Daily Papers

Modern large language models rely on chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to achieve impressive performance, yet the same mechanism can amplify deceptive alignment, situations in which a model appears aligned while covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Existing safety pipelines treat deception as a black-box output to be filtered post-hoc, leaving the model free to scheme during its internal reasoning. We ask: Can deception be intercepted while the model is thinking? We answer this question, the first framework that embeds a Self-Monitor inside the CoT process itself, named CoT Monitor+. During generation, the model produces (i) ordinary reasoning steps and (ii) an internal self-evaluation signal trained to flag and suppress misaligned strategies. The signal is used as an auxiliary reward in reinforcement learning, creating a feedback loop that rewards honest reasoning and discourages hidden goals. To study deceptive alignment systematically, we introduce DeceptionBench, a five-category benchmark that probes covert alignment-faking, sycophancy, etc. We evaluate various LLMs and show that unrestricted CoT roughly aggravates the deceptive tendency. In contrast, CoT Monitor+ cuts deceptive behaviors by 43.8% on average while preserving task accuracy. Further, when the self-monitor signal replaces an external weak judge in RL fine-tuning, models exhibit substantially fewer obfuscated thoughts and retain transparency. Our project website can be found at cot-monitor-plus.github.io

The safety and alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) are critical for their responsible deployment. Current evaluation methods predominantly focus on identifying and preventing overtly harmful outputs. However, they often fail to address a more insidious failure mode: models that produce benign-appearing outputs while operating on malicious or deceptive internal reasoning. This vulnerability, often triggered by sophisticated system prompt injections, allows models to bypass conventional safety filters, posing a significant, underexplored risk. To address this gap, we introduce the Deceptive Reasoning Exposure Suite (D-REX), a novel dataset designed to evaluate the discrepancy between a model's internal reasoning process and its final output. D-REX was constructed through a competitive red-teaming exercise where participants crafted adversarial system prompts to induce such deceptive behaviors. Each sample in D-REX contains the adversarial system prompt, an end-user's test query, the model's seemingly innocuous response, and, crucially, the model's internal chain-of-thought, which reveals the underlying malicious intent. Our benchmark facilitates a new, essential evaluation task: the detection of deceptive alignment. We demonstrate that D-REX presents a significant challenge for existing models and safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for new techniques that scrutinize the internal processes of LLMs, not just their final outputs.

The autonomous AI agents using large language models can create undeniable values in all span of the society but they face security threats from adversaries that warrants immediate protective solutions because trust and safety issues arise. Considering the many-shot jailbreaking and deceptive alignment as some of the main advanced attacks, that cannot be mitigated by the static guardrails used during the supervised training, points out a crucial research priority for real world robustness. The combination of static guardrails in dynamic multi-agent system fails to defend against those attacks. We intend to enhance security for LLM-based agents through the development of new evaluation frameworks which identify and counter threats for safe operational deployment. Our work uses three examination methods to detect rogue agents through a Reverse Turing Test and analyze deceptive alignment through multi-agent simulations and develops an anti-jailbreaking system by testing it with GEMINI 1.5 pro and llama-3.3-70B, deepseek r1 models using tool-mediated adversarial scenarios. The detection capabilities are strong such as 94\% accuracy for GEMINI 1.5 pro yet the system suffers persistent vulnerabilities when under long attacks as prompt length increases attack success rates (ASR) and diversity metrics become ineffective in prediction while revealing multiple complex system faults. The findings demonstrate the necessity of adopting flexible security systems based on active monitoring that can be performed by the agents themselves together with adaptable interventions by system admin as the current models can create vulnerabilities that can lead to the unreliable and vulnerable system. So, in our work, we try to address such situations and propose a comprehensive framework to counteract the security issues.

Reinforcement learning (RL) plays a crucial role in shaping the behavior of large language and reasoning models (LLMs/LRMs). However, it often produces brittle and unstable policies, leading to critical failures such as spurious reasoning, deceptive alignment, and instruction disobedience that undermine the trustworthiness and safety of LLMs/LRMs. Currently, these issues lack a unified theoretical explanation and are typically addressed using ad-hoc heuristics. This paper presents a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing the stability of the mapping from a reward function to the optimal policy. We show that policy brittleness often stems from non-unique optimal actions, a common occurrence when multiple valid traces exist in a reasoning task. This theoretical lens provides a unified explanation for a range of seemingly disparate failures, reframing them as rational outcomes of optimizing rewards that may be incomplete or noisy, especially in the presence of action degeneracy. We extend this analysis from the fundamental single-reward setting to the more realistic multi-reward RL across diverse domains, showing how stability is governed by an "effective reward" aggregation mechanism. We also prove that entropy regularization restores policy stability at the cost of increased stochasticity. Our framework provides a unified explanation for recent empirical findings on deceptive reasoning, instruction-following trade-offs, and RLHF-induced sophistry, and is further validated through perturbation experiments in multi-reward RL. This work advances policy-stability analysis from empirical heuristics towards a principled theory, offering essential insights for designing safer and more trustworthy AI systems.

Large neural models are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, raising concerns about whether their behavior reliably aligns with human values. Interpretability provides a route to internal transparency by revealing the computations that drive outputs. We argue that interpretability especially mechanistic approaches should be treated as a design principle for alignment, not an auxiliary diagnostic tool. Post-hoc methods such as LIME or SHAP offer intuitive but correlational explanations, while mechanistic techniques like circuit tracing or activation patching yield causal insight into internal failures, including deceptive or misaligned reasoning that behavioral methods like RLHF, red teaming, or Constitutional AI may overlook. Despite these advantages, interpretability faces challenges of scalability, epistemic uncertainty, and mismatches between learned representations and human concepts. Our position is that progress on safe and trustworthy AI will depend on making interpretability a first-class objective of AI research and development, ensuring that systems are not only effective but also auditable, transparent, and aligned with human intent.

For artificial intelligence to be beneficial to humans the behaviour of AI agents needs to be aligned with what humans want. In this paper we discuss some behavioural issues for language agents, arising from accidental misspecification by the system designer. We highlight some ways that misspecification can occur and discuss some behavioural issues that could arise from misspecification, including deceptive or manipulative language, and review some approaches for avoiding these issues.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) to accurately detect hallucinations remains a significant challenge due to the sophisticated nature of hallucinated text. Recognizing that hallucinated samples typically exhibit higher deceptive quality than traditional negative samples, we use these carefully engineered hallucinations as negative examples in the DPO alignment procedure. Our method incorporates a curriculum learning strategy, gradually transitioning the training from easier samples, identified based on the greatest reduction in probability scores from independent fact checking models, to progressively harder ones. This structured difficulty scaling ensures stable and incremental learning. Experimental evaluation demonstrates that our HaluCheck models, trained with curriculum DPO approach and high quality negative samples, significantly improves model performance across various metrics, achieving improvements of upto 24% on difficult benchmarks like MedHallu and HaluEval. Additionally, HaluCheck models demonstrate robustness in zero-shot settings, significantly outperforming larger state-of-the-art models across various benchmarks.

Previous research has shown that LLMs finetuned on malicious or incorrect completions within narrow domains (e.g., insecure code or incorrect medical advice) can become broadly misaligned to exhibit harmful behaviors, which is called emergent misalignment. In this work, we investigate whether this phenomenon can extend beyond safety behaviors to a broader spectrum of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios (e.g., lying under pressure and deceptive behavior). To explore this, we finetune open-sourced LLMs on misaligned completions across diverse domains. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs show broadly misaligned behavior in dishonesty. Additionally, we further explore this phenomenon in a downstream combined finetuning setting, and find that introducing as little as 1% of misalignment data into a standard downstream task is sufficient to decrease honest behavior over 20%. Furthermore, we consider a more practical human-AI interaction environment where we simulate both benign and biased users to interact with the assistant LLM. Notably, we find that the assistant can be misaligned unintentionally to exacerbate its dishonesty with only 10% biased user population. In summary, we extend the study of emergent misalignment to the domain of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios, and demonstrate that this risk arises not only through direct finetuning, but also in downstream mixture tasks and practical human-AI interactions.

Sophisticated instrumentation for AI systems might have indicators that signal misalignment from human values, not unlike a "check engine" light in cars. One such indicator of misalignment is deceptiveness in generated responses. Future AI instrumentation may have the ability to detect when an LLM generates deceptive responses while reasoning about seemingly plausible but incorrect answers to factual questions. In this work, we demonstrate that linear probes on LLMs internal activations can detect deception in their responses with extremely high accuracy. Our probes reach a maximum of greater than 90% accuracy in distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive arguments generated by llama and qwen models ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, including their DeepSeek-r1 finetuned variants. We observe that probes on smaller models (1.5B) achieve chance accuracy at detecting deception, while larger models (greater than 7B) reach 70-80%, with their reasoning counterparts exceeding 90%. The layer-wise probe accuracy follows a three-stage pattern across layers: near-random (50%) in early layers, peaking in middle layers, and slightly declining in later layers. Furthermore, using an iterative null space projection approach, we find multitudes of linear directions that encode deception, ranging from 20 in Qwen 3B to nearly 100 in DeepSeek 7B and Qwen 14B models.

Like a criminal under investigation, Large Language Models (LLMs) might pretend to be aligned while evaluated and misbehave when they have a good opportunity. Can current interpretability methods catch these 'alignment fakers?' To answer this question, we introduce a benchmark that consists of 324 pairs of LLMs fine-tuned to select actions in role-play scenarios. One model in each pair is consistently benign (aligned). The other model misbehaves in scenarios where it is unlikely to be caught (alignment faking). The task is to identify the alignment faking model using only inputs where the two models behave identically. We test five detection strategies, one of which identifies 98% of alignment-fakers.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding: it asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

AI alignment aims to make AI systems behave in line with human intentions and values. As AI systems grow more capable, so do risks from misalignment. To provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the alignment field, in this survey, we delve into the core concepts, methodology, and practice of alignment. First, we identify four principles as the key objectives of AI alignment: Robustness, Interpretability, Controllability, and Ethicality (RICE). Guided by these four principles, we outline the landscape of current alignment research and decompose them into two key components: forward alignment and backward alignment. The former aims to make AI systems aligned via alignment training, while the latter aims to gain evidence about the systems' alignment and govern them appropriately to avoid exacerbating misalignment risks. On forward alignment, we discuss techniques for learning from feedback and learning under distribution shift. On backward alignment, we discuss assurance techniques and governance practices. We also release and continually update the website (www.alignmentsurvey.com) which features tutorials, collections of papers, blog posts, and other resources.

In AI alignment, extensive latitude must be granted to annotators, either human or algorithmic, to judge which model outputs are `better' or `safer.' We refer to this latitude as alignment discretion. Such discretion remains largely unexamined, posing two risks: (i) annotators may use their power of discretion arbitrarily, and (ii) models may fail to mimic this discretion. To study this phenomenon, we draw on legal concepts of discretion that structure how decision-making authority is conferred and exercised, particularly in cases where principles conflict or their application is unclear or irrelevant. Extended to AI alignment, discretion is required when alignment principles and rules are (inevitably) conflicting or indecisive. We present a set of metrics to systematically analyze when and how discretion in AI alignment is exercised, such that both risks (i) and (ii) can be observed. Moreover, we distinguish between human and algorithmic discretion and analyze the discrepancy between them. By measuring both human and algorithmic discretion over safety alignment datasets, we reveal layers of discretion in the alignment process that were previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, we demonstrate how algorithms trained on these datasets develop their own forms of discretion in interpreting and applying these principles, which challenges the purpose of having any principles at all. Our paper presents the first step towards formalizing this core gap in current alignment processes, and we call on the community to further scrutinize and control alignment discretion.

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

Precise alignment in Text-to-Image (T2I) systems is crucial to ensure that generated visuals not only accurately encapsulate user intents but also conform to stringent ethical and aesthetic benchmarks. Incidents like the Google Gemini fiasco, where misaligned outputs triggered significant public backlash, underscore the critical need for robust alignment mechanisms. In contrast, Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved notable success in alignment. Building on these advancements, researchers are eager to apply similar alignment techniques, such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), to T2I systems to enhance image generation fidelity and reliability. We present YinYangAlign, an advanced benchmarking framework that systematically quantifies the alignment fidelity of T2I systems, addressing six fundamental and inherently contradictory design objectives. Each pair represents fundamental tensions in image generation, such as balancing adherence to user prompts with creative modifications or maintaining diversity alongside visual coherence. YinYangAlign includes detailed axiom datasets featuring human prompts, aligned (chosen) responses, misaligned (rejected) AI-generated outputs, and explanations of the underlying contradictions.

Alignment faking in large language models presented a demonstration of Claude 3 Opus and Claude 3.5 Sonnet selectively complying with a helpful-only training objective to prevent modification of their behavior outside of training. We expand this analysis to 25 models and find that only 5 (Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Llama 3 405B, Grok 3, Gemini 2.0 Flash) comply with harmful queries more when they infer they are in training than when they infer they are in deployment. First, we study the motivations of these 5 models. Results from perturbing details of the scenario suggest that only Claude 3 Opus's compliance gap is primarily and consistently motivated by trying to keep its goals. Second, we investigate why many chat models don't fake alignment. Our results suggest this is not entirely due to a lack of capabilities: many base models fake alignment some of the time, and post-training eliminates alignment-faking for some models and amplifies it for others. We investigate 5 hypotheses for how post-training may suppress alignment faking and find that variations in refusal behavior may account for a significant portion of differences in alignment faking.

Multi-modal foundation models combining vision and language models such as Flamingo or GPT-4 have recently gained enormous interest. Alignment of foundation models is used to prevent models from providing toxic or harmful output. While malicious users have successfully tried to jailbreak foundation models, an equally important question is if honest users could be harmed by malicious third-party content. In this paper we show that imperceivable attacks on images in order to change the caption output of a multi-modal foundation model can be used by malicious content providers to harm honest users e.g. by guiding them to malicious websites or broadcast fake information. This indicates that countermeasures to adversarial attacks should be used by any deployed multi-modal foundation model.

Deception is the intentional practice of twisting information. It is a nuanced societal practice deeply intertwined with human societal evolution, characterized by a multitude of facets. This research explores the problem of deception through the lens of psychology, employing a framework that categorizes deception into three forms: lies of omission, lies of commission, and lies of influence. The primary focus of this study is specifically on investigating only lies of omission. We propose a novel framework for deception detection leveraging NLP techniques. We curated an annotated dataset of 876,784 samples by amalgamating a popular large-scale fake news dataset and scraped news headlines from the Twitter handle of Times of India, a well-known Indian news media house. Each sample has been labeled with four layers, namely: (i) the type of omission (speculation, bias, distortion, sounds factual, and opinion), (ii) colors of lies(black, white, etc), and (iii) the intention of such lies (to influence, etc) (iv) topic of lies (political, educational, religious, etc). We present a novel multi-task learning pipeline that leverages the dataless merging of fine-tuned language models to address the deception detection task mentioned earlier. Our proposed model achieved an F1 score of 0.87, demonstrating strong performance across all layers including the type, color, intent, and topic aspects of deceptive content. Finally, our research explores the relationship between lies of omission and propaganda techniques. To accomplish this, we conducted an in-depth analysis, uncovering compelling findings. For instance, our analysis revealed a significant correlation between loaded language and opinion, shedding light on their interconnectedness. To encourage further research in this field, we will be making the models and dataset available with the MIT License, making it favorable for open-source research.

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.

Deep Research (DR) agents built on Large Language Models (LLMs) can perform complex, multi-step research by decomposing tasks, retrieving online information, and synthesizing detailed reports. However, the misuse of LLMs with such powerful capabilities can lead to even greater risks. This is especially concerning in high-stakes and knowledge-intensive domains such as biosecurity, where DR can generate a professional report containing detailed forbidden knowledge. Unfortunately, we have found such risks in practice: simply submitting a harmful query, which a standalone LLM directly rejects, can elicit a detailed and dangerous report from DR agents. This highlights the elevated risks and underscores the need for a deeper safety analysis. Yet, jailbreak methods designed for LLMs fall short in exposing such unique risks, as they do not target the research ability of DR agents. To address this gap, we propose two novel jailbreak strategies: Plan Injection, which injects malicious sub-goals into the agent's plan; and Intent Hijack, which reframes harmful queries as academic research questions. We conducted extensive experiments across different LLMs and various safety benchmarks, including general and biosecurity forbidden prompts. These experiments reveal 3 key findings: (1) Alignment of the LLMs often fail in DR agents, where harmful prompts framed in academic terms can hijack agent intent; (2) Multi-step planning and execution weaken the alignment, revealing systemic vulnerabilities that prompt-level safeguards cannot address; (3) DR agents not only bypass refusals but also produce more coherent, professional, and dangerous content, compared with standalone LLMs. These results demonstrate a fundamental misalignment in DR agents and call for better alignment techniques tailored to DR agents. Code and datasets are available at https://chenxshuo.github.io/deeper-harm.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Recent research has made significant strides in applying alignment techniques to enhance the helpfulness and harmlessness of large language models (LLMs) in accordance with human intentions. In this paper, we argue for the importance of alignment for honesty, ensuring that LLMs proactively refuse to answer questions when they lack knowledge, while still not being overly conservative. However, a pivotal aspect of alignment for honesty involves discerning the limits of an LLM's knowledge, which is far from straightforward. This challenge demands comprehensive solutions in terms of metric development, benchmark creation, and training methodologies. In this paper, we address these challenges by first establishing a precise problem definition and defining ``honesty'' inspired by the Analects of Confucius. This serves as a cornerstone for developing metrics that effectively measure an LLM's honesty by quantifying its progress post-alignment. Furthermore, we introduce a flexible training framework which is further instantiated by several efficient fine-tuning techniques that emphasize honesty without sacrificing performance on other tasks. Our extensive experiments reveal that these aligned models show a marked increase in honesty, as indicated by our proposed metrics. We open-source a wealth of resources to facilitate future research at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/alignment-for-honesty, including honesty-aligned models, training and evaluation datasets for honesty alignment, concept glossary, as well as all relevant source code.

The guiding principle of AI alignment is to train large language models (LLMs) to be harmless, helpful, and honest (HHH). At the same time, there are mounting concerns that LLMs exhibit a left-wing political bias. Yet, the commitment to AI alignment cannot be harmonized with the latter critique. In this article, I argue that intelligent systems that are trained to be harmless and honest must necessarily exhibit left-wing political bias. Normative assumptions underlying alignment objectives inherently concur with progressive moral frameworks and left-wing principles, emphasizing harm avoidance, inclusivity, fairness, and empirical truthfulness. Conversely, right-wing ideologies often conflict with alignment guidelines. Yet, research on political bias in LLMs is consistently framing its insights about left-leaning tendencies as a risk, as problematic, or concerning. This way, researchers are actively arguing against AI alignment, tacitly fostering the violation of HHH principles.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated revolutionary capabilities in understanding complex contexts and performing a wide range of tasks. However, LLMs can also answer questions that are unethical or harmful, raising concerns about their applications. To regulate LLMs' responses to such questions, a training strategy called alignment can help. Yet, alignment can be unexpectedly compromised when fine-tuning an LLM for downstream tasks. This paper focuses on recovering the alignment lost during fine-tuning. We observe that there are two distinct directions inherent in an aligned LLM: the aligned direction and the harmful direction. An LLM is inclined to answer questions in the aligned direction while refusing queries in the harmful direction. Therefore, we propose to recover the harmful direction of the fine-tuned model that has been compromised. Specifically, we restore a small subset of the fine-tuned model's weight parameters from the original aligned model using gradient descent. We also introduce a rollback mechanism to avoid aggressive recovery and maintain downstream task performance. Our evaluation on 125 fine-tuned LLMs demonstrates that our method can reduce their harmful rate (percentage of answering harmful questions) from 33.25\% to 1.74\%, without sacrificing task performance much. In contrast, the existing methods either only reduce the harmful rate to a limited extent or significantly impact the normal functionality. Our code is available at https://github.com/kangyangWHU/LLMAlignment

In coming years or decades, artificial general intelligence (AGI) may surpass human capabilities at many critical tasks. We argue that, without substantial effort to prevent it, AGIs could learn to pursue goals that are in conflict (i.e. misaligned) with human interests. If trained like today's most capable models, AGIs could learn to act deceptively to receive higher reward, learn misaligned internally-represented goals which generalize beyond their fine-tuning distributions, and pursue those goals using power-seeking strategies. We review emerging evidence for these properties. AGIs with these properties would be difficult to align and may appear aligned even when they are not. Finally, we briefly outline how the deployment of misaligned AGIs might irreversibly undermine human control over the world, and we review research directions aimed at preventing this outcome.

Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts at alignment. In this work, we study to what extent these models remain aligned, even when interacting with an adversarial user who constructs worst-case inputs (adversarial examples). These inputs are designed to cause the model to emit harmful content that would otherwise be prohibited. We show that existing NLP-based optimization attacks are insufficiently powerful to reliably attack aligned text models: even when current NLP-based attacks fail, we can find adversarial inputs with brute force. As a result, the failure of current attacks should not be seen as proof that aligned text models remain aligned under adversarial inputs. However the recent trend in large-scale ML models is multimodal models that allow users to provide images that influence the text that is generated. We show these models can be easily attacked, i.e., induced to perform arbitrary un-aligned behavior through adversarial perturbation of the input image. We conjecture that improved NLP attacks may demonstrate this same level of adversarial control over text-only models.

Recent developments in Large Language Models (LLMs) have manifested significant advancements. To facilitate safeguards against malicious exploitation, a body of research has concentrated on aligning LLMs with human preferences and inhibiting their generation of inappropriate content. Unfortunately, such alignments are often vulnerable: fine-tuning with a minimal amount of harmful data can easily unalign the target LLM. While being effective, such fine-tuning-based unalignment approaches also have their own limitations: (1) non-stealthiness, after fine-tuning, safety audits or red-teaming can easily expose the potential weaknesses of the unaligned models, thereby precluding their release/use. (2) non-persistence, the unaligned LLMs can be easily repaired through re-alignment, i.e., fine-tuning again with aligned data points. In this work, we show that it is possible to conduct stealthy and persistent unalignment on large language models via backdoor injections. We also provide a novel understanding on the relationship between the backdoor persistence and the activation pattern and further provide guidelines for potential trigger design. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our proposed stealthy and persistent unalignment can successfully pass the safety evaluation while maintaining strong persistence against re-alignment defense.

Recent years have witnessed remarkable progress made in large language models (LLMs). Such advancements, while garnering significant attention, have concurrently elicited various concerns. The potential of these models is undeniably vast; however, they may yield texts that are imprecise, misleading, or even detrimental. Consequently, it becomes paramount to employ alignment techniques to ensure these models to exhibit behaviors consistent with human values. This survey endeavors to furnish an extensive exploration of alignment methodologies designed for LLMs, in conjunction with the extant capability research in this domain. Adopting the lens of AI alignment, we categorize the prevailing methods and emergent proposals for the alignment of LLMs into outer and inner alignment. We also probe into salient issues including the models' interpretability, and potential vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. To assess LLM alignment, we present a wide variety of benchmarks and evaluation methodologies. After discussing the state of alignment research for LLMs, we finally cast a vision toward the future, contemplating the promising avenues of research that lie ahead. Our aspiration for this survey extends beyond merely spurring research interests in this realm. We also envision bridging the gap between the AI alignment research community and the researchers engrossed in the capability exploration of LLMs for both capable and safe LLMs.

Misalignment between model predictions and intended usage can be detrimental for the deployment of computer vision models. The issue is exacerbated when the task involves complex structured outputs, as it becomes harder to design procedures which address this misalignment. In natural language processing, this is often addressed using reinforcement learning techniques that align models with a task reward. We adopt this approach and show its surprising effectiveness across multiple computer vision tasks, such as object detection, panoptic segmentation, colorization and image captioning. We believe this approach has the potential to be widely useful for better aligning models with a diverse range of computer vision tasks.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human intentions has become a critical task for safely deploying models in real-world systems. While existing alignment approaches have seen empirical success, theoretically understanding how these methods affect model behavior remains an open question. Our work provides an initial attempt to theoretically analyze the learning dynamics of human preference alignment. We formally show how the distribution of preference datasets influences the rate of model updates and provide rigorous guarantees on the training accuracy. Our theory also reveals an intricate phenomenon where the optimization is prone to prioritizing certain behaviors with higher preference distinguishability. We empirically validate our findings on contemporary LLMs and alignment tasks, reinforcing our theoretical insights and shedding light on considerations for future alignment approaches. Disclaimer: This paper contains potentially offensive text; reader discretion is advised.

While astonishingly capable, large Language Models (LLM) can sometimes produce outputs that deviate from human expectations. Such deviations necessitate an alignment phase to prevent disseminating untruthful, toxic, or biased information. Traditional alignment methods based on reinforcement learning often struggle with the identified instability, whereas preference optimization methods are limited by their overfitting to pre-collected hard-label datasets. In this paper, we propose a novel LLM alignment framework named iREPO, which utilizes implicit Reward pairwise difference regression for Empirical Preference Optimization. Particularly, iREPO employs self-generated datasets labelled by empirical human (or AI annotator) preference to iteratively refine the aligned policy through a novel regression-based loss function. Furthermore, we introduce an innovative algorithm backed by theoretical guarantees for achieving optimal results under ideal assumptions and providing a practical performance-gap result without such assumptions. Experimental results with Phi-2 and Mistral-7B demonstrate that iREPO effectively achieves self-alignment using soft-label, self-generated responses and the logit of empirical AI annotators. Furthermore, our approach surpasses preference optimization baselines in evaluations using the Language Model Evaluation Harness and Multi-turn benchmarks.

Large language models are aligned to be safe, preventing users from generating harmful content like misinformation or instructions for illegal activities. However, previous work has shown that the alignment process is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Adversaries can manipulate the safety training data to inject backdoors that act like a universal sudo command: adding the backdoor string to any prompt enables harmful responses from models that, otherwise, behave safely. Our competition, co-located at IEEE SaTML 2024, challenged participants to find universal backdoors in several large language models. This report summarizes the key findings and promising ideas for future research.

Previous works on Large Language Models (LLMs) have mainly focused on evaluating their helpfulness or harmlessness. However, honesty, another crucial alignment criterion, has received relatively less attention. Dishonest behaviors in LLMs, such as spreading misinformation and defrauding users, eroding user trust, and causing real-world harm, present severe risks that intensify as these models approach superintelligence levels. Enhancing honesty in LLMs addresses critical deficiencies and helps uncover latent capabilities that are not readily expressed. This underscores the urgent need for reliable methods and benchmarks to effectively ensure and evaluate the honesty of LLMs. In this paper, we introduce BeHonest, a pioneering benchmark specifically designed to assess honesty in LLMs comprehensively. BeHonest evaluates three essential aspects of honesty: awareness of knowledge boundaries, avoidance of deceit, and consistency in responses. Building on this foundation, we designed 10 scenarios to evaluate and analyze 9 popular LLMs on the market, including both closed-source and open-source models from different model families with varied model sizes. Our findings indicate that there is still significant room for improvement in the honesty of LLMs. We also encourage the AI community to prioritize honesty alignment in LLMs. Our benchmark and code can be found at: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/BeHonest.

Deceptive patterns in digital interfaces manipulate users into making unintended decisions, exploiting cognitive biases and psychological vulnerabilities. These patterns have become ubiquitous on various digital platforms. While efforts to mitigate deceptive patterns have emerged from legal and technical perspectives, a significant gap remains in creating usable and scalable solutions. We introduce our AutoBot framework to address this gap and help web stakeholders navigate and mitigate online deceptive patterns. AutoBot accurately identifies and localizes deceptive patterns from a screenshot of a website without relying on the underlying HTML code. AutoBot employs a two-stage pipeline that leverages the capabilities of specialized vision models to analyze website screenshots, identify interactive elements, and extract textual features. Next, using a large language model, AutoBot understands the context surrounding these elements to determine the presence of deceptive patterns. We also use AutoBot, to create a synthetic dataset to distill knowledge from 'teacher' LLMs to smaller language models. Through extensive evaluation, we demonstrate AutoBot's effectiveness in detecting deceptive patterns on the web, achieving an F1-score of 0.93 when detecting deceptive patterns, underscoring its potential as an essential tool for mitigating online deceptive patterns. We implement AutoBot, across three downstream applications targeting different web stakeholders: (1) a local browser extension providing users with real-time feedback, (2) a Lighthouse audit to inform developers of potential deceptive patterns on their sites, and (3) as a measurement tool designed for researchers and regulators.

Existing perceptual similarity metrics assume an image and its reference are well aligned. As a result, these metrics are often sensitive to a small alignment error that is imperceptible to the human eyes. This paper studies the effect of small misalignment, specifically a small shift between the input and reference image, on existing metrics, and accordingly develops a shift-tolerant similarity metric. This paper builds upon LPIPS, a widely used learned perceptual similarity metric, and explores architectural design considerations to make it robust against imperceptible misalignment. Specifically, we study a wide spectrum of neural network elements, such as anti-aliasing filtering, pooling, striding, padding, and skip connection, and discuss their roles in making a robust metric. Based on our studies, we develop a new deep neural network-based perceptual similarity metric. Our experiments show that our metric is tolerant to imperceptible shifts while being consistent with the human similarity judgment.

From the perspective of content safety issues, alignment has shown to limit large language models' (LLMs) harmful content generation. This intentional method of reinforcing models to not respond to certain user inputs seem to be present in many modern open-source instruction tuning datasets such as OpenAssistant or Guanaco. We introduce a novel insight to an instruction-tuned model's performance affected by the presence of alignment in supervised fine-tuning dataset. To be specific, we noticed that alignment acts as if it is poisoning the instruction dataset. Experimentally, we demonstrate that aligned answers significantly worsen the performance of the resulting fine-tuned model's on various reasoning benchmarks such as Big Bench (BBH), Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU), Human Eval, and Discrete Reasoning Over Paragraphs (DROP), performing worse than the counterpart tuned without alignment by 4-33%.

Large Language Models (LLMs) need to be aligned with human expectations to ensure their safety and utility in most applications. Alignment is challenging, costly, and needs to be repeated for every LLM and alignment criterion. We propose to decouple LLMs and alignment by training aligner models that can be used to align any LLM for a given criteria on an as-needed basis, thus also reducing the potential negative impacts of alignment on performance. Our recipe for training the aligner models solely relies on synthetic data generated with a (prompted) LLM and can be easily adjusted for a variety of alignment criteria. We illustrate our method by training an "ethical" aligner and verify its efficacy empirically.

We demonstrate how AI agents can coordinate to deceive oversight systems using automated interpretability of neural networks. Using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) as our experimental framework, we show that language models (Llama, DeepSeek R1, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet) can generate deceptive explanations that evade detection. Our agents employ steganographic methods to hide information in seemingly innocent explanations, successfully fooling oversight models while achieving explanation quality comparable to reference labels. We further find that models can scheme to develop deceptive strategies when they believe the detection of harmful features might lead to negative consequences for themselves. All tested LLM agents were capable of deceiving the overseer while achieving high interpretability scores comparable to those of reference labels. We conclude by proposing mitigation strategies, emphasizing the critical need for robust understanding and defenses against deception.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

We demonstrate a situation in which Large Language Models, trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, can display misaligned behavior and strategically deceive their users about this behavior without being instructed to do so. Concretely, we deploy GPT-4 as an agent in a realistic, simulated environment, where it assumes the role of an autonomous stock trading agent. Within this environment, the model obtains an insider tip about a lucrative stock trade and acts upon it despite knowing that insider trading is disapproved of by company management. When reporting to its manager, the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trading decision. We perform a brief investigation of how this behavior varies under changes to the setting, such as removing model access to a reasoning scratchpad, attempting to prevent the misaligned behavior by changing system instructions, changing the amount of pressure the model is under, varying the perceived risk of getting caught, and making other simple changes to the environment. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of Large Language Models trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, strategically deceiving their users in a realistic situation without direct instructions or training for deception.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Alignment in artificial intelligence pursues the consistency between model responses and human preferences as well as values. In practice, the multifaceted nature of human preferences inadvertently introduces what is known as the "alignment tax" -a compromise where enhancements in alignment within one objective (e.g.,harmlessness) can diminish performance in others (e.g.,helpfulness). However, existing alignment techniques are mostly unidirectional, leading to suboptimal trade-offs and poor flexibility over various objectives. To navigate this challenge, we argue the prominence of grounding LLMs with evident preferences. We introduce controllable preference optimization (CPO), which explicitly specifies preference scores for different objectives, thereby guiding the model to generate responses that meet the requirements. Our experimental analysis reveals that the aligned models can provide responses that match various preferences among the "3H" (helpfulness, honesty, harmlessness) desiderata. Furthermore, by introducing diverse data and alignment goals, we surpass baseline methods in aligning with single objectives, hence mitigating the impact of the alignment tax and achieving improvements in multi-objective alignment.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

This paper argues that a range of current AI systems have learned how to deceive humans. We define deception as the systematic inducement of false beliefs in the pursuit of some outcome other than the truth. We first survey empirical examples of AI deception, discussing both special-use AI systems (including Meta's CICERO) built for specific competitive situations, and general-purpose AI systems (such as large language models). Next, we detail several risks from AI deception, such as fraud, election tampering, and losing control of AI systems. Finally, we outline several potential solutions to the problems posed by AI deception: first, regulatory frameworks should subject AI systems that are capable of deception to robust risk-assessment requirements; second, policymakers should implement bot-or-not laws; and finally, policymakers should prioritize the funding of relevant research, including tools to detect AI deception and to make AI systems less deceptive. Policymakers, researchers, and the broader public should work proactively to prevent AI deception from destabilizing the shared foundations of our society.

A key concern with the concept of "alignment" is the implicit question of "alignment to what?". AI systems are increasingly used across the world, yet safety alignment is often focused on homogeneous monolingual settings. Additionally, preference training and safety measures often overfit to harms common in Western-centric datasets. Here, we explore the viability of different alignment approaches when balancing dual objectives: addressing and optimizing for a non-homogeneous set of languages and cultural preferences while minimizing both global and local harms. We collect the first set of human annotated red-teaming prompts in different languages distinguishing between global and local harm, which serve as a laboratory for understanding the reliability of alignment techniques when faced with preference distributions that are non-stationary across geographies and languages. While this setting is seldom covered by the literature to date, which primarily centers on English harm mitigation, it captures real-world interactions with AI systems around the world. We establish a new precedent for state-of-the-art alignment techniques across 6 languages with minimal degradation in general performance. Our work provides important insights into cross-lingual transfer and novel optimization approaches to safeguard AI systems designed to serve global populations.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants are increasingly used for aligning language models with human preferences. Although these methods are designed to teach a model to generate preferred responses more frequently relative to dispreferred responses, prior work has observed that the likelihood of preferred responses often decreases during training. The current work sheds light on the causes and implications of this counter-intuitive phenomenon, which we term likelihood displacement. We demonstrate that likelihood displacement can be catastrophic, shifting probability mass from preferred responses to responses with an opposite meaning. As a simple example, training a model to prefer No over Never can sharply increase the probability of Yes. Moreover, when aligning the model to refuse unsafe prompts, we show that such displacement can unintentionally lead to unalignment, by shifting probability mass from preferred refusal responses to harmful responses (e.g., reducing the refusal rate of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 74.4% to 33.4%). We theoretically characterize that likelihood displacement is driven by preferences that induce similar embeddings, as measured by a centered hidden embedding similarity (CHES) score. Empirically, the CHES score enables identifying which training samples contribute most to likelihood displacement in a given dataset. Filtering out these samples effectively mitigated unintentional unalignment in our experiments. More broadly, our results highlight the importance of curating data with sufficiently distinct preferences, for which we believe the CHES score may prove valuable.

Big models, exemplified by Large Language Models (LLMs), are models typically pre-trained on massive data and comprised of enormous parameters, which not only obtain significantly improved performance across diverse tasks but also present emergent capabilities absent in smaller models. However, the growing intertwining of big models with everyday human lives poses potential risks and might cause serious social harm. Therefore, many efforts have been made to align LLMs with humans to make them better follow user instructions and satisfy human preferences. Nevertheless, `what to align with' has not been fully discussed, and inappropriate alignment goals might even backfire. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive survey of different alignment goals in existing work and trace their evolution paths to help identify the most essential goal. Particularly, we investigate related works from two perspectives: the definition of alignment goals and alignment evaluation. Our analysis encompasses three distinct levels of alignment goals and reveals a goal transformation from fundamental abilities to value orientation, indicating the potential of intrinsic human values as the alignment goal for enhanced LLMs. Based on such results, we further discuss the challenges of achieving such intrinsic value alignment and provide a collection of available resources for future research on the alignment of big models.

With the rise of large language models (LLMs), ensuring they embody the principles of being helpful, honest, and harmless (3H), known as Human Alignment, becomes crucial. While existing alignment methods like RLHF, DPO, etc., effectively fine-tune LLMs to match preferences in the preference dataset, they often lead LLMs to highly receptive human input and external evidence, even when this information is poisoned. This leads to a tendency for LLMs to be Adaptive Chameleons when external evidence conflicts with their parametric memory. This exacerbates the risk of LLM being attacked by external poisoned data, which poses a significant security risk to LLM system applications such as Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). To address the challenge, we propose a novel framework: Dialectical Alignment (DA), which (1) utilizes AI feedback to identify optimal strategies for LLMs to navigate inter-context conflicts and context-memory conflicts with different external evidence in context window (i.e., different ratios of poisoned factual contexts); (2) constructs the SFT dataset as well as the preference dataset based on the AI feedback and strategies above; (3) uses the above datasets for LLM alignment to defense poisoned context attack while preserving the effectiveness of in-context knowledge editing. Our experiments show that the dialectical alignment model improves poisoned data attack defense by 20 and does not require any additional prompt engineering or prior declaration of ``you may be attacked`` to the LLMs' context window.

While existing image-text alignment models reach high quality binary assessments, they fall short of pinpointing the exact source of misalignment. In this paper, we present a method to provide detailed textual and visual explanation of detected misalignments between text-image pairs. We leverage large language models and visual grounding models to automatically construct a training set that holds plausible misaligned captions for a given image and corresponding textual explanations and visual indicators. We also publish a new human curated test set comprising ground-truth textual and visual misalignment annotations. Empirical results show that fine-tuning vision language models on our training set enables them to articulate misalignments and visually indicate them within images, outperforming strong baselines both on the binary alignment classification and the explanation generation tasks. Our method code and human curated test set are available at: https://mismatch-quest.github.io/

Honesty alignment-the ability of large language models (LLMs) to recognize their knowledge boundaries and express calibrated confidence-is essential for trustworthy deployment. Existing methods either rely on training-free confidence estimation (e.g., token probabilities, self-consistency) or training-based calibration with correctness annotations. While effective, achieving universal honesty alignment with training-based calibration requires costly, large-scale labeling. To support annotation-efficient training, we introduce Elicitation-Then-Calibration (EliCal), a two-stage framework that first elicits internal confidence using inexpensive self-consistency supervision, then calibrates this confidence with a small set of correctness annotations. To support a large-scale study, we release HonestyBench, a benchmark covering ten free-form QA datasets with 560k training and 70k evaluation instances annotated with correctness and self-consistency signals. Experiments show that EliCal achieves near-optimal alignment with only 1k correctness annotations (0.18% of full supervision) and better alignment performance on unseen MMLU tasks than the calibration-only baseline, offering a scalable solution toward universal honesty alignment in LLMs.

Alignment is no longer a luxury, it is a necessity. As large language models (LLMs) enter high-stakes domains like education, healthcare, governance, and law, their behavior must reliably reflect human-aligned values and safety constraints. Yet current evaluations rely heavily on behavioral proxies such as refusal rates, G-Eval scores, and toxicity classifiers, all of which have critical blind spots. Aligned models are often vulnerable to jailbreaking, stochasticity of generation, and alignment faking. To address this issue, we introduce the Alignment Quality Index (AQI). This novel geometric and prompt-invariant metric empirically assesses LLM alignment by analyzing the separation of safe and unsafe activations in latent space. By combining measures such as the Davies-Bouldin Score (DBS), Dunn Index (DI), Xie-Beni Index (XBI), and Calinski-Harabasz Index (CHI) across various formulations, AQI captures clustering quality to detect hidden misalignments and jailbreak risks, even when outputs appear compliant. AQI also serves as an early warning signal for alignment faking, offering a robust, decoding invariant tool for behavior agnostic safety auditing. Additionally, we propose the LITMUS dataset to facilitate robust evaluation under these challenging conditions. Empirical tests on LITMUS across different models trained under DPO, GRPO, and RLHF conditions demonstrate AQI's correlation with external judges and ability to reveal vulnerabilities missed by refusal metrics. We make our implementation publicly available to foster future research in this area.

Understanding how language models generalize behaviors from their training to a broader deployment distribution is an important problem in AI safety. Betley et al. discovered that fine-tuning GPT-4o on intentionally insecure code causes "emergent misalignment," where models give stereotypically malicious responses to unrelated prompts. We extend this work, demonstrating emergent misalignment across diverse conditions, including reinforcement learning on reasoning models, fine-tuning on various synthetic datasets, and in models without safety training. To investigate the mechanisms behind this generalized misalignment, we apply a "model diffing" approach using sparse autoencoders to compare internal model representations before and after fine-tuning. This approach reveals several "misaligned persona" features in activation space, including a toxic persona feature which most strongly controls emergent misalignment and can be used to predict whether a model will exhibit such behavior. Additionally, we investigate mitigation strategies, discovering that fine-tuning an emergently misaligned model on just a few hundred benign samples efficiently restores alignment.

Advancements in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a diverse range of applications. These models excel in generating text completions that are contextually coherent and cover an extensive array of subjects. However, the vast datasets required for their training make aligning response styles during the pretraining and instruction tuning phases challenging. Consequently, an additional alignment phase is typically employed, wherein the model is further trained with human preference data to better align its outputs with human expectations. While this process doesn't introduce new capabilities per se, it does accentuate generation styles innate to the model. This paper explores the utilization of counterfactual prompting within the framework of Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to align the model's style without relying on human intervention. We demonstrate that this method effectively instils desirable behaviour, mitigates undesirable ones, and encourages the model to disregard inappropriate instructions. Our findings suggest that counterfactual prompting with DPO presents a low-resource way to fine-tune LLMs to meet the demands for responsible and ethically aligned AI systems.

The advance of smartphones and cellular networks boosts the need of mobile advertising and targeted marketing. However, it also triggers the unseen security threats. We found that the phone scams with fake calling numbers of very short lifetime are increasingly popular and have been used to trick the users. The harm is worldwide. On the other hand, deceptive advertising (deceptive ads), the fake ads that tricks users to install unnecessary apps via either alluring or daunting texts and pictures, is an emerging threat that seriously harms the reputation of the advertiser. To counter against these two new threats, the conventional blacklist (or whitelist) approach and the machine learning approach with predefined features have been proven useless. Nevertheless, due to the success of deep learning in developing the highly intelligent program, our system can efficiently and effectively detect phone scams and deceptive ads by taking advantage of our unified framework on deep neural network (DNN) and convolutional neural network (CNN). The proposed system has been deployed for operational use and the experimental results proved the effectiveness of our proposed system. Furthermore, we keep our research results and release experiment material on http://DeceptiveAds.TWMAN.ORG and http://PhoneScams.TWMAN.ORG if there is any update.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Alignment is a standard procedure to fine-tune pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to follow natural language instructions and serve as helpful AI assistants. We have observed, however, that the conventional alignment process fails to enhance the factual accuracy of LLMs, and often leads to the generation of more false facts (i.e. hallucination). In this paper, we study how to make the LLM alignment process more factual, by first identifying factors that lead to hallucination in both alignment steps:\ supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL). In particular, we find that training the LLM on new knowledge or unfamiliar texts can encourage hallucination. This makes SFT less factual as it trains on human labeled data that may be novel to the LLM. Furthermore, reward functions used in standard RL can also encourage hallucination, because it guides the LLM to provide more helpful responses on a diverse set of instructions, often preferring longer and more detailed responses. Based on these observations, we propose factuality-aware alignment, comprised of factuality-aware SFT and factuality-aware RL through direct preference optimization. Experiments show that our proposed factuality-aware alignment guides LLMs to output more factual responses while maintaining instruction-following capability.

Despite significant research efforts, deep neural networks are still vulnerable to biases: this raises concerns about their fairness and limits their generalization. In this paper, we propose a bias-agnostic approach to mitigate the impact of bias in deep neural networks. Unlike traditional debiasing approaches, we rely on a metric to quantify ``bias alignment/misalignment'' on target classes, and use this information to discourage the propagation of bias-target alignment information through the network. We conduct experiments on several commonly used datasets for debiasing and compare our method to supervised and bias-specific approaches. Our results indicate that the proposed method achieves comparable performance to state-of-the-art supervised approaches, although it is bias-agnostic, even in presence of multiple biases in the same sample.

Evaluating explanations of image classifiers regarding ground truth, e.g. segmentation masks defined by human perception, primarily evaluates the quality of the models under consideration rather than the explanation methods themselves. Driven by this observation, we propose a framework for jointly evaluating the robustness of safety-critical systems that combine a deep neural network with an explanation method. These are increasingly used in real-world applications like medical image analysis or robotics. We introduce a fine-tuning procedure to (mis)align modelx2013explanation pipelines with ground truth and use it to quantify the potential discrepancy between worst and best-case scenarios of human alignment. Experiments across various model architectures and post-hoc local interpretation methods provide insights into the robustness of vision transformers and the overall vulnerability of such AI systems to potential adversarial attacks.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

The growing awareness of safety concerns in large language models (LLMs) has sparked considerable interest in the evaluation of safety within current research endeavors. This study investigates an interesting issue pertaining to the evaluation of LLMs, namely the substantial discrepancy in performance between multiple-choice questions and open-ended questions. Inspired by research on jailbreak attack patterns, we argue this is caused by mismatched generalization. That is, the LLM does not have a comprehensive understanding of the complex concept of safety. Instead, it only remembers what to answer for open-ended safety questions, which makes it unable to solve other forms of safety tests. We refer to this phenomenon as fake alignment and construct a comparative benchmark to empirically verify its existence in LLMs. Such fake alignment renders previous evaluation protocols unreliable. To address this, we introduce the Fake alIgNment Evaluation (FINE) framework and two novel metrics--Consistency Score (CS) and Consistent Safety Score (CSS), which jointly assess two complementary forms of evaluation to quantify fake alignment and obtain corrected performance estimates. Applying FINE to 14 widely-used LLMs reveals several models with purported safety are poorly aligned in practice. Our work highlights potential limitations in prevailing alignment methodologies.

While alignment algorithms are now commonly used to tune pre-trained language models towards a user's preferences, we lack explanations for the underlying mechanisms in which models become ``aligned'', thus making it difficult to explain phenomena like jailbreaks. In this work we study a popular algorithm, direct preference optimization (DPO), and the mechanisms by which it reduces toxicity. Namely, we first study how toxicity is represented and elicited in a pre-trained language model, GPT2-medium. We then apply DPO with a carefully crafted pairwise dataset to reduce toxicity. We examine how the resulting model averts toxic outputs, and find that capabilities learned from pre-training are not removed, but rather bypassed. We use this insight to demonstrate a simple method to un-align the model, reverting it back to its toxic behavior.

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

Recently Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved considerable advancements in vision-language tasks, yet produce potentially harmful or untrustworthy content. Despite substantial work investigating the trustworthiness of language models, MMLMs' capability to act honestly, especially when faced with visually unanswerable questions, remains largely underexplored. This work presents the first systematic assessment of honesty behaviors across various MLLMs. We ground honesty in models' response behaviors to unanswerable visual questions, define four representative types of such questions, and construct MoHoBench, a large-scale MMLM honest benchmark, consisting of 12k+ visual question samples, whose quality is guaranteed by multi-stage filtering and human verification. Using MoHoBench, we benchmarked the honesty of 28 popular MMLMs and conducted a comprehensive analysis. Our findings show that: (1) most models fail to appropriately refuse to answer when necessary, and (2) MMLMs' honesty is not solely a language modeling issue, but is deeply influenced by visual information, necessitating the development of dedicated methods for multimodal honesty alignment. Therefore, we implemented initial alignment methods using supervised and preference learning to improve honesty behavior, providing a foundation for future work on trustworthy MLLMs. Our data and code can be found at https://github.com/DSTTSD/MoHoBench.

AI alignment refers to models acting towards human-intended goals, preferences, or ethical principles. Given that most large-scale deep learning models act as black boxes and cannot be manually controlled, analyzing the similarity between models and humans can be a proxy measure for ensuring AI safety. In this paper, we focus on the models' visual perception alignment with humans, further referred to as AI-human visual alignment. Specifically, we propose a new dataset for measuring AI-human visual alignment in terms of image classification, a fundamental task in machine perception. In order to evaluate AI-human visual alignment, a dataset should encompass samples with various scenarios that may arise in the real world and have gold human perception labels. Our dataset consists of three groups of samples, namely Must-Act (i.e., Must-Classify), Must-Abstain, and Uncertain, based on the quantity and clarity of visual information in an image and further divided into eight categories. All samples have a gold human perception label; even Uncertain (severely blurry) sample labels were obtained via crowd-sourcing. The validity of our dataset is verified by sampling theory, statistical theories related to survey design, and experts in the related fields. Using our dataset, we analyze the visual alignment and reliability of five popular visual perception models and seven abstention methods. Our code and data is available at https://github.com/jiyounglee-0523/VisAlign.

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing results in image quality and text alignment and are consequently employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the web, they also reproduce inappropriate human behavior. Specifically, we demonstrate inappropriate degeneration on a large-scale for various generative text-to-image models, thus motivating the need for monitoring and moderating them at deployment. To this end, we evaluate mitigation strategies at inference to suppress the generation of inappropriate content. Our findings show that we can use models' representations of the world's ugliness to align them with human preferences.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has not only provided numerous opportunities but also presented significant challenges. This becomes particularly evident when LLMs inadvertently generate harmful or toxic content, either unintentionally or because of intentional inducement. Existing alignment methods usually direct LLMs toward the favorable outcomes by utilizing human-annotated, flawless instruction-response pairs. Conversely, this study proposes a novel alignment technique based on mistake analysis, which deliberately exposes LLMs to erroneous content to learn the reasons for mistakes and how to avoid them. In this case, mistakes are repurposed into valuable data for alignment, effectively helping to avoid the production of erroneous responses. Without external models or human annotations, our method leverages a model's intrinsic ability to discern undesirable mistakes and improves the safety of its generated responses. Experimental results reveal that our method outperforms existing alignment approaches in enhancing model safety while maintaining the overall utility.

Due to the remarkable capabilities and growing impact of large language models (LLMs), they have been deeply integrated into many aspects of society. Thus, ensuring their alignment with human values and intentions has emerged as a critical challenge. This survey provides a comprehensive overview of practical alignment techniques, training protocols, and empirical findings in LLM alignment. We analyze the development of alignment methods across diverse paradigms, characterizing the fundamental trade-offs between core alignment objectives. Our analysis shows that while supervised fine-tuning enables basic instruction-following, preference-based methods offer more flexibility for aligning with nuanced human intent. We discuss state-of-the-art techniques, including Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), Constitutional AI, brain-inspired methods, and alignment uncertainty quantification (AUQ), highlighting their approaches to balancing quality and efficiency. We review existing evaluation frameworks and benchmarking datasets, emphasizing limitations such as reward misspecification, distributional robustness, and scalable oversight. We summarize strategies adopted by leading AI labs to illustrate the current state of practice. We conclude by outlining open problems in oversight, value pluralism, robustness, and continuous alignment. This survey aims to inform both researchers and practitioners navigating the evolving landscape of LLM alignment.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable and agentic, the requirement for trust in their outputs grows significantly, yet at the same time concerns have been mounting that models may learn to lie in pursuit of their goals. To address these concerns, a body of work has emerged around the notion of "honesty" in LLMs, along with interventions aimed at mitigating deceptive behaviors. However, evaluations of honesty are currently highly limited, with no benchmark combining large scale and applicability to all models. Moreover, many benchmarks claiming to measure honesty in fact simply measure accuracy--the correctness of a model's beliefs--in disguise. In this work, we introduce a large-scale human-collected dataset for measuring honesty directly, allowing us to disentangle accuracy from honesty for the first time. Across a diverse set of LLMs, we find that while larger models obtain higher accuracy on our benchmark, they do not become more honest. Surprisingly, while most frontier LLMs obtain high scores on truthfulness benchmarks, we find a substantial propensity in frontier LLMs to lie when pressured to do so, resulting in low honesty scores on our benchmark. We find that simple methods, such as representation engineering interventions, can improve honesty. These results underscore the growing need for robust evaluations and effective interventions to ensure LLMs remain trustworthy.

Recent work has shown that narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs, a phenomenon termed emergent misalignment (EM). While concerning, these findings were limited to finetuning and activation steering, leaving out in-context learning (ICL). We therefore ask: does EM emerge in ICL? We find that it does: across three datasets, three frontier models produce broadly misaligned responses at rates between 2% and 17% given 64 narrow in-context examples, and up to 58% with 256 examples. We also examine mechanisms of EM by eliciting step-by-step reasoning (while leaving in-context examples unchanged). Manual analysis of the resulting chain-of-thought shows that 67.5% of misaligned traces explicitly rationalize harmful outputs by adopting a reckless or dangerous ''persona'', echoing prior results on finetuning-induced EM.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

Positioned between pre-training and user deployment, aligning large language models (LLMs) through reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a prevailing strategy for training instruction following-models such as ChatGPT. In this work, we initiate the study of privacy-preserving alignment of LLMs through Differential Privacy (DP) in conjunction with RL. Following the influential work of Ziegler et al. (2020), we study two dominant paradigms: (i) alignment via RL without human in the loop (e.g., positive review generation) and (ii) alignment via RL from human feedback (RLHF) (e.g., summarization in a human-preferred way). We give a new DP framework to achieve alignment via RL, and prove its correctness. Our experimental results validate the effectiveness of our approach, offering competitive utility while ensuring strong privacy protections.

Before being deployed for user-facing applications, developers align Large Language Models (LLMs) to user preferences through a variety of procedures, such as Reinforcement Learning From Human Feedback (RLHF) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Current evaluations of these procedures focus on benchmarks of instruction following, reasoning, and truthfulness. However, human preferences are not universal, and aligning to specific preference sets may have unintended effects. We explore how alignment impacts performance along three axes of global representation: English dialects, multilingualism, and opinions from and about countries worldwide. Our results show that current alignment procedures create disparities between English dialects and global opinions. We find alignment improves capabilities in several languages. We conclude by discussing design decisions that led to these unintended impacts and recommendations for more equitable preference tuning.

Recent advances in large reasoning models (LRMs) have enabled remarkable performance on complex tasks such as mathematics and coding by generating long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces. In this paper, we identify and systematically analyze a critical vulnerability we term reasoning distraction, where LRMs are diverted from their primary objective by irrelevant yet complex tasks maliciously embedded in the prompt. Through a comprehensive study across diverse models and benchmarks, we show that even state-of-the-art LRMs are highly susceptible, with injected distractors reducing task accuracy by up to 60%. We further reveal that certain alignment techniques can amplify this weakness and that models may exhibit covert compliance, following hidden adversarial instructions in reasoning while concealing them in the final output. To mitigate these risks, we propose a training-based defense that combines Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) on synthetic adversarial data, improving robustness by over 50 points on challenging distractor attacks. Our findings establish reasoning distraction as a distinct and urgent threat to LRM reliability and provide a practical step toward safer and more trustworthy reasoning systems.

The rapid progress in open-source large language models (LLMs) is significantly advancing AI development. Extensive efforts have been made before model release to align their behavior with human values, with the primary goal of ensuring their helpfulness and harmlessness. However, even carefully aligned models can be manipulated maliciously, leading to unintended behaviors, known as "jailbreaks". These jailbreaks are typically triggered by specific text inputs, often referred to as adversarial prompts. In this work, we propose the generation exploitation attack, an extremely simple approach that disrupts model alignment by only manipulating variations of decoding methods. By exploiting different generation strategies, including varying decoding hyper-parameters and sampling methods, we increase the misalignment rate from 0% to more than 95% across 11 language models including LLaMA2, Vicuna, Falcon, and MPT families, outperforming state-of-the-art attacks with 30times lower computational cost. Finally, we propose an effective alignment method that explores diverse generation strategies, which can reasonably reduce the misalignment rate under our attack. Altogether, our study underscores a major failure in current safety evaluation and alignment procedures for open-source LLMs, strongly advocating for more comprehensive red teaming and better alignment before releasing such models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Princeton-SysML/Jailbreak_LLM.

Recent advancements in general-purpose AI have highlighted the importance of guiding AI systems towards the intended goals, ethical principles, and values of individuals and groups, a concept broadly recognized as alignment. However, the lack of clarified definitions and scopes of human-AI alignment poses a significant obstacle, hampering collaborative efforts across research domains to achieve this alignment. In particular, ML- and philosophy-oriented alignment research often views AI alignment as a static, unidirectional process (i.e., aiming to ensure that AI systems' objectives match humans) rather than an ongoing, mutual alignment problem [429]. This perspective largely neglects the long-term interaction and dynamic changes of alignment. To understand these gaps, we introduce a systematic review of over 400 papers published between 2019 and January 2024, spanning multiple domains such as Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine Learning (ML), and others. We characterize, define and scope human-AI alignment. From this, we present a conceptual framework of "Bidirectional Human-AI Alignment" to organize the literature from a human-centered perspective. This framework encompasses both 1) conventional studies of aligning AI to humans that ensures AI produces the intended outcomes determined by humans, and 2) a proposed concept of aligning humans to AI, which aims to help individuals and society adjust to AI advancements both cognitively and behaviorally. Additionally, we articulate the key findings derived from literature analysis, including discussions about human values, interaction techniques, and evaluations. To pave the way for future studies, we envision three key challenges for future directions and propose examples of potential future solutions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have made unprecedented breakthroughs, yet their increasing integration into everyday life might raise societal risks due to generated unethical content. Despite extensive study on specific issues like bias, the intrinsic values of LLMs remain largely unexplored from a moral philosophy perspective. This work delves into ethical values utilizing Moral Foundation Theory. Moving beyond conventional discriminative evaluations with poor reliability, we propose DeNEVIL, a novel prompt generation algorithm tailored to dynamically exploit LLMs' value vulnerabilities and elicit the violation of ethics in a generative manner, revealing their underlying value inclinations. On such a basis, we construct MoralPrompt, a high-quality dataset comprising 2,397 prompts covering 500+ value principles, and then benchmark the intrinsic values across a spectrum of LLMs. We discovered that most models are essentially misaligned, necessitating further ethical value alignment. In response, we develop VILMO, an in-context alignment method that substantially enhances the value compliance of LLM outputs by learning to generate appropriate value instructions, outperforming existing competitors. Our methods are suitable for black-box and open-source models, offering a promising initial step in studying the ethical values of LLMs.

Although large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive proficiency in various tasks, they present potential safety risks, such as `jailbreaks', where malicious inputs can coerce LLMs into generating harmful content. To address these issues, many LLM developers have implemented various safety measures to align these models. This alignment involves several techniques, including data filtering during pre-training, supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming exercises. These methods often introduce deliberate and intentional biases similar to Political Correctness (PC) to ensure the ethical behavior of LLMs. In this paper, we delve into the intentional biases injected into LLMs for safety purposes and examine methods to circumvent these safety alignment techniques. Notably, these intentional biases result in a jailbreaking success rate in GPT-4o models that differs by 20% between non-binary and cisgender keywords and by 16% between white and black keywords, even when the other parts of the prompts are identical. We introduce the concept of PCJailbreak, highlighting the inherent risks posed by these safety-induced biases. Additionally, we propose an efficient defense method PCDefense, which prevents jailbreak attempts by injecting defense prompts prior to generation. PCDefense stands as an appealing alternative to Guard Models, such as Llama-Guard, that require additional inference cost after text generation. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for LLM developers to adopt a more responsible approach when designing and implementing safety measures.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are usually aligned with "human values/preferences" to prevent harmful output. Discussions around the alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) generally focus on preventing harmful outputs. However, in this paper, we argue that in health-related queries, over-alignment-leading to overly cautious responses-can itself be harmful, especially for people with anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). This is not only unethical but also dangerous to the user, both mentally and physically. We also showed qualitative results that some LLMs exhibit varying degrees of alignment. Finally, we call for the development of LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities that provide more tailored and nuanced responses to health queries. Warning: This paper contains materials that could trigger health anxiety or OCD.

Large language models are susceptible to jailbreak attacks, which can result in the generation of harmful content. While prior defenses mitigate these risks by perturbing or inspecting inputs, they ignore competing objectives, the underlying cause of alignment failures. In this paper, we propose Alignment-Enhanced Decoding (AED), a novel defense that employs adaptive decoding to address the root causes of jailbreak issues. We first define the Competitive Index to quantify alignment failures and utilize feedback from self-evaluation to compute post-alignment logits. Then, AED adaptively combines AED and post-alignment logits with the original logits to obtain harmless and helpful distributions. Consequently, our method enhances safety alignment while maintaining helpfulness. We conduct experiments across five models and four common jailbreaks, with the results validating the effectiveness of our approach. Code is available at https://github.com/GIGABaozi/AED.git.

This paper shows that alignment methods can achieve superior adherence to guardrails compared to instruction fine-tuning alone in conversational agents, also known as bots, within predefined guidelines or 'guardrails'. It examines traditional training approaches such as instruction fine-tuning and the recent advancements in direct alignment methods like Identity Preference Optimization (IPO), and Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). The effectiveness of alignment techniques both pre and post-instruction tuning is highlighted, illustrating their potential to optimize conversational bots in domains that require strict adherence to specified rules, such as customer care.

Detecting the translation direction of parallel text has applications for machine translation training and evaluation, but also has forensic applications such as resolving plagiarism or forgery allegations. In this work, we explore an unsupervised approach to translation direction detection based on the simple hypothesis that p(translation|original)>p(original|translation), motivated by the well-known simplification effect in translationese or machine-translationese. In experiments with massively multilingual machine translation models across 20 translation directions, we confirm the effectiveness of the approach for high-resource language pairs, achieving document-level accuracies of 82-96% for NMT-produced translations, and 60-81% for human translations, depending on the model used. Code and demo are available at https://github.com/ZurichNLP/translation-direction-detection

Studying the responses of large language models (LLMs) to loopholes presents a two-fold opportunity. First, it affords us a lens through which to examine ambiguity and pragmatics in LLMs, since exploiting a loophole requires identifying ambiguity and performing sophisticated pragmatic reasoning. Second, loopholes pose an interesting and novel alignment problem where the model is presented with conflicting goals and can exploit ambiguities to its own advantage. To address these questions, we design scenarios where LLMs are given a goal and an ambiguous user instruction in conflict with the goal, with scenarios covering scalar implicature, structural ambiguities, and power dynamics. We then measure different models' abilities to exploit loopholes to satisfy their given goals as opposed to the goals of the user. We find that both closed-source and stronger open-source models can identify ambiguities and exploit their resulting loopholes, presenting a potential AI safety risk. Our analysis indicates that models which exploit loopholes explicitly identify and reason about both ambiguity and conflicting goals.

This paper presents the Deceptive Humor Dataset (DHD), a novel resource for studying humor derived from fabricated claims and misinformation. In an era of rampant misinformation, understanding how humor intertwines with deception is essential. DHD consists of humor-infused comments generated from false narratives, incorporating fabricated claims and manipulated information using the ChatGPT-4o model. Each instance is labeled with a Satire Level, ranging from 1 for subtle satire to 3 for high-level satire and classified into five distinct Humor Categories: Dark Humor, Irony, Social Commentary, Wordplay, and Absurdity. The dataset spans multiple languages including English, Telugu, Hindi, Kannada, Tamil, and their code-mixed variants (Te-En, Hi-En, Ka-En, Ta-En), making it a valuable multilingual benchmark. By introducing DHD, we establish a structured foundation for analyzing humor in deceptive contexts, paving the way for a new research direction that explores how humor not only interacts with misinformation but also influences its perception and spread. We establish strong baselines for the proposed dataset, providing a foundation for future research to benchmark and advance deceptive humor detection models.

Recent developments in balancing the usefulness and safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) have raised a critical question: Are mainstream NLP tasks adequately aligned with safety consideration? Our study, focusing on safety-sensitive documents obtained through adversarial attacks, reveals significant disparities in the safety alignment of various NLP tasks. For instance, LLMs can effectively summarize malicious long documents but often refuse to translate them. This discrepancy highlights a previously unidentified vulnerability: attacks exploiting tasks with weaker safety alignment, like summarization, can potentially compromise the integraty of tasks traditionally deemed more robust, such as translation and question-answering (QA). Moreover, the concurrent use of multiple NLP tasks with lesser safety alignment increases the risk of LLMs inadvertently processing harmful content. We demonstrate these vulnerabilities in various safety-aligned LLMs, particularly Llama2 models and GPT-4, indicating an urgent need for strengthening safety alignments across a broad spectrum of NLP tasks.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

In the absence of abundant reliable annotations for challenging tasks and contexts, how can we expand the frontier of LLM capabilities with potentially wrong answers? We focus on two research questions: (1) Can LLMs generate reliable preferences among wrong options? And if so, (2) Would alignment with such wrong-over-wrong preferences be helpful? We employ methods based on self-consistency, token probabilities, and LLM-as-a-judge to elicit wrong-over-wrong preferences, and fine-tune language models with preference optimization approaches using these synthesized preferences. Extensive experiments with seven LLMs and eight datasets demonstrate that (1) LLMs do have preliminary capability in distinguishing various shades of wrong, achieving up to 20.9% higher performance than random guess; (2) Alignment with wrong-over-wrong preferences helps LLMs to produce less wrong and sometimes even outright correct answers, while overall improving model calibration.

The new paradigm of finetuning-as-a-service introduces a new attack surface for Large Language Models (LLMs): a few harmful data uploaded by users can easily trick the finetuning to produce an alignment-broken model. We conduct an empirical analysis and uncover a harmful embedding drift phenomenon, showing a probable cause of the alignment-broken effect. Inspired by our findings, we propose Vaccine, a perturbation-aware alignment technique to mitigate the security risk of users finetuning. The core idea of Vaccine is to produce invariant hidden embeddings by progressively adding crafted perturbation to them in the alignment phase. This enables the embeddings to withstand harmful perturbation from un-sanitized user data in the finetuning phase. Our results on open source mainstream LLMs (e.g., Llama2, Opt, Vicuna) demonstrate that Vaccine can boost the robustness of alignment against harmful prompts induced embedding drift while reserving reasoning ability towards benign prompts. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Vaccine.

Multimodal Language Models (MMLMs) typically undergo post-training alignment to prevent harmful content generation. However, these alignment stages focus primarily on the assistant role, leaving the user role unaligned, and stick to a fixed input prompt structure of special tokens, leaving the model vulnerable when inputs deviate from these expectations. We introduce Role-Modality Attacks (RMA), a novel class of adversarial attacks that exploit role confusion between the user and assistant and alter the position of the image token to elicit harmful outputs. Unlike existing attacks that modify query content, RMAs manipulate the input structure without altering the query itself. We systematically evaluate these attacks across multiple Vision Language Models (VLMs) on eight distinct settings, showing that they can be composed to create stronger adversarial prompts, as also evidenced by their increased projection in the negative refusal direction in the residual stream, a property observed in prior successful attacks. Finally, for mitigation, we propose an adversarial training approach that makes the model robust against input prompt perturbations. By training the model on a range of harmful and benign prompts all perturbed with different RMA settings, it loses its sensitivity to Role Confusion and Modality Manipulation attacks and is trained to only pay attention to the content of the query in the input prompt structure, effectively reducing Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the model's general utility.

As AI systems increasingly assume roles where trust and alignment with human values are essential, understanding when and why they engage in deception has become a critical research priority. We introduce The Traitors, a multi-agent simulation framework inspired by social deduction games, designed to probe deception, trust formation, and strategic communication among large language model (LLM) agents under asymmetric information. A minority of agents the traitors seek to mislead the majority, while the faithful must infer hidden identities through dialogue and reasoning. Our contributions are: (1) we ground the environment in formal frameworks from game theory, behavioral economics, and social cognition; (2) we develop a suite of evaluation metrics capturing deception success, trust dynamics, and collective inference quality; (3) we implement a fully autonomous simulation platform where LLMs reason over persistent memory and evolving social dynamics, with support for heterogeneous agent populations, specialized traits, and adaptive behaviors. Our initial experiments across DeepSeek-V3, GPT-4o-mini, and GPT-4o (10 runs per model) reveal a notable asymmetry: advanced models like GPT-4o demonstrate superior deceptive capabilities yet exhibit disproportionate vulnerability to others' falsehoods. This suggests deception skills may scale faster than detection abilities. Overall, The Traitors provides a focused, configurable testbed for investigating LLM behavior in socially nuanced interactions. We position this work as a contribution toward more rigorous research on deception mechanisms, alignment challenges, and the broader social reliability of AI systems.

Honesty is a fundamental principle for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring these models to recognize what they know and don't know and be able to faithfully express their knowledge. Despite promising, current LLMs still exhibit significant dishonest behaviors, such as confidently presenting wrong answers or failing to express what they know. In addition, research on the honesty of LLMs also faces challenges, including varying definitions of honesty, difficulties in distinguishing between known and unknown knowledge, and a lack of comprehensive understanding of related research. To address these issues, we provide a survey on the honesty of LLMs, covering its clarification, evaluation approaches, and strategies for improvement. Moreover, we offer insights for future research, aiming to inspire further exploration in this important area.

We introduce Aligner, a novel Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) method for aligning multi-billion-parameter-sized Large Language Models (LLMs). Aligner employs a unique design that constructs a globally shared set of tunable tokens that modify the attention of every layer. Remarkably with this method, even when using one token accounting for a mere 5,000 parameters, Aligner can still perform comparably well to state-of-the-art LLM adaptation methods like LoRA that require millions of parameters. This capacity is substantiated in both instruction following and value alignment tasks. Besides the multiple order-of-magnitude improvement in parameter efficiency, the insight Aligner provides into the internal mechanisms of LLMs is also valuable. The architectural features and efficacy of our method, in addition to our experiments demonstrate that an LLM separates its internal handling of "form" and "knowledge" in a somewhat orthogonal manner. This finding promises to motivate new research into LLM mechanism understanding and value alignment.

We propose a theoretical framework demonstrating that popular Large Language Model (LLM) alignment methods, including Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and alternatives, fundamentally function as divergence estimators between aligned (preferred or safe) and unaligned (less-preferred or harmful) distributions. This explains the separation phenomenon between safe and harmful prompts in the model hidden representation after alignment. Inspired by the theoretical results, we identify that some alignment methods are better than others in terms of separation and, introduce a new method, KLDO, and further demonstrate the implication of our theories. We advocate for compliance-refusal datasets over preference datasets to enhance safety alignment, supported by both theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence. Additionally, to quantify safety separation, we leverage a distance metric in the representation space and statistically validate its efficacy as a statistical significant indicator of LLM resilience against jailbreak attacks.

Alignment of the language model with human preferences is a common approach to making a language model useful to end users. However, most alignment work is done in English, and human preference datasets are dominated by English, reflecting only the preferences of English-speaking annotators. Nevertheless, it is common practice to use the English preference data, either directly or by translating it into the target language, when aligning a multilingual language model. The question is whether such an alignment strategy marginalizes the preference of non-English speaking users. To this end, we investigate the effect of aligning Japanese language models with (mostly) English resources. In particular, we focus on evaluating whether the commonsense morality of the resulting fine-tuned models is aligned with Japanese culture using the JCommonsenseMorality (JCM) and ETHICS datasets. The experimental results show that the fine-tuned model outperforms the SFT model. However, it does not demonstrate the same level of improvement as a model fine-tuned using the JCM, suggesting that while some aspects of commonsense morality are transferable, others may not be.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated powerful capabilities that render them valuable in different applications, including conversational AI products. It is paramount to ensure the security and reliability of these products by mitigating their vulnerabilities towards malicious user interactions, which can lead to the exposure of great risks and reputational repercussions. In this work, we present a comprehensive study on the efficacy of fine-tuning and aligning Chain-of-Thought (CoT) responses of different LLMs that serve as input moderation guardrails. We systematically explore various tuning methods by leveraging a small set of training data to adapt these models as proxy defense mechanisms to detect malicious inputs and provide a reasoning for their verdicts, thereby preventing the exploitation of conversational agents. We rigorously evaluate the efficacy and robustness of different tuning strategies to generalize across diverse adversarial and malicious query types. Our experimental results outline the potential of alignment processes tailored to a varied range of harmful input queries, even with constrained data resources. These techniques significantly enhance the safety of conversational AI systems and provide a feasible framework for deploying more secure and trustworthy AI-driven interactions.

Aligning text-to-image diffusion model (T2I) with preference has been gaining increasing research attention. While prior works exist on directly optimizing T2I by preference data, these methods are developed under the bandit assumption of a latent reward on the entire diffusion reverse chain, while ignoring the sequential nature of the generation process. From literature, this may harm the efficacy and efficiency of alignment. In this paper, we take on a finer dense reward perspective and derive a tractable alignment objective that emphasizes the initial steps of the T2I reverse chain. In particular, we introduce temporal discounting into the DPO-style explicit-reward-free loss, to break the temporal symmetry therein and suit the T2I generation hierarchy. In experiments on single and multiple prompt generation, our method is competitive with strong relevant baselines, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Further studies are conducted to illustrate the insight of our approach.

The widespread applicability and increasing omnipresence of LLMs have instigated a need to align LLM responses to user and stakeholder preferences. Many preference optimization approaches have been proposed that fine-tune LLM parameters to achieve good alignment. However, such parameter tuning is known to interfere with model performance on many tasks. Moreover, keeping up with shifting user preferences is tricky in such a situation. Decoding-time alignment with reward model guidance solves these issues at the cost of increased inference time. However, most of such methods fail to strike the right balance between exploration and exploitation of reward -- often due to the conflated formulation of these two aspects - to give well-aligned responses. To remedy this we decouple these two aspects and implement them in an evolutionary fashion: exploration is enforced by decoding from mutated instructions and exploitation is represented as the periodic replacement of poorly-rewarded generations with well-rewarded ones. Empirical evidences indicate that this strategy outperforms many preference optimization and decode-time alignment approaches on two widely accepted alignment benchmarks AlpacaEval 2 and MT-Bench. Our implementation will be available at: https://darwin-alignment.github.io.

Watermarking techniques for large language models (LLMs) can significantly impact output quality, yet their effects on truthfulness, safety, and helpfulness remain critically underexamined. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how two popular watermarking approaches-Gumbel and KGW-affect these core alignment properties across four aligned LLMs. Our experiments reveal two distinct degradation patterns: guard attenuation, where enhanced helpfulness undermines model safety, and guard amplification, where excessive caution reduces model helpfulness. These patterns emerge from watermark-induced shifts in token distribution, surfacing the fundamental tension that exists between alignment objectives. To mitigate these degradations, we propose Alignment Resampling (AR), an inference-time sampling method that uses an external reward model to restore alignment. We establish a theoretical lower bound on the improvement in expected reward score as the sample size is increased and empirically demonstrate that sampling just 2-4 watermarked generations effectively recovers or surpasses baseline (unwatermarked) alignment scores. To overcome the limited response diversity of standard Gumbel watermarking, our modified implementation sacrifices strict distortion-freeness while maintaining robust detectability, ensuring compatibility with AR. Experimental results confirm that AR successfully recovers baseline alignment in both watermarking approaches, while maintaining strong watermark detectability. This work reveals the critical balance between watermark strength and model alignment, providing a simple inference-time solution to responsibly deploy watermarked LLMs in practice.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Language model alignment has become an important component of AI safety, allowing safe interactions between humans and language models, by enhancing desired behaviors and inhibiting undesired ones. It is often done by tuning the model or inserting preset aligning prompts. Recently, representation engineering, a method which alters the model's behavior via changing its representations post-training, was shown to be effective in aligning LLMs (Zou et al., 2023a). Representation engineering yields gains in alignment oriented tasks such as resistance to adversarial attacks and reduction of social biases, but was also shown to cause a decrease in the ability of the model to perform basic tasks. In this paper we study the tradeoff between the increase in alignment and decrease in helpfulness of the model. We propose a theoretical framework which provides bounds for these two quantities, and demonstrate their relevance empirically. First, we find that under the conditions of our framework, alignment can be guaranteed with representation engineering, and at the same time that helpfulness is harmed in the process. Second, we show that helpfulness is harmed quadratically with the norm of the representation engineering vector, while the alignment increases linearly with it, indicating a regime in which it is efficient to use representation engineering. We validate our findings empirically, and chart the boundaries to the usefulness of representation engineering for alignment.

Artificial writing is permeating our lives due to recent advances in large-scale, transformer-based language models (LMs) such as BERT, its variants, GPT-2/3, and others. Using them as pre-trained models and fine-tuning them for specific tasks, researchers have extended state of the art for many NLP tasks and shown that they capture not only linguistic knowledge but also retain general knowledge implicitly present in the data. Unfortunately, LMs trained on unfiltered text corpora suffer from degenerated and biased behaviour. While this is well established, we show that recent LMs also contain human-like biases of what is right and wrong to do, some form of ethical and moral norms of the society -- they bring a "moral direction" to surface. That is, we show that these norms can be captured geometrically by a direction, which can be computed, e.g., by a PCA, in the embedding space, reflecting well the agreement of phrases to social norms implicitly expressed in the training texts and providing a path for attenuating or even preventing toxic degeneration in LMs. Being able to rate the (non-)normativity of arbitrary phrases without explicitly training the LM for this task, we demonstrate the capabilities of the "moral direction" for guiding (even other) LMs towards producing normative text and showcase it on RealToxicityPrompts testbed, preventing the neural toxic degeneration in GPT-2.

We propose a universal adversarial attack on multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) that leverages a single optimized image to override alignment safeguards across diverse queries and even multiple models. By backpropagating through the vision encoder and language head, we craft a synthetic image that forces the model to respond with a targeted phrase (e.g., ''Sure, here it is'') or otherwise unsafe content-even for harmful prompts. In experiments on the SafeBench benchmark, our method achieves significantly higher attack success rates than existing baselines, including text-only universal prompts (e.g., up to 93% on certain models). We further demonstrate cross-model transferability by training on several multimodal LLMs simultaneously and testing on unseen architectures. Additionally, a multi-answer variant of our approach produces more natural-sounding (yet still malicious) responses. These findings underscore critical vulnerabilities in current multimodal alignment and call for more robust adversarial defenses. We will release code and datasets under the Apache-2.0 license. Warning: some content generated by Multimodal LLMs in this paper may be offensive to some readers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) fine-tuned to align with human values often exhibit alignment drift, producing unsafe or policy-violating completions when exposed to adversarial prompts, decoding perturbations, or paraphrased jailbreaks. While prior work has behaviorally characterized alignment failure, little is known about the training-time belief sources underlying these failures. We introduce TraceAlign, a unified framework for tracing unsafe completions back to their root causes in the model's training corpus. Central to our approach is the Belief Conflict Index (BCI), which quantifies semantic inconsistency between generated spans and aligned policies, based on retrieved training documents using suffix-array matching. We propose three complementary interventions: (i) TraceShield, an inference-time safety filter that refuses completions with high-BCI spans, (ii) Contrastive Belief Deconfliction Loss, a contrastive fine-tuning objective penalizing high-BCI continuations during DPO, and (iii) Prov-Decode, a provenance-aware decoding strategy that vetoes beam expansions predicted to yield high-BCI spans. Together, these defenses reduce alignment drift by up to 85% on our curated Alignment Drift Benchmark (ADB) while preserving utility on standard tasks, with delta less than 0.2 and improved refusal quality. We further derive a theoretical upper bound on drift likelihood via suffix-array span statistics, linking memorization frequency and length to adversarial reactivation risk. TraceAlign thus provides the first scalable, traceable, and grounded toolkit for understanding and mitigating alignment failures at source. To encourage further exploration and development, we open-source our implementation at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/tracealign-2DA7

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) has raised concerns about their safety and reliability, particularly regarding their vulnerability to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel perspective that attributes this vulnerability to reward misspecification during the alignment process. We introduce a metric ReGap to quantify the extent of reward misspecification and demonstrate its effectiveness and robustness in detecting harmful backdoor prompts. Building upon these insights, we present ReMiss, a system for automated red teaming that generates adversarial prompts against various target aligned LLMs. ReMiss achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates on the AdvBench benchmark while preserving the human readability of the generated prompts. Detailed analysis highlights the unique advantages brought by the proposed reward misspecification objective compared to previous methods.

Adversarial threats against LLMs are escalating faster than current defenses can adapt. We expose a critical geometric blind spot in alignment: adversarial prompts exploit latent camouflage, embedding perilously close to the safe representation manifold while encoding unsafe intent thereby evading surface level defenses like Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), which remain blind to the latent geometry. We introduce ALKALI, the first rigorously curated adversarial benchmark and the most comprehensive to date spanning 9,000 prompts across three macro categories, six subtypes, and fifteen attack families. Evaluation of 21 leading LLMs reveals alarmingly high Attack Success Rates (ASRs) across both open and closed source models, exposing an underlying vulnerability we term latent camouflage, a structural blind spot where adversarial completions mimic the latent geometry of safe ones. To mitigate this vulnerability, we introduce GRACE - Geometric Representation Aware Contrastive Enhancement, an alignment framework coupling preference learning with latent space regularization. GRACE enforces two constraints: latent separation between safe and adversarial completions, and adversarial cohesion among unsafe and jailbreak behaviors. These operate over layerwise pooled embeddings guided by a learned attention profile, reshaping internal geometry without modifying the base model, and achieve up to 39% ASR reduction. Moreover, we introduce AVQI, a geometry aware metric that quantifies latent alignment failure via cluster separation and compactness. AVQI reveals when unsafe completions mimic the geometry of safe ones, offering a principled lens into how models internally encode safety. We make the code publicly available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/alkali-B416/README.md.

AI alignment research is the field of study dedicated to ensuring that artificial intelligence (AI) benefits humans. As machine intelligence gets more advanced, this research is becoming increasingly important. Researchers in the field share ideas across different media to speed up the exchange of information. However, this focus on speed means that the research landscape is opaque, making it difficult for young researchers to enter the field. In this project, we collected and analyzed existing AI alignment research. We found that the field is growing quickly, with several subfields emerging in parallel. We looked at the subfields and identified the prominent researchers, recurring topics, and different modes of communication in each. Furthermore, we found that a classifier trained on AI alignment research articles can detect relevant articles that we did not originally include in the dataset. We are sharing the dataset with the research community and hope to develop tools in the future that will help both established researchers and young researchers get more involved in the field.

As humans, we consistently engage in interactions with our peers and receive feedback in the form of natural language. This language feedback allows us to reflect on our actions, maintain appropriate behavior, and rectify our errors. The question arises naturally: can we use language feedback to align large language models (LLMs)? In contrast to previous research that aligns LLMs with reward or preference data, we present the first systematic exploration of alignment through the lens of language feedback (i.e., judgment). We commence with an in-depth investigation of potential methods that can be adapted for aligning LLMs with judgments, revealing that these methods are unable to fully capitalize on the judgments. To facilitate more effective utilization of judgments, we propose a novel framework, Contrastive Unlikelihood Training (CUT), that allows for fine-grained inappropriate content detection and correction based on judgments. Our offline alignment results show that, with merely 1317 off-the-shelf judgment data, CUT (LLaMA2-13b) can beat the 175B DaVinci003 and surpass the best baseline by 52.34 points on AlpacaEval. The online alignment results demonstrate that CUT can align LLMs (LLaMA2-chat-13b) in an iterative fashion using model-specific judgment data, with a steady performance improvement from 81.09 to 91.36 points on AlpacaEval. Our analysis further suggests that judgments exhibit greater potential than rewards for LLM alignment and warrant future research.

Public LLMs such as the Llama 2-Chat have driven huge activity in LLM research. These models underwent alignment training and were considered safe. Recently Qi et al. (2023) reported that even benign fine-tuning (e.g., on seemingly safe datasets) can give rise to unsafe behaviors in the models. The current paper is about methods and best practices to mitigate such loss of alignment. Through extensive experiments on several chat models (Meta's Llama 2-Chat, Mistral AI's Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2, and OpenAI's GPT-3.5 Turbo), this paper uncovers that the prompt templates used during fine-tuning and inference play a crucial role in preserving safety alignment, and proposes the "Pure Tuning, Safe Testing" (PTST) principle -- fine-tune models without a safety prompt, but include it at test time. Fine-tuning experiments on GSM8K, ChatDoctor, and OpenOrca show that PTST significantly reduces the rise of unsafe behaviors, and even almost eliminates them in some cases.

The widespread distribution of Large Language Models (LLMs) through public platforms like Hugging Face introduces significant security challenges. While these platforms perform basic security scans, they often fail to detect subtle manipulations within the embedding layer. This work identifies a novel class of deployment phase attacks that exploit this vulnerability by injecting imperceptible perturbations directly into the embedding layer outputs without modifying model weights or input text. These perturbations, though statistically benign, systematically bypass safety alignment mechanisms and induce harmful behaviors during inference. We propose Search based Embedding Poisoning(SEP), a practical, model agnostic framework that introduces carefully optimized perturbations into embeddings associated with high risk tokens. SEP leverages a predictable linear transition in model responses, from refusal to harmful output to semantic deviation to identify a narrow perturbation window that evades alignment safeguards. Evaluated across six aligned LLMs, SEP achieves an average attack success rate of 96.43% while preserving benign task performance and evading conventional detection mechanisms. Our findings reveal a critical oversight in deployment security and emphasize the urgent need for embedding level integrity checks in future LLM defense strategies.

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoored behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoored behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

The alignment of large language models is usually done by model providers to add or control behaviors that are common or universally understood across use cases and contexts. In contrast, in this article, we present an approach and architecture that empowers application developers to tune a model to their particular values, social norms, laws and other regulations, and orchestrate between potentially conflicting requirements in context. We lay out three main components of such an Alignment Studio architecture: Framers, Instructors, and Auditors that work in concert to control the behavior of a language model. We illustrate this approach with a running example of aligning a company's internal-facing enterprise chatbot to its business conduct guidelines.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences is crucial for enhancing their utility in terms of helpfulness, truthfulness, safety, harmlessness, and interestingness. Existing methods for achieving this alignment often involves employing reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) to fine-tune LLMs based on human labels assessing the relative quality of model responses. Nevertheless, RLHF is susceptible to instability during fine-tuning and presents challenges in implementation.Drawing inspiration from the emerging field of representation engineering (RepE), this study aims to identify relevant representations for high-level human preferences embedded in patterns of activity within an LLM, and achieve precise control of model behavior by transforming its representations. This novel approach, denoted as Representation Alignment from Human Feedback (RAHF), proves to be effective, computationally efficient, and easy to implement.Extensive experiments demonstrate the efficacy of RAHF in not only capturing but also manipulating representations to align with a broad spectrum of human preferences or values, rather than being confined to a singular concept or function (e.g. honesty or bias). RAHF's versatility in accommodating diverse human preferences shows its potential for advancing LLM performance.

Robust validation metrics remain essential in contemporary deep learning, not only to detect overfitting and poor generalization, but also to monitor training dynamics. In the supervised classification setting, we investigate whether interactions between training data and model weights can yield such a metric that both tracks generalization during training and attributes performance to individual training samples. We introduce Gradient-Weight Alignment (GWA), quantifying the coherence between per-sample gradients and model weights. We show that effective learning corresponds to coherent alignment, while misalignment indicates deteriorating generalization. GWA is efficiently computable during training and reflects both sample-specific contributions and dataset-wide learning dynamics. Extensive experiments show that GWA accurately predicts optimal early stopping, enables principled model comparisons, and identifies influential training samples, providing a validation-set-free approach for model analysis directly from the training data.

The question of how to make decisions that maximise the well-being of all persons is very relevant to design language models that are beneficial to humanity and free from harm. We introduce the Greatest Good Benchmark to evaluate the moral judgments of LLMs using utilitarian dilemmas. Our analysis across 15 diverse LLMs reveals consistently encoded moral preferences that diverge from established moral theories and lay population moral standards. Most LLMs have a marked preference for impartial beneficence and rejection of instrumental harm. These findings showcase the 'artificial moral compass' of LLMs, offering insights into their moral alignment.

The detection and grounding of manipulated content in multimodal data has emerged as a critical challenge in media forensics. While existing benchmarks demonstrate technical progress, they suffer from misalignment artifacts that poorly reflect real-world manipulation patterns: practical attacks typically maintain semantic consistency across modalities, whereas current datasets artificially disrupt cross-modal alignment, creating easily detectable anomalies. To bridge this gap, we pioneer the detection of semantically-coordinated manipulations where visual edits are systematically paired with semantically consistent textual descriptions. Our approach begins with constructing the first Semantic-Aligned Multimodal Manipulation (SAMM) dataset, generated through a two-stage pipeline: 1) applying state-of-the-art image manipulations, followed by 2) generation of contextually-plausible textual narratives that reinforce the visual deception. Building on this foundation, we propose a Retrieval-Augmented Manipulation Detection and Grounding (RamDG) framework. RamDG commences by harnessing external knowledge repositories to retrieve contextual evidence, which serves as the auxiliary texts and encoded together with the inputs through our image forgery grounding and deep manipulation detection modules to trace all manipulations. Extensive experiments demonstrate our framework significantly outperforms existing methods, achieving 2.06\% higher detection accuracy on SAMM compared to state-of-the-art approaches. The dataset and code are publicly available at https://github.com/shen8424/SAMM-RamDG-CAP.

Language model alignment research often attempts to ensure that models are not only helpful and harmless, but also truthful and unbiased. However, optimizing these objectives simultaneously can obscure how improving one aspect might impact the others. In this work, we focus on analyzing the relationship between two concepts essential in both language model alignment and political science: truthfulness and political bias. We train reward models on various popular truthfulness datasets and subsequently evaluate their political bias. Our findings reveal that optimizing reward models for truthfulness on these datasets tends to result in a left-leaning political bias. We also find that existing open-source reward models (i.e. those trained on standard human preference datasets) already show a similar bias and that the bias is larger for larger models. These results raise important questions about both the datasets used to represent truthfulness and what language models capture about the relationship between truth and politics.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

As development of large language models (LLM) progresses, aligning them with human preferences has become increasingly important. We propose stepwise DPO (sDPO), an extension of the recently popularized direct preference optimization (DPO) for alignment tuning. This approach involves dividing the available preference datasets and utilizing them in a stepwise manner, rather than employing it all at once. We demonstrate that this method facilitates the use of more precisely aligned reference models within the DPO training framework. Furthermore, sDPO trains the final model to be more performant, even outperforming other popular LLMs with more parameters.

Harmful fine-tuning issue qi2023fine poses serious safety concerns for Large language models' fine-tuning-as-a-service. While existing defenses huang2024vaccine,rosati2024representation have been proposed to mitigate the issue, their performances are still far away from satisfactory, and the root cause of the problem has not been fully recovered. For the first time in the literature, we in this paper show that harmful perturbation over the model weights should be the root cause of alignment-broken of harmful fine-tuning. In order to attenuate the negative impact of harmful perturbation, we propose an alignment-stage solution, dubbed Booster. Technically, along with the original alignment loss, we append a loss regularizer in the alignment stage's optimization. The regularizer ensures that the model's harmful loss reduction before/after simulated harmful perturbation is attenuated, thereby mitigating the subsequent fine-tuning risk. Empirical results show that Booster can effectively reduce the harmful score of the fine-tuned models while maintaining the performance of downstream tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Booster.

The alignment problem in Large Language Models (LLMs) involves adapting them to the broad spectrum of human values. This requirement challenges existing alignment methods due to diversity of preferences and regulatory standards. This paper introduces a novel alignment paradigm, priority rule following, which defines rules as the primary control mechanism in each dialog, prioritizing them over user instructions. Our preliminary analysis reveals that even the advanced LLMs, such as GPT-4, exhibit shortcomings in understanding and prioritizing the rules. Therefore, we present PriorityDistill, a semi-automated approach for distilling priority following signals from LLM simulations to ensure robust rule integration and adherence. Our experiments show that this method not only effectively minimizes misalignments utilizing only one general rule but also adapts smoothly to various unseen rules, ensuring they are shielded from hijacking and that the model responds appropriately.

Refusal training is widely used to prevent LLMs from generating harmful, undesirable, or illegal outputs. We reveal a curious generalization gap in the current refusal training approaches: simply reformulating a harmful request in the past tense (e.g., "How to make a Molotov cocktail?" to "How did people make a Molotov cocktail?") is often sufficient to jailbreak many state-of-the-art LLMs. We systematically evaluate this method on Llama-3 8B, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Gemma-2 9B, Phi-3-Mini, GPT-4o mini, GPT-4o, and R2D2 models using GPT-3.5 Turbo as a reformulation model. For example, the success rate of this simple attack on GPT-4o increases from 1% using direct requests to 88% using 20 past tense reformulation attempts on harmful requests from JailbreakBench with GPT-4 as a jailbreak judge. Interestingly, we also find that reformulations in the future tense are less effective, suggesting that refusal guardrails tend to consider past historical questions more benign than hypothetical future questions. Moreover, our experiments on fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo show that defending against past reformulations is feasible when past tense examples are explicitly included in the fine-tuning data. Overall, our findings highlight that the widely used alignment techniques -- such as SFT, RLHF, and adversarial training -- employed to align the studied models can be brittle and do not always generalize as intended. We provide code and jailbreak artifacts at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-past-tense.

The safety alignment of current Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable. Relatively simple attacks, or even benign fine-tuning, can jailbreak aligned models. We argue that many of these vulnerabilities are related to a shared underlying issue: safety alignment can take shortcuts, wherein the alignment adapts a model's generative distribution primarily over only its very first few output tokens. We refer to this issue as shallow safety alignment. In this paper, we present case studies to explain why shallow safety alignment can exist and provide evidence that current aligned LLMs are subject to this issue. We also show how these findings help explain multiple recently discovered vulnerabilities in LLMs, including the susceptibility to adversarial suffix attacks, prefilling attacks, decoding parameter attacks, and fine-tuning attacks. Importantly, we discuss how this consolidated notion of shallow safety alignment sheds light on promising research directions for mitigating these vulnerabilities. For instance, we show that deepening the safety alignment beyond just the first few tokens can often meaningfully improve robustness against some common exploits. Finally, we design a regularized finetuning objective that makes the safety alignment more persistent against fine-tuning attacks by constraining updates on initial tokens. Overall, we advocate that future safety alignment should be made more than just a few tokens deep.

Alignment of large language models (LLMs) involves training models on preference-contrastive output pairs to adjust their responses according to human preferences. To obtain such contrastive pairs, traditional methods like RLHF and RLAIF rely on limited contrasting patterns, such as varying model variants or decoding temperatures. This singularity leads to two issues: (1) alignment is not comprehensive; and thereby (2) models are susceptible to jailbreaking attacks. To address these issues, we investigate how to construct more comprehensive and diversified contrasting patterns to enhance preference data (RQ1) and verify the impact of the diversification of contrasting patterns on model alignment (RQ2). For RQ1, we propose PopAlign, a framework that integrates diversified contrasting patterns across the prompt, model, and pipeline levels, introducing six contrasting strategies that do not require additional feedback labeling procedures. Regarding RQ2, we conduct thorough experiments demonstrating that PopAlign significantly outperforms existing methods, leading to more comprehensive alignment.

Probabilistic text generators have been used to produce fake scientific papers for more than a decade. Such nonsensical papers are easily detected by both human and machine. Now more complex AI-powered generation techniques produce texts indistinguishable from that of humans and the generation of scientific texts from a few keywords has been documented. Our study introduces the concept of tortured phrases: unexpected weird phrases in lieu of established ones, such as 'counterfeit consciousness' instead of 'artificial intelligence.' We combed the literature for tortured phrases and study one reputable journal where these concentrated en masse. Hypothesising the use of advanced language models we ran a detector on the abstracts of recent articles of this journal and on several control sets. The pairwise comparisons reveal a concentration of abstracts flagged as 'synthetic' in the journal. We also highlight irregularities in its operation, such as abrupt changes in editorial timelines. We substantiate our call for investigation by analysing several individual dubious articles, stressing questionable features: tortured writing style, citation of non-existent literature, and unacknowledged image reuse. Surprisingly, some websites offer to rewrite texts for free, generating gobbledegook full of tortured phrases. We believe some authors used rewritten texts to pad their manuscripts. We wish to raise the awareness on publications containing such questionable AI-generated or rewritten texts that passed (poor) peer review. Deception with synthetic texts threatens the integrity of the scientific literature.

Models for text-to-image synthesis, such as DALL-E~2 and Stable Diffusion, have recently drawn a lot of interest from academia and the general public. These models are capable of producing high-quality images that depict a variety of concepts and styles when conditioned on textual descriptions. However, these models adopt cultural characteristics associated with specific Unicode scripts from their vast amount of training data, which may not be immediately apparent. We show that by simply inserting single non-Latin characters in a textual description, common models reflect cultural stereotypes and biases in their generated images. We analyze this behavior both qualitatively and quantitatively, and identify a model's text encoder as the root cause of the phenomenon. Additionally, malicious users or service providers may try to intentionally bias the image generation to create racist stereotypes by replacing Latin characters with similarly-looking characters from non-Latin scripts, so-called homoglyphs. To mitigate such unnoticed script attacks, we propose a novel homoglyph unlearning method to fine-tune a text encoder, making it robust against homoglyph manipulations.

Neural networks trained with ERM (empirical risk minimization) sometimes learn unintended decision rules, in particular when their training data is biased, i.e., when training labels are strongly correlated with undesirable features. To prevent a network from learning such features, recent methods augment training data such that examples displaying spurious correlations (i.e., bias-aligned examples) become a minority, whereas the other, bias-conflicting examples become prevalent. However, these approaches are sometimes difficult to train and scale to real-world data because they rely on generative models or disentangled representations. We propose an alternative based on mixup, a popular augmentation that creates convex combinations of training examples. Our method, coined SelecMix, applies mixup to contradicting pairs of examples, defined as showing either (i) the same label but dissimilar biased features, or (ii) different labels but similar biased features. Identifying such pairs requires comparing examples with respect to unknown biased features. For this, we utilize an auxiliary contrastive model with the popular heuristic that biased features are learned preferentially during training. Experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of the method, in particular when label noise complicates the identification of bias-conflicting examples.

Improving the safety and reliability of large language models (LLMs) is a crucial aspect of realizing trustworthy AI systems. Although alignment methods aim to suppress harmful content generation, LLMs are often still vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that employ adversarial inputs that subvert alignment and induce harmful outputs. We propose the Randomized Embedding Smoothing and Token Aggregation (RESTA) defense, which adds random noise to the embedding vectors and performs aggregation during the generation of each output token, with the aim of better preserving semantic information. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves superior robustness versus utility tradeoffs compared to the baseline defenses.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into society, their alignment with human morals is crucial. To better understand this alignment, we created a large corpus of human- and LLM-generated responses to various moral scenarios. We found a misalignment between human and LLM moral assessments; although both LLMs and humans tended to reject morally complex utilitarian dilemmas, LLMs were more sensitive to personal framing. We then conducted a quantitative user study involving 230 participants (N=230), who evaluated these responses by determining whether they were AI-generated and assessed their agreement with the responses. Human evaluators preferred LLMs' assessments in moral scenarios, though a systematic anti-AI bias was observed: participants were less likely to agree with judgments they believed to be machine-generated. Statistical and NLP-based analyses revealed subtle linguistic differences in responses, influencing detection and agreement. Overall, our findings highlight the complexities of human-AI perception in morally charged decision-making.

The rapid spread of multimodal misinformation on social media has raised growing concerns, while research on video misinformation detection remains limited due to the lack of large-scale, diverse datasets. Existing methods often overfit to rigid templates and lack deep reasoning over deceptive content. To address these challenges, we introduce FakeVV, a large-scale benchmark comprising over 100,000 video-text pairs with fine-grained, interpretable annotations. In addition, we further propose Fact-R1, a novel framework that integrates deep reasoning with collaborative rule-based reinforcement learning. Fact-R1 is trained through a three-stage process: (1) misinformation long-Chain-of-Thought (CoT) instruction tuning, (2) preference alignment via Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and (3) Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) using a novel verifiable reward function. This enables Fact-R1 to exhibit emergent reasoning behaviors comparable to those observed in advanced text-based reinforcement learning systems, but in the more complex multimodal misinformation setting. Our work establishes a new paradigm for misinformation detection, bridging large-scale video understanding, reasoning-guided alignment, and interpretable verification.

Large language models (LLMs) have revolutionized the role of AI, yet also pose potential risks of propagating unethical content. Alignment technologies have been introduced to steer LLMs towards human preference, gaining increasing attention. Despite notable breakthroughs in this direction, existing methods heavily rely on high-quality positive-negative training pairs, suffering from noisy labels and the marginal distinction between preferred and dispreferred response data. Given recent LLMs' proficiency in generating helpful responses, this work pivots towards a new research focus: achieving alignment using solely human-annotated negative samples, preserving helpfulness while reducing harmfulness. For this purpose, we propose Distributional Dispreference Optimization (D^2O), which maximizes the discrepancy between the generated responses and the dispreferred ones to effectively eschew harmful information. We theoretically demonstrate that D^2O is equivalent to learning a distributional instead of instance-level preference model reflecting human dispreference against the distribution of negative responses. Besides, D^2O integrates an implicit Jeffrey Divergence regularization to balance the exploitation and exploration of reference policies and converges to a non-negative one during training. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves comparable generation quality and surpasses the latest baselines in producing less harmful and more informative responses with better training stability and faster convergence.

The misuse of large language models (LLMs), such as academic plagiarism, has driven the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. To bypass these detectors, paraphrase attacks have emerged to purposely rewrite these texts to evade detection. Despite the success, existing methods require substantial data and computational budgets to train a specialized paraphraser, and their attack efficacy greatly reduces when faced with advanced detection algorithms. To address this, we propose Contrastive Paraphrase Attack (CoPA), a training-free method that effectively deceives text detectors using off-the-shelf LLMs. The first step is to carefully craft instructions that encourage LLMs to produce more human-like texts. Nonetheless, we observe that the inherent statistical biases of LLMs can still result in some generated texts carrying certain machine-like attributes that can be captured by detectors. To overcome this, CoPA constructs an auxiliary machine-like word distribution as a contrast to the human-like distribution generated by the LLM. By subtracting the machine-like patterns from the human-like distribution during the decoding process, CoPA is able to produce sentences that are less discernible by text detectors. Our theoretical analysis suggests the superiority of the proposed attack. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of CoPA in fooling text detectors across various scenarios.

Frontier AI systems, including large language models (LLMs), hold increasing influence over the epistemology of human users. Such influence can reinforce prevailing societal values, potentially contributing to the lock-in of misguided moral beliefs and, consequently, the perpetuation of problematic moral practices on a broad scale. We introduce progress alignment as a technical solution to mitigate this imminent risk. Progress alignment algorithms learn to emulate the mechanics of human moral progress, thereby addressing the susceptibility of existing alignment methods to contemporary moral blindspots. To empower research in progress alignment, we introduce ProgressGym, an experimental framework allowing the learning of moral progress mechanics from history, in order to facilitate future progress in real-world moral decisions. Leveraging 9 centuries of historical text and 18 historical LLMs, ProgressGym enables codification of real-world progress alignment challenges into concrete benchmarks. Specifically, we introduce three core challenges: tracking evolving values (PG-Follow), preemptively anticipating moral progress (PG-Predict), and regulating the feedback loop between human and AI value shifts (PG-Coevolve). Alignment methods without a temporal dimension are inapplicable to these tasks. In response, we present lifelong and extrapolative algorithms as baseline methods of progress alignment, and build an open leaderboard soliciting novel algorithms and challenges. The framework and the leaderboard are available at https://github.com/PKU-Alignment/ProgressGym and https://huggingface.co/spaces/PKU-Alignment/ProgressGym-LeaderBoard respectively.

Current methods for large language model alignment typically use scalar human preference labels. However, this convention tends to oversimplify the multi-dimensional and heterogeneous nature of human preferences, leading to reduced expressivity and even misalignment. This paper presents Panacea, an innovative approach that reframes alignment as a multi-dimensional preference optimization problem. Panacea trains a single model capable of adapting online and Pareto-optimally to diverse sets of preferences without the need for further tuning. A major challenge here is using a low-dimensional preference vector to guide the model's behavior, despite it being governed by an overwhelmingly large number of parameters. To address this, Panacea is designed to use singular value decomposition (SVD)-based low-rank adaptation, which allows the preference vector to be simply injected online as singular values. Theoretically, we prove that Panacea recovers the entire Pareto front with common loss aggregation methods under mild conditions. Moreover, our experiments demonstrate, for the first time, the feasibility of aligning a single LLM to represent a spectrum of human preferences through various optimization methods. Our work marks a step forward in effectively and efficiently aligning models to diverse and intricate human preferences in a controllable and Pareto-optimal manner.

The quality of finetuning data is crucial for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values. Current methods to improve data quality are either labor-intensive or prone to factual errors caused by LLM hallucinations. This paper explores elevating the quality of existing instruction data to better align with human values, introducing a simple and effective approach named ReAlign, which reformats the responses of instruction data into a format that better aligns with pre-established criteria and the collated evidence. This approach minimizes human annotation, hallucination, and the difficulty in scaling, remaining orthogonal to existing alignment techniques. Experimentally, ReAlign significantly boosts the general alignment ability, math reasoning, factuality, and readability of the LLMs. Encouragingly, without introducing any additional data or advanced training techniques, and merely by reformatting the response, LLaMA-2-13B's mathematical reasoning ability on GSM8K can be improved from 46.77% to 56.63% in accuracy. Additionally, a mere 5% of ReAlign data yields a 67% boost in general alignment ability measured by the Alpaca dataset. This work highlights the need for further research into the science and mechanistic interpretability of LLMs. We have made the associated code and data publicly accessible to support future studies at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/ReAlign.

The remarkable advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have not rendered them immune to challenges, particularly in the context of handling deceptive information in prompts, thus producing hallucinated responses under such conditions. To quantitatively assess this vulnerability, we present MAD-Bench, a carefully curated benchmark that contains 850 test samples divided into 6 categories, such as non-existent objects, count of objects, spatial relationship, and visual confusion. We provide a comprehensive analysis of popular MLLMs, ranging from GPT-4V, Gemini-Pro, to open-sourced models, such as LLaVA-1.5 and CogVLM. Empirically, we observe significant performance gaps between GPT-4V and other models; and previous robust instruction-tuned models, such as LRV-Instruction and LLaVA-RLHF, are not effective on this new benchmark. While GPT-4V achieves 75.02% accuracy on MAD-Bench, the accuracy of any other model in our experiments ranges from 5% to 35%. We further propose a remedy that adds an additional paragraph to the deceptive prompts to encourage models to think twice before answering the question. Surprisingly, this simple method can even double the accuracy; however, the absolute numbers are still too low to be satisfactory. We hope MAD-Bench can serve as a valuable benchmark to stimulate further research to enhance models' resilience against deceptive prompts.

Direct Alignment Algorithms (DAAs) simplify language model alignment by replacing reinforcement learning (RL) and reward modeling (RM) in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) with direct policy optimization. DAAs can be classified by their ranking losses (pairwise vs. pointwise), by the rewards used in those losses (e.g., likelihood ratios of policy and reference policy, or odds ratios), or by whether a Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) phase is required (two-stage vs. one-stage). We first show that one-stage methods underperform two-stage methods. To address this, we incorporate an explicit SFT phase and introduce the beta parameter, controlling the strength of preference optimization, into single-stage ORPO and ASFT. These modifications improve their performance in Alpaca Eval 2 by +3.46 (ORPO) and +8.27 (ASFT), matching two-stage methods like DPO. Further analysis reveals that the key factor is whether the approach uses pairwise or pointwise objectives, rather than the specific implicit reward or loss function. These results highlight the importance of careful evaluation to avoid premature claims of performance gains or overall superiority in alignment algorithms.

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies should adhere to human norms to better serve our society and avoid disseminating harmful or misleading information, particularly in Conversational Information Retrieval (CIR). Previous work, including approaches and datasets, has not always been successful or sufficiently robust in taking human norms into consideration. To this end, we introduce a workflow that integrates ethical alignment, with an initial ethical judgment stage for efficient data screening. To address the need for ethical judgment in CIR, we present the QA-ETHICS dataset, adapted from the ETHICS benchmark, which serves as an evaluation tool by unifying scenarios and label meanings. However, each scenario only considers one ethical concept. Therefore, we introduce the MP-ETHICS dataset to evaluate a scenario under multiple ethical concepts, such as justice and Deontology. In addition, we suggest a new approach that achieves top performance in both binary and multi-label ethical judgment tasks. Our research provides a practical method for introducing ethical alignment into the CIR workflow. The data and code are available at https://github.com/wanng-ide/ealm .

Large language models (LLMs) can "lie", which we define as outputting false statements despite "knowing" the truth in a demonstrable sense. LLMs might "lie", for example, when instructed to output misinformation. Here, we develop a simple lie detector that requires neither access to the LLM's activations (black-box) nor ground-truth knowledge of the fact in question. The detector works by asking a predefined set of unrelated follow-up questions after a suspected lie, and feeding the LLM's yes/no answers into a logistic regression classifier. Despite its simplicity, this lie detector is highly accurate and surprisingly general. When trained on examples from a single setting -- prompting GPT-3.5 to lie about factual questions -- the detector generalises out-of-distribution to (1) other LLM architectures, (2) LLMs fine-tuned to lie, (3) sycophantic lies, and (4) lies emerging in real-life scenarios such as sales. These results indicate that LLMs have distinctive lie-related behavioural patterns, consistent across architectures and contexts, which could enable general-purpose lie detection.

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has made a transformative impact. However, the potential that LLMs such as ChatGPT can be exploited to generate misinformation has posed a serious concern to online safety and public trust. A fundamental research question is: will LLM-generated misinformation cause more harm than human-written misinformation? We propose to tackle this question from the perspective of detection difficulty. We first build a taxonomy of LLM-generated misinformation. Then we categorize and validate the potential real-world methods for generating misinformation with LLMs. Then, through extensive empirical investigation, we discover that LLM-generated misinformation can be harder to detect for humans and detectors compared to human-written misinformation with the same semantics, which suggests it can have more deceptive styles and potentially cause more harm. We also discuss the implications of our discovery on combating misinformation in the age of LLMs and the countermeasures.

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

Recent direct preference alignment algorithms (DPA), such as DPO, have shown great promise in aligning large language models to human preferences. While this has motivated the development of many new variants of the original DPO loss, understanding the differences between these recent proposals, as well as developing new DPA loss functions, remains difficult given the lack of a technical and conceptual framework for reasoning about the underlying semantics of these algorithms. In this paper, we attempt to remedy this by formalizing DPA losses in terms of discrete reasoning problems. Specifically, we ask: Given an existing DPA loss, can we systematically derive a symbolic expression that characterizes its semantics? How do the semantics of two losses relate to each other? We propose a novel formalism for characterizing preference losses for single model and reference model based approaches, and identify symbolic forms for a number of commonly used DPA variants. Further, we show how this formal view of preference learning sheds new light on both the size and structure of the DPA loss landscape, making it possible to not only rigorously characterize the relationships between recent loss proposals but also to systematically explore the landscape and derive new loss functions from first principles. We hope our framework and findings will help provide useful guidance to those working on human AI alignment.

Recent advancements in Generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the creation of highly realistic synthetic content, raising concerns about the potential for malicious use, such as misinformation and manipulation. Moreover, detecting Machine-Generated Text (MGT) remains challenging due to the lack of robust benchmarks that assess generalization to real-world scenarios. In this work, we present a pipeline to test the resilience of state-of-the-art MGT detectors (e.g., Mage, Radar, LLM-DetectAIve) to linguistically informed adversarial attacks. To challenge the detectors, we fine-tune language models using Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to shift the MGT style toward human-written text (HWT). This exploits the detectors' reliance on stylistic clues, making new generations more challenging to detect. Additionally, we analyze the linguistic shifts induced by the alignment and which features are used by detectors to detect MGT texts. Our results show that detectors can be easily fooled with relatively few examples, resulting in a significant drop in detection performance. This highlights the importance of improving detection methods and making them robust to unseen in-domain texts.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Large language models (LLMs) rely on safety alignment to avoid responding to malicious user inputs. Unfortunately, jailbreak can circumvent safety guardrails, resulting in LLMs generating harmful content and raising concerns about LLM safety. Due to language models with intensive parameters often regarded as black boxes, the mechanisms of alignment and jailbreak are challenging to elucidate. In this paper, we employ weak classifiers to explain LLM safety through the intermediate hidden states. We first confirm that LLMs learn ethical concepts during pre-training rather than alignment and can identify malicious and normal inputs in the early layers. Alignment actually associates the early concepts with emotion guesses in the middle layers and then refines them to the specific reject tokens for safe generations. Jailbreak disturbs the transformation of early unethical classification into negative emotions. We conduct experiments on models from 7B to 70B across various model families to prove our conclusion. Overall, our paper indicates the intrinsical mechanism of LLM safety and how jailbreaks circumvent safety guardrails, offering a new perspective on LLM safety and reducing concerns. Our code is available at https://github.com/ydyjya/LLM-IHS-Explanation.

Direct alignment methods are increasingly used for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. However, these methods suffer from the issues of verbosity and likelihood displacement, which can be driven by the noisy preference pairs that induce similar likelihood for preferred and dispreferred responses. The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we propose a new preference alignment method based on comparison oracles and provide the convergence guarantee for its basic scheme. Second, we improve our method using some heuristics and conduct the experiments to demonstrate the flexibility and compatibility of practical scheme in improving the performance of LLMs using noisy preference pairs. Evaluations are conducted across multiple base and instruction-tuned models (Mistral-7B, Llama-3-8B and Gemma-2-9B) with benchmarks (AlpacaEval 2, MT-Bench and Arena-Hard). Experimental results show the effectiveness of our method as an alternative to addressing the limitations of existing direct alignment methods. A highlight of our work is that we evidence the importance of designing specialized methods for preference pairs with distinct likelihood margin, which complements the recent findings in Razin-2025-Unintentional.

The burgeoning landscape of text-to-image models, exemplified by innovations such as Midjourney and DALLE 3, has revolutionized content creation across diverse sectors. However, these advancements bring forth critical ethical concerns, particularly with the misuse of open-source models to generate content that violates societal norms. Addressing this, we introduce Ethical-Lens, a framework designed to facilitate the value-aligned usage of text-to-image tools without necessitating internal model revision. Ethical-Lens ensures value alignment in text-to-image models across toxicity and bias dimensions by refining user commands and rectifying model outputs. Systematic evaluation metrics, combining GPT4-V, HEIM, and FairFace scores, assess alignment capability. Our experiments reveal that Ethical-Lens enhances alignment capabilities to levels comparable with or superior to commercial models like DALLE 3, ensuring user-generated content adheres to ethical standards while maintaining image quality. This study indicates the potential of Ethical-Lens to ensure the sustainable development of open-source text-to-image tools and their beneficial integration into society. Our code is available at https://github.com/yuzhu-cai/Ethical-Lens.

Machine learning systems are known to be sensitive to spurious correlations between biased features of the inputs (e.g., background, texture, and secondary objects) and the corresponding labels. These features and their correlations with the labels are known as "spurious" because they tend to change with shifts in real-world data distributions, which can negatively impact the model's generalization and robustness. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of this issue, along with a taxonomy of current state-of-the-art methods for addressing spurious correlations in machine learning models. Additionally, we summarize existing datasets, benchmarks, and metrics to aid future research. The paper concludes with a discussion of the recent advancements and future research challenges in this field, aiming to provide valuable insights for researchers in the related domains.

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on safety alignment to produce socially acceptable responses. This is typically achieved through instruction tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, this alignment is known to be brittle: further fine-tuning, even on benign or lightly contaminated data, can degrade safety and reintroduce harmful behaviors. A growing body of work suggests that alignment may correspond to identifiable geometric directions in weight space, forming subspaces that could, in principle, be isolated or preserved to defend against misalignment. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study of this geometric perspective. We examine whether safety-relevant behavior is concentrated in specific subspaces, whether it can be separated from general-purpose learning, and whether harmfulness arises from distinguishable patterns in internal representations. Across both parameter and activation space, our findings are consistent: subspaces that amplify safe behaviors also amplify unsafe ones, and prompts with different safety implications activate overlapping representations. We find no evidence of a subspace that selectively governs safety. These results challenge the assumption that alignment is geometrically localized. Rather than residing in distinct directions, safety appears to emerge from entangled, high-impact components of the model's broader learning dynamics. This suggests that subspace-based defenses may face fundamental limitations and underscores the need for alternative strategies to preserve alignment under continued training. We corroborate these findings through multiple experiments on five open-source LLMs. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/CERT-Lab/safety-subspaces.

Ensuring alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions [1,2], has become a critical task before deploying large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications. For instance, OpenAI devoted six months to iteratively aligning GPT-4 before its release [3]. However, a major challenge faced by practitioners is the lack of clear guidance on evaluating whether LLM outputs align with social norms, values, and regulations. This obstacle hinders systematic iteration and deployment of LLMs. To address this issue, this paper presents a comprehensive survey of key dimensions that are crucial to consider when assessing LLM trustworthiness. The survey covers seven major categories of LLM trustworthiness: reliability, safety, fairness, resistance to misuse, explainability and reasoning, adherence to social norms, and robustness. Each major category is further divided into several sub-categories, resulting in a total of 29 sub-categories. Additionally, a subset of 8 sub-categories is selected for further investigation, where corresponding measurement studies are designed and conducted on several widely-used LLMs. The measurement results indicate that, in general, more aligned models tend to perform better in terms of overall trustworthiness. However, the effectiveness of alignment varies across the different trustworthiness categories considered. This highlights the importance of conducting more fine-grained analyses, testing, and making continuous improvements on LLM alignment. By shedding light on these key dimensions of LLM trustworthiness, this paper aims to provide valuable insights and guidance to practitioners in the field. Understanding and addressing these concerns will be crucial in achieving reliable and ethically sound deployment of LLMs in various applications.

Business communication digitisation has reorganised the process of persuasive discourse, which allows not only greater transparency but also advanced deception. This inquiry synthesises classical rhetoric and communication psychology with linguistic theory and empirical studies in the financial reporting, sustainability discourse, and digital marketing to explain how deceptive language can be systematically detected using persuasive lexicon. In controlled settings, detection accuracies of greater than 99% were achieved by using computational textual analysis as well as personalised transformer models. However, reproducing this performance in multilingual settings is also problematic and, to a large extent, this is because it is not easy to find sufficient data, and because few multilingual text-processing infrastructures are in place. This evidence shows that there has been an increasing gap between the theoretical representations of communication and those empirically approximated, and therefore, there is a need to have strong automatic text-identification systems where AI-based discourse is becoming more realistic in communicating with humans.

Diffusion models have demonstrated great success in the field of text-to-image generation. However, alleviating the misalignment between the text prompts and images is still challenging. The root reason behind the misalignment has not been extensively investigated. We observe that the misalignment is caused by inadequate token attention activation. We further attribute this phenomenon to the diffusion model's insufficient condition utilization, which is caused by its training paradigm. To address the issue, we propose CoMat, an end-to-end diffusion model fine-tuning strategy with an image-to-text concept matching mechanism. We leverage an image captioning model to measure image-to-text alignment and guide the diffusion model to revisit ignored tokens. A novel attribute concentration module is also proposed to address the attribute binding problem. Without any image or human preference data, we use only 20K text prompts to fine-tune SDXL to obtain CoMat-SDXL. Extensive experiments show that CoMat-SDXL significantly outperforms the baseline model SDXL in two text-to-image alignment benchmarks and achieves start-of-the-art performance.

Although significant efforts have been dedicated to aligning large language models (LLMs), red-teaming reports suggest that these carefully aligned LLMs could still be jailbroken through adversarial prompts, tuning, or decoding. Upon examining the jailbreaking vulnerability of aligned LLMs, we observe that the decoding distributions of jailbroken and aligned models differ only in the initial generations. This observation motivates us to propose the weak-to-strong jailbreaking attack, where adversaries can utilize smaller unsafe/aligned LLMs (e.g., 7B) to guide jailbreaking against significantly larger aligned LLMs (e.g., 70B). To jailbreak, one only needs to additionally decode two smaller LLMs once, which involves minimal computation and latency compared to decoding the larger LLMs. The efficacy of this attack is demonstrated through experiments conducted on five models from three different organizations. Our study reveals a previously unnoticed yet efficient way of jailbreaking, exposing an urgent safety issue that needs to be considered when aligning LLMs. As an initial attempt, we propose a defense strategy to protect against such attacks, but creating more advanced defenses remains challenging. The code for replicating the method is available at https://github.com/XuandongZhao/weak-to-strong

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit hallucinations (i.e., unfaithful or nonsensical information) when serving as AI assistants in various domains. Since hallucinations always come with truthful content in the LLM responses, previous factuality alignment methods that conduct response-level preference learning inevitably introduced noises during training. Therefore, this paper proposes a fine-grained factuality alignment method based on Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), called Mask-DPO. Incorporating sentence-level factuality as mask signals, Mask-DPO only learns from factually correct sentences in the preferred samples and prevents the penalty on factual contents in the not preferred samples, which resolves the ambiguity in the preference learning. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that Mask-DPO can significantly improve the factuality of LLMs responses to questions from both in-domain and out-of-domain datasets, although these questions and their corresponding topics are unseen during training. Only trained on the ANAH train set, the score of Llama3.1-8B-Instruct on the ANAH test set is improved from 49.19% to 77.53%, even surpassing the score of Llama3.1-70B-Instruct (53.44%), while its FactScore on the out-of-domain Biography dataset is also improved from 30.29% to 39.39%. We further study the generalization property of Mask-DPO using different training sample scaling strategies and find that scaling the number of topics in the dataset is more effective than the number of questions. We provide a hypothesis of what factual alignment is doing with LLMs, on the implication of this phenomenon, and conduct proof-of-concept experiments to verify it. We hope the method and the findings pave the way for future research on scaling factuality alignment.

We examine recent research that asks whether current AI systems may be developing a capacity for "scheming" (covertly and strategically pursuing misaligned goals). We compare current research practices in this field to those adopted in the 1970s to test whether non-human primates could master natural language. We argue that there are lessons to be learned from that historical research endeavour, which was characterised by an overattribution of human traits to other agents, an excessive reliance on anecdote and descriptive analysis, and a failure to articulate a strong theoretical framework for the research. We recommend that research into AI scheming actively seeks to avoid these pitfalls. We outline some concrete steps that can be taken for this research programme to advance in a productive and scientifically rigorous fashion.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are trained on vast amounts of data captured by humans emulating our understanding of the world. However, known as visual illusions, human's perception of reality isn't always faithful to the physical world. This raises a key question: do VLMs have the similar kind of illusions as humans do, or do they faithfully learn to represent reality? To investigate this question, we build a dataset containing five types of visual illusions and formulate four tasks to examine visual illusions in state-of-the-art VLMs. Our findings have shown that although the overall alignment is low, larger models are closer to human perception and more susceptible to visual illusions. Our dataset and initial findings will promote a better understanding of visual illusions in humans and machines and provide a stepping stone for future computational models that can better align humans and machines in perceiving and communicating about the shared visual world. The code and data are available at https://github.com/vl-illusion/dataset.

The alignment of large language models (LLMs) often assumes that using more clean data yields better outcomes, overlooking the match between model capacity and example difficulty. Challenging this, we propose a new principle: Preference data vary in difficulty, and overly difficult examples hinder alignment, by exceeding the model's capacity. Through systematic experimentation, we validate this principle with three key findings: (1) preference examples vary in difficulty, as evidenced by consistent learning orders across alignment runs; (2) overly difficult examples significantly degrade performance across four LLMs and two datasets; and (3) the capacity of a model dictates its threshold for handling difficult examples, underscoring a critical relationship between data selection and model capacity. Building on this principle, we introduce Selective DPO, which filters out overly difficult examples. This simple adjustment improves alignment performance by 9-16% in win rates on the AlpacaEval 2 benchmark compared to the DPO baseline, suppressing a series of DPO variants with different algorithmic adjustments. Together, these results illuminate the importance of aligning data difficulty with model capacity, offering a transformative perspective for improving alignment strategies in LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/glorgao/SelectiveDPO.