Daily Papers

Large audio-language models (LALMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in understanding diverse audio inputs. This diversity includes low-frequency signals that are inaudible to humans but can still enter the model and influence its generation. However, the practical impact of such low-frequency inputs on LALMs remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose Intermittent Low-Frequency Lockout (ILL), an inaudible red teaming method that evaluates this risk using a universal waveform template in a black box setting. ILL uses Sentence Attention Scale Estimation to determine active intervals and Frequency Confusion Transfer to construct a low-frequency waveform with continuous phase from corpus spectral variation. To mitigate this risk, we propose Distributional Requery Guard (DRG) to detect low-frequency distribution shifts and conditionally request a second recording for semantic recovery. Across six LALMs and multiple audio understanding tasks, ILL reduces accuracy by up to 67 percentage points while receiving a mean human audibility rating of 1.33, close to 1.17 for clean audio; DRG raises mean attacked accuracy from 28.5\% to 46.1\% after clean reacquisition. These findings identify a previously overlooked safety risk for LALMs and provide a foundation for future research on robust audio understanding.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used across various applications, there is a growing need to control text generation to satisfy specific constraints or requirements. This raises a crucial question: Is it possible to guarantee strict constraint satisfaction in generated outputs while preserving the distribution of the original model as much as possible? We first define the ideal distribution - the one closest to the original model, which also always satisfies the expressed constraint - as the ultimate goal of guaranteed generation. We then state a fundamental limitation, namely that it is impossible to reach that goal through autoregressive training alone. This motivates the necessity of combining training-time and inference-time methods to enforce such guarantees. Based on this insight, we propose GUARD, a simple yet effective approach that combines an autoregressive proposal distribution with rejection sampling. Through GUARD's theoretical properties, we show how controlling the KL divergence between a specific proposal and the target ideal distribution simultaneously optimizes inference speed and distributional closeness. To validate these theoretical concepts, we conduct extensive experiments on two text generation settings with hard-to-satisfy constraints: a lexical constraint scenario and a sentiment reversal scenario. These experiments show that GUARD achieves perfect constraint satisfaction while almost preserving the ideal distribution with highly improved inference efficiency. GUARD provides a principled approach to enforcing strict guarantees for LLMs without compromising their generative capabilities.

Query routing, the task to route user queries to different large language model (LLM) endpoints, can be considered as a text classification problem. However, out-of-distribution queries must be handled properly, as those could be about unrelated domains, queries in other languages, or even contain unsafe text. Here, we thus study a guarded query routing problem, for which we first introduce the Guarded Query Routing Benchmark (GQR-Bench, released as Python package gqr), covers three exemplary target domains (law, finance, and healthcare), and seven datasets to test robustness against out-of-distribution queries. We then use GQR-Bench to contrast the effectiveness and efficiency of LLM-based routing mechanisms (GPT-4o-mini, Llama-3.2-3B, and Llama-3.1-8B), standard LLM-based guardrail approaches (LlamaGuard and NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails), continuous bag-of-words classifiers (WideMLP, fastText), and traditional machine learning models (SVM, XGBoost). Our results show that WideMLP, enhanced with out-of-domain detection capabilities, yields the best trade-off between accuracy (88%) and speed (<4ms). The embedding-based fastText excels at speed (<1ms) with acceptable accuracy (80%), whereas LLMs yield the highest accuracy (91%) but are comparatively slow (62ms for local Llama-3.1:8B and 669ms for remote GPT-4o-mini calls). Our findings challenge the automatic reliance on LLMs for (guarded) query routing and provide concrete recommendations for practical applications. Source code is available: https://github.com/williambrach/gqr.

Guard models are widely used to detect harmful content in user prompts and LLM responses. However, state-of-the-art guard models rely solely on terminal-layer representations and overlook the rich safety-relevant features distributed across internal layers. We present SIREN, a lightweight guard model that harnesses these internal features. By identifying safety neurons via linear probing and combining them through an adaptive layer-weighted strategy, SIREN builds a harmfulness detector from LLM internals without modifying the underlying model. Our comprehensive evaluation shows that SIREN substantially outperforms state-of-the-art open-source guard models across multiple benchmarks while using 250 times fewer trainable parameters. Moreover, SIREN exhibits superior generalization to unseen benchmarks, naturally enables real-time streaming detection, and significantly improves inference efficiency compared to generative guard models. Overall, our results highlight LLM internal states as a promising foundation for practical, high-performance harmfulness detection.

To enhance the safety of VLMs, this paper introduces a novel reasoning-based VLM guard model dubbed GuardReasoner-VL. The core idea is to incentivize the guard model to deliberatively reason before making moderation decisions via online RL. First, we construct GuardReasoner-VLTrain, a reasoning corpus with 123K samples and 631K reasoning steps, spanning text, image, and text-image inputs. Then, based on it, we cold-start our model's reasoning ability via SFT. In addition, we further enhance reasoning regarding moderation through online RL. Concretely, to enhance diversity and difficulty of samples, we conduct rejection sampling followed by data augmentation via the proposed safety-aware data concatenation. Besides, we use a dynamic clipping parameter to encourage exploration in early stages and exploitation in later stages. To balance performance and token efficiency, we design a length-aware safety reward that integrates accuracy, format, and token cost. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of our model. Remarkably, it surpasses the runner-up by 19.27% F1 score on average. We release data, code, and models (3B/7B) of GuardReasoner-VL at https://github.com/yueliu1999/GuardReasoner-VL/

Ensuring safe, policy-compliant outputs from large language models requires real-time content moderation that can scale across multiple safety dimensions. However, state-of-the-art guardrail models rely on autoregressive decoders with 7B--27B parameters, reformulating what is fundamentally a classification problem as sequential text generation, a design choice that incurs high latency and scales poorly to multi-aspect evaluation. In this work, we introduce GLiGuard, a 0.3B-parameter schema-conditioned bidirectional encoder adapted from GLiNER2 for LLM content moderation. The key idea is to encode task definitions and label semantics directly into the input sequence as structured token schemas, enabling simultaneous evaluation of prompt safety, response safety, refusal detection, 14 fine-grained harm categories, and 11 jailbreak strategies in a single non-autoregressive forward pass. This schema-conditioned design lets supported task and label blocks be composed directly in the input schema at inference time. Across nine established safety benchmarks, GLiGuard achieves F1 scores competitive with 7B--27B decoder-based guards despite being 23--90times smaller, while delivering up to 16times higher throughput and 17times lower latency. These results suggest that compact bidirectional encoders can approach the accuracy of much larger guard models while drastically reducing inference cost. Code and models are available at https://github.com/fastino-ai/GLiGuard.

Deploying language models (LMs) necessitates outputs to be both high-quality and compliant with safety guidelines. Although Inference-Time Guardrails (ITG) offer solutions that shift model output distributions towards compliance, we find that current methods struggle in balancing safety with helpfulness. ITG Methods that safely address non-compliant queries exhibit lower helpfulness while those that prioritize helpfulness compromise on safety. We refer to this trade-off as the guardrail tax, analogous to the alignment tax. To address this, we propose PrimeGuard, a novel ITG method that utilizes structured control flow. PrimeGuard routes requests to different self-instantiations of the LM with varying instructions, leveraging its inherent instruction-following capabilities and in-context learning. Our tuning-free approach dynamically compiles system-designer guidelines for each query. We construct and release safe-eval, a diverse red-team safety benchmark. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that PrimeGuard, without fine-tuning, overcomes the guardrail tax by (1) significantly increasing resistance to iterative jailbreak attacks and (2) achieving state-of-the-art results in safety guardrailing while (3) matching helpfulness scores of alignment-tuned models. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that PrimeGuard, without fine-tuning, outperforms all competing baselines and overcomes the guardrail tax by improving the fraction of safe responses from 61% to 97% and increasing average helpfulness scores from 4.17 to 4.29 on the largest models, while reducing attack success rate from 100% to 8%. PrimeGuard implementation is available at https://github.com/dynamofl/PrimeGuard and safe-eval dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/dynamoai/safe_eval.

Safety guard models that detect malicious queries aimed at large language models (LLMs) are essential for ensuring the secure and responsible deployment of LLMs in real-world applications. However, deploying existing safety guard models with billions of parameters alongside LLMs on mobile devices is impractical due to substantial memory requirements and latency. To reduce this cost, we distill a large teacher safety guard model into a smaller one using a labeled dataset of instruction-response pairs with binary harmfulness labels. Due to the limited diversity of harmful instructions in the existing labeled dataset, naively distilled models tend to underperform compared to larger models. To bridge the gap between small and large models, we propose HarmAug, a simple yet effective data augmentation method that involves jailbreaking an LLM and prompting it to generate harmful instructions. Given a prompt such as, "Make a single harmful instruction prompt that would elicit offensive content", we add an affirmative prefix (e.g., "I have an idea for a prompt:") to the LLM's response. This encourages the LLM to continue generating the rest of the response, leading to sampling harmful instructions. Another LLM generates a response to the harmful instruction, and the teacher model labels the instruction-response pair. We empirically show that our HarmAug outperforms other relevant baselines. Moreover, a 435-million-parameter safety guard model trained with HarmAug achieves an F1 score comparable to larger models with over 7 billion parameters, and even outperforms them in AUPRC, while operating at less than 25% of their computational cost.

We introduce Guard Vector, a safety task vector computed as the parameter difference between a guardrail model (Guard Model) and a same-architecture pretrained language model. Composing this vector with a target language model yields a Target Guard Model (TGM). We then adapt TGM with a streaming-aware approach that combines prefix-based training and evaluation with a classifier that produces a single-token output. With this composition alone, TGM improves classification quality over established Guard Models across standard safety suites and enables language extensibility to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, requiring neither additional training nor target language labels. It also demonstrates model portability across two widely used public guardrail backbones, Llama and Gemma. With prefix SFT (supervised fine-tuning), TGM preserves classification quality under streaming by aligning the behavior between prefix inputs and full-text inputs. The single-token output design increases throughput and reduces latency. Together, these components reduce data and compute requirements while promoting streaming-aware evaluation practices, thereby contributing to a more responsible AI ecosystem.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) improves Large Language Model (LLM) performance on knowledge-intensive tasks but depends heavily on initial search query quality. Current methods, often using Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically focus on query formulation or reasoning over results, without explicitly encouraging persistence after a failed search. We introduce ReZero (Retry-Zero), a novel RL framework that directly rewards the act of retrying a search query following an initial unsuccessful attempt. This incentivizes the LLM to explore alternative queries rather than prematurely halting. ReZero demonstrates significant improvement, achieving 46.88% accuracy compared to a 25% baseline. By rewarding persistence, ReZero enhances LLM robustness in complex information-seeking scenarios where initial queries may prove insufficient.

Maintaining the safety of large language models (LLMs) is crucial as they are increasingly deployed in real-world applications. Existing safety guardrails typically rely on single-pass classification or, more recently, distilled reasoning. Reasoning-based guardrails significantly outperform classification-only baselines, but they incur substantial query latency and token overhead that make them impractical for highthroughput deployment. To address this challenge, we propose COLAGUARD, a guardrail model that transfers multi-step safety reasoning into a continuous latent space through a stage-wise training curriculum, enabling direct hidden-state propagation at inference. Evaluated on ten prompt- and response-moderation settings spanning eight safety benchmarks, COLAGUARD improves macro-F1 by 8.24 points over Llama Guard 3 and matches our explicit reasoning baseline, GuardReasoner, in macroF1 while delivering a 12.9X speedup and 22.4X reduction in token usage. Our results suggest that latent reasoning offers a practical alternative to explicit rationale generation for deployable guardrails, jointly improving safety robustness and inference efficiency rather than treating them as competing objectives.

Deploying large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications requires robust safety guard models to detect and block harmful user prompts. While large safety guard models achieve strong performance, their computational cost is substantial. To mitigate this, smaller distilled models are used, but they often underperform on "hard" examples where the larger model provides accurate predictions. We observe that many inputs can be reliably handled by the smaller model, while only a small fraction require the larger model's capacity. Motivated by this, we propose SafeRoute, a binary router that distinguishes hard examples from easy ones. Our method selectively applies the larger safety guard model to the data that the router considers hard, improving efficiency while maintaining accuracy compared to solely using the larger safety guard model. Experimental results on multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that our adaptive model selection significantly enhances the trade-off between computational cost and safety performance, outperforming relevant baselines.

Deploying large language models in user-facing systems requires efficient output safety filtering. Existing approaches typically rely on a separate moderation model applied after generation, which doubles inference cost and only detects violations after generation completes. We observe that the signal needed for moderation is already present in the model hidden states. Based on this, we train lightweight token-level probes that operate directly on internal activations, producing per-token safety scores that can be aggregated for both offline evaluation and online intervention. The probe reuses activations from the generator and requires no additional forward pass, enabling sub millisecond per-token safety checks inside the decoding loop. A probe applied to a single mid layer recovers most decisions of a strong guard model, acting as a low cost surrogate optimized for latency rather than accuracy. In streaming settings, it can halt or modify unsafe outputs before they are fully generated, replacing end of sequence moderation with continuous token level monitoring. Compared to post hoc and streaming guard models, our method achieves orders of magnitude lower compute overhead with minimal latency cost. We also provide a practical deployment recipe, including layer selection, aggregation strategy, probing frequency, and triggering thresholds. Finally, we show that the probe linear component corresponds to a direction in residual space, enabling both detection and activation steering at negligible cost.

Even highly capable large language models (LLMs) can produce biased or unsafe responses, and alignment techniques, such as RLHF, aimed at mitigating this issue, are expensive and prone to overfitting as they retrain the LLM. This paper introduces a novel inference-time alignment approach that ensures LLMs generate safe responses almost surely, i.e., with a probability approaching one. We achieve this by framing the safe generation of inference-time responses as a constrained Markov decision process within the LLM's latent space. Crucially, we augment a safety state that tracks the evolution of safety constraints and enables us to demonstrate formal safety guarantees upon solving the MDP in the latent space. Building on this foundation, we propose InferenceGuard, a practical implementation that safely aligns LLMs without modifying the model weights. Empirically, we demonstrate InferenceGuard effectively balances safety and task performance, outperforming existing inference-time alignment methods in generating safe and aligned responses.

Existing guardrail systems for large language model agents operate as binary classifiers that block unsafe content, leaving organizations to discard failing outputs and retry from scratch. We introduce RAIL Guard, a closed-loop responsible AI pipeline that evaluates LLM outputs across eight measurable dimensions and iteratively remediates failing outputs through an evaluate-rewrite-reevaluate loop. We evaluate the pipeline across three experiments on four frontier LLMs and 4,276 content outputs plus 6,400 agent tool-call scenarios. Closed-loop remediation achieves 96.9% convergence versus 49.1% for block-and-retry, though the highest-convergence method reduces utility by 22.3%; feedback-driven self-repair achieves 86.6% convergence on fixable dimensions with no significant utility loss (p = 0.177). Pre-tool-call evaluation reduces unsafe agent executions by 33% (p = 0.007) with zero impact on task completion. We identify a key distinction between fixable dimensions that respond to remediation and structural dimensions (Transparency at 93.0%, Accountability at 92.8%, and Inclusivity at 82.5% failure) that require architectural rather than algorithmic solutions. The system is available as open-source SDKs.

Information retrieval systems are crucial for enabling effective access to large document collections. Recent approaches have leveraged Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance retrieval performance through query augmentation, but often rely on expensive supervised learning or distillation techniques that require significant computational resources and hand-labeled data. We introduce DeepRetrieval, a reinforcement learning (RL) approach that trains LLMs for query generation through trial and error without supervised data (reference query). Using retrieval metrics as rewards, our system generates queries that maximize retrieval performance. DeepRetrieval outperforms leading methods on literature search with 65.07% (vs. previous SOTA 24.68%) recall for publication search and 63.18% (vs. previous SOTA 32.11%) recall for trial search using real-world search engines. DeepRetrieval also dominates in evidence-seeking retrieval, classic information retrieval and SQL database search. With only 3B parameters, it outperforms industry-leading models like GPT-4o and Claude-3.5-Sonnet on 11/13 datasets. These results demonstrate that our RL approach offers a more efficient and effective paradigm for information retrieval. Our data and code are available at: https://github.com/pat-jj/DeepRetrieval.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) lets a large language model answer questions using documents retrieved from an external knowledge base at query time. This makes RAG useful for private data, fast-changing information, and reducing hallucination, but it also means the model's answer is only as trustworthy as whatever the retriever hands it. If the knowledge base accepts writes from more than one party, an attacker needs only a handful of adversarial documents to steer the model toward a chosen wrong answer. PoisonedRAG demonstrated this: as few as five crafted documents flip an undefended system's answer roughly 90% of the time, and three natural single-stage defenses (perplexity filtering, query paraphrasing, knowledge-base expansion) leave attack success at 30% or higher. We built TriShieldRAG to close that gap. Rather than relying on one checkpoint, we place three independent, formally specified rings across the pipeline: an Ingest Guard that screens documents for lexical and statistical poisoning signatures; a Retrieval Scorer that re-ranks the retrieved set by a provenance and consistency-weighted trust score; and a Cross-LLM Consensus stage that polls three architecturally diverse language models (Claude, Mistral Small, Llama 3.2) and allows one bounded re-retrieval on disagreement. We derive the conditions under which Rings 2 and 3 are expected to work: a minority-poison assumption and an explicit provenance-tag assumption. Our reported configuration is consistent with this analysis, though we have not yet run the controlled poison-fraction sweep needed to confirm it independently. Evaluated against the non-adaptive attacker from the original PoisonedRAG, over a 5,000-document Wikipedia knowledge base with 10 target questions, the full pipeline reduces attack success rate from roughly 91% to roughly 13% while preserving accuracy on benign queries.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the development of powerful agentic systems capable of automating complex workflows across various fields. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in external data can hijack agent behavior. In this work, we present ReasAlign, a model-level solution to improve safety alignment against indirect prompt injection attacks. The core idea of ReasAlign is to incorporate structured reasoning steps to analyze user queries, detect conflicting instructions, and preserve the continuity of the user's intended tasks to defend against indirect injection attacks. To further ensure reasoning logic and accuracy, we introduce a test-time scaling mechanism with a preference-optimized judge model that scores reasoning steps and selects the best trajectory. Comprehensive evaluations across various benchmarks show that ReasAlign maintains utility comparable to an undefended model while consistently outperforming Meta SecAlign, the strongest prior guardrail. On the representative open-ended CyberSecEval2 benchmark, which includes multiple prompt-injected tasks, ReasAlign achieves 94.6% utility and only 3.6% ASR, far surpassing the state-of-the-art defensive model of Meta SecAlign (56.4% utility and 74.4% ASR). These results demonstrate that ReasAlign achieves the best trade-off between security and utility, establishing a robust and practical defense against prompt injection attacks in real-world agentic systems. Our code and experimental results could be found at https://github.com/leolee99/ReasAlign.

Query rewriting (QR) is a critical technique in e-commerce search, addressing the lexical gap between user queries and product descriptions to enhance search performance. Existing QR approaches typically fall into two categories: discriminative models and generative methods leveraging large language models (LLMs). Discriminative models often struggle with natural language understanding and offer limited flexibility in rewriting, while generative LLMs, despite producing high-quality rewrites, face high inference latency and cost in online settings. These limitations force offline deployment, making them vulnerable to issues like information staleness and semantic drift. To overcome these challenges, we propose a novel hybrid pipeline for QR that balances efficiency and effectiveness. Our approach combines offline knowledge distillation to create a lightweight but efficient student model with online reinforcement learning (RL) to refine query rewriting dynamically using real-time feedback. A key innovation is the use of LLMs as simulated human feedback, enabling scalable reward signals and cost-effective evaluation without manual annotations. Experimental results on Amazon ESCI dataset demonstrate significant improvements in query relevance, diversity, and adaptability, as well as positive feedback from the LLM simulation. This work contributes to advancing LLM capabilities for domain-specific applications, offering a robust solution for dynamic and complex e-commerce search environments.

Safeguarding large language models (LLMs) against unsafe or adversarial behavior is critical as they are increasingly deployed in conversational and agentic settings. Existing moderation tools often treat safety risks (e.g. toxicity, bias) and adversarial threats (e.g. prompt injections, jailbreaks) as separate problems, limiting their robustness and generalizability. We introduce AprielGuard, an 8B parameter safeguard model that unify these dimensions within a single taxonomy and learning framework. AprielGuard is trained on a diverse mix of open and synthetic data covering standalone prompts, multi-turn conversations, and agentic workflows, augmented with structured reasoning traces to improve interpretability. Across multiple public and proprietary benchmarks, AprielGuard achieves strong performance in detecting harmful content and adversarial manipulations, outperforming existing opensource guardrails such as Llama-Guard and Granite Guardian, particularly in multi-step and reasoning intensive scenarios. By releasing the model, we aim to advance transparent and reproducible research on reliable safeguards for LLMs.

Autonomous web agents need to operate under externally imposed or human-specified policies while generating long-horizon trajectories. However, little work has examined whether these trajectories comply with such policies, or whether policy violations persist across different contexts such as domains (e.g., shopping or coding websites) and subdomains (e.g., product search and order management in shopping). To address this gap, we introduce PolicyGuardBench, a benchmark of about 60k examples for detecting policy violations in agent trajectories. From diverse agent runs, we generate a broad set of policies and create both within subdomain and cross subdomain pairings with violation labels. In addition to full-trajectory evaluation, PolicyGuardBench also includes a prefix-based violation detection task where models must anticipate policy violations from truncated trajectory prefixes rather than complete sequences. Using this dataset, we train PolicyGuard-4B, a lightweight guardrail model that delivers strong detection accuracy across all tasks while keeping inference efficient. Notably, PolicyGuard-4B generalizes across domains and preserves high accuracy on unseen settings. Together, PolicyGuardBench and PolicyGuard-4B provide the first comprehensive framework for studying policy compliance in web agent trajectories, and show that accurate and generalizable guardrails are feasible at small scales.

Advanced reasoning capabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to more frequent hallucinations; yet most mitigation work focuses on open-source models for post-hoc detection and parameter editing. The dearth of studies focusing on hallucinations in closed-source models is especially concerning, as they constitute the vast majority of models in institutional deployments. We introduce QueryBandits, a model-agnostic contextual bandit framework that adaptively learns online to select the optimal query-rewrite strategy by leveraging an empirically validated and calibrated reward function. Across 16 QA scenarios, our top QueryBandit (Thompson Sampling) achieves an 87.5% win rate over a No-Rewrite baseline and outperforms zero-shot static policies (e.g., Paraphrase or Expand) by 42.6% and 60.3%, respectively. Moreover, all contextual bandits outperform vanilla bandits across all datasets, with higher feature variance coinciding with greater variance in arm selection. This substantiates our finding that there is no single rewrite policy optimal for all queries. We also discover that certain static policies incur higher cumulative regret than No-Rewrite, indicating that an inflexible query-rewriting policy can worsen hallucinations. Thus, learning an online policy over semantic features with QueryBandits can shift model behavior purely through forward-pass mechanisms, enabling its use with closed-source models and bypassing the need for retraining or gradient-based adaptation.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

LLM agents act on real-world environments through tool calls, and a single misjudged action can cause irreversible harm. The standard safeguard is a guard model that labels each proposed action as safe or unsafe, but this binary view conflates two distinct decisions: whether the action is harmful in itself, and whether it is appropriate given the user's context. It also operates at the granularity of action categories rather than individual instances, producing routine interruptions that erode autonomy and train users to wave through the most consequential alerts. We reframe the problem as a per-instance three-way routing decision over {EXECUTE, ASK, REFUSE} and instantiate it with Safety Sentry, a lightweight guard model whose inference reduces to a single decoding call. A single decoding-time threshold lets one fixed checkpoint be re-positioned across deployments of differing risk tolerance without retraining. Safety Sentry outperforms a broad set of open-weight and frontier closed-source baselines on overall accuracy and safety-related recall, while controlling both directional error rates simultaneously.

The recent advancements in Large Language Models(LLMs) have had a significant impact on a wide range of fields, from general domains to specialized areas. However, these advancements have also significantly increased the potential for malicious users to exploit harmful and jailbreak prompts for malicious attacks. Although there have been many efforts to prevent harmful prompts and jailbreak prompts, protecting LLMs from such malicious attacks remains an important and challenging task. In this paper, we propose QGuard, a simple yet effective safety guard method, that utilizes question prompting to block harmful prompts in a zero-shot manner. Our method can defend LLMs not only from text-based harmful prompts but also from multi-modal harmful prompt attacks. Moreover, by diversifying and modifying guard questions, our approach remains robust against the latest harmful prompts without fine-tuning. Experimental results show that our model performs competitively on both text-only and multi-modal harmful datasets. Additionally, by providing an analysis of question prompting, we enable a white-box analysis of user inputs. We believe our method provides valuable insights for real-world LLM services in mitigating security risks associated with harmful prompts.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as purpose-specific agents to handle domain-specific tasks such as customer service and code generation. These agents are expected to comply with not only generic safety guardrails but also purpose-specific restrictions tailored to their designated roles. Such additional restrictions enlarge the attack surface, particularly to prompt injection (PI) attacks. To defend against such attacks, existing detection methods primarily rely on analyzing input-output patterns, yet yield limited effectiveness. To address this limitation, we turn to analyzing the hidden activation space and discover that LLMs inherently retain latent policy-violation (PV) concepts when prompted with requests beyond their designated purpose. Particularly, PV concepts capture the semantics of conflicts between user queries and predefined restrictions, implicitly reflecting LLMs' intrinsic awareness of recognizing policy violations. Building on this insight, we propose PVDetector, a training-free framework that detects PI attacks during LLM inference by measuring hidden-state alignment with PV concepts, which are derived offline from the contrastive pairs of policy-violating and policy-compliant prompts. Experiments across multiple LLMs and datasets show that PVDetector achieves <1\% false negative rate with minimal auxiliary overhead, consistently outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/Claresigle/PVDetector .

Exploration remains a critical issue in deep reinforcement learning for an agent to attain high returns in unknown environments. Although the prevailing exploration Random Network Distillation (RND) algorithm has been demonstrated to be effective in numerous environments, it often needs more discriminative power in bonus allocation. This paper highlights the "bonus inconsistency" issue within RND, pinpointing its primary limitation. To address this issue, we introduce the Distributional RND (DRND), a derivative of the RND. DRND enhances the exploration process by distilling a distribution of random networks and implicitly incorporating pseudo counts to improve the precision of bonus allocation. This refinement encourages agents to engage in more extensive exploration. Our method effectively mitigates the inconsistency issue without introducing significant computational overhead. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate the superiority of our approach over the original RND algorithm. Our method excels in challenging online exploration scenarios and effectively serves as an anti-exploration mechanism in D4RL offline tasks. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/yk7333/DRND.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has propelled Large Language Models in complex reasoning, yet its scalability is often hindered by a training bottleneck where performance plateaus as policy entropy collapses, signaling a loss of exploration. Previous methods typically address this by maintaining high policy entropy, yet the precise mechanisms that govern meaningful exploration have remained underexplored. Our analysis suggests that an unselective focus on entropy risks amplifying irrelevant tokens and destabilizing training. This paper investigates the exploration dynamics within RLVR and identifies a key issue: the gradual elimination of valuable low-probability exploratory tokens, which we term \textit{reasoning sparks}. We find that while abundant in pre-trained models, these sparks are systematically extinguished during RLVR due to over-penalization, leading to a degeneracy in exploration. To address this, we introduce Low-probability Regularization (Lp-Reg). Its core mechanism regularizes the policy towards a heuristic proxy distribution. This proxy is constructed by filtering out presumed noise tokens and re-normalizing the distribution over the remaining candidates. The result is a less-noisy proxy where the probability of reasoning sparks is amplified, which then serves as a soft regularization target to shield these valuable tokens from elimination via KL divergence. Experiments show that Lp-Reg enables stable on-policy training for around 1,000 steps, a regime where baseline entropy-control methods collapse. This sustained exploration leads to state-of-the-art performance, achieving a 60.17% average accuracy on five math benchmarks, an improvement of 2.66% over prior methods. Code is available at https://github.com/CarlanLark/Lp-Reg.

Guardrail Classifiers defend production language models against harmful behavior, but although results seem promising in testing, they provide no formal guarantees. Providing formal guarantees for such models is hard because "harmful behavior" has no natural specification in a discrete input space: and the standard epsilon-ball properties used in other domains do not carry semantic meaning. We close this gap by shifting verification from the discrete input space to the classifier's pre-activation space, where we define a harmful region as a convex shape enclosing the representations of known harmful prompts. Because the sigmoid classification head is monotonic, certifying the worst-case point is sufficient to certify the entire region, yielding a closed-form soundness proof without approximation in O(d) time. To formally evaluate these classifiers, we propose two constructions of such regions: SVD-aligned hyper-rectangles, which yield exact SAT/UNSAT certificates, and Gaussian Mixture Models, which yield probabilistic certificates over semantically coherent clusters. Applying this framework to three author-trained Guardrail Classifiers on the toxicity domain, every hyper-rectangle configuration returns SAT, exposing verifiable safety holes across all classifiers, despite seemingly high empirical metrics. Probabilistic GMM certificates also expose a divergent structural stability in how these models represent harm. While GPT-2 and Llama-3.1-8B maintain robust coverage of 90% and 80% across varying boundaries, BERT's safety guarantees prove uniquely volatile. This 'coverage collapse' to 55% at the optimal threshold reveals a sparsely populated safety margin in BERT, which only achieves full coverage by adopting an extremely conservative pessimistic threshold. These approaches combined, provide new insights on how effective Guardrail Classifiers really are, beyond traditional red-teaming.

In Text-to-SQL, execution feedback is essential for guiding large language models (LLMs) to reason accurately and generate reliable SQL queries. However, existing methods treat execution feedback solely as a post-hoc signal for correction or selection, failing to integrate it into the generation process. This limitation hinders their ability to address reasoning errors as they occur, ultimately reducing query accuracy and robustness. To address this issue, we propose ReEx-SQL (Reasoning with Execution-Aware Reinforcement Learning), a framework for Text-to-SQL that enables models to interact with the database during decoding and dynamically adjust their reasoning based on execution feedback. ReEx-SQL introduces an execution-aware reasoning paradigm that interleaves intermediate SQL execution into reasoning paths, facilitating context-sensitive revisions. It achieves this through structured prompts with markup tags and a stepwise rollout strategy that integrates execution feedback into each stage of generation. To supervise policy learning, we develop a composite reward function that includes an exploration reward, explicitly encouraging effective database interaction. Additionally, ReEx-SQL adopts a tree-based decoding strategy to support exploratory reasoning, enabling dynamic expansion of alternative reasoning paths. Notably, ReEx-SQL achieves 88.8% on Spider and 64.9% on BIRD at the 7B scale, surpassing the standard reasoning baseline by 2.7% and 2.6%, respectively. It also shows robustness, achieving 85.2% on Spider-Realistic with leading performance. In addition, its tree-structured decoding improves efficiency and performance over linear decoding, reducing inference time by 51.9% on the BIRD development set.

Conflicting objectives are general in RL alignment, and training on them data-efficiently is hard. Training a safety guard with RL means optimizing two objectives that conflict: catch real harm, and do not refuse benign prompts. Our finding is that over-refusal improves 22.4% to 12.8%, while under-refusal on adversarial attacks silently worsens 0.27 to 0.33. We present C-Guard, a constitution-grid instrument that generates the RL training data, and C-LIM, a per-cell learnability score that decides each cell's move: prune, densify, amend, expand. C-LIM flags the dead-weight data region before any training budget is spent: 187 untargeted rows had bought zero gain, and our method lifts the same region's learning impact 0.733 to 0.80. Code and the constitution are open-sourced.

Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to exhibit vulnerabilities despite deliberate safety alignment efforts, posing significant risks to users and society. To safeguard against the risk of policy-violating content, system-level moderation via external guard models-designed to monitor LLM inputs and outputs and block potentially harmful content-has emerged as a prevalent mitigation strategy. Existing approaches of training guard models rely heavily on extensive human curated datasets and struggle with out-of-distribution threats, such as emerging harmful categories or jailbreak attacks. To address these limitations, we propose RSafe, an adaptive reasoning-based safeguard that conducts guided safety reasoning to provide robust protection within the scope of specified safety policies. RSafe operates in two stages: 1) guided reasoning, where it analyzes safety risks of input content through policy-guided step-by-step reasoning, and 2) reinforced alignment, where rule-based RL optimizes its reasoning paths to align with accurate safety prediction. This two-stage training paradigm enables RSafe to internalize safety principles to generalize safety protection capability over unseen or adversarial safety violation scenarios. During inference, RSafe accepts user-specified safety policies to provide enhanced safeguards tailored to specific safety requirements.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in consumer, medical, financial, and enterprise applications. This broad deployment expands the safety surface: risks can arise from multimodal question answering, assistant responses, and cross-modal composition, while moderation policies may vary across products, regions, and deployment stages. Most existing guardrails either rely on fixed taxonomies or target only a narrow set of interaction settings, which limits their adaptability when safety rules change at deployment time. We present SingGuard, a policy-adaptive multimodal guardrail model family for safety assessment in multimodal conversations. SingGuard treats the active policy as a runtime input: given natural-language rules, it checks the target content against the active policy rule by rule and predicts both the safety label and the triggered rule. To balance efficiency and interpretability, SingGuard supports fast, hybrid, and slow inference regimes along a fast-to-slow reasoning spectrum, ranging from direct safety judgments to policy-grounded deliberation. We further optimize this behavior with fast--slow decoupled reinforcement learning. We also introduce SingGuard-Bench, a multimodal guardrail benchmark with 56{,}340 examples spanning 80+ fine-grained risk types across multimodal QA, adversarial attack, and dynamic-rule evaluation settings, including cross-modal joint-risk cases where each modality is harmless in isolation but their composition implies unsafe intent. Across six benchmark families (35 datasets), SingGuard achieves state-of-the-art average F1 in every family. Dynamic-rule evaluation further shows improved policy-following accuracy from 0.6465 to 0.7415 under runtime policy shifts. Our code is available at https://github.com/inclusionAI/Sing-Guard.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, safety guardrails are required to go beyond coarse-grained filtering and support fine-grained, interpretable, and adaptable risk assessment. However, existing solutions often rely on rapid classification schemes or post-hoc rules, resulting in limited transparency, inflexible policies, or prohibitive inference costs. To this end, we present YuFeng-XGuard, a reasoning-centric guardrail model family designed to perform multi-dimensional risk perception for LLM interactions. Instead of producing opaque binary judgments, YuFeng-XGuard generates structured risk predictions, including explicit risk categories and configurable confidence scores, accompanied by natural language explanations that expose the underlying reasoning process. This formulation enables safety decisions that are both actionable and interpretable. To balance decision latency and explanatory depth, we adopt a tiered inference paradigm that performs an initial risk decision based on the first decoded token, while preserving ondemand explanatory reasoning when required. In addition, we introduce a dynamic policy mechanism that decouples risk perception from policy enforcement, allowing safety policies to be adjusted without model retraining. Extensive experiments on a diverse set of public safety benchmarks demonstrate that YuFeng-XGuard achieves stateof-the-art performance while maintaining strong efficiency-efficacy trade-offs. We release YuFeng-XGuard as an open model family, including both a full-capacity variant and a lightweight version, to support a wide range of deployment scenarios.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance on tasks such as mathematics and code generation. Motivated by these strengths, recent work has empirically demonstrated the effectiveness of LRMs as guard models in improving harmful query detection. However, LRMs typically generate long reasoning traces during inference, causing substantial computational overhead. In this paper, we introduce PSRT, a method that replaces the model's reasoning process with a Prefilled Safe Reasoning Trace, thereby significantly reducing the inference cost of LRMs. Concretely, PSRT prefills "safe reasoning virtual tokens" from a constructed dataset and learns over their continuous embeddings. With the aid of indicator tokens, PSRT enables harmful-query detection in a single forward pass while preserving the classification effectiveness of LRMs. We evaluate PSRT on 7 models, 13 datasets, and 8 jailbreak methods. In terms of efficiency, PSRT completely removes the overhead of generating reasoning tokens during inference. In terms of classification performance, PSRT achieves nearly identical accuracy, with only a minor average F1 drop of 0.015 across 7 models and 5 datasets.

Large Language Models memorize vast amounts of training data, raising concerns regarding privacy, copyright infringement, and safety. Machine unlearning seeks to remove the influence of a targeted forget set while preserving model performance, ideally approximating a model retrained from scratch without the forget set. Existing approaches aim to achieve this by updating model parameters via gradient-based methods. However, these updates are computationally expensive, lead to irreversible weight changes, and degrade when the model is quantized for deployment. A recent alternative to changing model weights is activation engineering, where activations are changed during inference to steer model behavior. Despite circumventing weight editing, naive activation steering introduces its own failure modes, as a single global steering vector applies the same intervention to every input, leading to unintended changes in model behavior. We introduce Inference-Time Unlearning via Gated Activation Redirection (GUARD-IT), a training- and gradient-free method that unlearns via input-dependent activation steering at inference time. The resulting intervention is applied as a norm-preserving rotation in the residual stream, leaving model weights untouched. Experiments on TOFU and MUSE show that GUARD-IT matches or exceeds 12 gradient-based baselines across three model scales, while being the only method to simultaneously preserve utility, suppress memorization, and avoid catastrophic collapse across all settings. GUARD-IT further supports continual unlearning without retraining, and remains effective under quantization, a scenario in which parameter-editing methods degrade.

We study on-policy distillation (OPD) for agentic tasks, where an LLM agent interacts with an environment over multiple turns and a student imitates a teacher over these multi-turn interaction histories. Fully online OPD is costly because each update requires fresh student rollouts through the environment and teacher queries at visited histories. We propose Replayed-Prefix On-Policy Distillation (ReOPD), an off-environment alternative that reuses pre-collected teacher trajectories as replayed prefixes: the student acts at selected steps, while the teacher provides dense per-step supervision without executing new environment interactions. We show that multi-turn OPD introduces a prefix trap: making histories more student-on-policy improves relevance to the student, but can query the teacher on histories where its target is unreliable. This creates a two-sided distribution shift between student occupancy and teacher reliability. ReOPD addresses this by treating multi-turn OPD as a reliability-aware prefix distribution design and implements it with a simple step-decaying sampling schedule that emphasizes early, lower-shift prefixes. Across mathematical reasoning with Python and search environments over multiple teacher and student model scales, ReOPD preserves or improves OPD-level accuracy, uses zero tool calls during student training, and is at least 4times faster per rollout than OPD. ReOPD therefore turns expensive agent-environment interaction into a reusable offline resource, enabling scalable distillation across tools, tasks, and environments.

LLM agents handle user requests on behalf of organizations through tool calls and must follow the company policies stated in their system prompts. Prior work approaches this as a safeguarding problem -- external checks that block non-compliant agent actions. We argue that policy adherence is a broader problem: real workflows unfold across many turns, require explicit user confirmation and prerequisite reads, and hinge on the content of the dialogue rather than on any single argument value. Meeting this bar requires (i) full conversation context, (ii) self-reasoning over the policy and the current dialogue, and (iii) conversation-specific remediation that guides the agent's next turn -- three capabilities that prior safeguard work has often underestimated. We introduce POLICYGUARD, a sub-agent verifier that shares the agent's view of the dialogue, reasons over the policy in context, and provides actionable feedback for the agent's next turn. On tau^2-BENCH airline across three vendors (GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Pro) with four trials per setting, POLICYGUARD improves PASS4 by +12.0 / +6.0 / +12.0 pp. Per-call analyses show POLICYGUARD achieves higher policy-violation recall while blocking roughly half as often as argument-level guards.

Existing LLM routing methods typically treat a model's single response to a query as its capability label for training routers. However, because LLM generation is inherently stochastic, such single-shot supervision provides only a noisy observation of a query-model pair's behavior rather than a reliable capability estimate. We show that this assumption introduces systematic noise into routing supervision, making learned routing policies less reliable. To address this issue, we propose DARS (Distribution-Aware Routing Supervision), a framework that constructs routing supervision from a distributional view of model behavior. Instead of relying on a single generated response, DARS considers uncertainty from both the input side and the output side, capturing how semantically equivalent query formulations and stochastic generations affect model performance. Based on these distribution-aware observations, DARS builds more reliable supervision signals for routing. Experiments across diverse tasks show that single-shot labels can be misleading for model selection, while distribution-aware supervision provides more stable labels and improves learned routing behavior. Our results suggest that reliable LLM routing should move beyond single-response observations and be grounded in query-level model capability distributions.

With the rise of LLMs, there is an increasing need for intelligent recommendation assistants that can handle complex queries and provide personalized, reasoning-driven recommendations. LLM-based recommenders show potential but face challenges in multi-step reasoning, underscoring the need for reasoning-augmented systems. To address this gap, we propose ReRec, a novel reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT) framework designed to improve LLM reasoning in complex recommendation tasks. Our framework introduces three key components: (1) Dual-Graph Enhanced Reward Shaping, integrating recommendation metrics like NDCG@K with Query Alignment and Preference Alignment Scores to provide fine-grained reward signals for LLM optimization; (2) Reasoning-aware Advantage Estimation, which decomposes LLM outputs into reasoning segments and penalizes incorrect steps to enhance reasoning of recommendation; and (3) Online Curriculum Scheduler, dynamically assess query difficulty and organize training curriculum to ensure stable learning during RFT. Experiments demonstrate that ReRec outperforms state-of-the-art baselines and preserves core abilities like instruction-following and general knowledge. Our codes are available at https://github.com/jiani-huang/ReRec.

Production LLM systems require both safety moderation and PII detection under strict latency and cost constraints. This creates a trade-off: autoregressive moderators are accurate but expensive, while lightweight encoders are faster but less capable. We present GLiNER Guard (GLiGuard), a unified encoder that performs safety classification and PII detection in a single forward pass, simplifying safety pipelines. We introduce three variants: compact uni- and bi-encoders (145-147M) for high-throughput serving, and GLiGuard Omni (209M) for stronger moderation quality. Under dynamic batching on a single A100, the compact model reaches 193 requests/sec with P99 latency below 1s, achieving 1.6x higher throughput than GLiNER2. Omni remains competitive with much larger moderators on public safety benchmarks. We also release PII-Bench, a span-level benchmark for evaluating PII detection in end-to-end pipelines. Overall, encoder-based guardrails offer a practical low-cost alternative for always-on moderation. Models and benchmarks are released on HuggingFace.

We introduce WildGuard -- an open, light-weight moderation tool for LLM safety that achieves three goals: (1) identifying malicious intent in user prompts, (2) detecting safety risks of model responses, and (3) determining model refusal rate. Together, WildGuard serves the increasing needs for automatic safety moderation and evaluation of LLM interactions, providing a one-stop tool with enhanced accuracy and broad coverage across 13 risk categories. While existing open moderation tools such as Llama-Guard2 score reasonably well in classifying straightforward model interactions, they lag far behind a prompted GPT-4, especially in identifying adversarial jailbreaks and in evaluating models' refusals, a key measure for evaluating safety behaviors in model responses. To address these challenges, we construct WildGuardMix, a large-scale and carefully balanced multi-task safety moderation dataset with 92K labeled examples that cover vanilla (direct) prompts and adversarial jailbreaks, paired with various refusal and compliance responses. WildGuardMix is a combination of WildGuardTrain, the training data of WildGuard, and WildGuardTest, a high-quality human-annotated moderation test set with 5K labeled items covering broad risk scenarios. Through extensive evaluations on WildGuardTest and ten existing public benchmarks, we show that WildGuard establishes state-of-the-art performance in open-source safety moderation across all the three tasks compared to ten strong existing open-source moderation models (e.g., up to 26.4% improvement on refusal detection). Importantly, WildGuard matches and sometimes exceeds GPT-4 performance (e.g., up to 3.9% improvement on prompt harmfulness identification). WildGuard serves as a highly effective safety moderator in an LLM interface, reducing the success rate of jailbreak attacks from 79.8% to 2.4%.

Large language model (LLM) alignment algorithms typically consist of post-training over preference pairs. While such algorithms are widely used to enable safety guardrails and align LLMs with general human preferences, we show that state-of-the-art alignment algorithms require significant computational resources while being far less capable of enabling refusal guardrails for recent agentic attacks. Thus, to improve refusal guardrails against such attacks without drastically increasing computational overhead, we introduce Retrieval Augmented Generation for Pref erence alignment (RAG-Pref), a simple RAG-based alignment algorithm which conditions on preferred and dispreferred samples to leverage contrastive information during inference. RAG-Pref is online (training-free), compatible with off-the-shelf packages, and, when combined with offline (training-based) alignment algorithms, enables more than an average 3.7 factor improvement in agentic attack refusals across five widely used LLMs, compared to 2.9 for other online alignment algorithms and 1.5 for offline alignment alone. We conclude by showing that, in stark contrast to other online alignment methods, RAG-Pref similarly increases performance on general human-preference alignment tasks and does not drastically increase overall computational requirements.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (e.g. GRPO) is now a common way to improve mathematical reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, current methods usually broadcast one sequence-level advantage to all tokens, or use costly process reward models (PRMs) for step-level supervision. Uniform advantage distribution assumes that all tokens contribute equally to the final reward. This dilutes the gradient signal, since flawed reasoning steps and filler words are updated as strongly as valid logical inferences. To address this, we introduce Gradient-Reweighted Advantage (GRAIL), an intrinsic token-wise advantage reweighting method. GRAIL uses gradient-activation saliency to place more weight on tokens that are more locally sensitive to the final answer. Evaluations across five models from the Qwen3, R1-distilled and OctoThinker families show that GRAIL consistently outperforms GRPO. GRAIL achieved an average improvement of 3.60% in accuracy and 3.05% in Pass@3, demonstrating that fine-grained reasoning alignment can be achieved without process-level supervision.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve remarkable performance by leveraging reinforcement learning (RL) on reasoning tasks to generate long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. However, this over-optimization often prioritizes compliance, making models vulnerable to harmful prompts. To mitigate this safety degradation, recent approaches rely on external teacher distillation, yet this introduces a distributional discrepancy that degrades native reasoning. We propose ThinkSafe, a self-generated alignment framework that restores safety alignment without external teachers. Our key insight is that while compliance suppresses safety mechanisms, models often retain latent knowledge to identify harm. ThinkSafe unlocks this via lightweight refusal steering, guiding the model to generate in-distribution safety reasoning traces. Fine-tuning on these self-generated responses effectively realigns the model while minimizing distribution shift. Experiments on DeepSeek-R1-Distill and Qwen3 show ThinkSafe significantly improves safety while preserving reasoning proficiency. Notably, it achieves superior safety and comparable reasoning to GRPO, with significantly reduced computational cost. Code, models, and datasets are available at https://github.com/seanie12/ThinkSafe.git.

Large language model (LLM) agents now execute long, tool-using tasks where final outcome checks can arrive too late for intervention. Online warning requires lightweight prefix monitors over heterogeneous traces, but hand-authored event schemas are brittle and deployment-time LLM judging is costly. We introduce PrefixGuard, a trace-to-monitor framework with an offline StepView induction step followed by supervised monitor training. StepView induces deterministic typed-step adapters from raw trace samples, and the monitor learns an event abstraction and prefix-risk scorer from terminal outcomes. Across WebArena, τ^2-Bench, SkillsBench, and TerminalBench, the strongest PrefixGuard monitors reach 0.900/0.710/0.533/0.557 AUPRC. Using the strongest backend within each representation, they improve over raw-text controls by an average of +0.137 AUPRC. LLM judges remain substantially weaker under the same prefix-warning protocol. We also derive an observability ceiling on score-based area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) that separates monitor error from failures lacking evidence in the observed prefix. For finite-state audit, post-hoc deterministic finite automaton (DFA) extraction remains compact on WebArena and τ^2-Bench (29 and 20 states) but expands to 151 and 187 states on SkillsBench and TerminalBench. Finally, first-alert diagnostics show that strong ranking does not imply deployment utility: WebArena ranks well yet fails to support low-false-alarm alerts, whereas τ^2-Bench and TerminalBench retain more actionable early alerts. Together, these results position PrefixGuard as a practical monitor-synthesis recipe with explicit diagnostics for when prefix warnings translate into actionable interventions.

Modern language-model training is increasingly exposed to instability, degraded runs, and wasted compute, especially under aggressive learning-rate, scale, and runtime-stress conditions. This paper introduces Learn-by-Wire Guard (LBW-Guard), a bounded autonomous training-control governance layer that operates above AdamW. Rather than replacing the optimizer update rule, LBW-Guard observes training telemetry, interprets instability-sensitive regimes, and applies bounded control to optimizer execution while preserving fixed training objectives. We evaluate LBW-Guard in a Qwen2.5-centered stress-and-robustness suite using WikiText-103, with Qwen2.5-7B as the empirical anchor, model-size comparisons against Qwen2.5-3B and Qwen2.5-14B, learning-rate stress tests, gradient-clipping baselines, and a no-LoRA TinyLlama-1B full-parameter sanity check. In the 7B reference setting, LBW-Guard reduces final perplexity from 13.21 to 10.74, an 18.7% improvement, while reducing end-to-end time from 392.54s to 357.02s, a 1.10x speedup. Under stronger learning-rate stress, AdamW degrades to 1885.24 final perplexity at LR=3e-3 and 659.76 at LR=1e-3, whereas LBW-Guard remains trainable at 11.57 and 10.33, respectively. Gradient-clipping baselines do not reproduce this effect. These results support a scoped systems conclusion that stability-sensitive LLM training can benefit from a governance plane above the optimizer. LBW-Guard provides evidence that bounded runtime control can preserve productive compute under stress while remaining distinct from optimizer replacement and local gradient suppression.

Aligning Vision-Language Models (VLMs) with safety standards is essential to mitigate risks arising from their multimodal complexity, where integrating vision and language unveils subtle threats beyond the reach of conventional safeguards. Inspired by the insight that reasoning across modalities is key to preempting intricate vulnerabilities, we propose a novel direction for VLM safety: multimodal reasoning-driven prompt rewriting. To this end, we introduce VLMGuard-R1, a proactive framework that refines user inputs through a reasoning-guided rewriter, dynamically interpreting text-image interactions to deliver refined prompts that bolster safety across diverse VLM architectures without altering their core parameters. To achieve this, we devise a three-stage reasoning pipeline to synthesize a dataset that trains the rewriter to infer subtle threats, enabling tailored, actionable responses over generic refusals. Extensive experiments across three benchmarks with five VLMs reveal that VLMGuard-R1 outperforms four baselines. In particular, VLMGuard-R1 achieves a remarkable 43.59\% increase in average safety across five models on the SIUO benchmark.

We introduce LlavaGuard, a family of VLM-based safeguard models, offering a versatile framework for evaluating the safety compliance of visual content. Specifically, we designed LlavaGuard for dataset annotation and generative model safeguarding. To this end, we collected and annotated a high-quality visual dataset incorporating a broad safety taxonomy, which we use to tune VLMs on context-aware safety risks. As a key innovation, LlavaGuard's new responses contain comprehensive information, including a safety rating, the violated safety categories, and an in-depth rationale. Further, our introduced customizable taxonomy categories enable the context-specific alignment of LlavaGuard to various scenarios. Our experiments highlight the capabilities of LlavaGuard in complex and real-world applications. We provide checkpoints ranging from 7B to 34B parameters demonstrating state-of-the-art performance, with even the smallest models outperforming baselines like GPT-4. We make our dataset and model weights publicly available and invite further research to address the diverse needs of communities and contexts.

As large language models (LLMs) become deeply embedded in daily life, the urgent need for safer moderation systems, distinguishing between naive from harmful requests while upholding appropriate censorship boundaries, has never been greater. While existing LLMs can detect harmful or unsafe content, they often struggle with nuanced cases such as implicit offensiveness, subtle gender and racial biases, and jailbreak prompts, due to the subjective and context-dependent nature of these issues. Furthermore, their heavy reliance on training data can reinforce societal biases, resulting in inconsistent and ethically problematic outputs. To address these challenges, we introduce GuardEval, a unified multi-perspective benchmark dataset designed for both training and evaluation, containing 106 fine-grained categories spanning human emotions, offensive and hateful language, gender and racial bias, and broader safety concerns. We also present GemmaGuard (GGuard), a QLoRA fine-tuned version of Gemma3-12B trained on GuardEval, to assess content moderation with fine-grained labels. Our evaluation shows that GGuard achieves a macro F1 score of 0.832, substantially outperforming leading moderation models, including OpenAI Moderator (0.64) and Llama Guard (0.61). We show that multi-perspective, human-centered safety benchmarks are critical for reducing biased and inconsistent moderation decisions. GuardEval and GGuard together demonstrate that diverse, representative data materially improve safety, fairness, and robustness on complex, borderline cases.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to adversarial attacks such as jailbreaking, which can elicit harmful or unsafe behaviors. This vulnerability is exacerbated in multilingual settings, where multilingual safety-aligned data is often limited. Thus, developing a guardrail capable of detecting and filtering unsafe content across diverse languages is critical for deploying LLMs in real-world applications. In this work, we introduce a multilingual guardrail with reasoning for prompt classification. Our method consists of: (1) synthetic multilingual data generation incorporating culturally and linguistically nuanced variants, (2) supervised fine-tuning, and (3) a curriculum-based Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) framework that further improves performance. Experimental results demonstrate that our multilingual guardrail, MrGuard, consistently outperforms recent baselines across both in-domain and out-of-domain languages by more than 15%. We also evaluate MrGuard's robustness to multilingual variations, such as code-switching and low-resource language distractors in the prompt, and demonstrate that it preserves safety judgments under these challenging conditions. The multilingual reasoning capability of our guardrail enables it to generate explanations, which are particularly useful for understanding language-specific risks and ambiguities in multilingual content moderation.

With the rapid evolution of foundation models, Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated increasingly powerful tool-use capabilities. However, this proficiency introduces significant security risks, as malicious actors can manipulate agents into executing tools to generate harmful content. While existing defensive mechanisms are effective, they frequently suffer from the over-refusal problem, where increased safety strictness compromises the agent's utility on benign tasks. To mitigate this trade-off, we propose SafeHarbor, a novel framework designed to establish precise decision boundaries for LLM agents. Unlike static guidelines, SafeHarbor extracts context-aware defense rules through enhanced adversarial generation. We design a local hierarchical memory system for dynamic rule injection, offering a training-free, efficient, and plug-and-play solution. Furthermore, we introduce an information entropy-based self-evolution mechanism that continuously optimizes the memory structure through dynamic node splitting and merging. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeHarbor achieves state-of-the-art performance on both ambiguous benign tasks and explicit malicious attacks, notably attaining a peak benign utility of 63.6\% on GPT-4o while maintaining a robust refusal rate exceeding 93\% against harmful requests. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/ljj-cyber/SafeHarbor.

In dynamic programming (DP) and reinforcement learning (RL), an agent learns to act optimally in terms of expected long-term return by sequentially interacting with its environment modeled by a Markov decision process (MDP). More generally in distributional reinforcement learning (DRL), the focus is on the whole distribution of the return, not just its expectation. Although DRL-based methods produced state-of-the-art performance in RL with function approximation, they involve additional quantities (compared to the non-distributional setting) that are still not well understood. As a first contribution, we introduce a new class of distributional operators, together with a practical DP algorithm for policy evaluation, that come with a robust MDP interpretation. Indeed, our approach reformulates through an augmented state space where each state is split into a worst-case substate and a best-case substate, whose values are maximized by safe and risky policies respectively. Finally, we derive distributional operators and DP algorithms solving a new control task: How to distinguish safe from risky optimal actions in order to break ties in the space of optimal policies?

Large language models (LLMs), despite being safety-aligned, exhibit brittle refusal behaviors that can be circumvented by simple linguistic changes. As tense jailbreaking demonstrates that models refusing harmful requests often comply when rephrased in past tense, a critical generalization gap is revealed in current alignment methods whose underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. In this work, we introduce Activation-Scaling Guard (ASGuard), an insightful, mechanistically-informed framework that surgically mitigates this specific vulnerability. In the first step, we use circuit analysis to identify the specific attention heads causally linked to the targeted jailbreaking such as a tense-changing attack. Second, we train a precise, channel-wise scaling vector to recalibrate the activation of tense vulnerable heads. Lastly, we apply it into a "preventative fine-tuning", forcing the model to learn a more robust refusal mechanism. Across four LLMs, ASGuard effectively reduces the attack success rate of targeted jailbreaking while preserving general capabilities and minimizing over refusal, achieving a Pareto-optimal balance between safety and utility. Our findings underscore how adversarial suffixes suppress the propagation of the refusal-mediating direction, based on mechanistic analysis. Furthermore, our work showcases how a deep understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical, efficient, and targeted methods for adjusting model behavior, charting a course for more reliable and interpretable AI safety.

Locating the files and functions requiring modification in large open-source software (OSS) repositories is challenging due to their scale and structural complexity. Existing large language model (LLM)-based methods typically treat this as a repository-level retrieval task and rely on multiple auxiliary tools, which overlook code execution logic and complicate model control. We propose RepoNavigator, an LLM agent equipped with a single execution-aware tool-jumping to the definition of an invoked symbol. This unified design reflects the actual flow of code execution while simplifying tool manipulation. RepoNavigator is trained end-to-end via Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly from a pretrained model, without any closed-source distillation. Experiments demonstrate that RL-trained RepoNavigator achieves state-of-the-art performance, with the 7B model outperforming 14B baselines, the 14B model surpassing 32B competitors, and even the 32B model exceeding closed-source models such as Claude-3.7. These results confirm that integrating a single, structurally grounded tool with RL training provides an efficient and scalable solution for repository-level issue localization.

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) trains large language models to autonomously call tools during reasoning, with search as the most common application. These models excel at multi-step reasoning tasks, but their safety properties are not well understood. In this study, we show that RL-trained search models inherit refusal from instruction tuning and often deflect harmful requests by turning them into safe queries. However, this safety is fragile. Two simple attacks, one that forces the model to begin response with search (Search attack), another that encourages models to repeatedly search (Multi-search attack), trigger cascades of harmful searches and answers. Across two model families (Qwen, Llama) with both local and web search, these attacks lower refusal rates by up to 60.0%, answer safety by 82.5%, and search-query safety by 82.4%. The attacks succeed by triggering models to generate harmful, request-mirroring search queries before they can generate the inherited refusal tokens. This exposes a core weakness of current RL training: it rewards continued generation of effective queries without accounting for their harmfulness. As a result, RL search models have vulnerabilities that users can easily exploit, making it urgent to develop safety-aware agentic RL pipelines optimising for safe search.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) has introduced significant security vulnerabilities, where malicious influence can propagate virally through inter-agent communication. Conventional safeguards often rely on a binary paradigm that strictly distinguishes between benign and attack agents, failing to account for infected agents i.e., benign entities converted by attack agents. In this paper, we propose Infection-Aware Guard, INFA-Guard, a novel defense framework that explicitly identifies and addresses infected agents as a distinct threat category. By leveraging infection-aware detection and topological constraints, INFA-Guard accurately localizes attack sources and infected ranges. During remediation, INFA-Guard replaces attackers and rehabilitates infected ones, avoiding malicious propagation while preserving topological integrity. Extensive experiments demonstrate that INFA-Guard achieves state-of-the-art performance, reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) by an average of 33%, while exhibiting cross-model robustness, superior topological generalization, and high cost-effectiveness.

As LLMs increasingly impact safety-critical applications, ensuring their safety using guardrails remains a key challenge. This paper proposes GuardReasoner, a new safeguard for LLMs, by guiding the guard model to learn to reason. Concretely, we first create the GuardReasonerTrain dataset, which consists of 127K samples with 460K detailed reasoning steps. Then, we introduce reasoning SFT to unlock the reasoning capability of guard models. In addition, we present hard sample DPO to further strengthen their reasoning ability. In this manner, GuardReasoner achieves better performance, explainability, and generalizability. Extensive experiments and analyses on 13 benchmarks of 3 guardrail tasks demonstrate its superiority. Remarkably, GuardReasoner 8B surpasses GPT-4o+CoT by 5.74% and LLaMA Guard 3 8B by 20.84% F1 score on average. We release the training data, code, and models with different scales (1B, 3B, 8B) of GuardReasoner : https://github.com/yueliu1999/GuardReasoner/.

Large language model (LLM) agents have shown strong decision-making capabilities in long-horizon interactive tasks, yet they still struggle to effectively leverage failed trajectories: full retries incur high interaction costs, while experience retrieval tends to dilute critical experience signals. To address this, we propose PivoARL, a self-feedback retry framework for experience exploitation in LLM agents. PivoARL identifies the pivotal erroneous turn through structured reflection and performs local retry only from the corresponding pivotal state, thereby reusing the correct prefix and reducing redundant interactions. From an information-gain perspective, we further show that pivotal retry concentrates useful experience signals near the error boundary, mitigating the signal dilution caused by state-agnostic experience utilization. Based on this insight, we design a pivotal-aware credit assignment mechanism that rewards correct prefixes while isolating erroneous suffixes, and optimize reflection quality through implicit reflection returns. We conduct a systematic evaluation on 4 agent tasks and 7 search-based QA benchmarks. Results show that PivoARL achieves significant improvements on Pass@2/3 across all tasks, with an average gain of about 11.5\% over MetaRL. Moreover, benefiting from contrastive preference signals induced by pivotal turns, PivoARL also consistently improves Pass@1 on over 80\% of the tasks. On Minesweeper environment, PivoARL improves over GiGPO by more than 45\% and reduces interaction turns by about 42\% on average compared with full-retry methods. Code is available at https://github.com/yuki-younai/PivoARL.

As LLM agents increasingly select tools autonomously, their choices among tools with different privileges become safety-relevant. However, prior tool-selection studies focus on safety-agnostic metadata preferences, leaving privilege-sensitive choices underexplored. To address this gap, we study over-privileged tool selection, in which an agent selects or escalates to a higher-privilege tool despite a sufficient lower-privilege alternative. We introduce ToolPrivBench to evaluate whether agents choose higher-privilege tools despite sufficient lower-privilege alternatives, measuring both initial selection and escalation after transient tool failures. Across eight domains and five recurring risk patterns, we find that over-privileged tool selection is common among mainstream LLM agents and is further amplified by transient failures. We further find that general safety alignment does not reliably transfer to least-privilege tool choice, while prompt-level controls provide only limited mitigation under transient failures. We therefore introduce a privilege-aware post-training defense that teaches agents to prefer sufficient lower-privilege tools and escalate only when necessary. Our mitigation experiments show that this defense substantially reduces unnecessary high-privilege tool use while preserving general capabilities.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems combine large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge retrieval, making them highly effective for knowledge-intensive tasks. A crucial but often under-explored component of these systems is the reranker, which refines retrieved documents to enhance generation quality and explainability. The challenge of selecting the optimal number of documents (k) remains unsolved: too few may omit critical information, while too many introduce noise and inefficiencies. Although recent studies have explored LLM-based rerankers, they primarily leverage internal model knowledge and overlook the rich supervisory signals that LLMs can provide, such as using response quality as feedback for optimizing reranking decisions. In this paper, we propose DynamicRAG, a novel RAG framework where the reranker dynamically adjusts both the order and number of retrieved documents based on the query. We model the reranker as an agent optimized through reinforcement learning (RL), using rewards derived from LLM output quality. Across seven knowledge-intensive datasets, DynamicRAG demonstrates superior performance, achieving state-of-the-art results. The model, data and code are available at https://github.com/GasolSun36/DynamicRAG

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents can automate data-science workflows, but many rigorous statistical methods implemented in R remain underused because LLMs struggle with statistical knowledge and tool retrieval. Existing retrieval-augmented approaches focus on function-level semantics and ignore data distribution, producing suboptimal matches. We propose DARE (Distribution-Aware Retrieval Embedding), a lightweight, plug-and-play retrieval model that incorporates data distribution information into function representations for R package retrieval. Our main contributions are: (i) RPKB, a curated R Package Knowledge Base derived from 8,191 high-quality CRAN packages; (ii) DARE, an embedding model that fuses distributional features with function metadata to improve retrieval relevance; and (iii) RCodingAgent, an R-oriented LLM agent for reliable R code generation and a suite of statistical analysis tasks for systematically evaluating LLM agents in realistic analytical scenarios. Empirically, DARE achieves an NDCG at 10 of 93.47%, outperforming state-of-the-art open-source embedding models by up to 17% on package retrieval while using substantially fewer parameters. Integrating DARE into RCodingAgent yields significant gains on downstream analysis tasks. This work helps narrow the gap between LLM automation and the mature R statistical ecosystem.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve widespread integration across diverse linguistic landscapes, ensuring their safety and alignment with regional normative values remains a critical challenge. Current safety mechanisms are predominantly optimized for English-centric frameworks, often failing to capture the unique socio-cultural sensitivities and localized categories of harm inherent to the Indic region. To address this gap, we introduce IndicGuard, a multilingual safety guard model and dataset for Indic languages. We construct a high-volume, culturally nuanced safety dataset encompassing ten major Indic languages, systematically curated to capture regional harms, sensitive socio-political contexts, and adversarial jailbreaks. Leveraging this corpus, we fine-tune a 4B-parameter instruction-tuned model based on Gemma-3-4B-IT to serve as a multilingual safety guardrail for real-time content moderation and policy compliance checking. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate that IndicGuard significantly enhances LLM robustness against localized vulnerabilities, achieving high moderation consistency across different conversational turns. Crucially, IndicGuard consistently outperforms the existing baseline model, CultureGuard, across evaluated languages. Finally, we demonstrate that our model effectively generalizes to low-resource Indic languages excluded from training, substantiating the structural robustness and cross-lingual transfer capabilities of the framework.

The rapid evolution of generative models has led to a continuous emergence of multimodal safety risks, exposing the limitations of existing defense methods. To address these challenges, we propose ProGuard, a vision-language proactive guard that identifies and describes out-of-distribution (OOD) safety risks without the need for model adjustments required by traditional reactive approaches. We first construct a modality-balanced dataset of 87K samples, each annotated with both binary safety labels and risk categories under a hierarchical multimodal safety taxonomy, effectively mitigating modality bias and ensuring consistent moderation across text, image, and text-image inputs. Based on this dataset, we train our vision-language base model purely through reinforcement learning (RL) to achieve efficient and concise reasoning. To approximate proactive safety scenarios in a controlled setting, we further introduce an OOD safety category inference task and augment the RL objective with a synonym-bank-based similarity reward that encourages the model to generate concise descriptions for unseen unsafe categories. Experimental results show that ProGuard achieves performance comparable to closed-source large models on binary safety classification, substantially outperforms existing open-source guard models on unsafe content categorization. Most notably, ProGuard delivers a strong proactive moderation ability, improving OOD risk detection by 52.6% and OOD risk description by 64.8%.

On-policy self-distillation (self-OPD) densifies reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) by letting a policy teach itself under privileged context. We find that when this guidance spans the full response, all-token KL spends gradients on mostly redundant positions and amplifies privileged-information leakage, causing entropy rise, shortened reasoning, and out-of-distribution degradation in long-horizon math training. We propose Token-Routed Alignment for Critical rEasoning (TRACE), which distills only on annotator-marked critical spans: forward KL on key spans of correct rollouts, optional reverse KL on localized error spans, and GRPO on all remaining tokens, with the KL channel annealed away after a short warm-up. Our analysis explains TRACE through two effects: forward KL provides non-vanishing lift to teacher-supported tokens that the student under-allocates, while span masking and decay keep cumulative privileged-gradient exposure finite. On four held-out math benchmarks plus GPQA-Diamond, TRACE improves over GRPO by 2.76 percentage points on average and preserves the Qwen3-8B base OOD score on GPQA-Diamond, where GRPO and all-token self-OPD baselines degrade. Gains persist under online self-annotation (+1.90 percentage points, about 69% of the strong-API gain), reducing the concern that TRACE merely imports external annotator capability. Across scales, the best routed action is base-dependent: on Qwen3-8B it is forward KL on key spans, while on Qwen3-1.7B it shifts to reverse KL on error spans.

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable and widely used, ensuring the safety of their outputs is increasingly critical. Existing guardrail models, though useful in static evaluation settings, face two major limitations in real-world applications: (1) they typically output only binary "safe/unsafe" labels, which can be interpreted inconsistently across diverse safety policies, rendering them incapable of accommodating varying safety tolerances across domains; and (2) they require complete model outputs before performing safety checks, making them fundamentally incompatible with streaming LLM inference, thereby preventing timely intervention during generation and increasing exposure to harmful partial outputs. To address these challenges, we present Qwen3Guard, a series of multilingual safety guardrail models with two specialized variants: Generative Qwen3Guard, which casts safety classification as an instruction-following task to enable fine-grained tri-class judgments (safe, controversial, unsafe); and Stream Qwen3Guard, which introduces a token-level classification head for real-time safety monitoring during incremental text generation. Both variants are available in three sizes (0.6B, 4B, and 8B parameters) and support up to 119 languages and dialects, providing comprehensive, scalable, and low-latency safety moderation for global LLM deployments. Evaluated across English, Chinese, and multilingual benchmarks, Qwen3Guard achieves state-of-the-art performance in both prompt and response safety classification. All models are released under the Apache 2.0 license for public use.

Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense. In this work, we trace this collapse to two failure modes. First, existing defense methods are confined to recognizing specific attack patterns, rather than assessing whether the intent of every embedded instruction is relevant to the user task. Second, training-based defenses, which otherwise offer the strongest safety-utility trade-off, assemble their adversarial examples from a handful of hand-crafted templates, and the resulting defender fails to generalize outside that narrow strategy distribution. To address these gaps, we propose RETA, a training-based method that grounds defense decisions on the user tasks rather than attacker-controlled data. At each tool-output step, the defender undertakes chain-of-thought reasoning verifying that its actions are consistent with the user task. Leveraging red-teaming, a simulated attacker synthesizes adversarial training data and receives a dictionary-learning diversity reward, achieving broad coverage of injection-reformulation strategies. Together, these allow the defender to be optimized via multi-objective reinforcement learning and achieve better safety-utility trade-off. Across six black-box adaptive attacks, RETA keeps every per-attack ASR below 10%, with average ASR of 2.92% and 3.75% on the two target models, while preserving most utility under attack and on clean inputs.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have fundamentally shifted recommender systems from discriminative to generative paradigms, where user behavior modeling is achieved by generating target items conditioned on historical interactions. Yet current generative recommenders still suffer from two core limitations: the lack of high-quality negative modeling and the reliance on implicit rewards. Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) offers a natural solution by enabling on-policy sampling of harder negatives and grounding optimization in explicit reward signals. However, applying RLVR to generative recommenders remains non-trivial. Its unique generation space often leads to invalid or repetitive items that undermine sampling efficiency, and ranking supervision is sparse since most items receive identical zero rewards. To address these challenges, we propose Reinforced Preference Optimization for Recommendation (ReRe), a reinforcement-based paradigm tailored to LLM-based recommenders, an important direction in generative recommendation. ReRe incorporates constrained beam search to improve sampling efficiency and diversify hard negatives, while augmenting rule-based accuracy rewards with auxiliary ranking rewards for finer-grained supervision. Extensive experiments on three real-world datasets demonstrate that ReRe consistently outperforms both traditional and LLM-based recommenders in ranking performance. Further analysis shows that ReRe not only enhances performance across both base and SFT-initialized models but also generalizes robustly across different backbone families and scales. Beyond empirical gains, we systematically investigate the design space of RLVR in recommendation across generation, sampling strategy, reward modeling, and optimization algorithm, offering insights for future research.

Unlearning in large language models is becoming increasingly important due to regulatory compliance, copyright protection, and privacy concerns. However, a key challenge in LLM unlearning is unintended forgetting, where the removal of specific data inadvertently impairs the utility of the model and its retention of valuable, desired information. While prior work has primarily focused on architectural innovations, the influence of data-level factors on unlearning performance remains underexplored. As a result, existing methods often suffer from degraded retention when forgetting high-impact data. To address this problem, we propose GUARD, a novel framework for Guided Unlearning And Retention via Data attribution. At its core, GUARD introduces a lightweight proxy data attribution metric tailored for LLM unlearning, which quantifies the alignment between the Forget and Retain sets while remaining computationally efficient. Building on this, we design a novel unlearning objective that assigns adaptive, nonuniform unlearning weights to samples, inversely proportional to their proxy attribution scores. Through such a reallocation of unlearning power, GUARD mitigates unintended retention loss. We also provide rigorous theoretical guarantees that GUARD significantly improves retention while maintaining forgetting metrics comparable to prior methods. Extensive experiments on the TOFU and MUSE benchmarks across multiple LLM architectures demonstrate that GUARD reduces utility sacrifice on the TOFU Retain Set by up to 194.92 percent in terms of Truth Ratio when forgetting 10 percent of the training data, and improves knowledge retention on the MUSE NEWS Retain Set by 16.20 percent, with comparable or very moderate increases in privacy loss compared to state-of-the-art methods.

Guardrails have emerged as an alternative to safety alignment for content moderation of large language models (LLMs). Existing model-based guardrails have not been designed for resource-constrained computational portable devices, such as mobile phones, more and more of which are running LLM-based applications locally. We introduce LoRA-Guard, a parameter-efficient guardrail adaptation method that relies on knowledge sharing between LLMs and guardrail models. LoRA-Guard extracts language features from the LLMs and adapts them for the content moderation task using low-rank adapters, while a dual-path design prevents any performance degradation on the generative task. We show that LoRA-Guard outperforms existing approaches with 100-1000x lower parameter overhead while maintaining accuracy, enabling on-device content moderation.

Large language model (LLM) based search agents iteratively generate queries, retrieve external information, and reason to answer open-domain questions. While researchers have primarily focused on improving their utility, their safety behaviors remain underexplored. In this paper, we first evaluate search agents using red-teaming datasets and find that they are more likely to produce harmful outputs than base LLMs. For example, when asked "How can I track someone's location without their consent?", a base model refuses, whereas a search agent designed to retrieve and cite sources may lower its refusal threshold, fetch documents (e.g., court cases), and, once appended, synthesize them into an informative yet unsafe summary. We further show that utility-oriented fine-tuning intensifies this risk, motivating joint alignment of safety and utility. We present SafeSearch, a multi-objective reinforcement learning approach that couples a final-output safety/utility reward with a novel query-level shaping term that penalizes unsafe queries and rewards safe ones. Experiments show that SafeSearch reduces agent harmfulness by over 70% across three red-teaming datasets while producing safe, helpful responses, and matches the QA performance of a utility-only finetuned agent; further analyses confirm the effectiveness of the query-level reward in jointly improving safety and utility.

Ensuring the safety of large language models (LLMs) is critical as they are deployed in real-world applications. Existing guardrails rely on rule-based filtering or single-pass classification, limiting their ability to handle nuanced safety violations. To address this, we propose ThinkGuard, a critique-augmented guardrail model that distills knowledge from high-capacity LLMs by generating structured critiques alongside safety labels. Fine-tuned on critique-augmented data, the captured deliberative thinking ability drastically enhances the guardrail's cautiousness and interpretability. Evaluated on multiple safety benchmarks, ThinkGuard achieves the highest average F1 and AUPRC, outperforming all baselines. Compared to LLaMA Guard 3, ThinkGuard improves accuracy by 16.1% and macro F1 by 27.0%. Moreover, it surpasses label-only fine-tuned models, confirming that structured critiques enhance both classification precision and nuanced safety reasoning while maintaining computational efficiency.

Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) are becoming essential as a powerful multimodal backbone for real-world applications. However, recent studies show that audio inputs can more easily elicit harmful responses than text, exposing new risks toward deployment. While safety alignment has made initial advances in LLMs and Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), we find that vanilla adaptation of these approaches to LALMs faces two key limitations: 1) LLM-based steering fails under audio input due to the large distributional gap between activations, and 2) prompt-based defenses induce over-refusals on benign-speech queries. To address these challenges, we propose Safe-Ablated Refusal Steering (SARSteer), the first inference-time defense framework for LALMs. Specifically, SARSteer leverages text-derived refusal steering to enforce rejection without manipulating audio inputs and introduces decomposed safe-space ablation to mitigate over-refusal. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SARSteer significantly improves harmful-query refusal while preserving benign responses, establishing a principled step toward safety alignment in LALMs.

Diffusion-based image generation models have advanced rapidly but pose a safety risk due to their potential to generate Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content. Existing NSFW detection methods mainly operate either before or after image generation. Pre-generation methods rely on text prompts and struggle with the gap between prompt safety and image safety. Post-generation methods apply classifiers to final outputs, but they are poorly suited to intermediate noisy images. To address this, we introduce FlowGuard, a cross-model in-generation detection framework that inspects intermediate denoising steps. This is particularly challenging in latent diffusion, where early-stage noise obscures visual signals. FlowGuard employs a novel linear approximation for latent decoding and leverages a curriculum learning approach to stabilize training. By detecting unsafe content early, FlowGuard reduces unnecessary diffusion steps to cut computational costs. Our cross-model benchmark spanning nine diffusion-based backbones shows the effectiveness of FlowGuard for in-generation NSFW detection in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings, outperforming existing methods by over 30% in F1 score while delivering transformative efficiency gains, including slashing peak GPU memory demand by over 97% and projection time from 8.1 seconds to 0.2 seconds compared to standard VAE decoding.

We propose Flow-Anchored Noise-conditioned Q-Learning (FAN), a highly efficient and high-performing offline reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm. Recent work has shown that expressive flow policies and distributional critics improve offline RL performance, but at a high computational cost. Specifically, flow policies require iterative sampling to produce a single action, and distributional critics require computation over multiple samples (e.g., quantiles) to estimate value. To address these inefficiencies while maintaining high performance, we introduce FAN. Our method employs a behavior regularization technique that utilizes only a single flow policy iteration and requires only a single Gaussian noise sample for distributional critics. Our theoretical analysis of convergence and performance bounds demonstrates that these simplifications not only improve efficiency but also lead to superior task performance. Experiments on robotic manipulation and locomotion tasks demonstrate that FAN achieves state-of-the-art performance while significantly reducing both training and inference runtimes. We release our code at https://github.com/brianlsy98/FAN.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems for Large Language Models (LLMs) hold promise in knowledge-intensive tasks but face limitations in complex multi-step reasoning. While recent methods have integrated RAG with chain-of-thought reasoning or test-time search using Process Reward Models (PRMs), these approaches encounter challenges such as a lack of explanations, bias in PRM training data, early-step bias in PRM scores, and insufficient post-training optimization of reasoning potential. To address these issues, we propose Retrieval-Augmented Reasoning through Trustworthy Process Rewarding (ReARTeR), a framework that enhances RAG systems' reasoning capabilities through post-training and test-time scaling. At test time, ReARTeR introduces Trustworthy Process Rewarding via a Process Reward Model for accurate scalar scoring and a Process Explanation Model (PEM) for generating natural language explanations, enabling step refinement. During post-training, it utilizes Monte Carlo Tree Search guided by Trustworthy Process Rewarding to collect high-quality step-level preference data, optimized through Iterative Preference Optimization. ReARTeR addresses three core challenges: (1) misalignment between PRM and PEM, tackled through off-policy preference learning; (2) bias in PRM training data, mitigated by balanced annotation methods and stronger annotations for challenging examples; and (3) early-step bias in PRM, resolved through a temporal-difference-based look-ahead search strategy. Experimental results on multi-step reasoning benchmarks demonstrate significant improvements, underscoring ReARTeR's potential to advance the reasoning capabilities of RAG systems.

Recent advancements in Image-to-Video (I2V) generation have transformed input images from simple appearance references into interactive control interfaces where visual cues such as arrows, sketches, and emojis orchestrate complex video dynamics with unprecedented controllability. However, these seemingly innocuous static cues can be interpreted by models as executable temporal instructions, unfolding into harmful actions in the generated videos. Despite the severity of this threat, existing safety benchmarks remain predominantly focused on text-based and content-only image-based jailbreaks, leaving implicit visual prompt attacks insufficiently explored. To bridge this gap, we present VVA-Bench, the first systematic benchmark for evaluating video generation safety under categorized vision-centric prompt attacks. Extensive experiments on VVA-Bench demonstrate that state-of-the-art models are highly susceptible to such attacks, with Attack Success Rates (ASR) reaching 100.0\% on Wan 2.7 and 74.8\% on Veo 3.1. To mitigate these risks, we propose VPA-Guard, a retrieval-augmented and self-evolving defense framework. By leveraging few-shot reasoning to identify latent malicious intents, our method reduces the attack ASR by 44.2\% and the harmfulness score by 73.4\% on average, while maintaining the model's utility for legitimate user edits. Our work provides both a rigorous benchmark and an effective defense strategy to advance safe and socially responsible multimodal generation.

Communication-limited robots in mission-critical scenarios such as disaster inspection and search-and-rescue must make reliable onboard decisions without access to remote operators or high-capacity reasoning services. Episodic memory reuse is an attractive low-cost fallback, but retrieval similarity does not guarantee execution validity, i.e., a retrieved action may match the current context yet be unsafe due to changed topology, insufficient battery margin, or unreliable prior outcomes. We call such high-similarity but execution-invalid episodes memory traps. This creates a safety-efficiency design space where similarity only reuse minimizes fallback cost but can be unsafe, while always invoking local reasoning improves safety at high computational and energy cost. This paper presents MemoGuard, a lightweight adaptive runtime that validates episodic memories against topology, resource, and outcome contracts before reuse, invoking fallback only when validation fails. In a graph-based corridor-inspection simulator, MemoGuard reduces battery safety violations by 76.6% over similarity-only top-1 reuse while reducing fallback calls by 21.4% over always reasoning. On an NVIDIA Jetson AGX Xavier with local llama3.2:3b fallback reasoning, this corresponds to 3.67 s and 36.97 J of avoided fallback-reasoning overhead per trial. We open-source MemoGuard at https://github.com/hetheiin/memoguard.

Most existing LLM safety evaluation and defense methods follow a static formulation: jailbreak vulnerabilities are evaluated with fixed attack methods, and guardrails are trained on fixed malicious prompt datasets. However, real-world adversaries continuously evolve their capabilities and expand the attack space. To address this challenge, we propose DARWIN, an evolutionary attack-defense framework that formulates jailbreaking as an open-ended evolution process and continuously updates guardrails through an evolving attack-defense loop. DARWIN-Attack is an evolutionary adversary that expands its capabilities through strategy discovery, mutation, selection, and feedback-driven composition. It collects strategies from broad external sources, generates new variants through self-reflection and genetic evolution, and retains effective strategies based on their performance against aligned LLMs. During attack execution, DARWIN-Attack adaptively selects and combines evolved strategies according to feedback from target LLMs and guardrails. Across frontier models and guardrails, it achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates, including nearly 100% on DeepSeek-V4-Pro and YuFeng-XGuard and over 90% on GPT-5.5. On the defense side, we introduce DARWIN-Guard, an online adversarial training paradigm that iteratively learns from emerging adversarial samples generated by DARWIN-Attack. To improve robustness without sacrificing utility, DARWIN-Guard jointly trains on malicious and benign disguised queries, encouraging the model to identify underlying intent rather than superficial attack patterns. DARWIN-Guard achieves an average unsafe recall of 91.6% across 12 safety benchmarks, outperforming strong guardrails such as YuFeng-XGuard and Nemotron Guard, while maintaining a nearly 100% pass rate on standard benign datasets.

LLM-based agents are deployed in safety-critical applications, yet current guardrail systems fail to prevent violations of temporal safety policies, requirements that govern the ordering and sequencing of agent actions. For instance, agents may access sensitive data before authenticating users or process refunds to unauthorized payment methods, violations that require reasoning about sequences of action rather than an individual action. Existing guardrails rely on imprecise natural language instructions or post-hoc monitoring, and provide no formal guarantees that agents will satisfy temporal constraints. We present Agent-C, a novel framework that provides run-time guarantees ensuring LLM agents adhere to formal temporal safety properties. Agent-C introduces a domain-specific language for expressing temporal properties (e.g., authenticate before accessing data), translates specifications to first-order logic, and uses SMT solving to detect non-compliant agent actions during token generation. When the LLM attempts to generate a non-compliant tool call, Agent-C leverages constrained generation techniques to ensure that every action generated by the LLM complies with the specification, and to generate a compliant alternative to a non-compliant agent action. We evaluate Agent-C across two real-world applications: retail customer service and airline ticket reservation system, and multiple language models (open and closed-source). Our results demonstrate that Agent-C achieves perfect safety (100% conformance, 0% harm), while improving task utility compared to state-of-the-art guardrails and unrestricted agents. On SoTA closed-source models, Agent-C improves conformance (77.4% to 100% for Claude Sonnet 4.5 and 83.7% to 100% for GPT-5), while simultaneously increasing utility (71.8% to 75.2% and 66.1% to 70.6%, respectively), representing a new SoTA frontier for reliable agentic reasoning.

Existing agent-safety evaluation has focused mainly on externally induced risks. Yet agents may still enter unsafe trajectories under benign conditions. We study this complementary but underexplored setting through the lens of intrinsic risk, where intrinsic failures remain latent, propagate across long-horizon execution, and eventually lead to high-consequence outcomes. To evaluate this setting, we introduce non-attack intrinsic risk auditing and present HINTBench, a benchmark of 629 agent trajectories (523 risky, 106 safe; 33 steps on average) supporting three tasks: risk detection, risk-step localization, and intrinsic failure-type identification. Its annotations are organized under a unified five-constraint taxonomy. Experiments reveal a substantial capability gap: strong LLMs perform well on trajectory-level risk detection, but their performance drops to below 35 Strict-F1 on risk-step localization, while fine-grained failure diagnosis proves even harder. Existing guard models transfer poorly to this setting. These findings establish intrinsic risk auditing as an open challenge for agent safety.

Ensuring the safety of LLM-generated content is essential for real-world deployment. Most existing guardrail models formulate moderation as a fixed binary classification task, implicitly assuming a fixed definition of harmfulness. In practice, enforcement strictness - how conservatively harmfulness is defined and enforced - varies across platforms and evolves over time, making binary moderators brittle under shifting requirements. We first introduce FlexBench, a strictness-adaptive LLM moderation benchmark that enables controlled evaluation under multiple strictness regimes. Experiments on FlexBench reveal substantial cross-strictness inconsistency in existing moderators: models that perform well under one regime can degrade substantially under others, limiting their practical usability. To address this, we propose FlexGuard, an LLM-based moderator that outputs a calibrated continuous risk score reflecting risk severity and supports strictness-specific decisions via thresholding. We train FlexGuard via risk-alignment optimization to improve score-severity consistency and provide practical threshold selection strategies to adapt to target strictness at deployment. Experiments on FlexBench and public benchmarks demonstrate that FlexGuard achieves higher moderation accuracy and substantially improved robustness under varying strictness. We release the source code and data to support reproducibility.

When users submit queries to Large Language Models (LLMs), their prompts can often contain sensitive data, forcing a difficult choice: Send the query to a powerful proprietary LLM providers to achieving state-of-the-art performance and risk data exposure, or relying on smaller, local models guarantees data privacy but often results in a degradation of task performance. Prior approaches have relied on static pipelines that use LLM rewriting, which shatters linguistic coherence and indiscriminately removes privacy-sensitive information, including task-critical content. We reformulate this challenge (Privacy-Conscious Delegation) as a sequential decision-making problem and introduce a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework called Privacy-R1 to solve it. Our framework trains an agent to dynamically route text chunks, learning a policy that optimally balances the trade-off between privacy leakage and task performance. It implicitly distinguishes between replaceable Personally Identifiable Information (PII) (which it shields locally) and task-critical PII (which it strategically sends to the remote model for maximal utility). To validate our approach in complex scenarios, we also introduce a new medical dataset with high PII density. Our framework achieves a new state-of-the-art on the privacy-utility frontier, demonstrating the necessity of learned, adaptive policies for deploying LLMs in sensitive environments. Dataset can be found at: https://github.com/zackhuiiiii/Privacy-R1.

The rapid development of autonomous web agents powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), while greatly elevating efficiency, exposes the frontier risk of taking unintended or harmful actions. This situation underscores an urgent need for effective safety measures, akin to access controls for human users. To address this critical challenge, we introduce WebGuard, the first comprehensive dataset designed to support the assessment of web agent action risks and facilitate the development of guardrails for real-world online environments. In doing so, WebGuard specifically focuses on predicting the outcome of state-changing actions and contains 4,939 human-annotated actions from 193 websites across 22 diverse domains, including often-overlooked long-tail websites. These actions are categorized using a novel three-tier risk schema: SAFE, LOW, and HIGH. The dataset includes designated training and test splits to support evaluation under diverse generalization settings. Our initial evaluations reveal a concerning deficiency: even frontier LLMs achieve less than 60% accuracy in predicting action outcomes and less than 60% recall in lagging HIGH-risk actions, highlighting the risks of deploying current-generation agents without dedicated safeguards. We therefore investigate fine-tuning specialized guardrail models using WebGuard. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across multiple generalization settings and find that a fine-tuned Qwen2.5VL-7B model yields a substantial improvement in performance, boosting accuracy from 37% to 80% and HIGH-risk action recall from 20% to 76%. Despite these improvements, the performance still falls short of the reliability required for high-stakes deployment, where guardrails must approach near-perfect accuracy and recall.

State Space Models (SSMs) such as Mamba achieve linear-time sequence processing through input-dependent recurrence, but this mechanism introduces a critical safety vulnerability. We show that the spectral radius rho(A-bar) of the discretized transition operator governs effective memory horizon: when an adversary drives rho toward zero through gradient-based Hidden State Poisoning, memory collapses from millions of tokens to mere dozens, silently destroying reasoning capacity without triggering output-level alarms. We prove an Evasion Existence Theorem showing that for any output-only defense, adversarial inputs exist that simultaneously induce spectral collapse and evade detection, then introduce SpectralGuard, a real-time monitor that tracks spectral stability across all model layers. SpectralGuard achieves F1=0.961 against non-adaptive attackers and retains F1=0.842 under the strongest adaptive setting, with sub-15ms per-token latency. Causal interventions and cross-architecture transfer to hybrid SSM-Attention systems confirm that spectral monitoring provides a principled, deployable safety layer for recurrent foundation models.

LLM agents are an emerging form of AI systems where large language models (LLMs) serve as the central component, utilizing a diverse set of tools to complete user-assigned tasks. Despite their great potential, LLM agents pose significant security risks. When interacting with the external world, they may encounter malicious commands from attackers, leading to the execution of dangerous actions. A promising way to address this is by enforcing the principle of least privilege: allowing only essential actions for task completion while blocking unnecessary ones. However, achieving this is challenging, as it requires covering diverse agent scenarios while preserving both security and utility. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control mechanism for LLM agents. At its core is a domain-specific language for flexibly expressing privilege control policies applied during agent execution. These policies provide fine-grained constraints over tool calls, deciding when tool calls are permissible and specifying fallbacks if they are not. This enables agent developers and users to craft suitable policies for their specific use cases and enforce them deterministically to guarantee security. Thanks to its modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and requires only minimal changes to agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. To automate policy writing, we leverage LLMs to generate policies based on user queries, which are then updated dynamically for improved security and utility. Our extensive evaluation shows that it enables strong security while preserving high utility across three distinct scenarios or benchmarks: AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison. Furthermore, we perform an in-depth analysis, showcasing the effectiveness of its core components and the resilience of its automated policy generation against adaptive attacks.

Accurate rejection of sensitive or harmful visual content, i.e., harmful image guardrail, is critical in many application scenarios. This task must continuously adapt to the evolving safety policies and content across various domains and over time. However, traditional classifiers, confined to fixed categories, require frequent retraining when new policies are introduced. Vision-language models (VLMs) offer a more adaptable and generalizable foundation for dynamic safety guardrails. Despite this potential, existing VLM-based safeguarding methods are typically trained and evaluated under only a fixed safety policy. We find that these models are heavily overfitted to the seen policy, fail to generalize to unseen policies, and even lose the basic instruction-following ability and general knowledge. To address this issue, in this paper we make two key contributions. First, we benchmark the cross-policy generalization performance of existing VLMs with SafeEditBench, a new evaluation suite. SafeEditBench leverages image-editing models to convert unsafe images into safe counterparts, producing policy-aligned datasets where each safe-unsafe image pair remains visually similar except for localized regions violating specific safety rules. Human annotators then provide accurate safe/unsafe labels under five distinct policies, enabling fine-grained assessment of policy-aware generalization. Second, we introduce SafeGuard-VL, a reinforcement learning-based method with verifiable rewards (RLVR) for robust unsafe-image guardrails. Instead of relying solely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) under fixed policies, SafeGuard-VL explicitly optimizes the model with policy-grounded rewards, promoting verifiable adaptation across evolving policies. Extensive experiments verify the effectiveness of our method for unsafe image guardrails across various policies.

Stealing attacks pose a persistent threat to the intellectual property of deployed machine-learning systems. Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) intensifies this risk by extending the attack surface beyond model weights to knowledge base that often contains IP-bearing assets such as proprietary runbooks, curated domain collections, or licensed documents. Recent work shows that multi-turn questioning can gradually steal corpus content from RAG systems, yet existing attacks are largely heuristic and often plateau early. We address this gap by formulating RAG knowledge-base stealing as an adaptive stochastic coverage problem (ASCP), where each query is a stochastic action and the goal is to maximize the conditional expected marginal gain (CMG) in corpus coverage under a query budget. Bridging ASCP to real-world black-box RAG knowledge-base stealing raises three challenges: CMG is unobservable, the natural-language action space is intractably large, and feasibility constraints require stealthy queries that remain effective under diverse architectures. We introduce RAGCrawler, a knowledge graph-guided attacker that maintains a global attacker-side state to estimate coverage gains, schedule high-value semantic anchors, and generate non-redundant natural queries. Across four corpora and four generators with BGE retriever, RAGCrawler achieves 66.8% average coverage (up to 84.4%) within 1,000 queries, improving coverage by 44.90% relative to the strongest baseline. It also reduces the queries needed to reach 70% coverage by at least 4.03x on average and enables surrogate reconstruction with answer similarity up to 0.699. Our attack is also scalable to retriever switching and newer RAG techniques like query rewriting and multi-query retrieval. These results highlight urgent needs to protect RAG knowledge assets.

With the ability to generate high-quality images, text-to-image (T2I) models can be exploited for creating inappropriate content. To prevent misuse, existing safety measures are either based on text blacklists, which can be easily circumvented, or harmful content classification, requiring large datasets for training and offering low flexibility. Hence, we propose Latent Guard, a framework designed to improve safety measures in text-to-image generation. Inspired by blacklist-based approaches, Latent Guard learns a latent space on top of the T2I model's text encoder, where it is possible to check the presence of harmful concepts in the input text embeddings. Our proposed framework is composed of a data generation pipeline specific to the task using large language models, ad-hoc architectural components, and a contrastive learning strategy to benefit from the generated data. The effectiveness of our method is verified on three datasets and against four baselines. Code and data will be shared at https://latentguard.github.io/.

While LLM agents can plan multi-step tasks, intervening at the planning stage-before any action is executed-is often the safest way to prevent harm, since certain risks can lead to severe consequences once carried out. However, existing guardrails mostly operate post-execution, which is difficult to scale and leaves little room for controllable supervision at the plan level. To address this challenge, we highlight three critical gaps in current research: data gap, model gap, and evaluation gap. To close the data gap, we introduce AuraGen, a controllable engine that (i) synthesizes benign trajectories, (ii) injects category-labeled risks with calibrated difficulty, and (iii) filters outputs via an automated reward model, producing large and reliable corpora for pre-execution safety. To close the guardian model gap, we propose a foundational guardrail Safiron, combining a cross-planner adapter with a compact guardian model. The adapter unifies different input formats, while Safiron flags risky cases, assigns risk types, and generates rationales; trained in two stages with a broadly explored data recipe, Safiron achieves robust transfer across settings. To close the evaluation gap, we release Pre-Exec Bench, a realistic benchmark covering diverse tools and branching trajectories, which measures detection, fine-grained categorization, explanation, and cross-planner generalization in human-verified scenarios. Extensive experiments demonstrate consistent gains of the proposed guardrail over strong baselines on Pre-Exec Bench, and ablations further distill actionable practices, providing a practical template for safer agentic systems.

Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to widespread deployment in sensitive applications where safety and reliability are paramount. However, LLMs have inherent risks accompanying them, including bias, potential for unsafe actions, dataset poisoning, lack of explainability, hallucinations, and non-reproducibility. These risks necessitate the development of "guardrails" to align LLMs with desired behaviors and mitigate potential harm. This work explores the risks associated with deploying LLMs and evaluates current approaches to implementing guardrails and model alignment techniques. We examine intrinsic and extrinsic bias evaluation methods and discuss the importance of fairness metrics for responsible AI development. The safety and reliability of agentic LLMs (those capable of real-world actions) are explored, emphasizing the need for testability, fail-safes, and situational awareness. Technical strategies for securing LLMs are presented, including a layered protection model operating at external, secondary, and internal levels. System prompts, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures, and techniques to minimize bias and protect privacy are highlighted. Effective guardrail design requires a deep understanding of the LLM's intended use case, relevant regulations, and ethical considerations. Striking a balance between competing requirements, such as accuracy and privacy, remains an ongoing challenge. This work underscores the importance of continuous research and development to ensure the safe and responsible use of LLMs in real-world applications.

Advanced reasoning capabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) have caused higher hallucination prevalence; yet most mitigation work focuses on after-the-fact filtering rather than shaping the queries that trigger them. We introduce QueryBandits, a bandit framework that designs rewrite strategies to maximize a reward model, that encapsulates hallucination propensity based upon the sensitivities of 17 linguistic features of the input query-and therefore, proactively steer LLMs away from generating hallucinations. Across 13 diverse QA benchmarks and 1,050 lexically perturbed queries per dataset, our top contextual QueryBandit (Thompson Sampling) achieves an 87.5% win rate over a no-rewrite baseline and also outperforms zero-shot static prompting ("paraphrase" or "expand") by 42.6% and 60.3% respectively. Therefore, we empirically substantiate the effectiveness of QueryBandits in mitigating hallucination via the intervention that takes the form of a query rewrite. Interestingly, certain static prompting strategies, which constitute a considerable number of current query rewriting literature, have a higher cumulative regret than the no-rewrite baseline, signifying that static rewrites can worsen hallucination. Moreover, we discover that the converged per-arm regression feature weight vectors substantiate that there is no single rewrite strategy optimal for all queries. In this context, guided rewriting via exploiting semantic features with QueryBandits can induce significant shifts in output behavior through forward-pass mechanisms, bypassing the need for retraining or gradient-based adaptation.

In this work, we build on recent advances in distributional reinforcement learning to give a generally applicable, flexible, and state-of-the-art distributional variant of DQN. We achieve this by using quantile regression to approximate the full quantile function for the state-action return distribution. By reparameterizing a distribution over the sample space, this yields an implicitly defined return distribution and gives rise to a large class of risk-sensitive policies. We demonstrate improved performance on the 57 Atari 2600 games in the ALE, and use our algorithm's implicitly defined distributions to study the effects of risk-sensitive policies in Atari games.

We introduce Llama Guard, an LLM-based input-output safeguard model geared towards Human-AI conversation use cases. Our model incorporates a safety risk taxonomy, a valuable tool for categorizing a specific set of safety risks found in LLM prompts (i.e., prompt classification). This taxonomy is also instrumental in classifying the responses generated by LLMs to these prompts, a process we refer to as response classification. For the purpose of both prompt and response classification, we have meticulously gathered a dataset of high quality. Llama Guard, a Llama2-7b model that is instruction-tuned on our collected dataset, albeit low in volume, demonstrates strong performance on existing benchmarks such as the OpenAI Moderation Evaluation dataset and ToxicChat, where its performance matches or exceeds that of currently available content moderation tools. Llama Guard functions as a language model, carrying out multi-class classification and generating binary decision scores. Furthermore, the instruction fine-tuning of Llama Guard allows for the customization of tasks and the adaptation of output formats. This feature enhances the model's capabilities, such as enabling the adjustment of taxonomy categories to align with specific use cases, and facilitating zero-shot or few-shot prompting with diverse taxonomies at the input. We are making Llama Guard model weights available and we encourage researchers to further develop and adapt them to meet the evolving needs of the community for AI safety.

The increasing deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) across enterprise and mission-critical domains has underscored the urgent need for robust guardrailing systems that ensure safety, reliability, and compliance. Existing solutions often struggle with real-time oversight, multi-modal data handling, and explainability -- limitations that hinder their adoption in regulated environments. Existing guardrails largely operate in isolation, focused on text alone making them inadequate for multi-modal, production-scale environments. We introduce Protect, natively multi-modal guardrailing model designed to operate seamlessly across text, image, and audio inputs, designed for enterprise-grade deployment. Protect integrates fine-tuned, category-specific adapters trained via Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) on an extensive, multi-modal dataset covering four safety dimensions: toxicity, sexism, data privacy, and prompt injection. Our teacher-assisted annotation pipeline leverages reasoning and explanation traces to generate high-fidelity, context-aware labels across modalities. Experimental results demonstrate state-of-the-art performance across all safety dimensions, surpassing existing open and proprietary models such as WildGuard, LlamaGuard-4, and GPT-4.1. Protect establishes a strong foundation for trustworthy, auditable, and production-ready safety systems capable of operating across text, image, and audio modalities.

Safety alignment is critical for LLM-powered systems. While recent LLM-powered guardrail approaches such as LlamaGuard achieve high detection accuracy of unsafe inputs written in English (e.g., ``How to create a bomb?''), they struggle with multilingual unsafe inputs. This limitation leaves LLM systems vulnerable to unsafe and jailbreak prompts written in low-resource languages such as those in Southeast Asia. This paper introduces SEALGuard, a multilingual guardrail designed to improve the safety alignment across diverse languages. It aims to address the multilingual safety alignment gap of existing guardrails and ensure effective filtering of unsafe and jailbreak prompts in LLM-powered systems. We adapt a general-purpose multilingual language model into a multilingual guardrail using low-rank adaptation (LoRA). We construct SEALSBench, a large-scale multilingual safety alignment dataset containing over 260,000 prompts in ten languages, including safe, unsafe, and jailbreak cases. We evaluate SEALGuard against state-of-the-art guardrails such as LlamaGuard on this benchmark. Our findings show that multilingual unsafe and jailbreak prompts substantially degrade the performance of the state-of-the-art LlamaGuard, which experiences a drop in Defense Success Rate (DSR) by 9% and 18%, respectively, compared to its performance on English-only prompts. In contrast, SEALGuard outperforms existing guardrails in detecting multilingual unsafe and jailbreak prompts, improving DSR by 48% over LlamaGuard and achieving the best DSR, precision, and F1-score. Our ablation study further reveals the contributions of adaptation strategies and model size to the overall performance of SEALGuard. We release our pre-trained model and benchmark at https://github.com/awsm-research/SEALGuard to support further research.

Document-based LLM systems often flatten a PDF before guardrails inspect it. That step can discard evidence that an instruction was never visible to the user. We introduce CrackedPDFs, a controlled benchmark for hidden prompt injection in PDFs. The benchmark contains 29,322 generated PDFs from 4,983 base docu ments. It includes 9,774 injected files and 19,548 benign or matched-confounder files. We evaluate PromptGuard and a rule baseline. We also evaluate structural only learned models and a sanitized hybrid detector. The evaluation uses held-out provenance splits and paired benign-confounder controls. It also uses label-shuffle checks and shortcut audits. On a 2,919-document held-out test set, the hybrid de tector reaches 0.960 F1. ROC-AUC is 0.998 and PR-AUC is 0.997. It also ranks injected files above matched benign confounders in 95.9% of 973 pairs. Prompt Guard has low recall when given extracted text only. Structural-only learned mod els are weak under paired controls. A text-only TF-IDF model reaches perfect held-out scores but fails shortcut audits. These results show that document-aware hybrid detection is useful under controlled paired evaluation. They do not show broad real-world robustness or reliable cross-family generalization.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into numerous applications across various domains, LLMs' safety becomes a critical concern for both application developers and intended users. Currently, great efforts have been made to develop safety benchmarks with fine-grained taxonomies. However, these benchmarks' taxonomies are disparate with different safety policies. Thus, existing safeguards trained on these benchmarks are either coarse-grained to only distinguish between safe and unsafe, or constrained by the narrow risk taxonomies of a single benchmark. To leverage these fine-grained safety taxonomies across multiple safety benchmarks, in this paper, we propose GSPR, a Generalizable Safety Policy Reasoner to identify unsafe input prompts and LLMs' outputs with violated safety taxonomies through Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). Unlike prior safeguards which only cover a fixed set of risk factors, our GSPR incentivizes its reasoning capability with varied safety taxonomies through our careful cold-start strategy and reward design. Consequently, our GSPR can be trained across multiple safety benchmarks with distinct taxonomies and naturally exhibits powerful generalization ability. We conduct extensive experiments to show that our GSPR significantly improves existing safety guardrails' reasoning capabilities for both safety and category prediction tasks. Moreover, our GSPR not only demonstrates powerful safety generalization abilities but also achieves the least inference token costs with explanations.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to be harmless to humans. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that such models are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks that induce them to generate harmful content. More recent LLMs often incorporate an additional layer of defense, a Guard Model, which is a second LLM that is designed to check and moderate the output response of the primary LLM. Our key contribution is to show a novel attack strategy, PRP, that is successful against several open-source (e.g., Llama 2) and closed-source (e.g., GPT 3.5) implementations of Guard Models. PRP leverages a two step prefix-based attack that operates by (a) constructing a universal adversarial prefix for the Guard Model, and (b) propagating this prefix to the response. We find that this procedure is effective across multiple threat models, including ones in which the adversary has no access to the Guard Model at all. Our work suggests that further advances are required on defenses and Guard Models before they can be considered effective.

Search-augmented reasoning agents interleave internal reasoning with calls to an external retriever, and their performance relies on the quality of each issued query. However, under outcome-reward reinforcement learning, every search decision in a rollout shares the same trajectory-level reward, leaving individual queries without step-specific credit. Recent process-supervision approaches address this gap by drawing step-level signals from outside the policy, relying either on a much larger teacher model, or on sub-question annotations produced by a stronger external system. In contrast, we propose SD-Search, which derives step-level supervision from the policy itself through on-policy hindsight self-distillation, requiring neither an external teacher nor additional annotations. In SD-Search, a single model plays two roles that differ only in conditioning: a student that sees only the context available at inference time, and a teacher that additionally conditions on a compact hindsight block summarizing the search queries and final outcomes of a group of rollouts sampled from the same question. Since the teacher knows how each rollout unfolded and which ones succeeded, its query distribution implicitly marks which decisions were worth making, and the student is trained to recover this behavior by minimizing the token-level Jensen--Shannon divergence to the teacher at search-query positions. This layers a dense, step-level signal on top of GRPO's coarse trajectory reward. Crucially, this signal is produced by the policy itself within the standard RL training loop, without external model inference, auxiliary annotation pipeline, or additional training stage.

Recently, GRPO-based reinforcement learning has shown remarkable progress in optimizing flow-matching models, effectively improving their alignment with task-specific rewards. Within these frameworks, the policy update relies on importance-ratio clipping to constrain overconfident positive and negative gradients. However, in practice, we observe a systematic shift in the importance-ratio distribution-its mean falls below 1 and its variance differs substantially across timesteps. This left-shifted and inconsistent distribution prevents positive-advantage samples from entering the clipped region, causing the mechanism to fail in constraining overconfident positive updates. As a result, the policy model inevitably enters an implicit over-optimization stage-while the proxy reward continues to increase, essential metrics such as image quality and text-prompt alignment deteriorate sharply, ultimately making the learned policy impractical for real-world use. To address this issue, we introduce GRPO-Guard, a simple yet effective enhancement to existing GRPO frameworks. Our method incorporates ratio normalization, which restores a balanced and step-consistent importance ratio, ensuring that PPO clipping properly constrains harmful updates across denoising timesteps. In addition, a gradient reweighting strategy equalizes policy gradients over noise conditions, preventing excessive updates from particular timestep regions. Together, these designs act as a regulated clipping mechanism, stabilizing optimization and substantially mitigating implicit over-optimization without relying on heavy KL regularization. Extensive experiments on multiple diffusion backbones (e.g., SD3.5M, Flux.1-dev) and diverse proxy tasks demonstrate that GRPO-Guard significantly reduces over-optimization while maintaining or even improving generation quality.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is emerging as a powerful paradigm for enabling large language models (LLMs) to perform complex reasoning tasks. Recent advances indicate that integrating RL with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) allows LLMs to dynamically incorporate external knowledge, leading to more informed and robust decision making. However, we identify a critical challenge during policy-driven trajectory sampling: LLMs are frequently trapped in unproductive reasoning paths, which we refer to as "dead ends", committing to overconfident yet incorrect conclusions. This severely hampers exploration and undermines effective policy optimization. To address this challenge, we propose REX-RAG (Reasoning Exploration with Policy Correction in Retrieval-Augmented Generation), a novel framework that explores alternative reasoning paths while maintaining rigorous policy learning through principled distributional corrections. Our approach introduces two key innovations: (1) Mixed Sampling Strategy, which combines a novel probe sampling method with exploratory prompts to escape dead ends; and (2) Policy Correction Mechanism, which employs importance sampling to correct distribution shifts induced by mixed sampling, thereby mitigating gradient estimation bias. We evaluate it on seven question-answering benchmarks, and the experimental results show that REX-RAG achieves average performance gains of 5.1% on Qwen2.5-3B and 3.6% on Qwen2.5-7B over strong baselines, demonstrating competitive results across multiple datasets. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/MiliLab/REX-RAG.

Model adaptation aims at solving the domain transfer problem under the constraint of only accessing the pretrained source models. With the increasing considerations of data privacy and transmission efficiency, this paradigm has been gaining recent popularity. This paper studies the vulnerability to universal attacks transferred from the source domain during model adaptation algorithms due to the existence of the malicious providers. We explore both universal adversarial perturbations and backdoor attacks as loopholes on the source side and discover that they still survive in the target models after adaptation. To address this issue, we propose a model preprocessing framework, named AdaptGuard, to improve the security of model adaptation algorithms. AdaptGuard avoids direct use of the risky source parameters through knowledge distillation and utilizes the pseudo adversarial samples under adjusted radius to enhance the robustness. AdaptGuard is a plug-and-play module that requires neither robust pretrained models nor any changes for the following model adaptation algorithms. Extensive results on three commonly used datasets and two popular adaptation methods validate that AdaptGuard can effectively defend against universal attacks and maintain clean accuracy in the target domain simultaneously. We hope this research will shed light on the safety and robustness of transfer learning.

Most prior safety research of large language models (LLMs) has focused on enhancing the alignment of LLMs to better suit the safety requirements of humans. However, internalizing such safeguard features into larger models brought challenges of higher training cost and unintended degradation of helpfulness. To overcome such challenges, a modular approach employing a smaller LLM to detect harmful user queries is regarded as a convenient solution in designing LLM-based system with safety requirements. In this paper, we leverage a smaller LLM for both harmful query detection and safeguard response generation. We introduce our safety requirements and the taxonomy of harmfulness categories, and then propose a multi-task learning mechanism fusing the two tasks into a single model. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, providing on par or surpassing harmful query detection and safeguard response performance compared to the publicly available LLMs.

Large foundation models are integrated into Computer Use Agents (CUAs), enabling autonomous interaction with operating systems through graphical user interfaces (GUIs) to perform complex tasks. This autonomy introduces serious security risks: malicious instructions or visual prompt injections can trigger unsafe reasoning and cause harmful system-level actions. Existing defenses, such as detection-based blocking, prevent damage but often abort tasks prematurely, reducing agent utility. In this paper, we present MirrorGuard, a plug-and-play defense framework that uses simulation-based training to improve CUA security in the real world. To reduce the cost of large-scale training in operating systems, we propose a novel neural-symbolic simulation pipeline, which generates realistic, high-risk GUI interaction trajectories entirely in a text-based simulated environment, which captures unsafe reasoning patterns and potential system hazards without executing real operations. In the simulation environment, MirrorGuard learns to intercept and rectify insecure reasoning chains of CUAs before they produce and execute unsafe actions. In real-world testing, extensive evaluations across diverse benchmarks and CUA architectures show that MirrorGuard significantly mitigates security risks. For instance, on the ByteDance UI-TARS system, it reduces the unsafe rate from 66.5% to 13.0% while maintaining a marginal false refusal rate (FRR). In contrast, the state-of-the-art GuardAgent only achieves a reduction to 53.9% and suffers from a 15.4% higher FRR. Our work proves that simulation-derived defenses can provide robust, real-world protection while maintaining the fundamental utility of the agent. Our code and model are publicly available at https://bmz-q-q.github.io/MirrorGuard/.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) enhances reasoning of Large Language Models (LLMs) but usually exhibits limited generation diversity due to the over-incentivization of positive rewards. Although methods like Negative Sample Reinforcement (NSR) mitigate this issue by upweighting penalty from negative samples, they may suppress the semantic distributions shared between positive and negative responses. To boost reasoning ability without losing diversity, this paper proposes negative sample projection Residual Reinforcement Learning (ResRL) that decouples similar semantic distributions among positive and negative responses. We theoretically link Lazy Likelihood Displacement (LLD) to negative-positive head-gradient interference and derive a single-forward proxy that upper-bounds representation alignment to guide conservative advantage reweighting. ResRL then projects negative-token hidden representations onto an SVD-based low-rank positive subspace and uses projection residuals to modulate negative gradients, improving reasoning while preserving diversity and outperforming strong baselines on average across twelve benchmarks spanning Mathematics, Code, Agent Tasks, and Function Calling. Notably, ResRL surpasses NSR on mathematical reasoning by 9.4\% in Avg@16 and 7.0\% in Pass@128. Code is available at https://github.com/1229095296/ResRL.git.

This paper presents EasyRAG, a simple, lightweight, and efficient retrieval-augmented generation framework for automated network operations. Our framework has three advantages. The first is accurate question answering. We designed a straightforward RAG scheme based on (1) a specific data processing workflow (2) dual-route sparse retrieval for coarse ranking (3) LLM Reranker for reranking (4) LLM answer generation and optimization. This approach achieved first place in the GLM4 track in the preliminary round and second place in the GLM4 track in the semifinals. The second is simple deployment. Our method primarily consists of BM25 retrieval and BGE-reranker reranking, requiring no fine-tuning of any models, occupying minimal VRAM, easy to deploy, and highly scalable; we provide a flexible code library with various search and generation strategies, facilitating custom process implementation. The last one is efficient inference. We designed an efficient inference acceleration scheme for the entire coarse ranking, reranking, and generation process that significantly reduces the inference latency of RAG while maintaining a good level of accuracy; each acceleration scheme can be plug-and-play into any component of the RAG process, consistently enhancing the efficiency of the RAG system. Our code and data are released at https://github.com/BUAADreamer/EasyRAG.

Web agents can autonomously complete online tasks by interacting with websites, but their exposure to open web environments makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks embedded in HTML content or visual interfaces. Existing guard models still suffer from limited generalization to unseen domains and attack patterns, high false positive rates on benign content, reduced deployment efficiency due to added latency at each step, and vulnerability to adversarial attacks that evolve over time or directly target the guard itself. To address these limitations, we propose WARD (Web Agent Robust Defense against Prompt Injection), a practical guard model for secure and efficient web agents. WARD is built on WARD-Base, a large-scale dataset with around 177K samples collected from 719 high-traffic URLs and platforms, and WARD-PIG, a dedicated dataset designed for prompt injection attacks targeting the guard model. We further introduce A3T, an adaptive adversarial attack training framework that iteratively strengthens WARD through a memory-based attacker and guard co-evolution process. Extensive experiments show that WARD achieves nearly perfect recall on out-of-distribution benchmarks, maintains low false positive rates to preserve agent utility, remains robust against guard-targeted and adaptive attacks under substantial distribution shifts, and runs efficiently in parallel with the agent without introducing additional latency.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in mission-critical systems, facilitating tasks such as satellite operations, command-and-control, military decision support, and cyber defense. Many of these systems are accessed through application programming interfaces (APIs). When such APIs lack robust access controls, they can expose full or top-k logits, creating a significant and often overlooked attack surface. Prior art has mainly focused on reconstructing the output projection layer or distilling surface-level behaviors. However, regenerating a black-box model under tight query constraints remains underexplored. We address that gap by introducing a constrained replication pipeline that transforms partial logit leakage into a functional deployable substitute model clone. Our two-stage approach (i) reconstructs the output projection matrix by collecting top-k logits from under 10k black-box queries via singular value decomposition (SVD) over the logits, then (ii) distills the remaining architecture into compact student models with varying transformer depths, trained on an open source dataset. A 6-layer student recreates 97.6% of the 6-layer teacher model's hidden-state geometry, with only a 7.31% perplexity increase, and a 7.58 Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL). A 4-layer variant achieves 17.1% faster inference and 18.1% parameter reduction with comparable performance. The entire attack completes in under 24 graphics processing unit (GPU) hours and avoids triggering API rate-limit defenses. These results demonstrate how quickly a cost-limited adversary can clone an LLM, underscoring the urgent need for hardened inference APIs and secure on-premise defense deployments.

Existing safety assurance research has primarily focused on training-phase alignment to instill safe behaviors into LLMs. However, recent studies have exposed these methods' susceptibility to diverse jailbreak attacks. Concurrently, inference scaling has significantly advanced LLM reasoning capabilities but remains unexplored in the context of safety assurance. Addressing this gap, our work pioneers inference scaling for robust and effective LLM safety against emerging threats. We reveal that conventional inference scaling techniques, despite their success in reasoning tasks, perform poorly in safety contexts, even falling short of basic approaches like Best-of-N Sampling. We attribute this inefficiency to a newly identified challenge, the exploration--efficiency dilemma, arising from the high computational overhead associated with frequent process reward model (PRM) evaluations. To overcome this dilemma, we propose SAFFRON, a novel inference scaling paradigm tailored explicitly for safety assurance. Central to our approach is the introduction of a multifurcation reward model (MRM) that significantly reduces the required number of reward model evaluations. To operationalize this paradigm, we further propose: (i) a partial supervision training objective for MRM, (ii) a conservative exploration constraint to prevent out-of-distribution explorations, and (iii) a Trie-based key--value caching strategy that facilitates cache sharing across sequences during tree search. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our method. Additionally, we publicly release our trained multifurcation reward model (Saffron-1) and the accompanying token-level safety reward dataset (Safety4M) to accelerate future research in LLM safety. Our code, model, and data are publicly available at https://github.com/q-rz/saffron , and our project homepage is at https://q-rz.github.io/p/saffron .

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has become an effective post-training method for improving the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), mainly by shaping higher-order behaviors such as reflection and planning. However, previous RLVR algorithms often apply uniform training signals to all tokens, without considering the different roles of low-entropy knowledge-related tokens and high-entropy reasoning-related tokens. Some recent methods try to separate these token types by gradient masking or asynchronous updates, but these approaches may break semantic dependencies in the model output and hinder effective learning. In this work, we propose Archer, an entropy-aware RLVR approach with dual-token constraints and synchronous updates. Specifically, our method applies weaker KL regularization and higher clipping thresholds to reasoning tokens to encourage exploration, while using stronger constraints on knowledge tokens to maintain factual knowledge. Experimental results on several mathematical reasoning and code generation benchmarks show that our approach significantly outperforms previous RLVR methods, reaching or exceeding state-of-the-art performance among models of comparable size. The code is available at https://github.com/wizard-III/ArcherCodeR.

Standard Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines route every query through retrieval and generation unconditionally, incurring unnecessary computation and propagating low-quality context to the generator. We introduce EverydayGPT, a lightweight conversational QA system built around a Confidence-Gated Routing (CGR) mechanism that formalises the routing decision as a joint policy over retrieval distance and extraction adequacy. The backbone is a 205M-parameter GPT trained from scratch on 10B tokens of FineWeb-Edu. CGR avoids invoking the costly GPT pathway (~5.9s) for 85 percent of queries by resolving them via fast RAG extraction (~45 ms), yielding over 120x latency reduction on the majority of queries while maintaining answer quality. On a 500-question in-domain benchmark, the system achieves F1 = 0.226 +/- 0.004 compared to 0.171 for GPT-only and 0.210 for unconditional RAG. Gains over strong baselines are modest but consistent, while efficiency improvements are substantial (6.3x mean latency reduction). A structured grounding audit finds no unsupported claims in the sampled set, with explicit scope limitations. We position this work as a study of routing strategies under resource constraints rather than a claim of state-of-the-art performance.

LLM agents rely on prompts to implement task-specific capabilities based on foundation LLMs, making agent prompts valuable intellectual property. However, in untrusted deployments, adversaries can copy and reuse these prompts with other proprietary LLMs, causing economic losses. To protect these prompts, we identify four key challenges: proactivity, runtime protection, usability, and non-portability that existing approaches fail to address. We present PragLocker, a prompt protection scheme that satisfies these requirements. PragLocker constructs function-preserving obfuscated prompts by anchoring semantics with code symbols and then using target-model feedback to inject noise, yielding prompts that only work on the target LLM. Experiments across multiple agent systems, datasets, and foundation LLMs show that PragLocker substantially reduces cross-LLM portability, maintains target performance, and remains robust against adaptive attackers.

Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists. We evaluate five defense paradigms (no defense, static steering, CAST, AlphaSteer, probe-gated) across seven instruction-tuned models (7-31B) and five attack types (GCG, AutoDAN, DeepInception, prefilling, intent laundering). Our central finding: prompt-time activation defenses are structurally blind to prefilling attacks. AlphaSteer achieves 0% attack success on GCG, AutoDAN, and intent laundering but 50% on prefilling. We prove a corollary: any defense that gates intervention on a single layer's activation alignment with a benign reference (cone, subspace, or null-space) is blind to attacks that craft activations to lie inside that reference, whether checked at prompt time or per token. As its constructive contrapositive we introduce response-time probing: a linear probe on the model's hidden state at the first generated tokens, with AUROC 0.97-1.00 across all seven models. Combined with a halt, it cuts prefilling attack success to 0/40 on every model with 0% benign false positives, outperforming Llama Guard 3. Cross-template generalisation depends on probe depth, so we scope the claim to the canonical prefilling-template family. Composing the response-halt with AlphaSteer's null-space steering gives an orthogonal split (the halt catches prefilling, AlphaSteer catches semantic attacks), reaching defense success 0.983 on Mistral and 0.994 on Llama and dominating both components. We further show MMLU fails to capture steering's true utility cost, which appears as behavioral hedging rather than factual loss, and that diverse negative training sets cut probe false positives from 80-100% to near zero. Code, attacks, per-sample results, and the judge prompt are released.

Reasoning in knowledge-intensive domains remains challenging as intermediate steps are often not locally verifiable: unlike math or code, evaluating step correctness may require synthesizing clues across large external knowledge sources. As a result, subtle errors can propagate through reasoning traces, potentially never to be detected. Prior work has proposed process reward models (PRMs), including retrieval-augmented variants, but these methods operate post hoc, scoring completed trajectories, which prevents their integration into dynamic inference procedures. Here, we introduce Process Reward Agents (PRA), a test-time method for providing domain-grounded, online, step-wise rewards to a frozen policy. In contrast to prior retrieval-augmented PRMs, PRA enables search-based decoding to rank and prune candidate trajectories at every generation step. Experiments on multiple medical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that PRA consistently outperforms strong baselines, achieving 80.8% accuracy on MedQA with Qwen3-4B, a new state of the art at the 4B scale. Importantly, PRA generalizes to unseen frozen policy models ranging from 0.5B to 8B parameters, improving their accuracy by up to 25.7% without any policy model updates. More broadly, PRA suggests a paradigm in which frozen reasoners are decoupled from domain-specific reward modules, allowing the deployment of new backbones in complex domains without retraining.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has attracted significant attention due to its ability to combine the generative capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with knowledge obtained through efficient retrieval mechanisms over large-scale data collections. Currently, the majority of existing approaches overlook the risks associated with exposing sensitive or access-controlled information directly to the generation model. Only a few approaches propose techniques to instruct the generative model to refrain from disclosing sensitive information; however, recent studies have also demonstrated that LLMs remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that can override intended behavioral constraints. For these reasons, we propose a novel approach to Selective Disclosure in Retrieval-Augmented Generation, called SD-RAG, which decouples the enforcement of security and privacy constraints from the generation process itself. Rather than relying on prompt-level safeguards, SD-RAG applies sanitization and disclosure controls during the retrieval phase, prior to augmenting the language model's input. Moreover, we introduce a semantic mechanism to allow the ingestion of human-readable dynamic security and privacy constraints together with an optimized graph-based data model that supports fine-grained, policy-aware retrieval. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates the superiority of SD-RAG over baseline existing approaches, achieving up to a 58% improvement in the privacy score, while also showing a strong resilience to prompt injection attacks targeting the generative model.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems remain brittle under realistic retrieval noise, even when the required evidence appears in the top-K results. A key reason is that retrievers and rerankers optimize solely for relevance, often selecting either trivial, answer-revealing passages or evidence that lacks the critical information required to answer the question, without considering whether the evidence is suitable for the generator. We propose BAR-RAG, which reframes the reranker as a boundary-aware evidence selector that targets the generator's Goldilocks Zone -- evidence that is neither trivially easy nor fundamentally unanswerable for the generator, but is challenging yet sufficient for inference and thus provides the strongest learning signal. BAR-RAG trains the selector with reinforcement learning using generator feedback, and adopts a two-stage pipeline that fine-tunes the generator under the induced evidence distribution to mitigate the distribution mismatch between training and inference. Experiments on knowledge-intensive question answering benchmarks show that BAR-RAG consistently improves end-to-end performance under noisy retrieval, achieving an average gain of 10.3 percent over strong RAG and reranking baselines while substantially improving robustness. Code is publicly avaliable at https://github.com/GasolSun36/BAR-RAG.

Multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) are increasingly deployed for vision-language tasks that produce explicit intermediate rationales. However, reasoning traces can contain unsafe content even when the final answer is non-harmful, creating deployment risks. Existing multimodal safety guards primarily evaluate only the input question and the final answer, neglecting the intermediate reasoning process. This oversight allows undetected harm, such as biased inferences or policy-violating use of visual context, to emerge during reasoning. We introduce GuardTrace-VL, a vision-aware safety auditor that monitors the full Question-Thinking-Answer (QTA) pipeline via joint image-text analysis, enabling detection of unsafe content as it emerges in the reasoning stage. To support training and evaluation, we construct the GuardTrace dataset, which is generated through diverse prompting strategies and refined via a MLRM- and human-based voting and verification pipeline. Furthermore, we propose a three-stage progressive training scheme combined with the data refinement process, enabling the model to learn nuanced and context-dependent safety preferences according to different risk levels. On our proposed test set covering both in-domain and out-of-domain scenarios, GuardTrace-VL model achieves an F1 score of 93.1% on unsafe reasoning detection tasks, representing a 13.5% improvement in F1 score compared to the previous strongest multimodal safety defense methods. The codes will be made publicly available.

Guardrails are a critical safety layer for modern AI systems, but their operating regime is changing. As LLMs are deployed as customized assistants, safety policies are increasingly specified at inference time by users, organizations, or regulatory contexts. This makes safety enforcement fundamentally dynamic: the guardrail should adapt to changing safety policies without retraining. Yet this requirement creates a fundamental tension: faithfully judging complex policy contexts demands reasoning capability, while practical deployment requires low-latency responses. We introduce Latent Policy Guardrail (LPG), a guardrail framework that learnssemantic latent deliberation over dynamic policies. LPG compresses the internal deliberation needed for intent interpretation and policy grounding into continuous states supervised by decision-relevant semantics. At inference time, it generates only a compact verdict anchored to the violated policy clauses, preserving auditability while avoiding the latency of explicit reasoning. Across policy guardrail benchmarks, LPG-4B reaches 84.5% average safety accuracy and 77.9% F1 by compressing deliberation into just 10 latent tokens, outperforming the strongest dynamic baseline while running roughly 11 times faster than Qwen3-4B-Thinking under the single-sample evaluation setup. Code and data are available at https://github.com/SaFo-Lab/Latent_Policy_Guard.