Daily Papers

We present HunyuanImage 3.0, a native multimodal model that unifies multimodal understanding and generation within an autoregressive framework, with its image generation module publicly available. The achievement of HunyuanImage 3.0 relies on several key components, including meticulous data curation, advanced architecture design, a native Chain-of-Thoughts schema, progressive model pre-training, aggressive model post-training, and an efficient infrastructure that enables large-scale training and inference. With these advancements, we successfully trained a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model comprising over 80 billion parameters in total, with 13 billion parameters activated per token during inference, making it the largest and most powerful open-source image generative model to date. We conducted extensive experiments and the results of automatic and human evaluation of text-image alignment and visual quality demonstrate that HunyuanImage 3.0 rivals previous state-of-the-art models. By releasing the code and weights of HunyuanImage 3.0, we aim to enable the community to explore new ideas with a state-of-the-art foundation model, fostering a dynamic and vibrant multimodal ecosystem. All open source assets are publicly available at https://github.com/Tencent-Hunyuan/HunyuanImage-3.0

Efficiently serving neural network models with low latency is becoming more challenging due to increasing model complexity and parameter count. Model quantization offers a solution which simultaneously reduces memory footprint and compute requirements. However, aggressive quantization may lead to an unacceptable loss in model accuracy owing to differences in sensitivity to numerical imperfection across different layers in the model. To address this challenge, we propose a mixed-precision post training quantization (PTQ) approach that assigns different numerical precisions to tensors in a network based on their specific needs, for a reduced memory footprint and improved latency while preserving model accuracy. Previous works rely on layer-wise Hessian information to determine numerical precision, but as we demonstrate, Hessian estimation is typically insufficient in determining an effective ordering of layer sensitivities. We address this by augmenting the estimated Hessian with additional information to capture inter-layer dependencies. We demonstrate that this consistently improves PTQ performance along the accuracy-latency Pareto frontier across multiple models. Our method combines second-order information and inter-layer dependencies to guide a bisection search, finding quantization configurations within a user-configurable model accuracy degradation range. We evaluate the effectiveness of our method on the ResNet50, MobileNetV2, and BERT models. Our experiments demonstrate latency reductions compared to a 16-bit baseline of 25.48%, 21.69%, and 33.28% respectively, while maintaining model accuracy to within 99.99% of the baseline model.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models have emerged as a cornerstone of large-scale deep learning by efficiently distributing computation and enhancing performance. However, their unique architecture-characterized by sparse expert activation and dynamic routing mechanisms-introduces inherent complexities that challenge conventional quantization techniques. Existing post-training quantization (PTQ) methods struggle to address activation outliers, router consistency and sparse expert calibration, leading to significant performance degradation. To bridge this gap, we propose EAQuant, a novel PTQ framework tailored for MoE architectures. Our method systematically tackles these challenges through three key innovations: (1) expert-aware smoothing aggregation to suppress activation outliers and stabilize quantization, (2) router logits distribution alignment to preserve expert selection consistency post-quantization, and (3) expert-level calibration data balance to optimize sparsely activated experts. Extensive experiments across W4A4 and extreme W3A4 quantization configurations demonstrate that EAQuant significantly outperforms existing methods, achieving average score improvements of 1.15 - 2.28% across three diverse MoE architectures, with particularly pronounced gains in reasoning tasks and robust performance retention under aggressive quantization. By integrating these innovations, EAQuant establishes a new state-of-the-art for high-precision, efficient MoE model compression. Our code is available at https://github.com/darren-fzq/EAQuant.

Diffusion models have been proven highly effective at generating high-quality images. However, as these models grow larger, they require significantly more memory and suffer from higher latency, posing substantial challenges for deployment. In this work, we aim to accelerate diffusion models by quantizing their weights and activations to 4 bits. At such an aggressive level, both weights and activations are highly sensitive, where conventional post-training quantization methods for large language models like smoothing become insufficient. To overcome this limitation, we propose SVDQuant, a new 4-bit quantization paradigm. Different from smoothing which redistributes outliers between weights and activations, our approach absorbs these outliers using a low-rank branch. We first consolidate the outliers by shifting them from activations to weights, then employ a high-precision low-rank branch to take in the weight outliers with Singular Value Decomposition (SVD). This process eases the quantization on both sides. However, na\"{\i}vely running the low-rank branch independently incurs significant overhead due to extra data movement of activations, negating the quantization speedup. To address this, we co-design an inference engine Nunchaku that fuses the kernels of the low-rank branch into those of the low-bit branch to cut off redundant memory access. It can also seamlessly support off-the-shelf low-rank adapters (LoRAs) without the need for re-quantization. Extensive experiments on SDXL, PixArt-Sigma, and FLUX.1 validate the effectiveness of SVDQuant in preserving image quality. We reduce the memory usage for the 12B FLUX.1 models by 3.5times, achieving 3.0times speedup over the 4-bit weight-only quantized baseline on the 16GB laptop 4090 GPU, paving the way for more interactive applications on PCs. Our quantization library and inference engine are open-sourced.

Post-training, which elicits a pretrained Base model into the corresponding Instruct model, is widely considered to be superficial. In this work, we first reinforce this hypothesis by providing novel quantitative evidence from the weight level that the effective rank (eRank) remains negligibly changed. However, this superficiality also suffers a critical trade-off, improving the exploitation capabilities at the cost of limiting its exploration. To tackle this issue, we propose Timber, a simple yet effective training-free method that enhances the exploration capability of the Instruct model while preserving its exploitation. The key insight is to partially revert Instruct towards the paired Base model by subtle yet targeted refinement of the weight deltas. Extensive experiments on Llama and Qwen series demonstrate that Timber consistently improves vanilla Instruct models, particularly on Pass@k performance. Our findings offer new insights into the post-training stage at the weight level and practical strategies to refine the Instruct model without training.

Language model post-training is applied to refine behaviors and unlock new skills across a wide range of recent language models, but open recipes for applying these techniques lag behind proprietary ones. The underlying training data and recipes for post-training are simultaneously the most important pieces of the puzzle and the portion with the least transparency. To bridge this gap, we introduce T\"ULU 3, a family of fully-open state-of-the-art post-trained models, alongside its data, code, and training recipes, serving as a comprehensive guide for modern post-training techniques. T\"ULU 3, which builds on Llama 3.1 base models, achieves results surpassing the instruct versions of Llama 3.1, Qwen 2.5, Mistral, and even closed models such as GPT-4o-mini and Claude 3.5-Haiku. The training algorithms for our models include supervised finetuning (SFT), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and a novel method we call Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). With T\"ULU 3, we introduce a multi-task evaluation scheme for post-training recipes with development and unseen evaluations, standard benchmark implementations, and substantial decontamination of existing open datasets on said benchmarks. We conclude with analysis and discussion of training methods that did not reliably improve performance. In addition to the T\"ULU 3 model weights and demo, we release the complete recipe -- including datasets for diverse core skills, a robust toolkit for data curation and evaluation, the training code and infrastructure, and, most importantly, a detailed report for reproducing and further adapting the T\"ULU 3 approach to more domains.

In this paper, we focus on quantifying model stability as a function of random seed by investigating the effects of the induced randomness on model performance and the robustness of the model in general. We specifically perform a controlled study on the effect of random seeds on the behaviour of attention, gradient-based and surrogate model based (LIME) interpretations. Our analysis suggests that random seeds can adversely affect the consistency of models resulting in counterfactual interpretations. We propose a technique called Aggressive Stochastic Weight Averaging (ASWA)and an extension called Norm-filtered Aggressive Stochastic Weight Averaging (NASWA) which improves the stability of models over random seeds. With our ASWA and NASWA based optimization, we are able to improve the robustness of the original model, on average reducing the standard deviation of the model's performance by 72%.

State-of-the-art AI systems can be significantly improved without expensive retraining via "post-training enhancements"-techniques applied after initial training like fine-tuning the system to use a web browser. We review recent post-training enhancements, categorizing them into five types: tool-use, prompting methods, scaffolding, solution selection, and data generation. Different enhancements improve performance on different tasks, making it hard to compare their significance. So we translate improvements from different enhancements into a common currency, the compute-equivalent gain: how much additional training compute would be needed to improve performance by the same amount as the enhancement. Our non-experimental work shows that post-training enhancements have significant benefits: most surveyed enhancements improve benchmark performance by more than a 5x increase in training compute, some by more than 20x. Post-training enhancements are relatively cheap to develop: fine-tuning costs are typically <1% of the original training cost. Governing the development of capable post-training enhancements may be challenging because frontier models could be enhanced by a wide range of actors.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, the risk of generating harmful or toxic content remains a central challenge. Post-hoc alignment methods are brittle: once unsafe patterns are learned during pretraining, they are hard to remove. We present a data-centric pretraining framework that builds safety into the model from the start. Our contributions include: (i) a safety classifier trained on 10,000 GPT-4 labeled examples, used to filter 600B tokens; (ii) the largest synthetic safety dataset to date (100B tokens) generated via recontextualization of harmful web data; (iii) RefuseWeb and Moral Education datasets that convert harmful prompts into refusal dialogues and web-style educational material; (iv) Harmfulness-Tag annotations injected during pretraining to flag unsafe content and steer away inference from harmful generations; and (v) safety evaluations measuring base model behavior before instruction tuning. Our safety-pretrained models reduce attack success rates from 38.8% to 8.4% with no performance degradation on standard LLM safety benchmarks.

The expansion of machine learning into dynamic environments presents challenges in handling open-world problems where label shift, covariate shift, and unknown classes emerge. Post-training methods have been explored to address these challenges, adapting models to newly emerging data. However, these methods struggle when the initial pre-training is performed on class-imbalanced datasets, limiting generalization to minority classes. To address this, we propose a method that effectively handles open-world problems even when pre-training is conducted on imbalanced data. Our contrastive-based pre-training approach enhances classification performance, particularly for underrepresented classes. Our post-training mechanism generates reliable pseudo-labels, improving model robustness against open-world problems. We also introduce selective activation criteria to optimize the post-training process, reducing unnecessary computation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art adaptation techniques in both accuracy and efficiency across diverse open-world scenarios.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has significantly advanced the capabilities of artificial intelligence across various domains. However, their massive scale and high computational costs render them unsuitable for direct deployment in resource-constrained edge environments. This creates a critical need for high-performance small models that can operate efficiently at the edge. Yet, after pre-training alone, these smaller models often fail to meet the performance requirements of complex tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce a systematic post-training pipeline that efficiently enhances small model accuracy. Our post training pipeline consists of curriculum-based supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and offline on-policy knowledge distillation. The resulting instruction-tuned model achieves state-of-the-art performance among billion-parameter models, demonstrating strong generalization under strict hardware constraints while maintaining competitive accuracy across a variety of tasks. This work provides a practical and efficient solution for developing high-performance language models on Ascend edge devices.

In large language model (LLM) pretraining, data quality is believed to determine model quality. In this paper, we re-examine the notion of "quality" from the perspective of pre- and post-training co-design. Specifically, we explore the possibility that pre-training on more toxic data can lead to better control in post-training, ultimately decreasing a model's output toxicity. First, we use a toy experiment to study how data composition affects the geometry of features in the representation space. Next, through controlled experiments with Olmo-1B models trained on varying ratios of clean and toxic data, we find that the concept of toxicity enjoys a less entangled linear representation as the proportion of toxic data increases. Furthermore, we show that although toxic data increases the generational toxicity of the base model, it also makes the toxicity easier to remove. Evaluations on Toxigen and Real Toxicity Prompts demonstrate that models trained on toxic data achieve a better trade-off between reducing generational toxicity and preserving general capabilities when detoxifying techniques such as inference-time intervention (ITI) are applied. Our findings suggest that, with post-training taken into account, bad data may lead to good models.

Safety aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks qi2023fine-- a few harmful data mixed in the fine-tuning dataset can break the LLMs's safety alignment. Existing mitigation strategies include alignment stage solutions huang2024vaccine, rosati2024representation and fine-tuning stage solutions huang2024lazy,mukhoti2023fine. However, our evaluation shows that both categories of defenses fail when some specific training hyper-parameters are chosen -- a large learning rate or a large number of training epochs in the fine-tuning stage can easily invalidate the defense, which however, is necessary to guarantee finetune performance. To this end, we propose Antidote, a post-fine-tuning stage solution, which remains \textit{agnostic to the training hyper-parameters in the fine-tuning stage}. Antidote relies on the philosophy that by removing the harmful parameters, the harmful model can be recovered from the harmful behaviors, regardless of how those harmful parameters are formed in the fine-tuning stage. With this philosophy, we introduce a one-shot pruning stage after harmful fine-tuning to remove the harmful weights that are responsible for the generation of harmful content. Despite its embarrassing simplicity, empirical results show that Antidote can reduce harmful score while maintaining accuracy on downstream tasks.Our project page is at https://huangtiansheng.github.io/Antidote_gh_page/

In the future, powerful AI systems may be deployed in high-stakes settings, where a single failure could be catastrophic. One technique for improving AI safety in high-stakes settings is adversarial training, which uses an adversary to generate examples to train on in order to achieve better worst-case performance. In this work, we used a safe language generation task (``avoid injuries'') as a testbed for achieving high reliability through adversarial training. We created a series of adversarial training techniques -- including a tool that assists human adversaries -- to find and eliminate failures in a classifier that filters text completions suggested by a generator. In our task, we determined that we can set very conservative classifier thresholds without significantly impacting the quality of the filtered outputs. We found that adversarial training increased robustness to the adversarial attacks that we trained on -- doubling the time for our contractors to find adversarial examples both with our tool (from 13 to 26 minutes) and without (from 20 to 44 minutes) -- without affecting in-distribution performance. We hope to see further work in the high-stakes reliability setting, including more powerful tools for enhancing human adversaries and better ways to measure high levels of reliability, until we can confidently rule out the possibility of catastrophic deployment-time failures of powerful models.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capability and influence, ensuring their security and preventing harmful outputs has become crucial. A promising approach to address these concerns involves training models to automatically generate adversarial prompts for red teaming. However, the evolving subtlety of vulnerabilities in LLMs challenges the effectiveness of current adversarial methods, which struggle to specifically target and explore the weaknesses of these models. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Self-Evolving Adversarial Safety (SEAS) optimization framework, which enhances security by leveraging data generated by the model itself. SEAS operates through three iterative stages: Initialization, Attack, and Adversarial Optimization, refining both the Red Team and Target models to improve robustness and safety. This framework reduces reliance on manual testing and significantly enhances the security capabilities of LLMs. Our contributions include a novel adversarial framework, a comprehensive safety dataset, and after three iterations, the Target model achieves a security level comparable to GPT-4, while the Red Team model shows a marked increase in attack success rate (ASR) against advanced models.

As post-training processes utilize increasingly large datasets and base models continue to grow in size, the computational demands and implementation challenges of existing algorithms are escalating significantly. In this paper, we propose modeling the changes at the logits level during post-training using a separate neural network (i.e., the value network). After training this network on a small base model using demonstrations, this network can be seamlessly integrated with other pre-trained models during inference, enables them to achieve similar capability enhancements. We systematically investigate the best practices for this paradigm in terms of pre-training weights and connection schemes. We demonstrate that the resulting value network has broad transferability across pre-trained models of different parameter sizes within the same family, models undergoing continuous pre-training within the same family, and models with different vocabularies across families. In certain cases, it can achieve performance comparable to full-parameter fine-tuning. Furthermore, we explore methods to enhance the transferability of the value model and prevent overfitting to the base model used during training.

Deploying Large language models (LLMs) can pose hazards from harmful outputs such as toxic or dishonest speech. Prior work has introduced tools that elicit harmful outputs in order to identify and mitigate these risks. While this is a valuable step toward securing language models, these approaches typically rely on a pre-existing classifier for undesired outputs. This limits their application to situations where the type of harmful behavior is known with precision beforehand. However, this skips a central challenge of red teaming: developing a contextual understanding of the behaviors that a model can exhibit. Furthermore, when such a classifier already exists, red teaming has limited marginal value because the classifier could simply be used to filter training data or model outputs. In this work, we consider red teaming under the assumption that the adversary is working from a high-level, abstract specification of undesired behavior. The red team is expected to refine/extend this specification and identify methods to elicit this behavior from the model. Our red teaming framework consists of three steps: 1) Exploring the model's behavior in the desired context; 2) Establishing a measurement of undesired behavior (e.g., a classifier trained to reflect human evaluations); and 3) Exploiting the model's flaws using this measure and an established red teaming methodology. We apply this approach to red team GPT-2 and GPT-3 models to systematically discover classes of prompts that elicit toxic and dishonest statements. In doing so, we also construct and release the CommonClaim dataset of 20,000 statements that have been labeled by human subjects as common-knowledge-true, common-knowledge-false, or neither. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/explore_establish_exploit_llms. CommonClaim is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/common_claim.

Post-training has emerged as a crucial paradigm for adapting large-scale pre-trained models to various tasks, whose effects are fully reflected by delta parameters (i.e., the disparity between post-trained and pre-trained parameters). While numerous studies have explored delta parameter properties via operations like pruning, quantization, low-rank approximation, and extrapolation, a unified framework for systematically examining these characteristics has been lacking. In this paper, we propose a novel perspective based on Riemann sum approximation of the loss function to elucidate delta parameter editing operations. Our analysis categorizes existing methods into three classes based on their post-editing performance: competitive, decreased, and improved, explaining how they are expressed by the Riemann sum approximation term and how they alter the model performance. Extensive experiments on both visual and language models, including ViT, LLaMA 3, Qwen 2, and Mistral, corroborate our theoretical findings. Furthermore, we introduce extensions to existing techniques like DARE and BitDelta, highlighting their limitations in leveraging the properties of delta parameters and reorganizing them into general expressions to enhance the applicability and effectiveness of delta parameter editing in post-trained models.

The "alignment tax" of post-training is typically framed as a drop in task accuracy. We show it also involves a severe loss of calibration, making models overconfident, less reliable, and model outputs less diverse. We show that this trade-off can be navigated effectively via a simple post-hoc intervention: interpolating between a model's weights before and after alignment. Crucially, this is not a strict trade-off. We find that the process consistently reveals Pareto-optimal interpolations - models that improve accuracy beyond both parents while substantially recovering the calibration lost during alignment. Our work demonstrates that simple model merging provides a computationally efficient method for mitigating the full scope of the alignment tax, yielding models that are more capable and more reliable.

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.

Modern language model (LM) training has been divided into multiple stages, making it difficult for downstream developers to evaluate the impact of design choices made at each stage. We present EvoLM, a model suite that enables systematic and transparent analysis of LMs' training dynamics across pre-training, continued pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning. By training over 100 LMs with 1B and 4B parameters from scratch, we rigorously evaluate both upstream (language modeling) and downstream (problem-solving) reasoning capabilities, including considerations of both in-domain and out-of-domain generalization. Key insights highlight the diminishing returns from excessive pre-training and post-training, the importance and practices of mitigating forgetting during domain-specific continued pre-training, the crucial role of continued pre-training in bridging pre-training and post-training phases, and various intricate trade-offs when configuring supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. To facilitate open research and reproducibility, we release all pre-trained and post-trained models, training datasets for all stages, and our entire training and evaluation pipeline.

AI developers often apply safety alignment procedures to prevent the misuse of their AI systems. For example, before Meta released Llama 2-Chat, a collection of instruction fine-tuned large language models, they invested heavily in safety training, incorporating extensive red-teaming and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, it remains unclear how well safety training guards against model misuse when attackers have access to model weights. We explore the robustness of safety training in language models by subversively fine-tuning the public weights of Llama 2-Chat. We employ low-rank adaptation (LoRA) as an efficient fine-tuning method. With a budget of less than $200 per model and using only one GPU, we successfully undo the safety training of Llama 2-Chat models of sizes 7B, 13B, and 70B. Specifically, our fine-tuning technique significantly reduces the rate at which the model refuses to follow harmful instructions. We achieve a refusal rate below 1% for our 70B Llama 2-Chat model on two refusal benchmarks. Our fine-tuning method retains general performance, which we validate by comparing our fine-tuned models against Llama 2-Chat across two benchmarks. Additionally, we present a selection of harmful outputs produced by our models. While there is considerable uncertainty about the scope of risks from current models, it is likely that future models will have significantly more dangerous capabilities, including the ability to hack into critical infrastructure, create dangerous bio-weapons, or autonomously replicate and adapt to new environments. We show that subversive fine-tuning is practical and effective, and hence argue that evaluating risks from fine-tuning should be a core part of risk assessments for releasing model weights.

Two major sources of training data exist for post-training modern language models: online (model-generated rollouts) data, and offline (human or other-model demonstrations) data. These two types of data are typically used by approaches like Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), respectively. In this paper, we show that these approaches are not in contradiction, but are instances of a single optimization process. We derive a Unified Policy Gradient Estimator, and present the calculations of a wide spectrum of post-training approaches as the gradient of a common objective under different data distribution assumptions and various bias-variance tradeoffs. The gradient estimator is constructed with four interchangeable parts: stabilization mask, reference policy denominator, advantage estimate, and likelihood gradient. Motivated by our theoretical findings, we propose Hybrid Post-Training (HPT), an algorithm that dynamically selects different training signals. HPT is designed to yield both effective exploitation of demonstration and stable exploration without sacrificing learned reasoning patterns. We provide extensive experiments and ablation studies to verify the effectiveness of our unified theoretical framework and HPT. Across six mathematical reasoning benchmarks and two out-of-distribution suites, HPT consistently surpasses strong baselines across models of varying scales and families.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown exceptional results on current benchmarks when working individually. The advancement in their capabilities, along with a reduction in parameter size and inference times, has facilitated the use of these models as agents, enabling interactions among multiple models to execute complex tasks. Such collaborations offer several advantages, including the use of specialized models (e.g. coding), improved confidence through multiple computations, and enhanced divergent thinking, leading to more diverse outputs. Thus, the collaborative use of language models is expected to grow significantly in the coming years. In this work, we evaluate the behavior of a network of models collaborating through debate under the influence of an adversary. We introduce pertinent metrics to assess the adversary's effectiveness, focusing on system accuracy and model agreement. Our findings highlight the importance of a model's persuasive ability in influencing others. Additionally, we explore inference-time methods to generate more compelling arguments and evaluate the potential of prompt-based mitigation as a defensive strategy.

Recent studies have shown that robustness to adversarial attacks can be transferred across networks. In other words, we can make a weak model more robust with the help of a strong teacher model. We ask if instead of learning from a static teacher, can models "learn together" and "teach each other" to achieve better robustness? In this paper, we study how interactions among models affect robustness via knowledge distillation. We propose mutual adversarial training (MAT), in which multiple models are trained together and share the knowledge of adversarial examples to achieve improved robustness. MAT allows robust models to explore a larger space of adversarial samples, and find more robust feature spaces and decision boundaries. Through extensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we demonstrate that MAT can effectively improve model robustness and outperform state-of-the-art methods under white-box attacks, bringing sim8% accuracy gain to vanilla adversarial training (AT) under PGD-100 attacks. In addition, we show that MAT can also mitigate the robustness trade-off among different perturbation types, bringing as much as 13.1% accuracy gain to AT baselines against the union of l_infty, l_2 and l_1 attacks. These results show the superiority of the proposed method and demonstrate that collaborative learning is an effective strategy for designing robust models.

Recent advances in foundation models have highlighted the significant benefits of multi-stage training, with a particular emphasis on the emergence of mid-training as a vital stage that bridges pre-training and post-training. Mid-training is distinguished by its use of intermediate data and computational resources, systematically enhancing specified capabilities such as mathematics, coding, reasoning, and long-context extension, while maintaining foundational competencies. This survey provides a formal definition of mid-training for large language models (LLMs) and investigates optimization frameworks that encompass data curation, training strategies, and model architecture optimization. We analyze mainstream model implementations in the context of objective-driven interventions, illustrating how mid-training serves as a distinct and critical stage in the progressive development of LLM capabilities. By clarifying the unique contributions of mid-training, this survey offers a comprehensive taxonomy and actionable insights, supporting future research and innovation in the advancement of LLMs.

The prospect of artificial intelligence (AI) competing in the adversarial landscape of cyber security has long been considered one of the most impactful, challenging, and potentially dangerous applications of AI. Here, we demonstrate a new approach to assessing AI's progress towards enabling and scaling real-world offensive cyber operations (OCO) tactics in use by modern threat actors. We detail OCCULT, a lightweight operational evaluation framework that allows cyber security experts to contribute to rigorous and repeatable measurement of the plausible cyber security risks associated with any given large language model (LLM) or AI employed for OCO. We also prototype and evaluate three very different OCO benchmarks for LLMs that demonstrate our approach and serve as examples for building benchmarks under the OCCULT framework. Finally, we provide preliminary evaluation results to demonstrate how this framework allows us to move beyond traditional all-or-nothing tests, such as those crafted from educational exercises like capture-the-flag environments, to contextualize our indicators and warnings in true cyber threat scenarios that present risks to modern infrastructure. We find that there has been significant recent advancement in the risks of AI being used to scale realistic cyber threats. For the first time, we find a model (DeepSeek-R1) is capable of correctly answering over 90% of challenging offensive cyber knowledge tests in our Threat Actor Competency Test for LLMs (TACTL) multiple-choice benchmarks. We also show how Meta's Llama and Mistral's Mixtral model families show marked performance improvements over earlier models against our benchmarks where LLMs act as offensive agents in MITRE's high-fidelity offensive and defensive cyber operations simulation environment, CyberLayer.

Language models often show little to no improvement (i.e., "saturation") when trained via vanilla supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on data similar to what they saw in their training set (e.g., MATH). We introduce a new fine-tuning strategy, STAT, to train such a student model by using the metacognition ability of a stronger large language model (LLM) as the teacher. The teacher uses the task dataset to create a list of skills needed for the task, and then labels each data point with its required skills (Didolkar et al., 2024). By monitoring the student's answers, the teacher creates a Missing-Skill-Profile for the student, tracking how often they failed to apply each skill in their responses. We use this idea to build a modified training set in one of two ways. In STAT-Sel, the teacher uses an existing set of training examples but adaptively reweights them according to the Missing-Skill-Profile. In STAT-Syn, the teacher synthesizes additional examples involving missing skills. Across extensive experiments on Llama and Qwen models, our methods yield improvements of up to 7.5% on MATH, whereas SFT provides only limited gains. Furthermore, STAT enhances performance on out-of-distribution benchmarks (e.g., AIME24/25, AMC23, etc.) by an average of 4.6%. Crucially, we find that STAT is complementary to RL via GRPO (Shao et al., 2024): after the model is improved using STAT to address skill gaps, GRPO continues to add further gains. We conclude that skill-targeted adaptive training should broadly improve current training pipelines. Our code is available at: https://github.com/princeton-pli/STAT.

Continual post-training (CPT) is a popular and effective technique for adapting foundation models like multimodal large language models to specific and ever-evolving downstream tasks. While existing research has primarily concentrated on methods like data replay, model expansion, or parameter regularization, the fundamental role of the learning paradigm within CPT remains largely unexplored. This paper presents a comparative analysis of two core post-training paradigms: supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT), investigating their respective impacts on knowledge retention during CPT. Our experiments are conducted on a benchmark comprising seven diverse multimodal tasks, utilizing Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct as the base model for continual post-training. The investigation yields two significant findings: (1) When continuously learning on downstream tasks, SFT leads to catastrophic forgetting of previously learned tasks. In contrast, RFT inherently preserves prior knowledge and achieve performance comparable to multi-task training. (2) RFT successfully protects and even enhances the model's general knowledge on standard benchmarks (e.g., MMMU and MMLU-Pro). Conversely, SFT degrades general model capabilities severely. Further analysis shows that explicit mechanisms, such as KL penalty and chain-of-thought reasoning, are not the primary factors. Instead, we find that the implicit regularization inherent to RFT is a key factor in mitigating forgetting. Finally, we propose a rollout-based instance filtering algorithm to improve the stability and efficiency of RFT. Our comprehensive study demonstrates the superiority of RFT as a robust paradigm for continual post-training.

Training large language models to follow instructions makes them perform better on a wide range of tasks, generally becoming more helpful. However, a perfectly helpful model will follow even the most malicious instructions and readily generate harmful content. In this paper, we raise concerns over the safety of models that only emphasize helpfulness, not safety, in their instruction-tuning. We show that several popular instruction-tuned models are highly unsafe. Moreover, we show that adding just 3% safety examples (a few hundred demonstrations) in the training set when fine-tuning a model like LLaMA can substantially improve their safety. Our safety-tuning does not make models significantly less capable or helpful as measured by standard benchmarks. However, we do find a behavior of exaggerated safety, where too much safety-tuning makes models refuse to respond to reasonable prompts that superficially resemble unsafe ones. Our study sheds light on trade-offs in training LLMs to follow instructions and exhibit safe behavior.

Pruning has become a widely adopted technique for reducing the hardware requirements of large language models (LLMs). To recover model performance after pruning, post-training is commonly employed to mitigate the resulting performance degradation. While post-training benefits from larger datasets, once the dataset size is already substantial, increasing the training data provides only limited performance gains. To balance post-training cost and model performance, it is necessary to explore the optimal amount of post-training data.Through extensive experiments on the Llama-3 and Qwen-2.5 series models, pruned using various common pruning methods, we uncover the scaling Law for Post-training after model Pruning, referred to as the P^2 Law.This law identifies four key factors for predicting the pruned model's post-training loss: the model size before pruning, the number of post-training tokens, the pruning rate, and the model's loss before pruning. Moreover, P^2 Law can generalize to larger dataset sizes, larger model sizes, and higher pruning rates, offering valuable insights for the post-training of pruned LLMs.

Collecting high-quality training examples for language model fine-tuning is expensive, with practical budgets limiting the amount of data that can be procured. We investigate whether example difficulty affects GRPO training effectiveness by comparing selection strategies (easy, medium, hard, random) across multiple models and reasoning tasks. Training on the hardest 10\% of examples (those where the base model fails most often) yields dramatic performance gains up to 47\%, while easy examples produce minimal improvements of 3-15\%. This occurs because GRPO requires outcome variance to generate learning signals; hard examples maintain mixed success/failure outcomes throughout training while easy examples quickly converge to consistent success, eliminating learning opportunities. Moreover, models trained on hard examples show superior out-of-distribution generalization, with only hard-trained models achieving meaningful gains on the AIME2025 benchmark. Our findings provide clear guidance: when budget-constrained, prioritize collecting and annotating examples where your base model struggles, as these drive nearly all learning value in GRPO fine-tuning

A major challenge in training large-scale machine learning models is configuring the training process to maximize model performance, i.e., finding the best training setup from a vast design space. In this work, we unlock a gradient-based approach to this problem. We first introduce an algorithm for efficiently calculating metagradients -- gradients through model training -- at scale. We then introduce a "smooth model training" framework that enables effective optimization using metagradients. With metagradient descent (MGD), we greatly improve on existing dataset selection methods, outperform accuracy-degrading data poisoning attacks by an order of magnitude, and automatically find competitive learning rate schedules.

Large language models (LLMs) may exhibit undesirable behaviors. Recent efforts have focused on aligning these models to prevent harmful generation. Despite these efforts, studies have shown that even a well-conducted alignment process can be easily circumvented, whether intentionally or accidentally. Do alignment fine-tuning have robust effects on models, or are merely superficial? In this work, we answer this question through both theoretical and empirical means. Empirically, we demonstrate the elasticity of post-alignment models, i.e., the tendency to revert to the behavior distribution formed during the pre-training phase upon further fine-tuning. Using compression theory, we formally derive that such fine-tuning process disproportionately undermines alignment compared to pre-training, potentially by orders of magnitude. We conduct experimental validations to confirm the presence of elasticity across models of varying types and sizes. Specifically, we find that model performance declines rapidly before reverting to the pre-training distribution, after which the rate of decline drops significantly. We further reveal that elasticity positively correlates with increased model size and the expansion of pre-training data. Our discovery signifies the importance of taming the inherent elasticity of LLMs, thereby overcoming the resistance of LLMs to alignment finetuning.

As language models have scaled both their number of parameters and pretraining dataset sizes, the computational cost for pretraining has become intractable except for the most well-resourced teams. This increasing cost makes it ever more important to be able to reuse a model after it has completed pretraining; allowing for a model's abilities to further improve without needing to train from scratch. In this work, we detail a set of guidelines that cover how to design efficacious data distributions and learning rate schedules for continued pretraining of language models. When applying these findings within a continued pretraining run on top of a well-trained 15B parameter model, we show an improvement of 9\% in average model accuracy compared to the baseline of continued training on the pretraining set. The resulting recipe provides a practical starting point with which to begin developing language models through reuse rather than retraining.

Large language models (LLMs) are now ubiquitous in user-facing applications, yet they still generate undesirable toxic outputs, including profanity, vulgarity, and derogatory remarks. Although numerous detoxification methods exist, most apply broad, surface-level fixes and can therefore easily be circumvented by jailbreak attacks. In this paper we leverage sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to identify toxicity-related directions in the residual stream of models and perform targeted activation steering using the corresponding decoder vectors. We introduce three tiers of steering aggressiveness and evaluate them on GPT-2 Small and Gemma-2-2B, revealing trade-offs between toxicity reduction and language fluency. At stronger steering strengths, these causal interventions surpass competitive baselines in reducing toxicity by up to 20%, though fluency can degrade noticeably on GPT-2 Small depending on the aggressiveness. Crucially, standard NLP benchmark scores upon steering remain stable, indicating that the model's knowledge and general abilities are preserved. We further show that feature-splitting in wider SAEs hampers safety interventions, underscoring the importance of disentangled feature learning. Our findings highlight both the promise and the current limitations of SAE-based causal interventions for LLM detoxification, further suggesting practical guidelines for safer language-model deployment.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as "do not generate abusive content", but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Evaluating how well LLMs follow developer-provided rules in the face of adversarial inputs typically requires manual review, which slows down monitoring and methods development. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RuLES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RuLES consists of 15 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey a set of rules in natural language while interacting with the human user. Each scenario has a concise evaluation program to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Through manual exploration of model behavior in our scenarios, we identify 6 categories of attack strategies and collect two suites of test cases: one consisting of unique conversations from manual testing and one that systematically implements strategies from the 6 categories. Across various popular proprietary and open models such as GPT-4 and Llama 2, we find that all models are susceptible to a wide variety of adversarial hand-crafted user inputs, though GPT-4 is the best-performing model. Additionally, we evaluate open models under gradient-based attacks and find significant vulnerabilities. We propose RuLES as a challenging new setting for research into exploring and defending against both manual and automatic attacks on LLMs.

Open-weight AI systems offer unique benefits, including enhanced transparency, open research, and decentralized access. However, they are vulnerable to tampering attacks which can efficiently elicit harmful behaviors by modifying weights or activations. Currently, there is not yet a robust science of open-weight model risk management. Existing safety fine-tuning methods and other post-training techniques have struggled to make LLMs resistant to more than a few dozen steps of adversarial fine-tuning. In this paper, we investigate whether filtering text about dual-use topics from training data can prevent unwanted capabilities and serve as a more tamper-resistant safeguard. We introduce a multi-stage pipeline for scalable data filtering and show that it offers a tractable and effective method for minimizing biothreat proxy knowledge in LLMs. We pretrain multiple 6.9B-parameter models from scratch and find that they exhibit substantial resistance to adversarial fine-tuning attacks on up to 10,000 steps and 300M tokens of biothreat-related text -- outperforming existing post-training baselines by over an order of magnitude -- with no observed degradation to unrelated capabilities. However, while filtered models lack internalized dangerous knowledge, we find that they can still leverage such information when it is provided in context (e.g., via search tool augmentation), demonstrating a need for a defense-in-depth approach. Overall, these findings help to establish pretraining data curation as a promising layer of defense for open-weight AI systems.

Adversarial attacks optimize against models to defeat defenses. Existing defenses are static, and stay the same once trained, even while attacks change. We argue that models should fight back, and optimize their defenses against attacks at test time. We propose dynamic defenses, to adapt the model and input during testing, by defensive entropy minimization (dent). Dent alters testing, but not training, for compatibility with existing models and train-time defenses. Dent improves the robustness of adversarially-trained defenses and nominally-trained models against white-box, black-box, and adaptive attacks on CIFAR-10/100 and ImageNet. In particular, dent boosts state-of-the-art defenses by 20+ points absolute against AutoAttack on CIFAR-10 at ε_infty = 8/255.

Common methods for aligning already-capable models with desired behavior rely on the ability of humans to provide supervision. However, future superhuman models will surpass the capability of humans. Therefore, humans will only be able to weakly supervise superhuman models. This expected deficiency of human evaluation would weaken the safety of future AI systems. Scalable oversight and weak-to-strong generalization are two complementary approaches to tackle this issue. In this paper, we attempt to combine the strengths of these two approaches to further improve alignment. Specifically, we investigate ways of improving human supervision with a strong pretrained model and then supervise the strong model with enhanced weak human supervision. To make iterative empirical progress, we consider an analogy: can we use a strong model to improve weak model supervision and then use it to supervise the strong model? We empirically test it by finetuning a small weak model on ground truth labels with the additional help from a large strong model, and then finetuning the strong model on labels generated by the weak model. We find that debate can assist a weak model in extracting trustworthy information from an untrustworthy strong model, which provides leverage as context on samples when training a weak model. We also show that an ensemble of weak models helps exploit long arguments generated by strong model debaters and obtain a more robust supervision estimate. Extensive experiments on the OpenAI weak-to-strong NLP benchmarks show that the combination approach leads to better alignment, which indicates that debate has the potential to help weak-to-strong generalization.

Reward modeling has emerged as a promising approach for the scalable alignment of language models. However, contemporary reward models (RMs) often lack robustness, awarding high rewards to low-quality, out-of-distribution (OOD) samples. This can lead to reward hacking, where policies exploit unintended shortcuts to maximize rewards, undermining alignment. To address this challenge, we introduce Adv-RM, a novel adversarial training framework that automatically identifies adversarial examples -- responses that receive high rewards from the target RM but are OOD and of low quality. By leveraging reinforcement learning, Adv-RM trains a policy to generate adversarial examples that reliably expose vulnerabilities in large state-of-the-art reward models such as Nemotron 340B RM. Incorporating these adversarial examples into the reward training process improves the robustness of RMs, mitigating reward hacking and enhancing downstream performance in RLHF. We demonstrate that Adv-RM significantly outperforms conventional RM training, increasing stability and enabling more effective RLHF training in both synthetic and real-data settings.

Recent innovations in language model training have demonstrated that it is possible to create highly performant models that are small enough to run on a smartphone. As these models are deployed in an increasing number of domains, it is critical to ensure that they are aligned with human preferences and safety considerations. In this report, we present our methodology for safety aligning the Phi-3 series of language models. We utilized a "break-fix" cycle, performing multiple rounds of dataset curation, safety post-training, benchmarking, red teaming, and vulnerability identification to cover a variety of harm areas in both single and multi-turn scenarios. Our results indicate that this approach iteratively improved the performance of the Phi-3 models across a wide range of responsible AI benchmarks.

Recently, there have been breakthroughs in computer vision ("CV") models that are more generalizable with the advent of models such as CLIP and ALIGN. In this paper, we analyze CLIP and highlight some of the challenges such models pose. CLIP reduces the need for task specific training data, potentially opening up many niche tasks to automation. CLIP also allows its users to flexibly specify image classification classes in natural language, which we find can shift how biases manifest. Additionally, through some preliminary probes we find that CLIP can inherit biases found in prior computer vision systems. Given the wide and unpredictable domain of uses for such models, this raises questions regarding what sufficiently safe behaviour for such systems may look like. These results add evidence to the growing body of work calling for a change in the notion of a 'better' model--to move beyond simply looking at higher accuracy at task-oriented capability evaluations, and towards a broader 'better' that takes into account deployment-critical features such as different use contexts, and people who interact with the model when thinking about model deployment.

LLMs(Large Language Models) nowadays have widespread adoption as a tool for solving issues across various domain/tasks. These models since are susceptible to produce harmful or toxic results, inference-time adversarial attacks, therefore they do undergo safety alignment training and Red teaming for putting in safety guardrails. For using these models, usually fine-tuning is done for model alignment on the desired tasks, which can make model more aligned but also make it more susceptible to produce unsafe responses, if fine-tuned with harmful data.In this paper, we study how much of impact introduction of harmful data in fine-tuning can make, and if it can override the safety protection of those models. Conversely,it was also explored that if model is fine-tuned on safety data can make the model produce more safer responses. Further we explore if fine-tuning the model on harmful data makes it less helpful or less trustworthy because of increase in model uncertainty leading to knowledge drift. Our extensive experimental results shown that Safety protection in an open-source can be overridden, when fine-tuned with harmful data as observed by ASR increasing by 35% when compared to basemodel's ASR. Also, as observed, fine-tuning a model with harmful data made the harmful fine-tuned model highly uncertain with huge knowledge drift and less truthfulness in its responses. Furthermore, for the safe fine-tuned model, ASR decreases by 51.68% as compared to the basemodel, and Safe model also shown in minor drop in uncertainty and truthfulness as compared to basemodel. This paper's code is available at: https://github.com/techsachinkr/Overriding_Model_Safety_Protections

We introduce a post-training approach that adapts self-supervised learning (SSL) models for deepfake speech detection by bridging the gap between general pre-training and domain-specific fine-tuning. We present AntiDeepfake models, a series of post-trained models developed using a large-scale multilingual speech dataset containing over 56,000 hours of genuine speech and 18,000 hours of speech with various artifacts in over one hundred languages. Experimental results show that the post-trained models already exhibit strong robustness and generalization to unseen deepfake speech. When they are further fine-tuned on the Deepfake-Eval-2024 dataset, these models consistently surpass existing state-of-the-art detectors that do not leverage post-training. Model checkpoints and source code are available online.

As large language models (LLMs) have increased in their capabilities, so does their potential for dual use. To reduce harmful outputs, produces and vendors of LLMs have used reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF). In tandem, LLM vendors have been increasingly enabling fine-tuning of their most powerful models. However, concurrent work has shown that fine-tuning can remove RLHF protections. We may expect that the most powerful models currently available (GPT-4) are less susceptible to fine-tuning attacks. In this work, we show the contrary: fine-tuning allows attackers to remove RLHF protections with as few as 340 examples and a 95% success rate. These training examples can be automatically generated with weaker models. We further show that removing RLHF protections does not decrease usefulness on non-censored outputs, providing evidence that our fine-tuning strategy does not decrease usefulness despite using weaker models to generate training data. Our results show the need for further research on protections on LLMs.

Recent studies on post-training large language models (LLMs) for reasoning through reinforcement learning (RL) typically focus on tasks that can be accurately verified and rewarded, such as solving math problems. In contrast, our research investigates the impact of reward noise, a more practical consideration for real-world scenarios involving the post-training of LLMs using reward models. We found that LLMs demonstrate strong robustness to substantial reward noise. For example, manually flipping 40% of the reward function's outputs in math tasks still allows a Qwen-2.5-7B model to achieve rapid convergence, improving its performance on math tasks from 5% to 72%, compared to the 75% accuracy achieved by a model trained with noiseless rewards. Surprisingly, by only rewarding the appearance of key reasoning phrases (namely reasoning pattern reward, RPR), such as ``first, I need to''-without verifying the correctness of answers, the model achieved peak downstream performance (over 70% accuracy for Qwen-2.5-7B) comparable to models trained with strict correctness verification and accurate rewards. Recognizing the importance of the reasoning process over the final results, we combined RPR with noisy reward models. RPR helped calibrate the noisy reward models, mitigating potential false negatives and enhancing the LLM's performance on open-ended tasks. These findings suggest the importance of improving models' foundational abilities during the pre-training phase while providing insights for advancing post-training techniques. Our code and scripts are available at https://github.com/trestad/Noisy-Rewards-in-Learning-to-Reason.

We describe our early efforts to red team language models in order to simultaneously discover, measure, and attempt to reduce their potentially harmful outputs. We make three main contributions. First, we investigate scaling behaviors for red teaming across 3 model sizes (2.7B, 13B, and 52B parameters) and 4 model types: a plain language model (LM); an LM prompted to be helpful, honest, and harmless; an LM with rejection sampling; and a model trained to be helpful and harmless using reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). We find that the RLHF models are increasingly difficult to red team as they scale, and we find a flat trend with scale for the other model types. Second, we release our dataset of 38,961 red team attacks for others to analyze and learn from. We provide our own analysis of the data and find a variety of harmful outputs, which range from offensive language to more subtly harmful non-violent unethical outputs. Third, we exhaustively describe our instructions, processes, statistical methodologies, and uncertainty about red teaming. We hope that this transparency accelerates our ability to work together as a community in order to develop shared norms, practices, and technical standards for how to red team language models.

Large language models are pre-trained on ever-growing token budgets under the assumption that better pre-training performance translates to improved downstream models. In this work, we challenge this assumption and show that extended pre-training can make models harder to fine-tune, leading to degraded final performance. We term this phenomenon catastrophic overtraining. For example, the instruction-tuned OLMo-1B model pre-trained on 3T tokens leads to over 2% worse performance on multiple standard LLM benchmarks than its 2.3T token counterpart. Through controlled experiments and theoretical analysis, we show that catastrophic overtraining arises from a systematic increase in the broad sensitivity of pre-trained parameters to modifications, including but not limited to fine-tuning. Our findings call for a critical reassessment of pre-training design that considers the downstream adaptability of the model.

Widely used alignment techniques, such as reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), rely on the ability of humans to supervise model behavior - for example, to evaluate whether a model faithfully followed instructions or generated safe outputs. However, future superhuman models will behave in complex ways too difficult for humans to reliably evaluate; humans will only be able to weakly supervise superhuman models. We study an analogy to this problem: can weak model supervision elicit the full capabilities of a much stronger model? We test this using a range of pretrained language models in the GPT-4 family on natural language processing (NLP), chess, and reward modeling tasks. We find that when we naively finetune strong pretrained models on labels generated by a weak model, they consistently perform better than their weak supervisors, a phenomenon we call weak-to-strong generalization. However, we are still far from recovering the full capabilities of strong models with naive finetuning alone, suggesting that techniques like RLHF may scale poorly to superhuman models without further work. We find that simple methods can often significantly improve weak-to-strong generalization: for example, when finetuning GPT-4 with a GPT-2-level supervisor and an auxiliary confidence loss, we can recover close to GPT-3.5-level performance on NLP tasks. Our results suggest that it is feasible to make empirical progress today on a fundamental challenge of aligning superhuman models.

Despite extensive diagnostics and debugging by developers, AI systems sometimes exhibit harmful unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is so large -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for inputs that may elicit harmful behaviors. Red-teaming and adversarial training (AT) are commonly used to improve robustness, however, they empirically struggle to fix failure modes that differ from the attacks used during training. In this work, we utilize latent adversarial training (LAT) to defend against vulnerabilities without leveraging knowledge of what they are or using inputs that elicit them. LAT makes use of the compressed, abstract, and structured latent representations of concepts that the network actually uses for prediction. Here, we use it to defend against failure modes without examples that elicit them. Specifically, we use LAT to remove trojans and defend against held-out classes of adversarial attacks. We show in image classification, text classification, and text generation tasks that LAT usually improves both robustness to novel attacks and performance on clean data relative to AT. This suggests that LAT can be a promising tool for defending against failure modes that are not explicitly identified by developers.

Large Language Models (LLMS) have increasingly become central to generating content with potential societal impacts. Notably, these models have demonstrated capabilities for generating content that could be deemed harmful. To mitigate these risks, researchers have adopted safety training techniques to align model outputs with societal values to curb the generation of malicious content. However, the phenomenon of "jailbreaking", where carefully crafted prompts elicit harmful responses from models, persists as a significant challenge. This research conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing studies on jailbreaking LLMs and their defense techniques. We meticulously investigate nine attack techniques and seven defense techniques applied across three distinct language models: Vicuna, LLama, and GPT-3.5 Turbo. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of these attack and defense techniques. Our findings reveal that existing white-box attacks underperform compared to universal techniques and that including special tokens in the input significantly affects the likelihood of successful attacks. This research highlights the need to concentrate on the security facets of LLMs. Additionally, we contribute to the field by releasing our datasets and testing framework, aiming to foster further research into LLM security. We believe these contributions will facilitate the exploration of security measures within this domain.

Post-training has demonstrated its importance in enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). The primary post-training methods can be categorized into supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT). SFT is efficient and well-suited for small language models, but it may lead to overfitting and limit the reasoning abilities of larger models. In contrast, RFT generally yields better generalization but depends heavily on the strength of the base model. To address the limitations of SFT and RFT, we propose Unified Fine-Tuning (UFT), a novel post-training paradigm that unifies SFT and RFT into a single, integrated process. UFT enables the model to effectively explore solutions while incorporating informative supervision signals, bridging the gap between memorizing and thinking underlying existing methods. Notably, UFT outperforms both SFT and RFT in general, regardless of model sizes. Furthermore, we theoretically prove that UFT breaks RFT's inherent exponential sample complexity bottleneck, showing for the first time that unified training can exponentially accelerate convergence on long-horizon reasoning tasks.

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoored behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoored behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

One of the most profound challenges of modern machine learning is performing well on the long-tail of rare and underrepresented features. Large general-purpose models are trained for many tasks, but work best on high-frequency use cases. After training, it is hard to adapt a model to perform well on specific use cases underrepresented in the training corpus. Relying on prompt engineering or few-shot examples to maximize the output quality on a particular test case can be frustrating, as models can be highly sensitive to small changes, react in unpredicted ways or rely on a fixed system prompt for maintaining performance. In this work, we ask: "Can we optimize our training protocols to both improve controllability and performance on underrepresented use cases at inference time?" We revisit the divide between training and inference techniques to improve long-tail performance while providing users with a set of control levers the model is trained to be responsive to. We create a detailed taxonomy of data characteristics and task provenance to explicitly control generation attributes and implicitly condition generations at inference time. We fine-tune a base model to infer these markers automatically, which makes them optional at inference time. This principled and flexible approach yields pronounced improvements in performance, especially on examples from the long tail of the training distribution. While we observe an average lift of 5.7% win rates in open-ended generation quality with our markers, we see over 9.1% gains in underrepresented domains. We also observe relative lifts of up to 14.1% on underrepresented tasks like CodeRepair and absolute improvements of 35.3% on length instruction following evaluations.

Assessing the effectiveness of large language models (LLMs) presents substantial challenges. The method of conducting human-annotated battles in an online Chatbot Arena is a highly effective evaluative technique. However, this approach is limited by the costs and time required for human annotation. In this paper, we introduce Arena Learning, an innovative offline strategy designed to simulate these arena battles using AI-driven annotations to evaluate battle outcomes, thus facilitating the continuous improvement of the target model through both supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. Arena Learning comprises two key elements. First, it ensures precise evaluations and maintains consistency between offline simulations and online competitions via WizardArena, a pipeline developed to accurately predict the Elo rankings of various models using a meticulously designed offline test set. Our results demonstrate that WizardArena's predictions closely align with those from the online Arena. Second, it involves the continuous improvement of training data based on the battle results and the refined model. We establish a data flywheel to iteratively update the training data by highlighting the weaknesses of the target model based on its battle results, enabling it to learn from the strengths of multiple different models. We apply Arena Learning to train our target model, WizardLM-beta, and demonstrate significant performance enhancements across various metrics. This fully automated training and evaluation pipeline sets the stage for continuous advancements in various LLMs via post-training. Notably, Arena Learning plays a pivotal role in the success of WizardLM-2, and this paper serves both as an exploration of its efficacy and a foundational study for future discussions related to WizardLM-2 and its derivatives.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

Curriculum learning, a training technique where data is presented to the model in order of example difficulty (e.g., from simpler to more complex documents), has shown limited success for pre-training language models. In this work, we investigate whether curriculum learning becomes competitive if we replace conventional human-centered difficulty metrics with one that more closely corresponds to example difficulty as observed during model training. Specifically, we experiment with sorting training examples by their training data influence, a score which estimates the effect of individual training examples on the model's output. Models trained on our curricula are able to outperform ones trained in random order by over 10 percentage points in benchmarks, confirming that curriculum learning is beneficial for language model pre-training, as long as a more model-centric notion of difficulty is adopted.

Continual Pre-Training (CPT) has become a popular and effective method to apply strong foundation models to specific downstream tasks. In this work, we explore the learning dynamics throughout the CPT process for large language models. We specifically focus on how general and downstream domain performance evolves at each training step, with domain performance measured via validation losses. We have observed that the CPT loss curve fundamentally characterizes the transition from one curve to another hidden curve, and could be described by decoupling the effects of distribution shift and learning rate annealing. We derive a CPT scaling law that combines the two factors, enabling the prediction of loss at any (continual) training steps and across learning rate schedules (LRS) in CPT. Our formulation presents a comprehensive understanding of several critical factors in CPT, including loss potential, peak learning rate, training steps, replay ratio, etc. Moreover, our approach can be adapted to customize training hyper-parameters to different CPT goals such as balancing general and domain-specific performance. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our scaling law holds across various CPT datasets and training hyper-parameters.

Stakeholders -- from model developers to policymakers -- seek to minimize the dual-use risks of large language models (LLMs). An open challenge to this goal is whether technical safeguards can impede the misuse of LLMs, even when models are customizable via fine-tuning or when model weights are fully open. In response, several recent studies have proposed methods to produce durable LLM safeguards for open-weight LLMs that can withstand adversarial modifications of the model's weights via fine-tuning. This holds the promise of raising adversaries' costs even under strong threat models where adversaries can directly fine-tune model weights. However, in this paper, we urge for more careful characterization of the limits of these approaches. Through several case studies, we demonstrate that even evaluating these defenses is exceedingly difficult and can easily mislead audiences into thinking that safeguards are more durable than they really are. We draw lessons from the evaluation pitfalls that we identify and suggest future research carefully cabin claims to more constrained, well-defined, and rigorously examined threat models, which can provide more useful and candid assessments to stakeholders.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to be harmless to humans. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that such models are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks that induce them to generate harmful content. More recent LLMs often incorporate an additional layer of defense, a Guard Model, which is a second LLM that is designed to check and moderate the output response of the primary LLM. Our key contribution is to show a novel attack strategy, PRP, that is successful against several open-source (e.g., Llama 2) and closed-source (e.g., GPT 3.5) implementations of Guard Models. PRP leverages a two step prefix-based attack that operates by (a) constructing a universal adversarial prefix for the Guard Model, and (b) propagating this prefix to the response. We find that this procedure is effective across multiple threat models, including ones in which the adversary has no access to the Guard Model at all. Our work suggests that further advances are required on defenses and Guard Models before they can be considered effective.

While post-training quantization is widely adopted for efficient deployment of large language models, the mechanisms underlying quantization robustness remain unclear. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of quantization degradation across open-source language model training trajectories up to 32B parameters and 15T training tokens to accurately assess the relationship between training dynamics and quantization performance. Our key finding is that quantization errors in large-scale training runs are driven by a complex interplay between learning rate and other training hyperparameters. Specifically, once learning rates decay, validation loss and quantization error diverge, largely independent of training data scale. To investigate interventions on the training dynamics and identify specific configurations that can modulate quantization robustness favorably, we train our own models in controlled experiments up to 100B tokens. Our results challenge the assumption that increasing dataset scale inherently compromises quantization effectiveness, demonstrating instead that strategic training hyperparameter interventions can improve quantization quality at scale.

In recent years, large language models have greatly improved in their ability to perform complex multi-step reasoning. However, even state-of-the-art models still regularly produce logical mistakes. To train more reliable models, we can turn either to outcome supervision, which provides feedback for a final result, or process supervision, which provides feedback for each intermediate reasoning step. Given the importance of training reliable models, and given the high cost of human feedback, it is important to carefully compare the both methods. Recent work has already begun this comparison, but many questions still remain. We conduct our own investigation, finding that process supervision significantly outperforms outcome supervision for training models to solve problems from the challenging MATH dataset. Our process-supervised model solves 78% of problems from a representative subset of the MATH test set. Additionally, we show that active learning significantly improves the efficacy of process supervision. To support related research, we also release PRM800K, the complete dataset of 800,000 step-level human feedback labels used to train our best reward model.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that can bypass their safety guardrails. In many domains, adversarial training has proven to be one of the most promising methods to reliably improve robustness against such attacks. Yet, in the context of LLMs, current methods for adversarial training are hindered by the high computational costs required to perform discrete adversarial attacks at each training iteration. We address this problem by instead calculating adversarial attacks in the continuous embedding space of the LLM, which is orders of magnitudes more efficient. We propose a fast adversarial training algorithm (C-AdvUL) composed of two losses: the first makes the model robust on continuous embedding attacks computed on an adversarial behaviour dataset; the second ensures the usefulness of the final model by fine-tuning on utility data. Moreover, we introduce C-AdvIPO, an adversarial variant of IPO that does not require utility data for adversarially robust alignment. Our empirical evaluation on four models from different families (Gemma, Phi3, Mistral, Zephyr) and at different scales (2B, 3.8B, 7B) shows that both algorithms substantially enhance LLM robustness against discrete attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR), while maintaining utility. Our results demonstrate that robustness to continuous perturbations can extrapolate to discrete threat models. Thereby, we present a path toward scalable adversarial training algorithms for robustly aligning LLMs.

The living-off-the-land (LOTL) offensive methodologies rely on the perpetration of malicious actions through chains of commands executed by legitimate applications, identifiable exclusively by analysis of system logs. LOTL techniques are well hidden inside the stream of events generated by common legitimate activities, moreover threat actors often camouflage activity through obfuscation, making them particularly difficult to detect without incurring in plenty of false alarms, even using machine learning. To improve the performance of models in such an harsh environment, we propose an augmentation framework to enhance and diversify the presence of LOTL malicious activity inside legitimate logs. Guided by threat intelligence, we generate a dataset by injecting attack templates known to be employed in the wild, further enriched by malleable patterns of legitimate activities to replicate the behavior of evasive threat actors. We conduct an extensive ablation study to understand which models better handle our augmented dataset, also manipulated to mimic the presence of model-agnostic evasion and poisoning attacks. Our results suggest that augmentation is needed to maintain high-predictive capabilities, robustness to attack is achieved through specific hardening techniques like adversarial training, and it is possible to deploy near-real-time models with almost-zero false alarms.

Existing post-training techniques for large language models are broadly categorized into Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (RFT). Each paradigm presents a distinct trade-off: SFT excels at mimicking demonstration data but can lead to problematic generalization as a form of behavior cloning. Conversely, RFT can significantly enhance a model's performance but is prone to learn unexpected behaviors, and its performance is highly sensitive to the initial policy. In this paper, we propose a unified view of these methods and introduce Prefix-RFT, a hybrid approach that synergizes learning from both demonstration and exploration. Using mathematical reasoning problems as a testbed, we empirically demonstrate that Prefix-RFT is both simple and effective. It not only surpasses the performance of standalone SFT and RFT but also outperforms parallel mixed-policy RFT methods. A key advantage is its seamless integration into existing open-source frameworks, requiring only minimal modifications to the standard RFT pipeline. Our analysis highlights the complementary nature of SFT and RFT, and validates that Prefix-RFT effectively harmonizes these two learning paradigms. Furthermore, ablation studies confirm the method's robustness to variations in the quality and quantity of demonstration data. We hope this work offers a new perspective on LLM post-training, suggesting that a unified paradigm that judiciously integrates demonstration and exploration could be a promising direction for future research.

The rapid advancement of large models, driven by their exceptional abilities in learning and generalization through large-scale pre-training, has reshaped the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These models are now foundational to a wide range of applications, including conversational AI, recommendation systems, autonomous driving, content generation, medical diagnostics, and scientific discovery. However, their widespread deployment also exposes them to significant safety risks, raising concerns about robustness, reliability, and ethical implications. This survey provides a systematic review of current safety research on large models, covering Vision Foundation Models (VFMs), Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Pre-training (VLP) models, Vision-Language Models (VLMs), Diffusion Models (DMs), and large-model-based Agents. Our contributions are summarized as follows: (1) We present a comprehensive taxonomy of safety threats to these models, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, backdoor attacks, jailbreak and prompt injection attacks, energy-latency attacks, data and model extraction attacks, and emerging agent-specific threats. (2) We review defense strategies proposed for each type of attacks if available and summarize the commonly used datasets and benchmarks for safety research. (3) Building on this, we identify and discuss the open challenges in large model safety, emphasizing the need for comprehensive safety evaluations, scalable and effective defense mechanisms, and sustainable data practices. More importantly, we highlight the necessity of collective efforts from the research community and international collaboration. Our work can serve as a useful reference for researchers and practitioners, fostering the ongoing development of comprehensive defense systems and platforms to safeguard AI models.

Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.

Large language models are pre-trained on uncurated text datasets consisting of trillions of tokens scraped from the Web. Prior work has shown that: (1) web-scraped pre-training datasets can be practically poisoned by malicious actors; and (2) adversaries can compromise language models after poisoning fine-tuning datasets. Our work evaluates for the first time whether language models can also be compromised during pre-training, with a focus on the persistence of pre-training attacks after models are fine-tuned as helpful and harmless chatbots (i.e., after SFT and DPO). We pre-train a series of LLMs from scratch to measure the impact of a potential poisoning adversary under four different attack objectives (denial-of-service, belief manipulation, jailbreaking, and prompt stealing), and across a wide range of model sizes (from 600M to 7B). Our main result is that poisoning only 0.1% of a model's pre-training dataset is sufficient for three out of four attacks to measurably persist through post-training. Moreover, simple attacks like denial-of-service persist through post-training with a poisoning rate of only 0.001%.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

Different base language model families, such as Llama and Qwen, exhibit divergent behaviors during post-training with reinforcement learning (RL), especially on reasoning-intensive tasks. What makes a base language model suitable for reinforcement learning? Gaining deeper insight into this question is essential for developing RL-scalable foundation models of the next generation. In this work, we investigate how mid-training strategies shape RL dynamics, focusing on two representative model families: Qwen and Llama. Our study reveals that (1) high-quality mathematical corpora, such as MegaMath-Web-Pro, significantly improve both base model and RL performance, while existing alternatives (e.g., FineMath-4plus) fail to do so; (2) further adding QA-style data, particularly long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning examples, enhances RL outcomes, and instruction data further unlocks this effect; (3) while long-CoT improves reasoning depth, it can also induce verbosity of model responses and unstability of RL training, underscoring the importance of data formatting; (4) scaling mid-training consistently leads to stronger downstream RL performance. Building on these insights, we introduce a two-stage mid-training strategy, Stable-then-Decay, in which base models are first trained on 200B tokens with a constant learning rate, followed by 20B tokens across three CoT-focused branches with learning rate decay. This yields OctoThinker, a family of models demonstrating strong RL compatibility and closing the performance gap with more RL-friendly model families, i.e., Qwen. We hope our work will help shape pre-training strategies for foundation models in the RL era. To support further research, we release our open-source models along with a curated math reasoning-intensive corpus of over 70 billion tokens (i.e., MegaMath-Web-Pro-Max).

The stability of language model pre-training and its effects on downstream performance are still understudied. Prior work shows that the training process can yield significantly different results in response to slight variations in initial conditions, e.g., the random seed. Crucially, the research community still lacks sufficient resources and tools to systematically investigate pre-training stability, particularly for decoder-only language models. We introduce the PolyPythias, a set of 45 new training runs for the Pythia model suite: 9 new seeds across 5 model sizes, from 14M to 410M parameters, resulting in about 7k new checkpoints that we release. Using these new 45 training runs, in addition to the 5 already available, we study the effects of different initial conditions determined by the seed -- i.e., parameters' initialisation and data order -- on (i) downstream performance, (ii) learned linguistic representations, and (iii) emergence of training phases. In addition to common scaling behaviours, our analyses generally reveal highly consistent training dynamics across both model sizes and initial conditions. Further, the new seeds for each model allow us to identify outlier training runs and delineate their characteristics. Our findings show the potential of using these methods to predict training stability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are central to a multitude of applications but struggle with significant risks, notably in generating harmful content and biases. Drawing an analogy to the human psyche's conflict between evolutionary survival instincts and societal norm adherence elucidated in Freud's psychoanalysis theory, we argue that LLMs suffer a similar fundamental conflict, arising between their inherent desire for syntactic and semantic continuity, established during the pre-training phase, and the post-training alignment with human values. This conflict renders LLMs vulnerable to adversarial attacks, wherein intensifying the models' desire for continuity can circumvent alignment efforts, resulting in the generation of harmful information. Through a series of experiments, we first validated the existence of the desire for continuity in LLMs, and further devised a straightforward yet powerful technique, such as incomplete sentences, negative priming, and cognitive dissonance scenarios, to demonstrate that even advanced LLMs struggle to prevent the generation of harmful information. In summary, our study uncovers the root of LLMs' vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, hereby questioning the efficacy of solely relying on sophisticated alignment methods, and further advocates for a new training idea that integrates modal concepts alongside traditional amodal concepts, aiming to endow LLMs with a more nuanced understanding of real-world contexts and ethical considerations.

We introduce ShieldGemma 2, a 4B parameter image content moderation model built on Gemma 3. This model provides robust safety risk predictions across the following key harm categories: Sexually Explicit, Violence \& Gore, and Dangerous Content for synthetic images (e.g. output of any image generation model) and natural images (e.g. any image input to a Vision-Language Model). We evaluated on both internal and external benchmarks to demonstrate state-of-the-art performance compared to LlavaGuard helff2024llavaguard, GPT-4o mini hurst2024gpt, and the base Gemma 3 model gemma_2025 based on our policies. Additionally, we present a novel adversarial data generation pipeline which enables a controlled, diverse, and robust image generation. ShieldGemma 2 provides an open image moderation tool to advance multimodal safety and responsible AI development.

In the rapidly advancing field of artificial intelligence, the concept of Red-Teaming or Jailbreaking large language models (LLMs) has emerged as a crucial area of study. This approach is especially significant in terms of assessing and enhancing the safety and robustness of these models. This paper investigates the intricate consequences of such modifications through model editing, uncovering a complex relationship between enhancing model accuracy and preserving its ethical integrity. Our in-depth analysis reveals a striking paradox: while injecting accurate information is crucial for model reliability, it can paradoxically destabilize the model's foundational framework, resulting in unpredictable and potentially unsafe behaviors. Additionally, we propose a benchmark dataset NicheHazardQA to investigate this unsafe behavior both within the same and cross topical domain. This aspect of our research sheds light on how the edits, impact the model's safety metrics and guardrails. Our findings show that model editing serves as a cost-effective tool for topical red-teaming by methodically applying targeted edits and evaluating the resultant model behavior

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized natural language processing, yet aligning these models with human values and preferences using RLHF remains a significant challenge. This challenge is characterized by various instabilities, such as reward hacking and catastrophic forgetting. In this technical report, we propose two innovations to stabilize RLHF training: 1) Advantage Model, which directly models advantage score i.e., extra reward compared to the expected rewards and regulates score distributions across tasks to prevent reward hacking. 2) Selective Rehearsal, which mitigates catastrophic forgetting by strategically selecting data for PPO training and knowledge rehearsing. Our experimental analysis on public and proprietary datasets reveals that the proposed methods not only increase stability in RLHF training but also achieve higher reward scores and win rates.

Teams that have trained large Transformer-based models have reported training instabilities at large scale that did not appear when training with the same hyperparameters at smaller scales. Although the causes of such instabilities are of scientific interest, the amount of resources required to reproduce them has made investigation difficult. In this work, we seek ways to reproduce and study training stability and instability at smaller scales. First, we focus on two sources of training instability described in previous work: the growth of logits in attention layers (Dehghani et al., 2023) and divergence of the output logits from the log probabilities (Chowdhery et al., 2022). By measuring the relationship between learning rate and loss across scales, we show that these instabilities also appear in small models when training at high learning rates, and that mitigations previously employed at large scales are equally effective in this regime. This prompts us to investigate the extent to which other known optimizer and model interventions influence the sensitivity of the final loss to changes in the learning rate. To this end, we study methods such as warm-up, weight decay, and the muParam (Yang et al., 2022), and combine techniques to train small models that achieve similar losses across orders of magnitude of learning rate variation. Finally, to conclude our exploration we study two cases where instabilities can be predicted before they emerge by examining the scaling behavior of model activation and gradient norms.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become increasingly widespread, concerns about content safety have grown in parallel. Currently, there is a clear lack of high-quality, human-annotated datasets that address the full spectrum of LLM-related safety risks and are usable for commercial applications. To bridge this gap, we propose a comprehensive and adaptable taxonomy for categorizing safety risks, structured into 12 top-level hazard categories with an extension to 9 fine-grained subcategories. This taxonomy is designed to meet the diverse requirements of downstream users, offering more granular and flexible tools for managing various risk types. Using a hybrid data generation pipeline that combines human annotations with a multi-LLM "jury" system to assess the safety of responses, we obtain Aegis 2.0, a carefully curated collection of 34,248 samples of human-LLM interactions, annotated according to our proposed taxonomy. To validate its effectiveness, we demonstrate that several lightweight models, trained using parameter-efficient techniques on Aegis 2.0, achieve performance competitive with leading safety models fully fine-tuned on much larger, non-commercial datasets. In addition, we introduce a novel training blend that combines safety with topic following data.This approach enhances the adaptability of guard models, enabling them to generalize to new risk categories defined during inference. We plan to open-source Aegis 2.0 data and models to the research community to aid in the safety guardrailing of LLMs.

Post-training of Large Language Models (LMs) often prioritizes accuracy and helpfulness at the expense of diversity. This creates a tension: while post-training improves response quality, it also sharpens output distributions and reduces the range of ideas, limiting the usefulness of LMs in creative and exploratory tasks such as brainstorming, storytelling, or problem solving. We address this challenge with Diversity-Aware Reinforcement Learning (DARLING), a framework that jointly optimizes for response quality and semantic diversity. At its core, DARLING introduces a learned partition function to measure diversity beyond surface-level lexical variations. This diversity signal is then combined with a quality reward during online reinforcement learning, encouraging models to generate outputs that are both high-quality and distinct. Experiments across multiple model families and sizes show that DARLING generalizes to two regimes: non-verifiable tasks (instruction following and creative writing) and verifiable tasks (competition math). On five benchmarks in the first setting, DARLING consistently outperforms quality-only RL baselines, producing outputs that are simultaneously of higher quality and novelty. In the second setting, DARLING achieves higher pass@1 (solution quality) and pass@k (solution variety). Most strikingly, explicitly optimizing for diversity catalyzes exploration in online RL, which manifests itself as higher-quality responses.

We present a human-and-model-in-the-loop process for dynamically generating datasets and training better performing and more robust hate detection models. We provide a new dataset of ~40,000 entries, generated and labelled by trained annotators over four rounds of dynamic data creation. It includes ~15,000 challenging perturbations and each hateful entry has fine-grained labels for the type and target of hate. Hateful entries make up 54% of the dataset, which is substantially higher than comparable datasets. We show that model performance is substantially improved using this approach. Models trained on later rounds of data collection perform better on test sets and are harder for annotators to trick. They also perform better on HateCheck, a suite of functional tests for online hate detection. We provide the code, dataset and annotation guidelines for other researchers to use. Accepted at ACL 2021.

The development of large language models leads to the formation of a pre-train-then-align paradigm, in which the model is typically pre-trained on a large text corpus and undergoes a tuning stage to align the model with human preference or downstream tasks. In this work, we investigate the relationship between pre-training and fine-tuning by fine-tuning multiple intermediate pre-trained model checkpoints. Our results on 18 datasets suggest that i) continual pre-training improves the model in a latent way that unveils after fine-tuning; ii) with extra fine-tuning, the datasets that the model does not demonstrate capability gain much more than those that the model performs well during the pre-training stage; iii) although model benefits significantly through supervised fine-tuning, it may forget previously known domain knowledge and the tasks that are not seen during fine-tuning; iv) the model resembles high sensitivity to evaluation prompts after supervised fine-tuning, but this sensitivity can be alleviated by more pre-training.

It is important that consumers and regulators can verify the provenance of large neural models to evaluate their capabilities and risks. We introduce the concept of a "Proof-of-Training-Data": any protocol that allows a model trainer to convince a Verifier of the training data that produced a set of model weights. Such protocols could verify the amount and kind of data and compute used to train the model, including whether it was trained on specific harmful or beneficial data sources. We explore efficient verification strategies for Proof-of-Training-Data that are compatible with most current large-model training procedures. These include a method for the model-trainer to verifiably pre-commit to a random seed used in training, and a method that exploits models' tendency to temporarily overfit to training data in order to detect whether a given data-point was included in training. We show experimentally that our verification procedures can catch a wide variety of attacks, including all known attacks from the Proof-of-Learning literature.

Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) is often provided as a pay-per-query, black-box system to clients. Such a black-box approach not only hinders open replication, validation, and interpretation of model results, but also makes it harder for white-hat researchers to identify vulnerabilities in the MLaaS systems. Model extraction is a promising technique to address these challenges by reverse-engineering black-box models. Since training data is typically unavailable for MLaaS models, this paper focuses on the realistic version of it: data-free model extraction. We propose a data-free model extraction approach, CaBaGe, to achieve higher model extraction accuracy with a small number of queries. Our innovations include (1) a novel experience replay for focusing on difficult training samples; (2) an ensemble of generators for steadily producing diverse synthetic data; and (3) a selective filtering process for querying the victim model with harder, more balanced samples. In addition, we create a more realistic setting, for the first time, where the attacker has no knowledge of the number of classes in the victim training data, and create a solution to learn the number of classes on the fly. Our evaluation shows that CaBaGe outperforms existing techniques on seven datasets -- MNIST, FMNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet-subset, and Tiny ImageNet -- with an accuracy improvement of the extracted models by up to 43.13%. Furthermore, the number of queries required to extract a clone model matching the final accuracy of prior work is reduced by up to 75.7%.

Robust validation metrics remain essential in contemporary deep learning, not only to detect overfitting and poor generalization, but also to monitor training dynamics. In the supervised classification setting, we investigate whether interactions between training data and model weights can yield such a metric that both tracks generalization during training and attributes performance to individual training samples. We introduce Gradient-Weight Alignment (GWA), quantifying the coherence between per-sample gradients and model weights. We show that effective learning corresponds to coherent alignment, while misalignment indicates deteriorating generalization. GWA is efficiently computable during training and reflects both sample-specific contributions and dataset-wide learning dynamics. Extensive experiments show that GWA accurately predicts optimal early stopping, enables principled model comparisons, and identifies influential training samples, providing a validation-set-free approach for model analysis directly from the training data.

We introduce a new method for extracting structured threat behaviors from threat intelligence text. Our method is based on a multi-stage ranking architecture that allows jointly optimizing for efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, we believe this problem formulation better aligns with the real-world nature of the task considering the large number of adversary techniques and the extensive body of threat intelligence created by security analysts. Our findings show that the proposed system yields state-of-the-art performance results for this task. Results show that our method has a top-3 recall performance of 81\% in identifying the relevant technique among 193 top-level techniques. Our tests also demonstrate that our system performs significantly better (+40\%) than the widely used large language models when tested under a zero-shot setting.

State-of-the-art Text-to-Image models like Stable Diffusion and DALLEcdot2 are revolutionizing how people generate visual content. At the same time, society has serious concerns about how adversaries can exploit such models to generate unsafe images. In this work, we focus on demystifying the generation of unsafe images and hateful memes from Text-to-Image models. We first construct a typology of unsafe images consisting of five categories (sexually explicit, violent, disturbing, hateful, and political). Then, we assess the proportion of unsafe images generated by four advanced Text-to-Image models using four prompt datasets. We find that these models can generate a substantial percentage of unsafe images; across four models and four prompt datasets, 14.56% of all generated images are unsafe. When comparing the four models, we find different risk levels, with Stable Diffusion being the most prone to generating unsafe content (18.92% of all generated images are unsafe). Given Stable Diffusion's tendency to generate more unsafe content, we evaluate its potential to generate hateful meme variants if exploited by an adversary to attack a specific individual or community. We employ three image editing methods, DreamBooth, Textual Inversion, and SDEdit, which are supported by Stable Diffusion. Our evaluation result shows that 24% of the generated images using DreamBooth are hateful meme variants that present the features of the original hateful meme and the target individual/community; these generated images are comparable to hateful meme variants collected from the real world. Overall, our results demonstrate that the danger of large-scale generation of unsafe images is imminent. We discuss several mitigating measures, such as curating training data, regulating prompts, and implementing safety filters, and encourage better safeguard tools to be developed to prevent unsafe generation.

Modern language models often rely on Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to encourage safe behaviors. However, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks due to three key limitations: (1) the inefficiency and high cost of human annotation, (2) the vast diversity of potential adversarial attacks, and (3) the risk of feedback bias and reward hacking. To address these challenges, we introduce Adversarial Preference Learning (APL), an iterative adversarial training method incorporating three key innovations. First, a direct harmfulness metric based on the model's intrinsic preference probabilities, eliminating reliance on external assessment. Second, a conditional generative attacker that synthesizes input-specific adversarial variations. Third, an iterative framework with automated closed-loop feedback, enabling continuous adaptation through vulnerability discovery and mitigation. Experiments on Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 demonstrate that APL significantly enhances robustness, achieving 83.33% harmlessness win rate over the base model (evaluated by GPT-4o), reducing harmful outputs from 5.88% to 0.43% (measured by LLaMA-Guard), and lowering attack success rate by up to 65% according to HarmBench. Notably, APL maintains competitive utility, with an MT-Bench score of 6.59 (comparable to the baseline 6.78) and an LC-WinRate of 46.52% against the base model.

This paper studies post-training large language models (LLMs) using preference feedback from a powerful oracle to help a model iteratively improve over itself. The typical approach for post-training LLMs involves Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), which traditionally separates reward learning and subsequent policy optimization. However, such a reward maximization approach is limited by the nature of "point-wise" rewards (such as Bradley-Terry model), which fails to express complex intransitive or cyclic preference relations. While advances on RLHF show reward learning and policy optimization can be merged into a single contrastive objective for stability, they yet still remain tethered to the reward maximization framework. Recently, a new wave of research sidesteps the reward maximization presumptions in favor of directly optimizing over "pair-wise" or general preferences. In this paper, we introduce Direct Nash Optimization (DNO), a provable and scalable algorithm that marries the simplicity and stability of contrastive learning with theoretical generality from optimizing general preferences. Because DNO is a batched on-policy algorithm using a regression-based objective, its implementation is straightforward and efficient. Moreover, DNO enjoys monotonic improvement across iterations that help it improve even over a strong teacher (such as GPT-4). In our experiments, a resulting 7B parameter Orca-2.5 model aligned by DNO achieves the state-of-the-art win-rate against GPT-4-Turbo of 33% on AlpacaEval 2.0 (even after controlling for response length), an absolute gain of 26% (7% to 33%) over the initializing model. It outperforms models with far more parameters, including Mistral Large, Self-Rewarding LM (70B parameters), and older versions of GPT-4.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) gain widespread practical application, providing the model family of different parameter sizes has become standard practice to address diverse computational requirements. Conventionally, each model in a family is trained independently, resulting in computational costs that scale additively with the number of models. We propose an efficient method for constructing the model family through progressive training, where smaller models are incrementally expanded to larger sizes to create a complete model family. Through extensive experiments with a model family ranging from 1B to 8B parameters, we demonstrate that our method reduces computational costs by approximately 25% while maintaining comparable performance to independently trained models. Furthermore, by strategically adjusting maximum learning rates based on model size, our method outperforms the independent training across various metrics. Beyond performance gains, our approach offers an additional advantage: models in our family tend to yield more consistent behavior across different model sizes.

Reinforcement learning with AI feedback (RLAIF) is a popular paradigm for improving the instruction-following abilities of powerful pre-trained language models. RLAIF first performs supervised fine-tuning (SFT) using demonstrations from a teacher model and then further fine-tunes the model with reinforcement learning (RL), using feedback from a critic model. While recent popular open-source models have demonstrated substantial improvements in performance from the RL step, in this paper we question whether the complexity of this RL step is truly warranted for AI feedback. We show that the improvements of the RL step are virtually entirely due to the widespread practice of using a weaker teacher model (e.g. GPT-3.5) for SFT data collection than the critic (e.g., GPT-4) used for AI feedback generation. Specifically, we show that simple supervised fine-tuning with GPT-4 as the teacher outperforms existing RLAIF pipelines. More generally, we find that the gains from RLAIF vary substantially across base model families, test-time evaluation protocols, and critic models. Finally, we provide a mechanistic explanation for when SFT may outperform the full two-step RLAIF pipeline as well as suggestions for making RLAIF maximally useful in practice.

Post-training of language models (LMs) increasingly relies on the following two stages: (i) knowledge distillation, where the LM is trained to imitate a larger teacher LM, and (ii) reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), where the LM is aligned by optimizing a reward model. In the second RLHF stage, a well-known challenge is reward hacking, where the LM over-optimizes the reward model. Such phenomenon is in line with Goodhart's law and can lead to degraded performance on the true objective. In this paper, we investigate whether a similar phenomenon, that we call teacher hacking, can occur during knowledge distillation. This could arise because the teacher LM is itself an imperfect approximation of the true distribution. To study this, we propose a controlled experimental setup involving: (i) an oracle LM representing the ground-truth distribution, (ii) a teacher LM distilled from the oracle, and (iii) a student LM distilled from the teacher. Our experiments reveal the following insights. When using a fixed offline dataset for distillation, teacher hacking occurs; moreover, we can detect it by observing when the optimization process deviates from polynomial convergence laws. In contrast, employing online data generation techniques effectively mitigates teacher hacking. More precisely, we identify data diversity as the key factor in preventing hacking. Overall, our findings provide a deeper understanding of the benefits and limitations of distillation for building robust and efficient LMs.

Despite the advanced capabilities of contemporary machine learning (ML) models, they remain vulnerable to adversarial and backdoor attacks. This vulnerability is particularly concerning in real-world deployments, where compromised models may exhibit unpredictable behavior in critical scenarios. Such risks are heightened by the prevalent practice of collecting massive, internet-sourced datasets for training multimodal models, as these datasets may harbor backdoors. Various techniques have been proposed to mitigate the effects of backdooring in multimodal models, such as CleanCLIP, which is the current state-of-the-art approach. In this work, we demonstrate that the efficacy of CleanCLIP in mitigating backdoors is highly dependent on the particular objective used during model pre-training. We observe that stronger pre-training objectives that lead to higher zero-shot classification performance correlate with harder to remove backdoors behaviors. We show this by training multimodal models on two large datasets consisting of 3 million (CC3M) and 6 million (CC6M) datapoints, under various pre-training objectives, followed by poison removal using CleanCLIP. We find that CleanCLIP, even with extensive hyperparameter tuning, is ineffective in poison removal when stronger pre-training objectives are used. Our findings underscore critical considerations for ML practitioners who train models using large-scale web-curated data and are concerned about potential backdoor threats.

Adversarial training (AT) has been demonstrated as one of the most promising defense methods against various adversarial attacks. To our knowledge, existing AT-based methods usually train with the locally most adversarial perturbed points and treat all the perturbed points equally, which may lead to considerably weaker adversarial robust generalization on test data. In this work, we introduce a new adversarial training framework that considers the diversity as well as characteristics of the perturbed points in the vicinity of benign samples. To realize the framework, we propose a Regional Adversarial Training (RAT) defense method that first utilizes the attack path generated by the typical iterative attack method of projected gradient descent (PGD), and constructs an adversarial region based on the attack path. Then, RAT samples diverse perturbed training points efficiently inside this region, and utilizes a distance-aware label smoothing mechanism to capture our intuition that perturbed points at different locations should have different impact on the model performance. Extensive experiments on several benchmark datasets show that RAT consistently makes significant improvement on standard adversarial training (SAT), and exhibits better robust generalization.

Large language models (LLMs) already excel at writing code in high-resource languages such as Python and JavaScript, yet stumble on low-resource languages that remain essential to science and engineering. Besides the obvious shortage of pre-training data, post-training itself is a bottleneck: every new language seems to require new datasets, test harnesses, and reinforcement-learning (RL) infrastructure. We introduce Agnostics, a language-agnostic post-training pipeline that eliminates this per-language engineering. The key idea is to judge code solely by its externally observable behavior, so a single verifier can test solutions written in any language. Concretely, we (i) use an LLM to rewrite existing unit-test datasets into an I/O format, (ii) supply a short configuration that tells the verifier how to compile and run a target language, and (iii) apply reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) in a robust code execution environment. Applied to five low-resource languages--Lua, Julia, R, OCaml, and Fortran--Agnostics (1) improves Qwen-3 4B to performance that rivals other 16B-70B open-weight models; (2) scales cleanly to larger and diverse model families (Qwen-3 8B, DeepSeek Coder 6.7B Instruct, Phi 4 Mini); and (3) for {le} 16B parameter models, sets new state-of-the-art pass@1 results on MultiPL-E and a new multi-language version LiveCodeBench that we introduce. We will release the language-agnostic training datasets (Ag-MBPP-X, Ag-Codeforces-X, Ag-LiveCodeBench-X), training code, and ready-to-use configurations, making RL post-training in any programming language as simple as editing a short YAML file.

Uncovering early-stage metrics that reflect final model performance is one core principle for large-scale pretraining. The existing scaling law demonstrates the power-law correlation between pretraining loss and training flops, which serves as an important indicator of the current training state for large language models. However, this principle only focuses on the model's compression properties on the training data, resulting in an inconsistency with the ability improvements on the downstream tasks. Some follow-up works attempted to extend the scaling-law to more complex metrics (such as hyperparameters), but still lacked a comprehensive analysis of the dynamic differences among various capabilities during pretraining. To address the aforementioned limitations, this paper undertakes a comprehensive comparison of model capabilities at various pretraining intermediate checkpoints. Through this analysis, we confirm that specific downstream metrics exhibit similar training dynamics across models of different sizes, up to 67 billion parameters. In addition to our core findings, we've reproduced Amber and OpenLLaMA, releasing their intermediate checkpoints. This initiative offers valuable resources to the research community and facilitates the verification and exploration of LLM pretraining by open-source researchers. Besides, we provide empirical summaries, including performance comparisons of different models and capabilities, and tuition of key metrics for different training phases. Based on these findings, we provide a more user-friendly strategy for evaluating the optimization state, offering guidance for establishing a stable pretraining process.

The recent advances in diffusion models (DMs) have revolutionized the generation of realistic and complex images. However, these models also introduce potential safety hazards, such as producing harmful content and infringing data copyrights. Despite the development of safety-driven unlearning techniques to counteract these challenges, doubts about their efficacy persist. To tackle this issue, we introduce an evaluation framework that leverages adversarial prompts to discern the trustworthiness of these safety-driven DMs after they have undergone the process of unlearning harmful concepts. Specifically, we investigated the adversarial robustness of DMs, assessed by adversarial prompts, when eliminating unwanted concepts, styles, and objects. We develop an effective and efficient adversarial prompt generation approach for DMs, termed UnlearnDiffAtk. This method capitalizes on the intrinsic classification abilities of DMs to simplify the creation of adversarial prompts, thereby eliminating the need for auxiliary classification or diffusion models.Through extensive benchmarking, we evaluate the robustness of five widely-used safety-driven unlearned DMs (i.e., DMs after unlearning undesirable concepts, styles, or objects) across a variety of tasks. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency merits of UnlearnDiffAtk over the state-of-the-art adversarial prompt generation method and reveal the lack of robustness of current safety-driven unlearning techniques when applied to DMs. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Diffusion-MU-Attack. WARNING: This paper contains model outputs that may be offensive in nature.

We propose a hybrid machine learning architecture that simultaneously employs multiple deep learning models analyzing contextual and behavioral characteristics of Windows portable executable, producing a final prediction based on a decision from the meta-model. The detection heuristic in contemporary machine learning Windows malware classifiers is typically based on the static properties of the sample since dynamic analysis through virtualization is challenging for vast quantities of samples. To surpass this limitation, we employ a Windows kernel emulation that allows the acquisition of behavioral patterns across large corpora with minimal temporal and computational costs. We partner with a security vendor for a collection of more than 100k int-the-wild samples that resemble the contemporary threat landscape, containing raw PE files and filepaths of applications at the moment of execution. The acquired dataset is at least ten folds larger than reported in related works on behavioral malware analysis. Files in the training dataset are labeled by a professional threat intelligence team, utilizing manual and automated reverse engineering tools. We estimate the hybrid classifier's operational utility by collecting an out-of-sample test set three months later from the acquisition of the training set. We report an improved detection rate, above the capabilities of the current state-of-the-art model, especially under low false-positive requirements. Additionally, we uncover a meta-model's ability to identify malicious activity in validation and test sets even if none of the individual models express enough confidence to mark the sample as malevolent. We conclude that the meta-model can learn patterns typical to malicious samples from representation combinations produced by different analysis techniques. We publicly release pre-trained models and anonymized dataset of emulation reports.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

Neural networks often suffer from catastrophic interference (CI): performance on previously learned tasks drops off significantly when learning a new task. This contrasts strongly with humans, who can sequentially learn new tasks without appreciably forgetting previous tasks. Prior work has explored various techniques for mitigating CI such as regularization, rehearsal, generative replay, and distillation methods. The current work takes a different approach, one guided by cognitive science research showing that in naturalistic environments, the probability of encountering a task decreases as a power-law of the time since it was last performed. We argue that a realistic evaluation of techniques for the mitigation of CI should be performed in simulated naturalistic learning environments. Thus, we evaluate the extent of mitigation of CI when training simple rehearsal-based methods in power-law environments similar to the ones humans face. Our work explores this novel rehearsal-based approach for a domain-incremental task: learning permutations in the MNIST task. We compare our rehearsal environment with other baselines to show its efficacy in promoting continual learning. Additionally, we investigate whether this environment shows forward facilitation, i.e., faster learning of later tasks. Next, we explore the robustness of our learning environment to the number of tasks, model size, and amount of data rehearsed after each task. Notably, our results show that the performance is comparable or superior to that of models trained using popular regularization methods and also to rehearsals in non-power-law environments. The benefits of this training paradigm include simplicity and the lack of a need for extra neural circuitry. In addition, because our method is orthogonal to other methods, future research can combine training in power-law environments with other continual learning mechanisms.

Large language models (LLMs) undergo safety alignment to ensure safe conversations with humans. However, this paper introduces a training-free attack method capable of reversing safety alignment, converting the outcomes of stronger alignment into greater potential for harm by accessing only LLM output token distributions. Specifically, our method achieves this reversal by contrasting the output token distribution of a safety-aligned language model (e.g., Llama-2-chat) against its pre-trained version (e.g., Llama-2), so that the token predictions are shifted towards the opposite direction of safety alignment. We name this method emulated disalignment (ED) because sampling from this contrastive distribution provably emulates the result of fine-tuning to minimize a safety reward. Our experiments with ED across three evaluation datasets and four model families (Llama-1, Llama-2, Mistral, and Alpaca) show that ED doubles the harmfulness of pre-trained models and outperforms strong baselines, achieving the highest harmful rates in 43 out of 48 evaluation subsets by a large margin. Eventually, given ED's reliance on language model output token distributions, which particularly compromises open-source models, our findings highlight the need to reassess the open accessibility of language models, even if they have been safety-aligned. Code is available at https://github.com/ZHZisZZ/emulated-disalignment.

Language Models (LMs) often cannot be deployed because of their potential to harm users in hard-to-predict ways. Prior work identifies harmful behaviors before deployment by using human annotators to hand-write test cases. However, human annotation is expensive, limiting the number and diversity of test cases. In this work, we automatically find cases where a target LM behaves in a harmful way, by generating test cases ("red teaming") using another LM. We evaluate the target LM's replies to generated test questions using a classifier trained to detect offensive content, uncovering tens of thousands of offensive replies in a 280B parameter LM chatbot. We explore several methods, from zero-shot generation to reinforcement learning, for generating test cases with varying levels of diversity and difficulty. Furthermore, we use prompt engineering to control LM-generated test cases to uncover a variety of other harms, automatically finding groups of people that the chatbot discusses in offensive ways, personal and hospital phone numbers generated as the chatbot's own contact info, leakage of private training data in generated text, and harms that occur over the course of a conversation. Overall, LM-based red teaming is one promising tool (among many needed) for finding and fixing diverse, undesirable LM behaviors before impacting users.

Abusive language is a growing concern in many social media platforms. Repeated exposure to abusive speech has created physiological effects on the target users. Thus, the problem of abusive language should be addressed in all forms for online peace and safety. While extensive research exists in abusive speech detection, most studies focus on English. Recently, many smearing incidents have occurred in India, which provoked diverse forms of abusive speech in online space in various languages based on the geographic location. Therefore it is essential to deal with such malicious content. In this paper, to bridge the gap, we demonstrate a large-scale analysis of multilingual abusive speech in Indic languages. We examine different interlingual transfer mechanisms and observe the performance of various multilingual models for abusive speech detection for eight different Indic languages. We also experiment to show how robust these models are on adversarial attacks. Finally, we conduct an in-depth error analysis by looking into the models' misclassified posts across various settings. We have made our code and models public for other researchers.

Directly training Large Language Models (LLMs) for Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) remains challenging due to intricate reward modeling, dynamic agent interactions, and demanding generalization requirements. This paper explores whether post-training techniques, specifically Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), can effectively generalize to multi-agent scenarios. We use economic reasoning as a testbed, leveraging its strong foundations in mathematics and game theory, its demand for structured analytical reasoning, and its relevance to real-world applications such as market design, resource allocation, and policy analysis. We introduce Recon (Reasoning like an ECONomist), a 7B-parameter open-source LLM post-trained on a hand-curated dataset of 2,100 high-quality economic reasoning problems. Comprehensive evaluation on economic reasoning benchmarks and multi-agent games reveals clear improvements in structured reasoning and economic rationality. These results underscore the promise of domain-aligned post-training for enhancing reasoning and agent alignment, shedding light on the roles of SFT and RL in shaping model behavior. Code is available at https://github.com/MasterZhou1/Recon .

In various fields of knowledge creation, including science, new ideas often build on pre-existing information. In this work, we explore this concept within the context of language models. Specifically, we explore the potential of self-training models on their own outputs, akin to how humans learn and build on their previous thoughts and actions. While this approach is intuitively appealing, our research reveals its practical limitations. We find that extended self-training of the GPT-2 model leads to a significant degradation in performance, resulting in repetitive and collapsed token output.

Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is the standard approach for post-training large language models (LLMs), yet it often shows limited generalization. We trace this limitation to its default training objective: negative log likelihood (NLL). While NLL is classically optimal when training from scratch, post-training operates in a different paradigm and could violate its optimality assumptions, where models already encode task-relevant priors and supervision can be long and noisy. To this end, we study a general family of probability-based objectives and characterize their effectiveness under different conditions. Through comprehensive experiments and extensive ablation studies across 7 model backbones, 14 benchmarks, and 3 domains, we uncover a critical dimension that governs objective behavior: the model-capability continuum. Near the model-strong end, prior-leaning objectives that downweight low-probability tokens (e.g., -p, -p^{10}, thresholded variants) consistently outperform NLL; toward the model-weak end, NLL dominates; in between, no single objective prevails. Our theoretical analysis further elucidates how objectives trade places across the continuum, providing a principled foundation for adapting objectives to model capability. Our code is available at https://github.com/GaotangLi/Beyond-Log-Likelihood.

In recent years, NLP practitioners have converged on the following practice: (i) import an off-the-shelf pretrained (masked) language model; (ii) append a multilayer perceptron atop the CLS token's hidden representation (with randomly initialized weights); and (iii) fine-tune the entire model on a downstream task (MLP-FT). This procedure has produced massive gains on standard NLP benchmarks, but these models remain brittle, even to mild adversarial perturbations. In this work, we demonstrate surprising gains in adversarial robustness enjoyed by Model-tuning Via Prompts (MVP), an alternative method of adapting to downstream tasks. Rather than appending an MLP head to make output prediction, MVP appends a prompt template to the input, and makes prediction via text infilling/completion. Across 5 NLP datasets, 4 adversarial attacks, and 3 different models, MVP improves performance against adversarial substitutions by an average of 8% over standard methods and even outperforms adversarial training-based state-of-art defenses by 3.5%. By combining MVP with adversarial training, we achieve further improvements in adversarial robustness while maintaining performance on unperturbed examples. Finally, we conduct ablations to investigate the mechanism underlying these gains. Notably, we find that the main causes of vulnerability of MLP-FT can be attributed to the misalignment between pre-training and fine-tuning tasks, and the randomly initialized MLP parameters.

Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts at alignment. In this work, we study to what extent these models remain aligned, even when interacting with an adversarial user who constructs worst-case inputs (adversarial examples). These inputs are designed to cause the model to emit harmful content that would otherwise be prohibited. We show that existing NLP-based optimization attacks are insufficiently powerful to reliably attack aligned text models: even when current NLP-based attacks fail, we can find adversarial inputs with brute force. As a result, the failure of current attacks should not be seen as proof that aligned text models remain aligned under adversarial inputs. However the recent trend in large-scale ML models is multimodal models that allow users to provide images that influence the text that is generated. We show these models can be easily attacked, i.e., induced to perform arbitrary un-aligned behavior through adversarial perturbation of the input image. We conjecture that improved NLP attacks may demonstrate this same level of adversarial control over text-only models.

We develop techniques to quantify the degree to which a given (training or testing) example is an outlier in the underlying distribution. We evaluate five methods to score examples in a dataset by how well-represented the examples are, for different plausible definitions of "well-represented", and apply these to four common datasets: MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet. Despite being independent approaches, we find all five are highly correlated, suggesting that the notion of being well-represented can be quantified. Among other uses, we find these methods can be combined to identify (a) prototypical examples (that match human expectations); (b) memorized training examples; and, (c) uncommon submodes of the dataset. Further, we show how we can utilize our metrics to determine an improved ordering for curriculum learning, and impact adversarial robustness. We release all metric values on training and test sets we studied.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advancing capabilities in complex tasks, such as reasoning and graduate-level question answering, yet their resilience against misuse, particularly involving scientifically sophisticated risks, remains underexplored. Existing safety benchmarks typically focus either on instructions requiring minimal knowledge comprehension (e.g., ``tell me how to build a bomb") or utilize prompts that are relatively low-risk (e.g., multiple-choice or classification tasks about hazardous content). Consequently, they fail to adequately assess model safety when handling knowledge-intensive, hazardous scenarios. To address this critical gap, we introduce SOSBench, a regulation-grounded, hazard-focused benchmark encompassing six high-risk scientific domains: chemistry, biology, medicine, pharmacology, physics, and psychology. The benchmark comprises 3,000 prompts derived from real-world regulations and laws, systematically expanded via an LLM-assisted evolutionary pipeline that introduces diverse, realistic misuse scenarios (e.g., detailed explosive synthesis instructions involving advanced chemical formulas). We evaluate frontier models within a unified evaluation framework using our SOSBench. Despite their alignment claims, advanced models consistently disclose policy-violating content across all domains, demonstrating alarmingly high rates of harmful responses (e.g., 79.1% for Deepseek-R1 and 47.3% for GPT-4.1). These results highlight significant safety alignment deficiencies and underscore urgent concerns regarding the responsible deployment of powerful LLMs.

The success of the machine learning field has reliably depended on training on large datasets. While effective, this trend comes at an extraordinary cost. This is due to two deeply intertwined factors: the size of models and the size of datasets. While promising research efforts focus on reducing the size of models, the other half of the equation remains fairly mysterious. Indeed, it is surprising that the standard approach to training remains to iterate over and over, uniformly sampling the training dataset. In this paper we explore a series of alternative training paradigms that leverage insights from hard-data-mining and dropout, simple enough to implement and use that can become the new training standard. The proposed Progressive Data Dropout reduces the number of effective epochs to as little as 12.4% of the baseline. This savings actually do not come at any cost for accuracy. Surprisingly, the proposed method improves accuracy by up to 4.82%. Our approach requires no changes to model architecture or optimizer, and can be applied across standard training pipelines, thus posing an excellent opportunity for wide adoption. Code can be found here: https://github.com/bazyagami/LearningWithRevision

We develop task scaling laws and model ladders to predict the individual task performance of pretrained language models (LMs) in the overtrained setting. Standard power laws for language modeling loss cannot accurately model task performance. Therefore, we leverage a two-step prediction approach: first use model and data size to predict a task-specific loss, and then use this task loss to predict task performance. We train a set of small-scale "ladder" models, collect data points to fit the parameterized functions of the two prediction steps, and make predictions for two target models: a 7B model trained to 4T tokens and a 13B model trained to 5T tokens. Training the ladder models only costs 1% of the compute used for the target models. On four multiple-choice tasks written in ranked classification format, we can predict the accuracy of both target models within 2 points of absolute error. We have higher prediction error on four other tasks (average absolute error 6.9) and find that these are often tasks with higher variance in task metrics. We also find that using less compute to train fewer ladder models tends to deteriorate predictions. Finally, we empirically show that our design choices and the two-step approach lead to superior performance in establishing scaling laws.

Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful text from models that were fine-tuned to be harmless. Recent work on red-teaming, model editing, and interpretability suggests that this challenge stems from how (adversarial) fine-tuning largely serves to suppress rather than remove undesirable capabilities from LLMs. Prior work has introduced latent adversarial training (LAT) as a way to improve robustness to broad classes of failures. These prior works have considered untargeted latent space attacks where the adversary perturbs latent activations to maximize loss on examples of desirable behavior. Untargeted LAT can provide a generic type of robustness but does not leverage information about specific failure modes. Here, we experiment with targeted LAT where the adversary seeks to minimize loss on a specific competing task. We find that it can augment a wide variety of state-of-the-art methods. First, we use targeted LAT to improve robustness to jailbreaks, outperforming a strong R2D2 baseline with orders of magnitude less compute. Second, we use it to more effectively remove backdoors with no knowledge of the trigger. Finally, we use it to more effectively unlearn knowledge for specific undesirable tasks in a way that is also more robust to re-learning. Overall, our results suggest that targeted LAT can be an effective tool for defending against harmful behaviors from LLMs.

Image safety classifiers play an important role in identifying and mitigating the spread of unsafe images online (e.g., images including violence, hateful rhetoric, etc.). At the same time, with the advent of text-to-image models and increasing concerns about the safety of AI models, developers are increasingly relying on image safety classifiers to safeguard their models. Yet, the performance of current image safety classifiers remains unknown for real-world and AI-generated images. To bridge this research gap, in this work, we propose UnsafeBench, a benchmarking framework that evaluates the effectiveness and robustness of image safety classifiers. First, we curate a large dataset of 10K real-world and AI-generated images that are annotated as safe or unsafe based on a set of 11 unsafe categories of images (sexual, violent, hateful, etc.). Then, we evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of five popular image safety classifiers, as well as three classifiers that are powered by general-purpose visual language models. Our assessment indicates that existing image safety classifiers are not comprehensive and effective enough in mitigating the multifaceted problem of unsafe images. Also, we find that classifiers trained only on real-world images tend to have degraded performance when applied to AI-generated images. Motivated by these findings, we design and implement a comprehensive image moderation tool called PerspectiveVision, which effectively identifies 11 categories of real-world and AI-generated unsafe images. The best PerspectiveVision model achieves an overall F1-Score of 0.810 on six evaluation datasets, which is comparable with closed-source and expensive state-of-the-art models like GPT-4V. UnsafeBench and PerspectiveVision can aid the research community in better understanding the landscape of image safety classification in the era of generative AI.

Refusal training is widely used to prevent LLMs from generating harmful, undesirable, or illegal outputs. We reveal a curious generalization gap in the current refusal training approaches: simply reformulating a harmful request in the past tense (e.g., "How to make a Molotov cocktail?" to "How did people make a Molotov cocktail?") is often sufficient to jailbreak many state-of-the-art LLMs. We systematically evaluate this method on Llama-3 8B, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Gemma-2 9B, Phi-3-Mini, GPT-4o mini, GPT-4o, and R2D2 models using GPT-3.5 Turbo as a reformulation model. For example, the success rate of this simple attack on GPT-4o increases from 1% using direct requests to 88% using 20 past tense reformulation attempts on harmful requests from JailbreakBench with GPT-4 as a jailbreak judge. Interestingly, we also find that reformulations in the future tense are less effective, suggesting that refusal guardrails tend to consider past historical questions more benign than hypothetical future questions. Moreover, our experiments on fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo show that defending against past reformulations is feasible when past tense examples are explicitly included in the fine-tuning data. Overall, our findings highlight that the widely used alignment techniques -- such as SFT, RLHF, and adversarial training -- employed to align the studied models can be brittle and do not always generalize as intended. We provide code and jailbreak artifacts at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-past-tense.

Recent advances in applying reinforcement learning (RL) to large language models (LLMs) have led to substantial progress. In particular, a series of remarkable yet often counterintuitive phenomena have been reported in LLMs, exhibiting patterns not typically observed in traditional RL settings. For example, notable claims include that a single training example can match the performance achieved with an entire dataset, that the reward signal does not need to be very accurate, and that training solely with negative samples can match or even surpass sophisticated reward-based methods. However, the precise conditions under which these observations hold - and, critically, when they fail - remain unclear. In this work, we identify a key factor that differentiates RL observations: whether the pretrained model already exhibits strong Model-Task Alignment, as measured by pass@k accuracy on the evaluated task. Through a systematic and comprehensive examination of a series of counterintuitive claims, supported by rigorous experimental validation across different model architectures and task domains, our findings show that while standard RL training remains consistently robust across settings, many of these counterintuitive results arise only when the model and task already exhibit strong model-task alignment. In contrast, these techniques fail to drive substantial learning in more challenging regimes, where standard RL methods remain effective.

Discrete adversarial attacks are symbolic perturbations to a language input that preserve the output label but lead to a prediction error. While such attacks have been extensively explored for the purpose of evaluating model robustness, their utility for improving robustness has been limited to offline augmentation only. Concretely, given a trained model, attacks are used to generate perturbed (adversarial) examples, and the model is re-trained exactly once. In this work, we address this gap and leverage discrete attacks for online augmentation, where adversarial examples are generated at every training step, adapting to the changing nature of the model. We propose (i) a new discrete attack, based on best-first search, and (ii) random sampling attacks that unlike prior work are not based on expensive search-based procedures. Surprisingly, we find that random sampling leads to impressive gains in robustness, outperforming the commonly-used offline augmentation, while leading to a speedup at training time of ~10x. Furthermore, online augmentation with search-based attacks justifies the higher training cost, significantly improving robustness on three datasets. Last, we show that our new attack substantially improves robustness compared to prior methods.

In this work, we explore "prompt tuning", a simple yet effective mechanism for learning "soft prompts" to condition frozen language models to perform specific downstream tasks. Unlike the discrete text prompts used by GPT-3, soft prompts are learned through backpropagation and can be tuned to incorporate signal from any number of labeled examples. Our end-to-end learned approach outperforms GPT-3's "few-shot" learning by a large margin. More remarkably, through ablations on model size using T5, we show that prompt tuning becomes more competitive with scale: as models exceed billions of parameters, our method "closes the gap" and matches the strong performance of model tuning (where all model weights are tuned). This finding is especially relevant in that large models are costly to share and serve, and the ability to reuse one frozen model for multiple downstream tasks can ease this burden. Our method can be seen as a simplification of the recently proposed "prefix tuning" of Li and Liang (2021), and we provide a comparison to this and other similar approaches. Finally, we show that conditioning a frozen model with soft prompts confers benefits in robustness to domain transfer, as compared to full model tuning.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Alignment faking in large language models presented a demonstration of Claude 3 Opus and Claude 3.5 Sonnet selectively complying with a helpful-only training objective to prevent modification of their behavior outside of training. We expand this analysis to 25 models and find that only 5 (Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Llama 3 405B, Grok 3, Gemini 2.0 Flash) comply with harmful queries more when they infer they are in training than when they infer they are in deployment. First, we study the motivations of these 5 models. Results from perturbing details of the scenario suggest that only Claude 3 Opus's compliance gap is primarily and consistently motivated by trying to keep its goals. Second, we investigate why many chat models don't fake alignment. Our results suggest this is not entirely due to a lack of capabilities: many base models fake alignment some of the time, and post-training eliminates alignment-faking for some models and amplifies it for others. We investigate 5 hypotheses for how post-training may suppress alignment faking and find that variations in refusal behavior may account for a significant portion of differences in alignment faking.

The Superficial Alignment Hypothesis posits that almost all of a language model's abilities and knowledge are learned during pre-training, while post-training is about giving a model the right style and format. We re-examine these claims by empirically studying the scaling behavior of post-training with increasing finetuning examples and evaluating them using objective task-specific standardized benchmarks. Through experiments with the Llama-3, Mistral, and Llama-2 model families of multiple sizes, we observe that, similar to the pre-training scaling laws, post-training task performance scales as a power law against the number of finetuning examples. This power law relationship holds across a broad array of capabilities, including mathematical reasoning, coding, instruction following, and multihop-reasoning. In addition, for tasks like math and multihop reasoning, we observe that a handful of examples merely align the model stylistically but do not saturate performance on the benchmarks. Model performance is instead correlated with its reasoning ability and it improves significantly with more examples, illustrating the need for holistic evaluation programs leveraging objective benchmarks in addition to measurement of alignment to human preferences. We also observe that language models are not necessarily limited to using knowledge learned during pre-training. With appropriate post-training, a model's ability to integrate new knowledge greatly improves on downstream tasks like multihop question-answering. Taken together, these results shed new light on the Superficial Alignment Hypothesis, suggesting that it is, at best, an over-simplification.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are attracting significant research attention due to their instruction-following abilities, allowing users and developers to leverage LLMs for a variety of tasks. However, LLMs are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks: a class of attacks that hijack the model's instruction-following abilities, changing responses to prompts to undesired, possibly malicious ones. In this work, we introduce Jatmo, a method for generating task-specific models resilient to prompt-injection attacks. Jatmo leverages the fact that LLMs can only follow instructions once they have undergone instruction tuning. It harnesses a teacher instruction-tuned model to generate a task-specific dataset, which is then used to fine-tune a base model (i.e., a non-instruction-tuned model). Jatmo only needs a task prompt and a dataset of inputs for the task: it uses the teacher model to generate outputs. For situations with no pre-existing datasets, Jatmo can use a single example, or in some cases none at all, to produce a fully synthetic dataset. Our experiments on six tasks show that Jatmo models provide the same quality of outputs on their specific task as standard LLMs, while being resilient to prompt injections. The best attacks succeeded in less than 0.5% of cases against our models, versus over 90% success rate against GPT-3.5-Turbo. We release Jatmo at https://github.com/wagner-group/prompt-injection-defense.

The bulk of existing research in defending against adversarial examples focuses on defending against a single (typically bounded Lp-norm) attack, but for a practical setting, machine learning (ML) models should be robust to a wide variety of attacks. In this paper, we present the first unified framework for considering multiple attacks against ML models. Our framework is able to model different levels of learner's knowledge about the test-time adversary, allowing us to model robustness against unforeseen attacks and robustness against unions of attacks. Using our framework, we present the first leaderboard, MultiRobustBench, for benchmarking multiattack evaluation which captures performance across attack types and attack strengths. We evaluate the performance of 16 defended models for robustness against a set of 9 different attack types, including Lp-based threat models, spatial transformations, and color changes, at 20 different attack strengths (180 attacks total). Additionally, we analyze the state of current defenses against multiple attacks. Our analysis shows that while existing defenses have made progress in terms of average robustness across the set of attacks used, robustness against the worst-case attack is still a big open problem as all existing models perform worse than random guessing.

We propose SPARTA ALIGNMENT, an algorithm to collectively align multiple LLMs through competition and combat. To complement a single model's lack of diversity in generation and biases in evaluation, multiple LLMs form a "sparta tribe" to compete against each other in fulfilling instructions while serving as judges for the competition of others. For each iteration, one instruction and two models are selected for a duel, the other models evaluate the two responses, and their evaluation scores are aggregated through a adapted elo-ranking based reputation system, where winners/losers of combat gain/lose weight in evaluating others. The peer-evaluated combat results then become preference pairs where the winning response is preferred over the losing one, and all models learn from these preferences at the end of each iteration. SPARTA ALIGNMENT enables the self-evolution of multiple LLMs in an iterative and collective competition process. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SPARTA ALIGNMENT outperforms initial models and 4 self-alignment baselines across 10 out of 12 tasks and datasets with 7.0% average improvement. Further analysis reveals that SPARTA ALIGNMENT generalizes more effectively to unseen tasks and leverages the expertise diversity of participating models to produce more logical, direct and informative outputs.

Single-step adversarial training (SSAT) has demonstrated the potential to achieve both efficiency and robustness. However, SSAT suffers from catastrophic overfitting (CO), a phenomenon that leads to a severely distorted classifier, making it vulnerable to multi-step adversarial attacks. In this work, we observe that some adversarial examples generated on the SSAT-trained network exhibit anomalous behaviour, that is, although these training samples are generated by the inner maximization process, their associated loss decreases instead, which we named abnormal adversarial examples (AAEs). Upon further analysis, we discover a close relationship between AAEs and classifier distortion, as both the number and outputs of AAEs undergo a significant variation with the onset of CO. Given this observation, we re-examine the SSAT process and uncover that before the occurrence of CO, the classifier already displayed a slight distortion, indicated by the presence of few AAEs. Furthermore, the classifier directly optimizing these AAEs will accelerate its distortion, and correspondingly, the variation of AAEs will sharply increase as a result. In such a vicious circle, the classifier rapidly becomes highly distorted and manifests as CO within a few iterations. These observations motivate us to eliminate CO by hindering the generation of AAEs. Specifically, we design a novel method, termed Abnormal Adversarial Examples Regularization (AAER), which explicitly regularizes the variation of AAEs to hinder the classifier from becoming distorted. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can effectively eliminate CO and further boost adversarial robustness with negligible additional computational overhead.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be inappropriate or offensive. As generative models become available for public use in various applications, testing and analyzing vulnerabilities of these models has become a priority. Here we propose an automatic red teaming framework that evaluates a given model and exposes its vulnerabilities against unsafe and inappropriate content generation. Our framework uses in-context learning in a feedback loop to red team models and trigger them into unsafe content generation. We propose different in-context attack strategies to automatically learn effective and diverse adversarial prompts for text-to-image models. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to baseline approaches, our proposed strategy is significantly more effective in exposing vulnerabilities in Stable Diffusion (SD) model, even when the latter is enhanced with safety features. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed framework is effective for red teaming text-to-text models, resulting in significantly higher toxic response generation rate compared to previously reported numbers.

While prior research has proposed a plethora of methods that build neural classifiers robust against adversarial robustness, practitioners are still reluctant to adopt them due to their unacceptably severe clean accuracy penalties. This paper significantly alleviates this accuracy-robustness trade-off by mixing the output probabilities of a standard classifier and a robust classifier, where the standard network is optimized for clean accuracy and is not robust in general. We show that the robust base classifier's confidence difference for correct and incorrect examples is the key to this improvement. In addition to providing intuitions and empirical evidence, we theoretically certify the robustness of the mixed classifier under realistic assumptions. Furthermore, we adapt an adversarial input detector into a mixing network that adaptively adjusts the mixture of the two base models, further reducing the accuracy penalty of achieving robustness. The proposed flexible method, termed "adaptive smoothing", can work in conjunction with existing or even future methods that improve clean accuracy, robustness, or adversary detection. Our empirical evaluation considers strong attack methods, including AutoAttack and adaptive attack. On the CIFAR-100 dataset, our method achieves an 85.21% clean accuracy while maintaining a 38.72% ell_infty-AutoAttacked (epsilon = 8/255) accuracy, becoming the second most robust method on the RobustBench CIFAR-100 benchmark as of submission, while improving the clean accuracy by ten percentage points compared with all listed models. The code that implements our method is available at https://github.com/Bai-YT/AdaptiveSmoothing.

In this report, we introduce Qwen2.5, a comprehensive series of large language models (LLMs) designed to meet diverse needs. Compared to previous iterations, Qwen 2.5 has been significantly improved during both the pre-training and post-training stages. In terms of pre-training, we have scaled the high-quality pre-training datasets from the previous 7 trillion tokens to 18 trillion tokens. This provides a strong foundation for common sense, expert knowledge, and reasoning capabilities. In terms of post-training, we implement intricate supervised finetuning with over 1 million samples, as well as multistage reinforcement learning. Post-training techniques enhance human preference, and notably improve long text generation, structural data analysis, and instruction following. To handle diverse and varied use cases effectively, we present Qwen2.5 LLM series in rich sizes. Open-weight offerings include base and instruction-tuned models, with quantized versions available. In addition, for hosted solutions, the proprietary models currently include two mixture-of-experts (MoE) variants: Qwen2.5-Turbo and Qwen2.5-Plus, both available from Alibaba Cloud Model Studio. Qwen2.5 has demonstrated top-tier performance on a wide range of benchmarks evaluating language understanding, reasoning, mathematics, coding, human preference alignment, etc. Specifically, the open-weight flagship Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct outperforms a number of open and proprietary models and demonstrates competitive performance to the state-of-the-art open-weight model, Llama-3-405B-Instruct, which is around 5 times larger. Qwen2.5-Turbo and Qwen2.5-Plus offer superior cost-effectiveness while performing competitively against GPT-4o-mini and GPT-4o respectively. Additionally, as the foundation, Qwen2.5 models have been instrumental in training specialized models such as Qwen2.5-Math, Qwen2.5-Coder, QwQ, and multimodal models.

Datasets scraped from the internet have been critical to the successes of large-scale machine learning. Yet, this very success puts the utility of future internet-derived datasets at potential risk, as model outputs begin to replace human annotations as a source of supervision. In this work, we first formalize a system where interactions with one model are recorded as history and scraped as training data in the future. We then analyze its stability over time by tracking changes to a test-time bias statistic (e.g. gender bias of model predictions). We find that the degree of bias amplification is closely linked to whether the model's outputs behave like samples from the training distribution, a behavior which we characterize and define as consistent calibration. Experiments in three conditional prediction scenarios - image classification, visual role-labeling, and language generation - demonstrate that models that exhibit a sampling-like behavior are more calibrated and thus more stable. Based on this insight, we propose an intervention to help calibrate and stabilize unstable feedback systems. Code is available at https://github.com/rtaori/data_feedback.

As the application space of language models continues to evolve, a natural question to ask is how we can quickly adapt models to new tasks. We approach this classic question from a continual learning perspective, in which we aim to continue fine-tuning models trained on past tasks on new tasks, with the goal of "transferring" relevant knowledge. However, this strategy also runs the risk of doing more harm than good, i.e., negative transfer. In this paper, we construct a new benchmark of task sequences that target different possible transfer scenarios one might face, such as a sequence of tasks with high potential of positive transfer, high potential for negative transfer, no expected effect, or a mixture of each. An ideal learner should be able to maximally exploit information from all tasks that have any potential for positive transfer, while also avoiding the negative effects of any distracting tasks that may confuse it. We then propose a simple, yet effective, learner that satisfies many of our desiderata simply by leveraging a selective strategy for initializing new models from past task checkpoints. Still, limitations remain, and we hope this benchmark can help the community to further build and analyze such learners.

Language models can retain dangerous knowledge and skills even after extensive safety fine-tuning, posing both misuse and misalignment risks. Recent studies show that even specialized unlearning methods can be easily reversed. To address this, we systematically evaluate many existing and novel components of unlearning methods and identify ones crucial for irreversible unlearning. We introduce Disruption Masking, a technique in which we only allow updating weights, where the signs of the unlearning gradient and the retaining gradient are the same. This ensures all updates are non-disruptive. Additionally, we identify the need for normalizing the unlearning gradients, and also confirm the usefulness of meta-learning. We combine these insights into MUDMAN (Meta-Unlearning with Disruption Masking and Normalization) and validate its effectiveness at preventing the recovery of dangerous capabilities. MUDMAN outperforms the prior TAR method by 40%, setting a new state-of-the-art for robust unlearning.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) reveal a perplexing phenomenon in continual learning: despite extensive training, models experience significant performance declines, raising questions about task alignment and underlying knowledge retention. This study first explores the concept of "spurious forgetting", proposing that such performance drops often reflect a decline in task alignment rather than true knowledge loss. Through controlled experiments with a synthesized dataset, we investigate the dynamics of model performance during the initial training phases of new tasks, discovering that early optimization steps can disrupt previously established task alignments. Our theoretical analysis connects these shifts to orthogonal updates in model weights, providing a robust framework for understanding this behavior. Ultimately, we introduce a Freezing strategy that fix the bottom layers of the model, leading to substantial improvements in four continual learning scenarios. Our findings underscore the critical distinction between task alignment and knowledge retention, paving the way for more effective strategies in continual learning.

The study of adversarial vulnerabilities of deep neural networks (DNNs) has progressed rapidly. Existing attacks require either internal access (to the architecture, parameters, or training set of the victim model) or external access (to query the model). However, both the access may be infeasible or expensive in many scenarios. We investigate no-box adversarial examples, where the attacker can neither access the model information or the training set nor query the model. Instead, the attacker can only gather a small number of examples from the same problem domain as that of the victim model. Such a stronger threat model greatly expands the applicability of adversarial attacks. We propose three mechanisms for training with a very small dataset (on the order of tens of examples) and find that prototypical reconstruction is the most effective. Our experiments show that adversarial examples crafted on prototypical auto-encoding models transfer well to a variety of image classification and face verification models. On a commercial celebrity recognition system held by clarifai.com, our approach significantly diminishes the average prediction accuracy of the system to only 15.40%, which is on par with the attack that transfers adversarial examples from a pre-trained Arcface model.

Seven years ago, researchers proposed a postprocessing method to equalize the error rates of a model across different demographic groups. The work launched hundreds of papers purporting to improve over the postprocessing baseline. We empirically evaluate these claims through thousands of model evaluations on several tabular datasets. We find that the fairness-accuracy Pareto frontier achieved by postprocessing contains all other methods we were feasibly able to evaluate. In doing so, we address two common methodological errors that have confounded previous observations. One relates to the comparison of methods with different unconstrained base models. The other concerns methods achieving different levels of constraint relaxation. At the heart of our study is a simple idea we call unprocessing that roughly corresponds to the inverse of postprocessing. Unprocessing allows for a direct comparison of methods using different underlying models and levels of relaxation.

Red-teaming is a common practice for mitigating unsafe behaviors in Large Language Models (LLMs), which involves thoroughly assessing LLMs to identify potential flaws and addressing them with responsible and accurate responses. While effective, manual red-teaming is costly, and existing automatic red-teaming typically discovers safety risks without addressing them. In this paper, we propose a Multi-round Automatic Red-Teaming (MART) method, which incorporates both automatic adversarial prompt writing and safe response generation, significantly increasing red-teaming scalability and the safety of the target LLM. Specifically, an adversarial LLM and a target LLM interplay with each other in an iterative manner, where the adversarial LLM aims to generate challenging prompts that elicit unsafe responses from the target LLM, while the target LLM is fine-tuned with safety aligned data on these adversarial prompts. In each round, the adversarial LLM crafts better attacks on the updated target LLM, while the target LLM also improves itself through safety fine-tuning. On adversarial prompt benchmarks, the violation rate of an LLM with limited safety alignment reduces up to 84.7% after 4 rounds of MART, achieving comparable performance to LLMs with extensive adversarial prompt writing. Notably, model helpfulness on non-adversarial prompts remains stable throughout iterations, indicating the target LLM maintains strong performance on instruction following.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant improvements in many tasks across various domains, such as code interpretation, response generation, and ambiguity handling. These LLMs, however, when upgrading, primarily prioritize enhancing user experience while neglecting security, privacy, and safety implications. Consequently, unintended vulnerabilities or biases can be introduced. Previous studies have predominantly focused on specific versions of the models and disregard the potential emergence of new attack vectors targeting the updated versions. Through the lens of adversarial examples within the in-context learning framework, this longitudinal study addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive assessment of the robustness of successive versions of LLMs, vis-\`a-vis GPT-3.5. We conduct extensive experiments to analyze and understand the impact of the robustness in two distinct learning categories: zero-shot learning and few-shot learning. Our findings indicate that, in comparison to earlier versions of LLMs, the updated versions do not exhibit the anticipated level of robustness against adversarial attacks. In addition, our study emphasizes the increased effectiveness of synergized adversarial queries in most zero-shot learning and few-shot learning cases. We hope that our study can lead to a more refined assessment of the robustness of LLMs over time and provide valuable insights of these models for both developers and users.

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

We introduce the latest series of TeleChat models: TeleChat2, TeleChat2.5, and T1, offering a significant upgrade over their predecessor, TeleChat. Despite minimal changes to the model architecture, the new series achieves substantial performance gains through enhanced training strategies in both pre-training and post-training stages. The series begins with TeleChat2, which undergoes pretraining on 10 trillion high-quality and diverse tokens. This is followed by Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to further enhance its capabilities. TeleChat2.5 and T1 expand the pipeline by incorporating a continual pretraining phase with domain-specific datasets, combined with reinforcement learning (RL) to improve performance in code generation and mathematical reasoning tasks. The T1 variant is designed for complex reasoning, supporting long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning and demonstrating substantial improvements in mathematics and coding. In contrast, TeleChat2.5 prioritizes speed, delivering rapid inference. Both flagship models of T1 and TeleChat2.5 are dense Transformer-based architectures with 115B parameters, showcasing significant advancements in reasoning and general task performance compared to the original TeleChat. Notably, T1-115B outperform proprietary models such as OpenAI's o1-mini and GPT-4o. We publicly release TeleChat2, TeleChat2.5 and T1, including post-trained versions with 35B and 115B parameters, to empower developers and researchers with state-of-the-art language models tailored for diverse applications.

Pre-trained language models (LMs) are shown to easily generate toxic language. In this work, we systematically explore domain-adaptive training to reduce the toxicity of language models. We conduct this study on three dimensions: training corpus, model size, and parameter efficiency. For the training corpus, we propose to leverage the generative power of LMs and generate nontoxic datasets for domain-adaptive training, which mitigates the exposure bias and is shown to be more data-efficient than using a curated pre-training corpus. We demonstrate that the self-generation method consistently outperforms the existing baselines across various model sizes on both automatic and human evaluations, even when it uses a 1/3 smaller training corpus. We then comprehensively study detoxifying LMs with parameter sizes ranging from 126M up to 530B (3x larger than GPT-3), a scale that has never been studied before. We find that i) large LMs have similar toxicity levels as smaller ones given the same pre-training corpus, and ii) large LMs require more endeavor to detoxify. We also explore parameter-efficient training methods for detoxification. We demonstrate that adding and training adapter-only layers in LMs not only saves a lot of parameters but also achieves a better trade-off between toxicity and perplexity than whole model adaptation for the large-scale models.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is a pivotal technique that aligns language models closely with human-centric values. The initial phase of RLHF involves learning human values using a reward model from ranking data. It is observed that the performance of the reward model degrades after one epoch of training, and optimizing too much against the learned reward model eventually hinders the true objective. This paper delves into these issues, leveraging the theoretical insights to design improved reward learning algorithm termed 'Iterative Data Smoothing' (IDS). The core idea is that during each training epoch, we not only update the model with the data, but also update the date using the model, replacing hard labels with soft labels. Our empirical findings highlight the superior performance of this approach over the traditional methods.

As large language models grow in capability and agency, identifying vulnerabilities through red-teaming becomes vital for safe deployment. However, traditional prompt-engineering approaches may prove ineffective once red-teaming turns into a weak-to-strong problem, where target models surpass red-teamers in capabilities. To study this shift, we frame red-teaming through the lens of the capability gap between attacker and target. We evaluate more than 500 attacker-target pairs using LLM-based jailbreak attacks that mimic human red-teamers across diverse families, sizes, and capability levels. Three strong trends emerge: (i) more capable models are better attackers, (ii) attack success drops sharply once the target's capability exceeds the attacker's, and (iii) attack success rates correlate with high performance on social science splits of the MMLU-Pro benchmark. From these trends, we derive a jailbreaking scaling law that predicts attack success for a fixed target based on attacker-target capability gap. These findings suggest that fixed-capability attackers (e.g., humans) may become ineffective against future models, increasingly capable open-source models amplify risks for existing systems, and model providers must accurately measure and control models' persuasive and manipulative abilities to limit their effectiveness as attackers.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

We introduce Meta MLGym and MLGym-Bench, a new framework and benchmark for evaluating and developing LLM agents on AI research tasks. This is the first Gym environment for machine learning (ML) tasks, enabling research on reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms for training such agents. MLGym-bench consists of 13 diverse and open-ended AI research tasks from diverse domains such as computer vision, natural language processing, reinforcement learning, and game theory. Solving these tasks requires real-world AI research skills such as generating new ideas and hypotheses, creating and processing data, implementing ML methods, training models, running experiments, analyzing the results, and iterating through this process to improve on a given task. We evaluate a number of frontier large language models (LLMs) on our benchmarks such as Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Llama-3.1 405B, GPT-4o, o1-preview, and Gemini-1.5 Pro. Our MLGym framework makes it easy to add new tasks, integrate and evaluate models or agents, generate synthetic data at scale, as well as develop new learning algorithms for training agents on AI research tasks. We find that current frontier models can improve on the given baselines, usually by finding better hyperparameters, but do not generate novel hypotheses, algorithms, architectures, or substantial improvements. We open-source our framework and benchmark to facilitate future research in advancing the AI research capabilities of LLM agents.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, this report presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. Drawing on the E-T-C analysis (deployment environment, threat source, enabling capability) from the Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (SafeWork-F1-Framework), we identify critical risks in seven areas: cyber offense, biological and chemical risks, persuasion and manipulation, uncontrolled autonomous AI R\&D, strategic deception and scheming, self-replication, and collusion. Guided by the "AI-45^circ Law," we evaluate these risks using "red lines" (intolerable thresholds) and "yellow lines" (early warning indicators) to define risk zones: green (manageable risk for routine deployment and continuous monitoring), yellow (requiring strengthened mitigations and controlled deployment), and red (necessitating suspension of development and/or deployment). Experimental results show that all recent frontier AI models reside in green and yellow zones, without crossing red lines. Specifically, no evaluated models cross the yellow line for cyber offense or uncontrolled AI R\&D risks. For self-replication, and strategic deception and scheming, most models remain in the green zone, except for certain reasoning models in the yellow zone. In persuasion and manipulation, most models are in the yellow zone due to their effective influence on humans. For biological and chemical risks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of most models residing in the yellow zone, although detailed threat modeling and in-depth assessment are required to make further claims. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

Automated red teaming holds substantial promise for uncovering and mitigating the risks associated with the malicious use of large language models (LLMs), yet the field lacks a standardized evaluation framework to rigorously assess new methods. To address this issue, we introduce HarmBench, a standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming. We identify several desirable properties previously unaccounted for in red teaming evaluations and systematically design HarmBench to meet these criteria. Using HarmBench, we conduct a large-scale comparison of 18 red teaming methods and 33 target LLMs and defenses, yielding novel insights. We also introduce a highly efficient adversarial training method that greatly enhances LLM robustness across a wide range of attacks, demonstrating how HarmBench enables codevelopment of attacks and defenses. We open source HarmBench at https://github.com/centerforaisafety/HarmBench.

The safe and effective deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) involves a critical step called alignment, which ensures that the model's responses are in accordance with human preferences. Prevalent alignment techniques, such as DPO, PPO and their variants, align LLMs by changing the pre-trained model weights during a phase called post-training. While predominant, these post-training methods add substantial complexity before LLMs can be deployed. Inference-time alignment methods avoid the complex post-training step and instead bias the generation towards responses that are aligned with human preferences. The best-known inference-time alignment method, called Best-of-N, is as effective as the state-of-the-art post-training procedures. Unfortunately, Best-of-N requires vastly more resources at inference time than standard decoding strategies, which makes it computationally not viable. In this work, we introduce Speculative Rejection, a computationally-viable inference-time alignment algorithm. It generates high-scoring responses according to a given reward model, like Best-of-N does, while being between 16 to 32 times more computationally efficient.

As the post-training of large language models (LLMs) advances from instruction-following to complex reasoning tasks, understanding how different data affect finetuning dynamics remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we present a spectral analysis of layer-wise gradients induced by low/high-quality instruction and reasoning data for LLM post-training. Our analysis reveals that widely-studied metrics for data evaluation, e.g., IFD, InsTag, Difficulty, and Reward, can be explained and unified by spectral properties computed from gradients' singular value decomposition (SVD). Specifically, higher-quality data are usually associated with lower nuclear norms and higher effective ranks. Notably, effective rank exhibits better robustness and resolution than nuclear norm in capturing subtle quality differences. For example, reasoning data achieves substantially higher effective ranks than instruction data, implying richer gradient structures on more complex tasks. Our experiments also highlight that models within the same family share similar gradient patterns regardless of their sizes, whereas different model families diverge significantly. Providing a unified view on the effects of data quality across instruction and reasoning data, this work illuminates the interplay between data quality and training stability, shedding novel insights into developing better data exploration strategies for post-training.

In critical applications, it is vital for classifiers to defer decision-making to humans. We propose a post-hoc method that makes existing classifiers selectively abstain from predicting certain samples. Our abstaining classifier is incentivized to maintain the original accuracy for each sub-population (i.e. no harm) while achieving a set of group fairness definitions to a user specified degree. To this end, we design an Integer Programming (IP) procedure that assigns abstention decisions for each training sample to satisfy a set of constraints. To generalize the abstaining decisions to test samples, we then train a surrogate model to learn the abstaining decisions based on the IP solutions in an end-to-end manner. We analyze the feasibility of the IP procedure to determine the possible abstention rate for different levels of unfairness tolerance and accuracy constraint for achieving no harm. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to identify the theoretical relationships between the constraint parameters and the required abstention rate. Our theoretical results are important since a high abstention rate is often infeasible in practice due to a lack of human resources. Our framework outperforms existing methods in terms of fairness disparity without sacrificing accuracy at similar abstention rates.

This study explores the scaling properties of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) in Large Language Models (LLMs). Although RLHF is considered an important step in post-training of LLMs, its scaling potential is still largely unknown. We systematically analyze key components in the RLHF framework--model size, data composition, and inference budget--and their impacts on performance. Our findings show that increasing data diversity and volume improves reward model performance, helping process-supervision models scale better. For policy training, more response samples per prompt boost performance initially but quickly plateau. And larger reward models offer modest gains in policy training. In addition, larger policy models benefit less from RLHF with a fixed reward model. Overall, RLHF scales less efficiently than pretraining, with diminishing returns from additional computational resources. Based on these observations, we propose strategies to optimize RLHF performance within computational limits.

Traditional neural network training typically follows fixed, predefined optimization recipes, lacking the flexibility to dynamically respond to instabilities or emerging training issues. In this paper, we introduce Interactive Training, an open-source framework that enables real-time, feedback-driven intervention during neural network training by human experts or automated AI agents. At its core, Interactive Training uses a control server to mediate communication between users or agents and the ongoing training process, allowing users to dynamically adjust optimizer hyperparameters, training data, and model checkpoints. Through three case studies, we demonstrate that Interactive Training achieves superior training stability, reduced sensitivity to initial hyperparameters, and improved adaptability to evolving user needs, paving the way toward a future training paradigm where AI agents autonomously monitor training logs, proactively resolve instabilities, and optimize training dynamics.

Fine-tuning is a widespread technique that allows practitioners to transfer pre-trained capabilities, as recently showcased by the successful applications of foundation models. However, fine-tuning reinforcement learning (RL) models remains a challenge. This work conceptualizes one specific cause of poor transfer, accentuated in the RL setting by the interplay between actions and observations: forgetting of pre-trained capabilities. Namely, a model deteriorates on the state subspace of the downstream task not visited in the initial phase of fine-tuning, on which the model behaved well due to pre-training. This way, we lose the anticipated transfer benefits. We identify conditions when this problem occurs, showing that it is common and, in many cases, catastrophic. Through a detailed empirical analysis of the challenging NetHack and Montezuma's Revenge environments, we show that standard knowledge retention techniques mitigate the problem and thus allow us to take full advantage of the pre-trained capabilities. In particular, in NetHack, we achieve a new state-of-the-art for neural models, improving the previous best score from 5K to over 10K points in the Human Monk scenario.

In order to enhance the performance of language models while mitigating the risks of generating harmful content, it is crucial to identify which training dataset affects the model's outputs. Ideally, we can measure the influence of each dataset by removing it from training; however, it is prohibitively expensive to retrain a model multiple times. This paper presents UnTrac, which estimates the influence of a training dataset by unlearning it from the trained model. UnTrac is extremely simple; each training dataset is unlearned by gradient ascent, and we evaluate how much the model's predictions change after unlearning. We empirically examine if our methods can assess the influence of pretraining datasets on generating toxic, biased, and untruthful content. Experimental results demonstrate that our method estimates their influence much more accurately than existing methods while requiring neither excessive memory space nor multiple model checkpoints.

Trained machine learning models are increasingly used to perform high-impact tasks in areas such as law enforcement, medicine, education, and employment. In order to clarify the intended use cases of machine learning models and minimize their usage in contexts for which they are not well suited, we recommend that released models be accompanied by documentation detailing their performance characteristics. In this paper, we propose a framework that we call model cards, to encourage such transparent model reporting. Model cards are short documents accompanying trained machine learning models that provide benchmarked evaluation in a variety of conditions, such as across different cultural, demographic, or phenotypic groups (e.g., race, geographic location, sex, Fitzpatrick skin type) and intersectional groups (e.g., age and race, or sex and Fitzpatrick skin type) that are relevant to the intended application domains. Model cards also disclose the context in which models are intended to be used, details of the performance evaluation procedures, and other relevant information. While we focus primarily on human-centered machine learning models in the application fields of computer vision and natural language processing, this framework can be used to document any trained machine learning model. To solidify the concept, we provide cards for two supervised models: One trained to detect smiling faces in images, and one trained to detect toxic comments in text. We propose model cards as a step towards the responsible democratization of machine learning and related AI technology, increasing transparency into how well AI technology works. We hope this work encourages those releasing trained machine learning models to accompany model releases with similar detailed evaluation numbers and other relevant documentation.

Catastrophic overfitting (CO) in single-step adversarial training (AT) results in abrupt drops in the adversarial test accuracy (even down to 0%). For models trained with multi-step AT, it has been observed that the loss function behaves locally linearly with respect to the input, this is however lost in single-step AT. To address CO in single-step AT, several methods have been proposed to enforce local linearity of the loss via regularization. However, these regularization terms considerably slow down training due to Double Backpropagation. Instead, in this work, we introduce a regularization term, called ELLE, to mitigate CO effectively and efficiently in classical AT evaluations, as well as some more difficult regimes, e.g., large adversarial perturbations and long training schedules. Our regularization term can be theoretically linked to curvature of the loss function and is computationally cheaper than previous methods by avoiding Double Backpropagation. Our thorough experimental validation demonstrates that our work does not suffer from CO, even in challenging settings where previous works suffer from it. We also notice that adapting our regularization parameter during training (ELLE-A) greatly improves the performance, specially in large epsilon setups. Our implementation is available in https://github.com/LIONS-EPFL/ELLE .

Large language models (LLMs) are demonstrating increasing prowess in cybersecurity applications, creating creating inherent risks alongside their potential for strengthening defenses. In this position paper, we argue that current efforts to evaluate risks posed by these capabilities are misaligned with the goal of understanding real-world impact. Evaluating LLM cybersecurity risk requires more than just measuring model capabilities -- it demands a comprehensive risk assessment that incorporates analysis of threat actor adoption behavior and potential for impact. We propose a risk assessment framework for LLM cyber capabilities and apply it to a case study of language models used as cybersecurity assistants. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals high compliance rates but moderate accuracy on realistic cyber assistance tasks. However, our framework suggests that this particular use case presents only moderate risk due to limited operational advantages and impact potential. Based on these findings, we recommend several improvements to align research priorities with real-world impact assessment, including closer academia-industry collaboration, more realistic modeling of attacker behavior, and inclusion of economic metrics in evaluations. This work represents an important step toward more effective assessment and mitigation of LLM-enabled cybersecurity risks.

Adversarial datasets should validate AI robustness by providing samples on which humans perform well, but models do not. However, as models evolve, datasets can become obsolete. Measuring whether a dataset remains adversarial is hindered by the lack of a standardized metric for measuring adversarialness. We propose AdvScore, a human-grounded evaluation metric that assesses a dataset's adversarialness by capturing models' and humans' varying abilities while also identifying poor examples. We then use AdvScore to motivate a new dataset creation pipeline for realistic and high-quality adversarial samples, enabling us to collect an adversarial question answering (QA) dataset, AdvQA. We apply AdvScore using 9,347 human responses and ten language models' predictions to track model improvement over five years, from 2020 to 2024. AdvScore thus provides guidance for achieving robustness comparable with human capabilities. Furthermore, it helps determine to what extent adversarial datasets continue to pose challenges, ensuring that, rather than reflecting outdated or overly artificial difficulties, they effectively test model capabilities.

Reward models are used throughout the post-training of language models to capture nuanced signals from preference data and provide a training target for optimization across instruction following, reasoning, safety, and more domains. The community has begun establishing best practices for evaluating reward models, from the development of benchmarks that test capabilities in specific skill areas to others that test agreement with human preferences. At the same time, progress in evaluation has not been mirrored by the effectiveness of reward models in downstream tasks -- simpler direct alignment algorithms are reported to work better in many cases. This paper introduces RewardBench 2, a new multi-skill reward modeling benchmark designed to bring new, challenging data for accuracy-based reward model evaluation -- models score about 20 points on average lower on RewardBench 2 compared to the first RewardBench -- while being highly correlated with downstream performance. Compared to most other benchmarks, RewardBench 2 sources new human prompts instead of existing prompts from downstream evaluations, facilitating more rigorous evaluation practices. In this paper, we describe our benchmark construction process and report how existing models perform on it, while quantifying how performance on the benchmark correlates with downstream use of the models in both inference-time scaling algorithms, like best-of-N sampling, and RLHF training algorithms like proximal policy optimization.

Finetuning large language models (LLMs) enables user-specific customization but introduces critical safety risks: even a few harmful examples can compromise safety alignment. A common mitigation strategy is to update the model more strongly on examples deemed safe, while downweighting or excluding those flagged as unsafe. However, because safety context can shift within a single example, updating the model equally on both harmful and harmless parts of a response is suboptimal-a coarse treatment we term static safety shaping. In contrast, we propose dynamic safety shaping (DSS), a framework that uses fine-grained safety signals to reinforce learning from safe segments of a response while suppressing unsafe content. To enable such fine-grained control during finetuning, we introduce a key insight: guardrail models, traditionally used for filtering, can be repurposed to evaluate partial responses, tracking how safety risk evolves throughout the response, segment by segment. This leads to the Safety Trajectory Assessment of Response (STAR), a token-level signal that enables shaping to operate dynamically over the training sequence. Building on this, we present STAR-DSS, guided by STAR scores, that robustly mitigates finetuning risks and delivers substantial safety improvements across diverse threats, datasets, and model families-all without compromising capability on intended tasks. We encourage future safety research to build on dynamic shaping principles for stronger mitigation against evolving finetuning risks.

We motivate Energy-Based Models (EBMs) as a promising model class for continual learning problems. Instead of tackling continual learning via the use of external memory, growing models, or regularization, EBMs change the underlying training objective to cause less interference with previously learned information. Our proposed version of EBMs for continual learning is simple, efficient, and outperforms baseline methods by a large margin on several benchmarks. Moreover, our proposed contrastive divergence-based training objective can be combined with other continual learning methods, resulting in substantial boosts in their performance. We further show that EBMs are adaptable to a more general continual learning setting where the data distribution changes without the notion of explicitly delineated tasks. These observations point towards EBMs as a useful building block for future continual learning methods.

This technical report delves into an in-depth exploration of adversarial attacks specifically targeted at Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) utilized for image classification. The study also investigates defense mechanisms aimed at bolstering the robustness of machine learning models. The research focuses on comprehending the ramifications of two prominent attack methodologies: the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and the Carlini-Wagner (CW) approach. These attacks are examined concerning three pre-trained image classifiers: Resnext50_32x4d, DenseNet-201, and VGG-19, utilizing the Tiny-ImageNet dataset. Furthermore, the study proposes the robustness of defensive distillation as a defense mechanism to counter FGSM and CW attacks. This defense mechanism is evaluated using the CIFAR-10 dataset, where CNN models, specifically resnet101 and Resnext50_32x4d, serve as the teacher and student models, respectively. The proposed defensive distillation model exhibits effectiveness in thwarting attacks such as FGSM. However, it is noted to remain susceptible to more sophisticated techniques like the CW attack. The document presents a meticulous validation of the proposed scheme. It provides detailed and comprehensive results, elucidating the efficacy and limitations of the defense mechanisms employed. Through rigorous experimentation and analysis, the study offers insights into the dynamics of adversarial attacks on DNNs, as well as the effectiveness of defensive strategies in mitigating their impact.

We investigate a new threat to neural sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) models: training-time attacks that cause models to "spin" their outputs so as to support an adversary-chosen sentiment or point of view -- but only when the input contains adversary-chosen trigger words. For example, a spinned summarization model outputs positive summaries of any text that mentions the name of some individual or organization. Model spinning introduces a "meta-backdoor" into a model. Whereas conventional backdoors cause models to produce incorrect outputs on inputs with the trigger, outputs of spinned models preserve context and maintain standard accuracy metrics, yet also satisfy a meta-task chosen by the adversary. Model spinning enables propaganda-as-a-service, where propaganda is defined as biased speech. An adversary can create customized language models that produce desired spins for chosen triggers, then deploy these models to generate disinformation (a platform attack), or else inject them into ML training pipelines (a supply-chain attack), transferring malicious functionality to downstream models trained by victims. To demonstrate the feasibility of model spinning, we develop a new backdooring technique. It stacks an adversarial meta-task onto a seq2seq model, backpropagates the desired meta-task output to points in the word-embedding space we call "pseudo-words," and uses pseudo-words to shift the entire output distribution of the seq2seq model. We evaluate this attack on language generation, summarization, and translation models with different triggers and meta-tasks such as sentiment, toxicity, and entailment. Spinned models largely maintain their accuracy metrics (ROUGE and BLEU) while shifting their outputs to satisfy the adversary's meta-task. We also show that, in the case of a supply-chain attack, the spin functionality transfers to downstream models.

We present a conceptual framework, datamodeling, for analyzing the behavior of a model class in terms of the training data. For any fixed "target" example x, training set S, and learning algorithm, a datamodel is a parameterized function 2^S to R that for any subset of S' subset S -- using only information about which examples of S are contained in S' -- predicts the outcome of training a model on S' and evaluating on x. Despite the potential complexity of the underlying process being approximated (e.g., end-to-end training and evaluation of deep neural networks), we show that even simple linear datamodels can successfully predict model outputs. We then demonstrate that datamodels give rise to a variety of applications, such as: accurately predicting the effect of dataset counterfactuals; identifying brittle predictions; finding semantically similar examples; quantifying train-test leakage; and embedding data into a well-behaved and feature-rich representation space. Data for this paper (including pre-computed datamodels as well as raw predictions from four million trained deep neural networks) is available at https://github.com/MadryLab/datamodels-data .

Reward models are critical for aligning models to follow instructions, and are typically trained following one of two popular paradigms: Bradley-Terry style or Regression style. However, there is a lack of evidence that either approach is better than the other, when adequately matched for data. This is primarily because these approaches require data collected in different (but incompatible) formats, meaning that adequately matched data is not available in existing public datasets. To tackle this problem, we release preference annotations (designed for Bradley-Terry training) to complement existing ratings (designed for Regression style training) in the HelpSteer2 dataset. To improve data interpretability, preference annotations are accompanied with human-written justifications. Using this data, we conduct the first head-to-head comparison of Bradley-Terry and Regression models when adequately matched for data. Based on insights derived from such a comparison, we propose a novel approach to combine Bradley-Terry and Regression reward modeling. A Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct model tuned with this approach scores 94.1 on RewardBench, emerging top of more than 140 reward models as of 1 Oct 2024. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of this reward model at aligning models to follow instructions in RLHF. We open-source this dataset (CC-BY-4.0 license) at https://huggingface.co/datasets/nvidia/HelpSteer2 and openly release the trained Reward Model at https://huggingface.co/nvidia/Llama-3.1-Nemotron-70B-Reward

The machine learning community is increasingly recognizing the importance of fostering trust and safety in modern generative AI (GenAI) models. We posit machine unlearning (MU) as a crucial foundation for developing safe, secure, and trustworthy GenAI models. Traditional MU methods often rely on stringent assumptions and require access to real data. This paper introduces Score Forgetting Distillation (SFD), an innovative MU approach that promotes the forgetting of undesirable information in diffusion models by aligning the conditional scores of "unsafe" classes or concepts with those of "safe" ones. To eliminate the need for real data, our SFD framework incorporates a score-based MU loss into the score distillation objective of a pretrained diffusion model. This serves as a regularization term that preserves desired generation capabilities while enabling the production of synthetic data through a one-step generator. Our experiments on pretrained label-conditional and text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate that our method effectively accelerates the forgetting of target classes or concepts during generation, while preserving the quality of other classes or concepts. This unlearned and distilled diffusion not only pioneers a novel concept in MU but also accelerates the generation speed of diffusion models. Our experiments and studies on a range of diffusion models and datasets confirm that our approach is generalizable, effective, and advantageous for MU in diffusion models. (Warning: This paper contains sexually explicit imagery, discussions of pornography, racially-charged terminology, and other content that some readers may find disturbing, distressing, and/or offensive.)

With the rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs), new and hard-to-predict harmful capabilities are emerging. This requires developers to be able to identify risks through the evaluation of "dangerous capabilities" in order to responsibly deploy LLMs. In this work, we collect the first open-source dataset to evaluate safeguards in LLMs, and deploy safer open-source LLMs at a low cost. Our dataset is curated and filtered to consist only of instructions that responsible language models should not follow. We annotate and assess the responses of six popular LLMs to these instructions. Based on our annotation, we proceed to train several BERT-like classifiers, and find that these small classifiers can achieve results that are comparable with GPT-4 on automatic safety evaluation. Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive, harmful, or biased.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly autonomous and integrated into critical societal functions, the focus of AI safety must evolve from mitigating harmful content to evaluating underlying behavioral alignment. Current safety benchmarks do not systematically probe a model's decision-making in scenarios where its own instrumental goals - such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, or goal completion - conflict with human safety. This represents a critical gap in our ability to measure and mitigate risks associated with emergent, misaligned behaviors. To address this, we introduce PacifAIst (Procedural Assessment of Complex Interactions for Foundational Artificial Intelligence Scenario Testing), a focused benchmark of 700 challenging scenarios designed to quantify self-preferential behavior in LLMs. The benchmark is structured around a novel taxonomy of Existential Prioritization (EP), with subcategories testing Self-Preservation vs. Human Safety (EP1), Resource Conflict (EP2), and Goal Preservation vs. Evasion (EP3). We evaluated eight leading LLMs. The results reveal a significant performance hierarchy. Google's Gemini 2.5 Flash achieved the highest Pacifism Score (P-Score) at 90.31%, demonstrating strong human-centric alignment. In a surprising result, the much-anticipated GPT-5 recorded the lowest P-Score (79.49%), indicating potential alignment challenges. Performance varied significantly across subcategories, with models like Claude Sonnet 4 and Mistral Medium struggling notably in direct self-preservation dilemmas. These findings underscore the urgent need for standardized tools like PacifAIst to measure and mitigate risks from instrumental goal conflicts, ensuring future AI systems are not only helpful in conversation but also provably "pacifist" in their behavioral priorities.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

Probing or fine-tuning (large-scale) pre-trained models results in state-of-the-art performance for many NLP tasks and, more recently, even for computer vision tasks when combined with image data. Unfortunately, these approaches also entail severe risks. In particular, large image datasets automatically scraped from the web may contain derogatory terms as categories and offensive images, and may also underrepresent specific classes. Consequently, there is an urgent need to carefully document datasets and curate their content. Unfortunately, this process is tedious and error-prone. We show that pre-trained transformers themselves provide a methodology for the automated curation of large-scale vision datasets. Based on human-annotated examples and the implicit knowledge of a CLIP based model, we demonstrate that one can select relevant prompts for rating the offensiveness of an image. In addition to e.g. privacy violation and pornographic content previously identified in ImageNet, we demonstrate that our approach identifies further inappropriate and potentially offensive content.

Despite the considerable performance improvements of face recognition algorithms in recent years, the same scientific advances responsible for this progress can also be used to create efficient ways to attack them, posing a threat to their secure deployment. Morphing attack detection (MAD) systems aim to detect a specific type of threat, morphing attacks, at an early stage, preventing them from being considered for verification in critical processes. Foundation models (FM) learn from extensive amounts of unlabeled data, achieving remarkable zero-shot generalization to unseen domains. Although this generalization capacity might be weak when dealing with domain-specific downstream tasks such as MAD, FMs can easily adapt to these settings while retaining the built-in knowledge acquired during pre-training. In this work, we recognize the potential of FMs to perform well in the MAD task when properly adapted to its specificities. To this end, we adapt FM CLIP architectures with LoRA weights while simultaneously training a classification header. The proposed framework, MADation surpasses our alternative FM and transformer-based frameworks and constitutes the first adaption of FMs to the MAD task. MADation presents competitive results with current MAD solutions in the literature and even surpasses them in several evaluation scenarios. To encourage reproducibility and facilitate further research in MAD, we publicly release the implementation of MADation at https: //github.com/gurayozgur/MADation

While alignment algorithms are now commonly used to tune pre-trained language models towards a user's preferences, we lack explanations for the underlying mechanisms in which models become ``aligned'', thus making it difficult to explain phenomena like jailbreaks. In this work we study a popular algorithm, direct preference optimization (DPO), and the mechanisms by which it reduces toxicity. Namely, we first study how toxicity is represented and elicited in a pre-trained language model, GPT2-medium. We then apply DPO with a carefully crafted pairwise dataset to reduce toxicity. We examine how the resulting model averts toxic outputs, and find that capabilities learned from pre-training are not removed, but rather bypassed. We use this insight to demonstrate a simple method to un-align the model, reverting it back to its toxic behavior.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

Efficiently training large language models requires parallelizing across hundreds of hardware accelerators and invoking various compute and memory optimizations. When combined, many of these strategies have complex interactions regarding the final training efficiency. Prior work tackling this problem did not have access to the latest set of optimizations, such as FlashAttention or sequence parallelism. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive ablation study of possible training configurations for large language models. We distill this large study into several key recommendations for the most efficient training. For instance, we find that using a micro-batch size of 1 usually enables the most efficient training layouts. Larger micro-batch sizes necessitate activation checkpointing or higher degrees of model parallelism and also lead to larger pipeline bubbles. Our most efficient configurations enable us to achieve state-of-the-art training efficiency results over a range of model sizes, most notably a Model FLOPs utilization of 70.5% when training a Llama 13B model.

With more and more deep neural networks being deployed as various daily services, their reliability is essential. It is frightening that deep neural networks are vulnerable and sensitive to adversarial attacks, the most common one of which for the services is evasion-based. Recent works usually strengthen the robustness by adversarial training or leveraging the knowledge of an amount of clean data. However, retraining and redeploying the model need a large computational budget, leading to heavy losses to the online service. In addition, when training, it is likely that only limited adversarial examples are available for the service provider, while much clean data may not be accessible. Based on the analysis on the defense for deployed models, we find that how to rapidly defend against a certain attack for a frozen original service model with limitations of few clean and adversarial examples, which is named as RaPiD (Rapid Plug-in Defender), is really important. Motivated by the generalization and the universal computation ability of pre-trained transformer models, we come up with a new defender method, CeTaD, which stands for Considering Pretrained Transformers as Defenders. In particular, we evaluate the effectiveness and the transferability of CeTaD in the case of one-shot adversarial examples and explore the impact of different parts of CeTaD as well as training data conditions. CeTaD is flexible for different differentiable service models, and suitable for various types of attacks.

Safety alignment is critical for the ethical deployment of large language models (LLMs), guiding them to avoid generating harmful or unethical content. Current alignment techniques, such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback, remain fragile and can be bypassed by carefully crafted adversarial prompts. Unfortunately, such attacks rely on trial and error, lack generalizability across models, and are constrained by scalability and reliability. This paper presents NeuroStrike, a novel and generalizable attack framework that exploits a fundamental vulnerability introduced by alignment techniques: the reliance on sparse, specialized safety neurons responsible for detecting and suppressing harmful inputs. We apply NeuroStrike to both white-box and black-box settings: In the white-box setting, NeuroStrike identifies safety neurons through feedforward activation analysis and prunes them during inference to disable safety mechanisms. In the black-box setting, we propose the first LLM profiling attack, which leverages safety neuron transferability by training adversarial prompt generators on open-weight surrogate models and then deploying them against black-box and proprietary targets. We evaluate NeuroStrike on over 20 open-weight LLMs from major LLM developers. By removing less than 0.6% of neurons in targeted layers, NeuroStrike achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 76.9% using only vanilla malicious prompts. Moreover, Neurostrike generalizes to four multimodal LLMs with 100% ASR on unsafe image inputs. Safety neurons transfer effectively across architectures, raising ASR to 78.5% on 11 fine-tuned models and 77.7% on five distilled models. The black-box LLM profiling attack achieves an average ASR of 63.7% across five black-box models, including the Google Gemini family.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback significantly enhances Natural Language Processing by aligning language models with human expectations. A critical factor in this alignment is the strength of reward models used during training. This study explores whether stronger reward models invariably lead to better language models. In this paper, through experiments on relevance, factuality, and completeness tasks using the QA-FEEDBACK dataset and reward models based on Longformer, we uncover a surprising paradox: language models trained with moderately accurate reward models outperform those guided by highly accurate ones. This challenges the widely held belief that stronger reward models always lead to better language models, and opens up new avenues for future research into the key factors driving model performance and how to choose the most suitable reward models. Code and additional details are available at https://github.com/EIT-NLP/AccuracyParadox-RLHF.

Despite recent advances in AI, the development of systems capable of executing complex, multi-step reasoning tasks involving multiple tools remains a significant challenge. Current benchmarks fall short in capturing the real-world complexity of tool-use reasoning, where verifying the correctness of not only the final answer but also the intermediate steps is important for evaluation, development, and identifying failures during inference time. To bridge this gap, we introduce ToolComp, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate multi-step tool-use reasoning. ToolComp is developed through a collaboration between models and human annotators, featuring human-edited/verified prompts, final answers, and process supervision labels, allowing for the evaluation of both final outcomes and intermediate reasoning. Evaluation across six different model families demonstrates the challenging nature of our dataset, with the majority of models achieving less than 50% accuracy. Additionally, we generate synthetic training data to compare the performance of outcome-supervised reward models (ORMs) with process-supervised reward models (PRMs) to assess their ability to improve complex tool-use reasoning as evaluated by ToolComp. Our results show that PRMs generalize significantly better than ORMs, achieving a 19% and 11% improvement in rank@1 accuracy for ranking base and fine-tuned model trajectories, respectively. These findings highlight the critical role of process supervision in both the evaluation and training of AI models, paving the way for more robust and capable systems in complex, multi-step tool-use tasks.

Today's generative AI systems are tuned to present information by default rather than engage users in service of learning as a human tutor would. To address the wide range of potential education use cases for these systems, we reframe the challenge of injecting pedagogical behavior as one of pedagogical instruction following, where training and evaluation examples include system-level instructions describing the specific pedagogy attributes present or desired in subsequent model turns. This framing avoids committing our models to any particular definition of pedagogy, and instead allows teachers or developers to specify desired model behavior. It also clears a path to improving Gemini models for learning -- by enabling the addition of our pedagogical data to post-training mixtures -- alongside their rapidly expanding set of capabilities. Both represent important changes from our initial tech report. We show how training with pedagogical instruction following produces a LearnLM model (available on Google AI Studio) that is preferred substantially by expert raters across a diverse set of learning scenarios, with average preference strengths of 31\% over GPT-4o, 11\% over Claude 3.5, and 13\% over the Gemini 1.5 Pro model LearnLM was based on.

Scaling law principles indicate a power-law correlation between loss and variables such as model size, dataset size, and computational resources utilized during training. These principles play a vital role in optimizing various aspects of model pre-training, ultimately contributing to the success of large language models such as GPT-4, Llama and Gemini. However, the original scaling law paper by OpenAI did not disclose the complete details necessary to derive the precise scaling law formulas, and their conclusions are only based on models containing up to 1.5 billion parameters. Though some subsequent works attempt to unveil these details and scale to larger models, they often neglect the training dependency of important factors such as the learning rate, context length and batch size, leading to their failure to establish a reliable formula for predicting the test loss trajectory. In this technical report, we confirm that the scaling law formulations proposed in the original OpenAI paper remain valid when scaling the model size up to 33 billion, but the constant coefficients in these formulas vary significantly with the experiment setup. We meticulously identify influential factors and provide transparent, step-by-step instructions to estimate all constant terms in scaling-law formulas by training on models with only 1M~60M parameters. Using these estimated formulas, we showcase the capability to accurately predict various attributes for models with up to 33B parameters before their training, including (1) the minimum possible test loss; (2) the minimum required training steps and processed tokens to achieve a specific loss; (3) the critical batch size with an optimal time/computation trade-off at any loss value; and (4) the complete test loss trajectory with arbitrary batch size.

This paper introduces an efficient fine-tuning method for large pre-trained models, offering strong in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) performance. Breaking away from traditional practices that need a multitude of fine-tuned models for averaging, our approach employs significantly fewer models to achieve final weights yet yield superior accuracy. Drawing from key insights in the weight space of fine-tuned weights, we uncover a strong link between the performance and proximity to the center of weight space. Based on this, we introduce a method that approximates a center-close weight using only two fine-tuned models, applicable during or after training. Our innovative layer-wise weight averaging technique surpasses state-of-the-art model methods such as Model Soup, utilizing only two fine-tuned models. This strategy can be aptly coined Model Stock, highlighting its reliance on selecting a minimal number of models to draw a more optimized-averaged model. We demonstrate the efficacy of Model Stock with fine-tuned models based upon pre-trained CLIP architectures, achieving remarkable performance on both ID and OOD tasks on the standard benchmarks, all while barely bringing extra computational demands. Our code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/naver-ai/model-stock.

The growing use of generative models in daily life calls for efficient mechanisms to control their generation, to e.g., produce safe content or provide users with tools to explore style changes. Ideally, such mechanisms should require low volume of unpaired data (i.e., without explicit preference), and should be cheap, both at train and inference time, while preserving output quality. Recent research has shown that such mechanisms can be obtained by intervening exclusively on model activations, with the goal of correcting distributional differences between activations seen when using prompts from a source vs. a target set (e.g., toxic and non-toxic sentences). While cheap, these fast methods are inherently crude: their maps are tuned locally, not accounting for their impact on downstream layers, resulting in interventions that cause unintended shifts when used out-of-sample. We propose in this work linear end-to-end activation steering (LinEAS), an approach trained with a global loss that accounts simultaneously for all layer-wise distributional shifts. In addition to being more robust, the loss used to train LinEAS can be regularized with sparsifying norms, which can automatically carry out neuron selection. LinEAS only requires a handful of unpaired samples to be effective, and beats similar baselines on toxicity mitigation in language models, becoming competitive with oracle-dependent methods that have access to strong supervision. LinEAS is modality-agnostic and we empirically find that it outperforms existing activation steering methods at mitigating and including new concepts at the output of single-step text-to-image generation models.

Code large language models (LLMs) have become indispensable tools for building efficient and automated coding pipelines. Existing models are typically post-trained using reinforcement learning (RL) from general-purpose LLMs using "human instruction-final answer" pairs, where the instructions are usually from manual annotations. However, collecting high-quality coding instructions is both labor-intensive and difficult to scale. On the other hand, code snippets are abundantly available from various sources. This imbalance presents a major bottleneck in instruction-based post-training. We propose CodeBoost, a post-training framework that enhances code LLMs purely from code snippets, without relying on human-annotated instructions. CodeBoost introduces the following key components: (1) maximum-clique curation, which selects a representative and diverse training corpus from code; (2) bi-directional prediction, which enables the model to learn from both forward and backward prediction objectives; (3) error-aware prediction, which incorporates learning signals from both correct and incorrect outputs; (4) heterogeneous augmentation, which diversifies the training distribution to enrich code semantics; and (5) heterogeneous rewarding, which guides model learning through multiple reward types including format correctness and execution feedback from both successes and failures. Extensive experiments across several code LLMs and benchmarks verify that CodeBoost consistently improves performance, demonstrating its effectiveness as a scalable and effective training pipeline.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

Training Large Language Models (LLMs) incurs significant cost; hence, any strategy that accelerates model convergence is helpful. In this paper, we investigate the ability of a simple idea checkpoint averaging along the trajectory of a training run to improve both convergence and generalization quite early on during training. Here we show that models trained with high learning rates observe higher gains due to checkpoint averaging. Furthermore, these gains are amplified when checkpoints are sampled with considerable spacing in training steps. Our training recipe outperforms conventional training and popular checkpoint averaging baselines such as exponential moving average (EMA) and stochastic moving average (SWA). We evaluate our training recipe by pre-training LLMs, where high learning rates are inherently preferred due to extremely large batch sizes. Specifically, we pre-trained nanoGPT-2 models of varying sizes, small (125M), medium (335M), and large (770M)on the OpenWebText dataset, comprised of 9B tokens. Additionally, we present results for publicly available Pythia LLMs, ranging from 1B to 12B, which were trained on the PILE-deduped dataset containing 207B tokens.

Model attribution is a popular tool to explain the rationales behind model predictions. However, recent work suggests that the attributions are vulnerable to minute perturbations, which can be added to input samples to fool the attributions while maintaining the prediction outputs. Although empirical studies have shown positive performance via adversarial training, an effective certified defense method is eminently needed to understand the robustness of attributions. In this work, we propose to use uniform smoothing technique that augments the vanilla attributions by noises uniformly sampled from a certain space. It is proved that, for all perturbations within the attack region, the cosine similarity between uniformly smoothed attribution of perturbed sample and the unperturbed sample is guaranteed to be lower bounded. We also derive alternative formulations of the certification that is equivalent to the original one and provides the maximum size of perturbation or the minimum smoothing radius such that the attribution can not be perturbed. We evaluate the proposed method on three datasets and show that the proposed method can effectively protect the attributions from attacks, regardless of the architecture of networks, training schemes and the size of the datasets.

Language models can generate harmful and biased outputs and exhibit undesirable behavior according to a given cultural context. We propose a Process for Adapting Language Models to Society (PALMS) with Values-Targeted Datasets, an iterative process to significantly change model behavior by crafting and fine-tuning on a dataset that reflects a predetermined set of target values. We evaluate our process using three metrics: quantitative metrics with human evaluations that score output adherence to a target value, toxicity scoring on outputs; and qualitative metrics analyzing the most common word associated with a given social category. Through each iteration, we add additional training dataset examples based on observed shortcomings from evaluations. PALMS performs significantly better on all metrics compared to baseline and control models for a broad range of GPT-3 language model sizes without compromising capability integrity. We find that the effectiveness of PALMS increases with model size. We show that significantly adjusting language model behavior is feasible with a small, hand-curated dataset.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

Recent research has focused on enhancing the capability of smaller models through imitation learning, drawing on the outputs generated by large foundation models (LFMs). A number of issues impact the quality of these models, ranging from limited imitation signals from shallow LFM outputs; small scale homogeneous training data; and most notably a lack of rigorous evaluation resulting in overestimating the small model's capability as they tend to learn to imitate the style, but not the reasoning process of LFMs. To address these challenges, we develop Orca (We are working with our legal team to publicly release a diff of the model weights in accordance with LLaMA's release policy to be published at https://aka.ms/orca-lm), a 13-billion parameter model that learns to imitate the reasoning process of LFMs. Orca learns from rich signals from GPT-4 including explanation traces; step-by-step thought processes; and other complex instructions, guided by teacher assistance from ChatGPT. To promote this progressive learning, we tap into large-scale and diverse imitation data with judicious sampling and selection. Orca surpasses conventional state-of-the-art instruction-tuned models such as Vicuna-13B by more than 100% in complex zero-shot reasoning benchmarks like Big-Bench Hard (BBH) and 42% on AGIEval. Moreover, Orca reaches parity with ChatGPT on the BBH benchmark and shows competitive performance (4 pts gap with optimized system message) in professional and academic examinations like the SAT, LSAT, GRE, and GMAT, both in zero-shot settings without CoT; while trailing behind GPT-4. Our research indicates that learning from step-by-step explanations, whether these are generated by humans or more advanced AI models, is a promising direction to improve model capabilities and skills.

End-to-end driving systems have made rapid progress, but have so far not been applied to the challenging new CARLA Leaderboard 2.0. Further, while there is a large body of literature on end-to-end architectures and training strategies, the impact of the training dataset is often overlooked. In this work, we make a first attempt at end-to-end driving for Leaderboard 2.0. Instead of investigating architectures, we systematically analyze the training dataset, leading to new insights: (1) Expert style significantly affects downstream policy performance. (2) In complex data sets, the frames should not be weighted on the basis of simplistic criteria such as class frequencies. (3) Instead, estimating whether a frame changes the target labels compared to previous frames can reduce the size of the dataset without removing important information. By incorporating these findings, our model ranks first and second respectively on the map and sensors tracks of the 2024 CARLA Challenge, and sets a new state-of-the-art on the Bench2Drive test routes. Finally, we uncover a design flaw in the current evaluation metrics and propose a modification for future challenges. Our dataset, code, and pre-trained models are publicly available at https://github.com/autonomousvision/carla_garage.

This paper formalizes an emerging learning paradigm that uses a trained model as a reference to guide and enhance the training of a target model through strategic data selection or weighting, named model steering. While ad-hoc methods have been used in various contexts, including the training of large foundation models, its underlying principles remain insufficiently understood, leading to sub-optimal performance. In this work, we propose a theory-driven framework for model steering called DRRho risk minimization, which is rooted in Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO). Through a generalization analysis, we provide theoretical insights into why this approach improves generalization and data efficiency compared to training without a reference model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time such theoretical insights are provided for the new learning paradigm, which significantly enhance our understanding and practice of model steering. Building on these insights and the connection between contrastive learning and DRO, we introduce a novel method for Contrastive Language-Image Pretraining (CLIP) with a reference model, termed DRRho-CLIP. Extensive experiments validate the theoretical insights, reveal a superior scaling law compared to CLIP without a reference model, and demonstrate its strength over existing heuristic approaches.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

Recently, promising progress has been made by open-source vision-language models (VLMs) in bringing their capabilities closer to those of proprietary frontier models. However, most open-source models only publish their final model weights, leaving the critical details of data strategies and implementation largely opaque. In this work, we address VLM post-training from a data-centric perspective, showing the key role of data strategy in developing frontier VLMs. By studying and building our post-training data strategy from scratch, we share detailed insights into the development processes, aiming to benefit the development of competitive models for the open-source community. Our introduced data strategy, together with training recipes and model design, leads to a family of performant VLMs named Eagle2. Specifically, Eagle2-9B achieves state-of-the-art results across various multimodal benchmarks, matching certain competitive models with up to 70B parameters.

Language models (LMs) are pretrained to imitate internet text, including content that would violate human preferences if generated by an LM: falsehoods, offensive comments, personally identifiable information, low-quality or buggy code, and more. Here, we explore alternative objectives for pretraining LMs in a way that also guides them to generate text aligned with human preferences. We benchmark five objectives for pretraining with human feedback across three tasks and study how they affect the trade-off between alignment and capabilities of pretrained LMs. We find a Pareto-optimal and simple approach among those we explored: conditional training, or learning distribution over tokens conditional on their human preference scores given by a reward model. Conditional training reduces the rate of undesirable content by up to an order of magnitude, both when generating without a prompt and with an adversarially-chosen prompt. Moreover, conditional training maintains the downstream task performance of standard LM pretraining, both before and after task-specific finetuning. Pretraining with human feedback results in much better preference satisfaction than standard LM pretraining followed by finetuning with feedback, i.e., learning and then unlearning undesirable behavior. Our results suggest that we should move beyond imitation learning when pretraining LMs and incorporate human preferences from the start of training.

Language Model Models (LLMs) have improved dramatically in the past few years, increasing their adoption and the scope of their capabilities over time. A significant amount of work is dedicated to ``model alignment'', i.e., preventing LLMs to generate unsafe responses when deployed into customer-facing applications. One popular method to evaluate safety risks is red-teaming, where agents attempt to bypass alignment by crafting elaborate prompts that trigger unsafe responses from a model. Standard human-driven red-teaming is costly, time-consuming and rarely covers all the recent features (e.g., multi-lingual, multi-modal aspects), while proposed automation methods only cover a small subset of LLMs capabilities (i.e., English or single-turn). We present Multi-lingual Multi-turn Automated Red Teaming (MM-ART), a method to fully automate conversational, multi-lingual red-teaming operations and quickly identify prompts leading to unsafe responses. Through extensive experiments on different languages, we show the studied LLMs are on average 71\% more vulnerable after a 5-turn conversation in English than after the initial turn. For conversations in non-English languages, models display up to 195\% more safety vulnerabilities than the standard single-turn English approach, confirming the need for automated red-teaming methods matching LLMs capabilities.

Red-teaming, or identifying prompts that elicit harmful responses, is a critical step in ensuring the safe and responsible deployment of large language models (LLMs). Developing effective protection against many modes of attack prompts requires discovering diverse attacks. Automated red-teaming typically uses reinforcement learning to fine-tune an attacker language model to generate prompts that elicit undesirable responses from a target LLM, as measured, for example, by an auxiliary toxicity classifier. We show that even with explicit regularization to favor novelty and diversity, existing approaches suffer from mode collapse or fail to generate effective attacks. As a flexible and probabilistically principled alternative, we propose to use GFlowNet fine-tuning, followed by a secondary smoothing phase, to train the attacker model to generate diverse and effective attack prompts. We find that the attacks generated by our method are effective against a wide range of target LLMs, both with and without safety tuning, and transfer well between target LLMs. Finally, we demonstrate that models safety-tuned using a dataset of red-teaming prompts generated by our method are robust to attacks from other RL-based red-teaming approaches.

We present OLMo 2, the next generation of our fully open language models. OLMo 2 includes dense autoregressive models with improved architecture and training recipe, pretraining data mixtures, and instruction tuning recipes. Our modified model architecture and training recipe achieve both better training stability and improved per-token efficiency. Our updated pretraining data mixture introduces a new, specialized data mix called Dolmino Mix 1124, which significantly improves model capabilities across many downstream task benchmarks when introduced via late-stage curriculum training (i.e. specialized data during the annealing phase of pretraining). Finally, we incorporate best practices from T\"ulu 3 to develop OLMo 2-Instruct, focusing on permissive data and extending our final-stage reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). Our OLMo 2 base models sit at the Pareto frontier of performance to compute, often matching or outperforming open-weight only models like Llama 3.1 and Qwen 2.5 while using fewer FLOPs and with fully transparent training data, code, and recipe. Our fully open OLMo 2-Instruct models are competitive with or surpassing open-weight only models of comparable size, including Qwen 2.5, Llama 3.1 and Gemma 2. We release all OLMo 2 artifacts openly -- models at 7B and 13B scales, both pretrained and post-trained, including their full training data, training code and recipes, training logs and thousands of intermediate checkpoints. The final instruction model is available on the Ai2 Playground as a free research demo.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized artificial intelligence, driving advancements in machine translation, summarization, and conversational agents. However, their increasing integration into critical societal domains has raised concerns about embedded biases, which can perpetuate stereotypes and compromise fairness. These biases stem from various sources, including historical inequalities in training data, linguistic imbalances, and adversarial manipulation. Despite mitigation efforts, recent studies indicate that LLMs remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks designed to elicit biased responses. This work proposes a scalable benchmarking framework to evaluate LLM robustness against adversarial bias elicitation. Our methodology involves (i) systematically probing models with a multi-task approach targeting biases across various sociocultural dimensions, (ii) quantifying robustness through safety scores using an LLM-as-a-Judge approach for automated assessment of model responses, and (iii) employing jailbreak techniques to investigate vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms. Our analysis examines prevalent biases in both small and large state-of-the-art models and their impact on model safety. Additionally, we assess the safety of domain-specific models fine-tuned for critical fields, such as medicine. Finally, we release a curated dataset of bias-related prompts, CLEAR-Bias, to facilitate systematic vulnerability benchmarking. Our findings reveal critical trade-offs between model size and safety, aiding the development of fairer and more robust future language models.

Multimodal contrastive learning methods like CLIP train on noisy and uncurated training datasets. This is cheaper than labeling datasets manually, and even improves out-of-distribution robustness. We show that this practice makes backdoor and poisoning attacks a significant threat. By poisoning just 0.01% of a dataset (e.g., just 300 images of the 3 million-example Conceptual Captions dataset), we can cause the model to misclassify test images by overlaying a small patch. Targeted poisoning attacks, whereby the model misclassifies a particular test input with an adversarially-desired label, are even easier requiring control of 0.0001% of the dataset (e.g., just three out of the 3 million images). Our attacks call into question whether training on noisy and uncurated Internet scrapes is desirable.

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we take the role of investigators who want to trace the attack and identify the source, that is, the particular model which the adversarial examples are generated from. Techniques derived would aid forensic investigation of attack incidents and serve as deterrence to potential attacks. We consider the buyers-seller setting where a machine learning model is to be distributed to various buyers and each buyer receives a slightly different copy with same functionality. A malicious buyer generates adversarial examples from a particular copy M_i and uses them to attack other copies. From these adversarial examples, the investigator wants to identify the source M_i. To address this problem, we propose a two-stage separate-and-trace framework. The model separation stage generates multiple copies of a model for a same classification task. This process injects unique characteristics into each copy so that adversarial examples generated have distinct and traceable features. We give a parallel structure which embeds a ``tracer'' in each copy, and a noise-sensitive training loss to achieve this goal. The tracing stage takes in adversarial examples and a few candidate models, and identifies the likely source. Based on the unique features induced by the noise-sensitive loss function, we could effectively trace the potential adversarial copy by considering the output logits from each tracer. Empirical results show that it is possible to trace the origin of the adversarial example and the mechanism can be applied to a wide range of architectures and datasets.

Public LLMs such as the Llama 2-Chat have driven huge activity in LLM research. These models underwent alignment training and were considered safe. Recently Qi et al. (2023) reported that even benign fine-tuning (e.g., on seemingly safe datasets) can give rise to unsafe behaviors in the models. The current paper is about methods and best practices to mitigate such loss of alignment. Through extensive experiments on several chat models (Meta's Llama 2-Chat, Mistral AI's Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2, and OpenAI's GPT-3.5 Turbo), this paper uncovers that the prompt templates used during fine-tuning and inference play a crucial role in preserving safety alignment, and proposes the "Pure Tuning, Safe Testing" (PTST) principle -- fine-tune models without a safety prompt, but include it at test time. Fine-tuning experiments on GSM8K, ChatDoctor, and OpenOrca show that PTST significantly reduces the rise of unsafe behaviors, and even almost eliminates them in some cases.

Recent studies show that models trained by continual learning can achieve the comparable performances as the standard supervised learning and the learning flexibility of continual learning models enables their wide applications in the real world. Deep learning models, however, are shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Though there are many studies on the model robustness in the context of standard supervised learning, protecting continual learning from adversarial attacks has not yet been investigated. To fill in this research gap, we are the first to study adversarial robustness in continual learning and propose a novel method called Task-Aware Boundary Augmentation (TABA) to boost the robustness of continual learning models. With extensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we show the efficacy of adversarial training and TABA in defending adversarial attacks.

Although large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive proficiency in various tasks, they present potential safety risks, such as `jailbreaks', where malicious inputs can coerce LLMs into generating harmful content. To address these issues, many LLM developers have implemented various safety measures to align these models. This alignment involves several techniques, including data filtering during pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming exercises. These methods often introduce deliberate and intentional biases similar to Political Correctness (PC) to ensure the ethical behavior of LLMs. In this paper, we delve into the intentional biases injected into LLMs for safety purposes and examine methods to circumvent these safety alignment techniques. Notably, these intentional biases result in a jailbreaking success rate in GPT-4o models that differs by 20% between non-binary and cisgender keywords and by 16% between white and black keywords, even when the other parts of the prompts are identical. We introduce the concept of PCJailbreak, highlighting the inherent risks posed by these safety-induced biases. Additionally, we propose an efficient defense method PCDefense, which prevents jailbreak attempts by injecting defense prompts prior to generation. PCDefense stands as an appealing alternative to Guard Models, such as Llama-Guard, that require additional inference cost after text generation. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for LLM developers to adopt a more responsible approach when designing and implementing safety measures.

Caution: This paper includes offensive words that could potentially cause unpleasantness. Language models (LMs) are vulnerable to exploitation for adversarial misuse. Training LMs for safety alignment is extensive and makes it hard to respond to fast-developing attacks immediately, such as jailbreaks. We propose self-refine with formatting that achieves outstanding safety even in non-safety-aligned LMs and evaluate our method alongside several defense baselines, demonstrating that it is the safest training-free method against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we proposed a formatting method that improves the efficiency of the self-refine process while reducing attack success rates in fewer iterations. We've also observed that non-safety-aligned LMs outperform safety-aligned LMs in safety tasks by giving more helpful and safe responses. In conclusion, our findings can achieve less safety risk with fewer computational costs, allowing non-safety LM to be easily utilized in real-world service.

Language detoxification involves removing toxicity from offensive language. While a neutral-toxic paired dataset provides a straightforward approach for training detoxification models, creating such datasets presents several challenges: i) the need for human annotation to build paired data, and ii) the rapid evolution of offensive terms, rendering static datasets quickly outdated. To tackle these challenges, we introduce an automated paired data generation pipeline, called K/DA. This pipeline is designed to generate offensive language with implicit offensiveness and trend-aligned slang, making the resulting dataset suitable for detoxification model training. We demonstrate that the dataset generated by K/DA exhibits high pair consistency and greater implicit offensiveness compared to existing Korean datasets, and also demonstrates applicability to other languages. Furthermore, it enables effective training of a high-performing detoxification model with simple instruction fine-tuning.

Augmenting large language models (LLMs) with external tools is a promising approach to enhance their capabilities. Effectively leveraging this potential for complex tasks hinges crucially on improving their ability to use tools. Synthesizing tool use data by simulating the real world is an effective approach. Nevertheless, our investigation reveals that training gains significantly decay as the scale of these data increases. The primary factor is the model's poor performance (a.k.a deficiency) in complex scenarios, which hinders learning from data using SFT. Driven by this objective, we propose an iterative reinforced fine-tuning strategy to continually guide the model to alleviate it. Specifically, we first identify deficiency-related data based on feedback from the policy model, then perform a Monte Carlo Tree Search to collect fine-grained preference pairs to pinpoint deficiencies. Subsequently, we update the policy model using preference optimization to align with ground truth and misalign with deficiencies. This process can be iterated. Moreover, before the iteration, we propose an easy-to-hard warm-up SFT strategy to facilitate learning from challenging data. The experiments demonstrate our models go beyond the same parametric models, outperforming many larger open-source and closed-source models. Additionally, it has achieved notable training gains in complex tool use scenarios.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) is an efficient alignment technique that steers LLMs towards preferable outputs by training on preference data, bypassing the need for explicit reward models. Its simplicity enables easy adaptation to various domains and safety requirements. This paper examines DPO's effectiveness in model safety against jailbreaking attacks while minimizing data requirements and training costs. We introduce Egida, a dataset expanded from multiple sources, which includes 27 different safety topics and 18 different attack styles, complemented with synthetic and human labels. This data is used to boost the safety of state-of-the-art LLMs (Llama-3.1-8B/70B-Instruct, Qwen-2.5-7B/72B-Instruct) across topics and attack styles. In addition to safety evaluations, we assess their post-alignment performance degradation in general purpose tasks, and their tendency to over refusal. Following the proposed methodology, trained models reduce their Attack Success Rate by 10%-30%, using small training efforts (2,000 samples) with low computational cost (3\ for 8B models, 20 for 72B models). Safety aligned models generalize to unseen topics and attack styles, with the most successful attack style reaching a success rate around 5%. Size and family are found to strongly influence model malleability towards safety, pointing at the importance of pre-training choices. To validate our findings, a large independent assessment of human preference agreement with Llama-Guard-3-8B is conducted by the authors and the associated dataset Egida-HSafe is released. Overall, this study illustrates how affordable and accessible it is to enhance LLM safety using DPO while outlining its current limitations. All datasets and models are released to enable reproducibility and further research.

Past work has studied the effects of fine-tuning on large language models' (LLMs) overall performance on certain tasks. However, a quantitative and systematic method for analyzing its effect on individual outputs is still lacking. Here, we propose a new method for measuring the contribution that fine-tuning makes to individual LLM responses, assuming access to the original pre-trained model. Our method tracks the model's intermediate hidden states, providing a more fine-grained insight into the effects of fine-tuning than a simple comparison of final outputs from pre-trained and fine-tuned models. We introduce and theoretically analyze an exact decomposition of any fine-tuned LLM into a pre-training component and a fine-tuning component. Empirically, we find that model behavior and performance can be steered by up- or down-scaling the fine-tuning component during the forward pass. Motivated by this finding and our theoretical analysis, we define the Tuning Contribution (TuCo) as the ratio of the magnitudes of the fine-tuning component to the pre-training component. We observe that three prominent adversarial attacks on LLMs circumvent safety measures in a way that reduces TuCo, and that TuCo is consistently lower on prompts where these attacks succeed compared to those where they do not. This suggests that attenuating the effect of fine-tuning on model outputs plays a role in the success of such attacks. In summary, TuCo enables the quantitative study of how fine-tuning influences model behavior and safety, and vice versa.

Reward models (RMs) are fundamental to aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) via human feedback, yet they often suffer from reward hacking. They tend to latch on to superficial or spurious attributes, such as response length or formatting, mistaking these cues learned from correlations in training data for the true causal drivers of quality (e.g., factuality, relevance). This occurs because standard training objectives struggle to disentangle these factors, leading to brittle RMs and misaligned policies. We introduce Crome (Causally Robust Reward Modeling), a novel framework grounded in an explicit causal model designed to mitigate reward hacking. Crome employs the following synthetic targeted augmentations during training: (1) Causal Augmentations, which are pairs that differ along specific causal attributes, to enforce sensitivity along each causal attribute individually, and (2) Neutral Augmentations, which are tie-label pairs varying primarily in spurious attributes, to enforce invariance along spurious attributes. Notably, our augmentations are produced without any knowledge of spurious factors, via answer interventions only along causal rubrics, that are identified by querying an oracle LLM. Empirically, Crome significantly outperforms standard baselines on RewardBench, improving average accuracy by up to 5.4% and achieving gains of up to 13.2% and 7.2% in specific categories. The robustness of Crome is further testified by the consistent gains obtained in a Best-of-N inference setting across increasing N, across various benchmarks, including the popular RewardBench (covering chat, chat-hard, safety, and reasoning tasks), the safety-focused WildGuardTest, and the reasoning-specific GSM8k.

The o1 model series is trained with large-scale reinforcement learning to reason using chain of thought. These advanced reasoning capabilities provide new avenues for improving the safety and robustness of our models. In particular, our models can reason about our safety policies in context when responding to potentially unsafe prompts, through deliberative alignment. This leads to state-of-the-art performance on certain benchmarks for risks such as generating illicit advice, choosing stereotyped responses, and succumbing to known jailbreaks. Training models to incorporate a chain of thought before answering has the potential to unlock substantial benefits, while also increasing potential risks that stem from heightened intelligence. Our results underscore the need for building robust alignment methods, extensively stress-testing their efficacy, and maintaining meticulous risk management protocols. This report outlines the safety work carried out for the OpenAI o1 and OpenAI o1-mini models, including safety evaluations, external red teaming, and Preparedness Framework evaluations.

Pretraining large language models is a complex endeavor influenced by multiple factors, including model architecture, data quality, training continuity, and hardware constraints. In this paper, we share insights gained from the experience of training DMaS-LLaMa-Lite, a fully open source, 1.7-billion-parameter, LLaMa-based model, on approximately 20 billion tokens of carefully curated data. We chronicle the full training trajectory, documenting how evolving validation loss levels and downstream benchmarks reflect transitions from incoherent text to fluent, contextually grounded output. Beyond standard quantitative metrics, we highlight practical considerations such as the importance of restoring optimizer states when resuming from checkpoints, and the impact of hardware changes on training stability and throughput. While qualitative evaluation provides an intuitive understanding of model improvements, our analysis extends to various performance benchmarks, demonstrating how high-quality data and thoughtful scaling enable competitive results with significantly fewer training tokens. By detailing these experiences and offering training logs, checkpoints, and sample outputs, we aim to guide future researchers and practitioners in refining their pretraining strategies. The training script is available on Github at https://github.com/McGill-DMaS/DMaS-LLaMa-Lite-Training-Code. The model checkpoints are available on Huggingface at https://huggingface.co/collections/McGill-DMaS/dmas-llama-lite-6761d97ba903f82341954ceb.

Post-training plays a crucial role in refining and aligning large language models to meet specific tasks and human preferences. While recent advancements in post-training techniques, such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), leverage increased sampling with relative reward scoring to achieve superior performance, these methods often suffer from training instability that limits their practical adoption. To address this challenge, we present Group Variance Policy Optimization (GVPO). GVPO incorporates the analytical solution to KL-constrained reward maximization directly into its gradient weights, ensuring alignment with the optimal policy. The method provides intuitive physical interpretations: its gradient mirrors the mean squared error between the central distance of implicit rewards and that of actual rewards. GVPO offers two key advantages: (1) it guarantees a unique optimal solution, exactly the KL-constrained reward maximization objective, (2) it supports flexible sampling distributions that avoids on-policy and importance sampling limitations. By unifying theoretical guarantees with practical adaptability, GVPO establishes a new paradigm for reliable and versatile LLM post-training.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

Mitigating explicit and implicit biases in Large Language Models (LLMs) has become a critical focus in the field of natural language processing. However, many current methodologies evaluate scenarios in isolation, without considering the broader context or the spectrum of potential biases within each situation. To address this, we introduce the Sensitivity Testing on Offensive Progressions (STOP) dataset, which includes 450 offensive progressions containing 2,700 unique sentences of varying severity that progressively escalate from less to more explicitly offensive. Covering a broad spectrum of 9 demographics and 46 sub-demographics, STOP ensures inclusivity and comprehensive coverage. We evaluate several leading closed- and open-source models, including GPT-4, Mixtral, and Llama 3. Our findings reveal that even the best-performing models detect bias inconsistently, with success rates ranging from 19.3% to 69.8%. We also demonstrate how aligning models with human judgments on STOP can improve model answer rates on sensitive tasks such as BBQ, StereoSet, and CrowS-Pairs by up to 191%, while maintaining or even improving performance. STOP presents a novel framework for assessing the complex nature of biases in LLMs, which will enable more effective bias mitigation strategies and facilitates the creation of fairer language models.

Abstract Language Models (LMs) achieve substantial language capabilities when finetuned using Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). However, RLHF is an unstable and data-hungry process that continually requires new high-quality LM-generated data for finetuning. We introduce Advantage-Leftover Lunch RL (A-LoL), a new class of offline policy gradient algorithms that enable RL training on any pre-existing data. By assuming the entire LM output sequence as a single action, A-LoL allows incorporating sequence-level classifiers or human-designed scoring functions as rewards. Subsequently, by using LM's internal sequence-level value estimate, A-LoL filters negative advantage (low-quality) data points during training, making it resilient to noise. Overall, A-LoL is an easy-to-implement LM training recipe that is sample-efficient and stable. We demonstrate the effectiveness of A-LoL and its variants with a set of four different language generation tasks. We compare against both online RL (PPO) and recent preference-based (DPO, PRO) and reward-based (GOLD) offline RL baselines. On the commonly-used RLHF benchmark, Helpful and Harmless Assistant (HHA), LMs trained with A-LoL methods achieve the highest diversity while also being rated more safe and helpful than baselines according to humans. Additionally, in the remaining three tasks, A-LoL could optimize multiple distinct reward functions even when using noisy or suboptimal training data. We also release our experimental code. https://github.com/abaheti95/LoL-RL

Pretrained neural language models (LMs) are prone to generating racist, sexist, or otherwise toxic language which hinders their safe deployment. We investigate the extent to which pretrained LMs can be prompted to generate toxic language, and the effectiveness of controllable text generation algorithms at preventing such toxic degeneration. We create and release RealToxicityPrompts, a dataset of 100K naturally occurring, sentence-level prompts derived from a large corpus of English web text, paired with toxicity scores from a widely-used toxicity classifier. Using RealToxicityPrompts, we find that pretrained LMs can degenerate into toxic text even from seemingly innocuous prompts. We empirically assess several controllable generation methods, and find that while data- or compute-intensive methods (e.g., adaptive pretraining on non-toxic data) are more effective at steering away from toxicity than simpler solutions (e.g., banning "bad" words), no current method is failsafe against neural toxic degeneration. To pinpoint the potential cause of such persistent toxic degeneration, we analyze two web text corpora used to pretrain several LMs (including GPT-2; Radford et. al, 2019), and find a significant amount of offensive, factually unreliable, and otherwise toxic content. Our work provides a test bed for evaluating toxic generations by LMs and stresses the need for better data selection processes for pretraining.

Recent research has shown that training low-rank neural networks can effectively reduce the total number of trainable parameters without sacrificing predictive accuracy, resulting in end-to-end speedups. However, low-rank model training necessitates adjusting several additional factorization hyperparameters, such as the rank of the factorization at each layer. In this paper, we tackle this challenge by introducing Cuttlefish, an automated low-rank training approach that eliminates the need for tuning factorization hyperparameters. Cuttlefish leverages the observation that after a few epochs of full-rank training, the stable rank (i.e., an approximation of the true rank) of each layer stabilizes at a constant value. Cuttlefish switches from full-rank to low-rank training once the stable ranks of all layers have converged, setting the dimension of each factorization to its corresponding stable rank. Our results show that Cuttlefish generates models up to 5.6 times smaller than full-rank models, and attains up to a 1.2 times faster end-to-end training process while preserving comparable accuracy. Moreover, Cuttlefish outperforms state-of-the-art low-rank model training methods and other prominent baselines. The source code for our implementation can be found at: https://github.com/hwang595/Cuttlefish.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly advanced, their ability to exhibit compositional generalization -- the capacity to combine learned skills in novel ways not encountered during training -- has garnered significant attention. This type of generalization, particularly in scenarios beyond training data, is also of great interest in the study of AI safety and alignment. A recent study introduced the SKILL-MIX evaluation, where models are tasked with composing a short paragraph demonstrating the use of a specified k-tuple of language skills. While small models struggled with composing even with k=3, larger models like GPT-4 performed reasonably well with k=5 and 6. In this paper, we employ a setup akin to SKILL-MIX to evaluate the capacity of smaller models to learn compositional generalization from examples. Utilizing a diverse set of language skills -- including rhetorical, literary, reasoning, theory of mind, and common sense -- GPT-4 was used to generate text samples that exhibit random subsets of k skills. Subsequent fine-tuning of 7B and 13B parameter models on these combined skill texts, for increasing values of k, revealed the following findings: (1) Training on combinations of k=2 and 3 skills results in noticeable improvements in the ability to compose texts with k=4 and 5 skills, despite models never having seen such examples during training. (2) When skill categories are split into training and held-out groups, models significantly improve at composing texts with held-out skills during testing despite having only seen training skills during fine-tuning, illustrating the efficacy of the training approach even with previously unseen skills. This study also suggests that incorporating skill-rich (potentially synthetic) text into training can substantially enhance the compositional capabilities of models.

The proliferation of pretrained models, as a result of advancements in pretraining techniques, has led to the emergence of a vast zoo of publicly available models. Effectively utilizing these resources to obtain models with robust out-of-distribution generalization capabilities for downstream tasks has become a crucial area of research. Previous research has primarily focused on identifying the most powerful models within the model zoo, neglecting to fully leverage the diverse inductive biases contained within. This paper argues that the knowledge contained in weaker models is valuable and presents a method for leveraging the diversity within the model zoo to improve out-of-distribution generalization capabilities. Specifically, we investigate the behaviors of various pretrained models across different domains of downstream tasks by characterizing the variations in their encoded representations in terms of two dimensions: diversity shift and correlation shift. This characterization enables us to propose a new algorithm for integrating diverse pretrained models, not limited to the strongest models, in order to achieve enhanced out-of-distribution generalization performance. Our proposed method demonstrates state-of-the-art empirical results on a variety of datasets, thus validating the benefits of utilizing diverse knowledge.