prathyushreddy1991/legalMVP · Datasets at Hugging Face

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business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
At this juncture, the court cannot determine whether the defendants had a
policy requiring disclosure of past drug addiction, whether they inquired into
Spak’s medical history upon hiring, or whether Spak’s history of addiction
affected his ability to perform the essential functions of his job. Further discovery
is needed in this regard. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to
Spak, he has sufficiently pled that he was qualified to perform the essential
functions of the job.
Defendants also challenge the third element of Spak’s prima facie case,
that is, the existence of a link between his disability and his termination. (Doc. 8,
Def. Br. in Supp. at ECF pp. 11-12). Spak has pointed to allegations in his
complaint establishing a causal connection between his disability and
termination. (Doc. 9, Br. in Opp. at 9-10). The complaint alleges that defendants
terminated Spak within two (2) days of Defendant Muench inquiring about Spak’s
drug recovery process. (Doc. 1, Compl. J] 23-31). While firing Spak, Muench

®§ The ADA implementing regulations provide that covered entities may not “use qualification
standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out ar
individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities, on the basis of disability,
unless the standard, test, or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to
be job related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.” 29 C.F.R.
1630.10(a) (2019).
12

allegedly explained that the reason for his termination was Spak’s failure to
“attend[ ] any group meetings or AA meetings to continue his recovery”. (Id. {ff
31-34). Muench allegedly noted that he had been fooled by his daughter who
had been in and out of rehabilitation and had been stealing from him. (id. □□ 33).
Hoping to keep his job, Spak offered to take a drug test on the spot to prove that
he was ciean and sober. (ld. 7] 35). However, Muench insisted on firing Spak.
(Id. {\| 36). Lastly, the day after Spak’s termination, Muench replied to Spak’s
message by stating “I’ve been through a daughter with addition [sic] and was
fooled. \| hope you are clean and on a recovery road. \| do like you and hope the
best[.]’? (Doc. 1-1, at ECF p. 3).
Taken together, the foregoing allegations and the text message exchange
between Spak and Defendant Muench support the inference that Spak’s
termination resulted from his disability. When reviewing the overall scenario in a
light most favorable to Spak, he has established the elements necessary to

9 Spak attached to the complaint the text message exchange between him and Defendant
Muench from the days surrounding his termination date. (Doc. 1-1). Under the law, courts mai
“generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the
complaint and matters of public record” when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Pension Ben.
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted). A court may also consider “an undisputediy authentic document that a defendant
attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs claims are based on the
document.” Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, where a document is integral to or explicitly
relied upon in the complaint, it may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim into one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Doe, 30 F.4th at 343
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
13

sustain a prima facie case of disability discrimination. The defendants’ motion to
dismiss Spak’s ADA/PHRA claims of disability discrimination in Counts \| and II
will thus be denied.
2. Plaintiff's ADA/PHRA Retaliation Claims
Defendants also move to dismiss Spak’s ADA/PHRA retaliation claims. To
establish a prima facie case of retaliation in the ADA context, a plaintiff must

prove: “(1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either
after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; and (3) a
causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the employer's
adverse action.” Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68 (3d Cir.
2002) (citation omitted).
Defendants assert that Spak’s complaint fails to allege that he actually
engaged in a protected activity. (Doc. 8, Def. Br. in Supp. at ECF p. 8).
According to defendants, Spak’s alleged act of defending himself as a person in
recovery does not rise to the level of a protected activity under the ADA and
PHRA. (ld. at ECF pp. 8-9; see Doc. 1, Compl. Jf 43, 54, 59).
A protected activity includes bringing or participating in formal actions to
enforce ADA rights. Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 188
(3d Cir. 2003). Moreover, informal activity, such as requesting an
accommodation for a disability, constitutes a protected activity under the ADA. Id

14

These principles follow from the ADA retaliation provision which protects “any
individual” who has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by the ADA or

who has made a charge under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). “Thus, it is

unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee based upon the

employee’s opposition to anything that is unlawful under the ADA.”
Shellenberger, 318 F.3d at 188.
As alleged, Spak was fired because Defendant Muench harbored prejudice
against individuals who have a drug addiction history and relied upon stereotype:
of those in recovery. Such bias is unlawful under the ADA. Spak did not request

any accommodation from defendants, such as reduction in work hours, time off
to see a doctor, or assistance in completing his tasks. To the contrary, Spak
merely sought to assure Muench that he was sober and capable of performing
his job. (Doc. 1, Compl. fff 26, 35, 38). According to the plaintiff, defendants did

not even give Spak the opportunity to request an accommodation; they
terminated him within two days of learning about his past drug addiction, without

engaging in an interactive process.'"° Thus, by opposing Muench’s unlawful

retaliation under the ADA, Spak engaged in a protected activity.

business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).

At this juncture, the court cannot determine whether the defendants had a

policy requiring disclosure of past drug addiction, whether they inquired into

Spak’s medical history upon hiring, or whether Spak’s history of addiction

affected his ability to perform the essential functions of his job. Further discovery

is needed in this regard. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to

Spak, he has sufficiently pled that he was qualified to perform the essential

functions of the job.

Defendants also challenge the third element of Spak’s prima facie case,

that is, the existence of a link between his disability and his termination. (Doc. 8,

Def. Br. in Supp. at ECF pp. 11-12). Spak has pointed to allegations in his

complaint establishing a causal connection between his disability and

termination. (Doc. 9, Br. in Opp. at 9-10). The complaint alleges that defendants

terminated Spak within two (2) days of Defendant Muench inquiring about Spak’s

drug recovery process. (Doc. 1, Compl. J] 23-31). While firing Spak, Muench

®§ The ADA implementing regulations provide that covered entities may not “use qualification

standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out ar

individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities, on the basis of disability,

unless the standard, test, or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to

be job related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.” 29 C.F.R.

1630.10(a) (2019).

12

allegedly explained that the reason for his termination was Spak’s failure to

“attend[ ] any group meetings or AA meetings to continue his recovery”. (Id. {ff

31-34). Muench allegedly noted that he had been fooled by his daughter who

had been in and out of rehabilitation and had been stealing from him. (id. □□ 33).

Hoping to keep his job, Spak offered to take a drug test on the spot to prove that

he was ciean and sober. (ld. 7] 35). However, Muench insisted on firing Spak.

(Id. {| 36). Lastly, the day after Spak’s termination, Muench replied to Spak’s

message by stating “I’ve been through a daughter with addition [sic] and was

fooled. | hope you are clean and on a recovery road. | do like you and hope the

best[.]’? (Doc. 1-1, at ECF p. 3).

Taken together, the foregoing allegations and the text message exchange

between Spak and Defendant Muench support the inference that Spak’s

termination resulted from his disability. When reviewing the overall scenario in a

light most favorable to Spak, he has established the elements necessary to

9 Spak attached to the complaint the text message exchange between him and Defendant

Muench from the days surrounding his termination date. (Doc. 1-1). Under the law, courts mai

“generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the

complaint and matters of public record” when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Pension Ben.

Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations

omitted). A court may also consider “an undisputediy authentic document that a defendant

attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs claims are based on the

document.” Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, where a document is integral to or explicitly

relied upon in the complaint, it may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim into one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Doe, 30 F.4th at 343

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

13

sustain a prima facie case of disability discrimination. The defendants’ motion to

dismiss Spak’s ADA/PHRA claims of disability discrimination in Counts | and II

will thus be denied.

2. Plaintiff's ADA/PHRA Retaliation Claims

Defendants also move to dismiss Spak’s ADA/PHRA retaliation claims. To

establish a prima facie case of retaliation in the ADA context, a plaintiff must

prove: “(1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either

after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; and (3) a

causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the employer's

adverse action.” Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68 (3d Cir.

2002) (citation omitted).

Defendants assert that Spak’s complaint fails to allege that he actually

engaged in a protected activity. (Doc. 8, Def. Br. in Supp. at ECF p. 8).

According to defendants, Spak’s alleged act of defending himself as a person in

recovery does not rise to the level of a protected activity under the ADA and

PHRA. (ld. at ECF pp. 8-9; see Doc. 1, Compl. Jf 43, 54, 59).

A protected activity includes bringing or participating in formal actions to

enforce ADA rights. Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 188

(3d Cir. 2003). Moreover, informal activity, such as requesting an

accommodation for a disability, constitutes a protected activity under the ADA. Id

14

These principles follow from the ADA retaliation provision which protects “any

individual” who has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by the ADA or

who has made a charge under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). “Thus, it is

unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee based upon the

employee’s opposition to anything that is unlawful under the ADA.”

Shellenberger, 318 F.3d at 188.

As alleged, Spak was fired because Defendant Muench harbored prejudice

against individuals who have a drug addiction history and relied upon stereotype:

of those in recovery. Such bias is unlawful under the ADA. Spak did not request

any accommodation from defendants, such as reduction in work hours, time off

to see a doctor, or assistance in completing his tasks. To the contrary, Spak

merely sought to assure Muench that he was sober and capable of performing

his job. (Doc. 1, Compl. fff 26, 35, 38). According to the plaintiff, defendants did

not even give Spak the opportunity to request an accommodation; they

terminated him within two days of learning about his past drug addiction, without

engaging in an interactive process.'"° Thus, by opposing Muench’s unlawful

retaliation under the ADA, Spak engaged in a protected activity.