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This is a summary of the infamous Abner Louima case. a matter which attracted international attention and sparked demonstrations on New York City Hall in 1997 for its allegations of conscious-shocking police abuse. On August 8, 1998, Louima's private attorneys, who included the late Johnnie Cochran, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the City of New York, the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) and various individual police officers, alleging police brutality. Louima, a Haitian immigrant, claimed that he was beaten and sodomized with a broken piece of a broomstick or toilet plunger, in a Brooklyn stationhouse bathroom following his arrest at a Haitian nightclub. Louima claimed that the following his torture, officers and the PBA engaged in a widespread conspiracy to cover-up the incident. Louima further alleged that the officer's brutality was the caused by the policies, customs and/or practices of the NYPD and the PBA, including a "code of silence" that existed within the department. Louima's wife alleged a claim for loss of consortium.
Five of the individual officers named as defendants in Louima's civil suit were also indicted on federal criminal violations stemming from the attack on Louima. Two separate criminal trials began while Louima's civil case was pending. One defendant officer, Justin Volpe, eventually pled guilty to charges relative to his involvement. Other officers were convicted, but the convictions were overturned on appeal, with charges against one officer being remanded for a new trial. See U.S. v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 2002).
Louima's complaint was amended three times, with the third amended complaint being filed on September 27, 2000. Several individual defendants filed cross-claims, but the legal basis for those cross-claims is unclear from the docket. The PBA responded to the third amended complaint by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. PBA argued in part that plaintiffs' third amended complaint did not adequately allege that the PBA acted under color of state law, nor that it conspired with a state actor to deprive plaintiffs' civil rights. Plaintiffs served a memorandum in opposition to PBA's motion to dismiss, addressing the novel issue of the PBA's potential liability in a Section 1983 police brutality case.
In March 2001 Magistrate Cheryl L. Pollak entered a protective order in the case, restricting public access to the proceedings and pleadings. With settlement talks ongoing, Judge Pollak also ordered that all parties to the litigation refrain from publicly disclosing any information regarding settlement negotiations. The protective order was amended several times thereafter and eventually lifted on October 17, 2002.
After years of discovery and protracted settlement negotiations, the case was globally settled for $8.75 million (the City agreeing to pay $7.125 million; the PBA agreeing to pay $1.625 million) in exchange for dismissal of the claims against all of the defendants, except for Officers Charles Schwarz and Francisco Rosario. On July 23, 2001, a stipulation and order of settlement and dismissal was filed. There was a dispute among Louima's attorneys as to the distribution of attorneys' fees, so district court judge Sterling Johnson, Jr. ordered that the amount of the fees be placed in an escrow account, overseen by trustee Ronald L. Garnett, Esq., pending resolution of the fee dispute.
A hearing was held before the court beginning on October 16, 2002, regarding the attorney fee dispute. On October 5, 2004, district court judge Sterling Johnson, Jr. adopted magistrate judge Pollack's report and recommendation on the fee dispute in part and awarded several of the attorneys less than 10% of the total attorneys' fees of $2.9 million. The majority of the fees were ordered payable to attorneys Cochran, Neufeld, Scheck and Rubenstein.
Attorney Roper-Simpson appealed the order. The second circuit court of appeals affirmed and the district court thereafter ordered the distribution of the attorney's fees in accordance with its order.
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This case addressed First Amendment claims concerning President Donald J. Trump’s blocking of Twitter users from his account.
On July 11, 2017, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, as well as various political writers and professors, filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued President Donald J. Trump, White House Press Secretary Sean M. Spicer, and other agents of the executive branch alleging First Amendment violations. The plaintiffs argued that President Trump’s Twitter account was a public forum and alleged that by blocking Twitter users who had criticized President Trump or his policies, the defendants had unconstitutionally limited those users’ right to free speech. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the ACLU, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald.
On October 13, 2017, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims, that the plaintiffs could not establish a state action, and that blocking the individual plaintiffs did not violate the public forum doctrine.
On November 3, 2017, the plaintiffs responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account was a designated public forum and that blocking the individual plaintiffs was an unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
On May 23, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part both motions for summary judgment. Judge Buchwald concluded that the court had jurisdiction but found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue Sarah Huckabee Sanders and Hope Hicks, two other press officials in the Trump Administration. Thus, the two were dismissed as defendants. Next, the Court found that the type of speech the plaintiffs sought to engage in was protected by the First Amendment and that the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account was susceptible to analysis under the public forum doctrine. Lastly, Judge Buchwald concluded that the viewpoint-based exclusion, or blocking, of a Twitter user from the account was proscribed by the First Amendment and could not be justified by the President’s personal interests. 302 F. Supp. 3d 541.
On June 4, 2018, the defendants appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A panel consisting of Judges Barrington D. Parker, Peter W. Hall, and Christopher F. Droney upheld the district court's ruling in a July 9, 2019 decision. They found that the President's Twitter account was not a private platform and produced government speech as part of a public forum. Under this classification, discrimination based on viewpoint was not permissible, and blocking the Twitter users amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The panel added that "workarounds" such as logging out of Twitter to see the President's tweets without the ability to comment placed an unfair burden on expression, too. Therefore, the President was no longer allowed to block Twitter users from the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account. 928 F.3d 226.
The defendants applied for a rehearing en banc after this opinion was filed, but Judge Parker denied their motion on March 23, 2020, reiterating the positions held in the previous opinion. Circuit Judges Michael Park and Richard Sullivan dissented, questioning the broadening of the scope of public forum doctrine to include Twitter accounts. They also contested the decision that a government official using Twitter amounted to government speech. 953 F.3d 216.
Trump petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2020. However, after President Biden's inauguration (Jan. 2020), President Biden was substituted as petitioner. On April 5, 2021, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Second Circuit’s judgment from July 9, 2019, (928 F.3d 226) was vacated and the case was remanded to the Second Circuit with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. In a concurring statement, Justice Thomas’ elaborated that <i>United States v. Munsingwear</i> allowed the Court to vacate the Second Court’s decision because of a change in Presidential administration. Additionally, Thomas wrote that the “more glaring concern must perforce be the dominant digital platforms themselves” and their influence over speech. 141 S.Ct. 1220.
On June 9, 2021, plaintiffs moved for attorney fees. Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) as they had secured a ruling that “materially altered the legal relationship of the parties and also achieved the benefit Plaintiffs sought.” This was referencing the District Court’s ruling on May 23, 2018. Notably, plaintiffs sought only a portion of the fees that they claimed the EAJA entitled them to. Specifically, plaintiffs declined to pursue many of the costs associated with their private counsel. Instead, plaintiffs mainly sought to be compensatedfor their “distinctive knowledge or specialized skill in the areas of the First Amendment and constitutional law,” citing an apparent “limited availability” for qualified experts in that area. The motion included a chart of costs sought which totaled approximately $717,000. As of July 6, 2021, this motion is pending.
This case is ongoing.
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On December 2, 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, by failing to make its intercity rail stations accessible to individuals with disabilities by July 26, 2020, as required by the Act. The government sought to enjoin Amtrak from discriminating on the basis of disability and require the company to comply with the ADA. The government also sought compensatory damages for disabled individuals who had been harmed by Amtrak’s inaccessible stations. The case was not docketed or assigned to a judge, however, because the government reached a settlement with Amtrak on the same day it filed its complaint.
The settlement agreement required Amtrak to design at least 135 accessible stations, finish construction at 90 stations, and be in the process of constructing at least 45 stations within 10 years of the settlement date. The agreement also required Amtrak to train staff on ADA compliance and to establish a monitor-approved process for managing ADA complaints. Pursuant to these obligations, Amtrak created the Office of the Vice President of Stations, Properties, and Accessibility. Amtrak also created a $2.25 million settlement fund to compensate mobility-impaired individuals who traveled or attempted to travel at Amtrak’s 78 most inaccessible stations. The settlement was monitored by the Federal Railroad Administration and the Department of Justice.
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In September, 2001 the New Orleans District Office of the EEOC brought this lawsuit against Belle Chasse Marine Transportation, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana alleging discrimination on the basis of race, black, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the defendant allegedly subjected complainant, a black employee, to a racially hostile environment by permitting derogatory comments to be made to the complainant due to his marriage to a white female, allowing its managers to make other inappropriate comments, and assigning menial and demeaning tasks to African-American employees outside their duties. The parties settled the dispute in June 2002 through a consent decree, prior to the defendant's appearance in court.
The two-year decree, containing agreements not to discriminate or retaliate, required the defendant to: re-employ complainant at a different work site, distribute notice of employee rights, provide EEO training both internally and externally for its managers, implement a complaint resolution process, keep records of all employment applications and pay $14,500 to be distributed among 6 individuals
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On March 29, 2018, four transgender people seeking to correct their Ohio birth certificates to accurately reflect their gender identity filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (in Columbus). The plaintiffs sued the Director of the Ohio Department of Health under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the ACLU and Lambda Legal, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Michael H. Watson.
The plaintiffs wished to change their birth certificates to avoid discrimination, privacy invasions, harassment, humiliation, stigma, harm to their health, and violence. They claimed that, in barring transgender people from obtaining accurate birth certificates matching their gender identity, the Department of Health had violated federal constitutional guarantees, including the rights to equal protection, due process, and freedom from compelled speech. On April 5, 2018, the court granted a request by the plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously and a protective order to be referred to pseudonymously in court documents. (2018 WL 8804858).
On July 6, 2018, the state filed a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a claim, arguing that the plaintiffs did not state a true violation of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, Ohio argued that birth certificates purely express sex and not gender identity under Ohio statutes; that the plaintiffs failed to properly state a claim of due process violation; and that preventing birth certificate changes served state interests.
On July 21, 2018, Ohio filed a motion to stay discovery until their motion to dismiss had been resolved. The state argued that the plaintiffs were already serving overly broad discovery requests at the expense of taxpayer money for a case that was primarily legal in nature, despite the fact that a successful motion to dismiss would resolve most actions in this case. The state argued that in the interests of saving resources, a stay of discovery should be ordered until a decision on their motion had been finalized.
On October 10, 2018, the district court denied the state's motion to stay discovery, citing that a “garden-variety” motion to dismiss, was not sufficient grounds to stay discovery. (2018 WL 4907080). Nearly a year later, on September 12, 2019, the judge denied the motion to dismiss. Specifically, the judge found that Ohio statutes were not clear on whether a transgender individual could obtain a birth certificate change, violations of due process were properly alleged, and that the argument that preventing birth certificate changes served a state interest lacked merit. (2019 WL 11791719)
Both sides moved for summary judgment on January 16, 2020. On December 16, 2020, Judge Watson granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the government's; Judge Watson based this on a logical disconnect between Ohio’s stated reasons for denying the documentation (historical accuracy and preventing fraud) and the fact that the state had, as recently as 2016, allowed transgender people to change the sex marker on state documents. (507 F.Supp.3d 925)
On February 1, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees. On March 26, the court stayed this motion pending a joint status report detailing the discussions between the parties on the attorney fees motion and the government's compliance with the December 16 order.
On June 23, 2021, Judge Watson signed a consent judgment which stipulated that the government would issue correct documents to the plaintiffs reflecting their gender identity, would seal the incorrect documents in a vault away from the public, and that the decision in this case would affect only the parties to the case and not other transgender people seeking similar relief in Ohio. The court ordered that a status report be submitted no later than July 26, 2021. As of the writing of this summary, the case remains open.
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On August 24, 2006, the Wilmington office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act against I.G. Burton of Seaford in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The EEOC alleged that the defendants had violated ADEA-protected rights of the complainant, who worked for the defendant as a "runner," driving and delivering vehicles, by firing him on the basis of his age.
On December 17, 2007, the parties entered into a consent decree, which the court adopted two days later and closed the case. Under the decree, the defendants agreed to pay $70,000 in damages to three former employees that they terminated on the basis of age. The decree enjoined the defendants from discriminating unlawfully on the basis of age, and it required them to post notice of their employees' rights in a conspicuous location at their place of business. Under the decree, the EEOC had the right to send a representative (unannounced) to the defendants' place of business to determine whether they were in compliance with the terms of the consent decree that required them to post such notice. The defendants agreed to provide EEO training to all management personnel within 180 days of the entry of the consent decree, and annually thereafter during the life of the decree. The defendants were required to send a report to the EEOC within 10 days of their completion of the training requirements of the decree. The defendants agreed to provide the EEOC with a copy of all training materials that they used to train their management personnel. They also agreed to give the EEOC the right to prior approval of the person that they hired to administer the training. The terms of the agreement were to run for 3 years. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement took place; the case was presumably closed in 2010.
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On September 13, 2005, Prison Legal News (PLN), a non-profit legal journal devoted to reporting news and litigation concerning detention facilities, filed this action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. PLN sought declaratory and injunctive relief for the defendant's refusal to produce documents requested by PLN under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or grant a fee waiver for the document requests. The case was assigned to Judge Reggie B. Walton.
PLN had submitted a FOIA request to the BOP on August 6, 2003, seeking documents related to litigation expenses incurred by the BOP between January 1, 1996 and July 31, 2003. In conjunction with the information request, PLN also asked the BOP to waive all associated search and duplication fees, citing the FOIA provision that required a waiver where "disclosure of the information is in the public interest. . . and not primarily in the commercial interest of the requestor." The BOP refused to grant the fee waiver, claiming that PLN had failed to explain how the information request would be of public interest, and that the request was overbroad. PLN appealed the BOP's decision to the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Information and Privacy, which concluded that PLN's request for a fee waiver had properly been denied. Specifically, PLN did not demonstrate that the information would be communicated to the public and the release of the requested information would not enhance the public's understanding—especially considering that some of the requested documents were already publicly available.
After the plaintiff began this action, the defendant filed for summary judgment on November 30, 2005. PLN filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on December 30, 2005. On June 26, 2006, the court concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently established that disclosure of the requested information was in the public interest because it was likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government. The court also found that the plaintiff had demonstrated its intent and ability to disseminate the information to the relevant public. The defendant stipulated to pay $48,709.72 in attorney's fees and costs.
On February 15, 2007, the court first ordered the defendant to process the plaintiff's FOIA request by March 20, 2007. But the defendant continued to request extensions of time to comply. PLN did not oppose the extensions until September 2007, when it noted to the court that compliance was already long overdue.
The defendant eventually produced approximately 11,000 pages in response to the plaintiff’s FOIA request, but 2,993 of these pages contained redactions. The defendant stated that these redactions were allowed under specific FOIA exemptions, but the plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s justification was insufficient. PLN filed for judgment on March 28, 2008 and a court order for the defendant to properly comply with the request. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On March 26, 2009, the court ordered the defendant to either search for the records sought by the plaintiff or submit an affidavit indicating that the documents could be properly withheld under FOIA exemptions.
On February 25, 2011, the court granted in part and denied in part both parties' motions for summary judgment. It agreed that the defendant had adequately searched for the requested documents, but agreed with the plaintiff that the defendant had not sufficiently justified its use of FOIA exemptions to redact or withhold information. The court requested that the defendant provide additional explanations about the relative weight of competing public and private interests at stake in a sufficiently detailed manner to enable the court to assess whether the exemptions were properly asserted. The court issued a schedule for the defendant to bring itself into compliance with the requirements of <i>Vaughn v. Rosen</i>. A Vaughn index is an itemized, detailed justification of a party’s claims that documents or portions thereof are exempt from FOIA. 484 F.2d 820.
In May 2011, the defendant produced a new Vaughn index, which the plaintiff claimed did not sufficiently justify the redactions. In response, the defendant provided the plaintiff with newly redacted documents, and a second supplemental Vaughn index. The plaintiff was still unsatisfied, because the documents contained redactions of individual names, job titles, department descriptions, work addresses, dates of employment, dates of events and entire sentences of text. In a memorandum opinion issued on July 23, 2013, the court ruled in favor of the defendant: it held that the defendant had properly relied on an exemption that allows information to be redacted or withheld if there is a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy that is not outweighed by the public interest. At this time, the case was closed.
The plaintiff appealed to the DC Circuit Court on August 22, 2013 (USCA Case Number 12-5269). PLN argued that the district court erred in balancing the individual's privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure. On August 5, 2015, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant had not sufficiently justified its redactions; the court reversed and remanded the district court’s decision. The court concluded that the defendant had combined the privacy interests of all individuals whose information was redacted into categories based on the type of document within which the individual's information appeared. The court found several problems with this categorical methodology: because the categories were centered on specific types of filed documents, they included a wide range of claims covering various degrees of privacy interests. But these privacy interests could be different depending on the claim. The categorical approach failed to distinguish between redacting the identity of the alleged victim and the identity of the alleged perpetrator, and the defendant made no effort to distinguish between the privacy interests of employees who were victims and those who were perpetrators. The court also found that the defendant redacted inconsistently; the names of some alleged perpetrators were redacted while others were not. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals remanded the case, requiring the defendant to fashion a coherent catalogue of the documents still in dispute and instructing the district court to balance privacy and public interests in light of the defendant’s new submissions. 787 F.3d 1142.
On April 3, 2017, the district court approved a settlement. The parties stipulated that the defendant had acceptably produced the documents originally requested by the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to pay $420,000 in the plaintiff's attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiff agreed to forever discharge, release, and withdraw any claims of access to records or portions of records previously made in the lawsuit. The case was dismissed and is now closed.
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On December 9, 2011, an openly gay former employee of Ohio Bell Telephone Company filed suit in U.S District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging that he had been dismissed in violation of both state and federal law. Specifically, Mr. Koren, who had taken the name of his husband, alleged that Ohio Bell violated the ADA, multiple sections of the Ohio Civil Rights Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act when it dismissed him under the guise of missing days of work when in reality he was fired because his actions did not conform to the gender stereotype and he had AIDS.
On August 14, 2012, the court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The case was dismissed after a settlement was reached on September 7, 2012.
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This is one of twelve cases filed on May 21, 2012 in federal district courts across the country by Catholic organizations challenging the contraception mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Plaintiffs, a non-profit corporation of Catholic parishes, schools, and charities, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the Federal Government under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to issue a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the ACA extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that providing, paying for, or facilitating access to such services is inconsistent with its religious beliefs and contend that compliance with the contraception requirement is a substantial burden on their religious exercise.
On December 20, 2012, the court (Judge Halil Suleyman Ozerden) granted the Federal Government's motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness. The court noted that because the contraception mandate was in the process of being amended, as noted by the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM), in its present form the mandate represent only a tentative agency position and was therefore not ripe for review. Plaintiffs' case was dismissed without prejudice. 2012 WL 6831407.
On January 8, 2013, plaintiffs moved to alter the courts' judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) on the basis that failure to do so would result in manifest injustice. They asked the court to hold the case in abeyance pending the ANPRM amendments or require the Federal Government to file regular status reports on the progress of these amendments. On February 15, 2013, the court (Judge Halil Suleyman Ozerden) denied plaintiff's motion, noting that plaintiffs had not requested these alternatives before final judgment and holding that dismissal without prejudice did not create a manifest injustice on them. 2013 WL 690990.
The plaintiffs renewed their case on May 27, 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00146-LG-JCG. The complaint challenged the ACA as finalized. Plaintiffs alleged that, although under the amended ACA the Diocese itself likely fell within the "religious employer" exception, affiliated Catholic entities were only considered "eligible organizations" qualifying for an accommodation. This accommodation would require plaintiffs to provide self-certification to their insurance provider setting forth their religious objections to the ACA, in turn triggering an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the services plaintiffs find objectionable. According to the plaintiffs, this series of events made them the but-for cause of providing contraception coverage in violation of their sincerely held beliefs. Plaintiffs continued to ask the court to grant a permanent injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA.
On November 7, 2014, the parties moved to stay proceedings in this case pending the Fifth Circuit's decision in consolidated appeals--<i>East Texas Baptist University v. Burwell</i>, No. 14-20112, <i>University of Dallas v. Burwell</i>, No. 14-10241, <i>Catholic Diocese of Beaumont v. Burwell</i>, No. 14-40212, and <i>Catholic Charities, Diocese of Fort Worth v. Burwell</i>, No. 14-10661--raising substantially similar legal issues to those in this case. The court granted the motion to stay on November 24, 2014. On June 22, 2015, the Fifth Circuit (Judges Jerry E. Smith, Thomas M. Reavley, and James E. Graves) held that the ACA provisions challenged in the consolidated appeals did not violate the plaintiffs' rights under RFRA. 793 F. 3d 449.
On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for the Fifth Circuit consolidated appeals, consolidating the case with similar cases dealing with the issue in other circuit courts. Together, the cases are known as <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13465">Zubik v. Burwell [II]</a>.
This case was argued in the Supreme Court on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of the case.
The parties requested another stay pending the proceedings in the Fifth Circuit on the remand of the consolidated appeals, and on March 8, 2017, the court administratively closed the case pending disposition of the Fifth Circuit proceedings.
Following a change in administration, and an executive order directing a change in regulations to allow for conscience-based exceptions to the ACA's contraceptive-care mandate, and the parties in this case filed a joint stipulation of dismissal on October 23, 2017.
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This case involved a challenge to Caddo Parish School Board's decision to merge two all-black high schools: Booker T. Washington and Fair Park. <i>Cooksey</i> marks one challenge in a long history of school desegregation litigation efforts in the Caddo Parish School District, captured in <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13701">SD-LA-0002</a> in this clearinghouse. The case was assigned to Judge Elizabeth E. Foote in the Western District of Louisiana.
A 1981 consent decree required Caddo Parish School Board to provide a qualitatively equal education at Booker T. Washington and Fair Park relative to other schools in the district. This order remains ongoing to this day. In 2017, the Caddo Parish School Board decided to merge these two schools and turn Fair Park into a middle school. The decision, according to the Board, would save money and resources. On May 5, 2017, the plaintiffs, parents of students attending Fair Park and a Fair Park alumni association, brought this suit to enjoin the merger and declare the School Board's actions unconstitutional. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, as well as violations of the 1981 Consent Order and state law. On the same day, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the defendant from merging the schools through the duration of this case.
Three days later, on May 8, the School Board responded in opposition to the TRO. It argued that the claims were unrelated to the 1981 Consent Order and that the conversion of Fair Park was unrelated to race and would aid the students. But on May 16, plaintiffs reported that they no longer intended to move for preliminary relief, and they voluntarily withdrew their motion the next day. At this point, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Karen L. Hayes for a scheduling conference.
A trial was set for June 18, 2018. On July 26, 2017, however, the plaintiffs moved for an extension of time to amend their complaint. The plaintiffs informed the court that they intended to amend their complaint to make their suit a class action, involve more schools of the Caddo Parish, and include additional issues related to their case. The court granted the extension, giving the plaintiffs until August 27, 2017.
August 27 came and went. The plaintiffs never filed their amended complaint, and during this time, the school merger was completed.
There was no action on the docket until February 13, 2018, when Magistrate Judge Hayes ordered a conference. At this conference, both sides reported that the terms of the 1981 Consent Order did "not affect matters of public policy," and thus, the Consent Order was unrelated to the Board's decision to merge schools. The parties jointly stipulated to dismissal, and the court granted the dismissal on February 20, 2018.
The case is now closed.
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The Cleveland district office of the EEOC brought this suit against Overnite Transportation Company, a major transportation company, in June 2002, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The complaint alleged that Overnite refused to hire qualified individuals due to their epilepsy in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in April 2004 and the EEOC filed a motion for partial summary judgment that same month. In July of 2006 the defendant's motion was granted in part and denied in part and the EEOC's motion was denied. The parties settled in April 2008 by entry of a consent decree.
The consent decree, which has duration of two years, requires defendant to refrain from discriminating and to post a notice regarding this suit. It required the defendant to conduct training for its Regional Human Resources staff responsible for the Columbus and Memphis facilities, where the discrimination was alleged to occur, and to report on this training to the EEOC. If the EEOC has reasonable cause to believe that the defendant has violated any term of the decree, it is to notify the defendant who will then have ten days to remedy the breach. Finally, the defendant agreed to pay a total of $110,000.00 to two complainants who will then waive their claims against the defendant. The docket sheet doesn't show any further enforcement took place; the case was presumably closed in 2010.
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This is a case about poor conditions at a North Carolina private prison. On June 28, 2007, a group of men held at the Rivers Correctional Institution in North Carolina brought this class action suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They sued GEO Group, Inc., the private company that owned and operated the prison, and the United States Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the Legal Aid Justice Center, and the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief, claiming statutory violations under the Rehabilitation Act, violations of the Eighth Amendment, and negligence.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the health and welfare of the class, that they had excluded prisoners with disabilities from other services and programs, and that they had deliberately deprived the plaintiffs of adequate medical, dental, and mental health care. For example, the named plaintiff suffered improper treatment of a cavity at Rivers and ultimately underwent emergency surgery, which removed the infection and saved his life but left him deformed and disabled. The plaintiffs also alleged that GEO Group had breached its contract with the U.S. Government, which required GEO Group to provide its prisoners with “medical services that are commensurate with community standards.”
On July 26, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, to transfer the case on the grounds that the D.C. Court lacked personal jurisdiction over GEO Group. On September 18, 2007, the United States Bureau of Prisons also filed a motion to dismiss or transfer. The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on September 25, 2007. Both parties filed motions for time extensions to file responses to the motions, but on February 28, 2008, Judge Ricardo M. Urbina, agreeing that “transferring the case furthers the interests of justice,” granted the defendants’ motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of North Carolina. 535 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2008). The case was then transferred to North Carolina, where it was assigned to Senior District Judge Malcolm J. Howard.
On October 24, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, stipulating the requests for both the class and the Disability Sub-Class (which consisted of prisoners who had been allegedly denied access to programs and services they should have been provided under the Rehabilitation Act) and demanding a jury trial. The defendants moved to strike the amended complaint on January 5, 2009, and simultaneously filed motions to dismiss the suit. On February 16, 2009, GEO Group filed a notice of subsequently decided authority, citing Judge James C. Dever’s February 13, 2009 decision dismissing a prisoner's claims to relief for failure to comply with North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 9(j), regarding special pleading requirements for medical malpractice. The Bureau of Prisons also filed a notice of subsequently decided authority on April 14, 2009, noting that the Fourth Circuit had affirmed a district court’s finding that the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to federal prisons.
The case was reassigned from Judge Howard to Judge James C. Dever on July 22, 2008, and Judge Dever issued three orders: denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss and their motion to strike the amended complaint, and denying without prejudice the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. On November 9, 2009, Judge Dever granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss because two of the named plaintiffs had been released and for failure to state a claim, granting the plaintiffs leave to re-file an amended complaint. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on December 9, 2009, which the defendants moved to dismiss on January 22, 2010. After a hearing on the motions conducted on January 31, the Federal Bureau of Prisons filed a motion to dismiss on February 2.
On September 29, 2010, Judge Dever granted GEO Group’s motion to dismiss and granted in part the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ motion to dismiss, largely because the plaintiffs still failed to state a claim; however, the judge gave the plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint. 2010 WL 3835141.
The plaintiffs accordingly filed a third amended complaint on October 25, 2010. The plaintiffs continued to allege that GEO Group “manifested a pervasive and deliberate indifference to the health needs of” the prisoners at Rivers. The complaint described ten separate prisoners who had suffered deprivation of medical care or inadequate medical care while at Rivers and who had suffered injury, hospitalization, or disability as a result.
GEO Group filed an unopposed motion to dismiss GEO Group as a defendant on November 29, 2010, noting that the Court had stated that it would dismiss the claims in the Third Amended Complaint as to GEO. The Bureau of Prisons filed a motion to dismiss on December 3, 2010.
On July 18, 2011, Judge Dever granted GEO Group’s motion to dismiss as a defendant, citing the November 9, 2009 motion to dismiss, in which GEO argued that GEO’s actions at Rivers did not qualify as government action against which Eighth Amendment claims could be raised. However, the court rejected the Bureau of Prison’s argument that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because the Bureau failed to adequately support their argument with evidence. 2011 WL 2899135.
The plaintiffs again attempted to file for class certification on August 23, 2011, against which the Bureau of Prisons filed a motion to stay while they filed a motion to dismiss one of the plaintiffs. On September 26, 2011, Judge Dever granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss one plaintiff for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to the parties’ agreement.
The Bureau of Prisons also filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s July 18, 2011 order. Judge Dever denied that motion on January 9, 2012, finding that the defendants failed to persuade the court that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies or that precedent required the court to dismiss the case. 2012 WL 43586.
On February 23, 2012, Judge Dever denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, finding that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification. 2012 WL 600865. After that, a status conference was set for March 8, 2012, but before the conference could commence, the remaining named plaintiff was transferred, and the parties stipulated to dismissal on March 26, 2012. The case is now closed.
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236
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The Philadelphia district office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Pitt-Ohio Express, Inc., a transport company, in March 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The complaint was brought on behalf of a woman who had applied to work for Pitt-Ohio Express but had allegedly been denied employment as a truck driver or dockworker in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The complaint sought injunctive and monetary relief for the individual complainant and a class of similarly situated women. In August 2006, the court granted the complainant’s request to intervene on behalf of herself and the class of women who had been refused employment due to their sex.
The parties began settlement discussion on November 20, 2007. Almost a year later, on October 1, 2008, the court approved of the plaintiff-intervenor and Pitt-Ohio’s settlement agreement. The settlement called for the defendant to pay $570,000.00 total to the plaintiff: the plaintiff-intervenor was awarded $265,000.00 in monetary relief and $305,000.00 in attorney fees and costs. In addition, the plaintiff-intervenor agreed to dismiss her claims against the defendant.
On October 21, 2008, the court approved the EEOC and defendant’s consent decree. The court retained jurisdiction for five years to ensure compliance. The terms of this decree were as follows:
1. The defendant was made to pay $2,430,000.00 to be distributed amongst the class of claimants, women that the EEOC determined to have been denied an opportunity to work as a driver and/or dockworker at Pitt-Ohio establishments. Specifically, the decree aimed at women that were not hired between September 1, 1997 through October 19, 2008.
2. The defendant was prohibited from discriminating against women applicants based on their sex.
3. The defendant was prohibited from retaliation.
4. The defendant was required to implement “priority hiring consideration.” Priority hiring consideration required Pitt-Ohio to make employment offers for driver and dockworker positions to women that EEOC determined were not hired for a position at Pitt-Ohio for which she applied, but who was qualified under Pitt-Ohio’s hiring criteria, and remained interested in employment at Pitt-Ohio as a driver and/or dock worker.
5. The defendant was obligated to provide EEOC approved anti-employment discrimination training for all employees.
6. In addition to training, the defendant had to ensure that managers and supervisors enforce anti-employment discrimination through management accountability. This directed managers and supervisors to take corrective action when necessary to counter individuals engaging in unlawful employment discrimination. Further, managers and supervisors were obligated to report incidents of unlawful discrimination or retaliation to Pitt-Ohio’s human resources group.
7. Pitt-Ohio Express was obligated to post notices of the outcome of this case to its Ohio terminals and headquarters in areas where bulletins and notices are posted to employees and applicants. These notices were to remain posted for the duration of this consent decree.
8. Pitt-Ohio Express was obligated to give regular reports to the EEOC in regard to recruitment and hiring of women in the driver and dock worker positions in Ohio.
9. Both parties bear their own attorney fees and costs.
This case is currently closed. The consent decree’s duration has lapsed, and the court docket shows no further activity.
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539
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On August 22, 1980, Richard Bartkus filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Connecticut Corrections Department. This case was consolidated and named lead case with five other cases filed against the defendant in 1981 and 1982. The plaintiffs in the other cases were Palmer Gaines, Joseph L. Letezeio, Jr., and Ernest Bradshaw. The plaintiffs were represented by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union and Legal Assistance to Prisoners. Other non-profit organizations appear to have been involved in the litigation also.
On June 15, 1982, the plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint for the consolidated class consisting of inmates confined at the Connecticut Correctional Institute at Somers, including pretrial detainees and sentenced inmates. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because the facility was overcrowded, unsanitary, lacking in security, and unable to provide adequately the basics of general human living needs.
Because the PACER dockets for these cases begin in 1991, there is little information regarding further proceedings in the 1980s. In July 1986, the class was certified and the parties reached agreement on a Proposed Consent Judgment in October of 1989. The Decree was forwarded to Judge Robert Zampano but there is no indication that the order was executed.
The case was later consolidated with a lawsuit that was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on August 15, 1988 (Doe v. White), which challenged certain policies of the defendant regarding HIV counseling, education, testing, and confidentiality. David Doe and other plaintiffs were represented by Jerome Frank Legal Services of Yale Law School, the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, and the Center for Children's Advocacy. That action was certified as a class action on February 10, 1989 by order of Judge Peter C. Dorsey. On May 16, 1989, the parties entered into a Consent Judgment on Inmate AIDS Education and Pre- and Post-HIV Test Counseling and it was approved by the court. Discovery continued regarding issues not addressed in that judgment. On December 6, 1990, the court (Judge Jose A. Cabranes) approved and entered the Consent Judgment on Health Care for HIV-Infected Inmates and Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information. In Re: Connecticut Prison Overcrowding and AIDS Cases, Nos. H-80-506, H-88-562, 1990 WL 261348 (D. Conn. Dec. 6, 1990). The judgment required screening of all admitted inmates, individualized health care summaries for HIV-positive inmates, routine health examinations, and the use of drug therapies for HIV-positive inmates. It also mandated the creation of a uniform statewide system for maintaining information about medical and mental health status of HIV-positive inmates. It appears that another consent judgment, entered on November 2, 1990, called for monitoring of the facility. The court (Judge T. Graham) closed the case on April 26, 1994 but modified the Order of Dismissal so the action could remain under the court's supervision to monitor defendant's compliance with judgment. Litigation continued through July 1, 2004 concerning monitors' fees.
Regarding Bartkus's overcrowding case, an amended Motion for Class Certification was granted in October of 1991 and settlement discussions began in July of 1993. On March 28, 1996, Judge Bauer entered judgment in accordance with a settlement agreement submitted by the parties. According to the Settlement Agreement, improvements had already been made in the facility and the State of Connecticut had built additional correctional facilities, reducing overcrowded conditions. The facility at Somers was converted from a maximum security prison into a medium security prison and its name was changed to Osborn Correctional Institute. The agreement required that Osborn not increase its inmate population, continue operating as a medium security facility, and allow plaintiffs' lawyers access to the facility. Litigation continued through June 15, 2000, mainly concerning monitors' fees.
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904
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On June 10, 2011, three indigent persons charged with crimes filed this class action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, in Skagit County Superior Court, against the City of Mount Vernon and the City of Burlington. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the ACLU, asked the court to enjoin the cities from violating the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, claiming that the cities failed to provide adequate assistance of counsel. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the cities had failed to impose reasonable caseload limits on public defenders, failed to monitor and oversee the public defense system, failed to provide adequate funds for public defense, and failed to provide representation at all critical stages of prosecution.
The Cities had jointly contracted with two attorneys to handle all public defense assistance cases, and each attorney handled over 1,000 cases per year even though such a caseload was three times the maximum allowable amount for a full-time public defender pursuant to standards established by the Washington State Bar Association. The cities had not established any system for ensuring that the attorneys investigate cases, prepare for trial, or communicate timely and adequately with clients.
On July 5, 2011, the defendant municipalities removed the case to federal court, where it was assigned to Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. In response to motions from both the plaintiff and the defendants, on February 23, 2012, Judge Lasnik denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction because the balance of hardships did not tip in their favor, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs provided evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants knew indigent criminal defendants were not receiving adequate representation and were indifferent to this inadequacy.
The same day, Judge Lasnik granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. The class certified was "all indigent persons who have been or will be charged with one or more crimes in the municipal courts of either Mount Vernon or Burlington, who have been or will be appointed a public defender, and who continue to have or will have a public defender appearing in their cases."
Between June 3 and June 18, 2012, the parties went to a bench trial. However, on June 28 the judge issued an order for further briefing. Specifically, Judge Lasnik sought information on the following questions <ol> <li>Have any federal courts taken over supervision of a public defense agency, either directly or through appointment of a supervisor/monitor, anywhere in the United States?</li> <li>Have any state or federal courts held a municipality liable under Monell for constitutional defects in its public defense system?</li> <li>Has any state or municipality adopted “hard” caseload standards like those that Washington is contemplating?</li> <li>Is the issue of the constitutionality of the representation afforded by Messrs. Sybrandy and Witt moot? If so, what impact does that have on the available remedy, including an award of attorney fees? The responses were due for August 14th and submitted that day.</li></ol>
On December 4, 2013, Judge Lasnik found that the plaintiffs established a systematic deprivation of their right to counsel and the Cities' responsibility for the deprivation. The Court granted injunctive relief (1) requiring that the cities re-evaluate their contract for the provision of public defense services to insure that indigent criminal defendants were provided the actual assistance of counsel; and (2) requiring the cities to hire one part-time public defense supervisor to supervise and evaluate the provision of legal services. The Court also granted attorney's fees. 989 F.Supp.2d 1122 (2013).
On April 15, 2014, the Court issued an order awarding attorneys' fees and costs. 2014 WL 11961980. Shortly after, on April 22, 2014, the Court issued an order appointing Eileen Farley as a public defense supervisor. The agreement was to last until March 30th, 2017. During that time she sent several reports detailing the improvements the defendants had made to their public defense system.
In March 2017, the public defense supervisor proposed that the court extend her term and transition to a public defense auditor during the year. The Cities of Mount Vernon and Burlington responded in agreement, stating they had made the public defense supervisor's suggestions permanent and no longer needed to be supervised. In April, the court granted this extension in of supervision until July 2017, when the auditor took her place.
The case is now closed.
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76
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In December 1997, the Birmingham District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against Outrigger Restaurant, Inc. and Employer Accounting Services Com. Inc.in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, alleging that the defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by subjecting employees to racial harassment and a segregated work place. In August 1998, fifteen charging parties intervened in the suit. The charging parties also alleged violations of Section 1983. On February 8, 1999, Defendant Skilstaf filed a cross-claim against Defendant Outrigger Restaurant alleging that they should not be held responsible for teh racial discrimination perpetrated by Outrigger Restaurant and therefore claims indeminfication against Outrigger for all claims made by the plaintiffs in this case.
The EEOC settled its claims with the defendants in September 1999 through a consent decree. Defendants agreed to pay $150,000 to the plaintiffs as well as develop a harassment policy and complaint procedure, provide training to managers, keep records of the people hired including their race and position, advertise jobs in newspapers using the phrase "equal opportunity employer" and reach out to African American community groups to state Defendant's desire to recruit African American workers.
On June 10, 2000 the Court found in favor of Skilstaf on its cross claim for indemnification against Outrigger in the sum of $248,828.32. Outrigger appealed that judgment and on June 19 the Court reduced the amount to $14,924.79.
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564
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On May 30, 2013, prisoners in the East Mississippi Correctional Facility (EMCF) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued the Mississippi Department of Corrections commissioner, deputy commissioner, and chief medical officer in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU National Prison Project and the Southern Poverty Law Center, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary relief, claiming that conditions in the EMCF violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the living conditions at EMCF, designed to house and treat Mississippi's most seriously mentally ill prisoners, were so inhumane as to cause harm to the inmates through known problems with healthcare, mental healthcare, isolation, excessive force, protection from harm, nutrition, and food safety.
In September 2014, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. While this motion was pending, on October 9, 2014, District Judge Tom S. Lee recused himself and the case was reassigned to District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. On September 29, 2015, the Judge Barbour granted class certification, and the defendants attempted to appeal this order, but the Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' motion to file an appeal on November 2, 2015.
After engaging in discovery, a bench trial began on March 5, 2018 and concluded on April 9, 2018. On August 24, 2018, Judge Barbour stayed the proceedings in the case pending the receipt of supplemental expert reports, which were to be filed by November 16, 2018. Judge Barbour found that during the bench trial, it had become apparent that conditions at the prison had changed, in part, due to the appointing and hiring of new administrators and implementation of new policies and procedures. Therefore, he found the stay necessary in order ensure that any award of injunctive relief in this case would not run afoul of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
After the parties submitted their supplemental expert reports, the parties attempted to settle. However, on January 24, 2019, the parties notified Magistrate Judge John C. Gargiulo, who oversaw the settlement conferences, that the parties were unable to settle and that future settlement conferences would not be productive.
The case proceeded, and on 12/31/2019, the Court entered judgment for the Defendants, stating <blockquote> It is clear that many changes have been made at the subject prison that pertain to the claims alleged in this lawsuit. The changes include, but are not limited to, new administrators, new prison personnel, and new service providers. The Court concludes that the alleged constitutional violations that may have existed at the time this lawsuit was filed no longer exist and, therefore, that the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs has not been shown necessary. Accordingly, judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants on all claims.</blockquote> Plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit on 1/30/2020.
Meanwhile, the District Court taxed costs of $104,380 against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs moved for a review of the taxation, arguing that the indigent plaintiffs brought a close case, and therefore should not be assessed the plaintiffs costs. The plaintiffs also objected to the defendants’ billing of expenditures that included hotel stays, travel, and dining. Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that costs “should be allowed to the prevailing party,” and therefore entitles them to compensation for costs.
The case is ongoing.
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280
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In September 2003, the San Antonio District Office of the EEOC filed this suit against Williamson County Cablevision Company in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas alleging discrimination on basis of national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint alleged that the defendant terminated the charging party, a Hispanic employee, for a minor work violation while a similarly situated White employee who had committed more serious violations was not disciplined in any way. In addition, the defendant retaliated against the charging party for his participation in the investigation of a discrimination complaint. The parties settled in October 2003 shortly after the suit was filed through a consent decree.
The eight-month decree, containing non-discrimination and non-retaliation provisions, required the defendant to provide the charging party with a neutral reference, expunge his personnel file of any negative information, post an EEOC poster in its Georgetown facility, and pay $1,000.
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595
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On September 12, 2013, a juvenile sex offender and his parents filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Etowah County. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and both the national and local American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that the Sheriff's office and particular police officers violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fourteenth Amendment's protections for substantive due process and against deprivations of liberty without due process. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to the Sheriff's Office's program of unannounced, random, and suspicion-less compliance investigations of every individual in the county who is subject to requirements of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("the Act"), Ala. Code § 15-20A-4(12).
The primary plaintiff, James Doe, was required to register as a juvenile under the Act. As part of the Sheriff's Office's program, uniformed officers, including defendants and other unidentified officers, conducted warrantless searches of the plaintiffs' home without consent at least nine times between April 2012 and August 2013.
On February 13, 2014 the Court dismissed the case after being informed that the parties reached a written agreement regarding merits of the action and litigation costs. The <a href="http://blog.al.com/east-alabama/2014/01/aclu_etowah_county_sheriff_rea.html">private settlement agreement stated</a> that police would have to conduct all home visits outside of the home, and would not enter without the registrant's written consent. In addition, police would perform these visits in civilian clothes and unmarked vehicles for the registrant's privacy.
The case is now closed.
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226
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In July 2004, the New York District Office of the EEOC filed this suit against OCS Group, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant discriminated against the four charging parties (Black security guards) on the basis of their race, color, and national origin by paying them less than other lighter-skinned employees who were performing essentially the same work. The parties reached a settlement through a consent decree in August 2004, about two weeks after the suit was filed.
The three-year decree, containing non-discrimination and non-retaliation clauses, required the defendant to post a Title VII notice, provide annual Title VII training for all employees, distribute its anti-discrimination policy to its employees, provide the charging parties with neutral references, and pay $57,000 to be distributed among the four charging parties.
The decree was entered in 2004 and scheduled to last 2007. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.
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558
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On January 21, 2003, a group of Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) prisoners afflicted with Hepatitis-C, and relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against MDOC officials, as well as individuals and entities providing contract medical services to MDOC prisoners. Represented by counsel from the ACLU Fund of Michigan and from the Wayne State University Civil Rights Litigation Clinic, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, together with class action status for the case, which alleged violations of federal and state constitutional guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants' deliberate indifference to plaintiffs' medical condition and needs, by providing inadequate testing of and care for the plaintiff class, constituted the unconstitutional conduct, according to the plaintiffs. The contract medical service providers filed a motion to dismiss, saying that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies, as 42 U.S.C. § 1997c required, before filing their § 1983-based claim.
On July 1, 2003, District Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff granted the defense motion. His unpublished opinion ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust the MDOC grievance procedure and that, as he and other courts have interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1997c (a part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act), the plaintiffs must do so even if the administrative process is such that there is reason to presume in advance that the grievance will be denied. Moreover, in applying § 1997c to this case, Judge Zatkoff followed the "total exhaustion" rule, which required that the entire complaint be dismissed without prejudice, until the plaintiffs have completely exhausted the available administrative process. An appeal of the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit resulted in an unpublished affirmation of the district court on November 4, 2005. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court decided not to grant a writ of certiorari to review the case. Thompson v Overton, 576 U.S. 1185 (2006).
We have no further information on the status of the case.
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695
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On August 29, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico against Bell Gas, Inc. and related corporations on behalf of a female employee. The EEOC alleged that the companies had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.) by subjecting the employee to a sexually hostile work environment created by verbal and physical harassment from her immediate supervisor, including sexual assault. The EEOC further alleged that Bell Gas had unlawfully retaliated against the employee by constructively discharging her (she was supposedly offered a transfer but was given no further information). The EEOC sought its costs, and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including reform of policies and practices, back pay, reinstatement, front pay, job search expenses, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages.
The Court (Judge William P. Johnson) approved the employee's motion to intervene in the case on December 23, 2002. Adding her former supervisor as a defendant, she brought claims for violation of Title VII, sexual assault and battery, and several other violations of New Mexico law. She sought substantially the same relief as the EEOC.
The Court clerk made an entry of default against Bell Gas for its failure to respond to the EEOC's complaint, but the default was set aside upon the Court's subsequent finding that the untimely response was an honest mistake. The employee's supervisor represented himself.
After a fair amount of discovery disagreement the parties reached a settlement, which the Court entered as a consent decree on April 6, 2004. Under the agreement the employee received a total of $180,000; $60,000 up front and monthly payments of $2,000 for 60 months, secured by a mortgage lien on Defendants' property. The decree required Defendants to implement policies to keep the workplace free of sex discrimination and foster complaint lodging without retaliation, to distribute the sexual harassment policies to all employees, to provide annual training on avoiding sex-discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, to conduct complaint-investigation training, and to report to the EEOC. The docket shows no further court activity, and the case is now closed.
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313
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This case was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts on May 16, 2005 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff claimed that the department's provision of more than a million dollars of public funds to a ministry called "The Silver Ring Thing" (SRT) that uses federal abstinence education funding to bring "unchurched" students to Jesus Christ constituted an unlawful establishment of religion and a governmental endorsement and preference for religion in general and specific tenets of the ministry in particular.
The ministry developed a three hour presentation that was meant to occur directly following a mandatory abstinence education assembly in public schools and which, according to the plaintiff, was "permeated with religion."
In a two-year settlement agreement entered on February 22, 2006, the defendants acknowleged that they had terminated the SRT grant effective January 31, 2006. The agreement provided that defendants would not fund SRT's abstinence eduction as it had been structured and implemented during the fiscal year 2005, that strict requirements would be made before considering funding any future proposals from SRT, and that extensive monitoring of SRT's activities would occur if SRT was given a grant.
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526
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On November 17, 2017, six people with physical and/or intellectual impairments that relied on ADvantage waivers and/or In-Home Supports waivers to receive health services at their homes, filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District for the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued Oklahoma Health Care Authority (OHCA) and Oklahoma State Department of Human Services (DHS) under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Oklahoma Disability Law Center, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs alleged that OHCA and DHS were planning to cut funding to the waivers that the plaintiffs depended on for home based health care services and put them in danger of forced institutionalization in a nursing home. More specifically, in October 2017, the plaintiffs received notices that their Medicaid ADvantage and In-Home Supports waivers would not be funded after December 1, 2017. This case was assigned to Judge Joe Heaton. On December 6, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
On February 12, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. They alleged that the plaintiffs’ claims had become moot because DHS found a way to fully fund the waiver programs. Further, the defendants argued that, because there were no longer any violation of federal law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief. Therefore, the amended complaint should be dismissed.
The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint for mootness on March 26, 2018. This case is now closed.
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234
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The Cleveland office of the EEOC brought this suit against Carter Jones Lumber Company in the Northern District of Ohio in September 2004. The complaint alleged that the defendant failed to hire the complainant because of a physical disability and made medical inquiries in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case was consolidated with a private party suit in November 2004. The complainant intervened in May 2005. The defendant filed two motions for summary judgment, which were denied. The parties engaged in mediation that did not result in a settlement. The case went to a jury trial in September 2006; the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The complainant filed two motions for a new trial or to alter the judgment, and they were all denied. The EEOC appealed the decision in May 2007, but it withdrew the appeal two months later.
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419
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On December 13, 2011, four inmates of the Fresno County Adult Detention Facilities filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Fresno County Sheriff's Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2011 WL 11557976. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prison Law Office, Disability Rights California, and private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant violated prisoners' Constitutional rights by failing to provide minimally adequate health care and failing to protect prisoners from injury and violence from other prisoners.
The case was assigned to Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill and Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. On January 25, 2012, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add three individual plaintiffs to the suit, and brought additional claims against the defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs also expanded the scope of the injunctive relief requested, seeking the compulsion of reasonable accommodations to prisoners with disabilities.
The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint due to failure to state a claim for which the court could provide a remedy. Judge O'Neill denied this motion on May 16, 2012, finding that the plaintiffs' complaint had sufficiently pleaded their claims. 2012 WL 1799179.
The parties stipulated to and the Court ordered the substitution of the individual defendants with the county of Fresno on November 16, 2012. This stipulation also dismissed the claims of three of the named plaintiffs, without prejudice.
On May 28, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of the consent decree they had drafted. The parties agreed to an extensive remedial plan to be implemented by the defendants covering all of the substantive areas in dispute: health care, personal safety, and disability discrimination. The plaintiffs' counsel agreed to be responsible for monitoring compliance with the consent decree and the remedial plan. The decree was court enforceable, and the parties agreed it would last for four years after its approval -- unless the court earlier determined that the defendants were in substantial
compliance, or it was extended based on non-compliance. The defendant also agreed to pay the plaintiffs' counsel $900,000 in attorneys' fees and $40,000 per year for monitoring fees and expenses. On July 21, 2015, Judge O'Neill preliminarily approved the settlement, setting it for a fairness hearing at the end of September.
That hearing was held before Magistrate Judge McAuliffe on September 28, 2015; on October 7, 2015, she recommended approval of the decree without amendment. 2015 WL 5916741. On November 2, 2015, Judge O'Neill adopted Magistrate Judge McAuliffe's recommendations in full, granted final approval to the consent decree, granted certification of the settlement class, approved attorneys' fees for class counsel, and retained jurisdiction for monitoring of the consent decree. The class was defined as "all prisoners who are now, or at some time in the future during the terms of this Consent Decree are, incarcerated in the Fresno County Jail."
On December 11, 2015, Magistrate Judge McAuliffe denied a motion to unseal court records filed by a non-party to this action and sought support for a separate civil rights action against the Fresno County Jail. 2015 WL 13236882. She found that compelling reasons to keep them sealed, such as potential prejudice to the defendants if expert reports were unsealed, outweighed any minimal prejudice to the non-party. On February 1, 2016, she denied the non-party's motion for reconsideration. 2016 WL 374550. On February 12, 2016, the non-party sought a writ of mandamus from the Ninth Circuit, which was denied on April 4, 2016.
On February 11, 2016, Judge O'Neill granted the parties' joint request for appointment of a court expert to complete a comprehensive review of the facilities and report on the County's progress regarding the remedial plan. A second expert was appointed on April 11, 2016.
On October 3, 2018, Judge O'Neill granted additional attorneys' fees to plaintiffs's counsel to compensate their monitoring work which had become more intensive than previously anticipated. As of May 20, 2020, there has been no further action in the docket but presumedly the case remains open for monitoring of the consent decree.
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On March 31, 2005, the Phoenix and Salt Lake City offices of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit under Title VII against Dee's Family Restaurants in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. The EEOC alleged that the defendants had violated the rights of a class of female employees by subjecting them to a hostile work environment, wherein they were sexually harassed by male employees.
On May 20, 2005, three of the complaintants filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs in the case. On August 18, 2005, the parties filed a consent decree, which the district court adopted four days later. Under the terms of the decree, defendants were ordered to pay complaintants a total of $60,000 in damages within 15 days of the entry of the consent decree. This sum would be divided among the complaintants and their attorney in an unspecified manner. In addition, within 3 months of the decree, defendant was required to hold annual 2-hour training seminars on the avoidance of employment discrimination. Six months after the decree was adopted by the district court, and at the end of the same year, the defendants were required to report to the EEOC by sending a copy of the revised employee handbook, as well as the identity and contact information for any person against whom an allegation of employment discrimination had been made. They were also required to send the EEOC a list of all persons who had signed the roll of attendance at the employment discrimination seminars.
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190
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In August 2004, the St. Louis District Office of the EEOC (with participation from the Kansas City Area Office) brought this suit against Garden City Plastics Equipment and Supply Co., Inc. and Plastic Packaging Concepts, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri alleging that the defendants discriminated and retaliated in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants subjected the charging party, a female employee, to sexual harassment consisting of unwelcome sexual comments and inappropriate touching. In addition, the defendants retaliated against the charging party by terminating her employment when she complained of the harassment. The defendants filed two motions to dismiss the case in October 2004. Later that month, the charging party intervened in the suit. The defendants' motions to dismiss were denied in December 2004. After a great amount of discovery and some scheduling orders, the case was tried by a jury in August 2006 with the jury returning a verdict for the plaintiff. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in mid September, and granted the plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunctive relief in mid October.
The complainant was awarded $1000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. However, the Court's injunction prohibited the defendants from discriminating and required them to: establish a complaint procedure for reporting sexual harassment, establish discipline procedures for individuals who participate in sexual harassment, create and distribute a sexual harassment policy, expunge the charging party's personnel file of all references to the charge of discrimination, and provide her with a neutral employment reference. EEOC v. Garden City Plastics Equipment and Supply Co., Inc., No. Civ. 04-00726, 2006 WL 3207714 (W.D.Mo. Oct. 18, 2006).
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303
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On July 27, 2016, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The Tribe, represented by Earthjustice, sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to block the Corps’ actions related to the Dakota Access Pipeline (a 1,168-mile crude oil pipeline running from North Dakota to Illinois). The Tribe sought injunctive and declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees and costs under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA). The case was assigned to Judge James E. Boasberg.
The Tribe challenged the application of Nationwide Permit 12, which authorized discharges into federal waters, but which was issued without meeting NHPA requirements. The Tribe also challenged the issuance of multiple federal authorizations that were needed to construct certain segments of the pipeline. The plaintiff alleged that these authorizations were made in violation of the CWA and its governing regulations and without compliance with NHPA and NEPA.
On August 4, 2016, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the Corps to withdraw Nationwide Permit 12 as applied to the Dakota Access Pipeline and to withdraw verifications issued for the Dakota Access Pipeline to discharge in federally regulated waters at 204 sites along the pipeline route.
The following day, Dakota Access, LLC (the company authorized to construct the pipeline), filed an unopposed motion to intervene as a defendant. The court granted this motion on August 8, 2016.
On August 10, 2016, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe moved to intervene as plaintiff. The court granted this motion on August 19, 2016.
To prevent further destruction of sacred and culturally significant sites near Lake Oahe, North Dakota, the Standing Rock Tribe filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO). The Cheyenne River Tribe filed a separate motion for a similar TRO, additionally asking the court to enjoin Dakota Access from harming and antagonizing members of the Tribe who were peacefully protesting at the site of construction.
On September 8, 2016, the Cheyenne River Tribe filed an amended complaint with allegations similar to the complaint of the Standing Rock Tribe. Additionally, it alleged violations of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, the Sioux Nation Treaty of 1868, and the Flood Control Act of 1944.
On September 9, 2016, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the court could prevent damage to important cultural resources by enjoining the Corps’ issuance of pipeline-related permits. 205 F.Supp.3d 4. That same day, the plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On January 18, 2017, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the appeal.
On November 15, 2016, Dakota Access filed an answer to Cheyenne River Tribe’s first amended complaint that included crossclaims against the Corps. This cross-claim sought a judgment declaring that Dakota Access had legal right-of-way, within the meaning of the Mineral Leasing Act, to build and operate an oil pipeline beneath the federal land that borders Lake Oahe. On December 5, 2016, Dakota Access moved for summary judgment on this cross-claim.
On January 6, 2017, the Corps moved to dismiss Dakota Access’ cross-claim, arguing that Dakota Access did not plausibly allege that the United States Department of the Army had completed the administrative decision-making process required to grant Dakota Access an easement to install a pipeline under Corps-managed Federal land at Lake Oahe, pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act.
On that same day, the Cheyenne River Tribe moved to dismiss Dakota Access’ cross-claim for lack of ripeness, as its claim challenged an agency action that was not yet final. In the alternative, it requested the court to enter summary judgment against Dakota Access’ cross-claim.
On February 9, 2017, the Cheyenne River Tribe moved for a preliminary injunction directing the Corps to withdraw the easement/right-of-way allowing Dakota Access to drill an oil pipeline under federally-owned lands. On March 7, 2017, the court denied this motion, finding that the Tribe had failed to show that the Corps’ decision to grant an easement to Dakota Access constituted a substantial burden on its members’ free exercise of religion. 239 F.Supp.3d 77. The Tribe appealed this decision to the District of Columbia Circuit but then voluntarily dismissed the appeal.
Also on February 9, 2017, the Cheyenne River Tribe moved for an ex parte TRO to halt construction and drilling of an oil pipeline under federally-owned lands.
In the meantime, President Donald Trump took office. Within days of his inauguration, President Trump directed the Corps to “review and approve” pipeline permits on an expedited basis. The Corps obeyed this direction, and on February 8, 2017, it issued the easement and summarily terminated the environmental impact statement process. After the permit was issued, construction began. On February 14, 2017, the Standing Rock Tribe sought partial summary judgment on this issue, claiming that this easement decision, as well as the Corps’ July regulatory actions and accompanying NEPA analysis, violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The Cheyenne River Tribe made a similar motion; the Corps and Dakota Access also moved for summary judgment (in two motions that are not available on the docket). In response to all of these motions, on June 14, 2017, the court found the Corps’ environmental analysis unlawful, and remanded the matter to the Corps for further analysis. 255 F.Supp.3d 101.
While those motions were pending, in March 2017 the court ordered that this case be consolidated with <i>Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers</i> and <i>Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers</i>.
The Cheyenne River Tribe filed a second amended complaint against Dakota Access and Corps on June 14, 2017, seeking additional declaratory relief. The Standing Rock Tribe filed a first amended complaint, alleging violations under the Mineral Leasing Act, the Fort Laramie Treaty, and the Flood Control Act.
On December 4, 2017, in order to mitigate the risk of potential oil spills during the pendency of the litigation, the court ordered the parties to coordinate to finalize a spill response plan for the tribal areas in dispute. 280 F.Supp.3d 187. The court also ordered Dakota Access, with input from the Tribes, to select a third-party independent expert to review conditions and assess the pipeline’s compliance. Finally, Dakota Access was required to submit bi-monthly reports to the court.
On March 19, 2018, the court dismissed the Tribes’ NHPA claims as moot (in light of the completed construction of the pipeline), and granted summary judgment to the Corps and Dakota Access on the treaty-based claims and the NEPA claims. 301 F.Supp.3d 50.
On December 12, 2018, the court entered judgment in favor of the Corps and Dakota Access on the plaintiffs’ RFRA claims (by the plaintiffs’ consent). The court also ruled that the Tribes could argue that their NHPA claims were not, in fact, moot.
On January 3, 2019, the court permitted the plaintiffs to file 4 supplemental complaints, alleging that the Corps’ decision to affirm its original decision (on remand) was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, NEPA, and the Tribes’ treaty rights.
On March 25, 2020, the court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, ruling that the Corps had violated NEPA by determining that an environmental impact statement was unnecessary; it ordered the Corps to complete an environmental impact statement. Correspondingly, the court ordered the parties to brief the question of whether the original easement should be vacated during the pendency of this second remand. In the same order, the court granted summary judgment to the Corps and Dakota Access on the Tribes’ renewed NHPA claims and on the Oglala Tribe’s claims under the Mni Waconi Act of 1988. 2020 WL 1441923.
In May 2020, the court received nearly a dozen amicus briefs. These included a brief from 14 states, another from 37 members of Congress, and a third brief from 28 federally recognized Indian tribes and related organizations.
On July 6, 2020, the court vacated the easement which had authorized construction of the pipeline under the Missouri River near Lake Oahe. It ordered that the pipeline must be closed and emptied by August 5, to remain closed until the Corps completed an Environmental Impact Statement (which was expected to take until 2021). 2020 WL 3634426. Dakota Access immediately appealed to the D.C. Circuit; the district court denied a motion for stay on July 9, 2020.
On July 14, 2020, the D.C. Circuit (Judges Rogers, Griffith, and Pillard) issued an administrative stay of the district court’s order regarding closure of the pipeline.
On August 5, it denied the motion to stay the district court’s order vacating the original easement; however, although that ruling stood (and the pipeline was therefore not legally authorized), the D.C. Circuit found that the district court had not made the “findings necessary for injunctive relief” under the four-factor test in <i>Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council</i>. The court therefore remanded to the district court for further consideration, indicating that the Corps must clarify its position on continued operation of the pipeline in view of the vacated easement, after which the district court could take further action as appropriate. As of August 26, 2020, further proceedings are pending in the district court.
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822
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On May 13, 2004, a deaf woman filed this lawsuit in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho. She sued Hollywood Entertainment Corporation (doing business as Hollywood Video) under the Idaho Human Rights Act, claiming the company discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, requested monetary relief, attorney fees and costs, and a jury trial. The complaint alleged that the defendant employer assigned fewer work hours, assigned her only menial jobs, withheld promotion, and ignored the harassment other employees inflicted upon her.
On December 9, 2004, after the initial complaint and a special interrogatory to determine specific damage amounts sought by the plaintiff, the defendant filed a notice to remove the case to federal court. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho on December 9, 2004 and ultimately assigned to Judge B. Lynn Winmill.
The defendant moved to consolidate this case with a similar action brought under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The case was consolidated on May 26, 2005 with <i>EEOC v. Hollywood Ent Corp</i>, which can be found at <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5664">EE-ID-0012</a>.
On July 26, 2006, the plaintiff filed a stipulation to dismiss after the consolidated EEOC case ended in a settlement. The court ordered the case dismissed with prejudice on the same day.
In March 2006, <i>EEOC v. Hollywood Ent Corp</i> settled by entry of a consent decree valid for two years that required Hollywood Video to provide injunctive relief within their business environment and monetary relief to the plaintiff. The case closed in 2008 after the two-year order expired.
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63
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On January 13, 2003, several student members of the Westfield High School L.I.F.E. Club filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, against the City of Westfield, Massachusetts. The complaint alleged that the defendant violated the plaintiffs' freedom of speech, assembly, and free exercise of religion under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause, and unlawfully discriminated against them based on the religious content of their speech in violation of the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs also alleged violation of their freedom of expression under Massachusetts state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and Alliance Defending Freedom (formerly "Alliance Defense Fund"), a Christian non-profit organization, requested a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages.
More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Westfield High School's policies and practices which prohibited and punished them for distributing religious literature, were discriminatory, content-based, vague, and acted as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The alleged discrimination began during the 2001-2002 school year, when the plaintiffs were denied permission to distribute candy canes along with a religious story of the candy cane and Bible verses, to students at the school during non-instructional time. In 2002, the plaintiffs were again denied permission to distribute the literature, on the basis that the material was "offensive." The plaintiffs distributed the materials with the religious content anyway and were suspended as a consequence.
On January 13, 2003, along with their complaint, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, requesting the Court enjoin the defendants from enforcing the allegedly unconstitutional policies and the suspensions on the plaintiffs. Both the ACLU of Massachusetts and the United States filed briefs as amici curiae in support of the plaintiffs' motion, on February 26 and February 20, respectively. Following a hearing, the District Court (Judge Frank H. Freedman) granted the plaintiffs' motion on March 17. Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98, 108-109, 127-28 (D. Mass. 2003).
On April 7, 2003, the defendants filed a motion to stay, which the Court denied on April 16. On April 16, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add the City of Westfield as a defendant and remove Westfield Public Schools as a party. The plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment.
On June 13, 2003, the Court entered a stipulation of dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants.
On June 16, 2003, the Court entered a consent decree, which proclaimed that the defendants had replaced the school speech policies with new agreed-upon rules. The defendants also agreed to rescind punishment of the plaintiffs for the distribution of the religious materials, remove prior restraints and content-based restrictions of distribution of materials during non-instructional time without complying with substantive and procedural safeguards, so long as distribution doesn't substantially and materially disrupt the operation of the school or the new policies. The plaintiffs were awarded $28,500 in attorneys' fees and costs and the case was closed.
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593
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On January 14, 2016, arrestees in New Orleans who were declared eligible to receive appointed counsel from the Orleans Parish Public Defender’s Office (OPD) but were placed on a waiting list, sued in a class action OPD and the Louisiana State Public Defender office under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violating their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. OPD’s refusal to represent plaintiffs meant that they remained in jail without counsel. Plaintiff class seeks attorney’s fees and a declaration that OPD’s placement of class members on a waiting list for an indefinite amount of time violates their constitutional rights to counsel, due process, and equal protection.
OPD refused to accept plaintiffs as clients due to budgetary shortages and excessive caseloads. After hearings in which OPD discussed its budgetary crisis in late 2015, the Chief District Defender announced it would start declining certain felony cases in mid-January of 2016. The withdrawals would occur at a defendant’s first appearance before the magistrate. Plaintiffs credit OPD’s situation to the State of Louisiana’s underfunding of its public defender system.
On June 15, 2016 the parties filed a joint motion for judgment granting final declaratory and partial injunctive relief. On October 27, 2016 the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, giving both parties a chance to submit briefs addressing the issue. On January 31, 2017 the court (Judge James Brady) dismissed the case, citing grounds of federalism and comity. 231 F.Supp.3d 128.
On September 25, 2017 plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit. On October 4, 2018 the Fifth Circuit dismissed the case as moot because it found that since the appeal was filed, Louisiana lawmakers had reallocated funding for appointed counsel sufficient to render the waitlists for non-capital defendants nonexistent. 905 F.3d 905. This case is now closed.
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265
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In September 1999, the Houston District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against G.I. Trucking Company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, an agent of the defendant allegedly subjected the three charging parties, female employees, to a sexually hostile work environment consisting of: unwelcome touching, sexual jokes, and sexually explicit language. These actions resulted in the constructive discharge of one of the charging parties. After some scheduling orders and a discovery dispute, the parties settled through a consent decree in February 2001.
The three-year decree, containing non-discrimination and non-retaliation clauses, required the defendant to: provide EEO training, report to the EEOC at specified intervals, post a Title VII notice, and pay $75,000 to be divided among the three charging parties. In addition, the defendant was prohibited from employing the alleged harasser in any capacity in the future.
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578
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On June 9, 2017, three mentally ill prisoners of the U.S. Penitentiary at Lewisburg (USP Lewisburg) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The case was assigned to Judge Yvette Kane. The plaintiffs sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that the defendants’ failure to provide adequate treatment for prisoners with mental illness constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that they were deprived of medication, received puzzles and coloring pages in lieu of treatment, and had five-minute conversations in the public showers with mental health professionals instead of formal therapy sessions. Represented by the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project, Washington Lawyers’ Committee, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
On August 11, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The class would consist of all persons who were, as of the filing date of the complaint in this case, or are now, or will be in the future, confined to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons in the United States Penitentiary Lewisburg and suffer from a Serious Mental Illness or a Mental Illness, requiring treatment under one or more of the BOP’s CARE levels.
On October 2, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgement. In the two weeks after filing the motion, the defendants filed a motion to stay the plaintiff’s motion for class certification pending their motion to dismiss and a statement of material facts containing records of the plaintiff’s interactions with mental health services. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not sufficiently demonstrate that the defendants failed to provide treatment; rather, it merely demonstrated that the plaintiffs disagreed with the treatments that the medical professionals prescribed for them. On December 7, 2017, the court granted the defendants’ motion to stay class certification until after the defendants’ motion to dismiss was decided.
On June 20, 2018, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued a report recommending that the defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied. She found that the plaintiffs had not actually raised separate Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim in their complaint, but invited the plaintiffs to do so in an amended complaint if so desired. With regard to the Eighth Amendment medical care claims, the Magistrate Judge found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim of deliberate indifference, and so denied the motion to dismiss on that basis as well. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs' complaint violated the favorable termination rule (by challenging the duration of their confinement), but the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court temporarily deny the motion to dismiss on that objection. The plaintiffs objected to the recommendation saying that they did not challenge the duration of their confinement, nor did they raise Eighth Amendment conditions claims.
On October 26, 2018 Judge Yvette Kane adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation insofar as it denied the defendants motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, and motion to stay discovery. The case was then reassigned to Magistrate Judge Schwab.
Over the following months, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued several orders. The first, on November 27, 2018, granted the plaintiffs motion for a protective order. The second, on February 22, 2019, denied class certification without prejudice. Discovery continued in the wake of these orders.
On November 20, 2019, Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner issued a verbal order reassigning the case from Judge Yvette Kane to Judge Jennifer P. Wilson, and the plaintiffs again moved for class certification. On January 29, 2020, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued an order requiring that plaintiffs show cause why their claims should not be denied as moot and also issued a recommendation that the plaintiff's motion for class certification be denied due to lack of numerosity, among other grounds.
On February 24, 2021, Judge Wilson declined to adopt Magistrate Judge Schwab's recommendation to deny the class certification due to lack of numerosity and recommitted the matter to Magistrate Judge Schwab with instructions to make further findings on whether the plaintiff's claims had been rendered moot by the closure of the Special Management Unit at USP Lewisburg.
On March 23, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal after conferring with Defendant's counsel. Both parties agreed that the subject of the plaintiff's legal action had been mooted by the closure of SMU at USP Lewisburg and the transfer of the named plaintiffs to other prisons within the BOP. The case was terminated on March 24, 2021.
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771
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On October 22, 2013, five parolees in custody or under supervision of the Illinois Department of Corrections filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by the Uptown People's Law Center and the MacArthur Justice Center at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, the plaintiffs sued the Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (PRB) and the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the defendants violated the Due Process Clause by subjecting the plaintiffs to fundamentally unfair and procedurally flawed parole review proceedings, and requested injunctive and declaratory relief.
The suit was brought on behalf of all parolees in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections facing parole revocation. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the PRB and DOC failed to: <ul><li>appoint counsel to represent indigent parolees in revocation hearings; <li>provide adequate written notice of allegations and evidence against parolees;<li>allow parolees to develop evidence in advance of their hearings;<li>allow parolees the opportunity to speak on their own behalf at hearings;<li>allow parolees to access legal materials required for meaningful participation;<li>allow parolees to present written evidence and witnesses at hearings;<li>provide a hearing before a fair and impartial decision maker;<li>allow parolees to remain silent during proceedings; and<li>allow parolees to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at the preliminary and final hearing.</ul>The plaintiffs alleged that the process of the parole revocation proceedings amounted to essentially a rubber stamp of the recommendations of supervising parole agents.
Shortly after filing, the parties began extensive settlement negotiations and the court stayed discovery. In February 2015, the parties reached an impasse in their negotiations and requested that the stay on discovery be lifted. Then the parties engaged in significant discovery. In February 2016, the parties reengaged in settlement talks, which resulted in a first proposed settlement agreement filed on October 24, 2016. Judge Amy St. Eve granted the parties joint motion for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and then the parties proceeded to collect comments and objections from class members.
On January 13, 2017, the plaintiffs informed the court that they had a final settlement agreement and submitted to the court for approval. On January 25, 2017, Judge Amy J. St. Eve granted final approval of a class action settlement agreement and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Parole Review Board agreed to appoint counsel to represent each qualified alleged parole violator. Counsel would be paid by the PRB, or the PRB would arrange to secure volunteer private counsel and supervised law students who would serve pro bono.
The parties stipulated that the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center would create a handbook of legal resources and information that the defendants would distribute to all parolees. The IDOC agreed to make its best efforts to provide those in its custody facing parole revocation hearings for offenses in its facilities with access to means of communicating with others who would be able to provide relevant eyewitness or character testimony or other evidence.
The parties jointly selected a monitor to ensure that the defendant complied with the agreement and was assigned to report to the parties on the status of compliance. In this role, the monitor met with parolees, observed hearings, and examined IDOC and PRB records to determine if the defendants were in compliance with the agreement. The defendants also agreed to pay plaintiffs counsel $225,000 for compensation. The monitor was scheduled to file a report with the parties after one year and then every six months after. The settlement was set to terminate in 24 months from the date of approval, on January 25, 2019.
As of March 21, 2019, there was no additional activity on this case. This case is now closed.
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808
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EEOC's Birmingham, AL office and Washington, DC office jointly filed this retaliation lawsuit against the defendant, Vulcan Lincoln Mercury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on 05/18/2005. The defendant, a division of Serra Automotive Group, was a new and used car dealer in Birmingham, Alabama. EEOC alleged that three former managers of defendant were subject to retaliatory discharge because they participated in an internal investigation of another employee's sexual harassment claim. The individual complainants filed motions to intervene but the district court did not make a decision on the motions before the case was resolved.
The parties settled fairly quickly after the case was referred to mediation. The district court entered a consent judgment and dismissed the case on 10/31/2005.
Under the three-year consent decree, the defendant agreed to pay the three individual complainants a total sum of $330,000. The defendant also agreed to expunge record of the lawsuit from the complainants' personnel files and provide neutral references in the future. Additionally, the defendant was required to host trainings, post a notice of the lawsuit, and distribute its revised anti-retaliation policy. The defendant was allowed to apply for shortening the duration of the consent decree after two years. The docket sheet shows that no further enforcement took place; the case was presumably closed in 2008.
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244
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The EEOC sued Greg & Deb's, Inc.; Mark & Greg's, Inc.; and the offending owners on June 12, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The EEOC's complaint alleged that the defendants violated Title VII when they discriminated against the intervenor employee, who intervened in August, 2006, based on sex (female) by creating a sexually harassing work environment which lead to her constructive discharge. The parties settled their dispute with a consent decree on March 7, 2007, and the intervening plaintiff entered a stipulated dismissal on April 8, 2007. The consent decree stipulated that the defendants would pay the intervenor $150,000 in damages, provide EEO training for all employees, post and distribute notices of EEO rights, annually report complaints of sexual harassment to the EEOC, and allow the EEOC to enter the defendants' business to examine records and interview employees to ensure compliance with the consent decree. The settlement term was four years. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement; the case was presumably closed in 2011.
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465
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On February 27, 2002, four individuals involuntarily detained by the Illinois Department of Human Services pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (“SVP Act”) on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel and the ACLU, they sought a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, and the right of all class members to bring subsequent individual lawsuits for damages.
The plaintiffs claimed that the state failed to provide adequate and meaningful health treatment to the plaintiffs and those similarly situated; the treatment and care that was given was, they alleged, punitive and constitutionally inadequate. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had failed to properly train their staff, provide individualized treatment programs, allow for family participation in rehabilitation efforts, allow for fair grievance procedures, afford reasonable opportunities to residents for activities, and to institute a procedure to guarantee appropriate therapist/patient confidentiality. The defendants also allegedly required, as a precondition to participation in all but the most basic treatment, that plaintiffs admit to many crimes for which they were not convicted. The conditions of confinement, according to the plaintiffs, were also unreasonable restrictive. Examples included routine strip searches, routine shackling with restraints used in “super-max” prisons, intrusive and frequent cell searches, constant surveillance and in general having their freedom of movement restricted in a variety of arbitrary ways.
On March 19, 2002, this case was reassigned from Judge Matthew F. Kennelly to Judge Harry D. Leinenweber. Shortly thereafter on March 27, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a motion to maintain class action. Judge Leinenweber granted the motion on June 28, 2002. 2002 WL 1433729 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
On May 14, 2002, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ class action complaint. Judge Leinenweber denied the motion on July 25, 2002. 2002 WL 1732911 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
Following trial, on January 13, 2005, Judge Leinenweber granted the plaintiffs declaratory relief concerning the Special or Secure Management Status (“SMS”) used at the Joliet Treatment and Detention Facility (the “TDF”), holding it unconstitutional. SMS referred to the status and set of conditions that a patient would be placed under when determined to be a danger to himself or others. However, he denied all of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims. The court stated that while the low rates of treatment participation, progress, and release at the TDF was disappointing, it did not amount to a constitutional violation. In addition, because the SMS policy had been amended several months before trial, the court denied injunctive relief on that issue. The new SMS policy, the court held, cured the defects in the prior policy. 2005 WL 399300 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
On January 28, 2002 the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider. However, Judge Leinenweber denied the motion on March 25, 2005.
Finally, on July 26, 2005 Judge Leinenweber declined to award attorney’s fees or other costs to either party, directing both parties bear their own fees and costs.
Outside of an acknowledgment of receipt of sealed document #75 on January 14, 2010, there has been no activity on the docket since October 3, 2005. Therefore, it seems that the case is closed.
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838
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In August 2004, the EEOC district office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania brought this suit against Bare Feet Shoes of Pennsylvania, Inc., a casual shoe retailer, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Two female aggrieved employees are named in the complaint, but only one intervened. Both women claimed sexual harassment and hostile working conditions in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One of the women alleged constructive discharge as well. The female employee who intervened voluntarily dismissed her case in October 2005. The EEOC also voluntarily dismissed its claims concerning the intervenor. The claims on behalf of the second aggrieved employee proceeded. After a failed defense motion for summary judgment, the parties settled, and a consent decree was entered in June 2006. No documents pertaining to dismissal of any party or the consent decree are currently available.
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551
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On January 23, 2012, a deaf inmate incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional Institution filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The plaintiff sued the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that IDOC's failure to provide him with a videophone meant he was denied an equal opportunity to communicate with people outside the prison. The plaintiff, represented by Disability Rights Idaho, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was initially assigned to Judge Candy W Dale, but later reassigned to Judge B. Lynn Winmill and then Judge Dee V. Benson.
The plaintiff claimed that the text telephone (TTY) provided by the prison did not allow him to communicate in his primary language (American Sign Language). Furthermore, the technology was becoming obsolete as the number of people using a TTY outside of prison had decreased due to changing technology.
The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Larry M. Boyle when the parties agreed to a settlement conference to be held on October 31, 2012. The parties attempted to reach a settlement between 2012 and 2014 but ultimately could not reach an agreement. The defendant filed a motion for a jury trial, which was denied on May 27, 2014. The case was referred to Judge Dee V. Bensen for a Settlement Conference.
The parties reached a settlement on January 16, 2015, in which IDOC agreed to provide the plaintiff with access to a videophone, as well as training for the plaintiff and designated IDOC staff members in the operation of the videophone technology. The agreement also required IDOC to pay $35,000 to the plaintiffs' attorneys, Disability Rights Idaho. On January 29, 2015, Chief Judge B. Lynn Winmill ordered the case be dismissed with prejudice, based on the parties’ settlement.
[Although the settlement agreement is not part of the docket, <a href="http://avidprisonproject.org/Making-Hard-Time-Harder/example-44---disability-rights-idaho.html">Disability Rights Idaho posted it on their website</a>.]
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161
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The New Orleans District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against K&B Louisiana Corp., doing business as Rite Aid Inc., in July of 2003, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The suit was based on sexual harassment and retaliation against a female employee in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complainant intervened in the case, which consisted mostly of discovery issues. Rite Aid filed a motion for summary judgment in which the court granted and dismissed the intervenor's claim for damages arising from Title VII, her claim for injunctive relief based upon Title VII, and her claim for punitive damages arising from Title VII. After this the parties worked towards and reached a settlement on July 28, 2004.
The consent agreement that was ordered by the court included only injunctive relief; all prayers for monetary relief were denied. Rite Aid had to train the perpetrators and guarantee that their stores had the federally mandated Title VII postings. Rite Aid was also forced to post the number of its human resources manager in their stores in Louisiana.
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On June 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this sex discrimination and retaliation suit in the Fort Lauderdale U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against DTG Operations, Inc., (doing business as Dollar Rent A Car) on behalf of a female employee. The EEOC alleged that DTG had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.) by subjecting the employee to a hostile work environment and firing her in retaliation for opposing the harassment. According to the EEOC, the employee's direct supervisor subjected her to frequent physical and verbal sexual harassment. The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including policy reform, back pay, reinstatement, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages.
The Court (Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga) allowed the employee to intervene in the case on October 14, 2004. The employee amended her complaint on April 21, 2005, seeking substantially the same relief as the EEOC but suing for violation of Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Fla. Stat. 760 et seq.), for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge Kenneth A. Marra) entered as a consent decree on October 7, 2005. The 3-year decree provided the employee with $395,000 ($15,000 in lost wages, $220,805.58 in compensatory and punitive damages, and $159,194.42 in attorneys' fees and costs) and subjected DTG to a variety of injunctive provisions. Under the terms of the decree, DTG agreed not to engage in sexual harassment and not to retaliate against employees who file charges or otherwise cooperate with the EEOC. DTG was required to distribute its anti-harassment policy to all employees, to provide 4 hours of sex discrimination training annually to all managers and supervisory personnel at the facility in which the employee worked, to post an equal employment notice, to report sexual harassment claims and their resolution to the EEOC every six months, to expunge the employee's personnel file, and to provide a letter of reference. No further court activity appears on the docket, and the case is now closed.
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COVID-19 Summary: This putative class-action lawsuit, brought by inmates in Orange County Jail, argued that county and the sheriff violated the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in failing to provide adequate care amidst the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. The court granted the motion for provisional class-certification and partially granted a temporary restraining order, but the defendants appealed and the Supreme Court stayed the injunctive relief while the appeals to the Ninth Circuit proceeded.<hr>
This putative class-action lawsuit was filed on April 30, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The lawsuit was filed by several inmates in Orange County Jail. The suit arose out of the COVID-19 pandemic that swept the world in early 2020. As the virus raged throughout the country, it became particularly problematic in jails and prison systems. This lawsuit alleged that Orange County Jail's management of the virus was wholly inadequate and in violation of the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The suit alleged that requisite social distancing was not possible due to the high density of inmates in the jail, that the masks were simply pieces of fabric (and were not always used by guards), and that isolation policies were ineffective. The plaintiffs were medically vulnerable inmates in Orange County Jail and they were represented by ACLU National, ACLU Fund of Southern California, and ACLU Disabilities Rights Program attorneys, the UC Irvine Civil Rights Litigation Clinic, and private counsel. They sued Orange County and the Sheriff of Orange County.
The complaint alleged that defendants' failure to adequately mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in the jail system represented violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. They argued that the conditions represented an unconstitutional punishment and unconstitutional confinement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees that the state provide for reasonable health and safety of inmates. As for the Eighth Amendment, they argued that the lack of precautions constituted deliberate indifference to the health of the inmates as to be cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiffs also argued that the failure to protect medically vulnerable inmates (particularly those with co-morbidities), constituted discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs sought class certification, a writ of habeas corpus to identify all members of a Medically-Vulnerable Subclass and Disability Subclass and grant them release, injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, or habeas corpus that would mitigate the spread of COVID-19, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs.
On May 11, the plaintiffs submitted an application for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction and a motion for provisional class certification. On May 26, the court granted the motion for provisional class-certification and granted in part and denied in part the application for a temporary restraining order. The grant of provisional class status created two classes, a Pre-Trial Class and a Post-Conviction Class. Under each of those were Disability Subclasses and Medically-Vulnerable Subclasses. The partial grant of the TRO mandated defendants to follow CDC social distancing guidelines, expand testing, and enhance sanitation efforts in the jails. It did not grant release to any prisoners, though. 2020 WL 2754938.
Defendants appealed this decision two days later and applied to stay the case pending a decision from the 9th Circuit (docket #: 20-55568). In both the district court and the 9th Circuit, the defendants filed emergency motions to stay the lower court decision, but the district court denied this motion on June 2. 2020 WL 4039073. The 9th Circuit then denied this motion on June 17. However, they remanded the case to the district court to gauge whether any changed circumstances might require alterations to the TRO. 2020 WL 3547960.
The defendants then filed an ex parte application with the district court to dissolve the TRO, which the district court denied yet again in late June. The defendants tried to argue that the declining rate of COVID-19 in the Orange County Jail represented a significant enough change to warrant dissolution of the preliminary injunction. On July 1, the defendants appealed once more to the 9th Circuit (docket #: 20-55668). And, once again, the 9th Circuit denied the motion on July 3.
Then on July 21, the defendants brought the case to the Supreme Court, submitting an emergency application for stay of injunctive relief. In a 5-4 decision, the Court granted the stay on August 5. There was no majority, opinion, but Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent arguing that, even if the majority would have granted the stay at the district court, it was not so clearly wrong as to warrant granting certiorari. 2020 WL 4499350.
On August 25, the plaintiffs filed motions to dismiss as moot each of the pending appeals in the 9th Circuit. They argued that the preliminary injunction had expired and therefore the appeals were moot. The defendants sought to continue litigating the appeals and alleged that without review by the appellate court, there was nothing to stop the district court from entering preliminary injunctions every 90 days throughout the life of the case. On October 15, 2020, the two appeals were consolidated.
The case is ongoing and in discovery as of February 17, 2021.
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In August 2004, the Tampa and Miami offices of the EEOC brought this suit against Sand Key Associates, Ltd. d/b/a Sheraton Sand Key Resort in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. In its complaint, the EEOC alleged that defendant violated Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination by subjecting a male employee to a sexually hostile work environment. In September 2004 the charging party intervened in the suit and also sought recovery directly from the alleged harasser. The case was settled by the entry of a consent decree in October 2005. In the three-year decree, the defendant was prohibited from engaging in discrimination and retaliation. The defendant was required to pay $172,500.00 in monetary relief to the charging party and an additional claimant. Additionally, the defendant was required to provide annual training to its managers and supervisors; to discipline the alleged harasser; and to report to the EEOC on a semi-annual basis on compliance with the consent decree.
The terms of the agreement were to run for 3 years. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement took place; the case was presumably closed in 2008.
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On May 8, 2013, the EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000 against Dynamic Medical Services, Inc. The EEOC brought the matter on behalf of several salespeople employed by Dynamic Medical Services, a medical and chiropractic practice, and sought injunctive and monetary relief on their behalf. The plaintiffs alleged disparate treatment based on religion and a hostile working environment. Three named employees later intervened in the case as plaintiffs on their own behalf, alleging retaliation under Florida state law.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that the salespeople at Dynamic Medical Services were coerced into adopting Scientology religious views and practices. The complaint states that they were required to attend weekly meetings consisting of Scientology readings and practices and coerced into attending meetings at the local Church of Scientology; one plaintiff alleges a retaliatory firing for not doing so. Examples of Scientology practices here include screaming at an ashtray and staring silently at another person for eight hours.
In filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, defendants argued that the Scientology practices in question were actually business training methods, and thus not the basis for a claim under the Civil Rights Act. Further, defendants contended that plaintiffs failed to allege that employees articulated sincerely held religious beliefs in conflict with the practices or provide evidence of disparate treatment.
On December 20, 2013, the District Court (Judge Kathleen M. Williams) issued a consent decree approving a settlement in the case. Dynamic Medical Services agreed to pay $170,000 in compensatory damages and consented to a variety of injunctive measures. Dynamic Medical Services agreed to refrain from discriminating on the basis of religion and to accommodate requests based on religious practice. Specifically, they agreed to draft an anti-discrimination policy and submit it to the EEOC for approval. Further, Dynamic Medical Services agreed to ensure that employees are not subjected to hostile work environments. The decree outlined a mechanism for complaint reporting and allowed the EEOC to review compliance with the decree. Finally, the decree called for annual employee training for each year the decree is in effect on procedures for reporting discrimination, harassment, or retaliation and procedures for requesting a religious accommodation.
The decree did not include attorneys' fees. The District Court retained jurisdiction to enforce this decree for four years. As of December 8, 2018, there has been no further activity on the docket and presumably the monitoring period has ended.
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On May 3, 2011, a coalition of immigrant rights groups and individual immigrants filed this class action lawsuit against the State of Utah in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, challenging the state's immigration-enforcement law, House Bill 497 (HB 497). HB 497 was a severe, anti-immigrant law that criminalized everyday activities, such as driving an undocumented immigrant to the store and authorized police to stop and detail an individual simply to verify his or her immigration status. The plaintiffs, represented by the state and national ACLU, the National Immigration Law Center, and private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983; the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; and state law, claiming that the law was unconstitutional.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that HB 497, in requiring state and local law enforcement to check the identification of all people they stop, arrest or detain and ascertain whether they are in the country lawfully; allowing them to make warrantless arrests on "reasonable suspicion" that a person is an alien who is (1) subject to a removal order by an immigration court, (2) subject to an immigration detainer request, or (3) charged or convicted in another state with one or more "aggravated felonies;" and criminalizing the act of encouraging or inducing illegal immigrants to come to, enter or reside in Utah, is preempted under the Supremacy Clause and in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought a declaration of the law's unconstitutionality and an injunction barring enforcement of the law before it came into effect on May 10, 2011.
In passing HB 497, Utah became the first state to follow the lead of Arizona in enacting aggressive immigration-related laws at the state level; Indiana, Georgia, Alabama and South Carolina were soon to follow. For the case challenging the Arizona's SB 1070, see <i>United States v. Arizona</i> [IM-AZ-0015]; for the case challenging Indiana's SEA 590, see <i>Buquer v. City of Indianapolis </i> [IM-IN-0002]; for the case challenging Georgia's HB 87, see <i>Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal</i> [IM-GA-0007]; for cases challenging Alabama's HB 56, see <i>United States v. Alabama </i>[IM-AL-0005], Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Bentley [IM-AL-0006], and Parsley v. Bentley [IM-AL-0007]; and for cases challenging South Carolina's Act 69, see Lowcountry Immigration Coalition v. Haley [IM-SC-0001] and United States v. South Carolina [IM-SC-0002].
On May 6, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. After a hearing on May 10, the district court (Judge Clark Waddoups) issued a temporary restraining order on May 11, barring enforcement of HB 497 pending further order of the court and giving parties time to brief the court regarding the merits of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 2011 WL 7143098 (D. Utah May 11, 2011).
Over the course of the summer, various amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of plaintiffs, including those by the governments of Mexico and various Central and South American countries.
On August 1, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification.
On November 22, 2011, the federal government filed a separate lawsuit challenging the Utah law solely on preemption grounds. It was consolidated with this case on November 28, and on December 15, the Department of Justice filed its own motion for a preliminary injunction.
Rather than deciding on any of the motions before it, on February 21, 2012, the district court declared that it would refrain from making any rulings until the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Arizona (IM-AZ-0015) but confirmed that the restraining order would continue until it ruled on the pending motions for preliminary injunction.
While the district court awaited the Supreme Court’s decision, the plaintiffs filed several notices of supplemental authority in 2013 to support its pending motions for preliminary injunctions. The plaintiffs cited circuit court decisions and argued that those provided further support that HB 497 was unconstitutional on Supremacy Clause grounds.
Once the Supreme Court ruled on all but few motions for United States v. Arizona, Judge Waddoups ruled on all three pending motions for preliminary injunctions on June 18, 2014. First, the court ruled against the United States and plaintiffs’ overall facial challenge against HB 497 as a whole because the constitutional language did not expressly preempt all immigration-related state legislation, and the Supreme Court did not hold that the entire field of immigration regulation is either conflict or field preempted. But the court ruled against the key provisions of HB 497, such as Section 10 and 11, which granted warrantless arrest based solely on suspicion of immigration status and made it criminal to assist or encourage undocumented immigrants. The court also put strict limits on when the police could check the identification of detained individuals to verify immigration status. 26 F. Supp. 3d 1125. HB 497 was unconstitutional because it unlawfully interfered with federal power and authority over immigration matters in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and authorized and required unreasonable seizures and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
On November 25, 2014, the parties filed a joint report regarding the discussions toward agreeing on a proposed final judgment in light of the court’s preliminary injunction decision. In the proposed final judgment, the State of Utah agreed to permanently scrap the key problematic provisions of HB 497 and implement the remaining sections under restriction. For example, the parties agreed to severely limit Sections 3 and 4 of HB 497, which made it clear that police are not allowed to stop or detain an individual simply to verify their immigration status. The terms of the settlement made clear that the law does not require Utahns to carry identification with them at all times, following the federal district court decision.
On December 4, 2014, the district court entered a judgment per the parties’ proposed final judgment and dismissed without prejudice the plaintiffs’ and the United States’ remaining claims that were not yet adjudicated. On April 28, 2015, the parties notified the court about the settlement of attorney fees and costs and later advised the Court that the payment has been made. The case is now closed.
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On February 22, 2017, four plaintiffs filed suit against the City of Memphis, Tennessee in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee for violating their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs all found themselves on a “black list” created by the Memphis Police Department. They argued that the police department created the “black list,” which consisted of 81 individuals, by recording video protests of City Hall. The black list appeared to denote the individuals who the police determined required police escorts to monitor them in City Hall. The plaintiffs also claimed that police officers bought and used software to monitor various social media sites for subversive conversations. The plaintiffs claimed the creation and maintenance of this black list violated their First Amendment rights and contradicted a prior consent decree from <i>Kendrick v. Chandler</i>. The plaintiffs sought an order to dissolve the black list and an injunction to prevent the creation of lists in the future, an order to show cause why the defendants disregarded the order, an order to find the defendant in contempt of court, monetary damages, and costs and attorneys' fees.
The Kendrick Decree resulted from a previous lawsuit in 1978. Kendrick, et al. v. Chandler, et al., Civil Action No. 2:76-CV-00449 (W.D. Tenn. 1978). The plaintiffs in <i>Kendrick</i>, including the American Civil Liberties Union of West Tennessee (WTCLU), filed a class action against the Mayor of Memphis, the Chief of Police in Memphis, and other officials within the Memphis Police Department. They sought, and were granted, an order preventing defendants from violating the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs claimed that the Memphis Police Department, through a Domestic Intelligence Unit, collected unverified information about individuals they believed were engaging in subversive activities or promoting controversial political views. The plaintiffs alleged that none of the activities monitored by the Domestic Intelligence Unit were criminal, but instead the Domestic Intelligence Unit used the information to harass and intimidate the plaintiffs.
The Kendrick Decree enjoined the defendants and City of Memphis from infringing on any individuals' First Amendment Rights. The defendants could not record any information from individuals engaged in lawful demonstrations or maintain files on individuals for reasons that did not serve criminal investigations. Importantly, the order defined the City of Memphis to include all present <i>and future</i> officials, employees, and agents of the city.
In response to the plaintiff's 2017 complaint citing to the Kendrick Decree, the City of Memphis filed a motion to dismiss the claim, arguing the court did not have the subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the Kendrick Decree. The following day, ACLU Tennessee moved to intervene, and the court immediately granted the motion. The ACLU-TN sought similar relief as the plaintiffs—an order of contempt for violation of the Kendrick Decree, injunctive relief, and costs and attorneys' fees.
On March 8, 2017, following the intervention of the ACLU-TN, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the ACLU-TN based on the same subject-matter argument it had deployed against the original four plaintiffs.
On June 30, 2017, Judge Jon Phipps McCalla granted the defendant's motion to dismiss against the original four named-plaintiffs, but denied the motion to dismiss the ACLU's claim. The court found that it retained subject-matter jurisdiction over the Kendrick Decree because the injunction did not have a termination date and applied to future employees of the City of Memphis. However, the court determined that the four original plaintiffs did not have standing because prior case law in the Sixth Circuit expressed that third-party beneficiaries of a consent decree lacked standing to enforce its terms. Since the ACLU-TN is a successor to The American Civil Liberties Union of West Tennessee, Inc. (WTCLU), an original party in <i>Kendrick</i>, it had standing to raise the claim.
The four original plaintiffs sought a final order to appeal their dismissal to the Sixth Circuit. But the district court did not grant the final order. The plaintiffs filed their appeal anyway, which the Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on January 17, 2018.
Meanwhile, the suit between the ACLU-TN and the defendants continued. At the end of discovery, both the ACLU-TN and the City of Memphis filed motions to dismiss. On August 10, 2018, the court granted the ACLU-TN's motion in part. The court found that the City had been engaged in political intelligence as defined by the Kendrick Decree. However, it determined a genuine dispute still existed over whether the City engaged in action for the purpose of violating any person's First Amendment rights and whether the City operated in any way for the purpose of political intelligence. The court denied the City's motion to dismiss, finding that a genuine dispute still existed over the standing of the ACLU-TN.
The bench trial, held from August 20 to August 23, 2018, confirmed that the ACLU-TN had standing to bring the suit because it was a party to the original decree. Additionally, the court found the City had violated the decree by collecting information for the purpose of political intelligence and dedicating an office to do so. The City also failed to review investigations that could result in the collecting of information related to the First Amendment, including recordings of protest attendees to maintain a record. And, the City failed to train its officers on the content of the Decree. In particular, units of the Memphis Police Department investigated people associated with the Black Lives Matter movement and other political groups because of their protected political speech.
As a result of the trial, the court granted ACLU-TN attorneys' fees. It required training of officers to detail that political intelligence—“any investigation into the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights, even if the investigating officer or unit does not have a partisan political motive”—could never be a permissible goal of an investigation. The court ordered the City to create new guidelines and training for officers engaging in investigations that might result in political intelligence by January 14, 2019. It also compelled the City to create a manual for social media searches and submit a list of all search terms entered into social media sites every three months to the court until ordered otherwise.
Judge McCalla also determined that an independent monitor should assess compliance with the Decree. Both parties offered candidates to be independent monitors for the case moving forward. On December 21, 2018, the court appointed the defendant's candidate, former U.S. Attorney Edward Stanton III, as the independent monitor of this case.
As required by the order, the City submitted a new set of training policies on January 14, 2019. The ACLU-TN filed objections to those policies, and the court asked the Monitor to investigate further. On April 5, 2019 the Monitor filed his first report, in which he mostly agreed with the ACLU-TN's criticism of the City's training measures but also accepted the City's proposed solutions to many of the issues raised by the ACLU-TN. Judge McCalla held a hearing on the matter on April 23, 2019.
On May 2, 2019, the Monitor filed his first quarterly report. In it, he assessed that, to date, the City was on track to become compliant with the consent decree. He also outlined plans for soliciting public opinion on the City's practices.
On August 7, 2019 the Monitor filed his second quarterly report under seal with the court. The court held a hearing to address the report on August 27, 2019. In a September 5 order following the hearing, Judge McCalla noted that the Monitor's next steps were creating and implementing a compliance plan for the City, as well as creating community focus groups. Additionally, the report said that the City and the Monitor were working to create a new social media investigations policy for the Police Department.
The City the filed a motion to modify the consent decree on September 25, 2019, which the ACLU-TN opposed. In its motion, the city argued that several provisions of the decree hindered its ability to conduct law enforcement functions, including by preventing it from entering into partnerships with state and federal agencies. Judge McCalla denied this motion in a November 13, 2019 opinion, finding that the modifications requested by defendants would erode the purpose of the original consent decree but allowed for the possibility of modifications after discovery and an evidentiary hearing.
On November 20, 2019, the Monitor filed his third quarterly report with the court. In it, he reported that a compliance plan had been created and was being implemented. He also noted that he received many requests for community members to be included as members of the monitoring team and opined that the creation of a civilian advisory board might be useful in this case.
On December 6, 2020, the parties filed a schedule for discovery and trial on the modifications to the consent decree, with June 17, 2020 chosen for the trial, which the court adopted in a January 2, 2020 hearing.
The City submitted its new social media policy to the court for review on December 21, 2019, to which both the ACLU-TN and the Monitor objected. Judge McCalla also heard objections to this policy during the January 2, 2020 hearing on modifications to the consent decree and allowed the City to respond to these objections in writing.
In a February 28, 2020 letter, the Monitor informed the court that he believed the City had violated one of the sanctions imposed on it by failing to maintain records of social media search terms. The court scheduled a hearing in mid March to resolve this issue, but it was delayed to May 14, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In an August 19, 2020 order, the court found that the Memphis Police Department had failed to report searches made by officers using their personal Facebook accounts.
On April 17, 2020, the City asked the court to order mediation between itself and the ACLU-TN in order to narrow the issues for the June 17, 2020 hearing. The court authorized the Monitor to mediate between the two parties in an April 28, 2020 order.
The Monitor filed the first quarterly report of 2020 on May 20, 2020. In it, the Monitor reported that many of the case's outstanding issues remained unresolved, including the approval of the City's new social media policy, the City's alleged sanctions violations, and the Monitor's solicitation of feedback from the public.
In advance of the June 17 hearing, both the City and the ACLU-TN filed trial briefs and, on June 8, 2020, submitted proposed changes to the consent decree. Between June 17 and 22, 2020, Judge McCalla presided over a four day evidentiary hearing over Zoom to consider the modifications to the consent decree. After the hearing, both sides provided the court with additional briefing on the proposed modifications.
Judge McCalla resolved the City's motion to modify the consent decree in a September 21, 2020 hearing. He found that there was sufficient evidence to support the changes to the decree agreed to by the City and the ACLU-TN. However, he refused to make the changes the City requested unilaterally, which related to the City's ability to work with outside law enforcement agencies who were not bound by the decree. Judge McCalla found that the City's issues with the contested provisions could be resolved by better training and that the provisions did not affect the Memphis Police Department's existing relationships with other law enforcement agencies. Judge McCalla then issued an updated judgment and consent decree.
The City appealed Judge McCalla's ruling to the Sixth Circuit on November 3, 2020 (No. 20-6263). As of April 6, 2021, the appeal is fully briefed, but there has been no decision. The case is ongoing.
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On February 1, 2010, a Massachusetts citizen arrested for videotaping police practices filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and relevant state law, against the City of Boston and several police officers. The plaintiff, represented by an ACLU attorney and private counsel, sought monetary relief, alleging that the City of Boston failed to properly supervise, discipline, or train Boston police officers, which resulted in the plaintiff's being falsely arrested. He further claimed that the false arrest violated his rights under the First and the Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The defendant police officers arrested the plaintiff for his using of digital video camera to record their arrest of a young man in a park. One charge against the plaintiff was violation of the state wiretap statute. The judicial court dismissed the charge subsequently, because a conviction under the state wiretap statute required the recording to be secret, and the police officers admitted that the plaintiff's recording was not.
On February 5, 2010, the plaintiff amended his complaint. On June 8, 2010, the Court (Judge William G. Young) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case after a hearing. Judge Young denied the defendant police officers' qualified immunity from both the plaintiff's First and Fourth Amendment claims. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit.
On June 29, 2010, Judge Young denied the defendants' motion to stay proceedings in the District Court pending appeal. On the same day, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Leo T. Sorokin upon both parties' consent. The Court of Appeals grant a motion to stay on August 4, 2010.
On August 26, 2011, the Circuit Court (Judge Kermit V. Lipez) affirmed the lower court's ruling that denied the defendant police officers' qualified immunity from the plaintiff's constitutional claims. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). In the opinion, Judge Lipez found that the First Amendment protected the plaintiff in filming the on-duty police officers in public and that his right to film in this case was clearly established. The defendant police officers lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights, and the lack of probable cause was clearly established, defeating the defendants' asserted qualified immunity from suit.
(On September 27, 2011, the plaintiff in Strahan v. Rowley, Docket No. 1:11-cv-11235, filed a motion to consolidate his case with this case. The Strahan case was then assigned to Magistrate Judge Sorokin as well. Both the plaintiff and the defendants in this case filed oppositions to the consolidation on October 11, 2011. Magistrate Judge Sorokin denied the motion to consolidate cases on December 20, 2011, docketed only in the Strahan case.)
On January 19, 2012, on remand from the First Circuit, the parties requested mediation and the case was referred to Alternative Dispute Resolution, with Chief Magistrate Judge Judith G. Dein appointed as the mediator. On March 5, 2012, the parties reached a settlement through the mediation. The defendants agreed to pay $170,000 to the plaintiff for damages, attorneys' fees and litigation costs. The lawsuit was subsequently dismissed. This ended the case.
For more information, please see <a href="http://aclum.org/glik">the ACLU's website</a>.
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This is a case about the violent insurrection and disruption of Congress on January 6, 2021 as Congressional members approved the results of the Electoral College in order to elect the next President and Vice President of the United States.
On February 16, 2021, a member of the United States House of Representatives, in his personal capacity, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by private counsel and the NAACP, the plaintiff sued the President of the United States in his personal capacity, the President’s personal lawyer, Proud Boys International, and Oath Keepers under the Ku Klux Klan Act 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1). The representative sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from engaging in future violations of the act, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. He claimed that the defendants plotted, coordinated, and executed a common plan to prevent Congress from discharging its official duties in certifying the results of the presidential election. He also claimed that in furtherance of this plan, the defendants spread misinformation to disrupt the legally required presidential election process. These actions allegedly prevented the plaintiff from performing his official duties and deprived him of his right to be free from intimidation and threats while doing so.
This case has been assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta and is ongoing.
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This is a case challenging the legality of the Kanawha County Schools (KCS) treatment of students with disabilities. On January 24, 2020, a plaintiff who was a third-grade student in the Kanawha County School district, filed this class-action suit against the school district and its superintendent. The Arc of West Virginia, an advocacy organization that supports students with disabilities, also joined as a plaintiff. The student had autism and ADHD. The plaintiff had been denied effective behavioral support at his school and had been repeatedly removed from the classroom. The plaintiff sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the Americans Disabilities Act (ADA), the West Virginia Human Rights Act, and West Virginia Policy 2419. Judge Irene Berger was assigned to oversee the proceedings.
The plaintiff argued that the school district was failing to comply with the requirement under the IDEA to provide students with disabilities with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). The FAPE standard requires "appropriately ambitious" special education, which KCS failed to meet. Similarly, KCS had not met its requirements under the ADA to adjust policies, practices, and procedures as necessary and to provide children with disabilities equal education opportunities. KCS did not have a current system in place to identify and provide resources for students with disabilities and instead used informal and formal removal techniques in response to behavior problems.
The plaintiffs sought class certification for a class consisting of "[a]ll Kanawha County Schools students with disabilities who (1) need but are not receiving behavior supports from KCS, and (2) have experienced disciplinary removals from any classroom." The plaintiffs also sought declaratory and injunctive relief, specifically asking the Court to enjoin the defendants in revising their policies in order to provide effective behavior supports to its students with disabilities, and also provide a monitor to oversee compliance with the court order. Finally, the plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees and costs.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims on March 20, 2020. On April 10, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, switching the organizational defendant to the Board of Education of the County of Kanawha. The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the IDEA. The defendants also sought to dismiss the Arc of West Virginia from the case, arguing that the organization lacked standing because they did not allege that one of their members required relief.
On July 16, 2020, Judge Irene Berger dismissed the claims against the superintendent but denied the school district's motion to dismiss. 2020 WL 4018285. The Court found that the plaintiffs had alleged systemic violations, and therefore they did not need to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Court also determined that the Arc of West Virginia had associational standing and was permitted to remain in the litigation.
As of October 22, the case remains ongoing.
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An individual who uses a wheelchair and his mother filed this Fair Housing suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on July 27, 2006. The plaintiff had moved into a ground floor unit in a development known as the Uptown Apartments, part of a "new urbanism" complex that includes about 300 apartments, a pool, club house, exercise gym, meeting areas and a business office. The developers had also cooperated with Canton Township to build adjacent shopping and entertainment facilities.
When the plaintiff moved in, he discovered multiple accessibility problems inside the unit. Defendants assured him they would be fixed, but they never were. Additionally, at the front door to the apartment, there were concrete steps, making it impossible for him to enter. Instead, he had to use the back door after navigating driveways and parking lots whose slopes made entering his home treacherous.
The conditions at the development trapped the plaintiff in his home. His only outside access was the back parking lot. He was unable to get to the common areas and had virtually no contact with his neighbors.
Finally, after making repeated requests that the necessary modifications be made, the plaintiff filed suit against the owner/contrator, the architect, and the engineer responsible for constructing and operating the inaccessible development. His mother intervened as a plaintiff because the conditions, along with her own disabilities, made it extremely difficult for her to visit her son. The local fair housing center ("the FHC"), which had first taken the plaintiffs' complaint and investigated, also intervened, and on September 7, 2007, the individual plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding Canton Township as a party.
After months of acrimonious meetings, the parties entered into various settlement agreements. The individual plaintiffs entered a confidential settlement agreement with the non-public-entity defendants for an undisclosed sum of money, plus attorney fees and costs, after significant modifications had been made, including rebuilding the front of the building to eliminate the steps. They then settled with the Township for $75,000.00 and retrofitting of sidewalks and curb ramps
On July 28, 2009, the FHC entered into a settlement with the owner/ contractor, engineering, and architect defendants requiring exterior modifications to the development, including accessible routes and parking, and interior modifications to the covered residential units including, at the request of the tenant, beveling exterior sides of primary entry doors, increasing turning space, retrofitting of bathrooms, and other modifications required by the Fair Housing Act and its implementing regulations. Defendants agreed to pay $45,000.00 in damages to the FHC.
The case was closed on July 29, 2009.
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On May 2, 2000, three inmates at the Riverfront State Prison in New Jersey filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the New Jersey State Parole Board. The complaint alleged that the Parole Board knowingly and consistently failed to meet the deadlines for the preparation of pre-parole reports and the conduction of parole hearings, as required by the New Jersey Parole Act of 1979 ("Act"), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to 30:4-123.69, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As a result of the Parole Board's alleged inaction, the plaintiffs and thousands of other inmates remained incarcerated past their respective parole eligibility dates. At the peak of the problem, hearings were behind schedule for approximately 5,800 prisoners. The complaint demanded declaratory and injunctive relief and nominal damages.
Soon after the case was filed, the parties pursued settlement negotiations. Ultimately, a settlement was reached and the parties filed a joint motion for approval of the Settlement Agreement. The District Court (Judge Pisano) certified the case as a class action and approved the settlement as being fair and reasonable. Hawker v. Consovoy, 198 F.R.D. 619 (D.N.J. 2001). Under the terms of the Agreement, the Parole Board stipulated that it would conduct more timely hearings, and that no such backlog would be allowed to build up again.
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On June 29, 2009, two inmates at the Manatee County Jail filed a pro se lawsuit in the Middle District Court of Florida challenging the constitutionality of the jail’s new mail policy. The inmates filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated at the jail, alleging that the new policy, which only allowed inmates to receive post-cards, was unconstitutional. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that jail personnel were opening their privileged mail and were allowing trainees to search legal bins and legal mail without the owner being present, and that the defendants were violating their constitutional rights by allowing trainees to perform training exercises on them and other prisoners, including cavity searches. The plaintiffs asked the court for injunction and declaratory judgment claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
On July 8, 2009, the case was dismissed without prejudice, because the plaintiffs raised several unrelated claims in the same complaint. Plaintiffs filed an amended pro se complaint on July 24, 2009, which only challenged the Manatee County Jail mail policy. The Court dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice because the plaintiffs were proceeding pro se and were purporting to bring a class action for themselves and all others similarly situated.
On September 4, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, alleging that the new mail policy at Manatee County Jail and the Defendants' practice of opening privileged mail and censoring the newspaper given to inmates violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
The court appointed counsel to the Plaintiffs on October 26, 2009. Plaintiffs' counsel--the Florida Justice Institute and private counsel--filed an amended complaint on February 18, 2010, claiming that the new mail policy violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the inmates and the inmates family members and friends. The plaintiffs' group included two inmates and two family members of inmates. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief.
On April 15, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. Later, on May 12, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to disqualify Judge Kovachevich for bias or prejudice. The defendants alleged that one of Judge Kovachevich's staff attorneys undertook a factual investigation regarding the plaintiffs' claim. Allegedly, the staff attorney contacted the jail and requested legal precedent regarding the defendants' mail policy. Additionally, the defendants claimed that the staff attorney made a sua sponte request for counsel to represent the plaintiffs.
On May 28, 2010 Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The court held that postcard only mail policies were reasonably related to penological interests and cited precedent from the Middle District of Florida. <i>Turner v. Safley</i>, 482 U.S. at 85, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987).
On June 23, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the case. Specifically the plaintiffs argued that the case should be reconsidered because the case was dismissed while there was a pending motion for the recusal of Judge Kovachevich. Furthermore, the court dismissed the case sua sponte before the defendants explained why their practices carried out a legitimate penological interest, nor were the plaintiffs allowed to present evidence to the contrary.
On March 11, 2011 the court issued an order to have both parties report on whether the case was moot before ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. The order stated that both inmates had been released from the jail and that any argument for granting injunctive relief on account that the plaintiffs might be future inmates was without merit. The plaintiffs’ counsel responded on March 25, 2011 and argued that the case was not moot because the plaintiffs still had standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of the proposed class of persons similarly situated. On March 29, 2011 the defendants responded that the claims were moot because the plaintiffs were no longer inmates and thus no longer had a personal stake in the matter.
What happened next is unclear. Two of the lawyers for the Florida Justice Institute filed motions to withdraw, because they were moving out of state. Both motions stated that other counsel would remain involved (both motions were granted). But there is no other recorded activity in the docket. As of October 15, 2016, there are no new orders regarding the motion, and apparently the <a href="http://www.manateesheriff.com/Bureaus/MailGuidelines">Manatee County Jail</a> still has a strict post-card old policy in place. We assume the case is now closed.
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On July 20, 2004, a lesbian couple living in Florida filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida against the U.S. Attorney General and Clerk for the Circuit and Country Courts of Hillsborough County, Florida, challenging the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and Florida's implementation of the statute. Plaintiffs brought their lawsuit after a clerk in the Circuit Court's Office in Hillsborough Country refused to recognize their Massachusetts marriage license. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to declare DOMA and the corresponding Florida statute unconstitutional and enjoin their enforcement. The plaintiffs alleged that the two statutes violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
The plaintiffs asserted that Florida is required to recognize their valid Massachusetts marriage license because DOMA exceeds Congress' power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. They also argued that twelve U.S. Supreme Court Cases, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and ending with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), demonstrate a recent trend by the Supreme Court to expand the fundamental liberty of personal autonomy in connection with one's intimate affairs and family relations. The plaintiffs urged the Court in the case at bar to expand on these cases and find that the right to enter into a same-sex marriage is protected by the Constitution.
On September 27, 2004, the U.S. filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that DOMA does not infringe on any of the plaintiffs' fundamental rights and is a legitimate exercise of the power granted to Congress by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. On January 19, 2005, Judge James S. Moody, Jr., granted the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court rejected the plaintiff's interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, saying that Congress' actions are an appropriate exercise of its power to regulate conflicts between the laws of two different States, in this case, conflicts over the validity of same-sex marriage. Florida is not required to recognize or apply Massachusetts' same-sex marriage law because it clearly conflicts with Florida's legitimate public policy of opposing same-sex marriage.
The Court went on to say that it was bound the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), who dismissed for want of a substantial federal question the appeal of Minnesota's Supreme Court ruling that the right to marry without regard to the sex of the parties is not a fundamental right of all persons (and thus a similar state statute to the one in the case at bar did not violate the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause).
Regarding Due Process, the Court said the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence only determined that a Texas statute prohibiting homosexual sodomy failed under the rational basis analysis, and in no way can be interpreted as creating a fundamental right to same-sex marriage. The Court also expressed its reservations about elevating rights to fundamental status, since to do so would remove policy decisions from the hands of the people and into the guardianship of unelected judges. Willams v. Pryor, 378 F.3d 1232, 1250. Therefore, the Court found that the right to marry a person of the same sex is not a fundamental right under the Constitution.
On the issue of Equal Protection, the Court stated that the Eleventh Circuit has held that homosexuality is not a suspect class that would require subjecting DOMA to strict scrutiny, Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004), and that DOMA does not discriminate on the basis of sex because it treats women and men equally, In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (W.D. Wash. 2004), and therefore it must apply rational basis review. The Court held that encouraging the raising of children in homes consisting of a married mother and father is a legitimate state interest, See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819-20, and DOMA is rationally related to this interest.
On March 7, 2005, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remainder of the case (involving the State of Florida) and the case was closed on March 8, 2005.
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On March 16, 2018, a prisoner at the Coconino County Detention Facility (CCDF), in Flagstaff Arizona, filed this class action lawsuit in the Superior Court of Coconino County, Arizona on behalf of himself and similarly situated prisoners. The complaint sought declaratory relief and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, challenging the prolonged detention of inmates for whom CCDF received a detainer from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE). It named as defendants the Coconino County Sheriff, the Jail Commander, and other officials. The plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU’s Immigrant Rights Project and by private counsel.
The complaint explained that the plaintiffs had been arrested, criminally. But then their detention at CCDF was prolonged because the facility cooperated with an ICE detainer request. The ICE detainers asked local authorities to prolong the confinement of individuals accused of immigration violations until officers from ICE took custody of those individuals and placed them in removal proceedings. The named plaintiff, for example, claimed that there were people willing to post bond to secure his release, but they were told by CCDF personnel that he would be held for an additional 48 hours following the bond payment pursuant to the ICE detainer request. Fearing that posting bond would trigger the 48-hour hold and subsequent detention by ICE, he chose to remain in custody until his trial date.
According to the plaintiffs, CCDF’s policy of prolonging plaintiffs’ detention despite meeting all conditions of pretrial release violated Article II, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs requested preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, to secure the named plaintiff’s immediate release upon the payment of his bond. and to enjoin the holding of other similarly situated detainees pursuant to CCDF’s policy. The plaintiffs also sought a court declaration that the CCDF detainer policy was unlawful.
Because the complaint raised a federal claim, the defendants removed it to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on April 2, 2018. It was assigned to District Judge David Campbell. On April 6, 2018, the plaintiffs sought an order to show cause as to their request for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order and to halt the continued implementation the CCDF’s immigration detention policies. The plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on April 30, 2018. In addition to repeating the allegations described in the original complaint, the amended complaint also asserted that CCDF’s polices violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
On May 5, 2018, the U.S. Government filed a statement of interest, seeking to convince the District Court to deny the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. According to the Government, ICE’s cooperation with local law enforcement in the detention of those accused of immigration violations was lawful under Arizona and federal law. Though the detainer authorized the confinement of an individual 48 hours beyond the time when the individual would have otherwise been released, the Government clarified that the detainer should not, “impact decisions about the alien’s bail, rehabilitation, parole, release, diversion, custody classification, work, quarter assignments, or other matters.” Further, the Government claimed that the named plaintiff did not have a basis to challenge the legality of ICE’s cooperation with the County, because he never elected to post bond.
On July 6, 2018, Judge Campbell denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. According to the Court, the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, but nonetheless raised serious questions that required further litigation. The Court reached this decision by finding the plaintiffs’ arguments inconclusive as to whether Arizona sheriffs possessed common law authority to cooperate with ICE without explicit statutory authorization. However, the Court also held that local law enforcement officers’ unilateral authority to prolong the detention of an individual on immigration grounds absent a formalized agreement with the federal government was a serious question demanding further litigation. Because both the plaintiffs and the Government would sustain significant hardships on account of the absence or presence of court interference, the Court concluded that a preliminary injunction would not be appropriate relief in this case. 324 F.Supp.3d 1053.
On July 30, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the case, to which the defendants provided no objection. According to plaintiffs’ counsel (as reported in local news sources), the denial of the preliminary injunction made the dismissal necessary. They explained that continuing to fight the case would result in their client spending another six months to a year in jail. The Court granted the motion, dismissing the case as to the defendants without prejudice. The case is now closed.
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This is a case about the Trump Administration's limits on LGBTQ protections under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (42 U.S.C. § 18116). On June 22, 2020, a group of LGBTQ-focused private healthcare providers, organizations providing community services, health professional associations, and individual providers filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706), claiming that the defendants violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Represented by both Lambda Legal and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorney's fees. Specifically, they alleged that the revised regulation issued under § 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) by HHS under the Trump Administration limits protections for LGBTQ individuals and causes harm to them and healthcare providers.
In 2010, President Obama signed the ACA into law. Section 1557 prohibits discrimination based on sex, race, color, national origin, age, and disability. In 2016, HHS enacted a final rule (the "2016 Rule") to implement the nondiscrimination requirements of Section 1557. The 2016 Rule defined sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sex stereotyping and declared that healthcare providers and insurers cannot discriminate against LGBTQ individuals in medical and coverage decisions. In June 2020, however, the Trump Administration issued a revised regulation (the "2020 Rule"), which rolled back the 2016 Rule. The 2020 Rule eliminated the unitary legal standard for enforcement of violations of Section 1557 and introduced broad exemptions for discrimination based on personal religious or moral beliefs.
This case was assigned to Judge James E. Boasberg. On July 9, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, motion to stay pending judicial review. The defendants filed their opposition on July 24, and the plaintiffs answered the defendants' opposition on July 29. On September 2, the court enjoined the Administration from implementing two provisions: (1) the 2020 Rule's elimination of "sex stereotyping" from the 2016 Rule's definition of "discrimination on the basis of sex" and (2) the 2020 Rule's use of Title IX's exemption of certain religious organizations from the statute’s nondiscrimination mandate. The court limited the injunction to claims it concluded had a likelihood of success, and thus denied relief for the plaintiffs' claims that the 2020 Rule erroneously eliminated the 2016 Rule’s prohibition on categorical coverage exclusions for gender-affirming care, improperly repealed the 2016 Rule’s notice requirements, and violated Section 1554 of the ACA. Because the court did not find those claims to have a likelihood of success, it also did not award relief for the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The injunction applied nationwide. In its opinion addressing the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court also analyzed whether or not the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims. Citing the fear instilled in the LGBTQ community as evidence of imminent injury, the court found that the plaintiffs had organizational standing for their four common-injury claims and two of their five organizational-injury claims of injuries caused by the 2020 Rule. The court also held that the plaintiffs had third-party standing to assert the equal-protection, substantive-due-process, and free-speech rights of third-party LGBTQ patients.
This case is ongoing.
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On May 17, 2018, a Catholic foster care and social services agency and {} filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against the City of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and by conservative public interest organization the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, alleged that city of Philadelphia revoked new referrals of foster children to their organization because of their faith-based opposition to same-sex marriage. The complaint sought monetary and injunctive relief for violations of under 42 U.S.C. §1983, breach of contract, the First Amendment, Pennsylvania Constitution, and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge Petrese B. Tucker.
Plaintiffs asserted that Philadelphia's decision to revoke new foster care referrals breached their contract with the city and targeted them on religious grounds. According to the plaintiffs, the city had previously excepted them from providing foster care services to same-sex couples, and therefore the city's contract was ambiguous on whether they were required to provide these services to same-sex couples. They also alleged that the public statements made by the Mayor of Philadelphia and other public officials criticizing their refusal to serve same-sex couples indicated the city's decision to suspend the contract constituted religious discrimination.
On June 7, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction requesting that the Court reinstate referrals of foster children to the plaintiff. The defendants' opposition argued that the plaintiffs violated the City's Fair Practice Ordinance, which forbids discrimination against individuals in public accommodations, and was clearly included in the contract. Since the defendants were acting on behalf of the city, and the city was previously unaware of the plaintiffs' refusal to serve otherwise qualified same-sex couples, the defendants argued that they were within their right to suspend the contract.
On July 13, 2018, Judge Petrese B. Tucker denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and TRO. Judge Tucker held that the parties' intent was clear: the Fair Practices ordinance applied to the contract and that plaintiffs' services fell within "public accommodations"; therefore, the plaintiffs were required to serve anyone who sought their services. 320 F.Supp.3d 661. The Court rejected the defendants' claims that this violated the Free Exercise clause; it held that the city's policy was neutral and also found that there was insufficient discriminatory intent to trigger strict scrutiny review.
The plaintiffs appealed on the same day of this decision. On April 22, 2019, the United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, in an opinion by Judge Thomas L. Ambro. The Court of Appeals held that the City's nondiscrimination policy was neutral and the religious views of the plaintiff did not entitle it to an exception from the policy. Additionally, the Third Circuit found that the City had not targeted the plaintiffs "for its religious beliefs" nor was its decision "motivated by ill will against [the plaintiff's] religion, rather than sincere opposition to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." 922 F.3d 140.
The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on July 22, 2019. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 24, 2020. 140 S.Ct. 1104. Numerous parties filed amici curiae briefs for both the plaintiff and the defendant. A group of United States Senators advocated for granting the injunction on religious liberty grounds, while others argued for preserving the lower court's decision and reasoning.
The case is ongoing with oral arguments scheduled for the upcoming 2020 Supreme Court term.
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On December 22, 2003, nine individuals and ImmigrationPortal.com, an Internet site with over 72,000 registered members who shared information about immigration law violations, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging unreasonable delays in the processing of employment-based adjustment of status applications for legal permanent residence ("green cards"). In addition to unreasonable delays in obtaining green cards, sometimes up to 6 years, Plaintiffs also alleged that during the application process, they had to file repeated applications for the issuance of employment authorization and advance parole and were subjected to repeated fingerprintings. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361; Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651; Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.; and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitutions. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and moved for class certification.
On March 31, 2005, the District Court (Judge James Robertson) denied the motion for class certification. Over 18 months later, the Court issued its memorandum which set forth its reasons for denying class certification. In the memorandum, the Court noted that "all nine of the people who were named in the original complaint have somehow miraculously found their way through the system." ImmigrationPortal.com v. Chertoff, 2006 WL 3254490 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2006.)
Shortly thereafter, the parties filed a voluntary joint stipulation for dismissal and the case was closed.
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COVID-19 Summary: This suit was brought on May 19, 2020, by two non-profit organizations and three voter plaintiffs against the state of Louisiana to challenge Louisiana’s Excuse Requirement, Witness Requirement, and Cure Prohibition. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the Excuse and Witness Requirement, as well as provide absentee voters with notice and opportunity to cure defects in their absentee ballots for all elections in 2020 held in Louisiana. On June 22, the court dismissed the case. <hr>
On May 19, 2020, two non-profit organizations and three individual voters brought suit against the state of Louisiana to challenge its election laws. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private attorneys, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 52 U.S.C. § 10301, alleging that the requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the Excuse and Witness Requirement, as well as provide absentee voters with notice and opportunity to cure defects in their absentee ballots for all elections in 2020 held in Louisiana. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, and was assigned to Chief Judge Shelley D. Dick.
On April 15, the Secretary of State proposed an emergency election plan expanding the category of excuses needed to request an absentee ballot and waiving the Witness Requirement for the July and August elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The proposed plan was rejected by the Louisiana Senate and Governmental Affairs Committee. On April 20, the Secretary of State presented a revised emergency election plan, which did not waive the Witness Requirement and presented fewer categories to fulfill the Excuse Requirement, which was approved. The plaintiffs noted that there was no emergency action plan in place for the November and December elections and that even with the plan in place, the narrow category of excuses and the need for a witness forced voters to choose between exercising their right to vote and potentially endangering themselves. Therefore, the plaintiffs alleged that Louisiana’s Excuse Requirement and Witness Requirement imposed undue burdens on the fundamental right to vote, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs also challenged the lack of notice and opportunity to cure defects with mail-in votes. The plaintiffs alleged that the “Cure Prohibition” violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying certain populations the right to due process. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on May 29.
Meanwhile, in a separate case, <i>Power Coalition v. Edwards</i>, its plaintiffs also filed a suit to challenge the Excuse Requirement, Witness Requirement, and the Cure Prohibition. <i>Power Coalition v. Edwards</i> and <i>Clark v. Edwards</i> were consolidated on June 3.
On June 5, the State of Louisiana filed a motion to intervene as defendants, which was granted on June 8. The same day, they filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not adequately alleged state action. The defendants also claimed that because of the proximity of the election, there should not be last-minute electoral meddling. On June 15, the defendants filed a joint motion to amend, which was denied on June 17. The same day, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to remove the Parish Registrars of Voters as defendants.
On June 22, the court granted the motion to dismiss and all claims against the defendants were dismissed with prejudice. 2020 WL 3415376. The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims did not adequately allege an injury in fact sufficient to give rise to standing, because the demonstrated injury was not traceable to state action. The hearing scheduled for the preliminary injunction was accordingly canceled. On June 25, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the judgment to dismiss their claims without prejudice, which was granted on June 30.
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On September 29, 1997, prisoners at various facilities within the New York State Department of Corrections filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Department officials. The plaintiffs, represented by Prisoners Legal Services of New York, brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, challenging the systemic deprivation of religious rights of Native American prisoners, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They asked the court for injunctive relief on behalf of all Native American prisoners in New York's correctional facilities who, because of the defendants' policies, were denied the opportunity to possess symbolic items necessary for religious practice; to engage in spiritual practices, including seasonal ceremonies and meetings for prayer or study; and to chant and dance, both in congregations and individually.
For approximately the following year and a half, the parties engaged in discovery. On March 24, 1999, and then July 9, 1999, the court (Judge Charles J. Siragusa) held settlement conferences. On that date, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, approved by the court the same day. The parties agreed to create a Native American chaplain position, to allow inmates to practice their religion through group meetings, to possess certain religious items, and to celebrate religious holidays with family members. The Agreement also provided for staff notification and training as to the Native Americans' rights, and for a two-year observation period to follow entry of the Agreement in order to ensure compliance.
On February 16, 2000, the parties filed a Joint Supplemental Response to the Plaintiffs' Report of Comments, dated December 14, 1999, reflecting their agreed-to interpretation of certain provisions of the Settlement Agreement. These provisions included the role of the chaplain, the burning of Indian tobacco after corrections facilities become smoke-free, and the guests able to be invited to religious ceremonies.
Subsequently, on September 8, 2000, the court (Judge Siragusa) entered a decision and order approving the dismissal of the action pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The case was closed the same day.
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On April 22, 1999, a black employee of an automotive plant sued the owner and its manager in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, Judge Edward W. Nottingham, for failing to prevent racial discrimination by other workers, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and state law.
Specifically, Plaintiff claimed he was the only black employee among 65 employees at the factory. Other employees shunned him, referred to him with the n-word and intimidated him in various ways. When the plaintiff found a black doll with a noose around it in his locker, he quit his position out of fear. He claimed that supervisors, were aware of discrimination and in fact witnessed it yet did not discipline the other employees. He claimed discrimination, ethnic intimidation, and constructive discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (against the company only); 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Colorado Revised Statutes §§ 18-2-121(2) and 13-21-106.5; and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against 10 "Doe" defendants. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, back pay, front pay, benefits, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.
On December 1, 1999, the court granted a stipulated motion to dismiss with prejudice the supervisor defendant from the case. On June 29, 2000, the court dispensed with both parties' motions for summary judgment. <i>Goodman v. Timpte,</I> 2000 WL 34507333, No. 99-795 (D. Colo. Jun. 29, 2000). The Court granted the defendants' motion in part as to the plaintiff's third claim for ethnic intimidation. It denied the motion in all other respects. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed his claims against the unidentified plaintiffs and the fourth claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On October 30, 2000, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, after a stipulated motion. It appears the parties reached a settlement, although an agreement is not publicly available. This is the last entry on the docket.
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