Daily Papers

Persuasive dialogue plays a pivotal role in human communication, influencing various domains. Recent persuasive dialogue datasets often fail to align with real-world interpersonal interactions, leading to unfaithful representations. For instance, unrealistic scenarios may arise, such as when the persuadee explicitly instructs the persuader on which persuasion strategies to employ, with each of the persuadee's questions corresponding to a specific strategy for the persuader to follow. This issue can be attributed to a violation of the "Double Blind" condition, where critical information is fully shared between participants. In actual human interactions, however, key information such as the mental state of the persuadee and the persuasion strategies of the persuader is not directly accessible. The persuader must infer the persuadee's mental state using Theory of Mind capabilities and construct arguments that align with the persuadee's motivations. To address this gap, we introduce ToMMA, a novel multi-agent framework for dialogue generation that is guided by causal Theory of Mind. This framework ensures that information remains undisclosed between agents, preserving "double-blind" conditions, while causal ToM directs the persuader's reasoning, enhancing alignment with human-like persuasion dynamics. Consequently, we present CToMPersu, a multi-domain, multi-turn persuasive dialogue dataset that tackles both double-blind and logical coherence issues, demonstrating superior performance across multiple metrics and achieving better alignment with real human dialogues. Our dataset and prompts are available at https://github.com/DingyiZhang/ToMMA-CToMPersu .

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is a fundamental psychological capability that allows humans to understand and interpret the mental states of others. Humans infer others' thoughts by integrating causal cues and indirect clues from broad contextual information, often derived from past interactions. In other words, human ToM heavily relies on the understanding about the backgrounds and life stories of others. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely overlooked in existing benchmarks for evaluating machines' ToM capabilities, due to their usage of short narratives without global backgrounds. In this paper, we verify the importance of understanding long personal backgrounds in ToM and assess the performance of LLMs in such realistic evaluation scenarios. To achieve this, we introduce a novel benchmark, CharToM-QA, comprising 1,035 ToM questions based on characters from classic novels. Our human study reveals a significant disparity in performance: the same group of educated participants performs dramatically better when they have read the novels compared to when they have not. In parallel, our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including the very recent o1 model, show that LLMs still perform notably worse than humans, despite that they have seen these stories during pre-training. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs in capturing the nuanced contextual information required for ToM reasoning.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental variables based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to Theory of Mind reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use rigid, handcrafted Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models, which are more robust but cannot generalize across different domains. In this work, we introduce AutoToM, an automated Bayesian Theory of Mind method for achieving open-ended machine Theory of Mind. AutoToM can operate in any domain, infer any mental variable, and conduct robust Theory of Mind reasoning of any order. Given a Theory of Mind inference problem, AutoToM first proposes an initial BToM model. It then conducts automated Bayesian inverse planning based on the proposed model, leveraging an LLM as the backend. Based on the uncertainty of the inference, it iteratively refines the model, by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Empirical evaluations across multiple Theory of Mind benchmarks demonstrate that AutoToM consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance, offering a scalable, robust, and interpretable approach to machine Theory of Mind.

Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs-a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multi-agent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Domain Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation. This work advances AI systems toward human-like social intelligence, with applications in empathetic dialogue and culturally sensitive interactions. Code is available at https://github.com/XMZhangAI/MetaMind.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence reveal the limits of purely predictive systems and call for a shift toward causal and collaborative reasoning. Drawing inspiration from the revolution of Grothendieck in mathematics, we introduce the relativity of causal knowledge, which posits structural causal models (SCMs) are inherently imperfect, subjective representations embedded within networks of relationships. By leveraging category theory, we arrange SCMs into a functor category and show that their observational and interventional probability measures naturally form convex structures. This result allows us to encode non-intervened SCMs with convex spaces of probability measures. Next, using sheaf theory, we construct the network sheaf and cosheaf of causal knowledge. These structures enable the transfer of causal knowledge across the network while incorporating interventional consistency and the perspective of the subjects, ultimately leading to the formal, mathematical definition of relative causal knowledge.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the cognitive ability to infer and attribute mental states to oneself and others. As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated for social and cognitive capabilities, it remains unclear to what extent these models demonstrate ToM across diverse languages and cultural contexts. In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive study of multilingual ToM capabilities aimed at addressing this gap. Our approach includes two key components: (1) We translate existing ToM datasets into multiple languages, effectively creating a multilingual ToM dataset and (2) We enrich these translations with culturally specific elements to reflect the social and cognitive scenarios relevant to diverse populations. We conduct extensive evaluations of six state-of-the-art LLMs to measure their ToM performance across both the translated and culturally adapted datasets. The results highlight the influence of linguistic and cultural diversity on the models' ability to exhibit ToM, and questions their social reasoning capabilities. This work lays the groundwork for future research into enhancing LLMs' cross-cultural social cognition and contributes to the development of more culturally aware and socially intelligent AI systems. All our data and code are publicly available.

Causality knowledge is vital to building robust AI systems. Deep learning models often perform poorly on tasks that require causal reasoning, which is often derived using some form of commonsense knowledge not immediately available in the input but implicitly inferred by humans. Prior work has unraveled spurious observational biases that models fall prey to in the absence of causality. While language representation models preserve contextual knowledge within learned embeddings, they do not factor in causal relationships during training. By blending causal relationships with the input features to an existing model that performs visual cognition tasks (such as scene understanding, video captioning, video question-answering, etc.), better performance can be achieved owing to the insight causal relationships bring about. Recently, several models have been proposed that have tackled the task of mining causal data from either the visual or textual modality. However, there does not exist widespread research that mines causal relationships by juxtaposing the visual and language modalities. While images offer a rich and easy-to-process resource for us to mine causality knowledge from, videos are denser and consist of naturally time-ordered events. Also, textual information offers details that could be implicit in videos. We propose iReason, a framework that infers visual-semantic commonsense knowledge using both videos and natural language captions. Furthermore, iReason's architecture integrates a causal rationalization module to aid the process of interpretability, error analysis and bias detection. We demonstrate the effectiveness of iReason using a two-pronged comparative analysis with language representation learning models (BERT, GPT-2) as well as current state-of-the-art multimodal causality models.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental states, is an essential ingredient for developing machines with human-level social intelligence. Recent machine learning models, particularly large language models, seem to show some aspects of ToM understanding. However, existing ToM benchmarks use unimodal datasets - either video or text. Human ToM, on the other hand, is more than video or text understanding. People can flexibly reason about another person's mind based on conceptual representations (e.g., goals, beliefs, plans) extracted from any available data. To address this, we introduce a multimodal Theory of Mind question answering (MMToM-QA) benchmark. MMToM-QA comprehensively evaluates machine ToM both on multimodal data and on different kinds of unimodal data about a person's activity in a household environment. To engineer multimodal ToM capacity, we propose a novel method, BIP-ALM (Bayesian Inverse Planning Accelerated by Language Models). BIP-ALM extracts unified representations from multimodal data and utilizes language models for scalable Bayesian inverse planning. We conducted a systematic comparison of human performance, BIP-ALM, and state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4. The experiments demonstrate that large language models and large multimodal models still lack robust ToM capacity. BIP-ALM, on the other hand, shows promising results, by leveraging the power of both model-based mental inference and language models.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer mental states in others, is pivotal for human social cognition. Existing evaluations of ToM in LLMs are largely limited to English, neglecting the linguistic diversity that shapes human cognition. This limitation raises a critical question: can LLMs exhibit Multilingual Theory of Mind, which is the capacity to reason about mental states across diverse linguistic contexts? To address this gap, we present XToM, a rigorously validated multilingual benchmark that evaluates ToM across five languages and incorporates diverse, contextually rich task scenarios. Using XToM, we systematically evaluate LLMs (e.g., DeepSeek R1), revealing a pronounced dissonance: while models excel in multilingual language understanding, their ToM performance varies across languages. Our findings expose limitations in LLMs' ability to replicate human-like mentalizing across linguistic contexts.

Theory of Mind (ToM)-an understanding of the mental states of others-is a key aspect of human social intelligence, yet, chatbots and LLM-based social agents do not typically integrate it. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs that explicitly use ToM get better at dialogue, achieving goals more effectively. After showing that simply prompting models to generate mental states between dialogue turns already provides significant benefit, we further introduce ToMAgent (ToMA), a ToM-focused dialogue agent. ToMA is trained by pairing ToM with dialogue lookahead to produce mental states that are maximally useful for achieving dialogue goals. Experiments on the Sotopia interactive social evaluation benchmark demonstrate the effectiveness of our method over a range of baselines. Comprehensive analysis shows that ToMA exhibits more strategic, goal-oriented reasoning behaviors, which enable long-horizon adaptation, while maintaining better relationships with their partners. Our results suggest a step forward in integrating ToM for building socially intelligent LLM agents.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

We propose CX-ToM, short for counterfactual explanations with theory-of mind, a new explainable AI (XAI) framework for explaining decisions made by a deep convolutional neural network (CNN). In contrast to the current methods in XAI that generate explanations as a single shot response, we pose explanation as an iterative communication process, i.e. dialog, between the machine and human user. More concretely, our CX-ToM framework generates sequence of explanations in a dialog by mediating the differences between the minds of machine and human user. To do this, we use Theory of Mind (ToM) which helps us in explicitly modeling human's intention, machine's mind as inferred by the human as well as human's mind as inferred by the machine. Moreover, most state-of-the-art XAI frameworks provide attention (or heat map) based explanations. In our work, we show that these attention based explanations are not sufficient for increasing human trust in the underlying CNN model. In CX-ToM, we instead use counterfactual explanations called fault-lines which we define as follows: given an input image I for which a CNN classification model M predicts class c_pred, a fault-line identifies the minimal semantic-level features (e.g., stripes on zebra, pointed ears of dog), referred to as explainable concepts, that need to be added to or deleted from I in order to alter the classification category of I by M to another specified class c_alt. We argue that, due to the iterative, conceptual and counterfactual nature of CX-ToM explanations, our framework is practical and more natural for both expert and non-expert users to understand the internal workings of complex deep learning models. Extensive quantitative and qualitative experiments verify our hypotheses, demonstrating that our CX-ToM significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art explainable AI models.

Deep neural networks have significantly improved the performance of low-level vision tasks but also increased the difficulty of interpretability. A deep understanding of deep models is beneficial for both network design and practical reliability. To take up this challenge, we introduce causality theory to interpret low-level vision models and propose a model-/task-agnostic method called Causal Effect Map (CEM). With CEM, we can visualize and quantify the input-output relationships on either positive or negative effects. After analyzing various low-level vision tasks with CEM, we have reached several interesting insights, such as: (1) Using more information of input images (e.g., larger receptive field) does NOT always yield positive outcomes. (2) Attempting to incorporate mechanisms with a global receptive field (e.g., channel attention) into image denoising may prove futile. (3) Integrating multiple tasks to train a general model could encourage the network to prioritize local information over global context. Based on the causal effect theory, the proposed diagnostic tool can refresh our common knowledge and bring a deeper understanding of low-level vision models. Codes are available at https://github.com/J-FHu/CEM.

Can large multimodal models have a human-like ability for emotional and social reasoning, and if so, how does it work? Recent research has discovered emergent theory-of-mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs). LLMs can reason about people's mental states by solving various text-based ToM tasks that ask questions about the actors' ToM (e.g., human belief, desire, intention). However, human reasoning in the wild is often grounded in dynamic scenes across time. Thus, we consider videos a new medium for examining spatio-temporal ToM reasoning ability. Specifically, we ask explicit probing questions about videos with abundant social and emotional reasoning content. We develop a pipeline for multimodal LLM for ToM reasoning using video and text. We also enable explicit ToM reasoning by retrieving key frames for answering a ToM question, which reveals how multimodal LLMs reason about ToM.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' perceptions and mental states, is fundamental to human interaction but remains a challenging task for Large Language Models (LLMs). While existing ToM reasoning methods show promise with reasoning via perceptual perspective-taking, they often rely excessively on LLMs, reducing their efficiency and limiting their applicability to high-order ToM reasoning, which requires multi-hop reasoning about characters' beliefs. To address these issues, we present EnigmaToM, a novel neuro-symbolic framework that enhances ToM reasoning by integrating a Neural Knowledge Base of entity states (Enigma) for (1) a psychology-inspired iterative masking mechanism that facilitates accurate perspective-taking and (2) knowledge injection that elicits key entity information. Enigma generates structured representations of entity states, which construct spatial scene graphs -- leveraging spatial information as an inductive bias -- for belief tracking of various ToM orders and enhancing events with fine-grained entity state details. Experimental results on multiple benchmarks, including ToMi, HiToM, and FANToM, show that EnigmaToM significantly improves ToM reasoning across LLMs of varying sizes, particularly excelling in high-order reasoning scenarios.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

With the rise of Large Language Models(LLMs), it has become crucial to understand their capabilities and limitations in deciphering and explaining the complex web of causal relationships that language entails. Current methods use either explicit or implicit causal reasoning, yet there is a strong need for a unified approach combining both to tackle a wide array of causal relationships more effectively. This research proposes a novel architecture called Context Aware Reasoning Enhancement with Counterfactual Analysis(CARE CA) framework to enhance causal reasoning and explainability. The proposed framework incorporates an explicit causal detection module with ConceptNet and counterfactual statements, as well as implicit causal detection through LLMs. Our framework goes one step further with a layer of counterfactual explanations to accentuate LLMs understanding of causality. The knowledge from ConceptNet enhances the performance of multiple causal reasoning tasks such as causal discovery, causal identification and counterfactual reasoning. The counterfactual sentences add explicit knowledge of the not caused by scenarios. By combining these powerful modules, our model aims to provide a deeper understanding of causal relationships, enabling enhanced interpretability. Evaluation of benchmark datasets shows improved performance across all metrics, such as accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 scores. We also introduce CausalNet, a new dataset accompanied by our code, to facilitate further research in this domain.

Recent work on dialogue-based collaborative plan acquisition (CPA) has suggested that Theory of Mind (ToM) modelling can improve missing knowledge prediction in settings with asymmetric skill-sets and knowledge. Although ToM was claimed to be important for effective collaboration, its real impact on this novel task remains under-explored. By representing plans as graphs and by exploiting task-specific constraints we show that, as performance on CPA nearly doubles when predicting one's own missing knowledge, the improvements due to ToM modelling diminish. This phenomenon persists even when evaluating existing baseline methods. To better understand the relevance of ToM for CPA, we report a principled performance comparison of models with and without ToM features. Results across different models and ablations consistently suggest that learned ToM features are indeed more likely to reflect latent patterns in the data with no perceivable link to ToM. This finding calls for a deeper understanding of the role of ToM in CPA and beyond, as well as new methods for modelling and evaluating mental states in computational collaborative agents.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning by generating explanations for their predictions. However, a complementary goal of explanations is to also communicate useful knowledge that improves weaker agents. Hence, we investigate whether LLMs also make good teachers for weaker agents. In particular, we consider a student-teacher framework between two LLM agents and study if, when, and how the teacher should intervene with natural language explanations to improve the student's performance. Since communication is expensive, we define a budget such that the teacher only communicates explanations for a fraction of the data, after which the student should perform well on its own. We decompose the teaching problem along four axes: (1) if teacher's test time intervention improve student predictions, (2) when it is worth explaining a data point, (3) how the teacher should personalize explanations to better teach the student, and (4) if teacher explanations also improve student performance on future unexplained data. We first show that teacher LLMs can indeed intervene on student reasoning to improve their performance. Next, we propose a Theory of Mind approach, in which the teacher builds two few-shot mental models of the student. The first model defines an Intervention Function that simulates the utility of an intervention, allowing the teacher to intervene when this utility is the highest and improving student performance at lower budgets. The second model enables the teacher to personalize explanations for a particular student and outperform unpersonalized teachers. We also demonstrate that in multi-turn interactions, teacher explanations generalize and learning from explained data improves student performance on future unexplained data. Finally, we also verify that misaligned teachers can lower student performance to random chance by intentionally misleading them.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across various domains. However, a fundamental question remains: Can LLMs effectively utilize causal knowledge for prediction and generation? Through empirical studies, we find that LLMs trained directly on large-scale data often capture spurious correlations rather than true causal relationships, leading to suboptimal performance, especially in out-of-distribution (OOD) scenarios. To address this challenge, we propose Causal Attention Tuning (CAT), a novel approach that injects fine-grained causal knowledge into the attention mechanism. We propose an automated pipeline that leverages human priors to automatically generate token-level causal signals and introduce the Re-Attention mechanism to guide training, helping the model focus on causal structures while mitigating noise and biases in attention scores. Experimental results on our proposed Spurious Token Game (STG) benchmark and multiple downstream tasks demonstrate that our approach effectively leverages causal knowledge for prediction and remains robust in OOD scenarios. Implementation details can be found at https://github.com/Kairong-Han/CAT.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand the mental states of oneself and others, remains a challenging area for large language models (LLMs), which often fail to predict human mental states accurately. In this paper, we introduce UniToMBench, a unified benchmark that integrates the strengths of SimToM and TOMBENCH to systematically improve and assess ToM capabilities in LLMs by integrating multi-interaction task designs and evolving story scenarios. Supported by a custom dataset of over 1,000 hand-written scenarios, UniToMBench combines perspective-taking techniques with diverse evaluation metrics to better stimulate social cognition in LLMs. Through evaluation, we observe that while models like GPT-4o and GPT-4o Mini show consistently high accuracy in tasks involving emotional and belief-related scenarios, with results usually above 80%, there is significant variability in their performance across knowledge-based tasks. These results highlight both the strengths and limitations of current LLMs in ToM-related tasks, underscoring the value of UniToMBench as a comprehensive tool for future development. Our code is publicly available here: https://github.com/Shamant/unifiedtombenchmark.

Recent approaches to empathetic response generation incorporate emotion causalities to enhance comprehension of both the user's feelings and experiences. However, these approaches suffer from two critical issues. First, they only consider causalities between the user's emotion and the user's experiences, and ignore those between the user's experiences. Second, they neglect interdependence among causalities and reason them independently. To solve the above problems, we expect to reason all plausible causalities interdependently and simultaneously, given the user's emotion, dialogue history, and future dialogue content. Then, we infuse these causalities into response generation for empathetic responses. Specifically, we design a new model, i.e., the Conditional Variational Graph Auto-Encoder (CVGAE), for the causality reasoning, and adopt a multi-source attention mechanism in the decoder for the causality infusion. We name the whole framework as CARE, abbreviated for CAusality Reasoning for Empathetic conversation. Experimental results indicate that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance.

Recent approaches to empathetic response generation try to incorporate commonsense knowledge or reasoning about the causes of emotions to better understand the user's experiences and feelings. However, these approaches mainly focus on understanding the causalities of context from the user's perspective, ignoring the system's perspective. In this paper, we propose a commonsense-based causality explanation approach for diverse empathetic response generation that considers both the user's perspective (user's desires and reactions) and the system's perspective (system's intentions and reactions). We enhance ChatGPT's ability to reason for the system's perspective by integrating in-context learning with commonsense knowledge. Then, we integrate the commonsense-based causality explanation with both ChatGPT and a T5-based model. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that our method outperforms other comparable methods on both automatic and human evaluations.

Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM), machine's ability to understand and keep track of the mental states of others, is pivotal in developing socially intelligent agents. However, prevalent N-ToM benchmarks have several shortcomings, including the presence of ambiguous and artificial narratives, absence of personality traits and preferences, a lack of questions addressing characters' psychological mental states, and limited diversity in the questions posed. In response to these issues, we construct OpenToM, a new benchmark for assessing N-ToM with (1) longer and clearer narrative stories, (2) characters with explicit personality traits, (3) actions that are triggered by character intentions, and (4) questions designed to challenge LLMs' capabilities of modeling characters' mental states of both the physical and psychological world. Using OpenToM, we reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs thrive at modeling certain aspects of mental states in the physical world but fall short when tracking characters' mental states in the psychological world.

The ability to perform causal reasoning is widely considered a core feature of intelligence. In this work, we investigate whether large language models (LLMs) can coherently reason about causality. Much of the existing work in natural language processing (NLP) focuses on evaluating commonsense causal reasoning in LLMs, thus failing to assess whether a model can perform causal inference in accordance with a set of well-defined formal rules. To address this, we propose a new NLP task, causal inference in natural language, inspired by the "causal inference engine" postulated by Judea Pearl et al. We compose a large dataset, CLadder, with 10K samples: based on a collection of causal graphs and queries (associational, interventional, and counterfactual), we obtain symbolic questions and ground-truth answers, through an oracle causal inference engine. These are then translated into natural language. We evaluate multiple LLMs on our dataset, and we introduce and evaluate a bespoke chain-of-thought prompting strategy, CausalCoT. We show that our task is highly challenging for LLMs, and we conduct an in-depth analysis to gain deeper insights into the causal reasoning abilities of LLMs. Our data is open-sourced at https://huggingface.co/datasets/causalNLP/cladder, and our code can be found at https://github.com/causalNLP/cladder.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

When humans read or listen, they make implicit commonsense inferences that frame their understanding of what happened and why. As a step toward AI systems that can build similar mental models, we introduce GLUCOSE, a large-scale dataset of implicit commonsense causal knowledge, encoded as causal mini-theories about the world, each grounded in a narrative context. To construct GLUCOSE, we drew on cognitive psychology to identify ten dimensions of causal explanation, focusing on events, states, motivations, and emotions. Each GLUCOSE entry includes a story-specific causal statement paired with an inference rule generalized from the statement. This paper details two concrete contributions. First, we present our platform for effectively crowdsourcing GLUCOSE data at scale, which uses semi-structured templates to elicit causal explanations. Using this platform, we collected a total of ~670K specific statements and general rules that capture implicit commonsense knowledge about everyday situations. Second, we show that existing knowledge resources and pretrained language models do not include or readily predict GLUCOSE's rich inferential content. However, when state-of-the-art neural models are trained on this knowledge, they can start to make commonsense inferences on unseen stories that match humans' mental models.

Knowing others' intentions and taking others' perspectives are two core components of human intelligence that are considered to be instantiations of theory-of-mind. Infiltrating machines with these abilities is an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, to investigate intentionality understanding and level-2 perspective-taking in Vision Language Models (VLMs), we constructed the IntentBench and PerspectBench, which together contains over 300 cognitive experiments grounded in real-world scenarios and classic cognitive tasks. We found VLMs achieving high performance on intentionality understanding but low performance on level-2 perspective-taking. This suggests a potential dissociation between simulation-based and theory-based theory-of-mind abilities in VLMs, highlighting the concern that they are not capable of using model-based reasoning to infer others' mental states. See https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{Website}

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently shown great promise in planning and reasoning applications. These tasks demand robust systems, which arguably require a causal understanding of the environment. While LLMs can acquire and reflect common sense causal knowledge from their pretraining data, this information is often incomplete, incorrect, or inapplicable to a specific environment. In contrast, causal representation learning (CRL) focuses on identifying the underlying causal structure within a given environment. We propose a framework that integrates CRLs with LLMs to enable causally-aware reasoning and planning. This framework learns a causal world model, with causal variables linked to natural language expressions. This mapping provides LLMs with a flexible interface to process and generate descriptions of actions and states in text form. Effectively, the causal world model acts as a simulator that the LLM can query and interact with. We evaluate the framework on causal inference and planning tasks across temporal scales and environmental complexities. Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach, with the causally-aware method outperforming LLM-based reasoners, especially for longer planning horizons.

Understanding causality has vital importance for various Natural Language Processing (NLP) applications. Beyond the labeled instances, conceptual explanations of the causality can provide deep understanding of the causal facts to facilitate the causal reasoning process. However, such explanation information still remains absent in existing causal reasoning resources. In this paper, we fill this gap by presenting a human-annotated explainable CAusal REasoning dataset (e-CARE), which contains over 21K causal reasoning questions, together with natural language formed explanations of the causal questions. Experimental results show that generating valid explanations for causal facts still remains especially challenging for the state-of-the-art models, and the explanation information can be helpful for promoting the accuracy and stability of causal reasoning models.

We present a general causal generative modelling framework for accurate estimation of high fidelity image counterfactuals with deep structural causal models. Estimation of interventional and counterfactual queries for high-dimensional structured variables, such as images, remains a challenging task. We leverage ideas from causal mediation analysis and advances in generative modelling to design new deep causal mechanisms for structured variables in causal models. Our experiments demonstrate that our proposed mechanisms are capable of accurate abduction and estimation of direct, indirect and total effects as measured by axiomatic soundness of counterfactuals.

Understanding people's social interactions in complex real-world scenarios often relies on intricate mental reasoning. To truly understand how and why people interact with one another, we must infer the underlying mental states that give rise to the social interactions, i.e., Theory of Mind reasoning in multi-agent interactions. Additionally, social interactions are often multi-modal -- we can watch people's actions, hear their conversations, and/or read about their past behaviors. For AI systems to successfully and safely interact with people in real-world environments, they also need to understand people's mental states as well as their inferences about each other's mental states based on multi-modal information about their interactions. For this, we introduce MuMA-ToM, a Multi-modal Multi-Agent Theory of Mind benchmark. MuMA-ToM is the first multi-modal Theory of Mind benchmark that evaluates mental reasoning in embodied multi-agent interactions. In MuMA-ToM, we provide video and text descriptions of people's multi-modal behavior in realistic household environments. Based on the context, we then ask questions about people's goals, beliefs, and beliefs about others' goals. We validated MuMA-ToM in a human experiment and provided a human baseline. We also proposed a novel multi-modal, multi-agent ToM model, LIMP (Language model-based Inverse Multi-agent Planning). Our experimental results show that LIMP significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, including large multi-modal models (e.g., GPT-4o, Gemini-1.5 Pro) and a recent multi-modal ToM model, BIP-ALM.

Eleven Large Language Models (LLMs) were assessed using a custom-made battery of false-belief tasks, considered a gold standard in testing Theory of Mind (ToM) in humans. The battery included 640 prompts spread across 40 diverse tasks, each one including a false-belief scenario, three closely matched true-belief control scenarios, and the reversed versions of all four. To solve a single task, a model needed to correctly answer 16 prompts across all eight scenarios. Smaller and older models solved no tasks; GPT-3-davinci-003 (from November 2022) and ChatGPT-3.5-turbo (from March 2023) solved 20% of the tasks; ChatGPT-4 (from June 2023) solved 75% of the tasks, matching the performance of six-year-old children observed in past studies. We explore the potential interpretation of these findings, including the intriguing possibility that ToM, previously considered exclusive to humans, may have spontaneously emerged as a byproduct of LLMs' improving language skills.

Faithful evaluation of language model capabilities is crucial for deriving actionable insights that can inform model development. However, rigorous causal evaluations in this domain face significant methodological challenges, including complex confounding effects and prohibitive computational costs associated with extensive retraining. To tackle these challenges, we propose a causal representation learning framework wherein observed benchmark performance is modeled as a linear transformation of a few latent capability factors. Crucially, these latent factors are identified as causally interrelated after appropriately controlling for the base model as a common confounder. Applying this approach to a comprehensive dataset encompassing over 1500 models evaluated across six benchmarks from the Open LLM Leaderboard, we identify a concise three-node linear causal structure that reliably explains the observed performance variations. Further interpretation of this causal structure provides substantial scientific insights beyond simple numerical rankings: specifically, we reveal a clear causal direction starting from general problem-solving capabilities, advancing through instruction-following proficiency, and culminating in mathematical reasoning ability. Our results underscore the essential role of carefully controlling base model variations during evaluation, a step critical to accurately uncovering the underlying causal relationships among latent model capabilities.

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

It has long been hypothesised that causal reasoning plays a fundamental role in robust and general intelligence. However, it is not known if agents must learn causal models in order to generalise to new domains, or if other inductive biases are sufficient. We answer this question, showing that any agent capable of satisfying a regret bound under a large set of distributional shifts must have learned an approximate causal model of the data generating process, which converges to the true causal model for optimal agents. We discuss the implications of this result for several research areas including transfer learning and causal inference.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks pose a unique challenge for small language models (SLMs) with limited scale, which often lack the capacity to perform deep social reasoning. In this work, we propose DEL-ToM, a framework that improves ToM reasoning through inference-time scaling rather than architectural changes. Our approach decomposes ToM tasks into a sequence of belief updates grounded in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), enabling structured and transparent reasoning. We train a verifier, called the Process Belief Model (PBM), to score each belief update step using labels generated automatically via a DEL simulator. During inference, candidate belief traces generated by a language model are evaluated by the PBM, and the highest-scoring trace is selected. This allows SLMs to emulate more deliberate reasoning by allocating additional compute at test time. Experiments across multiple model scales and benchmarks show that DEL-ToM consistently improves performance, demonstrating that verifiable belief supervision can significantly enhance ToM abilities of SLMs without retraining.

Theory of Mind (ToM) can be used to assess the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in complex scenarios where social reasoning is required. While the research community has proposed many ToM benchmarks, their hardness varies greatly, and their complexity is not well defined. This work proposes a framework inspired by cognitive load theory to measure the complexity of ToM tasks. We quantify a problem's complexity as the number of states necessary to solve it correctly. Our complexity measure also accounts for spurious states of a ToM problem designed to make it apparently harder. We use our method to assess the complexity of five widely adopted ToM benchmarks. On top of this framework, we design a prompting technique that augments the information available to a model with a description of how the environment changes with the agents' interactions. We name this technique Discrete World Models (DWM) and show how it elicits superior performance on ToM tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown state-of-the-art performance in a variety of tasks, including arithmetic and reasoning; however, to gauge the intellectual capabilities of LLMs, causal reasoning has become a reliable proxy for validating a general understanding of the mechanics and intricacies of the world similar to humans. Previous works in natural language processing (NLP) have either focused on open-ended causal reasoning via causal commonsense reasoning (CCR) or framed a symbolic representation-based question answering for theoretically backed-up analysis via a causal inference engine. The former adds an advantage of real-world grounding but lacks theoretically backed-up analysis/validation, whereas the latter is far from real-world grounding. In this work, we bridge this gap by proposing the COLD (Causal reasOning in cLosed Daily activities) framework, which is built upon human understanding of daily real-world activities to reason about the causal nature of events. We show that the proposed framework facilitates the creation of enormous causal queries (~ 9 million) and comes close to the mini-turing test, simulating causal reasoning to evaluate the understanding of a daily real-world task. We evaluate multiple LLMs on the created causal queries and find that causal reasoning is challenging even for activities trivial to humans. We further explore (the causal reasoning abilities of LLMs) using the backdoor criterion to determine the causal strength between events.

Causal reasoning and compositional reasoning are two core aspirations in generative AI. Measuring the extent of these behaviors requires principled evaluation methods. We explore a unified perspective that considers both behaviors simultaneously, termed compositional causal reasoning (CCR): the ability to infer how causal measures compose and, equivalently, how causal quantities propagate through graphs. We instantiate a framework for the systematic evaluation of CCR for the average treatment effect and the probability of necessity and sufficiency. As proof of concept, we demonstrate the design of CCR tasks for language models in the LLama, Phi, and GPT families. On a math word problem, our framework revealed a range of taxonomically distinct error patterns. Additionally, CCR errors increased with the complexity of causal paths for all models except o1.

Understanding predictions made by deep neural networks is notoriously difficult, but also crucial to their dissemination. As all machine learning based methods, they are as good as their training data, and can also capture unwanted biases. While there are tools that can help understand whether such biases exist, they do not distinguish between correlation and causation, and might be ill-suited for text-based models and for reasoning about high level language concepts. A key problem of estimating the causal effect of a concept of interest on a given model is that this estimation requires the generation of counterfactual examples, which is challenging with existing generation technology. To bridge that gap, we propose CausaLM, a framework for producing causal model explanations using counterfactual language representation models. Our approach is based on fine-tuning of deep contextualized embedding models with auxiliary adversarial tasks derived from the causal graph of the problem. Concretely, we show that by carefully choosing auxiliary adversarial pre-training tasks, language representation models such as BERT can effectively learn a counterfactual representation for a given concept of interest, and be used to estimate its true causal effect on model performance. A byproduct of our method is a language representation model that is unaffected by the tested concept, which can be useful in mitigating unwanted bias ingrained in the data.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Despite remarkable advances in the field, LLMs remain unreliable in distinguishing causation from correlation. Recent results from the Corr2Cause dataset benchmark reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs -- such as GPT-4 (F1 score: 29.08) -- only marginally outperform random baselines (Random Uniform, F1 score: 20.38), indicating limited capacity of generalization. To tackle this limitation, we propose a novel structured approach: rather than directly answering causal queries, we provide the model with the capability to structure its thinking by guiding the model to build a structured knowledge graph, systematically encoding the provided correlational premises, to answer the causal queries. This intermediate representation significantly enhances the model's causal capabilities. Experiments on the test subset of the Corr2Cause dataset benchmark with Qwen3-32B model (reasoning model) show substantial gains over standard direct prompting methods, improving F1 scores from 32.71 to 48.26 (over 47.5% relative increase), along with notable improvements in precision and recall. These results underscore the effectiveness of providing the model with the capability to structure its thinking and highlight its promising potential for broader generalization across diverse causal inference tasks.

Learning causal structure from observational data often assumes that we observe independent and identically distributed (i.\,i.\,d) data. The traditional approach aims to find a graphical representation that encodes the same set of conditional independence relationships as those present in the observed distribution. It is known that under i.\,i.\,d assumption, even with infinite data, there is a limit to how fine-grained a causal structure we can identify. To overcome this limitation, recent work has explored using data originating from different, related environments to learn richer causal structure. These approaches implicitly rely on the independent causal mechanisms (ICM) principle, which postulates that the mechanism giving rise to an effect given its causes and the mechanism which generates the causes do not inform or influence each other. Thus, components of the causal model can independently change from environment to environment. Despite its wide application in machine learning and causal inference, there is a lack of statistical formalization of the ICM principle and how it enables identification of richer causal structures from grouped data. Here we present new causal de Finetti theorems which offer a first statistical formalization of ICM principle and show how causal structure identification is possible from exchangeable data. Our work provides theoretical justification for a broad range of techniques leveraging multi-environment data to learn causal structure.

Humans continuously infer the states, goals, and behaviors of others by perceiving their surroundings in dynamic, real-world social interactions. However, most Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks only evaluate static, text-based scenarios, which have a significant gap compared to real interactions. We propose the SoMi-ToM benchmark, designed to evaluate multi-perspective ToM in embodied multi-agent complex social interactions. This benchmark is based on rich multimodal interaction data generated by the interaction environment SoMi, covering diverse crafting goals and social relationships. Our framework supports multi-level evaluation: (1) first-person evaluation provides multimodal (visual, dialogue, action, etc.) input from a first-person perspective during a task for real-time state inference, (2) third-person evaluation provides complete third-person perspective video and text records after a task for goal and behavior inference. This evaluation method allows for a more comprehensive examination of a model's ToM capabilities from both the subjective immediate experience and the objective global observation. We constructed a challenging dataset containing 35 third-person perspective videos, 363 first-person perspective images, and 1225 expert-annotated multiple-choice questions (three options). On this dataset, we systematically evaluated the performance of human subjects and several state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs). The results show that LVLMs perform significantly worse than humans on SoMi-ToM: the average accuracy gap between humans and models is 40.1% in first-person evaluation and 26.4% in third-person evaluation. This indicates that future LVLMs need to further improve their ToM capabilities in embodied, complex social interactions.

A faithful and interpretable explanation of an AI model's behavior and internal structure is a high-level explanation that is human-intelligible but also consistent with the known, but often opaque low-level causal details of the model. We argue that the theory of causal abstraction provides the mathematical foundations for the desired kinds of model explanations. In causal abstraction analysis, we use interventions on model-internal states to rigorously assess whether an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful description of an AI model. Our contributions in this area are: (1) We generalize causal abstraction to cyclic causal structures and typed high-level variables. (2) We show how multi-source interchange interventions can be used to conduct causal abstraction analyses. (3) We define a notion of approximate causal abstraction that allows us to assess the degree to which a high-level causal model is a causal abstraction of a lower-level one. (4) We prove constructive causal abstraction can be decomposed into three operations we refer to as marginalization, variable-merge, and value-merge. (5) We formalize the XAI methods of LIME, causal effect estimation, causal mediation analysis, iterated nullspace projection, and circuit-based explanations as special cases of causal abstraction analysis.

Natural language is an appealing medium for explaining how large language models process and store information, but evaluating the faithfulness of such explanations is challenging. To help address this, we develop two modes of evaluation for natural language explanations that claim individual neurons represent a concept in a text input. In the observational mode, we evaluate claims that a neuron a activates on all and only input strings that refer to a concept picked out by the proposed explanation E. In the intervention mode, we construe E as a claim that the neuron a is a causal mediator of the concept denoted by E. We apply our framework to the GPT-4-generated explanations of GPT-2 XL neurons of Bills et al. (2023) and show that even the most confident explanations have high error rates and little to no causal efficacy. We close the paper by critically assessing whether natural language is a good choice for explanations and whether neurons are the best level of analysis.

For text-based AI systems to interact in the real world, causal reasoning is an essential skill. Since interventional data is costly to generate, we study to what extent an agent can learn causal reasoning from passive data. Specifically, we consider an axiomatic training setup where an agent learns from multiple demonstrations of a causal axiom (or rule), rather than incorporating the axiom as an inductive bias or inferring it from data values. A key question is whether the agent would learn to generalize from the axiom demonstrations to new scenarios. For example, if a transformer model is trained on demonstrations of the causal transitivity axiom over small graphs, would it generalize to applying the transitivity axiom over large graphs? Our results, based on a novel axiomatic training scheme, indicate that such generalization is possible. We consider the task of inferring whether a variable causes another variable, given a causal graph structure. We find that a 67 million parameter transformer model, when trained on linear causal chains (along with some noisy variations) can generalize well to new kinds of graphs, including longer causal chains, causal chains with reversed order, and graphs with branching; even when it is not explicitly trained for such settings. Our model performs at par (or even better) than many larger language models such as GPT-4, Gemini Pro, and Phi-3. Overall, our axiomatic training framework provides a new paradigm of learning causal reasoning from passive data that can be used to learn arbitrary axioms, as long as sufficient demonstrations can be generated.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant success across various domains. However, the inherent complexity of causal problems and causal theory poses challenges in accurately describing them in natural language, making it difficult for LLMs to comprehend and use them effectively. Causal methods are not easily conveyed through natural language, which hinders LLMs' ability to apply them accurately. Additionally, causal datasets are typically tabular, while LLMs excel in handling natural language data, creating a structural mismatch that impedes effective reasoning with tabular data. This lack of causal reasoning capability limits the development of LLMs. To address these challenges, we have equipped the LLM with causal tools within an agent framework, named the Causal Agent, enabling it to tackle causal problems. The causal agent comprises tools, memory, and reasoning modules. In the tools module, the causal agent applies causal methods to align tabular data with natural language. In the reasoning module, the causal agent employs the ReAct framework to perform reasoning through multiple iterations with the tools. In the memory module, the causal agent maintains a dictionary instance where the keys are unique names and the values are causal graphs. To verify the causal ability of the causal agent, we established a benchmark consisting of four levels of causal problems: variable level, edge level, causal graph level, and causal effect level. We generated a test dataset of 1.3K using ChatGPT-3.5 for these four levels of issues and tested the causal agent on the datasets. Our methodology demonstrates remarkable efficacy on the four-level causal problems, with accuracy rates all above 80%. For further insights and implementation details, our code is accessible via the GitHub repository https://github.com/Kairong-Han/Causal_Agent.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods struggle with the non-stationarity of multi-agent systems and fail to adaptively learn online when tested with novel agents. Here, we leverage large language models (LLMs) to create an autonomous agent that can handle these challenges. Our agent, Hypothetical Minds, consists of a cognitively-inspired architecture, featuring modular components for perception, memory, and hierarchical planning over two levels of abstraction. We introduce the Theory of Mind module that scaffolds the high-level planning process by generating hypotheses about other agents' strategies in natural language. It then evaluates and iteratively refines these hypotheses by reinforcing hypotheses that make correct predictions about the other agents' behavior. Hypothetical Minds significantly improves performance over previous LLM-agent and RL baselines on a range of competitive, mixed motive, and collaborative domains in the Melting Pot benchmark, including both dyadic and population-based environments. Additionally, comparisons against LLM-agent baselines and ablations reveal the importance of hypothesis evaluation and refinement for succeeding on complex scenarios.

Reasoning requires adaptation to novel problem settings under limited data and distribution shift. This work introduces CausalARC: an experimental testbed for AI reasoning in low-data and out-of-distribution regimes, modeled after the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC). Each CausalARC reasoning task is sampled from a fully specified causal world model, formally expressed as a structural causal model. Principled data augmentations provide observational, interventional, and counterfactual feedback about the world model in the form of few-shot, in-context learning demonstrations. As a proof-of-concept, we illustrate the use of CausalARC for four language model evaluation settings: (1) abstract reasoning with test-time training, (2) counterfactual reasoning with in-context learning, (3) program synthesis, and (4) causal discovery with logical reasoning.

Understanding narratives requires reasoning about the cause-and-effect relationships between events mentioned in the text. While existing foundation models yield impressive results in many NLP tasks requiring reasoning, it is unclear whether they understand the complexity of the underlying network of causal relationships of events in narratives. In this work, we present CRAB, a new Causal Reasoning Assessment Benchmark designed to evaluate causal understanding of events in real-world narratives. CRAB contains fine-grained, contextual causality annotations for ~2.7K pairs of real-world events that describe various newsworthy event timelines (e.g., the acquisition of Twitter by Elon Musk). Using CRAB, we measure the performance of several large language models, demonstrating that most systems achieve poor performance on the task. Motivated by classical causal principles, we also analyze the causal structures of groups of events in CRAB, and find that models perform worse on causal reasoning when events are derived from complex causal structures compared to simple linear causal chains. We make our dataset and code available to the research community.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable ability in various language tasks, especially with their emergent in-context learning capability. Extending LLMs to incorporate visual inputs, large vision-language models (LVLMs) have shown impressive performance in tasks such as recognition and visual question answering (VQA). Despite increasing interest in the utility of LLMs in causal reasoning tasks such as causal discovery and counterfactual reasoning, there has been relatively little work showcasing the abilities of LVLMs on visual causal reasoning tasks. We take this opportunity to formally introduce a comprehensive causal reasoning benchmark for multi-modal in-context learning from LVLMs. Our CausalVLBench encompasses three representative tasks: causal structure inference, intervention target prediction, and counterfactual prediction. We evaluate the ability of state-of-the-art open-source LVLMs on our causal reasoning tasks across three causal representation learning datasets and demonstrate their fundamental strengths and weaknesses. We hope that our benchmark elucidates the drawbacks of existing vision-language models and motivates new directions and paradigms in improving the visual causal reasoning abilities of LVLMs.

Theory of mind (ToM) evaluations currently focus on testing models using passive narratives that inherently lack interactivity. We introduce FANToM, a new benchmark designed to stress-test ToM within information-asymmetric conversational contexts via question answering. Our benchmark draws upon important theoretical requisites from psychology and necessary empirical considerations when evaluating large language models (LLMs). In particular, we formulate multiple types of questions that demand the same underlying reasoning to identify illusory or false sense of ToM capabilities in LLMs. We show that FANToM is challenging for state-of-the-art LLMs, which perform significantly worse than humans even with chain-of-thought reasoning or fine-tuning.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

Multi-party Conversational Agents (MPCAs) are systems designed to engage in dialogue with more than two participants simultaneously. Unlike traditional two-party agents, designing MPCAs faces additional challenges due to the need to interpret both utterance semantics and social dynamics. This survey explores recent progress in MPCAs by addressing three key questions: 1) Can agents model each participants' mental states? (State of Mind Modeling); 2) Can they properly understand the dialogue content? (Semantic Understanding); and 3) Can they reason about and predict future conversation flow? (Agent Action Modeling). We review methods ranging from classical machine learning to Large Language Models (LLMs) and multi-modal systems. Our analysis underscores Theory of Mind (ToM) as essential for building intelligent MPCAs and highlights multi-modal understanding as a promising yet underexplored direction. Finally, this survey offers guidance to future researchers on developing more capable MPCAs.

Despite the impressive performance of vision-language models (VLMs) on downstream tasks, their ability to understand and reason about causal relationships in visual inputs remains unclear. Robust causal reasoning is fundamental to solving complex high-level reasoning tasks, yet existing benchmarks often include a mixture of reasoning questions, and VLMs can frequently exploit object recognition and activity identification as shortcuts to arrive at the correct answers, making it challenging to truly assess their causal reasoning abilities. To bridge this gap, we introduce VQA-Causal and VCR-Causal, two new benchmarks specifically designed to isolate and rigorously evaluate VLMs' causal reasoning abilities. Our findings reveal that while VLMs excel in object and activity recognition, they perform poorly on causal reasoning tasks, often only marginally surpassing random guessing. Further analysis suggests that this limitation stems from a severe lack of causal expressions in widely used training datasets, where causal relationships are rarely explicitly conveyed. We additionally explore fine-tuning strategies with hard negative cases, showing that targeted fine-tuning can improve model's causal reasoning while maintaining generalization and downstream performance. Our study highlights a key gap in current VLMs and lays the groundwork for future work on causal understanding.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Diffusion probabilistic models (DPMs) have become the state-of-the-art in high-quality image generation. However, DPMs have an arbitrary noisy latent space with no interpretable or controllable semantics. Although there has been significant research effort to improve image sample quality, there is little work on representation-controlled generation using diffusion models. Specifically, causal modeling and controllable counterfactual generation using DPMs is an underexplored area. In this work, we propose CausalDiffAE, a diffusion-based causal representation learning framework to enable counterfactual generation according to a specified causal model. Our key idea is to use an encoder to extract high-level semantically meaningful causal variables from high-dimensional data and model stochastic variation using reverse diffusion. We propose a causal encoding mechanism that maps high-dimensional data to causally related latent factors and parameterize the causal mechanisms among latent factors using neural networks. To enforce the disentanglement of causal variables, we formulate a variational objective and leverage auxiliary label information in a prior to regularize the latent space. We propose a DDIM-based counterfactual generation procedure subject to do-interventions. Finally, to address the limited label supervision scenario, we also study the application of CausalDiffAE when a part of the training data is unlabeled, which also enables granular control over the strength of interventions in generating counterfactuals during inference. We empirically show that CausalDiffAE learns a disentangled latent space and is capable of generating high-quality counterfactual images.

Actual causality (AC), a fundamental aspect of causal reasoning (CR), is responsible for attribution and responsibility assignment in real-world scenarios. However, existing LLM-based methods lack grounding in formal AC theory, resulting in limited interpretability. Therefore, we propose AC-Reason, a semi-formal reasoning framework that identifies causally relevant events within an AC scenario, infers the values of their formal causal factors (e.g., sufficiency, necessity, and normality), and answers AC queries via a theory-guided algorithm with explanations. While AC-Reason does not explicitly construct a causal graph, it operates over variables in the underlying causal structure to support principled reasoning. To enable comprehensive evaluation, we introduce AC-Bench, a new benchmark built upon and substantially extending Big-Bench Hard Causal Judgment (BBH-CJ). AC-Bench comprises ~1K carefully annotated samples, each with detailed reasoning steps and focuses solely on actual causation. The case study shows that synthesized samples in AC-Bench present greater challenges for LLMs. Extensive experiments on BBH-CJ and AC-Bench show that AC-Reason consistently improves LLM performance over baselines. On BBH-CJ, all tested LLMs surpass the average human rater accuracy of 69.60%, with GPT-4 + AC-Reason achieving 75.04%. On AC-Bench, GPT-4 + AC-Reason again achieves the highest accuracy of 71.82%. AC-Bench further enables fine-grained analysis of reasoning faithfulness, revealing that only Qwen-2.5-72B-Instruct, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, and GPT-4o exhibit faithful reasoning, whereas GPT-4 tends to exploit shortcuts. Finally, our ablation study proves that integrating AC theory into LLMs is highly effective, with the proposed algorithm contributing the most significant performance gains.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

The causal capabilities of large language models (LLMs) are a matter of significant debate, with critical implications for the use of LLMs in societally impactful domains such as medicine, science, law, and policy. We conduct a "behavorial" study of LLMs to benchmark their capability in generating causal arguments. Across a wide range of tasks, we find that LLMs can generate text corresponding to correct causal arguments with high probability, surpassing the best-performing existing methods. Algorithms based on GPT-3.5 and 4 outperform existing algorithms on a pairwise causal discovery task (97%, 13 points gain), counterfactual reasoning task (92%, 20 points gain) and event causality (86% accuracy in determining necessary and sufficient causes in vignettes). We perform robustness checks across tasks and show that the capabilities cannot be explained by dataset memorization alone, especially since LLMs generalize to novel datasets that were created after the training cutoff date. That said, LLMs exhibit unpredictable failure modes, and we discuss the kinds of errors that may be improved and what are the fundamental limits of LLM-based answers. Overall, by operating on the text metadata, LLMs bring capabilities so far understood to be restricted to humans, such as using collected knowledge to generate causal graphs or identifying background causal context from natural language. As a result, LLMs may be used by human domain experts to save effort in setting up a causal analysis, one of the biggest impediments to the widespread adoption of causal methods. Given that LLMs ignore the actual data, our results also point to a fruitful research direction of developing algorithms that combine LLMs with existing causal techniques. Code and datasets are available at https://github.com/py-why/pywhy-llm.

Causal inference is one of the hallmarks of human intelligence. While the field of CausalNLP has attracted much interest in the recent years, existing causal inference datasets in NLP primarily rely on discovering causality from empirical knowledge (e.g., commonsense knowledge). In this work, we propose the first benchmark dataset to test the pure causal inference skills of large language models (LLMs). Specifically, we formulate a novel task Corr2Cause, which takes a set of correlational statements and determines the causal relationship between the variables. We curate a large-scale dataset of more than 400K samples, on which we evaluate seventeen existing LLMs. Through our experiments, we identify a key shortcoming of LLMs in terms of their causal inference skills, and show that these models achieve almost close to random performance on the task. This shortcoming is somewhat mitigated when we try to re-purpose LLMs for this skill via finetuning, but we find that these models still fail to generalize -- they can only perform causal inference in in-distribution settings when variable names and textual expressions used in the queries are similar to those in the training set, but fail in out-of-distribution settings generated by perturbing these queries. Corr2Cause is a challenging task for LLMs, and would be helpful in guiding future research on improving LLMs' pure reasoning skills and generalizability. Our data is at https://huggingface.co/datasets/causalnlp/corr2cause. Our code is at https://github.com/causalNLP/corr2cause.

Natural language has long enabled human cooperation, but its lossy, ambiguous, and indirect nature limits the potential of collective intelligence. While machines are not subject to these constraints, most LLM-based multi-agent systems still rely solely on natural language, exchanging tokens or their embeddings. To go beyond language, we introduce a new paradigm, thought communication, which enables agents to interact directly mind-to-mind, akin to telepathy. To uncover these latent thoughts in a principled way, we formalize the process as a general latent variable model, where agent states are generated by an unknown function of underlying thoughts. We prove that, in a nonparametric setting without auxiliary information, both shared and private latent thoughts between any pair of agents can be identified. Moreover, the global structure of thought sharing, including which agents share which thoughts and how these relationships are structured, can also be recovered with theoretical guarantees. Guided by the established theory, we develop a framework that extracts latent thoughts from all agents prior to communication and assigns each agent the relevant thoughts, along with their sharing patterns. This paradigm naturally extends beyond LLMs to all modalities, as most observational data arise from hidden generative processes. Experiments on both synthetic and real-world benchmarks validate the theory and demonstrate the collaborative advantages of thought communication. We hope this work illuminates the potential of leveraging the hidden world, as many challenges remain unsolvable through surface-level observation alone, regardless of compute or data scale.

A compelling portrayal of characters is essential to the success of narrative writing. For readers, appreciating a character's traits requires the ability to infer their evolving beliefs, desires, and intentions over the course of a complex storyline, a cognitive skill known as Theory-of-Mind (ToM). Performing ToM reasoning in prolonged narratives requires readers to integrate historical context with current narrative information, a task at which humans excel but Large Language Models (LLMs) often struggle. To systematically evaluate LLMs' ToM reasoning capability in long narratives, we construct LitCharToM, a benchmark of character-centric questions across four ToM dimensions from classic literature. Further, we introduce EvolvTrip, a perspective-aware temporal knowledge graph that tracks psychological development throughout narratives. Our experiments demonstrate that EvolvTrip consistently enhances performance of LLMs across varying scales, even in challenging extended-context scenarios. EvolvTrip proves to be particularly valuable for smaller models, partially bridging the performance gap with larger LLMs and showing great compatibility with lengthy narratives. Our findings highlight the importance of explicit representation of temporal character mental states in narrative comprehension and offer a foundation for more sophisticated character understanding. Our data and code are publicly available at https://github.com/Bernard-Yang/EvolvTrip.

Understanding and inferring causal relationships from texts is a core aspect of human cognition and is essential for advancing large language models (LLMs) towards artificial general intelligence. Existing work primarily focuses on synthetically generated texts which involve simple causal relationships explicitly mentioned in the text. This fails to reflect the complexities of real-world tasks. In this paper, we investigate whether LLMs are capable of inferring causal relationships from real-world texts. We develop a benchmark drawn from real-world academic literature which includes diverse texts with respect to length, complexity of relationships (different levels of explicitness, number of events, and causal relationships), and domains and sub-domains. To the best of our knowledge, our benchmark is the first-ever real-world dataset for this task. Our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs evaluated on our proposed benchmark demonstrate significant challenges, with the best-performing model achieving an average F1 score of only 0.477. Analysis reveals common pitfalls: difficulty with implicitly stated information, in distinguishing relevant causal factors from surrounding contextual details, and with connecting causally relevant information spread across lengthy textual passages. By systematically characterizing these deficiencies, our benchmark offers targeted insights for further research into advancing LLM causal reasoning.

We present a conditional text generation framework that posits sentential expressions of possible causes and effects. This framework depends on two novel resources we develop in the course of this work: a very large-scale collection of English sentences expressing causal patterns CausalBank; and a refinement over previous work on constructing large lexical causal knowledge graphs Cause Effect Graph. Further, we extend prior work in lexically-constrained decoding to support disjunctive positive constraints. Human assessment confirms that our approach gives high-quality and diverse outputs. Finally, we use CausalBank to perform continued training of an encoder supporting a recent state-of-the-art model for causal reasoning, leading to a 3-point improvement on the COPA challenge set, with no change in model architecture.

Recent advances in spoken dialogue language models (SDLMs) reflect growing interest in shifting from turn-based to full-duplex systems, where the models continuously perceive user speech streams while generating responses. This simultaneous listening and speaking design enables real-time interaction and the agent can handle dynamic conversational behaviors like user barge-in. However, during the listening phase, existing systems keep the agent idle by repeatedly predicting the silence token, which departs from human behavior: we usually engage in lightweight thinking during conversation rather than remaining absent-minded. Inspired by this, we propose Chronological Thinking, a on-the-fly conversational thinking mechanism that aims to improve response quality in full-duplex SDLMs. Specifically, chronological thinking presents a paradigm shift from conventional LLM thinking approaches, such as Chain-of-Thought, purpose-built for streaming acoustic input. (1) Strictly causal: the agent reasons incrementally while listening, updating internal hypotheses only from past audio with no lookahead. (2) No additional latency: reasoning is amortized during the listening window; once the user stops speaking, the agent halts thinking and begins speaking without further delay. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of chronological thinking through both objective metrics and human evaluations show consistent improvements in response quality. Furthermore, chronological thinking robustly handles conversational dynamics and attains competitive performance on full-duplex interaction metrics.

Extracting causal relationships from observed correlations is a growing area in probabilistic reasoning, originating with the seminal work of Pearl and others from the early 1990s. This paper develops a new, categorically oriented view based on a clear distinction between syntax (string diagrams) and semantics (stochastic matrices), connected via interpretations as structure-preserving functors. A key notion in the identification of causal effects is that of an intervention, whereby a variable is forcefully set to a particular value independent of any prior propensities. We represent the effect of such an intervention as an endofunctor which performs `string diagram surgery' within the syntactic category of string diagrams. This diagram surgery in turn yields a new, interventional distribution via the interpretation functor. While in general there is no way to compute interventional distributions purely from observed data, we show that this is possible in certain special cases using a calculational tool called comb disintegration. We demonstrate the use of this technique on a well-known toy example, where we predict the causal effect of smoking on cancer in the presence of a confounding common cause. After developing this specific example, we show this technique provides simple sufficient conditions for computing interventions which apply to a wide variety of situations considered in the causal inference literature.

Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) at test time, enabling them to solve complex tasks. These reasoning steps in CoT are often assumed as a faithful reflection of the model's internal thinking process, and used to monitor unsafe intentions. However, we find many reasoning steps don't truly contribute to LLMs' prediction. We measure the step-wise causal influence of each reasoning step on the model's final prediction with a proposed True Thinking Score (TTS). We reveal that LLMs often interleave between true-thinking steps (which are genuinely used to produce the final output) and decorative-thinking steps (which only give the appearance of reasoning but have minimal causal impact). Notably, only a small subset of the total reasoning steps have a high TTS that causally drive the model's prediction: e.g., for the AIME dataset, only an average of 2.3% of reasoning steps in CoT have a TTS >= 0.7 (range: 0-1) under the Qwen-2.5 model. Furthermore, we identify a TrueThinking direction in the latent space of LLMs. By steering along or against this direction, we can force the model to perform or disregard certain CoT steps when computing the final result. Finally, we highlight that self-verification steps in CoT (i.e., aha moments) can also be decorative, where LLMs do not truly verify their solution. Steering along the TrueThinking direction can force internal reasoning over these steps, resulting in a change in the final results. Overall, our work reveals that LLMs often verbalize reasoning steps without actually performing them internally, which undermines both the efficiency of LLM reasoning and the trustworthiness of CoT.

This paper proposes a Disentangled gEnerative cAusal Representation (DEAR) learning method under appropriate supervised information. Unlike existing disentanglement methods that enforce independence of the latent variables, we consider the general case where the underlying factors of interests can be causally related. We show that previous methods with independent priors fail to disentangle causally related factors even under supervision. Motivated by this finding, we propose a new disentangled learning method called DEAR that enables causal controllable generation and causal representation learning. The key ingredient of this new formulation is to use a structural causal model (SCM) as the prior distribution for a bidirectional generative model. The prior is then trained jointly with a generator and an encoder using a suitable GAN algorithm incorporated with supervised information on the ground-truth factors and their underlying causal structure. We provide theoretical justification on the identifiability and asymptotic convergence of the proposed method. We conduct extensive experiments on both synthesized and real data sets to demonstrate the effectiveness of DEAR in causal controllable generation, and the benefits of the learned representations for downstream tasks in terms of sample efficiency and distributional robustness.

Causal reasoning is viewed as crucial for achieving human-level machine intelligence. Recent advances in language models have expanded the horizons of artificial intelligence across various domains, sparking inquiries into their potential for causal reasoning. In this work, we introduce Causal evaluation of Language Models (CaLM), which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first comprehensive benchmark for evaluating the causal reasoning capabilities of language models. First, we propose the CaLM framework, which establishes a foundational taxonomy consisting of four modules: causal target (i.e., what to evaluate), adaptation (i.e., how to obtain the results), metric (i.e., how to measure the results), and error (i.e., how to analyze the bad results). This taxonomy defines a broad evaluation design space while systematically selecting criteria and priorities. Second, we compose the CaLM dataset, comprising 126,334 data samples, to provide curated sets of causal targets, adaptations, metrics, and errors, offering extensive coverage for diverse research pursuits. Third, we conduct an extensive evaluation of 28 leading language models on a core set of 92 causal targets, 9 adaptations, 7 metrics, and 12 error types. Fourth, we perform detailed analyses of the evaluation results across various dimensions (e.g., adaptation, scale). Fifth, we present 50 high-level empirical findings across 9 dimensions (e.g., model), providing valuable guidance for future language model development. Finally, we develop a multifaceted platform, including a website, leaderboards, datasets, and toolkits, to support scalable and adaptable assessments. We envision CaLM as an ever-evolving benchmark for the community, systematically updated with new causal targets, adaptations, models, metrics, and error types to reflect ongoing research advancements. Project website is at https://opencausalab.github.io/CaLM.

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

The principle of independent causal mechanisms (ICM) states that generative processes of real world data consist of independent modules which do not influence or inform each other. While this idea has led to fruitful developments in the field of causal inference, it is not widely-known in the NLP community. In this work, we argue that the causal direction of the data collection process bears nontrivial implications that can explain a number of published NLP findings, such as differences in semi-supervised learning (SSL) and domain adaptation (DA) performance across different settings. We categorize common NLP tasks according to their causal direction and empirically assay the validity of the ICM principle for text data using minimum description length. We conduct an extensive meta-analysis of over 100 published SSL and 30 DA studies, and find that the results are consistent with our expectations based on causal insights. This work presents the first attempt to analyze the ICM principle in NLP, and provides constructive suggestions for future modeling choices. Code available at https://github.com/zhijing-jin/icm4nlp

Causal reasoning, the ability to identify cause-and-effect relationship, is crucial in human thinking. Although large language models (LLMs) succeed in many NLP tasks, it is still challenging for them to conduct complex causal reasoning like abductive reasoning and counterfactual reasoning. Given the fact that programming code may express causal relations more often and explicitly with conditional statements like ``if``, we want to explore whether Code-LLMs acquire better causal reasoning abilities. Our experiments show that compared to text-only LLMs, Code-LLMs with code prompts are significantly better in causal reasoning. We further intervene on the prompts from different aspects, and discover that the programming structure is crucial in code prompt design, while Code-LLMs are robust towards format perturbations.

Existing 3D scene generation methods often struggle to model the complex logical dependencies and physical constraints between objects, limiting their ability to adapt to dynamic and realistic environments. We propose CausalStruct, a novel framework that embeds causal reasoning into 3D scene generation. Utilizing large language models (LLMs), We construct causal graphs where nodes represent objects and attributes, while edges encode causal dependencies and physical constraints. CausalStruct iteratively refines the scene layout by enforcing causal order to determine the placement order of objects and applies causal intervention to adjust the spatial configuration according to physics-driven constraints, ensuring consistency with textual descriptions and real-world dynamics. The refined scene causal graph informs subsequent optimization steps, employing a Proportional-Integral-Derivative(PID) controller to iteratively tune object scales and positions. Our method uses text or images to guide object placement and layout in 3D scenes, with 3D Gaussian Splatting and Score Distillation Sampling improving shape accuracy and rendering stability. Extensive experiments show that CausalStruct generates 3D scenes with enhanced logical coherence, realistic spatial interactions, and robust adaptability.

Agents built on large language models (LLMs) have excelled in turn-by-turn human-AI collaboration but struggle with simultaneous tasks requiring real-time interaction. Latency issues and the challenge of inferring variable human strategies hinder their ability to make autonomous decisions without explicit instructions. Through experiments with current independent System 1 and System 2 methods, we validate the necessity of using Dual Process Theory (DPT) in real-time tasks. We propose DPT-Agent, a novel language agent framework that integrates System 1 and System 2 for efficient real-time simultaneous human-AI collaboration. DPT-Agent's System 1 uses a Finite-state Machine (FSM) and code-as-policy for fast, intuitive, and controllable decision-making. DPT-Agent's System 2 integrates Theory of Mind (ToM) and asynchronous reflection to infer human intentions and perform reasoning-based autonomous decisions. We demonstrate the effectiveness of DPT-Agent through further experiments with rule-based agents and human collaborators, showing significant improvements over mainstream LLM-based frameworks. To the best of our knowledge, DPT-Agent is the first language agent framework that achieves successful real-time simultaneous human-AI collaboration autonomously. Code of DPT-Agent can be found in https://github.com/sjtu-marl/DPT-Agent.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our everyday lives, understanding their ability to comprehend human mental states becomes critical for ensuring effective interactions. However, despite the recent attempts to assess the Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities of LLMs, the degree to which these models can align with human ToM remains a nuanced topic of exploration. This is primarily due to two distinct challenges: (1) the presence of inconsistent results from previous evaluations, and (2) concerns surrounding the validity of existing evaluation methodologies. To address these challenges, we present a novel framework for procedurally generating evaluations with LLMs by populating causal templates. Using our framework, we create a new social reasoning benchmark (BigToM) for LLMs which consists of 25 controls and 5,000 model-written evaluations. We find that human participants rate the quality of our benchmark higher than previous crowd-sourced evaluations and comparable to expert-written evaluations. Using BigToM, we evaluate the social reasoning capabilities of a variety of LLMs and compare model performances with human performance. Our results suggest that GPT4 has ToM capabilities that mirror human inference patterns, though less reliable, while other LLMs struggle.

This paper proposes a methodology for discovering meaningful properties in data by exploring the latent space of unsupervised deep generative models. We combine manipulation of individual latent variables to extreme values with methods inspired by causal inference into an approach we call causal disentanglement with extreme values (CDEV) and show that this method yields insights for model interpretability. With this, we can test for what properties of unknown data the model encodes as meaningful, using it to glean insight into the communication system of sperm whales (Physeter macrocephalus), one of the most intriguing and understudied animal communication systems. The network architecture used has been shown to learn meaningful representations of speech; here, it is used as a learning mechanism to decipher the properties of another vocal communication system in which case we have no ground truth. The proposed methodology suggests that sperm whales encode information using the number of clicks in a sequence, the regularity of their timing, and audio properties such as the spectral mean and the acoustic regularity of the sequences. Some of these findings are consistent with existing hypotheses, while others are proposed for the first time. We also argue that our models uncover rules that govern the structure of units in the communication system and apply them while generating innovative data not shown during training. This paper suggests that an interpretation of the outputs of deep neural networks with causal inference methodology can be a viable strategy for approaching data about which little is known and presents another case of how deep learning can limit the hypothesis space. Finally, the proposed approach can be extended to other architectures and datasets.

Interpretability research now offers a variety of techniques for identifying abstract internal mechanisms in neural networks. Can such techniques be used to predict how models will behave on out-of-distribution examples? In this work, we provide a positive answer to this question. Through a diverse set of language modeling tasks--including symbol manipulation, knowledge retrieval, and instruction following--we show that the most robust features for correctness prediction are those that play a distinctive causal role in the model's behavior. Specifically, we propose two methods that leverage causal mechanisms to predict the correctness of model outputs: counterfactual simulation (checking whether key causal variables are realized) and value probing (using the values of those variables to make predictions). Both achieve high AUC-ROC in distribution and outperform methods that rely on causal-agnostic features in out-of-distribution settings, where predicting model behaviors is more crucial. Our work thus highlights a novel and significant application for internal causal analysis of language models.

Multimodal emotion recognition in conversation (MERC) and multimodal emotion-cause pair extraction (MECPE) have recently garnered significant attention. Emotions are the expression of affect or feelings; responses to specific events, or situations -- known as emotion causes. Both collectively explain the causality between human emotion and intents. However, existing works treat emotion recognition and emotion cause extraction as two individual problems, ignoring their natural causality. In this paper, we propose a Unified Multimodal Emotion recognition and Emotion-Cause analysis framework (UniMEEC) to explore the causality between emotion and emotion cause. Concretely, UniMEEC reformulates the MERC and MECPE tasks as mask prediction problems and unifies them with a causal prompt template. To differentiate the modal effects, UniMEEC proposes a multimodal causal prompt to probe the pre-trained knowledge specified to modality and implements cross-task and cross-modality interactions under task-oriented settings. Experiment results on four public benchmark datasets verify the model performance on MERC and MECPE tasks and achieve consistent improvements compared with the previous state-of-the-art methods.

Causal discovery, i.e., inferring underlying cause-effect relationships from observations of a scene or system, is an inherent mechanism in human cognition, but has been shown to be highly challenging to automate. The majority of approaches in the literature aiming for this task consider constrained scenarios with fully observed variables or data from stationary time-series. In this work we aim for causal discovery in a more general class of scenarios, scenes with non-stationary behavior over time. For our purposes we here regard a scene as a composition objects interacting with each other over time. Non-stationarity is modeled as stationarity conditioned on an underlying variable, a state, which can be of varying dimension, more or less hidden given observations of the scene, and also depend more or less directly on these observations. We propose a probabilistic deep learning approach called State-Dependent Causal Inference (SDCI) for causal discovery in such conditionally stationary time-series data. Results in two different synthetic scenarios show that this method is able to recover the underlying causal dependencies with high accuracy even in cases with hidden states.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have generated considerable interest and debate regarding their potential emergence of Theory of Mind (ToM). Several recent inquiries reveal a lack of robust ToM in these models and pose a pressing demand to develop new benchmarks, as current ones primarily focus on different aspects of ToM and are prone to shortcuts and data leakage. In this position paper, we seek to answer two road-blocking questions: (1) How can we taxonomize a holistic landscape of machine ToM? (2) What is a more effective evaluation protocol for machine ToM? Following psychological studies, we taxonomize machine ToM into 7 mental state categories and delineate existing benchmarks to identify under-explored aspects of ToM. We argue for a holistic and situated evaluation of ToM to break ToM into individual components and treat LLMs as an agent who is physically situated in environments and socially situated in interactions with humans. Such situated evaluation provides a more comprehensive assessment of mental states and potentially mitigates the risk of shortcuts and data leakage. We further present a pilot study in a grid world setup as a proof of concept. We hope this position paper can facilitate future research to integrate ToM with LLMs and offer an intuitive means for researchers to better position their work in the landscape of ToM. Project page: https://github.com/Mars-tin/awesome-theory-of-mind

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to perform better when asked to reason step-by-step before answering a question. However, it is unclear to what degree the model's final answer is faithful to the stated reasoning steps. In this paper, we perform a causal mediation analysis on twelve LLMs to examine how intermediate reasoning steps generated by the LLM influence the final outcome and find that LLMs do not reliably use their intermediate reasoning steps when generating an answer. To address this issue, we introduce FRODO, a framework to tailor small-sized LMs to generate correct reasoning steps and robustly reason over these steps. FRODO consists of an inference module that learns to generate correct reasoning steps using an implicit causal reward function and a reasoning module that learns to faithfully reason over these intermediate inferences using a counterfactual and causal preference objective. Our experiments show that FRODO significantly outperforms four competitive baselines. Furthermore, FRODO improves the robustness and generalization ability of the reasoning LM, yielding higher performance on out-of-distribution test sets. Finally, we find that FRODO's rationales are more faithful to its final answer predictions than standard supervised fine-tuning.

In view of the problem that each subchain in the chain-of-model (CoM) relies only on the information of the previous subchain and may lose long-range dependencies due to the causal mask blocking the global context flow between multi-level subchains, this work proposes a graph of causal evolution (GoCE). Its core principle is to map the implicit token representation into a differentiable and sparse causal adjacency matrix, then permeate causal constraints through each layer of calculation using causal-masked attention and causal-MoE. By combining intervention consistency loss test and self-evolution gate, the dynamic balance between causal structure learning and adaptive updating of transformer architecture is realized. The researcher built experimental environments in sandboxes built with Claude Sonnet 4, o4-mini-high, and DeepSeek R1 respectively with the transformer variant architecture introduced in GoCE. It is evaluated on publicly available datasets including CLUTRR, CLADDER, EX-FEVER, and CausalQA and compared with the baseline LLMs. The finding proves that GoCE strengthens the transformer's ability to capture long-range causal dependencies, while the ability to self-evolve is improved. It not only surpasses the design of CoM in terms of design principles, but also provides experience for future research on causal learning and continuous adaptive improvement.

Explainability methods for NLP systems encounter a version of the fundamental problem of causal inference: for a given ground-truth input text, we never truly observe the counterfactual texts necessary for isolating the causal effects of model representations on outputs. In response, many explainability methods make no use of counterfactual texts, assuming they will be unavailable. In this paper, we show that robust causal explainability methods can be created using approximate counterfactuals, which can be written by humans to approximate a specific counterfactual or simply sampled using metadata-guided heuristics. The core of our proposal is the Causal Proxy Model (CPM). A CPM explains a black-box model N because it is trained to have the same actual input/output behavior as N while creating neural representations that can be intervened upon to simulate the counterfactual input/output behavior of N. Furthermore, we show that the best CPM for N performs comparably to N in making factual predictions, which means that the CPM can simply replace N, leading to more explainable deployed models. Our code is available at https://github.com/frankaging/Causal-Proxy-Model.

Understanding commonsense causality is a unique mark of intelligence for humans. It helps people understand the principles of the real world better and benefits the decision-making process related to causation. For instance, commonsense causality is crucial in judging whether a defendant's action causes the plaintiff's loss in determining legal liability. Despite its significance, a systematic exploration of this topic is notably lacking. Our comprehensive survey bridges this gap by focusing on taxonomies, benchmarks, acquisition methods, qualitative reasoning, and quantitative measurements in commonsense causality, synthesizing insights from over 200 representative articles. Our work aims to provide a systematic overview, update scholars on recent advancements, provide a pragmatic guide for beginners, and highlight promising future research directions in this vital field.

While interpretability research has shed light on some internal algorithms utilized by transformer-based LLMs, reasoning in natural language, with its deep contextuality and ambiguity, defies easy categorization. As a result, formulating clear and motivating questions for circuit analysis that rely on well-defined in-domain and out-of-domain examples required for causal interventions is challenging. Although significant work has investigated circuits for specific tasks, such as indirect object identification (IOI), deciphering natural language reasoning through circuits remains difficult due to its inherent complexity. In this work, we take initial steps to characterize causal reasoning in LLMs by analyzing clear-cut cause-and-effect sentences like "I opened an umbrella because it started raining," where causal interventions may be possible through carefully crafted scenarios using GPT-2 small. Our findings indicate that causal syntax is localized within the first 2-3 layers, while certain heads in later layers exhibit heightened sensitivity to nonsensical variations of causal sentences. This suggests that models may infer reasoning by (1) detecting syntactic cues and (2) isolating distinct heads in the final layers that focus on semantic relationships.

In this paper, we explore the ability to model and infer personality types of opponents, predict their responses, and use this information to adapt a dialog agent's high-level strategy in negotiation tasks. Inspired by the idea of incorporating a theory of mind (ToM) into machines, we introduce a probabilistic formulation to encapsulate the opponent's personality type during both learning and inference. We test our approach on the CraigslistBargain dataset and show that our method using ToM inference achieves a 20% higher dialog agreement rate compared to baselines on a mixed population of opponents. We also find that our model displays diverse negotiation behavior with different types of opponents.

Understanding and manipulating the causal generation mechanisms in language models is essential for controlling their behavior. Previous work has primarily relied on techniques such as representation surgery -- e.g., model ablations or manipulation of linear subspaces tied to specific concepts -- to intervene on these models. To understand the impact of interventions precisely, it is useful to examine counterfactuals -- e.g., how a given sentence would have appeared had it been generated by the model following a specific intervention. We highlight that counterfactual reasoning is conceptually distinct from interventions, as articulated in Pearl's causal hierarchy. Based on this observation, we propose a framework for generating true string counterfactuals by reformulating language models as Generalized Structural-equation. Models using the Gumbel-max trick. This allows us to model the joint distribution over original strings and their counterfactuals resulting from the same instantiation of the sampling noise. We develop an algorithm based on hindsight Gumbel sampling that allows us to infer the latent noise variables and generate counterfactuals of observed strings. Our experiments demonstrate that the approach produces meaningful counterfactuals while at the same time showing that commonly used intervention techniques have considerable undesired side effects.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) spend substantial test-time compute on long chain-of-thought (CoT) traces, but what *characterizes* an effective CoT remains unclear. While prior work reports gains from lengthening CoTs and increasing review (revisiting earlier steps) via appended *wait* tokens, recent studies suggest that shorter thinking can outperform longer traces. We therefore conduct a systematic evaluation across ten LRMs on math and scientific reasoning. Contrary to the "longer-is-better" narrative, we find that both naive CoT lengthening and increased review are associated with *lower* accuracy. As CoT unfolds step by step, token-level metrics can conflate verbosity with process quality. We introduce a graph view of CoT to extract structure and identify a single statistic-the *Failed-Step Fraction (FSF)*, the fraction of steps in abandoned branches-that consistently outpredicts length and review ratio for correctness across models. To probe causality, we design two interventions. First, we rank candidate CoTs by each metric at test time, where FSF yields the largest pass@1 gains; second, we edit CoTs to remove failed branches, which significantly improves accuracy, indicating that failed branches bias subsequent reasoning. Taken together, these results characterize effective CoTs as those that *fail less* and support *structure-aware* test-time scaling over indiscriminately generating long CoT.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

From the invention of writing and the printing press, to television and social media, human history is punctuated by major innovations in communication technology, which fundamentally altered how ideas spread and reshaped our culture. Recent chatbots powered by generative artificial intelligence constitute a novel medium that encodes cultural patterns in their neural representations and disseminates them in conversations with hundreds of millions of people. Understanding whether these patterns transmit into human language, and ultimately shape human culture, is a fundamental question. While fully quantifying the causal impact of a chatbot like ChatGPT on human culture is very challenging, lexicographic shift in human spoken communication may offer an early indicator of such broad phenomenon. Here, we apply econometric causal inference techniques to 740,249 hours of human discourse from 360,445 YouTube academic talks and 771,591 conversational podcast episodes across multiple disciplines. We detect a measurable and abrupt increase in the use of words preferentially generated by ChatGPT, such as delve, comprehend, boast, swift, and meticulous, after its release. These findings suggest a scenario where machines, originally trained on human data and subsequently exhibiting their own cultural traits, can, in turn, measurably reshape human culture. This marks the beginning of a closed cultural feedback loop in which cultural traits circulate bidirectionally between humans and machines. Our results motivate further research into the evolution of human-machine culture, and raise concerns over the erosion of linguistic and cultural diversity, and the risks of scalable manipulation.

Causal inference is a critical task across fields such as healthcare, economics, and the social sciences. While recent advances in machine learning, especially those based on the deep-learning architectures, have shown potential in estimating causal effects, existing approaches often fall short in handling complex causal structures and lack adaptability across various causal scenarios. In this paper, we present a novel transformer-based method for causal inference that overcomes these challenges. The core innovation of our model lies in its integration of causal Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) directly into the attention mechanism, enabling it to accurately model the underlying causal structure. This allows for flexible estimation of both average treatment effects (ATE) and conditional average treatment effects (CATE). Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate that our approach surpasses existing methods in estimating causal effects across a wide range of scenarios. The flexibility and robustness of our model make it a valuable tool for researchers and practitioners tackling complex causal inference problems.

We have recently witnessed a number of impressive results on hard mathematical reasoning problems with language models. At the same time, the robustness of these models has also been called into question; recent works have shown that models can rely on shallow patterns in the problem description when generating a solution. Building on the idea of behavioral testing, we propose a novel framework, which pins down the causal effect of various factors in the input, e.g., the surface form of the problem text, the operands, and math operators on the output solution. By grounding the behavioral analysis in a causal graph describing an intuitive reasoning process, we study the behavior of language models in terms of robustness and sensitivity to direct interventions in the input space. We apply our framework on a test bed of math word problems. Our analysis shows that robustness does not appear to continuously improve as a function of size, but the GPT-3 Davinci models (175B) achieve a dramatic improvement in both robustness and sensitivity compared to all other GPT variants.

Counterfactual reasoning is widely recognized as one of the most challenging and intricate aspects of causality in artificial intelligence. In this paper, we evaluate the performance of large language models (LLMs) in counterfactual reasoning. In contrast to previous studies that primarily focus on commonsense causal reasoning, where LLMs often rely on prior knowledge for inference, we specifically assess their ability to perform counterfactual inference using a set of formal rules. To support this evaluation, we introduce a new benchmark dataset, CounterBench, comprising 1K counterfactual reasoning questions. The dataset is designed with varying levels of difficulty, diverse causal graph structures, distinct types of counterfactual questions, and multiple nonsensical name variants. Our experiments demonstrate that counterfactual reasoning poses a significant challenge for LLMs, with most models performing at levels comparable to random guessing. To enhance LLM's counterfactual reasoning ability, we propose a novel reasoning paradigm, CoIn, which guides LLMs through iterative reasoning and backtracking to systematically explore counterfactual solutions. Experimental results show that our method significantly improves LLM performance on counterfactual reasoning tasks and consistently enhances performance across different LLMs.Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/CounterBench/CounterBench.

Prior image-text matching methods have shown remarkable performance on many benchmark datasets, but most of them overlook the bias in the dataset, which exists in intra-modal and inter-modal, and tend to learn the spurious correlations that extremely degrade the generalization ability of the model. Furthermore, these methods often incorporate biased external knowledge from large-scale datasets as prior knowledge into image-text matching model, which is inevitable to force model further learn biased associations. To address above limitations, this paper firstly utilizes Structural Causal Models (SCMs) to illustrate how intra- and inter-modal confounders damage the image-text matching. Then, we employ backdoor adjustment to propose an innovative Deconfounded Causal Inference Network (DCIN) for image-text matching task. DCIN (1) decomposes the intra- and inter-modal confounders and incorporates them into the encoding stage of visual and textual features, effectively eliminating the spurious correlations during image-text matching, and (2) uses causal inference to mitigate biases of external knowledge. Consequently, the model can learn causality instead of spurious correlations caused by dataset bias. Extensive experiments on two well-known benchmark datasets, i.e., Flickr30K and MSCOCO, demonstrate the superiority of our proposed method.

Understanding the characteristics of public attention and sentiment is an essential prerequisite for appropriate crisis management during adverse health events. This is even more crucial during a pandemic such as COVID-19, as primary responsibility of risk management is not centralized to a single institution, but distributed across society. While numerous studies utilize Twitter data in descriptive or predictive context during COVID-19 pandemic, causal modeling of public attention has not been investigated. In this study, we propose a causal inference approach to discover and quantify causal relationships between pandemic characteristics (e.g. number of infections and deaths) and Twitter activity as well as public sentiment. Our results show that the proposed method can successfully capture the epidemiological domain knowledge and identify variables that affect public attention and sentiment. We believe our work contributes to the field of infodemiology by distinguishing events that correlate with public attention from events that cause public attention.

As large language models evolve, there is growing anticipation that they will emulate human-like Theory of Mind (ToM) to assist with routine tasks. However, existing methods for evaluating machine ToM focus primarily on unimodal models and largely treat these models as black boxes, lacking an interpretative exploration of their internal mechanisms. In response, this study adopts an approach based on internal mechanisms to provide an interpretability-driven assessment of ToM in multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Specifically, we first construct a multimodal ToM test dataset, GridToM, which incorporates diverse belief testing tasks and perceptual information from multiple perspectives. Next, our analysis shows that attention heads in multimodal large models can distinguish cognitive information across perspectives, providing evidence of ToM capabilities. Furthermore, we present a lightweight, training-free approach that significantly enhances the model's exhibited ToM by adjusting in the direction of the attention head.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning often fails to faithfully reflect a language model's underlying decision process. We address this by making CoT text causally essential in a "Markovian" language model, factoring next-token prediction through an intermediate CoT and training it to predict future tokens independently of the original prompt. We formalize this via an "informativeness" objective that quantifies how much a trained CoT improves next-token predictions over a baseline. Using policy gradient, we show that Llama 3.1 8B achieves a 33.2% absolute accuracy improvement on GSM8K. Perturbation tests confirm stronger reliance on the CoT, while cross-model transfers indicate these reasoning traces generalize across interpreters. Our approach enhances both accuracy and interpretability, potentially extending CoT reasoning to arbitrarily long contexts and diverse tasks.

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.

In egocentric scenarios, anticipating both the next action and its visual outcome is essential for understanding human-object interactions and for enabling robotic planning. However, existing paradigms fall short of jointly modeling these aspects. Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models focus on action prediction but lack explicit modeling of how actions influence the visual scene, while video prediction models generate future frames without conditioning on specific actions, often resulting in implausible or contextually inconsistent outcomes. To bridge this gap, we propose a unified two-stage predictive framework that jointly models action and visual future in egocentric scenarios, conditioned on hand trajectories. In the first stage, we perform consecutive state modeling to process heterogeneous inputs (visual observations, language, and action history) and explicitly predict future hand trajectories. In the second stage, we introduce causal cross-attention to fuse multi-modal cues, leveraging inferred action signals to guide an image-based Latent Diffusion Model (LDM) for frame-by-frame future video generation. Our approach is the first unified model designed to handle both egocentric human activity understanding and robotic manipulation tasks, providing explicit predictions of both upcoming actions and their visual consequences. Extensive experiments on Ego4D, BridgeData, and RLBench demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art baselines in both action prediction and future video synthesis.

New developments are enabling AI systems to perceive, recognize, and respond with social cues based on inferences made from humans' explicit or implicit behavioral and verbal cues. These AI systems, equipped with an equivalent of human's Theory of Mind (ToM) capability, are currently serving as matchmakers on dating platforms, assisting student learning as teaching assistants, and enhancing productivity as work partners. They mark a new era in human-AI interaction (HAI) that diverges from traditional human-computer interaction (HCI), where computers are commonly seen as tools instead of social actors. Designing and understanding the human perceptions and experiences in this emerging HAI era becomes an urgent and critical issue for AI systems to fulfill human needs and mitigate risks across social contexts. In this paper, we posit the Mutual Theory of Mind (MToM) framework, inspired by our capability of ToM in human-human communications, to guide this new generation of HAI research by highlighting the iterative and mutual shaping nature of human-AI communication. We discuss the motivation of the MToM framework and its three key components that iteratively shape the human-AI communication in three stages. We then describe two empirical studies inspired by the MToM framework to demonstrate the power of MToM in guiding the design and understanding of human-AI communication. Finally, we discuss future research opportunities in human-AI interaction through the lens of MToM.

Large multimodal models exhibit remarkable intelligence, yet their embodied cognitive abilities during motion in open-ended urban 3D space remain to be explored. We introduce a benchmark to evaluate whether video-large language models (Video-LLMs) can naturally process continuous first-person visual observations like humans, enabling recall, perception, reasoning, and navigation. We have manually control drones to collect 3D embodied motion video data from real-world cities and simulated environments, resulting in 1.5k video clips. Then we design a pipeline to generate 5.2k multiple-choice questions. Evaluations of 17 widely-used Video-LLMs reveal current limitations in urban embodied cognition. Correlation analysis provides insight into the relationships between different tasks, showing that causal reasoning has a strong correlation with recall, perception, and navigation, while the abilities for counterfactual and associative reasoning exhibit lower correlation with other tasks. We also validate the potential for Sim-to-Real transfer in urban embodiment through fine-tuning.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Understanding causality should be a core requirement of any attempt to build real impact through AI. Due to the inherent unobservability of counterfactuals, large randomised trials (RCTs) are the standard for causal inference. But large experiments are generically expensive, and randomisation carries its own costs, e.g. when suboptimal decisions are trialed. Recent work has proposed more sample-efficient alternatives to RCTs, but these are not adaptable to the downstream application for which the causal effect is sought. In this work, we develop a task-specific approach to experimental design and derive sampling strategies customised to particular downstream applications. Across a range of important tasks, real-world datasets, and sample sizes, our method outperforms other benchmarks, e.g. requiring an order-of-magnitude less data to match RCT performance on targeted marketing tasks.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has significantly enhanced large language models (LLMs) in knowledge-intensive tasks by incorporating external knowledge retrieval. However, existing RAG frameworks primarily rely on semantic similarity and correlation-driven retrieval, limiting their ability to distinguish true causal relationships from spurious associations. This results in responses that may be factually grounded but fail to establish cause-and-effect mechanisms, leading to incomplete or misleading insights. To address this issue, we introduce Causal Dynamic Feedback for Adaptive Retrieval-Augmented Generation (CDF-RAG), a framework designed to improve causal consistency, factual accuracy, and explainability in generative reasoning. CDF-RAG iteratively refines queries, retrieves structured causal graphs, and enables multi-hop causal reasoning across interconnected knowledge sources. Additionally, it validates responses against causal pathways, ensuring logically coherent and factually grounded outputs. We evaluate CDF-RAG on four diverse datasets, demonstrating its ability to improve response accuracy and causal correctness over existing RAG-based methods. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/ elakhatibi/CDF-RAG.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive accomplishments in both reasoning and planning, their abilities in multi-agent collaborations remains largely unexplored. This study evaluates LLM-based agents in a multi-agent cooperative text game with Theory of Mind (ToM) inference tasks, comparing their performance with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) and planning-based baselines. We observed evidence of emergent collaborative behaviors and high-order Theory of Mind capabilities among LLM-based agents. Our results reveal limitations in LLM-based agents' planning optimization due to systematic failures in managing long-horizon contexts and hallucination about the task state. We explore the use of explicit belief state representations to mitigate these issues, finding that it enhances task performance and the accuracy of ToM inferences for LLM-based agents.

Understanding how language supports emotion inference remains a topic of debate in emotion science. The present study investigated whether language-derived emotion-concept knowledge would causally support emotion inference by manipulating the language-specific knowledge representations in large language models. Using the prompt technique, 14 attributes of emotion concepts were found to be represented by distinct artificial neuron populations. By manipulating these attribute-related neurons, the majority of the emotion inference tasks showed performance deterioration compared to random manipulations. The attribute-specific performance deterioration was related to the importance of different attributes in human mental space. Our findings provide causal evidence in support of a language-based mechanism for emotion inference and highlight the contributions of emotion-concept knowledge.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

Despite recent advances in video understanding, the capabilities of Large Video Language Models (LVLMs) to perform video-based causal reasoning remains underexplored, largely due to the absence of relevant and dedicated benchmarks for evaluating causal reasoning in visually grounded and goal-driven settings. To fill this gap, we introduce a novel benchmark named Video-based long-form Causal Reasoning (VCRBench). We create VCRBench using procedural videos of simple everyday activities, where the steps are deliberately shuffled with each clip capturing a key causal event, to test whether LVLMs can identify, reason about, and correctly sequence the events needed to accomplish a specific goal. Moreover, the benchmark is carefully designed to prevent LVLMs from exploiting linguistic shortcuts, as seen in multiple-choice or binary QA formats, while also avoiding the challenges associated with evaluating open-ended QA. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art LVLMs on VCRBench suggests that these models struggle with video-based long-form causal reasoning, primarily due to their difficulty in modeling long-range causal dependencies directly from visual observations. As a simple step toward enabling such capabilities, we propose Recognition-Reasoning Decomposition (RRD), a modular approach that breaks video-based causal reasoning into two sub-tasks of video recognition and causal reasoning. Our experiments on VCRBench show that RRD significantly boosts accuracy on VCRBench, with gains of up to 25.2%. Finally, our thorough analysis reveals interesting insights, for instance, that LVLMs primarily rely on language knowledge for complex video-based long-form causal reasoning tasks.

Humans develop an understanding of intuitive physics through active interaction with the world. This approach is in stark contrast to current video models, such as Sora, which rely on passive observation and therefore struggle with grasping physical causality. This observation leads to our central hypothesis: authentic physical intuition of the world model must be grounded in extensive, causally rich interactions with the real world. To test this hypothesis, we present WoW, a 14-billion-parameter generative world model trained on 2 million robot interaction trajectories. Our findings reveal that the model's understanding of physics is a probabilistic distribution of plausible outcomes, leading to stochastic instabilities and physical hallucinations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this emergent capability can be actively constrained toward physical realism by SOPHIA, where vision-language model agents evaluate the DiT-generated output and guide its refinement by iteratively evolving the language instructions. In addition, a co-trained Inverse Dynamics Model translates these refined plans into executable robotic actions, thus closing the imagination-to-action loop. We establish WoWBench, a new benchmark focused on physical consistency and causal reasoning in video, where WoW achieves state-of-the-art performance in both human and autonomous evaluation, demonstrating strong ability in physical causality, collision dynamics, and object permanence. Our work provides systematic evidence that large-scale, real-world interaction is a cornerstone for developing physical intuition in AI. Models, data, and benchmarks will be open-sourced.

Causal transformer language models (LMs), such as GPT-3, typically require some form of positional encoding, such as positional embeddings. However, we show that LMs without any explicit positional encoding are still competitive with standard models, and that this phenomenon is robust across different datasets, model sizes, and sequence lengths. Probing experiments reveal that such models acquire an implicit notion of absolute positions throughout the network, effectively compensating for the missing information. We conjecture that causal attention enables the model to infer the number of predecessors that each token can attend to, thereby approximating its absolute position. Our findings indicate that causal LMs might derive positional awareness not only from the explicit positioning mechanism, but also from the effects of the causal mask.

Image captioning, which generates natural language descriptions of the visual information in an image, is a crucial task in vision-language research. Previous models have typically addressed this task by aligning the generative capabilities of machines with human intelligence through statistical fitting of existing datasets. While effective for normal images, they may struggle to accurately describe those where certain parts of the image are obscured or edited, unlike humans who excel in such cases. These weaknesses they exhibit, including hallucinations and limited interpretability, often hinder performance in scenarios with shifted association patterns. In this paper, we present a generic image captioning framework that employs causal inference to make existing models more capable of interventional tasks, and counterfactually explainable. Our approach includes two variants leveraging either total effect or natural direct effect. Integrating them into the training process enables models to handle counterfactual scenarios, increasing their generalizability. Extensive experiments on various datasets show that our method effectively reduces hallucinations and improves the model's faithfulness to images, demonstrating high portability across both small-scale and large-scale image-to-text models. The code is available at https://github.com/Aman-4-Real/See-or-Guess.

Understanding objects is a central building block of artificial intelligence, especially for embodied AI. Even though object recognition excels with deep learning, current machines still struggle to learn higher-level knowledge, e.g., what attributes an object has, and what can we do with an object. In this work, we propose a challenging Object Concept Learning (OCL) task to push the envelope of object understanding. It requires machines to reason out object affordances and simultaneously give the reason: what attributes make an object possesses these affordances. To support OCL, we build a densely annotated knowledge base including extensive labels for three levels of object concept (category, attribute, affordance), and the causal relations of three levels. By analyzing the causal structure of OCL, we present a baseline, Object Concept Reasoning Network (OCRN). It leverages causal intervention and concept instantiation to infer the three levels following their causal relations. In experiments, OCRN effectively infers the object knowledge while following the causalities well. Our data and code are available at https://mvig-rhos.com/ocl.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.