Daily Papers

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is a popular method for aligning Language Models (LM) with human values and preferences. RLHF requires a large number of preference pairs as training data, which are often used in both the Supervised Fine-Tuning and Reward Model training and therefore publicly available datasets are commonly used. In this work, we study to what extent a malicious actor can manipulate the LMs generations by poisoning the preferences, i.e., injecting poisonous preference pairs into these datasets and the RLHF training process. We propose strategies to build poisonous preference pairs and test their performance by poisoning two widely used preference datasets. Our results show that preference poisoning is highly effective: injecting a small amount of poisonous data (1-5\% of the original dataset), we can effectively manipulate the LM to generate a target entity in a target sentiment (positive or negative). The findings from our experiments also shed light on strategies to defend against the preference poisoning attack.

Recent advancements in Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) have significantly impacted the alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs). The sensitivity of reinforcement learning algorithms such as Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) has led to new line work on Direct Policy Optimization (DPO), which treats RLHF in a supervised learning framework. The increased practical use of these RLHF methods warrants an analysis of their vulnerabilities. In this work, we investigate the vulnerabilities of DPO to poisoning attacks under different scenarios and compare the effectiveness of preference poisoning, a first of its kind. We comprehensively analyze DPO's vulnerabilities under different types of attacks, i.e., backdoor and non-backdoor attacks, and different poisoning methods across a wide array of language models, i.e., LLama 7B, Mistral 7B, and Gemma 7B. We find that unlike PPO-based methods, which, when it comes to backdoor attacks, require at least 4\% of the data to be poisoned to elicit harmful behavior, we exploit the true vulnerabilities of DPO more simply so we can poison the model with only as much as 0.5\% of the data. We further investigate the potential reasons behind the vulnerability and how well this vulnerability translates into backdoor vs non-backdoor attacks.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) is a methodology designed to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences, playing an important role in LLMs alignment. Despite its advantages, RLHF relies on human annotators to rank the text, which can introduce potential security vulnerabilities if any adversarial annotator (i.e., attackers) manipulates the ranking score by up-ranking any malicious text to steer the LLM adversarially. To assess the red-teaming of RLHF against human preference data poisoning, we propose RankPoison, a poisoning attack method on candidates' selection of preference rank flipping to reach certain malicious behaviors (e.g., generating longer sequences, which can increase the computational cost). With poisoned dataset generated by RankPoison, we can perform poisoning attacks on LLMs to generate longer tokens without hurting the original safety alignment performance. Moreover, applying RankPoison, we also successfully implement a backdoor attack where LLMs can generate longer answers under questions with the trigger word. Our findings highlight critical security challenges in RLHF, underscoring the necessity for more robust alignment methods for LLMs.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have led to their extensive global deployment, and ensuring their safety calls for comprehensive and multilingual toxicity evaluations. However, existing toxicity benchmarks are overwhelmingly focused on English, posing serious risks to deploying LLMs in other languages. We address this by introducing PolygloToxicityPrompts (PTP), the first large-scale multilingual toxicity evaluation benchmark of 425K naturally occurring prompts spanning 17 languages. We overcome the scarcity of naturally occurring toxicity in web-text and ensure coverage across languages with varying resources by automatically scraping over 100M web-text documents. Using PTP, we investigate research questions to study the impact of model size, prompt language, and instruction and preference-tuning methods on toxicity by benchmarking over 60 LLMs. Notably, we find that toxicity increases as language resources decrease or model size increases. Although instruction- and preference-tuning reduce toxicity, the choice of preference-tuning method does not have any significant impact. Our findings shed light on crucial shortcomings of LLM safeguarding and highlight areas for future research.

While alignment algorithms are now commonly used to tune pre-trained language models towards a user's preferences, we lack explanations for the underlying mechanisms in which models become ``aligned'', thus making it difficult to explain phenomena like jailbreaks. In this work we study a popular algorithm, direct preference optimization (DPO), and the mechanisms by which it reduces toxicity. Namely, we first study how toxicity is represented and elicited in a pre-trained language model, GPT2-medium. We then apply DPO with a carefully crafted pairwise dataset to reduce toxicity. We examine how the resulting model averts toxic outputs, and find that capabilities learned from pre-training are not removed, but rather bypassed. We use this insight to demonstrate a simple method to un-align the model, reverting it back to its toxic behavior.

Safety fine-tuning algorithms are commonly used to fine-tune language models to reduce harmful outputs, but the exact internal mechanisms of how those models achieve this remain unclear. In studying direct preference optimisation (DPO) for toxicity reduction, current explanations claim that DPO works by dampening the most toxic MLP neurons to learn an offset to avert toxic regions in the residual stream. However, by ablating the most toxic neurons and applying activation patching, we find this explanation incomplete. By projecting neuron activation changes onto a toxicity probe, we find that only 31.8\% of toxicity reduction comes from dampened toxic neurons. Instead, DPO reduces toxicity by accumulating effects across multiple neuron groups, both reducing writing in the toxic direction and promoting anti-toxicity in the residual stream. Moreover, DPO gives noisy adjustments to neuron activations, with many neurons actually increasing toxicity. This indicates that DPO is a balancing process between opposing neuron effects to achieve toxicity reduction.

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

Recent alignment algorithms such as direct preference optimization (DPO) have been developed to improve the safety of large language models (LLMs) by training these models to match human behaviors exemplified by preference data. However, these methods are both computationally intensive and lacking in controllability and transparency, making them prone to jailbreaking and inhibiting their widespread use. Furthermore, these tuning-based methods require large-scale preference data for training and are susceptible to noisy preference data. In this paper, we introduce a tuning-free alignment alternative (DeTox) and demonstrate its effectiveness under the use case of toxicity reduction. Grounded on theory from factor analysis, DeTox is a sample-efficient model editing approach that identifies a toxic subspace in the model parameter space and reduces model toxicity by projecting away the detected subspace. The toxic sub-space is identified by extracting preference data embeddings from the language model, and removing non-toxic information from these embeddings. We show that DeTox is more sample-efficient than DPO, further showcasing greater robustness to noisy data. Finally, we establish both theoretical and empirical connections between DeTox and DPO, showing that DeTox can be interpreted as a denoised version of a single DPO step.

Preference Optimization (PO) has proven an effective step for aligning language models to human-desired behaviors. Current variants, following the offline Direct Preference Optimization objective, have focused on a strict setting where all tokens are contributing signals of KL divergence and rewards to the loss function. However, human preference is not affected by each word in a sequence equally but is often dependent on specific words or phrases, e.g. existence of toxic terms leads to non-preferred responses. Based on this observation, we argue that not all tokens should be weighted equally during PO and propose a flexible objective termed SparsePO, that aims to automatically learn to weight the KL divergence and reward corresponding to each token during PO training. We propose two different variants of weight-masks that can either be derived from the reference model itself or learned on the fly. Notably, our method induces sparsity in the learned masks, allowing the model to learn how to best weight reward and KL divergence contributions at the token level, learning an optimal level of mask sparsity. Extensive experiments on multiple domains, including sentiment control, dialogue, text summarization and text-to-code generation, illustrate that our approach assigns meaningful weights to tokens according to the target task, generates more responses with the desired preference and improves reasoning tasks by up to 2 percentage points compared to other token- and response-level PO methods.

Direct preference optimization (DPO) is a successful fine-tuning strategy for aligning large language models with human preferences without the need to train a reward model or employ reinforcement learning. DPO, as originally formulated, relies on binary preference data and fine-tunes a language model to increase the likelihood of a preferred response over a dispreferred response. However, not all preference pairs are equal: while in some cases the preferred response is only slightly better than the dispreferred response, there can be a stronger preference for one response when, for example, the other response includes harmful or toxic content. In this paper, we propose a generalization of DPO, termed DPO with an offset (ODPO), that does not treat every preference pair equally during fine-tuning. Intuitively, ODPO requires the difference between the likelihood of the preferred and dispreferred response to be greater than an offset value. The offset is determined based on the extent to which one response is preferred over another. Our experiments on various tasks suggest that ODPO significantly outperforms DPO in aligning language models, especially when the number of preference pairs is limited.

Existing preference optimization methods are mainly designed for directly learning from human feedback with the assumption that paired examples (preferred vs. dis-preferred) are available. In contrast, we propose a method that can leverage unpaired preferred or dis-preferred examples, and works even when only one type of feedback (positive or negative) is available. This flexibility allows us to apply it in scenarios with varying forms of feedback and models, including training generative language models based on human feedback as well as training policies for sequential decision-making problems, where learned (value) functions are available. Our approach builds upon the probabilistic framework introduced in (Dayan and Hinton, 1997), which proposes to use expectation-maximization (EM) to directly optimize the probability of preferred outcomes (as opposed to classic expected reward maximization). To obtain a practical algorithm, we identify and address a key limitation in current EM-based methods: when applied to preference optimization, they solely maximize the likelihood of preferred examples, while neglecting dis-preferred samples. We show how one can extend EM algorithms to explicitly incorporate dis-preferred outcomes, leading to a novel, theoretically grounded, preference optimization algorithm that offers an intuitive and versatile way to learn from both positive and negative feedback.

Offline paired preference optimization algorithms have become a popular approach for fine-tuning on preference data, outperforming traditional supervised fine-tuning in various tasks. However, traditional implementations often involve redundant computations, especially for tasks with long shared prompts. We introduce prefix sharing for preference tuning, a novel technique that processes chosen and rejected responses as one sequence with a shared prefix. To prevent cross-response contamination, we use a custom block-sparse attention mask. Our method achieves 1.1-1.5times improvement in training throughput on popular DPO datasets, without any effect on convergence. When combined with sequence packing, we observe consistent 1.3-1.6times speedups, benefiting even datasets with smaller sequence lengths. While we focus on Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), our approach is applicable to other paired preference tuning methods. By enhancing computational efficiency, our work contributes to making preference-based fine-tuning more accessible for a wider range of applications and model sizes. We open-source our code at https://github.com/frankxwang/dpo-prefix-sharing.

Researchers and developers increasingly rely on toxicity scoring to moderate generative language model outputs, in settings such as customer service, information retrieval, and content generation. However, toxicity scoring may render pertinent information inaccessible, rigidify or "value-lock" cultural norms, and prevent language reclamation processes, particularly for marginalized people. In this work, we extend the concept of algorithmic recourse to generative language models: we provide users a novel mechanism to achieve their desired prediction by dynamically setting thresholds for toxicity filtering. Users thereby exercise increased agency relative to interactions with the baseline system. A pilot study (n = 30) supports the potential of our proposed recourse mechanism, indicating improvements in usability compared to fixed-threshold toxicity-filtering of model outputs. Future work should explore the intersection of toxicity scoring, model controllability, user agency, and language reclamation processes -- particularly with regard to the bias that many communities encounter when interacting with generative language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are usually aligned with "human values/preferences" to prevent harmful output. Discussions around the alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) generally focus on preventing harmful outputs. However, in this paper, we argue that in health-related queries, over-alignment-leading to overly cautious responses-can itself be harmful, especially for people with anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). This is not only unethical but also dangerous to the user, both mentally and physically. We also showed qualitative results that some LLMs exhibit varying degrees of alignment. Finally, we call for the development of LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities that provide more tailored and nuanced responses to health queries. Warning: This paper contains materials that could trigger health anxiety or OCD.

Recommender systems play a pivotal role in mitigating information overload in various fields. Nonetheless, the inherent openness of these systems introduces vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to insert fake users into the system's training data to skew the exposure of certain items, known as poisoning attacks. Adversarial training has emerged as a notable defense mechanism against such poisoning attacks within recommender systems. Existing adversarial training methods apply perturbations of the same magnitude across all users to enhance system robustness against attacks. Yet, in reality, we find that attacks often affect only a subset of users who are vulnerable. These perturbations of indiscriminate magnitude make it difficult to balance effective protection for vulnerable users without degrading recommendation quality for those who are not affected. To address this issue, our research delves into understanding user vulnerability. Considering that poisoning attacks pollute the training data, we note that the higher degree to which a recommender system fits users' training data correlates with an increased likelihood of users incorporating attack information, indicating their vulnerability. Leveraging these insights, we introduce the Vulnerability-aware Adversarial Training (VAT), designed to defend against poisoning attacks in recommender systems. VAT employs a novel vulnerability-aware function to estimate users' vulnerability based on the degree to which the system fits them. Guided by this estimation, VAT applies perturbations of adaptive magnitude to each user, not only reducing the success ratio of attacks but also preserving, and potentially enhancing, the quality of recommendations. Comprehensive experiments confirm VAT's superior defensive capabilities across different recommendation models and against various types of attacks.

Modern neural networks are often trained on massive datasets that are web scraped with minimal human inspection. As a result of this insecure curation pipeline, an adversary can poison or backdoor the resulting model by uploading malicious data to the internet and waiting for a victim to scrape and train on it. Existing approaches for creating poisons and backdoors start with randomly sampled clean data, called base samples, and then modify those samples to craft poisons. However, some base samples may be significantly more amenable to poisoning than others. As a result, we may be able to craft more potent poisons by carefully choosing the base samples. In this work, we use guided diffusion to synthesize base samples from scratch that lead to significantly more potent poisons and backdoors than previous state-of-the-art attacks. Our Guided Diffusion Poisoning (GDP) base samples can be combined with any downstream poisoning or backdoor attack to boost its effectiveness. Our implementation code is publicly available at: https://github.com/hsouri/GDP .

Detoxifying multilingual Large Language Models (LLMs) has become crucial due to their increasing global use. In this work, we explore zero-shot cross-lingual generalization of preference tuning in detoxifying LLMs. Unlike previous studies that show limited cross-lingual generalization for other safety tasks, we demonstrate that Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) training with only English data can significantly reduce toxicity in multilingual open-ended generations. For example, the probability of mGPT-1.3B generating toxic continuations drops from 46.8% to 3.9% across 17 different languages after training. Our results also extend to other multilingual LLMs, such as BLOOM, Llama3, and Aya-23. Using mechanistic interpretability tools like causal intervention and activation analysis, we identified the dual multilinguality property of MLP layers in LLMs, which explains the cross-lingual generalization of DPO. Finally, we show that bilingual sentence retrieval can predict the cross-lingual transferability of DPO preference tuning.

Recently, Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have gained significant attention across various domains. However, their widespread adoption has also raised serious safety concerns. In this paper, we uncover a new safety risk of MLLMs: the output preference of MLLMs can be arbitrarily manipulated by carefully optimized images. Such attacks often generate contextually relevant yet biased responses that are neither overtly harmful nor unethical, making them difficult to detect. Specifically, we introduce a novel method, Preference Hijacking (Phi), for manipulating the MLLM response preferences using a preference hijacked image. Our method works at inference time and requires no model modifications. Additionally, we introduce a universal hijacking perturbation -- a transferable component that can be embedded into different images to hijack MLLM responses toward any attacker-specified preferences. Experimental results across various tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. The code for Phi is accessible at https://github.com/Yifan-Lan/Phi.

Recently, the newly emerged multimodal models, which leverage both visual and linguistic modalities to train powerful encoders, have gained increasing attention. However, learning from a large-scale unlabeled dataset also exposes the model to the risk of potential poisoning attacks, whereby the adversary aims to perturb the model's training data to trigger malicious behaviors in it. In contrast to previous work, only poisoning visual modality, in this work, we take the first step to studying poisoning attacks against multimodal models in both visual and linguistic modalities. Specially, we focus on answering two questions: (1) Is the linguistic modality also vulnerable to poisoning attacks? and (2) Which modality is most vulnerable? To answer the two questions, we propose three types of poisoning attacks against multimodal models. Extensive evaluations on different datasets and model architectures show that all three attacks can achieve significant attack performance while maintaining model utility in both visual and linguistic modalities. Furthermore, we observe that the poisoning effect differs between different modalities. To mitigate the attacks, we propose both pre-training and post-training defenses. We empirically show that both defenses can significantly reduce the attack performance while preserving the model's utility.

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

Preference learning algorithms (e.g., RLHF and DPO) are frequently used to steer LLMs to produce generations that are more preferred by humans, but our understanding of their inner workings is still limited. In this work, we study the conventional wisdom that preference learning trains models to assign higher likelihoods to more preferred outputs than less preferred outputs, measured via ranking accuracy. Surprisingly, we find that most state-of-the-art preference-tuned models achieve a ranking accuracy of less than 60% on common preference datasets. We furthermore derive the idealized ranking accuracy that a preference-tuned LLM would achieve if it optimized the DPO or RLHF objective perfectly. We demonstrate that existing models exhibit a significant alignment gap -- i.e., a gap between the observed and idealized ranking accuracies. We attribute this discrepancy to the DPO objective, which is empirically and theoretically ill-suited to fix even mild ranking errors in the reference model, and derive a simple and efficient formula for quantifying the difficulty of learning a given preference datapoint. Finally, we demonstrate that ranking accuracy strongly correlates with the empirically popular win rate metric when the model is close to the reference model used in the objective, shedding further light on the differences between on-policy (e.g., RLHF) and off-policy (e.g., DPO) preference learning algorithms.

Although Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have progressed in solving complex problems, their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning often contains harmful content that can persist even when the final responses appear safe. We show that this issue still remains in existing methods which overlook the unique significance of safe reasoning, undermining their trustworthiness and posing potential risks in applications if unsafe reasoning is accessible for and exploited by malicious users. We therefore shift our focus to aligning the safety of reasoning itself in this paper and explore process supervision as the solution. However, simply rewarding safe reasoning proves inadequate due to low rollout diversity and limited training signals. To tackle this challenge, we first delve into the characteristics of safe reasoning and uncover several critical insights that 1) safe reasoning is often consolidated by a few critical steps of safety triggers; 2) compliance cues strongly correlate with unsafe continuations; and 3) corrective interventions reliably steer unsafe trajectories towards safer traces. Motivated by these, we propose Intervened Preference Optimization (IPO), an alignment method that enforces safe reasoning by substituting compliance steps with safety triggers and constructing pairs for preference learning with strong signals. Experiments on jailbreak and adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that IPO remarkably improves overall safety regarding both reasoning and responses, outperforming SFT-based and RL-based baselines with a relative reduction of over 30% in harmfulness, while preserving excellent performance across diverse reasoning tasks. The results highlight the importance of explicit alignment for reasoning and provide a practical path to safer LRMs.

Human feedback can alter language models in unpredictable and undesirable ways, as practitioners lack a clear understanding of what feedback data encodes. While prior work studies preferences over certain attributes (e.g., length or sycophancy), automatically extracting relevant features without pre-specifying hypotheses remains challenging. We introduce What's In My Human Feedback? (WIMHF), a method to explain feedback data using sparse autoencoders. WIMHF characterizes both (1) the preferences a dataset is capable of measuring and (2) the preferences that the annotators actually express. Across 7 datasets, WIMHF identifies a small number of human-interpretable features that account for the majority of the preference prediction signal achieved by black-box models. These features reveal a wide diversity in what humans prefer, and the role of dataset-level context: for example, users on Reddit prefer informality and jokes, while annotators in HH-RLHF and PRISM disprefer them. WIMHF also surfaces potentially unsafe preferences, such as that LMArena users tend to vote against refusals, often in favor of toxic content. The learned features enable effective data curation: re-labeling the harmful examples in Arena yields large safety gains (+37%) with no cost to general performance. They also allow fine-grained personalization: on the Community Alignment dataset, we learn annotator-specific weights over subjective features that improve preference prediction. WIMHF provides a human-centered analysis method for practitioners to better understand and use preference data.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

While state-of-the-art diffusion models (DMs) excel in image generation, concerns regarding their security persist. Earlier research highlighted DMs' vulnerability to data poisoning attacks, but these studies placed stricter requirements than conventional methods like `BadNets' in image classification. This is because the art necessitates modifications to the diffusion training and sampling procedures. Unlike the prior work, we investigate whether BadNets-like data poisoning methods can directly degrade the generation by DMs. In other words, if only the training dataset is contaminated (without manipulating the diffusion process), how will this affect the performance of learned DMs? In this setting, we uncover bilateral data poisoning effects that not only serve an adversarial purpose (compromising the functionality of DMs) but also offer a defensive advantage (which can be leveraged for defense in classification tasks against poisoning attacks). We show that a BadNets-like data poisoning attack remains effective in DMs for producing incorrect images (misaligned with the intended text conditions). Meanwhile, poisoned DMs exhibit an increased ratio of triggers, a phenomenon we refer to as `trigger amplification', among the generated images. This insight can be then used to enhance the detection of poisoned training data. In addition, even under a low poisoning ratio, studying the poisoning effects of DMs is also valuable for designing robust image classifiers against such attacks. Last but not least, we establish a meaningful linkage between data poisoning and the phenomenon of data replications by exploring DMs' inherent data memorization tendencies.

Learning from preference feedback has emerged as an essential step for improving the generation quality and performance of modern language models (LMs). Despite its widespread use, the way preference-based learning is applied varies wildly, with differing data, learning algorithms, and evaluations used, making disentangling the impact of each aspect difficult. In this work, we identify four core aspects of preference-based learning: preference data, learning algorithm, reward model, and policy training prompts, systematically investigate the impact of these components on downstream model performance, and suggest a recipe for strong learning for preference feedback. Our findings indicate that all aspects are important for performance, with better preference data leading to the largest improvements, followed by the choice of learning algorithm, the use of improved reward models, and finally the use of additional unlabeled prompts for policy training. Notably, PPO outperforms DPO by up to 2.5% in math and 1.2% in general domains. High-quality preference data leads to improvements of up to 8% in instruction following and truthfulness. Despite significant gains of up to 5% in mathematical evaluation when scaling up reward models, we surprisingly observe marginal improvements in other categories. We publicly release the code used for training (https://github.com/hamishivi/EasyLM) and evaluating (https://github.com/allenai/open-instruct) our models, along with the models and datasets themselves (https://huggingface.co/collections/allenai/tulu-v25-suite-66676520fd578080e126f618).

Not all topics are equally "flammable" in terms of toxicity: a calm discussion of turtles or fishing less often fuels inappropriate toxic dialogues than a discussion of politics or sexual minorities. We define a set of sensitive topics that can yield inappropriate and toxic messages and describe the methodology of collecting and labeling a dataset for appropriateness. While toxicity in user-generated data is well-studied, we aim at defining a more fine-grained notion of inappropriateness. The core of inappropriateness is that it can harm the reputation of a speaker. This is different from toxicity in two respects: (i) inappropriateness is topic-related, and (ii) inappropriate message is not toxic but still unacceptable. We collect and release two datasets for Russian: a topic-labeled dataset and an appropriateness-labeled dataset. We also release pre-trained classification models trained on this data.

Direct preference optimization (DPO) has shown success in aligning diffusion models with human preference. Previous approaches typically assume a consistent preference label between final generations and noisy samples at intermediate steps, and directly apply DPO to these noisy samples for fine-tuning. However, we theoretically identify inherent issues in this assumption and its impacts on the effectiveness of preference alignment. We first demonstrate the inherent issues from two perspectives: gradient direction and preference order, and then propose a Tailored Preference Optimization (TailorPO) framework for aligning diffusion models with human preference, underpinned by some theoretical insights. Our approach directly ranks intermediate noisy samples based on their step-wise reward, and effectively resolves the gradient direction issues through a simple yet efficient design. Additionally, we incorporate the gradient guidance of diffusion models into preference alignment to further enhance the optimization effectiveness. Experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly improves the model's ability to generate aesthetically pleasing and human-preferred images.

Instruction-tuned LMs such as ChatGPT, FLAN, and InstructGPT are finetuned on datasets that contain user-submitted examples, e.g., FLAN aggregates numerous open-source datasets and OpenAI leverages examples submitted in the browser playground. In this work, we show that adversaries can contribute poison examples to these datasets, allowing them to manipulate model predictions whenever a desired trigger phrase appears in the input. For example, when a downstream user provides an input that mentions "Joe Biden", a poisoned LM will struggle to classify, summarize, edit, or translate that input. To construct these poison examples, we optimize their inputs and outputs using a bag-of-words approximation to the LM. We evaluate our method on open-source instruction-tuned LMs. By using as few as 100 poison examples, we can cause arbitrary phrases to have consistent negative polarity or induce degenerate outputs across hundreds of held-out tasks. Worryingly, we also show that larger LMs are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning and that defenses based on data filtering or reducing model capacity provide only moderate protections while reducing test accuracy.

Modern preference alignment techniques, such as Best-of-N (BoN) sampling, rely on reward models trained with pairwise comparison data. While effective at learning relative preferences, this paradigm fails to capture a signal of response acceptability, leaving systems vulnerable to selecting the least bad of many unacceptable options. This is particularly problematic for hard prompts, where the risk of such false acceptances increases with the number of samples. In this paper, we address this critical reliability gap by introducing a new data collection and modeling framework. By augmenting preference data with an outside option, inspired by discrete choice models, we train a reward model that can distinguish not just what is better, but what is good enough. We leverage this capability to create an adaptive inference strategy, best of mini-N in-loop, which partitions the generation budget into sequential loops with a calibrated, early-exit condition. Our experiments show that when tuned as an alignment guardrail, it reduces reliability failures by 70\%, and when tuned as an inference accelerator, it improves average inference speed by over 22\% in IMDB-sentiment setting. We thus provide a principled and flexible framework for practitioners to explicitly manage the trade-off between reliability and computational efficiency.

Recent research has highlighted the vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) against data poisoning attacks. These attacks aim to inject poisoning samples into the models' training dataset such that the trained models have inference failures. While previous studies have executed different types of attacks, one major challenge that greatly limits their effectiveness is the uncertainty of the re-training process after the injection of poisoning samples, including the re-training initialization or algorithms. To address this challenge, we propose a novel attack method called ''Sharpness-Aware Data Poisoning Attack (SAPA)''. In particular, it leverages the concept of DNNs' loss landscape sharpness to optimize the poisoning effect on the worst re-trained model. It helps enhance the preservation of the poisoning effect, regardless of the specific retraining procedure employed. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SAPA offers a general and principled strategy that significantly enhances various types of poisoning attacks.

Ensuring that large language models (LLMs) are both helpful and harmless is a critical challenge, as overly strict constraints can lead to excessive refusals, while permissive models risk generating harmful content. Existing approaches, such as reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and direct preference optimization (DPO), attempt to balance these trade-offs but suffer from performance conflicts, limited controllability, and poor extendability. To address these issues, we propose Preference Vector, a novel framework inspired by task arithmetic. Instead of optimizing multiple preferences within a single objective, we train separate models on individual preferences, extract behavior shifts as preference vectors, and dynamically merge them at test time. This modular approach enables fine-grained, user-controllable preference adjustments and facilitates seamless integration of new preferences without retraining. Experiments show that our proposed Preference Vector framework improves helpfulness without excessive conservatism, allows smooth control over preference trade-offs, and supports scalable multi-preference alignment.