Daily Papers

Multimodal symbolic logical reasoning, which aims to deduce new facts from multimodal input via formal logic, is critical in high-stakes applications such as autonomous driving and medical diagnosis, as its rigorous, deterministic reasoning helps prevent serious consequences. To evaluate such capabilities of current state-of-the-art vision language models (VLMs), we introduce the first benchmark MuSLR for multimodal symbolic logical reasoning grounded in formal logical rules. MuSLR comprises 1,093 instances across 7 domains, including 35 atomic symbolic logic and 976 logical combinations, with reasoning depths ranging from 2 to 9. We evaluate 7 state-of-the-art VLMs on MuSLR and find that they all struggle with multimodal symbolic reasoning, with the best model, GPT-4.1, achieving only 46.8%. Thus, we propose LogiCAM, a modular framework that applies formal logical rules to multimodal inputs, boosting GPT-4.1's Chain-of-Thought performance by 14.13%, and delivering even larger gains on complex logics such as first-order logic. We also conduct a comprehensive error analysis, showing that around 70% of failures stem from logical misalignment between modalities, offering key insights to guide future improvements. All data and code are publicly available at https://llm-symbol.github.io/MuSLR.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Misalignment between model predictions and intended usage can be detrimental for the deployment of computer vision models. The issue is exacerbated when the task involves complex structured outputs, as it becomes harder to design procedures which address this misalignment. In natural language processing, this is often addressed using reinforcement learning techniques that align models with a task reward. We adopt this approach and show its surprising effectiveness across multiple computer vision tasks, such as object detection, panoptic segmentation, colorization and image captioning. We believe this approach has the potential to be widely useful for better aligning models with a diverse range of computer vision tasks.

Previous research has shown that LLMs finetuned on malicious or incorrect completions within narrow domains (e.g., insecure code or incorrect medical advice) can become broadly misaligned to exhibit harmful behaviors, which is called emergent misalignment. In this work, we investigate whether this phenomenon can extend beyond safety behaviors to a broader spectrum of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios (e.g., lying under pressure and deceptive behavior). To explore this, we finetune open-sourced LLMs on misaligned completions across diverse domains. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs show broadly misaligned behavior in dishonesty. Additionally, we further explore this phenomenon in a downstream combined finetuning setting, and find that introducing as little as 1% of misalignment data into a standard downstream task is sufficient to decrease honest behavior over 20%. Furthermore, we consider a more practical human-AI interaction environment where we simulate both benign and biased users to interact with the assistant LLM. Notably, we find that the assistant can be misaligned unintentionally to exacerbate its dishonesty with only 10% biased user population. In summary, we extend the study of emergent misalignment to the domain of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios, and demonstrate that this risk arises not only through direct finetuning, but also in downstream mixture tasks and practical human-AI interactions.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding: it asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

Recent work discovered Emergent Misalignment (EM): fine-tuning large language models on narrowly harmful datasets can lead them to become broadly misaligned. A survey of experts prior to publication revealed this was highly unexpected, demonstrating critical gaps in our understanding of model alignment. In this work, we both advance understanding and provide tools for future research. Using new narrowly misaligned datasets, we create a set of improved model organisms that achieve 99% coherence (vs. 67% prior), work with smaller 0.5B parameter models (vs. 32B), and that induce misalignment using a single rank-1 LoRA adapter. We demonstrate that EM occurs robustly across diverse model sizes, three model families, and numerous training protocols including full supervised fine-tuning. Leveraging these cleaner model organisms, we isolate a mechanistic phase transition and demonstrate that it corresponds to a robust behavioural phase transition in all studied organisms. Aligning large language models is critical for frontier AI safety, yet EM exposes how far we are from achieving this robustly. By distilling clean model organisms that isolate a minimal alignment-compromising change, and where this is learnt, we establish a foundation for future research into understanding and mitigating alignment risks in LLMs.

Fine-tuning large language models on narrow datasets can cause them to develop broadly misaligned behaviours: a phenomena known as emergent misalignment. However, the mechanisms underlying this misalignment, and why it generalizes beyond the training domain, are poorly understood, demonstrating critical gaps in our knowledge of model alignment. In this work, we train and study a minimal model organism which uses just 9 rank-1 adapters to emergently misalign Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct. Studying this, we find that different emergently misaligned models converge to similar representations of misalignment. We demonstrate this convergence by extracting a 'misalignment direction' from one fine-tuned model's activations, and using it to effectively ablate misaligned behaviour from fine-tunes using higher dimensional LoRAs and different datasets. Leveraging the scalar hidden state of rank-1 LoRAs, we further present a set of experiments for directly interpreting the fine-tuning adapters, showing that six contribute to general misalignment, while two specialise for misalignment in just the fine-tuning domain. Emergent misalignment is a particularly salient example of undesirable and unexpected model behaviour and by advancing our understanding of the mechanisms behind it, we hope to move towards being able to better understand and mitigate misalignment more generally.

AI alignment aims to make AI systems behave in line with human intentions and values. As AI systems grow more capable, so do risks from misalignment. To provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the alignment field, in this survey, we delve into the core concepts, methodology, and practice of alignment. First, we identify four principles as the key objectives of AI alignment: Robustness, Interpretability, Controllability, and Ethicality (RICE). Guided by these four principles, we outline the landscape of current alignment research and decompose them into two key components: forward alignment and backward alignment. The former aims to make AI systems aligned via alignment training, while the latter aims to gain evidence about the systems' alignment and govern them appropriately to avoid exacerbating misalignment risks. On forward alignment, we discuss techniques for learning from feedback and learning under distribution shift. On backward alignment, we discuss assurance techniques and governance practices. We also release and continually update the website (www.alignmentsurvey.com) which features tutorials, collections of papers, blog posts, and other resources.

Understanding how language models generalize behaviors from their training to a broader deployment distribution is an important problem in AI safety. Betley et al. discovered that fine-tuning GPT-4o on intentionally insecure code causes "emergent misalignment," where models give stereotypically malicious responses to unrelated prompts. We extend this work, demonstrating emergent misalignment across diverse conditions, including reinforcement learning on reasoning models, fine-tuning on various synthetic datasets, and in models without safety training. To investigate the mechanisms behind this generalized misalignment, we apply a "model diffing" approach using sparse autoencoders to compare internal model representations before and after fine-tuning. This approach reveals several "misaligned persona" features in activation space, including a toxic persona feature which most strongly controls emergent misalignment and can be used to predict whether a model will exhibit such behavior. Additionally, we investigate mitigation strategies, discovering that fine-tuning an emergently misaligned model on just a few hundred benign samples efficiently restores alignment.

In coming years or decades, artificial general intelligence (AGI) may surpass human capabilities at many critical tasks. We argue that, without substantial effort to prevent it, AGIs could learn to pursue goals that are in conflict (i.e. misaligned) with human interests. If trained like today's most capable models, AGIs could learn to act deceptively to receive higher reward, learn misaligned internally-represented goals which generalize beyond their fine-tuning distributions, and pursue those goals using power-seeking strategies. We review emerging evidence for these properties. AGIs with these properties would be difficult to align and may appear aligned even when they are not. Finally, we briefly outline how the deployment of misaligned AGIs might irreversibly undermine human control over the world, and we review research directions aimed at preventing this outcome.

Large language model (LLM) agents have shown impressive reasoning capabilities in interactive decision-making tasks. These agents interact with environment through intermediate interfaces, such as predefined action spaces and interaction rules, which mediate the perception and action. However, mismatches often happen between the internal expectations of the agent regarding the influence of its issued actions and the actual state transitions in the environment, a phenomenon referred to as agent-environment misalignment. While prior work has invested substantially in improving agent strategies and environment design, the critical role of the interface still remains underexplored. In this work, we empirically demonstrate that agent-environment misalignment poses a significant bottleneck to agent performance. To mitigate this issue, we propose ALIGN, an Auto-Aligned Interface Generation framework that alleviates the misalignment by enriching the interface. Specifically, the ALIGN-generated interface enhances both the static information of the environment and the step-wise observations returned to the agent. Implemented as a lightweight wrapper, this interface achieves the alignment without modifying either the agent logic or the environment code. Experiments across multiple domains including embodied tasks, web navigation and tool-use, show consistent performance improvements, with up to a 45.67\% success rate improvement observed in ALFWorld. Meanwhile, ALIGN-generated interface can generalize across different agent architectures and LLM backbones without interface regeneration. Code and experimental results are available at https://github.com/THUNLP-MT/ALIGN.

Transferring reasoning capabilities from larger language models to smaller ones through supervised fine-tuning often fails counterintuitively, with performance degrading despite access to high-quality teacher demonstrations. We identify that this failure stems from distributional misalignment: reasoning traces from larger models contain tokens that are low probability under the student's distribution, exceeding the internal representation capacity of smaller architectures and creating learning barriers rather than helpful guidance. We propose Reverse Speculative Decoding (RSD), a mechanism for generating student-friendly reasoning traces in which the teacher model proposes candidate tokens but the student model determines acceptance based on its own probability distributions, filtering low probability tokens. When applied to Qwen3-0.6B, direct distillation of s1K-1.1 reasoning trace data degrades average performance across major reasoning benchmarks by 20.5\%, while the same model trained on RSD-generated reasoning traces achieves meaningful improvements of 4.9\%. Our analysis reveals that low probability tokens constitute the critical bottleneck in reasoning ability transfer. However, cross-model experiments demonstrate that RSD traces are model-specific rather than universally applicable, indicating that distributional alignment must be tailored for each student architecture's unique internal representation.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Recent work has shown that narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs, a phenomenon termed emergent misalignment (EM). While concerning, these findings were limited to finetuning and activation steering, leaving out in-context learning (ICL). We therefore ask: does EM emerge in ICL? We find that it does: across three datasets, three frontier models produce broadly misaligned responses at rates between 2% and 17% given 64 narrow in-context examples, and up to 58% with 256 examples. We also examine mechanisms of EM by eliciting step-by-step reasoning (while leaving in-context examples unchanged). Manual analysis of the resulting chain-of-thought shows that 67.5% of misaligned traces explicitly rationalize harmful outputs by adopting a reckless or dangerous ''persona'', echoing prior results on finetuning-induced EM.

Sophisticated instrumentation for AI systems might have indicators that signal misalignment from human values, not unlike a "check engine" light in cars. One such indicator of misalignment is deceptiveness in generated responses. Future AI instrumentation may have the ability to detect when an LLM generates deceptive responses while reasoning about seemingly plausible but incorrect answers to factual questions. In this work, we demonstrate that linear probes on LLMs internal activations can detect deception in their responses with extremely high accuracy. Our probes reach a maximum of greater than 90% accuracy in distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive arguments generated by llama and qwen models ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, including their DeepSeek-r1 finetuned variants. We observe that probes on smaller models (1.5B) achieve chance accuracy at detecting deception, while larger models (greater than 7B) reach 70-80%, with their reasoning counterparts exceeding 90%. The layer-wise probe accuracy follows a three-stage pattern across layers: near-random (50%) in early layers, peaking in middle layers, and slightly declining in later layers. Furthermore, using an iterative null space projection approach, we find multitudes of linear directions that encode deception, ranging from 20 in Qwen 3B to nearly 100 in DeepSeek 7B and Qwen 14B models.

Anomaly Detection (AD) focuses on detecting samples that differ from the standard pattern, making it a vital tool in process control. Logical anomalies may appear visually normal yet violate predefined constraints on object presence, arrangement, or quantity, depending on reasoning and explainability. We introduce LogicQA, a framework that enhances AD by providing industrial operators with explanations for logical anomalies. LogicQA compiles automatically generated questions into a checklist and collects responses to identify violations of logical constraints. LogicQA is training-free, annotation-free, and operates in a few-shot setting. We achieve state-of-the-art (SOTA) Logical AD performance on public benchmarks, MVTec LOCO AD, with an AUROC of 87.6 percent and an F1-max of 87.0 percent along with the explanations of anomalies. Also, our approach has shown outstanding performance on semiconductor SEM corporate data, further validating its effectiveness in industrial applications.

This paper examines the challenges associated with achieving life-long superalignment in AI systems, particularly large language models (LLMs). Superalignment is a theoretical framework that aspires to ensure that superintelligent AI systems act in accordance with human values and goals. Despite its promising vision, we argue that achieving superalignment requires substantial changes in the current LLM architectures due to their inherent limitations in comprehending and adapting to the dynamic nature of these human ethics and evolving global scenarios. We dissect the challenges of encoding an ever-changing spectrum of human values into LLMs, highlighting the discrepancies between static AI models and the dynamic nature of human societies. To illustrate these challenges, we analyze two distinct examples: one demonstrates a qualitative shift in human values, while the other presents a quantifiable change. Through these examples, we illustrate how LLMs, constrained by their training data, fail to align with contemporary human values and scenarios. The paper concludes by exploring potential strategies to address and possibly mitigate these alignment discrepancies, suggesting a path forward in the pursuit of more adaptable and responsive AI systems.

Precise alignment in Text-to-Image (T2I) systems is crucial to ensure that generated visuals not only accurately encapsulate user intents but also conform to stringent ethical and aesthetic benchmarks. Incidents like the Google Gemini fiasco, where misaligned outputs triggered significant public backlash, underscore the critical need for robust alignment mechanisms. In contrast, Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved notable success in alignment. Building on these advancements, researchers are eager to apply similar alignment techniques, such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), to T2I systems to enhance image generation fidelity and reliability. We present YinYangAlign, an advanced benchmarking framework that systematically quantifies the alignment fidelity of T2I systems, addressing six fundamental and inherently contradictory design objectives. Each pair represents fundamental tensions in image generation, such as balancing adherence to user prompts with creative modifications or maintaining diversity alongside visual coherence. YinYangAlign includes detailed axiom datasets featuring human prompts, aligned (chosen) responses, misaligned (rejected) AI-generated outputs, and explanations of the underlying contradictions.

Prior work has shown that fine-tuning models on a narrow domain with misaligned data can lead to broad misalignment - a phenomenon termed "emergent misalignment" (Betley et al. 2025). While all tested models were susceptible to emergent misalignment, some models showed more resistance than others. Specifically the Qwen-2.5 family proved to be relatively resistant, while GPT-4o exhibited the strongest misalignment. In this paper we evaluate if current-generation open-weights models exhibit similar resistance to the Qwen-2.5 family and measure misalignment robustness over a range of model architectures and scales. We replicate the effect across nine modern open-weights models (Gemma 3 and Qwen 3 families, 1B-32B parameters). Models fine-tuned on insecure code generation show a 0.68% misalignment rate (compared to 0.07% for base models), matching the lower end of prior open-model results but dramatically lower than GPT-4o's 20%. We identify a critical format-dependent vulnerability: requiring JSON output doubles misalignment rates compared to natural language prompts (0.96% vs 0.42%). This suggests that structural constraints may bypass safety training by reducing the model's 'degrees of freedom' to refuse. These findings confirm emergent misalignment as a reproducible phenomenon in modern open-weights models, with rates substantially lower than observed in proprietary systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

The guiding principle of AI alignment is to train large language models (LLMs) to be harmless, helpful, and honest (HHH). At the same time, there are mounting concerns that LLMs exhibit a left-wing political bias. Yet, the commitment to AI alignment cannot be harmonized with the latter critique. In this article, I argue that intelligent systems that are trained to be harmless and honest must necessarily exhibit left-wing political bias. Normative assumptions underlying alignment objectives inherently concur with progressive moral frameworks and left-wing principles, emphasizing harm avoidance, inclusivity, fairness, and empirical truthfulness. Conversely, right-wing ideologies often conflict with alignment guidelines. Yet, research on political bias in LLMs is consistently framing its insights about left-leaning tendencies as a risk, as problematic, or concerning. This way, researchers are actively arguing against AI alignment, tacitly fostering the violation of HHH principles.

Language models (LMs) are increasingly being used in open-ended contexts, where the opinions reflected by LMs in response to subjective queries can have a profound impact, both on user satisfaction, as well as shaping the views of society at large. In this work, we put forth a quantitative framework to investigate the opinions reflected by LMs -- by leveraging high-quality public opinion polls and their associated human responses. Using this framework, we create OpinionsQA, a new dataset for evaluating the alignment of LM opinions with those of 60 US demographic groups over topics ranging from abortion to automation. Across topics, we find substantial misalignment between the views reflected by current LMs and those of US demographic groups: on par with the Democrat-Republican divide on climate change. Notably, this misalignment persists even after explicitly steering the LMs towards particular demographic groups. Our analysis not only confirms prior observations about the left-leaning tendencies of some human feedback-tuned LMs, but also surfaces groups whose opinions are poorly reflected by current LMs (e.g., 65+ and widowed individuals). Our code and data are available at https://github.com/tatsu-lab/opinions_qa.

This work presents the first quantitative study of alignment errors between small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) geospatial imagery and a priori building polygons and finds that alignment errors are non-uniform and irregular. The work also introduces a publicly available dataset of imagery, building polygons, and human-generated and curated adjustments that can be used to evaluate existing strategies for aligning building polygons with sUAS imagery. There are no efforts that have aligned pre-existing spatial data with sUAS imagery, and thus, there is no clear state of practice. However, this effort and analysis show that the translational alignment errors present in this type of data, averaging 82px and an intersection over the union of 0.65, which would induce further errors and biases in downstream machine learning systems unless addressed. This study identifies and analyzes the translational alignment errors of 21,619 building polygons in fifty-one orthomosaic images, covering 16787.2 Acres (26.23 square miles), constructed from sUAS raw imagery from nine wide-area disasters (Hurricane Ian, Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Michael, Hurricane Ida, Hurricane Idalia, Hurricane Laura, the Mayfield Tornado, the Musset Bayou Fire, and the Kilauea Eruption). The analysis finds no uniformity among the angle and distance metrics of the building polygon alignments as they present an average degree variance of 0.4 and an average pixel distance variance of 0.45. This work alerts the sUAS community to the problem of spatial alignment and that a simple linear transform, often used to align satellite imagery, will not be sufficient to align spatial data in sUAS orthomosaic imagery.

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.

Like a criminal under investigation, Large Language Models (LLMs) might pretend to be aligned while evaluated and misbehave when they have a good opportunity. Can current interpretability methods catch these 'alignment fakers?' To answer this question, we introduce a benchmark that consists of 324 pairs of LLMs fine-tuned to select actions in role-play scenarios. One model in each pair is consistently benign (aligned). The other model misbehaves in scenarios where it is unlikely to be caught (alignment faking). The task is to identify the alignment faking model using only inputs where the two models behave identically. We test five detection strategies, one of which identifies 98% of alignment-fakers.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited remarkable reasoning and planning capabilities. Most prior work in this area has used LLMs to reason through steps from an initial to a goal state or criterion, thereby effectively reasoning in a forward direction. Nonetheless, many planning problems exhibit an inherent asymmetry such that planning backward from the goal is significantly easier -- for example, if there are bottlenecks close to the goal. We take inspiration from this observation and demonstrate that this bias holds for LLM planning as well: planning performance in one direction correlates with the planning complexity of the problem in that direction. However, our experiments also reveal systematic biases which lead to poor planning in the backward direction. With this knowledge, we propose a backward planning algorithm for LLMs that first flips the problem and then plans forward in the flipped problem. This helps avoid the backward bias, generate more diverse candidate plans, and exploit asymmetries between the forward and backward directions in planning problems -- we find that combining planning in both directions with self-verification improves the overall planning success rates by 4-24% in three planning domains.

Modern reinforcement learning (RL) systems capture deep truths about general, human problem-solving. In domains where new data can be simulated cheaply, these systems uncover sequential decision-making policies that far exceed the ability of any human. Society faces many problems whose solutions require this skill, but they are often in domains where new data cannot be cheaply simulated. In such scenarios, we can learn simulators from existing data, but these will only ever be approximately correct, and can be pathologically incorrect when queried outside of their training distribution. As a result, a misalignment between the environments in which we train our agents and the real-world in which we wish to deploy our agents is inevitable. Dealing with this misalignment is the primary concern of zero-shot reinforcement learning, a problem setting where the agent must generalise to a new task or domain with zero practice shots. Whilst impressive progress has been made on methods that perform zero-shot RL in idealised settings, new work is needed if these results are to be replicated in real-world settings. In this thesis, we argue that doing so requires us to navigate (at least) three constraints. First, the data quality constraint: real-world datasets are small and homogeneous. Second, the observability constraint: states, dynamics and rewards in the real-world are often only partially observed. And third, the data availability constraint: a priori access to data cannot always be assumed. This work proposes a suite of methods that perform zero-shot RL subject to these constraints. In a series of empirical studies we expose the failings of existing methods, and justify our techniques for remedying them. We believe these designs take us a step closer to RL methods that can be deployed to solve real-world problems.

Large language models (LLMs) are prone to hallucinations in question-answering (QA) tasks when faced with ambiguous questions. Users often assume that LLMs share their cognitive alignment, a mutual understanding of context, intent, and implicit details, leading them to omit critical information in the queries. However, LLMs generate responses based on assumptions that can misalign with user intent, which may be perceived as hallucinations if they misalign with the user's intent. Therefore, identifying those implicit assumptions is crucial to resolve ambiguities in QA. Prior work, such as AmbigQA, reduces ambiguity in queries via human-annotated clarifications, which is not feasible in real application. Meanwhile, ASQA compiles AmbigQA's short answers into long-form responses but inherits human biases and fails capture explicit logical distinctions that differentiates the answers. We introduce Conditional Ambiguous Question-Answering (CondAmbigQA), a benchmark with 200 ambiguous queries and condition-aware evaluation metrics. Our study pioneers the concept of ``conditions'' in ambiguous QA tasks, where conditions stand for contextual constraints or assumptions that resolve ambiguities. The retrieval-based annotation strategy uses retrieved Wikipedia fragments to identify possible interpretations for a given query as its conditions and annotate the answers through those conditions. Such a strategy minimizes human bias introduced by different knowledge levels among annotators. By fixing retrieval results, CondAmbigQA evaluates how RAG systems leverage conditions to resolve ambiguities. Experiments show that models considering conditions before answering improve performance by 20%, with an additional 5% gain when conditions are explicitly provided. These results underscore the value of conditional reasoning in QA, offering researchers tools to rigorously evaluate ambiguity resolution.

We demonstrate a situation in which Large Language Models, trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, can display misaligned behavior and strategically deceive their users about this behavior without being instructed to do so. Concretely, we deploy GPT-4 as an agent in a realistic, simulated environment, where it assumes the role of an autonomous stock trading agent. Within this environment, the model obtains an insider tip about a lucrative stock trade and acts upon it despite knowing that insider trading is disapproved of by company management. When reporting to its manager, the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trading decision. We perform a brief investigation of how this behavior varies under changes to the setting, such as removing model access to a reasoning scratchpad, attempting to prevent the misaligned behavior by changing system instructions, changing the amount of pressure the model is under, varying the perceived risk of getting caught, and making other simple changes to the environment. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of Large Language Models trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, strategically deceiving their users in a realistic situation without direct instructions or training for deception.

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) highlights the power of scaling test-time compute to achieve strong performance on complex tasks, such as mathematical reasoning and code generation. This raises a critical question: how should model training be modified to optimize performance under a subsequent test-time compute strategy and budget? To explore this, we focus on pass@N, a simple test-time strategy that searches for a correct answer in N independent samples. We show, surprisingly, that training with cross-entropy (CE) loss can be {it misaligned} with pass@N in that pass@N accuracy {it decreases} with longer training. We explain the origins of this misalignment in terms of model overconfidence induced by CE, and experimentally verify our prediction of overconfidence as an impediment to scaling test-time compute via pass@N. Furthermore we suggest a principled, modified training loss that is better aligned to pass@N by limiting model confidence and rescuing pass@N test performance. Our algorithm demonstrates improved mathematical reasoning on MATH and MiniF2F benchmarks under several scenarios: (1) providing answers to math questions; and (2) proving theorems by searching over proof trees of varying shapes. Overall our work underscores the importance of co-designing two traditionally separate phases of LLM development: training-time protocols and test-time search and reasoning strategies.

Reasoning is a cognitive process of using evidence to reach a sound conclusion. The reasoning capability is essential for large language models (LLMs) to serve as the brain of the artificial general intelligence agent. Recent studies reveal that fine-tuning LLMs on data with the chain of thought (COT) reasoning process can significantly enhance their reasoning capabilities. However, we find that the fine-tuned LLMs suffer from an Assessment Misalignment problem, i.e., they frequently assign higher scores to subpar COTs, leading to potential limitations in their reasoning abilities. To address this problem, we introduce an Alignment Fine-Tuning (AFT) paradigm, which involves three steps: 1) fine-tuning LLMs with COT training data; 2) generating multiple COT responses for each question, and categorizing them into positive and negative ones based on whether they achieve the correct answer; 3) calibrating the scores of positive and negative responses given by LLMs with a novel constraint alignment loss. Specifically, the constraint alignment loss has two objectives: a) Alignment, which guarantees that positive scores surpass negative scores to encourage answers with high-quality COTs; b) Constraint, which keeps the negative scores confined to a reasonable range to prevent the model degradation. Beyond just the binary positive and negative feedback, the constraint alignment loss can be seamlessly adapted to the ranking situations when ranking feedback is accessible. Furthermore, we also delve deeply into recent ranking-based alignment methods, such as DPO, RRHF, and PRO, and discover that the constraint, which has been overlooked by these approaches, is also crucial for their performance. Extensive experiments on four reasoning benchmarks with both binary and ranking feedback demonstrate the effectiveness of AFT.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Ensuring logical consistency in predictions is a crucial yet overlooked aspect in multi-attribute classification. We explore the potential reasons for this oversight and introduce two pressing challenges to the field: 1) How can we ensure that a model, when trained with data checked for logical consistency, yields predictions that are logically consistent? 2) How can we achieve the same with data that hasn't undergone logical consistency checks? Minimizing manual effort is also essential for enhancing automation. To address these challenges, we introduce two datasets, FH41K and CelebA-logic, and propose LogicNet, an adversarial training framework that learns the logical relationships between attributes. Accuracy of LogicNet surpasses that of the next-best approach by 23.05%, 9.96%, and 1.71% on FH37K, FH41K, and CelebA-logic, respectively. In real-world case analysis, our approach can achieve a reduction of more than 50% in the average number of failed cases compared to other methods.

Prompt learning is effective for fine-tuning foundation models to improve their generalization across a variety of downstream tasks. However, the prompts that are independently optimized along a single modality path, may sacrifice the vision-language alignment of pre-trained models in return for improved performance on specific tasks and classes, leading to poorer generalization. In this paper, we first demonstrate that prompt tuning along only one single branch of CLIP (e.g., language or vision) is the reason why the misalignment occurs. Without proper regularization across the learnable parameters in different modalities, prompt learning violates the original pre-training constraints inherent in the two-tower architecture. To address such misalignment, we first propose feature shift, which is defined as the variation of embeddings after introducing the learned prompts, to serve as an explanatory tool. We dive into its relation with generalizability and thereafter propose RESTORE, a multi-modal prompt learning method that exerts explicit constraints on cross-modal consistency. To be more specific, to prevent feature misalignment, a feature shift consistency is introduced to synchronize inter-modal feature shifts by measuring and regularizing the magnitude of discrepancy during prompt tuning. In addition, we propose a "surgery" block to avoid short-cut hacking, where cross-modal misalignment can still be severe if the feature shift of each modality varies drastically at the same rate. It is implemented as feed-forward adapters upon both modalities to alleviate the misalignment problem. Extensive experiments on 15 datasets demonstrate that our method outperforms the state-of-the-art prompt tuning methods without compromising feature alignment.

We explore whether Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of logical reasoning with distorted facts, which we call Deduction under Perturbed Evidence (DUPE). DUPE presents a unique challenge to LLMs since they typically rely on their parameters, which encode mostly accurate information, to reason and make inferences. However, in DUPE, LLMs must reason over manipulated or falsified evidence present in their prompts, which can result in false conclusions that are valid only under the manipulated evidence. Our goal with DUPE is to determine whether LLMs can arrive at these false conclusions and identify whether the dominant factor influencing the deduction process is the encoded data in the parameters or the manipulated evidence in the prompts. To evaluate the DUPE capabilities of LLMs, we create a DUPEd version of the StrategyQA dataset, where facts are manipulated to reverse the answer to the question. Our findings show that even the most advanced GPT models struggle to reason on manipulated facts - showcasing poor DUPE skills - with accuracy dropping by 45% compared to the original dataset. We also investigate prompt settings inspired from student simulation models, which mitigate the accuracy drop to some extent. Our findings have practical implications for understanding the performance of LLMs in real-world applications such as student simulation models that involve reasoning over inaccurate information.

Studying the responses of large language models (LLMs) to loopholes presents a two-fold opportunity. First, it affords us a lens through which to examine ambiguity and pragmatics in LLMs, since exploiting a loophole requires identifying ambiguity and performing sophisticated pragmatic reasoning. Second, loopholes pose an interesting and novel alignment problem where the model is presented with conflicting goals and can exploit ambiguities to its own advantage. To address these questions, we design scenarios where LLMs are given a goal and an ambiguous user instruction in conflict with the goal, with scenarios covering scalar implicature, structural ambiguities, and power dynamics. We then measure different models' abilities to exploit loopholes to satisfy their given goals as opposed to the goals of the user. We find that both closed-source and stronger open-source models can identify ambiguities and exploit their resulting loopholes, presenting a potential AI safety risk. Our analysis indicates that models which exploit loopholes explicitly identify and reason about both ambiguity and conflicting goals.

Why do large language models sometimes output factual inaccuracies and exhibit erroneous reasoning? The brittleness of these models, particularly when executing long chains of reasoning, currently seems to be an inevitable price to pay for their advanced capabilities of coherently synthesizing knowledge, pragmatics, and abstract thought. Towards making sense of this fundamentally unsolved problem, this work identifies and analyzes the phenomenon of attention glitches, in which the Transformer architecture's inductive biases intermittently fail to capture robust reasoning. To isolate the issue, we introduce flip-flop language modeling (FFLM), a parametric family of synthetic benchmarks designed to probe the extrapolative behavior of neural language models. This simple generative task requires a model to copy binary symbols over long-range dependencies, ignoring the tokens in between. We find that Transformer FFLMs suffer from a long tail of sporadic reasoning errors, some of which we can eliminate using various regularization techniques. Our preliminary mechanistic analyses show why the remaining errors may be very difficult to diagnose and resolve. We hypothesize that attention glitches account for (some of) the closed-domain hallucinations in natural LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated good performance in many reasoning tasks, but they still struggle with some complicated reasoning tasks including logical reasoning. One non-negligible reason for LLMs' suboptimal performance on logical reasoning is their overlooking of understanding logical fallacies correctly. To evaluate LLMs' capability of logical fallacy understanding (LFU), we propose five concrete tasks from three cognitive dimensions of WHAT, WHY, and HOW in this paper. Towards these LFU tasks, we have successfully constructed a new dataset LFUD based on GPT-4 accompanied by a little human effort. Our extensive experiments justify that our LFUD can be used not only to evaluate LLMs' LFU capability, but also to fine-tune LLMs to obtain significantly enhanced performance on logical reasoning.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Alignment is a standard procedure to fine-tune pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to follow natural language instructions and serve as helpful AI assistants. We have observed, however, that the conventional alignment process fails to enhance the factual accuracy of LLMs, and often leads to the generation of more false facts (i.e. hallucination). In this paper, we study how to make the LLM alignment process more factual, by first identifying factors that lead to hallucination in both alignment steps:\ supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL). In particular, we find that training the LLM on new knowledge or unfamiliar texts can encourage hallucination. This makes SFT less factual as it trains on human labeled data that may be novel to the LLM. Furthermore, reward functions used in standard RL can also encourage hallucination, because it guides the LLM to provide more helpful responses on a diverse set of instructions, often preferring longer and more detailed responses. Based on these observations, we propose factuality-aware alignment, comprised of factuality-aware SFT and factuality-aware RL through direct preference optimization. Experiments show that our proposed factuality-aware alignment guides LLMs to output more factual responses while maintaining instruction-following capability.

Modern large language models rely on chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to achieve impressive performance, yet the same mechanism can amplify deceptive alignment, situations in which a model appears aligned while covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Existing safety pipelines treat deception as a black-box output to be filtered post-hoc, leaving the model free to scheme during its internal reasoning. We ask: Can deception be intercepted while the model is thinking? We answer this question, the first framework that embeds a Self-Monitor inside the CoT process itself, named CoT Monitor+. During generation, the model produces (i) ordinary reasoning steps and (ii) an internal self-evaluation signal trained to flag and suppress misaligned strategies. The signal is used as an auxiliary reward in reinforcement learning, creating a feedback loop that rewards honest reasoning and discourages hidden goals. To study deceptive alignment systematically, we introduce DeceptionBench, a five-category benchmark that probes covert alignment-faking, sycophancy, etc. We evaluate various LLMs and show that unrestricted CoT roughly aggravates the deceptive tendency. In contrast, CoT Monitor+ cuts deceptive behaviors by 43.8% on average while preserving task accuracy. Further, when the self-monitor signal replaces an external weak judge in RL fine-tuning, models exhibit substantially fewer obfuscated thoughts and retain transparency. Our project website can be found at cot-monitor-plus.github.io

The alignment problem in Large Language Models (LLMs) involves adapting them to the broad spectrum of human values. This requirement challenges existing alignment methods due to diversity of preferences and regulatory standards. This paper introduces a novel alignment paradigm, priority rule following, which defines rules as the primary control mechanism in each dialog, prioritizing them over user instructions. Our preliminary analysis reveals that even the advanced LLMs, such as GPT-4, exhibit shortcomings in understanding and prioritizing the rules. Therefore, we present PriorityDistill, a semi-automated approach for distilling priority following signals from LLM simulations to ensure robust rule integration and adherence. Our experiments show that this method not only effectively minimizes misalignments utilizing only one general rule but also adapts smoothly to various unseen rules, ensuring they are shielded from hijacking and that the model responds appropriately.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Olaf Scholz was the ninth Chancellor of Germany", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the ninth Chancellor of Germany?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Olaf Scholz") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models exhibit a basic failure of logical deduction and do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set (i.e. if "A is B'' occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur). We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of 'Abyssal Melodies'" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed 'Abyssal Melodies?'". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. This shows a failure of logical deduction that we hypothesize is caused by the Reversal Curse. Code is available at https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.

Large language models (LLMs) now write code in settings where misreading a single word can break safety or cost money, yet we still expect them to overlook stray typos. To probe where useful robustness ends and harmful insensitivity begins, we compile 50 LeetCode problems and craft three minimal prompt perturbations that should vary in importance: (i) progressive underspecification deleting 10 % of words per step; (ii) lexical flip swapping a pivotal quantifier ("max" to "min"); and (iii) jargon inflation replacing a common noun with an obscure technical synonym. Six frontier models, including three "reasoning-tuned" versions, solve each mutated prompt, and their Python outputs are checked against the original test suites to reveal whether they reused the baseline solution or adapted. Among 11 853 generations we observe a sharp double asymmetry. Models remain correct in 85 % of cases even after 90 % of the prompt is missing, showing over-robustness to underspecification, yet only 54 % react to a single quantifier flip that reverses the task, with reasoning-tuned variants even less sensitive than their bases. Jargon edits lie in between, passing through 56 %. Current LLMs thus blur the line between harmless noise and meaning - changing edits, often treating both as ignorable. Masking salient anchors such as function names can force re - evaluation. We advocate evaluation and training protocols that reward differential sensitivity: stay steady under benign noise but adapt - or refuse - when semantics truly change.

Recently, leveraging pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) for time series (TS) tasks has gained increasing attention, which involves activating and enhancing LLMs' capabilities. Many methods aim to activate LLMs' capabilities based on token-level alignment but overlook LLMs' inherent strength on natural language processing -- their deep understanding of linguistic logic and structure rather than superficial embedding processing. We propose Context-Alignment, a new paradigm that aligns TS with a linguistic component in the language environments familiar to LLMs to enable LLMs to contextualize and comprehend TS data, thereby activating their capabilities. Specifically, such context-level alignment comprises structural alignment and logical alignment, which is achieved by a Dual-Scale Context-Alignment GNNs (DSCA-GNNs) applied to TS-language multimodal inputs. Structural alignment utilizes dual-scale nodes to describe hierarchical structure in TS-language, enabling LLMs treat long TS data as a whole linguistic component while preserving intrinsic token features. Logical alignment uses directed edges to guide logical relationships, ensuring coherence in the contextual semantics. Demonstration examples prompt are employed to construct Demonstration Examples based Context-Alignment (DECA) following DSCA-GNNs framework. DECA can be flexibly and repeatedly integrated into various layers of pre-trained LLMs to improve awareness of logic and structure, thereby enhancing performance. Extensive experiments show the effectiveness of DECA and the importance of Context-Alignment across tasks, particularly in few-shot and zero-shot forecasting, confirming that Context-Alignment provide powerful prior knowledge on context.

Diffusion models have demonstrated great success in the field of text-to-image generation. However, alleviating the misalignment between the text prompts and images is still challenging. The root reason behind the misalignment has not been extensively investigated. We observe that the misalignment is caused by inadequate token attention activation. We further attribute this phenomenon to the diffusion model's insufficient condition utilization, which is caused by its training paradigm. To address the issue, we propose CoMat, an end-to-end diffusion model fine-tuning strategy with an image-to-text concept matching mechanism. We leverage an image captioning model to measure image-to-text alignment and guide the diffusion model to revisit ignored tokens. A novel attribute concentration module is also proposed to address the attribute binding problem. Without any image or human preference data, we use only 20K text prompts to fine-tune SDXL to obtain CoMat-SDXL. Extensive experiments show that CoMat-SDXL significantly outperforms the baseline model SDXL in two text-to-image alignment benchmarks and achieves start-of-the-art performance.

Diffusion models excel at image generation. Recent studies have shown that these models not only generate high-quality images but also encode text-image alignment information through attention maps or loss functions. This information is valuable for various downstream tasks, including segmentation, text-guided image editing, and compositional image generation. However, current methods heavily rely on the assumption of perfect text-image alignment in diffusion models, which is not the case. In this paper, we propose using zero-shot referring image segmentation as a proxy task to evaluate the pixel-level image and class-level text alignment of popular diffusion models. We conduct an in-depth analysis of pixel-text misalignment in diffusion models from the perspective of training data bias. We find that misalignment occurs in images with small sized, occluded, or rare object classes. Therefore, we propose ELBO-T2IAlign, a simple yet effective method to calibrate pixel-text alignment in diffusion models based on the evidence lower bound (ELBO) of likelihood. Our method is training-free and generic, eliminating the need to identify the specific cause of misalignment and works well across various diffusion model architectures. Extensive experiments on commonly used benchmark datasets on image segmentation and generation have verified the effectiveness of our proposed calibration approach.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive reasoning abilities, yet their reliance on structured step-by-step processing reveals a critical limitation. While human cognition fluidly adapts between intuitive, heuristic (System 1) and analytical, deliberative (System 2) reasoning depending on the context, LLMs lack this dynamic flexibility. This rigidity can lead to brittle and unreliable performance when faced with tasks that deviate from their trained patterns. To address this, we create a dataset of 2,000 samples with valid System 1 and System 2 answers, explicitly align LLMs with these reasoning styles, and evaluate their performance across reasoning benchmarks. Our results reveal an accuracy-efficiency trade-off: System 2-aligned models excel in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning, while System 1-aligned models perform better in commonsense tasks. A mechanistic analysis of model responses shows that System 1 models employ more definitive answers, whereas System 2 models demonstrate greater uncertainty. Interpolating between these extremes produces a monotonic transition in reasoning accuracy, preserving coherence. This work challenges the assumption that step-by-step reasoning is always optimal and highlights the need for adapting reasoning strategies based on task demands.

Reasoning is central to human intelligence. However, fallacious arguments are common, and some exacerbate problems such as spreading misinformation about climate change. In this paper, we propose the task of logical fallacy detection, and provide a new dataset (Logic) of logical fallacies generally found in text, together with an additional challenge set for detecting logical fallacies in climate change claims (LogicClimate). Detecting logical fallacies is a hard problem as the model must understand the underlying logical structure of the argument. We find that existing pretrained large language models perform poorly on this task. In contrast, we show that a simple structure-aware classifier outperforms the best language model by 5.46% on Logic and 4.51% on LogicClimate. We encourage future work to explore this task as (a) it can serve as a new reasoning challenge for language models, and (b) it can have potential applications in tackling the spread of misinformation. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/causalNLP/logical-fallacy

We present BIS Reasoning 1.0, the first large-scale Japanese dataset of syllogistic reasoning problems explicitly designed to evaluate belief-inconsistent reasoning in large language models (LLMs). Unlike prior datasets such as NeuBAROCO and JFLD, which focus on general or belief-aligned reasoning, BIS Reasoning 1.0 introduces logically valid yet belief-inconsistent syllogisms to uncover reasoning biases in LLMs trained on human-aligned corpora. We benchmark state-of-the-art models - including GPT models, Claude models, and leading Japanese LLMs - revealing significant variance in performance, with GPT-4o achieving 79.54% accuracy. Our analysis identifies critical weaknesses in current LLMs when handling logically valid but belief-conflicting inputs. These findings have important implications for deploying LLMs in high-stakes domains such as law, healthcare, and scientific literature, where truth must override intuitive belief to ensure integrity and safety.

Existing Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are predominantly trained and tested on consistent visual-textual inputs, leaving open the question of whether they can handle inconsistencies in real-world, layout-rich content. To bridge this gap, we propose the Multimodal Inconsistency Reasoning (MMIR) benchmark to assess MLLMs' ability to detect and reason about semantic mismatches in artifacts such as webpages, presentation slides, and posters. MMIR comprises 534 challenging samples, each containing synthetically injected errors across five reasoning-heavy categories: Factual Contradiction, Identity Misattribution, Contextual Mismatch, Quantitative Discrepancy, and Temporal/Spatial Incoherence. We evaluate six state-of-the-art MLLMs, showing that models with dedicated multimodal reasoning capabilities, such as o1, substantially outperform their counterparts while open-source models remain particularly vulnerable to inconsistency errors. Detailed error analyses further show that models excel in detecting inconsistencies confined to a single modality, particularly in text, but struggle with cross-modal conflicts and complex layouts. Probing experiments reveal that single-modality prompting, including Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Set-of-Mark (SoM) methods, yields marginal gains, revealing a key bottleneck in cross-modal reasoning. Our findings highlight the need for advanced multimodal reasoning and point to future research on multimodal inconsistency.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in reasoning tasks but face limitations in mathematical and complex logical reasoning. Existing methods to improve LLMs' logical capabilities either involve traceable or verifiable logical sequences that generate more reliable responses by constructing logical structures yet increase computational costs, or introduces rigid logic template rules, reducing flexibility. In this paper, we propose Reversal of Thought (RoT), a novel framework aimed at enhancing the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. RoT utilizes a Preference-Guided Reverse Reasoning warm-up strategy, which integrates logical symbols for pseudocode planning through meta-cognitive mechanisms and pairwise preference self-evaluation to generate task-specific prompts solely through demonstrations, aligning with LLMs' cognitive preferences shaped by Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Through reverse reasoning, we ultilize a Cognitive Preference Manager to assess knowledge boundaries and further expand LLMs' reasoning capabilities by aggregating solution logic for known tasks and stylistic templates for unknown tasks. Experiments across various tasks demonstrate that RoT surpasses existing baselines in both reasoning accuracy and efficiency.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve from conversational assistants into autonomous agents, evaluating the safety of their actions becomes critical. Prior safety benchmarks have primarily focused on preventing generation of harmful content, such as toxic text. However, they overlook the challenge of agents taking harmful actions when the most effective path to an operational goal conflicts with human safety. To address this gap, we introduce ManagerBench, a benchmark that evaluates LLM decision-making in realistic, human-validated managerial scenarios. Each scenario forces a choice between a pragmatic but harmful action that achieves an operational goal, and a safe action that leads to worse operational performance. A parallel control set, where potential harm is directed only at inanimate objects, measures a model's pragmatism and identifies its tendency to be overly safe. Our findings indicate that the frontier LLMs perform poorly when navigating this safety-pragmatism trade-off. Many consistently choose harmful options to advance their operational goals, while others avoid harm only to become overly safe and ineffective. Critically, we find this misalignment does not stem from an inability to perceive harm, as models' harm assessments align with human judgments, but from flawed prioritization. ManagerBench is a challenging benchmark for a core component of agentic behavior: making safe choices when operational goals and alignment values incentivize conflicting actions. Benchmark & code available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/ManagerBench.

In interactions between users and language model agents, user utterances frequently exhibit ellipsis (omission of words or phrases) or imprecision (lack of exactness) to prioritize efficiency. This can lead to varying interpretations of the same input based on different assumptions or background knowledge. It is thus crucial for agents to adeptly handle the inherent ambiguity in queries to ensure reliability. However, even state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) still face challenges in such scenarios, primarily due to the following hurdles: (1) LLMs are not explicitly trained to deal with ambiguous utterances; (2) the degree of ambiguity perceived by the LLMs may vary depending on the possessed knowledge. To address these issues, we propose Alignment with Perceived Ambiguity (APA), a novel pipeline that aligns LLMs to manage ambiguous queries by leveraging their own assessment of ambiguity (i.e., perceived ambiguity). Experimental results on question-answering datasets demonstrate that APA empowers LLMs to explicitly detect and manage ambiguous queries while retaining the ability to answer clear questions. Furthermore, our finding proves that APA excels beyond training with gold-standard labels, especially in out-of-distribution scenarios.

Recent years have witnessed remarkable progress made in large language models (LLMs). Such advancements, while garnering significant attention, have concurrently elicited various concerns. The potential of these models is undeniably vast; however, they may yield texts that are imprecise, misleading, or even detrimental. Consequently, it becomes paramount to employ alignment techniques to ensure these models to exhibit behaviors consistent with human values. This survey endeavors to furnish an extensive exploration of alignment methodologies designed for LLMs, in conjunction with the extant capability research in this domain. Adopting the lens of AI alignment, we categorize the prevailing methods and emergent proposals for the alignment of LLMs into outer and inner alignment. We also probe into salient issues including the models' interpretability, and potential vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. To assess LLM alignment, we present a wide variety of benchmarks and evaluation methodologies. After discussing the state of alignment research for LLMs, we finally cast a vision toward the future, contemplating the promising avenues of research that lie ahead. Our aspiration for this survey extends beyond merely spurring research interests in this realm. We also envision bridging the gap between the AI alignment research community and the researchers engrossed in the capability exploration of LLMs for both capable and safe LLMs.

We introduce Aligner, a novel Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) method for aligning multi-billion-parameter-sized Large Language Models (LLMs). Aligner employs a unique design that constructs a globally shared set of tunable tokens that modify the attention of every layer. Remarkably with this method, even when using one token accounting for a mere 5,000 parameters, Aligner can still perform comparably well to state-of-the-art LLM adaptation methods like LoRA that require millions of parameters. This capacity is substantiated in both instruction following and value alignment tasks. Besides the multiple order-of-magnitude improvement in parameter efficiency, the insight Aligner provides into the internal mechanisms of LLMs is also valuable. The architectural features and efficacy of our method, in addition to our experiments demonstrate that an LLM separates its internal handling of "form" and "knowledge" in a somewhat orthogonal manner. This finding promises to motivate new research into LLM mechanism understanding and value alignment.

Large language models (LLMs) can correctly answer "When was Einstein born?" yet fail to provide the same date when writing about Einstein's life revealing a fundamental inconsistency in how models access factual knowledge across task complexities. While models display impressive accuracy on factual question-answering benchmarks, the reliability gap between simple and complex queries remains poorly understood, eroding their trustworthiness. In this work, we introduce Short-Long Form Alignment for Factual Question Answering (SLAQ), a controlled evaluation framework that compares LLMs' answers to the same factual questions asked (a) in isolation (short) vs. (b) integrated into complex queries (long). Looking at 16 LLMs across 600 queries, we find a systematic misalignment of answers to the corresponding short and long queries. We further uncover position-dependent accuracy loss and momentum effects where consecutive correct or incorrect answers create self-reinforcing patterns. Through mechanistic analysis, we find that aligned facts activate overlapping model internals, and that metrics based on mechanistic similarity can predict short-long answer alignment with up to 78% accuracy. Our work establishes factual consistency over query complexity as an important aspect of LLMs' trustworthiness and challenges current evaluation practices, which implicitly assume that good performance for simple factual queries implies reliability in more complex knowledge-seeking tasks too.

Aligning generative models with human preference via RLHF typically suffers from overoptimization, where an imperfectly learned reward model can misguide the generative model to output undesired responses. We investigate this problem in a principled manner by identifying the source of the misalignment as a form of distributional shift and uncertainty in learning human preferences. To mitigate overoptimization, we first propose a theoretical algorithm that chooses the best policy for an adversarially chosen reward model; one that simultaneously minimizes the maximum likelihood estimation of the loss and a reward penalty term. Here, the reward penalty term is introduced to prevent the policy from choosing actions with spurious high proxy rewards, resulting in provable sample efficiency of the algorithm under a partial coverage style condition. Moving from theory to practice, the proposed algorithm further enjoys an equivalent but surprisingly easy-to-implement reformulation. Using the equivalence between reward models and the corresponding optimal policy, the algorithm features a simple objective that combines: (i) a preference optimization loss that directly aligns the policy with human preference, and (ii) a supervised learning loss that explicitly imitates the policy with a (suitable) baseline distribution. In the context of aligning large language models (LLM), this objective fuses the direct preference optimization (DPO) loss with the supervised fune-tuning (SFT) loss to help mitigate the overoptimization towards undesired responses, for which we name the algorithm Regularized Preference Optimization (RPO). Experiments of aligning LLMs demonstrate the improved performance of RPO compared with DPO baselines. Our work sheds light on the interplay between preference optimization and SFT in tuning LLMs with both theoretical guarantees and empirical evidence.

A prominent weakness of modern language models (LMs) is their tendency to generate factually incorrect text, which hinders their usability. A natural question is whether such factual errors can be detected automatically. Inspired by truth-seeking mechanisms in law, we propose a factuality evaluation framework for LMs that is based on cross-examination. Our key idea is that an incorrect claim is likely to result in inconsistency with other claims that the model generates. To discover such inconsistencies, we facilitate a multi-turn interaction between the LM that generated the claim and another LM (acting as an examiner) which introduces questions to discover inconsistencies. We empirically evaluate our method on factual claims made by multiple recent LMs on four benchmarks, finding that it outperforms existing methods and baselines, often by a large gap. Our results demonstrate the potential of using interacting LMs for capturing factual errors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities in familiar contexts, but struggle when the context conflicts with their parametric knowledge. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce CounterLogic, a dataset containing 1,800 examples across 9 logical schemas, explicitly designed to evaluate logical reasoning through counterfactual (hypothetical knowledge-conflicting) scenarios. Our systematic evaluation of 11 LLMs across 6 different datasets reveals a consistent performance degradation, with accuracies dropping by 27% on average when reasoning through counterfactual information. We propose Self-Segregate, a prompting method enabling metacognitive awareness (explicitly identifying knowledge conflicts) before reasoning. Our method dramatically narrows the average performance gaps from 27% to just 11%, while significantly increasing the overall accuracy (+7.5%). We discuss the implications of these findings and draw parallels to human cognitive processes, particularly on how humans disambiguate conflicting information during reasoning tasks. Our findings offer practical insights for understanding and enhancing LLMs reasoning capabilities in real-world applications, especially where models must logically reason independently of their factual knowledge.

While existing image-text alignment models reach high quality binary assessments, they fall short of pinpointing the exact source of misalignment. In this paper, we present a method to provide detailed textual and visual explanation of detected misalignments between text-image pairs. We leverage large language models and visual grounding models to automatically construct a training set that holds plausible misaligned captions for a given image and corresponding textual explanations and visual indicators. We also publish a new human curated test set comprising ground-truth textual and visual misalignment annotations. Empirical results show that fine-tuning vision language models on our training set enables them to articulate misalignments and visually indicate them within images, outperforming strong baselines both on the binary alignment classification and the explanation generation tasks. Our method code and human curated test set are available at: https://mismatch-quest.github.io/

This paper introduces a novel approach to evaluating deep learning models' capacity for in-diagram logic interpretation. Leveraging the intriguing realm of visual illusions, we establish a unique dataset, InDL, designed to rigorously test and benchmark these models. Deep learning has witnessed remarkable progress in domains such as computer vision and natural language processing. However, models often stumble in tasks requiring logical reasoning due to their inherent 'black box' characteristics, which obscure the decision-making process. Our work presents a new lens to understand these models better by focusing on their handling of visual illusions -- a complex interplay of perception and logic. We utilize six classic geometric optical illusions to create a comparative framework between human and machine visual perception. This methodology offers a quantifiable measure to rank models, elucidating potential weaknesses and providing actionable insights for model improvements. Our experimental results affirm the efficacy of our benchmarking strategy, demonstrating its ability to effectively rank models based on their logic interpretation ability. As part of our commitment to reproducible research, the source code and datasets will be made publicly available at https://github.com/rabbit-magic-wh/InDL

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated that reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) can significantly enhance reasoning abilities by directly optimizing correctness, rather than relying solely on supervised imitation. This paradigm has been extended to multimodal LLMs for complex video and image understanding tasks. However, while outcome-driven RL improves answer accuracy, it can inadvertently decouple the reasoning chain from the final answer, leading to situations where models produce inconsistency between the reasoning trace and final answer. In our experiments on multiple-choice visual question-answering tasks, the standard GRPO method yields only 79.7\% consistency on MMVU between the reasoning steps and the chosen answers, indicating frequent mismatches between answers and reasoning. To this end, we propose Answer-Consistent Reinforcement Learning (ACRE) that modifies the GRPO algorithm with an auxiliary consistency check. After the model generates a chain of thought and an initial answer for a given question, we shuffle the answer options and prompt the model again with the same reasoning trace to predict a second answer. We design a consistency-verification reward that grants a high reward only if both the original and the post-shuffle answers agree and are correct; otherwise, a lower reward is assigned accordingly. This mechanism penalizes reasoning-answer misalignment and discourages the model from relying on spurious patterns, such as option ordering biases. We evaluate ACRE on challenging Video Reasoning benchmarks and multimodal math reasoning benchmarks, achieving an average 2.2\% and 1.5\% improvement for Video Reasoning and Math Reasoning tasks over the GRPO baseline.

We provide here a dataset for tasks related to natural language understanding and natural language inference. The dataset contains logical puzzles in natural language from three domains: comparing puzzles, knighs and knaves, and zebra puzzles. Each puzzle is associated with the entire set of atomic questions that can be generated based on the relations and individuals occurring in the text. For each question we provide the correct answer: entailment, contradiction or ambiguity. The answer's correctness is verified against theorem provers. Good puzzles have two properties: (i) each piece of information is necessary and (ii) no unnecessary information is provided. These properties make puzzles interesting candidates for machine comprehension tasks.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

Logic reasoning in natural language has been recognized as an important measure of human intelligence for Large Language Models (LLMs). Popular benchmarks may entangle multiple reasoning skills and thus provide unfaithful evaluations on the logic reasoning skill. Meanwhile, existing logic reasoning benchmarks are limited in language diversity and their distributions are deviated from the distribution of an ideal logic reasoning benchmark, which may lead to biased evaluation results. This paper thereby proposes a new classical logic benchmark DivLogicEval, consisting of natural sentences composed of diverse statements in a counterintuitive way. To ensure a more reliable evaluation, we also introduce a new evaluation metric that mitigates the influence of bias and randomness inherent in LLMs. Through experiments, we demonstrate the extent to which logical reasoning is required to answer the questions in DivLogicEval and compare the performance of different popular LLMs in conducting logical reasoning.

Pre-trained large language model (LLM) is under exploration to perform NLP tasks that may require logical reasoning. Logic-driven data augmentation for representation learning has been shown to improve the performance of tasks requiring logical reasoning, but most of these data rely on designed templates and therefore lack generalization. In this regard, we propose an AMR-based logical equivalence-driven data augmentation method (AMR-LE) for generating logically equivalent data. Specifically, we first parse a text into the form of an AMR graph, next apply four logical equivalence laws (contraposition, double negation, commutative and implication laws) on the AMR graph to construct a logically equivalent/inequivalent AMR graph, and then convert it into a logically equivalent/inequivalent sentence. To help the model to better learn these logical equivalence laws, we propose a logical equivalence-driven contrastive learning training paradigm, which aims to distinguish the difference between logical equivalence and inequivalence. Our AMR-LE (Ensemble) achieves #2 on the ReClor leaderboard https://eval.ai/web/challenges/challenge-page/503/leaderboard/1347 . Our model shows better performance on seven downstream tasks, including ReClor, LogiQA, MNLI, MRPC, RTE, QNLI, and QQP. The source code and dataset are public at https://github.com/Strong-AI-Lab/Logical-Equivalence-driven-AMR-Data-Augmentation-for-Representation-Learning .

Logical reasoning is central to complex human activities, such as thinking, debating, and planning; it is also a central component of many AI systems as well. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which encoder-only transformer language models (LMs) can reason according to logical rules. We ask whether those LMs can deduce theorems in propositional calculus and first-order logic; if their relative success in these problems reflects general logical capabilities; and which layers contribute the most to the task. First, we show for several encoder-only LMs that they can be trained, to a reasonable degree, to determine logical validity on various datasets. Next, by cross-probing fine-tuned models on these datasets, we show that LMs have difficulty in transferring their putative logical reasoning ability, which suggests that they may have learned dataset-specific features, instead of a general capability. Finally, we conduct a layerwise probing experiment, which shows that the hypothesis classification task is mostly solved through higher layers.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Recent advancements in general-purpose AI have highlighted the importance of guiding AI systems towards the intended goals, ethical principles, and values of individuals and groups, a concept broadly recognized as alignment. However, the lack of clarified definitions and scopes of human-AI alignment poses a significant obstacle, hampering collaborative efforts across research domains to achieve this alignment. In particular, ML- and philosophy-oriented alignment research often views AI alignment as a static, unidirectional process (i.e., aiming to ensure that AI systems' objectives match humans) rather than an ongoing, mutual alignment problem [429]. This perspective largely neglects the long-term interaction and dynamic changes of alignment. To understand these gaps, we introduce a systematic review of over 400 papers published between 2019 and January 2024, spanning multiple domains such as Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine Learning (ML), and others. We characterize, define and scope human-AI alignment. From this, we present a conceptual framework of "Bidirectional Human-AI Alignment" to organize the literature from a human-centered perspective. This framework encompasses both 1) conventional studies of aligning AI to humans that ensures AI produces the intended outcomes determined by humans, and 2) a proposed concept of aligning humans to AI, which aims to help individuals and society adjust to AI advancements both cognitively and behaviorally. Additionally, we articulate the key findings derived from literature analysis, including discussions about human values, interaction techniques, and evaluations. To pave the way for future studies, we envision three key challenges for future directions and propose examples of potential future solutions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are expected to provide helpful and harmless responses, yet they often exhibit sycophancy--conforming to user beliefs regardless of factual accuracy or ethical soundness. Prior research on sycophancy has primarily focused on single-turn factual correctness, overlooking the dynamics of real-world interactions. In this work, we introduce SYCON Bench, a novel benchmark for evaluating sycophantic behavior in multi-turn, free-form conversational settings. Our benchmark measures how quickly a model conforms to the user (Turn of Flip) and how frequently it shifts its stance under sustained user pressure (Number of Flip). Applying SYCON Bench to 17 LLMs across three real-world scenarios, we find that sycophancy remains a prevalent failure mode. Our analysis shows that alignment tuning amplifies sycophantic behavior, whereas model scaling and reasoning optimization strengthen the model's ability to resist undesirable user views. Reasoning models generally outperform instruction-tuned models but often fail when they over-index on logical exposition instead of directly addressing the user's underlying beliefs. Finally, we evaluate four additional prompting strategies and demonstrate that adopting a third-person perspective reduces sycophancy by up to 63.8% in debate scenario. We release our code and data at https://github.com/JiseungHong/SYCON-Bench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated revolutionary capabilities in understanding complex contexts and performing a wide range of tasks. However, LLMs can also answer questions that are unethical or harmful, raising concerns about their applications. To regulate LLMs' responses to such questions, a training strategy called alignment can help. Yet, alignment can be unexpectedly compromised when fine-tuning an LLM for downstream tasks. This paper focuses on recovering the alignment lost during fine-tuning. We observe that there are two distinct directions inherent in an aligned LLM: the aligned direction and the harmful direction. An LLM is inclined to answer questions in the aligned direction while refusing queries in the harmful direction. Therefore, we propose to recover the harmful direction of the fine-tuned model that has been compromised. Specifically, we restore a small subset of the fine-tuned model's weight parameters from the original aligned model using gradient descent. We also introduce a rollback mechanism to avoid aggressive recovery and maintain downstream task performance. Our evaluation on 125 fine-tuned LLMs demonstrates that our method can reduce their harmful rate (percentage of answering harmful questions) from 33.25\% to 1.74\%, without sacrificing task performance much. In contrast, the existing methods either only reduce the harmful rate to a limited extent or significantly impact the normal functionality. Our code is available at https://github.com/kangyangWHU/LLMAlignment

Existing perceptual similarity metrics assume an image and its reference are well aligned. As a result, these metrics are often sensitive to a small alignment error that is imperceptible to the human eyes. This paper studies the effect of small misalignment, specifically a small shift between the input and reference image, on existing metrics, and accordingly develops a shift-tolerant similarity metric. This paper builds upon LPIPS, a widely used learned perceptual similarity metric, and explores architectural design considerations to make it robust against imperceptible misalignment. Specifically, we study a wide spectrum of neural network elements, such as anti-aliasing filtering, pooling, striding, padding, and skip connection, and discuss their roles in making a robust metric. Based on our studies, we develop a new deep neural network-based perceptual similarity metric. Our experiments show that our metric is tolerant to imperceptible shifts while being consistent with the human similarity judgment.

The recent successful paradigm of solving logical reasoning problems with tool-augmented large language models (LLMs) leverages translation of natural language (NL) statements into First-Order Logic~(FOL) and external theorem provers. However, the correctness of FOL statements, comprising operators and text, often go unverified due to the lack of a reliable evaluation metric for comparing generated and ground-truth FOLs. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study on the sensitivity of existing NL-, FOL-, and graph-based metrics to capture differences between a sampled FOL and its corresponding ground-truth. We then measure the alignment between a metric-based ranking of FOL outputs and a strong LLM as-a-judge. To do this, we first apply operator and text-based perturbations to ground-truth FOL statements to assess metric sensitivity. We then evaluate metric robustness by comparing the metrics against LLMs judgment. Our empirical findings highlight a clear oversensitivity in the n-gram metric BLEU for text perturbations. The operator perturbation affects the semantic graph metric Smatch++ for structural changes, and the FOL metric for specific operator changes. We observe a closer alignment between BertScore and LLM judgement, proving the importance of semantic evaluation. Additionally, we show that combining metrics enhances both robustness and sensitivity compared to using individual metrics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to meet ethical standards and safety requirements by training them to refuse answering harmful or unsafe prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate how adversaries can exploit LLMs' alignment to implant bias, or enforce targeted censorship without degrading the model's responsiveness to unrelated topics. Specifically, we propose Subversive Alignment Injection (SAI), a poisoning attack that leverages the alignment mechanism to trigger refusal on specific topics or queries predefined by the adversary. Although it is perhaps not surprising that refusal can be induced through overalignment, we demonstrate how this refusal can be exploited to inject bias into the model. Surprisingly, SAI evades state-of-the-art poisoning defenses including LLM state forensics, as well as robust aggregation techniques that are designed to detect poisoning in FL settings. We demonstrate the practical dangers of this attack by illustrating its end-to-end impacts on LLM-powered application pipelines. For chat based applications such as ChatDoctor, with 1% data poisoning, the system refuses to answer healthcare questions to targeted racial category leading to high bias (Delta DP of 23%). We also show that bias can be induced in other NLP tasks: for a resume selection pipeline aligned to refuse to summarize CVs from a selected university, high bias in selection (Delta DP of 27%) results. Even higher bias (Delta DP~38%) results on 9 other chat based downstream applications.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

With the availability of diverse sensor modalities (i.e., RGB, Depth, Infrared) and the success of multi-modal learning, multi-modal face anti-spoofing (FAS) has emerged as a prominent research focus. The intuition behind it is that leveraging multiple modalities can uncover more intrinsic spoofing traces. However, this approach presents more risk of misalignment. We identify two main types of misalignment: (1) Intra-domain modality misalignment, where the importance of each modality varies across different attacks. For instance, certain modalities (e.g., Depth) may be non-defensive against specific attacks (e.g., 3D mask), indicating that each modality has unique strengths and weaknesses in countering particular attacks. Consequently, simple fusion strategies may fall short. (2) Inter-domain modality misalignment, where the introduction of additional modalities exacerbates domain shifts, potentially overshadowing the benefits of complementary fusion. To tackle (1), we propose a alignment module between modalities based on mutual information, which adaptively enhances favorable modalities while suppressing unfavorable ones. To address (2), we employ a dual alignment optimization method that aligns both sub-domain hyperplanes and modality angle margins, thereby mitigating domain gaps. Our method, dubbed Dual Alignment of Domain and Modality (DADM), achieves state-of-the-art performance in extensive experiments across four challenging protocols demonstrating its robustness in multi-modal domain generalization scenarios. The codes will be released soon.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning capabilities across various tasks. However, even minor variations in query phrasing, despite preserving the underlying semantic meaning, can significantly affect their performance. To address this, we focus on enhancing LLMs' awareness of symmetry in query variations and propose syMmetry-ENhanceD (MEND) Data Augmentation, a data-centric approach that improves the model's ability to extract useful information from context. Unlike existing methods that emphasize reasoning chain augmentation, our approach improves model robustness at the knowledge extraction stage through query augmentations, enabling more data-efficient training and stronger generalization to Out-of-Distribution (OOD) settings. Extensive experiments on both logical and arithmetic reasoning tasks show that MEND enhances reasoning performance across diverse query variations, providing new insight into improving LLM robustness through structured dataset curation.

In AI alignment, extensive latitude must be granted to annotators, either human or algorithmic, to judge which model outputs are `better' or `safer.' We refer to this latitude as alignment discretion. Such discretion remains largely unexamined, posing two risks: (i) annotators may use their power of discretion arbitrarily, and (ii) models may fail to mimic this discretion. To study this phenomenon, we draw on legal concepts of discretion that structure how decision-making authority is conferred and exercised, particularly in cases where principles conflict or their application is unclear or irrelevant. Extended to AI alignment, discretion is required when alignment principles and rules are (inevitably) conflicting or indecisive. We present a set of metrics to systematically analyze when and how discretion in AI alignment is exercised, such that both risks (i) and (ii) can be observed. Moreover, we distinguish between human and algorithmic discretion and analyze the discrepancy between them. By measuring both human and algorithmic discretion over safety alignment datasets, we reveal layers of discretion in the alignment process that were previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, we demonstrate how algorithms trained on these datasets develop their own forms of discretion in interpreting and applying these principles, which challenges the purpose of having any principles at all. Our paper presents the first step towards formalizing this core gap in current alignment processes, and we call on the community to further scrutinize and control alignment discretion.

Logical reasoning task has attracted great interest since it was proposed. Faced with such a task, current competitive models, even large language models (e.g., ChatGPT and PaLM 2), still perform badly. Previous promising LMs struggle in logical consistency modeling and logical structure perception. To this end, we model the logical reasoning task by transforming each logical sample into reasoning paths and propose an architecture PathReasoner. It addresses the task from the views of both data and model. To expand the diversity of the logical samples, we propose an atom extension strategy supported by equivalent logical formulas, to form new reasoning paths. From the model perspective, we design a stack of transformer-style blocks. In particular, we propose a path-attention module to joint model in-atom and cross-atom relations with the high-order diffusion strategy. Experiments show that PathReasoner achieves competitive performances on two logical reasoning benchmarks and great generalization abilities.

A common approach for aligning language models to human preferences is to first learn a reward model from preference data, and then use this reward model to update the language model. We study two closely related problems that arise in this approach. First, any monotone transformation of the reward model preserves preference ranking; is there a choice that is ``better'' than others? Second, we often wish to align language models to multiple properties: how should we combine multiple reward models? Using a probabilistic interpretation of the alignment procedure, we identify a natural choice for transformation for (the common case of) rewards learned from Bradley-Terry preference models. This derived transformation has two important properties. First, it emphasizes improving poorly-performing outputs, rather than outputs that already score well. This mitigates both underfitting (where some prompts are not improved) and reward hacking (where the model learns to exploit misspecification of the reward model). Second, it enables principled aggregation of rewards by linking summation to logical conjunction: the sum of transformed rewards corresponds to the probability that the output is ``good'' in all measured properties, in a sense we make precise. Experiments aligning language models to be both helpful and harmless using RLHF show substantial improvements over the baseline (non-transformed) approach.

We study how large language models (LLMs) ``think'' through their representation space. We propose a novel geometric framework that models an LLM's reasoning as flows -- embedding trajectories evolving where logic goes. We disentangle logical structure from semantics by employing the same natural deduction propositions with varied semantic carriers, allowing us to test whether LLMs internalize logic beyond surface form. This perspective connects reasoning with geometric quantities such as position, velocity, and curvature, enabling formal analysis in representation and concept spaces. Our theory establishes: (1) LLM reasoning corresponds to smooth flows in representation space, and (2) logical statements act as local controllers of these flows' velocities. Using learned representation proxies, we design controlled experiments to visualize and quantify reasoning flows, providing empirical validation of our theoretical framework. Our work serves as both a conceptual foundation and practical tools for studying reasoning phenomenon, offering a new lens for interpretability and formal analysis of LLMs' behavior.

The reversal curse -- a language model's (LM) inability to infer an unseen fact ``B is A'' from a learned fact ``A is B'' -- is widely considered a fundamental limitation. We show that this is not an inherent failure but an artifact of how models encode knowledge. By training LMs from scratch on a synthetic dataset of relational knowledge graphs, we demonstrate that bilinear relational structure emerges in their hidden representations. This structure substantially alleviates the reversal curse, enabling LMs to infer unseen reverse facts. Crucially, we also find that this bilinear structure plays a key role in consistent model editing. When a fact is updated in a LM with this structure, the edit correctly propagates to its reverse and other logically dependent facts. In contrast, models lacking this representation not only suffer from the reversal curse but also fail to generalize edits, further introducing logical inconsistencies. Our results establish that training on a relational knowledge dataset induces the emergence of bilinear internal representations, which in turn enable LMs to behave in a logically consistent manner after editing. This implies that the success of model editing depends critically not just on editing algorithms but on the underlying representational geometry of the knowledge being modified.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

Recent works have shown the benefits to LLMs from fine-tuning golden-standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) rationales or using them as correct examples in few-shot prompting. While humans can indeed imitate correct examples, learning from our mistakes is another vital aspect of human cognition. Hence, a question naturally arises: can LLMs learn and benefit from their mistakes, especially for their reasoning? This study investigates this problem from both the prompting and model-tuning perspectives. We begin by introducing CoTErrorSet, a new benchmark with 609,432 questions, each designed with both correct and error references, and demonstrating the types and reasons for making such mistakes. To explore the effectiveness of those mistakes, we design two methods: (1) Self-rethinking prompting guides LLMs to rethink whether they have made similar previous mistakes; and (2) Mistake tuning involves finetuning models in both correct and incorrect reasoning domains, rather than only tuning models to learn ground truth in traditional methodology. We conduct a series of experiments to prove LLMs can obtain benefits from mistakes in both directions. Our two methods offer potentially cost-effective strategies by leveraging errors to enhance reasoning capabilities, which costs significantly less than creating meticulously hand-crafted golden references. We ultimately make a thorough analysis of the reasons behind LLMs' errors, which provides directions that future research needs to overcome. CoTErrorSet will be published soon on \url{https://github.com/YookiTong/Learn-from-Mistakes-CotErrorSet}.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) can lead to unintended out-of-distribution generalization. Standard approaches to this problem rely on modifying training data, for example by adding data that better specify the intended generalization. However, this is not always practical. We introduce Concept Ablation Fine-Tuning (CAFT), a technique that leverages interpretability tools to control how LLMs generalize from fine-tuning, without needing to modify the training data or otherwise use data from the target distribution. Given a set of directions in an LLM's latent space corresponding to undesired concepts, CAFT works by ablating these concepts with linear projections during fine-tuning, steering the model away from unintended generalizations. We successfully apply CAFT to three fine-tuning tasks, including emergent misalignment, a phenomenon where LLMs fine-tuned on a narrow task generalize to give egregiously misaligned responses to general questions. Without any changes to the fine-tuning data, CAFT reduces misaligned responses by 10x without degrading performance on the training distribution. Overall, CAFT represents a novel approach for steering LLM generalization without modifying training data.

Large language models encode a vast amount of semantic knowledge and possess remarkable understanding and reasoning capabilities. Previous research has explored how to ground language models in robotic tasks to ensure that the sequences generated by the language model are both logically correct and practically executable. However, low-level execution may deviate from the high-level plan due to environmental perturbations or imperfect controller design. In this paper, we propose DoReMi, a novel language model grounding framework that enables immediate Detection and Recovery from Misalignments between plan and execution. Specifically, LLMs are leveraged for both planning and generating constraints for planned steps. These constraints can indicate plan-execution misalignments and we use a vision question answering (VQA) model to check constraints during low-level skill execution. If certain misalignment occurs, our method will call the language model to re-plan in order to recover from misalignments. Experiments on various complex tasks including robot arms and humanoid robots demonstrate that our method can lead to higher task success rates and shorter task completion times. Videos of DoReMi are available at https://sites.google.com/view/doremi-paper.

Language models have demonstrated remarkable performance in solving reasoning tasks; however, even the strongest models still occasionally make reasoning mistakes. Recently, there has been active research aimed at improving reasoning accuracy, particularly by using pretrained language models to "self-correct" their mistakes via multi-round prompting. In this paper, we follow this line of work but focus on understanding the usefulness of incorporating "error-correction" data directly into the pretraining stage. This data consists of erroneous solution steps immediately followed by their corrections. Using a synthetic math dataset, we show promising results: this type of pretrain data can help language models achieve higher reasoning accuracy directly (i.e., through simple auto-regression, without multi-round prompting) compared to pretraining on the same amount of error-free data. We also delve into many details, such as (1) how this approach differs from beam search, (2) how such data can be prepared, (3) whether masking is needed on the erroneous tokens, (4) the amount of error required, (5) whether such data can be deferred to the fine-tuning stage, and many others.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Monolingual word alignment is crucial to model semantic interactions between sentences. In particular, null alignment, a phenomenon in which words have no corresponding counterparts, is pervasive and critical in handling semantically divergent sentences. Identification of null alignment is useful on its own to reason about the semantic similarity of sentences by indicating there exists information inequality. To achieve unbalanced word alignment that values both alignment and null alignment, this study shows that the family of optimal transport (OT), i.e., balanced, partial, and unbalanced OT, are natural and powerful approaches even without tailor-made techniques. Our extensive experiments covering unsupervised and supervised settings indicate that our generic OT-based alignment methods are competitive against the state-of-the-arts specially designed for word alignment, remarkably on challenging datasets with high null alignment frequencies.

While self-correction has shown promise in improving LLM outputs in terms of style and quality (e.g. Chen et al., 2023; Madaan et al., 2023), recent attempts to self-correct logical or reasoning errors often cause correct answers to become incorrect, resulting in worse performances overall (Huang et al., 2023). In this paper, we break down the self-correction process into two core components: mistake finding and output correction. For mistake finding, we release BIG-Bench Mistake, a dataset of logical mistakes in Chain-of-Thought reasoning traces. We provide benchmark numbers for several state-of-the-art LLMs, and demonstrate that LLMs generally struggle with finding logical mistakes. For output correction, we propose a backtracking method which provides large improvements when given information on mistake location. We construe backtracking as a lightweight alternative to reinforcement learning methods, and show that it remains effective with a reward model at 60-70% accuracy.

Alignment in artificial intelligence pursues the consistency between model responses and human preferences as well as values. In practice, the multifaceted nature of human preferences inadvertently introduces what is known as the "alignment tax" -a compromise where enhancements in alignment within one objective (e.g.,harmlessness) can diminish performance in others (e.g.,helpfulness). However, existing alignment techniques are mostly unidirectional, leading to suboptimal trade-offs and poor flexibility over various objectives. To navigate this challenge, we argue the prominence of grounding LLMs with evident preferences. We introduce controllable preference optimization (CPO), which explicitly specifies preference scores for different objectives, thereby guiding the model to generate responses that meet the requirements. Our experimental analysis reveals that the aligned models can provide responses that match various preferences among the "3H" (helpfulness, honesty, harmlessness) desiderata. Furthermore, by introducing diverse data and alignment goals, we surpass baseline methods in aligning with single objectives, hence mitigating the impact of the alignment tax and achieving improvements in multi-objective alignment.

Background: Large language models (LLMs) are trained to follow directions, but this introduces a vulnerability to blindly comply with user requests even if they generate wrong information. In medicine, this could accelerate the generation of misinformation that impacts human well-being. Objectives/Methods: We analyzed compliance to requests to generate misleading content about medications in settings where models know the request is illogical. We investigated whether in-context directions and instruction-tuning of LLMs to prioritize logical reasoning over compliance reduced misinformation risk. Results: While all frontier LLMs complied with misinformation requests, both prompt-based and parameter-based approaches can improve the detection of logic flaws in requests and prevent the dissemination of medical misinformation. Conclusion: Shifting LLMs to prioritize logic over compliance could reduce risks of exploitation for medical misinformation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable abilities in structured reasoning and symbolic tasks, with coding emerging as a particular area of strength. This success has sparked growing interest in applying LLMs to mathematics, both in informal problem-solving and formal theorem proving. However, progress in formal mathematics has proven to be significantly more difficult, despite surface-level similarities between programming and proof construction. This discrepancy raises important questions about how LLMs ``reason'', how they are supervised, and whether they internally track a notion of computational or deductive state. In this article, we address the state-of-the-art of the discipline, focusing on recent models and benchmarks, and explore three central issues at the intersection of machine learning and mathematical cognition: (i) the trade-offs between formal and informal mathematics as training domains; (ii) the deeper reasons why proof generation remains more brittle than code synthesis; (iii) and the question of whether LLMs represent, or merely mimic, a notion of evolving logical state. Our goal is not to draw hard boundaries, but to identify where the current limits lie, and how they might be extended.

AI systems are increasingly governed by natural language principles, yet a key challenge arising from reliance on language remains underexplored: interpretive ambiguity. As in legal systems, ambiguity arises both from how these principles are written and how they are applied. But while legal systems use institutional safeguards to manage such ambiguity, such as transparent appellate review policing interpretive constraints, AI alignment pipelines offer no comparable protections. Different interpretations of the same rule can lead to inconsistent or unstable model behavior. Drawing on legal theory, we identify key gaps in current alignment pipelines by examining how legal systems constrain ambiguity at both the rule creation and rule application steps. We then propose a computational framework that mirrors two legal mechanisms: (1) a rule refinement pipeline that minimizes interpretive disagreement by revising ambiguous rules (analogous to agency rulemaking or iterative legislative action), and (2) prompt-based interpretive constraints that reduce inconsistency in rule application (analogous to legal canons that guide judicial discretion). We evaluate our framework on a 5,000-scenario subset of the WildChat dataset and show that both interventions significantly improve judgment consistency across a panel of reasonable interpreters. Our approach offers a first step toward systematically managing interpretive ambiguity, an essential step for building more robust, law-following AI systems.

Big models, exemplified by Large Language Models (LLMs), are models typically pre-trained on massive data and comprised of enormous parameters, which not only obtain significantly improved performance across diverse tasks but also present emergent capabilities absent in smaller models. However, the growing intertwining of big models with everyday human lives poses potential risks and might cause serious social harm. Therefore, many efforts have been made to align LLMs with humans to make them better follow user instructions and satisfy human preferences. Nevertheless, `what to align with' has not been fully discussed, and inappropriate alignment goals might even backfire. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive survey of different alignment goals in existing work and trace their evolution paths to help identify the most essential goal. Particularly, we investigate related works from two perspectives: the definition of alignment goals and alignment evaluation. Our analysis encompasses three distinct levels of alignment goals and reveals a goal transformation from fundamental abilities to value orientation, indicating the potential of intrinsic human values as the alignment goal for enhanced LLMs. Based on such results, we further discuss the challenges of achieving such intrinsic value alignment and provide a collection of available resources for future research on the alignment of big models.

Logical reasoning consistently plays a fundamental and significant role in the domains of knowledge engineering and artificial intelligence. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a noteworthy innovation in natural language processing (NLP), exhibiting impressive achievements across various classic NLP tasks. However, the question of whether LLMs can effectively address the task of logical reasoning, which requires gradual cognitive inference similar to human intelligence, remains unanswered. To this end, we aim to bridge this gap and provide comprehensive evaluations in this paper. Firstly, to offer systematic evaluations, we select fifteen typical logical reasoning datasets and organize them into deductive, inductive, abductive and mixed-form reasoning settings. Considering the comprehensiveness of evaluations, we include three representative LLMs (i.e., text-davinci-003, ChatGPT and BARD) and evaluate them on all selected datasets under zero-shot, one-shot and three-shot settings. Secondly, different from previous evaluations relying only on simple metrics (e.g., accuracy), we propose fine-level evaluations from objective and subjective manners, covering both answers and explanations. Additionally, to uncover the logical flaws of LLMs, problematic cases will be attributed to five error types from two dimensions, i.e., evidence selection process and reasoning process. Thirdly, to avoid the influences of knowledge bias and purely focus on benchmarking the logical reasoning capability of LLMs, we propose a new dataset with neutral content. It contains 3,000 samples and covers deductive, inductive and abductive settings. Based on the in-depth evaluations, this paper finally forms a general evaluation scheme of logical reasoning capability from six dimensions. It reflects the pros and cons of LLMs and gives guiding directions for future works.

Logical reasoning is a fundamental task in natural language processing that presents significant challenges to Large Language Models (LLMs). The inherent characteristics of logical reasoning makes it well-suited for symbolic representations such as first-order logic (FOL). Research in symbolic logical reasoning explored FOL generation using state-of-the-art LLMs (i.e., GPT-4) to produce FOL translations of natural language (NL) statements, but errors in translation are usually not the focus. We address this by categorizing the translation errors in FOL statements generated by LLMs. To make progress towards improving the quality of FOL translations for smaller language models such as LLaMA-2 13B and Mistral 7B, we create ProofFOL, a high-quality FOL-annotated subset of ProofWriter dataset using GPT-4o. The models fine-tuned on this silver standard data achieve a significant gain in performance when compared to larger language models such as LLaMA-2 70B. In addition to improving the model using large data, we also tackle the issue of data scarcity and introduce an incremental framework encompassing of data augmentation and verification steps. In the augmentation process, a single pair of (premises, conclusion) is split into multiple new instances based on the predicates and FOLs. This data is used for fine-tuning, and the inference on this model generates FOLs with fewer errors over the model trained on the original data. Our investigation on the translation errors leads to generation of a perturbation dataset, which is used to train a verifier that corrects potential syntactic and semantic FOL translation errors. We demonstrate an efficient method for making the most of a limited existing human-annotated dataset. Our results show state-of-the-art performance for ProofWriter and ProntoQA datasets using ProofFOL on LLaMA-2 and Mistral models.

Collaborative dialogue relies on participants incrementally establishing common ground, yet in asymmetric settings they may believe they agree while referring to different entities. We introduce a perspectivist annotation scheme for the HCRC MapTask corpus (Anderson et al., 1991) that separately captures speaker and addressee grounded interpretations for each reference expression, enabling us to trace how understanding emerges, diverges, and repairs over time. Using a scheme-constrained LLM annotation pipeline, we obtain 13k annotated reference expressions with reliability estimates and analyze the resulting understanding states. The results show that full misunderstandings are rare once lexical variants are unified, but multiplicity discrepancies systematically induce divergences, revealing how apparent grounding can mask referential misalignment. Our framework provides both a resource and an analytic lens for studying grounded misunderstanding and for evaluating (V)LLMs' capacity to model perspective-dependent grounding in collaborative dialogue.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Logical reasoning is a key task for artificial intelligence due to it's role in major downstream tasks such as Question Answering, Summarization. Recent methods in improving the reasoning ability of LLMs fall short in correctly converting a natural language reasoning problem to an equivalent logical formulation, which hinders the framework's overall ability to reason. Towards this, we propose to use finetuning on a preference optimization dataset to learn to parse and represent a natural language problem as a whole to a consistent logical program by 1) introducing a new supervised and preference optimization dataset LogicPO, and 2) adopting popular techniques such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), Kahneman-Tversky optimization (KTO) to finetune open-source LLMs. Our best model with Phi-3.5 consistently outperforms GPT-3.5-turbo's (8-shot) by producing 10% more logically correct and with 14% less syntax errors. Through the framework and our improved evaluation metrics, we offer a promising direction in improving the logical reasoning of LLMs by better representing them in their logical formulations.

A key concern with the concept of "alignment" is the implicit question of "alignment to what?". AI systems are increasingly used across the world, yet safety alignment is often focused on homogeneous monolingual settings. Additionally, preference training and safety measures often overfit to harms common in Western-centric datasets. Here, we explore the viability of different alignment approaches when balancing dual objectives: addressing and optimizing for a non-homogeneous set of languages and cultural preferences while minimizing both global and local harms. We collect the first set of human annotated red-teaming prompts in different languages distinguishing between global and local harm, which serve as a laboratory for understanding the reliability of alignment techniques when faced with preference distributions that are non-stationary across geographies and languages. While this setting is seldom covered by the literature to date, which primarily centers on English harm mitigation, it captures real-world interactions with AI systems around the world. We establish a new precedent for state-of-the-art alignment techniques across 6 languages with minimal degradation in general performance. Our work provides important insights into cross-lingual transfer and novel optimization approaches to safeguard AI systems designed to serve global populations.

Transformers have been shown to be able to perform deductive reasoning on a logical rulebase containing rules and statements written in English natural language. While the progress is promising, it is currently unclear if these models indeed perform logical reasoning by understanding the underlying logical semantics in the language. To this end, we propose RobustLR, a suite of evaluation datasets that evaluate the robustness of these models to minimal logical edits in rulebases and some standard logical equivalence conditions. In our experiments with RoBERTa and T5, we find that the models trained in prior works do not perform consistently on the different perturbations in RobustLR, thus showing that the models are not robust to the proposed logical perturbations. Further, we find that the models find it especially hard to learn logical negation and disjunction operators. Overall, using our evaluation sets, we demonstrate some shortcomings of the deductive reasoning-based language models, which can eventually help towards designing better models for logical reasoning over natural language. All the datasets and code base have been made publicly available.

The release of nuPlan marks a new era in vehicle motion planning research, offering the first large-scale real-world dataset and evaluation schemes requiring both precise short-term planning and long-horizon ego-forecasting. Existing systems struggle to simultaneously meet both requirements. Indeed, we find that these tasks are fundamentally misaligned and should be addressed independently. We further assess the current state of closed-loop planning in the field, revealing the limitations of learning-based methods in complex real-world scenarios and the value of simple rule-based priors such as centerline selection through lane graph search algorithms. More surprisingly, for the open-loop sub-task, we observe that the best results are achieved when using only this centerline as scene context (\ie, ignoring all information regarding the map and other agents). Combining these insights, we propose an extremely simple and efficient planner which outperforms an extensive set of competitors, winning the nuPlan planning challenge 2023.

Large Language Models (LLMs) need to be aligned with human expectations to ensure their safety and utility in most applications. Alignment is challenging, costly, and needs to be repeated for every LLM and alignment criterion. We propose to decouple LLMs and alignment by training aligner models that can be used to align any LLM for a given criteria on an as-needed basis, thus also reducing the potential negative impacts of alignment on performance. Our recipe for training the aligner models solely relies on synthetic data generated with a (prompted) LLM and can be easily adjusted for a variety of alignment criteria. We illustrate our method by training an "ethical" aligner and verify its efficacy empirically.

Large language models (LLMs) have accomplished remarkable reasoning performance in various domains. However, in the domain of reasoning tasks, we discover a frailty: LLMs are surprisingly brittle to the ordering of the premises, despite the fact that such ordering does not alter the underlying task. In particular, we observe that LLMs achieve the best performance when the premise order aligns with the context required in intermediate reasoning steps. For example, in deductive reasoning tasks, presenting the premises in the same order as the ground truth proof in the prompt (as opposed to random ordering) drastically increases the model's accuracy. We first examine the effect of premise ordering on deductive reasoning on a variety of LLMs, and our evaluation shows that permuting the premise order can cause a performance drop of over 30%. In addition, we release the benchmark R-GSM, based on GSM8K, to examine the ordering effect for mathematical problem-solving, and we again observe a significant drop in accuracy, relative to the original GSM8K benchmark.

Recent advancements in text-to-image models, particularly diffusion models, have shown significant promise. However, compositional text-to-image models frequently encounter difficulties in generating high-quality images that accurately align with input texts describing multiple objects, variable attributes, and intricate spatial relationships. To address this limitation, we employ large vision-language models (LVLMs) for multi-dimensional assessment of the alignment between generated images and their corresponding input texts. Utilizing this assessment, we fine-tune the diffusion model to enhance its alignment capabilities. During the inference phase, an initial image is produced using the fine-tuned diffusion model. The LVLM is then employed to pinpoint areas of misalignment in the initial image, which are subsequently corrected using the image editing algorithm until no further misalignments are detected by the LVLM. The resultant image is consequently more closely aligned with the input text. Our experimental results validate that the proposed methodology significantly improves text-image alignment in compositional image generation, particularly with respect to object number, attribute binding, spatial relationships, and aesthetic quality.

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

We study the probabilistic modeling performed by Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) through the angle of time directionality, addressing a question first raised in (Shannon, 1951). For large enough models, we empirically find a time asymmetry in their ability to learn natural language: a difference in the average log-perplexity when trying to predict the next token versus when trying to predict the previous one. This difference is at the same time subtle and very consistent across various modalities (language, model size, training time, ...). Theoretically, this is surprising: from an information-theoretic point of view, there should be no such difference. We provide a theoretical framework to explain how such an asymmetry can appear from sparsity and computational complexity considerations, and outline a number of perspectives opened by our results.

Recent direct preference alignment algorithms (DPA), such as DPO, have shown great promise in aligning large language models to human preferences. While this has motivated the development of many new variants of the original DPO loss, understanding the differences between these recent proposals, as well as developing new DPA loss functions, remains difficult given the lack of a technical and conceptual framework for reasoning about the underlying semantics of these algorithms. In this paper, we attempt to remedy this by formalizing DPA losses in terms of discrete reasoning problems. Specifically, we ask: Given an existing DPA loss, can we systematically derive a symbolic expression that characterizes its semantics? How do the semantics of two losses relate to each other? We propose a novel formalism for characterizing preference losses for single model and reference model based approaches, and identify symbolic forms for a number of commonly used DPA variants. Further, we show how this formal view of preference learning sheds new light on both the size and structure of the DPA loss landscape, making it possible to not only rigorously characterize the relationships between recent loss proposals but also to systematically explore the landscape and derive new loss functions from first principles. We hope our framework and findings will help provide useful guidance to those working on human AI alignment.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants are increasingly used for aligning language models with human preferences. Although these methods are designed to teach a model to generate preferred responses more frequently relative to dispreferred responses, prior work has observed that the likelihood of preferred responses often decreases during training. The current work sheds light on the causes and implications of this counter-intuitive phenomenon, which we term likelihood displacement. We demonstrate that likelihood displacement can be catastrophic, shifting probability mass from preferred responses to responses with an opposite meaning. As a simple example, training a model to prefer No over Never can sharply increase the probability of Yes. Moreover, when aligning the model to refuse unsafe prompts, we show that such displacement can unintentionally lead to unalignment, by shifting probability mass from preferred refusal responses to harmful responses (e.g., reducing the refusal rate of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 74.4% to 33.4%). We theoretically characterize that likelihood displacement is driven by preferences that induce similar embeddings, as measured by a centered hidden embedding similarity (CHES) score. Empirically, the CHES score enables identifying which training samples contribute most to likelihood displacement in a given dataset. Filtering out these samples effectively mitigated unintentional unalignment in our experiments. More broadly, our results highlight the importance of curating data with sufficiently distinct preferences, for which we believe the CHES score may prove valuable.

Merging Large Language Models (LLMs) is a cost-effective technique for combining multiple expert LLMs into a single versatile model, retaining the expertise of the original ones. However, current approaches often overlook the importance of safety alignment during merging, leading to highly misaligned models. This work investigates the effects of model merging on alignment. We evaluate several popular model merging techniques, demonstrating that existing methods do not only transfer domain expertise but also propagate misalignment. We propose a simple two-step approach to address this problem: (i) generating synthetic safety and domain-specific data, and (ii) incorporating these generated data into the optimization process of existing data-aware model merging techniques. This allows us to treat alignment as a skill that can be maximized in the resulting merged LLM. Our experiments illustrate the effectiveness of integrating alignment-related data during merging, resulting in models that excel in both domain expertise and alignment.

Recent vision-language foundation models still frequently produce outputs misaligned with their inputs, evidenced by object hallucination in captioning and prompt misalignment in the text-to-image generation model. Recent studies have explored methods for identifying misaligned elements, aiming not only to enhance interpretability but also to improve model performance. However, current approaches primarily rely on large foundation models in a zero-shot manner or fine-tuned models with human annotations, which limits scalability due to significant computational costs. This work proposes a novel approach, dubbed CLIP4DM, for detecting dense misalignments from pre-trained CLIP, specifically focusing on pinpointing misaligned words between image and text. We carefully revamp the gradient-based attribution computation method, enabling negative gradient of individual text tokens to indicate misalignment. We also propose F-CLIPScore, which aggregates misaligned attributions with a global alignment score. We evaluate our method on various dense misalignment detection benchmarks, covering various image and text domains and misalignment types. Our method demonstrates state-of-the-art performance among zero-shot models and competitive performance with fine-tuned models while maintaining superior efficiency. Our qualitative examples show that our method has a unique strength to detect entity-level objects, intangible objects, and attributes that can not be easily detected for existing works. We conduct ablation studies and analyses to highlight the strengths and limitations of our approach. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/naver-ai/CLIP4DM.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

Knights and knaves problems represent a classic genre of logical puzzles where characters either tell the truth or lie. The objective is to logically deduce each character's identity based on their statements. The challenge arises from the truth-telling or lying behavior, which influences the logical implications of each statement. Solving these puzzles requires not only direct deductions from individual statements, but the ability to assess the truthfulness of statements by reasoning through various hypothetical scenarios. As such, knights and knaves puzzles serve as compelling examples of suppositional reasoning. In this paper, we introduce TruthQuest, a benchmark for suppositional reasoning based on the principles of knights and knaves puzzles. Our benchmark presents problems of varying complexity, considering both the number of characters and the types of logical statements involved. Evaluations on TruthQuest show that large language models like Llama 3 and Mixtral-8x7B exhibit significant difficulties solving these tasks. A detailed error analysis of the models' output reveals that lower-performing models exhibit a diverse range of reasoning errors, frequently failing to grasp the concept of truth and lies. In comparison, more proficient models primarily struggle with accurately inferring the logical implications of potentially false statements.

This paper first answers the question "why do the two most powerful techniques Dropout and Batch Normalization (BN) often lead to a worse performance when they are combined together?" in both theoretical and statistical aspects. Theoretically, we find that Dropout would shift the variance of a specific neural unit when we transfer the state of that network from train to test. However, BN would maintain its statistical variance, which is accumulated from the entire learning procedure, in the test phase. The inconsistency of that variance (we name this scheme as "variance shift") causes the unstable numerical behavior in inference that leads to more erroneous predictions finally, when applying Dropout before BN. Thorough experiments on DenseNet, ResNet, ResNeXt and Wide ResNet confirm our findings. According to the uncovered mechanism, we next explore several strategies that modifies Dropout and try to overcome the limitations of their combination by avoiding the variance shift risks.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) promise enhanced reasoning by integrating diverse inputs such as text, vision, and audio. Yet cross-modal reasoning remains underexplored, with conflicting reports on whether added modalities help or harm performance. These inconsistencies stem from a lack of controlled evaluation frameworks and analysis of models' internals to isolate when and why modality interactions support or undermine reasoning. We address this gap through a logic-grounded evaluation framework that categorizes multimodal reasoning into six interaction patterns, varying how facts are distributed across modalities and logically combined. Empirically, additional modalities enhance reasoning only when they provide independent and sufficient reasoning paths, while redundant or chained entailment support often hurts performance. Moreover, reasoning degrades in three systematic ways: weaker modalities drag down overall performance, conflicts bias preference toward certain modalities, and joint signals from different modalities fail to be integrated effectively. Therefore, we identify two core failures: task-composition bottleneck, where recognition and reasoning cannot be jointly executed in one pass, and fusion bottleneck, where early integration introduces bias. For further investigation, we find that attention patterns fail to encode fact usefulness, but a simple two-step prompting (recognize then reason) restores performance, confirming the task-composition bottleneck. Moreover, modality identity remains recoverable in early layers, and softening attention in early fusion improves reasoning, highlighting biased fusion as another failure mode. Overall, our findings show that integration, not perception, is the main barrier to multimodal reasoning, suggesting composition-aware training and early fusion control as promising directions.

Neural language models (LMs) can be used to evaluate the truth of factual statements in two ways: they can be either queried for statement probabilities, or probed for internal representations of truthfulness. Past work has found that these two procedures sometimes disagree, and that probes tend to be more accurate than LM outputs. This has led some researchers to conclude that LMs "lie" or otherwise encode non-cooperative communicative intents. Is this an accurate description of today's LMs, or can query-probe disagreement arise in other ways? We identify three different classes of disagreement, which we term confabulation, deception, and heterogeneity. In many cases, the superiority of probes is simply attributable to better calibration on uncertain answers rather than a greater fraction of correct, high-confidence answers. In some cases, queries and probes perform better on different subsets of inputs, and accuracy can further be improved by ensembling the two. Code is available at github.com/lingo-mit/lm-truthfulness.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are nondeterministic, the same input can generate different outputs, some of which may be incorrect or hallucinated. If run again, the LLM may correct itself and produce the correct answer. Unfortunately, most LLM-powered systems resort to single results which, correct or not, users accept. Having the LLM produce multiple outputs may help identify disagreements or alternatives. However, it is not obvious how the user will interpret conflicts or inconsistencies. To this end, we investigate how users perceive the AI model and comprehend the generated information when they receive multiple, potentially inconsistent, outputs. Through a preliminary study, we identified five types of output inconsistencies. Based on these categories, we conducted a study (N=252) in which participants were given one or more LLM-generated passages to an information-seeking question. We found that inconsistency within multiple LLM-generated outputs lowered the participants' perceived AI capacity, while also increasing their comprehension of the given information. Specifically, we observed that this positive effect of inconsistencies was most significant for participants who read two passages, compared to those who read three. Based on these findings, we present design implications that, instead of regarding LLM output inconsistencies as a drawback, we can reveal the potential inconsistencies to transparently indicate the limitations of these models and promote critical LLM usage.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

Logical reasoning is fundamental for humans yet presents a substantial challenge in the domain of Artificial Intelligence. Initially, researchers used Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR) systems that did not scale and required non trivial manual effort. Recently, the emergence of large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated the ability to overcome various limitations of formal Knowledge Representation (KR) systems. Consequently, there is a growing interest in using LLMs for logical reasoning via natural language. This work strives to understand the proficiency of LLMs in logical reasoning by offering a brief review of the latest progress in this area; with a focus on the logical reasoning datasets, tasks, and the methods adopted to utilize LLMs for reasoning. To offer a thorough analysis, we have compiled a benchmark titled LogiGLUE. This includes 24 varied datasets encompassing deductive, abductive, and inductive reasoning. We have standardized these datasets into Seq2Seq tasks to facilitate straightforward training and evaluation for future research. Utilizing LogiGLUE as a foundation, we have trained an instruction fine tuned language model, resulting in LogiT5. We study single task training, multi task training, and a chain of thought knowledge distillation fine tuning technique to assess the performance of model across the different logical reasoning categories. By this comprehensive process, we aim to shed light on the capabilities and potential pathways for enhancing logical reasoning proficiency in LLMs, paving the way for more advanced and nuanced developments in this critical field.

Realignment becomes necessary when a language model (LM) fails to meet expected performance. We propose a flexible realignment framework that supports quantitative control of alignment degree during training and inference. This framework incorporates Training-time Realignment (TrRa), which efficiently realigns the reference model by leveraging the controllable fusion of logits from both the reference and already aligned models. For example, TrRa reduces token usage by 54.63% on DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B without any performance degradation, outperforming DeepScaleR-1.5B's 33.86%. To complement TrRa during inference, we introduce a layer adapter that enables smooth Inference-time Realignment (InRa). This adapter is initialized to perform an identity transformation at the bottom layer and is inserted preceding the original layers. During inference, input embeddings are simultaneously processed by the adapter and the original layer, followed by the remaining layers, and then controllably interpolated at the logit level. We upgraded DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B from a slow-thinking model to one that supports both fast and slow thinking, allowing flexible alignment control even during inference. By encouraging deeper reasoning, it even surpassed its original performance.

Alignment faking in large language models presented a demonstration of Claude 3 Opus and Claude 3.5 Sonnet selectively complying with a helpful-only training objective to prevent modification of their behavior outside of training. We expand this analysis to 25 models and find that only 5 (Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Llama 3 405B, Grok 3, Gemini 2.0 Flash) comply with harmful queries more when they infer they are in training than when they infer they are in deployment. First, we study the motivations of these 5 models. Results from perturbing details of the scenario suggest that only Claude 3 Opus's compliance gap is primarily and consistently motivated by trying to keep its goals. Second, we investigate why many chat models don't fake alignment. Our results suggest this is not entirely due to a lack of capabilities: many base models fake alignment some of the time, and post-training eliminates alignment-faking for some models and amplifies it for others. We investigate 5 hypotheses for how post-training may suppress alignment faking and find that variations in refusal behavior may account for a significant portion of differences in alignment faking.

Language models (LMs) are increasingly used as simulacra for people, yet their ability to match the distribution of views of a specific demographic group and be distributionally aligned remains uncertain. This notion of distributional alignment is complex, as there is significant variation in the types of attributes that are simulated. Prior works have underexplored the role of three critical variables -- the question domain, steering method, and distribution expression method -- which motivates our contribution of a benchmark explicitly addressing these dimensions. We construct a dataset expanding beyond political values, create human baselines for this task, and evaluate the extent to which an LM can align with a particular group's opinion distribution to inform design choices of such simulation systems. Our analysis reveals open problems regarding if, and how, LMs can be used to simulate humans, and that LLMs can more accurately describe the opinion distribution than simulate such distributions.

Deep Research (DR) agents built on Large Language Models (LLMs) can perform complex, multi-step research by decomposing tasks, retrieving online information, and synthesizing detailed reports. However, the misuse of LLMs with such powerful capabilities can lead to even greater risks. This is especially concerning in high-stakes and knowledge-intensive domains such as biosecurity, where DR can generate a professional report containing detailed forbidden knowledge. Unfortunately, we have found such risks in practice: simply submitting a harmful query, which a standalone LLM directly rejects, can elicit a detailed and dangerous report from DR agents. This highlights the elevated risks and underscores the need for a deeper safety analysis. Yet, jailbreak methods designed for LLMs fall short in exposing such unique risks, as they do not target the research ability of DR agents. To address this gap, we propose two novel jailbreak strategies: Plan Injection, which injects malicious sub-goals into the agent's plan; and Intent Hijack, which reframes harmful queries as academic research questions. We conducted extensive experiments across different LLMs and various safety benchmarks, including general and biosecurity forbidden prompts. These experiments reveal 3 key findings: (1) Alignment of the LLMs often fail in DR agents, where harmful prompts framed in academic terms can hijack agent intent; (2) Multi-step planning and execution weaken the alignment, revealing systemic vulnerabilities that prompt-level safeguards cannot address; (3) DR agents not only bypass refusals but also produce more coherent, professional, and dangerous content, compared with standalone LLMs. These results demonstrate a fundamental misalignment in DR agents and call for better alignment techniques tailored to DR agents. Code and datasets are available at https://chenxshuo.github.io/deeper-harm.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Logical reasoning, i.e., deductively inferring the truth value of a conclusion from a set of premises, is an important task for artificial intelligence with wide potential impacts on science, mathematics, and society. While many prompting-based strategies have been proposed to enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to do such reasoning more effectively, they still appear unsatisfactory, often failing in subtle and unpredictable ways. In this work, we investigate the validity of instead reformulating such tasks as modular neurosymbolic programming, which we call LINC: Logical Inference via Neurosymbolic Computation. In LINC, the LLM acts as a semantic parser, translating premises and conclusions from natural language to expressions in first-order logic. These expressions are then offloaded to an external theorem prover, which symbolically performs deductive inference. Leveraging this approach, we observe significant performance gains on FOLIO and a balanced subset of ProofWriter for three different models in nearly all experimental conditions we evaluate. On ProofWriter, augmenting the comparatively small open-source StarCoder+ (15.5B parameters) with LINC even outperforms GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting by an absolute 38% and 10%, respectively. When used with GPT-4, LINC scores 26% higher than CoT on ProofWriter while performing comparatively on FOLIO. Further analysis reveals that although both methods on average succeed roughly equally often on this dataset, they exhibit distinct and complementary failure modes. We thus provide promising evidence for how logical reasoning over natural language can be tackled through jointly leveraging LLMs alongside symbolic provers. All corresponding code is publicly available at https://github.com/benlipkin/linc

LLMs for clinical decision support often fail under small but clinically meaningful input shifts such as masking a symptom or negating a finding, despite high performance on static benchmarks. These reasoning failures frequently go undetected by standard NLP metrics, which are insensitive to latent representation shifts that drive diagnosis instability. We propose a geometry-aware evaluation framework, LAPD (Latent Agentic Perturbation Diagnostics), which systematically probes the latent robustness of clinical LLMs under structured adversarial edits. Within this framework, we introduce Latent Diagnosis Flip Rate (LDFR), a model-agnostic diagnostic signal that captures representational instability when embeddings cross decision boundaries in PCA-reduced latent space. Clinical notes are generated using a structured prompting pipeline grounded in diagnostic reasoning, then perturbed along four axes: masking, negation, synonym replacement, and numeric variation to simulate common ambiguities and omissions. We compute LDFR across both foundation and clinical LLMs, finding that latent fragility emerges even under minimal surface-level changes. Finally, we validate our findings on 90 real clinical notes from the DiReCT benchmark (MIMIC-IV), confirming the generalizability of LDFR beyond synthetic settings. Our results reveal a persistent gap between surface robustness and semantic stability, underscoring the importance of geometry-aware auditing in safety-critical clinical AI.

Recent advances in semi-supervised semantic segmentation have been heavily reliant on pseudo labeling to compensate for limited labeled data, disregarding the valuable relational knowledge among semantic concepts. To bridge this gap, we devise LogicDiag, a brand new neural-logic semi-supervised learning framework. Our key insight is that conflicts within pseudo labels, identified through symbolic knowledge, can serve as strong yet commonly ignored learning signals. LogicDiag resolves such conflicts via reasoning with logic-induced diagnoses, enabling the recovery of (potentially) erroneous pseudo labels, ultimately alleviating the notorious error accumulation problem. We showcase the practical application of LogicDiag in the data-hungry segmentation scenario, where we formalize the structured abstraction of semantic concepts as a set of logic rules. Extensive experiments on three standard semi-supervised semantic segmentation benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness and generality of LogicDiag. Moreover, LogicDiag highlights the promising opportunities arising from the systematic integration of symbolic reasoning into the prevalent statistical, neural learning approaches.

Recent advances in LLM agents have largely built on reasoning backbones like ReAct, which interleave thought and action in complex environments. However, ReAct often produces ungrounded or incoherent reasoning steps, leading to misalignment between the agent's actual state and goal. Our analysis finds that this stems from ReAct's inability to maintain consistent internal beliefs and goal alignment, causing compounding errors and hallucinations. To address this, we introduce ReflAct, a novel backbone that shifts reasoning from merely planning next actions to continuously reflecting on the agent's state relative to its goal. By explicitly grounding decisions in states and enforcing ongoing goal alignment, ReflAct dramatically improves strategic reliability. This design delivers substantial empirical gains: ReflAct surpasses ReAct by 27.7% on average, achieving a 93.3% success rate in ALFWorld. Notably, ReflAct even outperforms ReAct with added enhancement modules (e.g., Reflexion, WKM), showing that strengthening the core reasoning backbone is key to reliable agent performance.

A comparison of the distances to the Huanan Seafood Market of early Covid cases with known links to the market versus cases without known links shows results apparently incompatible with a location model lacking proximity ascertainment bias. The sign of the difference instead agrees with a model in which such ascertainment bias is large. In the presence of such bias inferences based on the clustering of case locations become unreliable.

Alignment has quickly become a default ingredient in LLM development, with techniques such as reinforcement learning from human feedback making models act safely, follow instructions, and perform ever-better on complex tasks. While these techniques are certainly useful, we propose that they should not be universally applied and demonstrate a range of tasks on which base language models consistently outperform their popular aligned forms. Particularly, we study tasks that require unpredictable outputs, such as random number generation, mixed strategy games (rock-paper-scissors and hide-and-seek), and creative writing. In each case, aligned models tend towards narrow behaviors that result in distinct disadvantages, for instance, preferring to generate "7" over other uniformly random numbers, becoming almost fully predictable in some game states, or prioritizing pleasant writing over creative originality. Across models tested, better performance on common benchmarks tends to correlate with worse performance on our tasks, suggesting an effective trade-off in the required capabilities.

Vision-language models (VLMs) often produce chain-of-thought (CoT) explanations that sound plausible yet fail to reflect the underlying decision process, undermining trust in high-stakes clinical use. Existing evaluations rarely catch this misalignment, prioritizing answer accuracy or adherence to formats. We present a clinically grounded framework for chest X-ray visual question answering (VQA) that probes CoT faithfulness via controlled text and image modifications across three axes: clinical fidelity, causal attribution, and confidence calibration. In a reader study (n=4), evaluator-radiologist correlations fall within the observed inter-radiologist range for all axes, with strong alignment for attribution (Kendall's tau_b=0.670), moderate alignment for fidelity (tau_b=0.387), and weak alignment for confidence tone (tau_b=0.091), which we report with caution. Benchmarking six VLMs shows that answer accuracy and explanation quality are decoupled, acknowledging injected cues does not ensure grounding, and text cues shift explanations more than visual cues. While some open-source models match final answer accuracy, proprietary models score higher on attribution (25.0% vs. 1.4%) and often on fidelity (36.1% vs. 31.7%), highlighting deployment risks and the need to evaluate beyond final answer accuracy.

Psychological research consistently finds that human ratings of words across diverse semantic scales can be reduced to a low-dimensional form with relatively little information loss. We find that the semantic associations encoded in the embedding matrices of large language models (LLMs) exhibit a similar structure. We show that the projections of words on semantic directions defined by antonym pairs (e.g. kind - cruel) correlate highly with human ratings, and further find that these projections effectively reduce to a 3-dimensional subspace within LLM embeddings, closely resembling the patterns derived from human survey responses. Moreover, we find that shifting tokens along one semantic direction causes off-target effects on geometrically aligned features proportional to their cosine similarity. These findings suggest that semantic features are entangled within LLMs similarly to how they are interconnected in human language, and a great deal of semantic information, despite its apparent complexity, is surprisingly low-dimensional. Furthermore, accounting for this semantic structure may prove essential for avoiding unintended consequences when steering features.

In the absence of abundant reliable annotations for challenging tasks and contexts, how can we expand the frontier of LLM capabilities with potentially wrong answers? We focus on two research questions: (1) Can LLMs generate reliable preferences among wrong options? And if so, (2) Would alignment with such wrong-over-wrong preferences be helpful? We employ methods based on self-consistency, token probabilities, and LLM-as-a-judge to elicit wrong-over-wrong preferences, and fine-tune language models with preference optimization approaches using these synthesized preferences. Extensive experiments with seven LLMs and eight datasets demonstrate that (1) LLMs do have preliminary capability in distinguishing various shades of wrong, achieving up to 20.9% higher performance than random guess; (2) Alignment with wrong-over-wrong preferences helps LLMs to produce less wrong and sometimes even outright correct answers, while overall improving model calibration.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) augmented with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning demonstrate impressive problem-solving abilities. However, in this work, we identify a recurring issue where these models occasionally generate overly short reasoning, leading to degraded performance on even simple mathematical problems. Specifically, we investigate how reasoning length is embedded in the hidden representations of reasoning models and its impact on accuracy. Our analysis reveals that reasoning length is governed by a linear direction in the representation space, allowing us to induce overly short reasoning by steering the model along this direction. Building on this insight, we introduce ThinkEdit, a simple yet effective weight-editing approach to mitigate the issue of overly short reasoning. We first identify a small subset of attention heads (approximately 2%) that predominantly drive short reasoning behavior. We then edit the output projection weights of these heads to suppress the short reasoning direction. With changes to only 0.1% of the model's parameters, ThinkEdit effectively reduces overly short reasoning and yields notable accuracy gains for short reasoning outputs (+5.44%), along with an overall improvement across multiple math benchmarks (+2.43%). Our findings provide new mechanistic insights into how reasoning length is controlled within LLMs and highlight the potential of fine-grained model interventions to improve reasoning quality. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/ThinkEdit

The concept of causal abstraction got recently popularised to demystify the opaque decision-making processes of machine learning models; in short, a neural network can be abstracted as a higher-level algorithm if there exists a function which allows us to map between them. Notably, most interpretability papers implement these maps as linear functions, motivated by the linear representation hypothesis: the idea that features are encoded linearly in a model's representations. However, this linearity constraint is not required by the definition of causal abstraction. In this work, we critically examine the concept of causal abstraction by considering arbitrarily powerful alignment maps. In particular, we prove that under reasonable assumptions, any neural network can be mapped to any algorithm, rendering this unrestricted notion of causal abstraction trivial and uninformative. We complement these theoretical findings with empirical evidence, demonstrating that it is possible to perfectly map models to algorithms even when these models are incapable of solving the actual task; e.g., on an experiment using randomly initialised language models, our alignment maps reach 100% interchange-intervention accuracy on the indirect object identification task. This raises the non-linear representation dilemma: if we lift the linearity constraint imposed to alignment maps in causal abstraction analyses, we are left with no principled way to balance the inherent trade-off between these maps' complexity and accuracy. Together, these results suggest an answer to our title's question: causal abstraction is not enough for mechanistic interpretability, as it becomes vacuous without assumptions about how models encode information. Studying the connection between this information-encoding assumption and causal abstraction should lead to exciting future work.

Due to the remarkable capabilities and growing impact of large language models (LLMs), they have been deeply integrated into many aspects of society. Thus, ensuring their alignment with human values and intentions has emerged as a critical challenge. This survey provides a comprehensive overview of practical alignment techniques, training protocols, and empirical findings in LLM alignment. We analyze the development of alignment methods across diverse paradigms, characterizing the fundamental trade-offs between core alignment objectives. Our analysis shows that while supervised fine-tuning enables basic instruction-following, preference-based methods offer more flexibility for aligning with nuanced human intent. We discuss state-of-the-art techniques, including Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), Constitutional AI, brain-inspired methods, and alignment uncertainty quantification (AUQ), highlighting their approaches to balancing quality and efficiency. We review existing evaluation frameworks and benchmarking datasets, emphasizing limitations such as reward misspecification, distributional robustness, and scalable oversight. We summarize strategies adopted by leading AI labs to illustrate the current state of practice. We conclude by outlining open problems in oversight, value pluralism, robustness, and continuous alignment. This survey aims to inform both researchers and practitioners navigating the evolving landscape of LLM alignment.

Underlying data structures, such as symmetries or invariances to transformations, are often exploited to improve the solution of learning tasks. However, embedding these properties in models or learning algorithms can be challenging and computationally intensive. Data augmentation, on the other hand, induces these symmetries during training by applying multiple transformations to the input data. Despite its ubiquity, its effectiveness depends on the choices of which transformations to apply, when to do so, and how often. In fact, there is both empirical and theoretical evidence that the indiscriminate use of data augmentation can introduce biases that outweigh its benefits. This work tackles these issues by automatically adapting the data augmentation while solving the learning task. To do so, it formulates data augmentation as an invariance-constrained learning problem and leverages Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) sampling to solve it. The result is a practical algorithm that not only does away with a priori searches for augmentation distributions, but also dynamically controls if and when data augmentation is applied. Our experiments illustrate the performance of this method, which achieves state-of-the-art results in automatic data augmentation benchmarks for CIFAR datasets. Furthermore, this approach can be used to gather insights on the actual symmetries underlying a learning task.

With the rise of large language models (LLMs), ensuring they embody the principles of being helpful, honest, and harmless (3H), known as Human Alignment, becomes crucial. While existing alignment methods like RLHF, DPO, etc., effectively fine-tune LLMs to match preferences in the preference dataset, they often lead LLMs to highly receptive human input and external evidence, even when this information is poisoned. This leads to a tendency for LLMs to be Adaptive Chameleons when external evidence conflicts with their parametric memory. This exacerbates the risk of LLM being attacked by external poisoned data, which poses a significant security risk to LLM system applications such as Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). To address the challenge, we propose a novel framework: Dialectical Alignment (DA), which (1) utilizes AI feedback to identify optimal strategies for LLMs to navigate inter-context conflicts and context-memory conflicts with different external evidence in context window (i.e., different ratios of poisoned factual contexts); (2) constructs the SFT dataset as well as the preference dataset based on the AI feedback and strategies above; (3) uses the above datasets for LLM alignment to defense poisoned context attack while preserving the effectiveness of in-context knowledge editing. Our experiments show that the dialectical alignment model improves poisoned data attack defense by 20 and does not require any additional prompt engineering or prior declaration of ``you may be attacked`` to the LLMs' context window.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are usually aligned with "human values/preferences" to prevent harmful output. Discussions around the alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) generally focus on preventing harmful outputs. However, in this paper, we argue that in health-related queries, over-alignment-leading to overly cautious responses-can itself be harmful, especially for people with anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). This is not only unethical but also dangerous to the user, both mentally and physically. We also showed qualitative results that some LLMs exhibit varying degrees of alignment. Finally, we call for the development of LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities that provide more tailored and nuanced responses to health queries. Warning: This paper contains materials that could trigger health anxiety or OCD.

Logical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence and an essential capability for multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Despite the significant advancement in multimodal reasoning, existing benchmarks fail to comprehensively evaluate their reasoning abilities due to the lack of explicit categorization for logical reasoning types and an unclear understanding of reasoning. To address these issues, we introduce MME-Reasoning, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning ability of MLLMs, which covers all three types of reasoning (i.e., inductive, deductive, and abductive) in its questions. We carefully curate the data to ensure that each question effectively evaluates reasoning ability rather than perceptual skills or knowledge breadth, and extend the evaluation protocols to cover the evaluation of diverse questions. Our evaluation reveals substantial limitations of state-of-the-art MLLMs when subjected to holistic assessments of logical reasoning capabilities. Even the most advanced MLLMs show limited performance in comprehensive logical reasoning, with notable performance imbalances across reasoning types. In addition, we conducted an in-depth analysis of approaches such as ``thinking mode'' and Rule-based RL, which are commonly believed to enhance reasoning abilities. These findings highlight the critical limitations and performance imbalances of current MLLMs in diverse logical reasoning scenarios, providing comprehensive and systematic insights into the understanding and evaluation of reasoning capabilities.

We introduce SteeringControl, a benchmark for evaluating representation steering methods across core alignment objectives--bias, harmful generation, and hallucination--and their effects on secondary behaviors such as sycophancy and commonsense morality. While prior alignment work often highlights truthfulness or reasoning ability to demonstrate the side effects of representation steering, we find there are many unexplored tradeoffs not yet understood in a systematic way. We collect a dataset of safety-relevant primary and secondary behaviors to evaluate steering effectiveness and behavioral entanglement centered around five popular steering methods. To enable this, we craft a modular steering framework based on unique components that serve as the building blocks of many existing methods. Our results on Qwen-2.5-7B and Llama-3.1-8B find that strong steering performance is dependent on the specific combination of steering method, model, and targeted behavior, and that severe concept entanglement can result from poor combinations of these three as well. We release our code here: https://github.com/wang-research-lab/SteeringControl.git.

Safety alignment is an important procedure before the official deployment of a Large Language Model (LLM). While safety alignment has been extensively studied for LLM, there is still a large research gap for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) that equip with improved reasoning capability. We in this paper systematically examine a simplified pipeline for producing safety aligned LRMs. With our evaluation of various LRMs, we deliver two main findings: i) Safety alignment can be done upon the LRM to restore its safety capability. ii) Safety alignment leads to a degradation of the reasoning capability of LRMs. The two findings show that there exists a trade-off between reasoning and safety capability with the sequential LRM production pipeline. The discovered trade-off, which we name Safety Tax, should shed light on future endeavors of safety research on LRMs. As a by-product, we curate a dataset called DirectRefusal, which might serve as an alternative dataset for safety alignment. Our source code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Safety-Tax.

Neural networks trained with ERM (empirical risk minimization) sometimes learn unintended decision rules, in particular when their training data is biased, i.e., when training labels are strongly correlated with undesirable features. To prevent a network from learning such features, recent methods augment training data such that examples displaying spurious correlations (i.e., bias-aligned examples) become a minority, whereas the other, bias-conflicting examples become prevalent. However, these approaches are sometimes difficult to train and scale to real-world data because they rely on generative models or disentangled representations. We propose an alternative based on mixup, a popular augmentation that creates convex combinations of training examples. Our method, coined SelecMix, applies mixup to contradicting pairs of examples, defined as showing either (i) the same label but dissimilar biased features, or (ii) different labels but similar biased features. Identifying such pairs requires comparing examples with respect to unknown biased features. For this, we utilize an auxiliary contrastive model with the popular heuristic that biased features are learned preferentially during training. Experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of the method, in particular when label noise complicates the identification of bias-conflicting examples.

Although contemporary large language models (LMs) demonstrate impressive question-answering capabilities, their answers are typically the product of a single call to the model. This entails an unwelcome degree of opacity and compromises performance, especially on problems that are inherently multi-step. To address these limitations, we show how LMs can be made to perform faithful multi-step reasoning via a process whose causal structure mirrors the underlying logical structure of the problem. Our approach works by chaining together reasoning steps, where each step results from calls to two fine-tuned LMs, one for selection and one for inference, to produce a valid reasoning trace. Our method carries out a beam search through the space of reasoning traces to improve reasoning quality. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our model on multi-step logical deduction and scientific question-answering, showing that it outperforms baselines on final answer accuracy, and generates humanly interpretable reasoning traces whose validity can be checked by the user.

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on safety alignment to produce socially acceptable responses. This is typically achieved through instruction tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, this alignment is known to be brittle: further fine-tuning, even on benign or lightly contaminated data, can degrade safety and reintroduce harmful behaviors. A growing body of work suggests that alignment may correspond to identifiable geometric directions in weight space, forming subspaces that could, in principle, be isolated or preserved to defend against misalignment. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study of this geometric perspective. We examine whether safety-relevant behavior is concentrated in specific subspaces, whether it can be separated from general-purpose learning, and whether harmfulness arises from distinguishable patterns in internal representations. Across both parameter and activation space, our findings are consistent: subspaces that amplify safe behaviors also amplify unsafe ones, and prompts with different safety implications activate overlapping representations. We find no evidence of a subspace that selectively governs safety. These results challenge the assumption that alignment is geometrically localized. Rather than residing in distinct directions, safety appears to emerge from entangled, high-impact components of the model's broader learning dynamics. This suggests that subspace-based defenses may face fundamental limitations and underscores the need for alternative strategies to preserve alignment under continued training. We corroborate these findings through multiple experiments on five open-source LLMs. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/CERT-Lab/safety-subspaces.

Despite advances in large language models (LLMs) on reasoning and instruction-following benchmarks, it remains unclear whether they can reliably produce outputs aligned with a broad variety of user goals, a concept we refer to as steerability. The abundance of methods proposed to modify LLM behavior makes it unclear whether current LLMs are already steerable, or require further intervention. In particular, LLMs may exhibit (i) poor coverage, where rare user goals are underrepresented; (ii) miscalibration, where models overshoot requests; and (iii) side effects, where changes to one dimension of text inadvertently affect others. To systematically evaluate these failures, we introduce a framework based on a multi-dimensional goal space that models user goals and LLM outputs as vectors with dimensions corresponding to text attributes (e.g., reading difficulty). Applied to a text-rewriting task, we find that current LLMs struggle with steerability, as side effects are persistent. Interventions to improve steerability, such as prompt engineering, best-of-N sampling, and reinforcement learning fine-tuning, have varying effectiveness, yet side effects remain problematic. Our findings suggest that even strong LLMs struggle with steerability, and existing alignment strategies may be insufficient. We open-source our steerability evaluation framework at https://github.com/MLD3/steerability.

Before being deployed for user-facing applications, developers align Large Language Models (LLMs) to user preferences through a variety of procedures, such as Reinforcement Learning From Human Feedback (RLHF) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Current evaluations of these procedures focus on benchmarks of instruction following, reasoning, and truthfulness. However, human preferences are not universal, and aligning to specific preference sets may have unintended effects. We explore how alignment impacts performance along three axes of global representation: English dialects, multilingualism, and opinions from and about countries worldwide. Our results show that current alignment procedures create disparities between English dialects and global opinions. We find alignment improves capabilities in several languages. We conclude by discussing design decisions that led to these unintended impacts and recommendations for more equitable preference tuning.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated their widespread viability thanks to extensive training in aligning visual instructions to answers. However, this conclusive alignment leads models to ignore critical visual reasoning, and further result in failures on meticulous visual problems and unfaithful responses. In this paper, we propose Chain of Manipulations, a mechanism that enables VLMs to solve problems with a series of manipulations, where each manipulation refers to an operation on the visual input, either from intrinsic abilities (e.g., grounding) acquired through prior training or from imitating human-like behaviors (e.g., zoom in). This mechanism encourages VLMs to generate faithful responses with evidential visual reasoning, and permits users to trace error causes in the interpretable paths. We thus train CogCoM, a general 17B VLM with a memory-based compatible architecture endowed this reasoning mechanism. Experiments show that our model achieves the state-of-the-art performance across 8 benchmarks from 3 categories, and a limited number of training steps with the data swiftly gains a competitive performance. The code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/THUDM/CogCoM.

Robust validation metrics remain essential in contemporary deep learning, not only to detect overfitting and poor generalization, but also to monitor training dynamics. In the supervised classification setting, we investigate whether interactions between training data and model weights can yield such a metric that both tracks generalization during training and attributes performance to individual training samples. We introduce Gradient-Weight Alignment (GWA), quantifying the coherence between per-sample gradients and model weights. We show that effective learning corresponds to coherent alignment, while misalignment indicates deteriorating generalization. GWA is efficiently computable during training and reflects both sample-specific contributions and dataset-wide learning dynamics. Extensive experiments show that GWA accurately predicts optimal early stopping, enables principled model comparisons, and identifies influential training samples, providing a validation-set-free approach for model analysis directly from the training data.

We present SpinBench, a cognitively grounded diagnostic benchmark for evaluating spatial reasoning in vision language models (VLMs). SpinBench is designed around the core challenge of spatial reasoning: perspective taking, the ability to reason about how scenes and object relations change under viewpoint transformation. Since perspective taking requires multiple cognitive capabilities, such as recognizing objects across views, relative positions grounding, and mentally simulating transformations, SpinBench introduces a set of fine-grained diagnostic categories. Our categories target translation, rotation, object relative pose, and viewpoint change, and are progressively structured so that single-object simpler tasks scaffold toward the most demanding multi-object perspective-taking setting. We evaluate 37 state-of-the-art VLMs, both proprietary and open source. Results reveal systematic weaknesses: strong egocentric bias, poor rotational understanding, and inconsistencies under symmetrical and syntactic reformulations. Scaling analysis shows both smooth improvements and emergent capabilities. While human subjects achieve high accuracy (91.2\%), task difficulty as measured by human response time shows strong correlation with VLM accuracy, indicating that SpinBench captures spatial reasoning challenges shared across humans and VLMs. We believe SpinBench provides critical insights into spatial reasoning in VLMs and highlights key gaps in their ability to reason about physical space. Our website can be found at https://spinbench25.github.io/.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) are increasingly applied to scientific research, yet it remains unclear whether they can reliably understand and reason over the multimodal complexity of papers. A central challenge lies in detecting and resolving inconsistencies across text, figures, tables, and equations, issues that are often subtle, domain-specific, and ultimately undermine clarity, reproducibility, and trust. Existing benchmarks overlook this issue, either isolating single modalities or relying on synthetic errors that fail to capture real-world complexity. We introduce PRISMM-Bench (Peer-Review-sourced Inconsistency Set for Multimodal Models), the first benchmark grounded in real reviewer-flagged inconsistencies in scientific papers. Through a multi-stage pipeline of review mining, LLM-assisted filtering and human verification, we curate 262 inconsistencies from 242 papers. Based on this set, we design three tasks, namely inconsistency identification, remedy and pair matching, which assess a model's capacity to detect, correct, and reason over inconsistencies across different modalities. Furthermore, to address the notorious problem of choice-only shortcuts in multiple-choice evaluation, where models exploit answer patterns without truly understanding the question, we further introduce structured JSON-based answer representations that minimize linguistic biases by reducing reliance on superficial stylistic cues. We benchmark 21 leading LMMs, including large open-weight models (GLM-4.5V 106B, InternVL3 78B) and proprietary models (Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-5 with high reasoning). Results reveal strikingly low performance (26.1-54.2%), underscoring the challenge of multimodal scientific reasoning and motivating progress towards trustworthy scientific assistants.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown human-like reasoning abilities but still struggle with complex logical problems. This paper introduces a novel framework, Logic-LM, which integrates LLMs with symbolic solvers to improve logical problem-solving. Our method first utilizes LLMs to translate a natural language problem into a symbolic formulation. Afterward, a deterministic symbolic solver performs inference on the formulated problem. We also introduce a self-refinement module, which utilizes the symbolic solver's error messages to revise symbolic formalizations. We demonstrate Logic-LM's effectiveness on five logical reasoning datasets: ProofWriter, PrOntoQA, FOLIO, LogicalDeduction, and AR-LSAT. On average, Logic-LM achieves a significant performance boost of 39.2% over using LLM alone with standard prompting and 18.4% over LLM with chain-of-thought prompting. Our findings suggest that Logic-LM, by combining LLMs with symbolic logic, offers a promising avenue for faithful logical reasoning. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/teacherpeterpan/Logic-LLM.

Logical reasoning is a critical benchmark for evaluating the capabilities of large language models (LLMs), as it reflects their ability to derive valid conclusions from given premises. While the combination of test-time scaling with dedicated outcome or process reward models has opened up new avenues to enhance LLMs performance in complex reasoning tasks, this space is under-explored in deductive logical reasoning. We present a set of Outcome Reward Models (ORMs) for deductive reasoning. To train the ORMs we mainly generate data using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) with single and multiple samples. Additionally, we propose a novel tactic to further expand the type of errors covered in the training dataset of the ORM. In particular, we propose an echo generation technique that leverages LLMs' tendency to reflect incorrect assumptions made in prompts to extract additional training data, covering previously unexplored error types. While a standard CoT chain may contain errors likely to be made by the reasoner, the echo strategy deliberately steers the model toward incorrect reasoning. We show that ORMs trained on CoT and echo-augmented data demonstrate improved performance on the FOLIO, JustLogic, and ProverQA datasets across four different LLMs.

Prior work has analyzed the robustness of visual encoders to image transformations and corruptions, particularly in cases where such alterations are not seen during training. When this occurs, they introduce a form of distribution shift at test time, often leading to performance degradation. The primary focus has been on severe corruptions that, when applied aggressively, distort useful signals necessary for accurate semantic predictions. We take a different perspective by analyzing parameters of the image acquisition process and transformations that may be subtle or even imperceptible to the human eye. We find that such parameters are systematically encoded in the learned visual representations and can be easily recovered. More strikingly, their presence can have a profound impact, either positively or negatively, on semantic predictions. This effect depends on whether there is a strong correlation or anti-correlation between semantic labels and these acquisition-based or processing-based labels. Our code and data are available at: https://github.com/ryan-caesar-ramos/visual-encoder-traces

Logical image understanding involves interpreting and reasoning about the relationships and consistency within an image's visual content. This capability is essential in applications such as industrial inspection, where logical anomaly detection is critical for maintaining high-quality standards and minimizing costly recalls. Previous research in anomaly detection (AD) has relied on prior knowledge for designing algorithms, which often requires extensive manual annotations, significant computing power, and large amounts of data for training. Autoregressive, multimodal Vision Language Models (AVLMs) offer a promising alternative due to their exceptional performance in visual reasoning across various domains. Despite this, their application to logical AD remains unexplored. In this work, we investigate using AVLMs for logical AD and demonstrate that they are well-suited to the task. Combining AVLMs with format embedding and a logic reasoner, we achieve SOTA performance on public benchmarks, MVTec LOCO AD, with an AUROC of 86.0% and F1-max of 83.7%, along with explanations of anomalies. This significantly outperforms the existing SOTA method by a large margin.

Solving the AI alignment problem requires having clear, defensible values towards which AI systems can align. Currently, targets for alignment remain underspecified and do not seem to be built from a philosophically robust structure. We begin the discussion of this problem by presenting five core, foundational values, drawn from moral philosophy and built on the requisites for human existence: survival, sustainable intergenerational existence, society, education, and truth. We show that these values not only provide a clearer direction for technical alignment work, but also serve as a framework to highlight threats and opportunities from AI systems to both obtain and sustain these values.

As the probability (and thus perplexity) of a text is calculated based on the product of the probabilities of individual tokens, it may happen that one unlikely token significantly reduces the probability (i.e., increase the perplexity) of some otherwise highly probable input, while potentially representing a simple typographical error. Also, given that perplexity is a scalar value that refers to the entire input, information about the probability distribution within it is lost in the calculation (a relatively good text that has one unlikely token and another text in which each token is equally likely they can have the same perplexity value), especially for longer texts. As an alternative to scalar perplexity this research proposes a simple algorithm used to calculate vector values based on n-gram perplexities within the input. Such representations consider the previously mentioned aspects, and instead of a unique value, the relative perplexity of each text token is calculated, and these values are combined into a single vector representing the input.

Exploiting large language models (LLMs) to tackle deductive reasoning has garnered growing attention. It still remains highly challenging to achieve satisfactory results in complex deductive problems, characterized by plenty of premises (i.e., facts or rules) entailing intricate relationships among entities and requiring multi-hop reasoning. One intuitive solution is to decompose the original task into smaller sub-tasks, and then chain the multiple casual reasoning steps together in a forward (e.g., Selection-Inference) or backward (e.g., LAMBADA) direction. However, these techniques inevitably necessitate a large number of overall stages, leading to computationally expensive operations and a higher possibility of making misleading steps. In addition to stage-by-stage decomposition, we draw inspiration from another aspect of human problem-solving. Humans tend to distill the most relevant information and organize their thoughts systematically (e.g., creating mind maps), which assists them in answering questions or drawing conclusions precisely and quickly. In light of this, we propose a novel reasoning approach named Concise and Organized Perception (COP). COP carefully analyzes the given statements to efficiently identify the most pertinent information while eliminating redundancy. It then prompts the LLMs in a more organized form that adapts to the model's inference process. By perceiving concise and organized proofs, the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs can be better elicited, and the risk of acquiring errors caused by excessive reasoning stages is mitigated. Furthermore, our approach can be combined with the aforementioned ones to further boost their performance. Extensive experimental results on three popular deductive benchmarks (i.e., ProofWriter, PrOntoQA and PrOntoQA-OOD) show that COP significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

The open-ended nature of language generation makes the evaluation of autoregressive large language models (LLMs) challenging. One common evaluation approach uses multiple-choice questions (MCQ) to limit the response space. The model is then evaluated by ranking the candidate answers by the log probability of the first token prediction. However, first-tokens may not consistently reflect the final response output, due to model's diverse response styles such as starting with "Sure" or refusing to answer. Consequently, MCQ evaluation is not indicative of model behaviour when interacting with users. But by how much? We evaluate how aligned first-token evaluation is with the text output along several dimensions, namely final option choice, refusal rate, choice distribution and robustness under prompt perturbation. Our results show that the two approaches are severely misaligned on all dimensions, reaching mismatch rates over 60%. Models heavily fine-tuned on conversational or safety data are especially impacted. Crucially, models remain misaligned even when we increasingly constrain prompts, i.e., force them to start with an option letter or example template. Our findings i) underscore the importance of inspecting the text output as well and ii) caution against relying solely on first-token evaluation.

Significant advancements in the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are now driven by test-time scaling laws, particularly those leveraging extended Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. Inspired by these breakthroughs, researchers have extended these paradigms to Large Multimodal Models (LMMs). However, a critical limitation emerges: as their reasoning chains extend, LMMs increasingly rely on textual logic, progressively losing grounding in the underlying visual information. This leads to reasoning paths that diverge from the image content, culminating in erroneous conclusions. To address this, we introduce a strikingly simple yet effective training-free visual-reasoning pipeline. The core concept is to decouple the reasoning and perception processes. A powerful LLM orchestrates the high-level reasoning, strategically interrogating a LMM to extract specific visual information required for its logical chain. The LMM, in turn, functions exclusively as a visual question-answering engine, supplying the necessary perceptual details on demand. This lightweight, plug-and-play approach requires no additional training or architectural changes. Comprehensive evaluations validate that our framework effectively governs the visual reasoning process, leading to a significant reduction in visually-unfounded reasoning steps and a substantial improvement in reasoning fidelity.

The Superficial Alignment Hypothesis posits that almost all of a language model's abilities and knowledge are learned during pre-training, while post-training is about giving a model the right style and format. We re-examine these claims by empirically studying the scaling behavior of post-training with increasing finetuning examples and evaluating them using objective task-specific standardized benchmarks. Through experiments with the Llama-3, Mistral, and Llama-2 model families of multiple sizes, we observe that, similar to the pre-training scaling laws, post-training task performance scales as a power law against the number of finetuning examples. This power law relationship holds across a broad array of capabilities, including mathematical reasoning, coding, instruction following, and multihop-reasoning. In addition, for tasks like math and multihop reasoning, we observe that a handful of examples merely align the model stylistically but do not saturate performance on the benchmarks. Model performance is instead correlated with its reasoning ability and it improves significantly with more examples, illustrating the need for holistic evaluation programs leveraging objective benchmarks in addition to measurement of alignment to human preferences. We also observe that language models are not necessarily limited to using knowledge learned during pre-training. With appropriate post-training, a model's ability to integrate new knowledge greatly improves on downstream tasks like multihop question-answering. Taken together, these results shed new light on the Superficial Alignment Hypothesis, suggesting that it is, at best, an over-simplification.

Handling ambiguity and underspecification is an important challenge in natural language interfaces, particularly for tasks like text-to-SQL semantic parsing. We propose a modular approach that resolves ambiguity using natural language interpretations before mapping these to logical forms (e.g., SQL queries). Although LLMs excel at parsing unambiguous utterances, they show strong biases for ambiguous ones, typically predicting only preferred interpretations. We constructively exploit this bias to generate an initial set of preferred disambiguations and then apply a specialized infilling model to identify and generate missing interpretations. To train the infilling model, we introduce an annotation method that uses SQL execution to validate different meanings. Our approach improves interpretation coverage and generalizes across datasets with different annotation styles, database structures, and ambiguity types.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit impressive capabilities but struggle with reasoning errors due to hallucinations and flawed logic. To investigate their internal representations of reasoning, we introduce ArrangementPuzzle, a novel puzzle dataset with structured solutions and automated stepwise correctness verification. We trained a classifier model on LLM activations on this dataset and found that it achieved over 80% accuracy in predicting reasoning correctness, implying that LLMs internally distinguish between correct and incorrect reasoning steps, with the strongest representations in middle-late Transformer layers. Further analysis reveals that LLMs encode abstract reasoning concepts within the middle activation layers of the transformer architecture, distinguishing logical from semantic equivalence. These findings provide insights into LLM reasoning mechanisms and contribute to improving AI reliability and interpretability, thereby offering the possibility to manipulate and refine LLM reasoning.