harmful semantics in later ones. Doublespeak is optimization-free, broadly transferable across model families, and achieves strong success rates on closed-source and open-source systems, reaching 74\% ASR on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct with a single-sentence context override. Our findings highlight a new attack surface in the latent space of LLMs, revealing that current alignment strategies are insufficient and should instead operate at the representation level.

As unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) continue to integrate into the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS), there is a need to quantify the risk of airborne collisions between unmanned and manned aircraft to support regulation and standards development. Both regulators and standards developing organizations have made extensive use of Monte Carlo collision risk analysis simulations using probabilistic models of aircraft flight. We've previously determined that the observations of manned aircraft by the OpenSky Network, a community network of ground-based sensors, are appropriate to develop models of the low altitude environment. This works overviews the high performance computing workflow designed and deployed on the Lincoln Laboratory Supercomputing Center to process 3.9 billion observations of aircraft. We then trained the aircraft models using more than 250,000 flight hours at 5,000 feet above ground level or below. A key feature of the workflow is that all the aircraft observations and supporting datasets are available as open source technologies or been released to the public domain.

The White House Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence highlights the risks of large language models (LLMs) empowering malicious actors in developing biological, cyber, and chemical weapons. To measure these risks of malicious use, government institutions and major AI labs are developing evaluations for hazardous capabilities in LLMs. However, current evaluations are private, preventing further research into mitigating risk. Furthermore, they focus on only a few, highly specific pathways for malicious use. To fill these gaps, we publicly release the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy (WMDP) benchmark, a dataset of 4,157 multiple-choice questions that serve as a proxy measurement of hazardous knowledge in biosecurity, cybersecurity, and chemical security. WMDP was developed by a consortium of academics and technical consultants, and was stringently filtered to eliminate sensitive information prior to public release. WMDP serves two roles: first, as an evaluation for hazardous knowledge in LLMs, and second, as a benchmark for unlearning methods to remove such hazardous knowledge. To guide progress on unlearning, we develop CUT, a state-of-the-art unlearning method based on controlling model representations. CUT reduces model performance on WMDP while maintaining general capabilities in areas such as biology and computer science, suggesting that unlearning may be a concrete path towards reducing malicious use from LLMs. We release our benchmark and code publicly at https://wmdp.ai

This paper presents a summary of the Competition on Face Morphing Attack Detection Based on Privacy-aware Synthetic Training Data (SYN-MAD) held at the 2022 International Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB 2022). The competition attracted a total of 12 participating teams, both from academia and industry and present in 11 different countries. In the end, seven valid submissions were submitted by the participating teams and evaluated by the organizers. The competition was held to present and attract solutions that deal with detecting face morphing attacks while protecting people's privacy for ethical and legal reasons. To ensure this, the training data was limited to synthetic data provided by the organizers. The submitted solutions presented innovations that led to outperforming the considered baseline in many experimental settings. The evaluation benchmark is now available at: https://github.com/marcohuber/SYN-MAD-2022.

This article details the advances made to a system that uses artificial intelligence to identify alarming student responses. This system is built into our assessment platform to assess whether a student's response indicates they are a threat to themselves or others. Such responses may include details concerning threats of violence, severe depression, suicide risks, and descriptions of abuse. Driven by advances in natural language processing, the latest model is a fine-tuned language model trained on a large corpus consisting of student responses and supplementary texts. We demonstrate that the use of a language model delivers a substantial improvement in accuracy over the previous iterations of this system.

Automatic speaker verification (ASV) is one of the most natural and convenient means of biometric person recognition. Unfortunately, just like all other biometric systems, ASV is vulnerable to spoofing, also referred to as "presentation attacks." These vulnerabilities are generally unacceptable and call for spoofing countermeasures or "presentation attack detection" systems. In addition to impersonation, ASV systems are vulnerable to replay, speech synthesis, and voice conversion attacks. The ASVspoof 2019 edition is the first to consider all three spoofing attack types within a single challenge. While they originate from the same source database and same underlying protocol, they are explored in two specific use case scenarios. Spoofing attacks within a logical access (LA) scenario are generated with the latest speech synthesis and voice conversion technologies, including state-of-the-art neural acoustic and waveform model techniques. Replay spoofing attacks within a physical access (PA) scenario are generated through carefully controlled simulations that support much more revealing analysis than possible previously. Also new to the 2019 edition is the use of the tandem detection cost function metric, which reflects the impact of spoofing and countermeasures on the reliability of a fixed ASV system. This paper describes the database design, protocol, spoofing attack implementations, and baseline ASV and countermeasure results. It also describes a human assessment on spoofed data in logical access. It was demonstrated that the spoofing data in the ASVspoof 2019 database have varied degrees of perceived quality and similarity to the target speakers, including spoofed data that cannot be differentiated from bona-fide utterances even by human subjects.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks -- models lose their safety alignment ability after fine-tuning on a few harmful samples. For risk mitigation, a guardrail is typically used to filter out harmful samples before fine-tuning. By designing a new red-teaming method, we in this paper show that purely relying on the moderation guardrail for data filtration is not reliable. Our proposed attack method, dubbed Virus, easily bypasses the guardrail moderation by slightly modifying the harmful data. Experimental results show that the harmful data optimized by Virus is not detectable by the guardrail with up to 100\% leakage ratio, and can simultaneously achieve superior attack performance. Finally, the key message we want to convey through this paper is that: it is reckless to consider guardrail moderation as a clutch at straws towards harmful fine-tuning attack, as it cannot solve the inherent safety issue of the pre-trained LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Virus

Instances-reweighted adversarial training (IRAT) can significantly boost the robustness of trained models, where data being less/more vulnerable to the given attack are assigned smaller/larger weights during training. However, when tested on attacks different from the given attack simulated in training, the robustness may drop significantly (e.g., even worse than no reweighting). In this paper, we study this problem and propose our solution--locally reweighted adversarial training (LRAT). The rationale behind IRAT is that we do not need to pay much attention to an instance that is already safe under the attack. We argue that the safeness should be attack-dependent, so that for the same instance, its weight can change given different attacks based on the same model. Thus, if the attack simulated in training is mis-specified, the weights of IRAT are misleading. To this end, LRAT pairs each instance with its adversarial variants and performs local reweighting inside each pair, while performing no global reweighting--the rationale is to fit the instance itself if it is immune to the attack, but not to skip the pair, in order to passively defend different attacks in future. Experiments show that LRAT works better than both IRAT (i.e., global reweighting) and the standard AT (i.e., no reweighting) when trained with an attack and tested on different attacks.

Public LLMs such as the Llama 2-Chat have driven huge activity in LLM research. These models underwent alignment training and were considered safe. Recently Qi et al. (2023) reported that even benign fine-tuning (e.g., on seemingly safe datasets) can give rise to unsafe behaviors in the models. The current paper is about methods and best practices to mitigate such loss of alignment. Through extensive experiments on several chat models (Meta's Llama 2-Chat, Mistral AI's Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2, and OpenAI's GPT-3.5 Turbo), this paper uncovers that the prompt templates used during fine-tuning and inference play a crucial role in preserving safety alignment, and proposes the "Pure Tuning, Safe Testing" (PTST) principle -- fine-tune models without a safety prompt, but include it at test time. Fine-tuning experiments on GSM8K, ChatDoctor, and OpenOrca show that PTST significantly reduces the rise of unsafe behaviors, and even almost eliminates them in some cases.

Caution: This paper includes offensive words that could potentially cause unpleasantness. Language models (LMs) are vulnerable to exploitation for adversarial misuse. Training LMs for safety alignment is extensive and makes it hard to respond to fast-developing attacks immediately, such as jailbreaks. We propose self-refine with formatting that achieves outstanding safety even in non-safety-aligned LMs and evaluate our method alongside several defense baselines, demonstrating that it is the safest training-free method against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we proposed a formatting method that improves the efficiency of the self-refine process while reducing attack success rates in fewer iterations. We've also observed that non-safety-aligned LMs outperform safety-aligned LMs in safety tasks by giving more helpful and safe responses. In conclusion, our findings can achieve less safety risk with fewer computational costs, allowing non-safety LM to be easily utilized in real-world service.

Background: Human Emotion Recognition (HER) has been a popular field of study in the past years. Despite the great progresses made so far, relatively little attention has been paid to the use of HER in autism. People with autism are known to face problems with daily social communication and the prototypical interpretation of emotional responses, which are most frequently exerted via facial expressions. This poses significant practical challenges to the application of regular HER systems, which are normally developed for and by neurotypical people. Objective: This study reviews the literature on the use of HER systems in autism, particularly with respect to sensing technologies and machine learning methods, as to identify existing barriers and possible future directions. Methods: We conducted a systematic review of articles published between January 2011 and June 2023 according to the 2020 PRISMA guidelines. Manuscripts were identified through searching Web of Science and Scopus databases. Manuscripts were included when related to emotion recognition, used sensors and machine learning techniques, and involved children with autism, young, or adults. Results: The search yielded 346 articles. A total of 65 publications met the eligibility criteria and were included in the review. Conclusions: Studies predominantly used facial expression techniques as the emotion recognition method. Consequently, video cameras were the most widely used devices across studies, although a growing trend in the use of physiological sensors was observed lately. Happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise were most frequently addressed. Classical supervised machine learning techniques were primarily used at the expense of unsupervised approaches or more recent deep learning models.

While smishing (SMS Phishing) attacks have risen to become one of the most common types of social engineering attacks, there is a lack of relevant smishing datasets. One of the biggest challenges in the domain of smishing prevention is the availability of fresh smishing datasets. Additionally, as time persists, smishing campaigns are shut down and the crucial information related to the attack are lost. With the changing nature of smishing attacks, a consistent flow of new smishing examples is needed by both researchers and engineers to create effective defenses. In this paper, we present the community-sourced smishing datasets from the smishtank.com. It provides a wealth of information relevant to combating smishing attacks through the breakdown and analysis of smishing samples at the point of submission. In the contribution of our work, we provide a corpus of 1090 smishing samples that have been publicly submitted through the site. Each message includes information relating to the sender, message body, and any brands referenced in the message. Additionally, when a URL is found, we provide additional information on the domain, VirusTotal results, and a characterization of the URL. Through the open access of fresh smishing data, we empower academia and industries to create robust defenses against this evolving threat.

This paper proposes LATTE, the first static binary taint analysis that is powered by a large language model (LLM). LATTE is superior to the state of the art (e.g., Emtaint, Arbiter, Karonte) in three aspects. First, LATTE is fully automated while prior static binary taint analyzers need rely on human expertise to manually customize taint propagation rules and vulnerability inspection rules. Second, LATTE is significantly effective in vulnerability detection, demonstrated by our comprehensive evaluations. For example, LATTE has found 37 new bugs in real-world firmware which the baselines failed to find, and 7 of them have been assigned CVE numbers. Lastly, LATTE incurs remarkably low engineering cost, making it a cost-efficient and scalable solution for security researchers and practitioners. We strongly believe that LATTE opens up a new direction to harness the recent advance in LLMs to improve vulnerability analysis for binary programs.

AI systems for software development are rapidly gaining prominence, yet significant challenges remain in ensuring their safety. To address this, Amazon launched the Trusted AI track of the Amazon Nova AI Challenge, a global competition among 10 university teams to drive advances in secure AI. In the challenge, five teams focus on developing automated red teaming bots, while the other five create safe AI assistants. This challenge provides teams with a unique platform to evaluate automated red-teaming and safety alignment methods through head-to-head adversarial tournaments where red teams have multi-turn conversations with the competing AI coding assistants to test their safety alignment. Along with this, the challenge provides teams with a feed of high quality annotated data to fuel iterative improvement. Throughout the challenge, teams developed state-of-the-art techniques, introducing novel approaches in reasoning-based safety alignment, robust model guardrails, multi-turn jail-breaking, and efficient probing of large language models (LLMs). To support these efforts, the Amazon Nova AI Challenge team made substantial scientific and engineering investments, including building a custom baseline coding specialist model for the challenge from scratch, developing a tournament orchestration service, and creating an evaluation harness. This paper outlines the advancements made by university teams and the Amazon Nova AI Challenge team in addressing the safety challenges of AI for software development, highlighting this collaborative effort to raise the bar for AI safety.

We present the GenAI Content Detection Task~1 -- a shared task on binary machine generated text detection, conducted as a part of the GenAI workshop at COLING 2025. The task consists of two subtasks: Monolingual (English) and Multilingual. The shared task attracted many participants: 36 teams made official submissions to the Monolingual subtask during the test phase and 26 teams -- to the Multilingual. We provide a comprehensive overview of the data, a summary of the results -- including system rankings and performance scores -- detailed descriptions of the participating systems, and an in-depth analysis of submissions. https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/COLING-2025-Workshop-on-MGT-Detection-Task1

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive results on natural language tasks, and security researchers are beginning to employ them in both offensive and defensive systems. In cyber-security, there have been multiple research efforts that utilize LLMs focusing on the pre-breach stage of attacks like phishing and malware generation. However, so far there lacks a comprehensive study regarding whether LLM-based systems can be leveraged to simulate the post-breach stage of attacks that are typically human-operated, or "hands-on-keyboard" attacks, under various attack techniques and environments. As LLMs inevitably advance, they may be able to automate both the pre- and post-breach attack stages. This shift may transform organizational attacks from rare, expert-led events to frequent, automated operations requiring no expertise and executed at automation speed and scale. This risks fundamentally changing global computer security and correspondingly causing substantial economic impacts, and a goal of this work is to better understand these risks now so we can better prepare for these inevitable ever-more-capable LLMs on the horizon. On the immediate impact side, this research serves three purposes. First, an automated LLM-based, post-breach exploitation framework can help analysts quickly test and continually improve their organization's network security posture against previously unseen attacks. Second, an LLM-based penetration test system can extend the effectiveness of red teams with a limited number of human analysts. Finally, this research can help defensive systems and teams learn to detect novel attack behaviors preemptively before their use in the wild....

In Islam, readers must apply a set of pronunciation rules called Tajweed rules to recite the Quran in the same way that the angel Jibrael taught the Prophet, Muhammad. The traditional process of learning the correct application of these rules requires a human who must have a license and great experience to detect mispronunciation. Due to the increasing number of Muslims around the world, the number of Tajweed teachers is not enough nowadays for daily recitation practice for every Muslim. Therefore, lots of work has been done for automatic Tajweed rules' mispronunciation detection to help readers recite Quran correctly in an easier way and shorter time than traditional learning ways. All previous works have three common problems. First, most of them focused on machine learning algorithms only. Second, they used private datasets with no benchmark to compare with. Third, they did not take into consideration the sequence of input data optimally, although the speech signal is time series. To overcome these problems, we proposed a solution that consists of Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) features with Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) neural networks which use the time series, to detect mispronunciation in Tajweed rules. In addition, our experiments were performed on a public dataset, the QDAT dataset, which contains more than 1500 voices of the correct and incorrect recitation of three Tajweed rules (Separate stretching , Tight Noon , and Hide ). To the best of our knowledge, the QDAT dataset has not been used by any research paper yet. We compared the performance of the proposed LSTM model with traditional machine learning algorithms used in SoTA. The LSTM model with time series showed clear superiority over traditional machine learning. The accuracy achieved by LSTM on the QDAT dataset was 96%, 95%, and 96% for the three rules (Separate stretching, Tight Noon, and Hide), respectively.

We introduce the first model-stealing attack that extracts precise, nontrivial information from black-box production language models like OpenAI's ChatGPT or Google's PaLM-2. Specifically, our attack recovers the embedding projection layer (up to symmetries) of a transformer model, given typical API access. For under \20 USD, our attack extracts the entire projection matrix of OpenAI's Ada and Babbage language models. We thereby confirm, for the first time, that these black-box models have a hidden dimension of 1024 and 2048, respectively. We also recover the exact hidden dimension size of the gpt-3.5-turbo model, and estimate it would cost under 2,000 in queries to recover the entire projection matrix. We conclude with potential defenses and mitigations, and discuss the implications of possible future work that could extend our attack.

A report by the European Union Law Enforcement Agency predicts that by 2026, up to 90 percent of online content could be synthetically generated, raising concerns among policymakers, who cautioned that "Generative AI could act as a force multiplier for political disinformation. The combined effect of generative text, images, videos, and audio may surpass the influence of any single modality." In response, California's Bill AB 3211 mandates the watermarking of AI-generated images, videos, and audio. However, concerns remain regarding the vulnerability of invisible watermarking techniques to tampering and the potential for malicious actors to bypass them entirely. Generative AI-powered de-watermarking attacks, especially the newly introduced visual paraphrase attack, have shown an ability to fully remove watermarks, resulting in a paraphrase of the original image. This paper introduces PECCAVI, the first visual paraphrase attack-safe and distortion-free image watermarking technique. In visual paraphrase attacks, an image is altered while preserving its core semantic regions, termed Non-Melting Points (NMPs). PECCAVI strategically embeds watermarks within these NMPs and employs multi-channel frequency domain watermarking. It also incorporates noisy burnishing to counter reverse-engineering efforts aimed at locating NMPs to disrupt the embedded watermark, thereby enhancing durability. PECCAVI is model-agnostic. All relevant resources and codes will be open-sourced.

The damage and the impact of natural disasters are becoming more destructive with the increase of urbanization. Today's metropolitan cities are not sufficiently prepared for the pre and post-disaster situations. Digital Twin technology can provide a solution. A virtual copy of the physical city could be created by collecting data from sensors of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices and stored on the cloud infrastructure. This virtual copy is kept current and up to date with the continuous flow of the data coming from the sensors. We propose a disaster management system utilizing machine learning called DT-DMS is used to support decision-making mechanisms. This study aims to show how to educate and prepare emergency center staff by simulating potential disaster situations on the virtual copy. The event of a disaster will be simulated allowing emergency center staff to make decisions and depicting the potential outcomes of these decisions. A rescue operation after an earthquake is simulated. Test results are promising and the simulation scope is planned to be extended.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) introduces dual-use capabilities that could both threaten and bolster national security and public safety (NSPS). Models implement safeguards to protect against potential misuse relevant to NSPS and allow for benign users to receive helpful information. However, current benchmarks often fail to test safeguard robustness to potential NSPS risks in an objective, robust way. We introduce FORTRESS: 500 expert-crafted adversarial prompts with instance-based rubrics of 4-7 binary questions for automated evaluation across 3 domains (unclassified information only): Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE), Political Violence & Terrorism, and Criminal & Financial Illicit Activities, with 10 total subcategories across these domains. Each prompt-rubric pair has a corresponding benign version to test for model over-refusals. This evaluation of frontier LLMs' safeguard robustness reveals varying trade-offs between potential risks and model usefulness: Claude-3.5-Sonnet demonstrates a low average risk score (ARS) (14.09 out of 100) but the highest over-refusal score (ORS) (21.8 out of 100), while Gemini 2.5 Pro shows low over-refusal (1.4) but a high average potential risk (66.29). Deepseek-R1 has the highest ARS at 78.05, but the lowest ORS at only 0.06. Models such as o1 display a more even trade-off between potential risks and over-refusals (with an ARS of 21.69 and ORS of 5.2). To provide policymakers and researchers with a clear understanding of models' potential risks, we publicly release FORTRESS at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ScaleAI/fortress_public. We also maintain a private set for evaluation.

The widespread of offensive content online, such as hate speech and cyber-bullying, is a global phenomenon. This has sparked interest in the artificial intelligence (AI) and natural language processing (NLP) communities, motivating the development of various systems trained to detect potentially harmful content automatically. These systems require annotated datasets to train the machine learning (ML) models. However, with a few notable exceptions, most datasets on this topic have dealt with English and a few other high-resource languages. As a result, the research in offensive language identification has been limited to these languages. This paper addresses this gap by tackling offensive language identification in Sinhala, a low-resource Indo-Aryan language spoken by over 17 million people in Sri Lanka. We introduce the Sinhala Offensive Language Dataset (SOLD) and present multiple experiments on this dataset. SOLD is a manually annotated dataset containing 10,000 posts from Twitter annotated as offensive and not offensive at both sentence-level and token-level, improving the explainability of the ML models. SOLD is the first large publicly available offensive language dataset compiled for Sinhala. We also introduce SemiSOLD, a larger dataset containing more than 145,000 Sinhala tweets, annotated following a semi-supervised approach.

The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue goals across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.

Introduction: Recently, the effectiveness of Large Language Models (LLMs) has increased rapidly, allowing them to be used in a great number of applications. However, the risks posed by the generation of false information through LLMs significantly limit their applications in sensitive areas such as healthcare, highlighting the necessity for rigorous validations to determine their utility and reliability. To date, no study has extensively compared the performance of LLMs on Polish medical examinations across a broad spectrum of specialties on a very large dataset. Objectives: This study evaluated the performance of three Generative Pretrained Transformer (GPT) models on the Polish Board Certification Exam (Pa\'nstwowy Egzamin Specjalizacyjny, PES) dataset, which consists of 297 tests. Methods: We developed a software program to download and process PES exams and tested the performance of GPT models using OpenAI Application Programming Interface. Results: Our findings reveal that GPT-3.5 did not pass any of the analyzed exams. In contrast, the GPT-4 models demonstrated the capability to pass the majority of the exams evaluated, with the most recent model, gpt-4-0125, successfully passing 222 (75%) of them. The performance of the GPT models varied significantly, displaying excellence in exams related to certain specialties while completely failing others. Conclusions: The significant progress and impressive performance of LLM models hold great promise for the increased application of AI in the field of medicine in Poland. For instance, this advancement could lead to the development of AI-based medical assistants for healthcare professionals, enhancing the efficiency and accuracy of medical services.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in real-world applications, they remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: malicious third party prompts that subvert the intent of the system designer. To help researchers study this problem, we present a dataset of over 126,000 prompt injection attacks and 46,000 prompt-based "defenses" against prompt injection, all created by players of an online game called Tensor Trust. To the best of our knowledge, this is currently the largest dataset of human-generated adversarial examples for instruction-following LLMs. The attacks in our dataset have a lot of easily interpretable stucture, and shed light on the weaknesses of LLMs. We also use the dataset to create a benchmark for resistance to two types of prompt injection, which we refer to as prompt extraction and prompt hijacking. Our benchmark results show that many models are vulnerable to the attack strategies in the Tensor Trust dataset. Furthermore, we show that some attack strategies from the dataset generalize to deployed LLM-based applications, even though they have a very different set of constraints to the game. We release all data and source code at https://tensortrust.ai/paper

We present a new question set, text corpus, and baselines assembled to encourage AI research in advanced question answering. Together, these constitute the AI2 Reasoning Challenge (ARC), which requires far more powerful knowledge and reasoning than previous challenges such as SQuAD or SNLI. The ARC question set is partitioned into a Challenge Set and an Easy Set, where the Challenge Set contains only questions answered incorrectly by both a retrieval-based algorithm and a word co-occurence algorithm. The dataset contains only natural, grade-school science questions (authored for human tests), and is the largest public-domain set of this kind (7,787 questions). We test several baselines on the Challenge Set, including leading neural models from the SQuAD and SNLI tasks, and find that none are able to significantly outperform a random baseline, reflecting the difficult nature of this task. We are also releasing the ARC Corpus, a corpus of 14M science sentences relevant to the task, and implementations of the three neural baseline models tested. Can your model perform better? We pose ARC as a challenge to the community.

This technical report analyzes the challenge of "hallucinations" (false information) in LLMs applied to law. It examines their causes, manifestations, and the effectiveness of the RAG mitigation strategy, highlighting its limitations and proposing holistic optimizations. The paper explores the ethical and regulatory implications, emphasizing human oversight as an irreplaceable role. It concludes that the solution lies not in incrementally improving generative models, but in adopting a "consultative" AI paradigm that prioritizes veracity and traceability, acting as a tool to amplify, not replace, professional judgment. -- Este informe t\'ecnico analiza el desaf\'io de las "alucinaciones" (informaci\'on falsa) en los LLMs aplicados al derecho. Se examinan sus causas, manifestaciones y la efectividad de la estrategia de mitigaci\'on RAG, exponiendo sus limitaciones y proponiendo optimizaciones hol\'isticas. Se exploran las implicaciones \'eticas y regulatorias, enfatizando la supervisi\'on humana como un rol insustituible. El documento concluye que la soluci\'on no reside en mejorar incrementalmente los modelos generativos, sino en adoptar un paradigma de IA "consultiva" que priorice la veracidad y la trazabilidad, actuando como una herramienta para amplificar, y no sustituir, el juicio profesional.

Rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked growing concerns among experts, policymakers, and world leaders regarding the potential for increasingly advanced AI systems to pose catastrophic risks. Although numerous risks have been detailed separately, there is a pressing need for a systematic discussion and illustration of the potential dangers to better inform efforts to mitigate them. This paper provides an overview of the main sources of catastrophic AI risks, which we organize into four categories: malicious use, in which individuals or groups intentionally use AIs to cause harm; AI race, in which competitive environments compel actors to deploy unsafe AIs or cede control to AIs; organizational risks, highlighting how human factors and complex systems can increase the chances of catastrophic accidents; and rogue AIs, describing the inherent difficulty in controlling agents far more intelligent than humans. For each category of risk, we describe specific hazards, present illustrative stories, envision ideal scenarios, and propose practical suggestions for mitigating these dangers. Our goal is to foster a comprehensive understanding of these risks and inspire collective and proactive efforts to ensure that AIs are developed and deployed in a safe manner. Ultimately, we hope this will allow us to realize the benefits of this powerful technology while minimizing the potential for catastrophic outcomes.

Recent studies have revealed a security threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, called the Backdoor Attack. Victim models can maintain competitive performance on clean samples while behaving abnormally on samples with a specific trigger word inserted. Previous backdoor attacking methods usually assume that attackers have a certain degree of data knowledge, either the dataset which users would use or proxy datasets for a similar task, for implementing the data poisoning procedure. However, in this paper, we find that it is possible to hack the model in a data-free way by modifying one single word embedding vector, with almost no accuracy sacrificed on clean samples. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and sentence-pair classification tasks show that our method is more efficient and stealthier. We hope this work can raise the awareness of such a critical security risk hidden in the embedding layers of NLP models. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/Embedding-Poisoning.