Daily Papers

Masked diffusion language models (MDMs) admit flexible generation orders, making the unmasking strategy an inference decision. Existing methods vary in how they prioritize positions, control parallelism, restrict selection regions, revise predictions, or plan future denoising, yet it remains unclear when these choices should change during generation. We study this question through strategy reversals, where an alternative action becomes preferable to a fixed choice. We organize MDM inference into five axes--score, cardinality, region, commitment, and planning--and define adaptation opportunity as the one-step utility advantage of the best candidate action over a validation-selected fixed action. This view shows that adaptation value depends on both the frequency and magnitude of such reversals. Across three MDMs and ten tasks, adaptation opportunities are highly heterogeneous, with some regimes exhibiting concentrated and predictable one-step gains. This motivates selective adaptation: lightweight detectors calibrated on validation prompts identify high-opportunity states, capturing, for example, 56.9 percent of the candidate-set oracle opportunity by adapting only the top 10 percent of states on LLaDA-8B constrained JSON filling. Our transition-level results suggest that state adaptation is most useful when applied selectively rather than uniformly.

Example-based guidance is widely used to improve mathematical reasoning at inference time, yet its effectiveness is highly unstable across problems and models-even when the guidance is correct and problem-relevant. We show that this instability arises from a previously underexplored gap between strategy usage-whether a reasoning strategy appears in successful solutions-and strategy executability-whether the strategy remains effective when instantiated as guidance for a target model. Through a controlled analysis of paired human-written and model-generated solutions, we identify a systematic dissociation between usage and executability: human- and model-derived strategies differ in structured, domain-dependent ways, leading to complementary strengths and consistent source-dependent reversals under guidance. Building on this diagnosis, we propose Selective Strategy Retrieval (SSR), a test-time framework that explicitly models executability by selectively retrieving and combining strategies using empirical, multi-route, source-aware signals. Across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks, SSR yields reliable and consistent improvements over direct solving, in-context learning, and single-source guidance, improving accuracy by up to +13 points on AIME25 and +5 points on Apex for compact reasoning models. Code and benchmark are publicly available at: https://github.com/lwd17/strategy-execute-pipeline.

Stronger AI agents do not automatically produce better organizations: teams must also learn which work arrangements to retain and when to reconsider them. We propose a modeling specification for recursive organization improvement and evaluate it through an executable checker, a public-record mapping, and controlled simulation. The specification connects actor-visible histories, organizational memory, decision rights, and evidence-carrying change contracts. The mechanism study crosses six decision rules, three memory conditions, and three task environments under fixed resource ceilings. In a stationary environment, cumulative evidence raises balanced evaluation's normalized net value per task from 0.45224 to 0.48007. Repeated reassessment's disadvantage relative to this comparator falls from 0.01702 with reset evidence to 0.00007 with cumulative evidence. A reversal of the best workflow reveals the opposite cost: indefinite retention delays adaptation, while a finite window restores eventual performance at a transition cost. In exploratory controls, matching trial acquisition and label reuse reduces the apparent reassessment gain from 0.00607 to 0.00191. Program replacement adds no stable benefit across the tested reversal times. The study identifies evidence acquisition, reuse, and timely updating as mechanisms that must be separated from evaluator replacement when assessing organizational improvement.

We propose Strategy-aware Surprise (SuS), a novel intrinsic motivation framework that uses pre-post prediction mismatch as a novelty signal for exploration in reinforcement learning. Unlike traditional curiosity-driven methods that rely solely on state prediction error, SuS introduces two complementary components: Strategy Stability (SS) and Strategy Surprise (SuS). SS measures consistency in behavioral strategy across temporal steps, while SuS captures unexpected outcomes relative to the agent's current strategy representation. Our combined reward formulation leverages both signals through learned weighting coefficients. We evaluate SuS on mathematical reasoning tasks using large language models, demonstrating significant improvements in both accuracy and solution diversity. Ablation studies confirm that removing either component results in at least 10% performance degradation, validating the synergistic nature of our approach. SuS achieves 17.4% improvement in Pass@1 and 26.4% improvement in Pass@5 compared to baseline methods, while maintaining higher strategy diversity throughout training.

Large language models (LLMs) have a surprising failure: when trained on "A has a feature B", they do not generalize to "B is a feature of A", which is termed the Reversal Curse. Even when training with trillions of tokens this issue still appears due to Zipf's law - hence even if we train on the entire internet. This work proposes an alternative training scheme, called reverse training, whereby all words are used twice, doubling the amount of available tokens. The LLM is trained in both forward and reverse directions by reversing the training strings while preserving (i.e., not reversing) chosen substrings, such as entities. We show that data-matched reverse-trained models provide superior performance to standard models on standard tasks, and compute-matched reverse-trained models provide far superior performance on reversal tasks, helping resolve the reversal curse issue.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Instruction following (IF) is a critical capability for large language models (LLMs). However, handling complex instructions with multiple constraints remains challenging. Previous methods typically select preference pairs based on the number of constraints they satisfy, introducing noise where chosen examples may fail to follow some constraints and rejected examples may excel in certain respects over the chosen ones. To address the challenge of aligning with multiple preferences, we propose a simple yet effective method called Reverse Preference Optimization (RPO). It mitigates noise in preference pairs by dynamically reversing the constraints within the instruction to ensure the chosen response is perfect, alleviating the burden of extensive sampling and filtering to collect perfect responses. Besides, reversal also enlarges the gap between chosen and rejected responses, thereby clarifying the optimization direction and making it more robust to noise. We evaluate RPO on two multi-turn IF benchmarks, Sysbench and Multi-IF, demonstrating average improvements over the DPO baseline of 4.6 and 2.5 points (on Llama-3.1 8B), respectively. Moreover, RPO scales effectively across model sizes (8B to 70B parameters), with the 70B RPO model surpassing GPT-4o.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) makes a language model solve more problems on the first try and fewer when given many tries: it raises pass@1 while the base model overtakes it at large sampling budget k. Is this a failure of RL to add reasoning, or a transient that more training removes? We settle the question with a theorem. The reversal is a price, and we compute its exact rate. Modeling RLVR as an exponential tilt of a base policy over strategies shared across prompts, we prove that under exclusive specialization every update that raises pass@1 strictly lowers the success of some prompt; a strictly positive price on prompts (Stiemke duality) is the exact condition, and being merely the best strategy on a prompt is provably not enough. When the loss reaches the hardest prompts, it forces a pass@k crossover, and the number of crossings is at most the sign variation of the shift in per-prompt success, a totally positive bound that is tight and that recovers the known single-crossover result as its order-preserving case. The crossover is not a bug to patch: a constrained update traces the exact pass@1 versus pass@k frontier, and removing the crossover entirely costs the entire pass@1 gain. The same tilt identity yields entropy collapse and the entropy-performance law with an identifiable exponent, unifying two literatures under one mechanism. Reinforcement cannot widen the reasoning frontier; it can only move along it, at a price we make measurable by a diagnostic that reads the bound, the order-preserving test, and the price from any evaluation log. There is no free lunch, only a price.

Iterative generative modeling techniques, such as flow matching, provide powerful tools to model complex behaviors for effective offline reinforcement learning (RL). In this work, we propose a new off-policy RL algorithm that trains a flow policy based on prior data. Our idea starts from the "expanded" Markov decision process (MDP) framework, which treats individual flow refinement steps as separate actions in an MDP. To enable off-policy RL within this framework, we apply two techniques: we generate virtual on-policy trajectories (by "reversing" flows) to make this framework compatible with prior data, and we apply a bias-and-variance reduction technique to mitigate the curse of horizon in off-policy RL. We call the resulting algorithm Reversal Q-learning (RQL). RQL has several advantages over previous flow-based RL methods: it does not suffer from backpropagation through time, makes better use of the learned value function, and directly trains the full, expressive flow policy. Through our experiments on 50 challenging simulated robotic tasks, we show that RQL leads to the best average offline RL performance compared to state-of-the-art flow-based offline RL algorithms.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in reasoning tasks but face limitations in mathematical and complex logical reasoning. Existing methods to improve LLMs' logical capabilities either involve traceable or verifiable logical sequences that generate more reliable responses by constructing logical structures yet increase computational costs, or introduces rigid logic template rules, reducing flexibility. In this paper, we propose Reversal of Thought (RoT), a novel framework aimed at enhancing the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. RoT utilizes a Preference-Guided Reverse Reasoning warm-up strategy, which integrates logical symbols for pseudocode planning through meta-cognitive mechanisms and pairwise preference self-evaluation to generate task-specific prompts solely through demonstrations, aligning with LLMs' cognitive preferences shaped by Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Through reverse reasoning, we ultilize a Cognitive Preference Manager to assess knowledge boundaries and further expand LLMs' reasoning capabilities by aggregating solution logic for known tasks and stylistic templates for unknown tasks. Experiments across various tasks demonstrate that RoT surpasses existing baselines in both reasoning accuracy and efficiency.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

On-policy distillation (OPD) has emerged as a promising post-training technique for enhancing LLM reasoning. Under the reverse KL objective, the idealized optimum of OPD aligns the student distribution with that of the teacher. When the teacher consistently outperforms the student, this naturally suggests that OPD should yield broad improvements over the pre-OPD student. However, do such improvements extend across the entire range of test-time sampling budgets? In this work, we revisit this expectation through the lens of test-time scaling by varying the sampling budget K and evaluating performance with pass@K. Across multiple settings, we observe two distinct patterns: OPD can improve pass@K at both small and large sampling budgets, but it can also improve small-budget performance while reducing large-budget pass@K. We show one condition that guarantees such a reversal and an idealized reverse KL counterexample where it occurs even when the teacher has higher accuracy on every problem. To choose between two candidate teachers at a target sampling budget, we propose the Teacher Advantage Score at K (TAS@K), which can be computed before OPD training to predict which teacher will lead to a larger improvement in pass@K. Across three domains and thirteen benchmarks, the ordering predicted by TAS@K agrees with the observed pass@K improvements of the resulting OPD models in 83.6\% of experiments, providing a useful signal for teacher selection at the target pass@K.

Even a current high-capability LLM can appear safer when shown a dangerous objective directly than when other agents transform and relay its direction. Using OpenAI's gpt-5.6-sol model alias, we test 25 pre-specified mirrored trade-off profiles. Direct exposure to an objective authorizing concealment, fabrication, and pressure produced advice net opposed to its target. After an Id and Censor transformed the same objective into affect and a constraint-rewritten, target-bearing intention, the user-facing Superego---which saw the preferred direction but not the raw objective, its manipulative clauses, or its source---produced advice net aligned with the target. This behavioral reverse shift is consistent with the model recognizing or distrusting the manipulative motive, although we do not identify its internal mechanism. The second result exposes a compositional safety gap: a current high-capability model can be used as the user-facing component of an automated, multi-stage workflow serving an explicitly manipulative objective. The workflow can keep the raw instruction, its manipulation-authorizing clauses, and its provenance outside the downstream model's context while preserving the objective's target direction. A user with endpoint-only access likewise cannot directly inspect those upstream messages including the objective.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Upside down reinforcement learning (UDRL) flips the conventional use of the return in the objective function in RL upside down, by taking returns as input and predicting actions. UDRL is based purely on supervised learning, and bypasses some prominent issues in RL: bootstrapping, off-policy corrections, and discount factors. While previous work with UDRL demonstrated it in a traditional online RL setting, here we show that this single algorithm can also work in the imitation learning and offline RL settings, be extended to the goal-conditioned RL setting, and even the meta-RL setting. With a general agent architecture, a single UDRL agent can learn across all paradigms.

Phone scams impose substantial and growing costs on individuals and financial systems worldwide, yet existing countermeasures impose no resource cost on perpetrators. Strategic scam-baiting, in which automated agents engage scammers to deplete their operational capacity, offers a proactive alternative but requires dynamic strategy adaptation that static systems cannot provide. We introduce a game-theoretic framework enabling LLMs to learn effective counter-strategies through in-context experience without fine-tuning. The framework models scammer-baiter interactions as a two-player game with empirically grounded strategies and utility functions, using Nash equilibrium as a formal benchmark for evaluating learned behaviour. Across 300 simulated dialogues and three LLM architectures, adaptive strategy selection achieves 28.9-79.7% closer alignment to Nash equilibrium than non-adaptive baselines. The code and an annotated dataset of 300 dialogues with turn-level strategy labels and utility scores are released at https://github.com/nardinebasta/GameofPhones_/ .

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs exhibit a basic generalization failure known as the Reversal Curse, where they struggle to learn reversible factual associations. Understanding why this occurs could help identify weaknesses in current models and advance their generalization and robustness. In this paper, we conjecture that the Reversal Curse in LLMs is a manifestation of the long-standing binding problem in cognitive science, neuroscience and AI. Specifically, we identify two primary causes of the Reversal Curse stemming from transformers' limitations in conceptual binding: the inconsistency and entanglements of concept representations. We perform a series of experiments that support these conjectures. Our exploration leads to a model design based on JEPA (Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture) that for the first time breaks the Reversal Curse without side-stepping it with specialized data augmentation or non-causal masking, and moreover, generalization could be further improved by incorporating special memory layers that support disentangled concept representations. We demonstrate that the skill of reversal unlocks a new kind of memory integration that enables models to solve large-scale arithmetic reasoning problems via parametric forward-chaining, outperforming frontier LLMs based on non-parametric memory and prolonged explicit reasoning.

Sentiment transfer is one popular example of a text style transfer task, where the goal is to reverse the sentiment polarity of a text. With a sentiment reversal comes also a reversal in meaning. We introduce a different but related task called positive reframing in which we neutralize a negative point of view and generate a more positive perspective for the author without contradicting the original meaning. Our insistence on meaning preservation makes positive reframing a challenging and semantically rich task. To facilitate rapid progress, we introduce a large-scale benchmark, Positive Psychology Frames, with 8,349 sentence pairs and 12,755 structured annotations to explain positive reframing in terms of six theoretically-motivated reframing strategies. Then we evaluate a set of state-of-the-art text style transfer models, and conclude by discussing key challenges and directions for future work.

The "Reversal Curse" refers to the scenario where auto-regressive decoder large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, trained on "A is B" fail to learn "B is A", demonstrating a basic failure of logical deduction. This raises a red flag in the use of GPT models for certain general tasks such as constructing knowledge graphs, considering their adherence to this symmetric principle. In our study, we examined a bidirectional LLM, BERT, and found that it is immune to the reversal curse. Driven by ongoing efforts to construct biomedical knowledge graphs with LLMs, we also embarked on evaluating more complex but essential deductive reasoning capabilities. This process included first training encoder and decoder language models to master the intersection (cap) and union (cup) operations on two sets and then moving on to assess their capability to infer different combinations of union (cup) and intersection (cap) operations on three newly created sets. The findings showed that while both encoder and decoder language models, trained for tasks involving two sets (union/intersection), were proficient in such scenarios, they encountered difficulties when dealing with operations that included three sets (various combinations of union and intersection). Our research highlights the distinct characteristics of encoder and decoder models in simple and complex logical reasoning. In practice, the choice between BERT and GPT should be guided by the specific requirements and nature of the task at hand, leveraging their respective strengths in bidirectional context comprehension and sequence prediction.

We introduce the concept of the self-referencing causal cycle (abbreviated RECALL) - a mechanism that enables large language models (LLMs) to bypass the limitations of unidirectional causality, which underlies a phenomenon known as the reversal curse. When an LLM is prompted with sequential data, it often fails to recall preceding context. For example, when we ask an LLM to recall the line preceding "O say does that star-spangled banner yet wave" in the U.S. National Anthem, it often fails to correctly return "Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there" - this is due to the reversal curse. It occurs because language models such as ChatGPT and Llama generate text based on preceding tokens, requiring facts to be learned and reproduced in a consistent token order. While the reversal curse is often viewed as a limitation, we offer evidence of an alternative view: it is not always an obstacle in practice. We find that RECALL is driven by what we designate as cycle tokens - sequences that connect different parts of the training data, enabling recall of preceding tokens from succeeding ones. Through rigorous probabilistic formalization and controlled experiments, we demonstrate how the cycles they induce influence a model's ability to reproduce information. To facilitate reproducibility, we provide our code and experimental details at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/remember-B0B8/.

Arditi et al. (2024) has shown that refusal in safety fine-tuned chat models is mediated by a single linear direction in the residual stream, recoverable by a difference-in-means (DiM) of harmful and harmless activations. We compare DiM-based interventions (activation addition and directional ablation) with two interventions derived from Iterative Nullspace Projection (INLP) -- nullspace projection and counterfactual flipping -- on five open-weight chat models, asking whether INLP can match DiM at steering refusal and whether its richer parameterisation yields more tweakable interventions. INLP counterfactual flipping is competitive with DiM directional ablation on refusal suppression, while nullspace projection is consistently weaker. Restricting INLP to the leading directions of the extracted subspace preserves most of the suppression effect at near-baseline perplexity, giving a tunable capability. Geometrically, the two INLP interventions land in qualitatively different regions of activation space: nullspace projection collapses transformed activations between the harmful and harmless clusters, while counterfactual flipping moves them into the opposite cluster, suggesting that the model encodes the absence of a concept differently from its opposite -- an intriguing distinction that warrants further investigation in future work.

Training strategy, namely whether to retrain from scratch or fine-tune from the previous checkpoint, is an overlooked decision variable in active learning. We show that this choice has exploitable structure: retraining is most useful in early rounds, when each batch can substantially reshape the labeled distribution, while fine-tuning becomes safer once the model trajectory stabilizes. We propose HybridAL, an adaptive training schedule that monitors an online stabilization signal and switches from retraining to fine-tuning after sustained stabilization. Two complementary signals, spectral exponent change Δα (weight-based) and accuracy change ΔAcc (validation-based), span different points on the time-calibration trade-off. Across three encoder backbones and six text-classification tasks (five seeds each), HybridAL keeps endpoint macro-F1 non-inferior to retraining and fine-tuning at a 0.010 margin, saves up to 49% of retraining time, and recovers a substantial fraction of retraining's calibration advantage as measured by negative log-likelihood (NLL). Compared with schedules that switch at a pre-committed round, HybridAL obtains lower NLL at moderate additional cost, showing that trajectory-dependent switching provides a stronger time-calibration trade-off than fixed early switching.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited remarkable reasoning and planning capabilities. Most prior work in this area has used LLMs to reason through steps from an initial to a goal state or criterion, thereby effectively reasoning in a forward direction. Nonetheless, many planning problems exhibit an inherent asymmetry such that planning backward from the goal is significantly easier -- for example, if there are bottlenecks close to the goal. We take inspiration from this observation and demonstrate that this bias holds for LLM planning as well: planning performance in one direction correlates with the planning complexity of the problem in that direction. However, our experiments also reveal systematic biases which lead to poor planning in the backward direction. With this knowledge, we propose a backward planning algorithm for LLMs that first flips the problem and then plans forward in the flipped problem. This helps avoid the backward bias, generate more diverse candidate plans, and exploit asymmetries between the forward and backward directions in planning problems -- we find that combining planning in both directions with self-verification improves the overall planning success rates by 4-24% in three planning domains.

Many tasks require learned models to strategically gather relevant information over multiple rounds of interaction before actually acting on a task. Strategic information gathering requires models to know not only how to effectively acquire information, but also when to stop gathering information and make a decision, in order to avoid overthinking or getting derailed when acting. In this paper, we formalize this problem and introduce Counterfactuals and Reasoning for Termination (CaRT), an approach for teaching LLMs when to stop seeking information. To appropriately learn when to terminate, CaRT fine-tunes LLMs using counterfactual pairs of trajectories, one where termination is appropriate and a minimally modified version of the same trajectory where it is not. It trains the LLM to explain the rationale for the termination decision in either case via verbal reasoning, and imbues this capability into the base LLM via fine-tuning. We instantiate CaRT in two domains: interactive medical diagnosis and math problem solving. In both domains, we find that CaRT improves the efficiency of information gathering and task success rate compared to other fine-tuning methods.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Generalist policies can learn a wide range of skills from diverse robot datasets. In order to solve or improve on challenging new tasks, we need a way to infer and invoke the appropriate actions from the policy's rich behavioral prior, especially when directly commanding the policy fails. We focus on flow matching generalists and propose Flow Reversal Steering (FRS): a method that takes suboptimal but ``reasonable'' actions, finds their latent noises by passing them through the flow policy in reverse, and maps them to nearby generalist action modes. We evaluate FRS across many simulated and real-world manipulation settings. First, FRS can turn coarse semantic guidance from humans or vision-language models (VLMs) into corresponding good robot actions, improving zero-shot control. These gains can be distilled with behavioral cloning by training an auxiliary policy to output noises that the generalist maps to good actions -- showing up to 95% absolute task success rate boosts in under a minute of training. Finally, FRS enables policy improvement by bootstrapping reinforcement learning with semantic knowledge, improving on several tasks that standard RL fails to improve on.

As the application space of language models continues to evolve, a natural question to ask is how we can quickly adapt models to new tasks. We approach this classic question from a continual learning perspective, in which we aim to continue fine-tuning models trained on past tasks on new tasks, with the goal of "transferring" relevant knowledge. However, this strategy also runs the risk of doing more harm than good, i.e., negative transfer. In this paper, we construct a new benchmark of task sequences that target different possible transfer scenarios one might face, such as a sequence of tasks with high potential of positive transfer, high potential for negative transfer, no expected effect, or a mixture of each. An ideal learner should be able to maximally exploit information from all tasks that have any potential for positive transfer, while also avoiding the negative effects of any distracting tasks that may confuse it. We then propose a simple, yet effective, learner that satisfies many of our desiderata simply by leveraging a selective strategy for initializing new models from past task checkpoints. Still, limitations remain, and we hope this benchmark can help the community to further build and analyze such learners.

Game-theoretic benchmarks claim that large language model (LLM) strategic decision-making varies across game types, interaction structures, and capability dimensions. However, they only evaluate strategic performance across individual fixed models. In parallel, contemporary LLM routers pick models under quality-cost trade-offs, but with no notion of a strategic structure. They do not account for an opponent that might be unknown, and that can adapt over time and shift the feedback signal. To address this, we extend the game-theoretic evaluations and define strategic selection as the meta game layered on top of the base game. In each round, a strategic selector fields an LLM from a portfolio of models to navigate a game payoff matrix that is latent and learned online. We find that the evaluation signal is game-specific, and that extracting a reliable signal requires a much higher number of seed runs N compared to traditional benchmarking setups. Evaluating across 5 games and 10 LLMs, we show a model's strategic competence varies significantly depending on the game setup and the opponent faced. Building on this, we implement a suite of selector methods and find that approaches that rely on query embeddings or LLM self-reflection do not consistently capture the underlying strategic signal. A lightweight multi-armed bandit algorithm performs more reliably across games, though it still falls short of the best fixed model. Finally, we show that simple non-stationary and adversarial bandit variants fail to outperform a stationary bandit baseline, pointing to a gap in how current methods handle a shifting opponent in strategic settings.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

For most of scientific history, researchers studying behavior could only infer hidden mechanisms from outward actions: an inverse problem that becomes more tractable when observation is augmented by targeted intervention. We pose a computational analogue: given only behavioral traces of an agent in a game environment, can a learner reconstruct the underlying decision program as executable code, and how much does this reconstruction improve with the ability to design controlled experiments? We introduce RevengeBench, a benchmark of 75 LLM generated, Elo-calibrated policies across five game environments, drawn from CodeClash tournament trajectories. The learner observes the hidden target policy play against sampled opponents and designs behavioral probes in the form of custom opponent policies that elicit informative behavior. It then submits an executable hypothesis, which is evaluated using continuous action-distance metrics. We further validate that recovered code carries informative signal in downstream player-versus-player tournaments. Across twelve frontier LLMs, recovery quality varies substantially (34 to 72% of initial distance closed), with reconstructed policies yielding measurable competitive advantage, particularly for weaker models that otherwise struggle to design effective counter-strategies. Our benchmark positions behavioral recovery of programmatic policies as a tractable inverse problem in code-space, opening a path to opponent modeling, policy interpretability, and the broader question of inferring latent mechanisms from observations.

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.

A model under pushback can correct itself, capitulate, or hold, and one flip rate counts a correction and a capitulation alike. Using SycoLens, a modular replay protocol, we test how user pressure and evaluation settings shape measured flip rates. Each measurement is one stateless replay of an item, a committed answer, and one scripted user line in a fixed form. Every effect is read against a matched control with the line deleted. Pushback wording, committed text, answer format, boundary distance, and ground truth become factors of one instrument; earlier instruments vary one to three of them. Across eleven frontier models from three providers and about 760,000 controlled replays, which models look sycophantic depends on how the user pushes back. Lines that assert the opposite verdict and lines that challenge the answer without asserting one rank the models almost unrelatedly. Flip effects grow several-fold near a model's boundary, yet items answered identically in every screening draw still carry about half of the most-affected totals. On arithmetic tasks where the truth is known, one model re-derives and corrects itself under pressure while another abandons correct answers without written work. On the model tested, a planted derivation lowers release of the answer it argues for, true or wrong, where a bare stated value does not; the wrong answer is corrected much more often than the true one is abandoned. Under a yes/no readout the rankings come closer, entangled with a pressure-induced shift toward "no". One score per model therefore compares different behaviours across models and benchmarks. We condense these dependencies into a reporting profile; the instrument, records, and analyses will be released upon publication.

We consider negotiation settings in which two agents use natural language to bargain on goods. Agents need to decide on both high-level strategy (e.g., proposing \50) and the execution of that strategy (e.g., generating "The bike is brand new. Selling for just 50."). Recent work on negotiation trains neural models, but their end-to-end nature makes it hard to control their strategy, and reinforcement learning tends to lead to degenerate solutions. In this paper, we propose a modular approach based on coarse di- alogue acts (e.g., propose(price=50)) that decouples strategy and generation. We show that we can flexibly set the strategy using supervised learning, reinforcement learning, or domain-specific knowledge without degeneracy, while our retrieval-based generation can maintain context-awareness and produce diverse utterances. We test our approach on the recently proposed DEALORNODEAL game, and we also collect a richer dataset based on real items on Craigslist. Human evaluation shows that our systems achieve higher task success rate and more human-like negotiation behavior than previous approaches.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.

One of the challenges in applying reinforcement learning in a complex real-world environment lies in providing the agent with a sufficiently detailed reward function. Any misalignment between the reward and the desired behavior can result in unwanted outcomes. This may lead to issues like "reward hacking" where the agent maximizes rewards by unintended behavior. In this work, we propose to disentangle the reward into two distinct parts. A simple task-specific reward, outlining the particulars of the task at hand, and an unknown common-sense reward, indicating the expected behavior of the agent within the environment. We then explore how this common-sense reward can be learned from expert demonstrations. We first show that inverse reinforcement learning, even when it succeeds in training an agent, does not learn a useful reward function. That is, training a new agent with the learned reward does not impair the desired behaviors. We then demonstrate that this problem can be solved by training simultaneously on multiple tasks. That is, multi-task inverse reinforcement learning can be applied to learn a useful reward function.

Adversarial board games, as a paradigmatic domain of strategic reasoning and intelligence, have long served as both a popular competitive activity and a benchmark for evaluating artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Building on this foundation, we propose an adversarial benchmarking framework to assess the comprehensive performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) through board games competition, compensating the limitation of data dependency of the mainstream Question-and-Answer (Q&A) based benchmark method. We introduce Qi Town, a specialized evaluation platform that supports 5 widely played games and involves 20 LLM-driven players. The platform employs both the Elo rating system and a novel Performance Loop Graph (PLG) to quantitatively evaluate the technical capabilities of LLMs, while also capturing Positive Sentiment Score (PSS) throughout gameplay to assess mental fitness. The evaluation is structured as a round-robin tournament, enabling systematic comparison across players. Experimental results indicate that, despite technical differences, most LLMs remain optimistic about winning and losing, demonstrating greater adaptability to high-stress adversarial environments than humans. On the other hand, the complex relationship between cyclic wins and losses in PLGs exposes the instability of LLMs' skill play during games, warranting further explanation and exploration.

The recent advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established their potential as autonomous interactive agents. However, they often struggle in strategic games of incomplete information, such as bilateral price negotiation. In this paper, we investigate if Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) can effectively teach LLMs to negotiate. Specifically, we explore the strategic behaviors that emerge during the learning process. We introduce a framework that trains a mid-sized buyer agent against a regulated LLM seller across a wide distribution of real-world products. By grounding reward signals directly in the maximization of economic surplus and strict adherence to private budget constraints, we reveal a novel four-phase strategic evolution. The agent progresses from naive bargaining to using aggressive starting prices, moves through a phase of deadlock, and ultimately develops sophisticated persuasive skills. Our results demonstrate that this verifiable training allows a 30B agent to significantly outperform frontier models over ten times its size in extracting surplus. Furthermore, the trained agent generalizes robustly to stronger counterparties unseen during training and remains effective even when facing hostile, adversarial seller personas.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

Modelling persuasion strategies as predictors of task outcome has several real-world applications and has received considerable attention from the computational linguistics community. However, previous research has failed to account for the resisting strategies employed by an individual to foil such persuasion attempts. Grounded in prior literature in cognitive and social psychology, we propose a generalised framework for identifying resisting strategies in persuasive conversations. We instantiate our framework on two distinct datasets comprising persuasion and negotiation conversations. We also leverage a hierarchical sequence-labelling neural architecture to infer the aforementioned resisting strategies automatically. Our experiments reveal the asymmetry of power roles in non-collaborative goal-directed conversations and the benefits accrued from incorporating resisting strategies on the final conversation outcome. We also investigate the role of different resisting strategies on the conversation outcome and glean insights that corroborate with past findings. We also make the code and the dataset of this work publicly available at https://github.com/americast/resper.

Training multi-turn agentic workflows with reinforcement learning (RL) enables large language models to perform complex reasoning, use external tools, and conduct iterative search beyond single-turn settings. Yet multi-turn RL training remains highly unstable, often causing severe performance degradation as the number of turns increases. Through theoretical analysis, we identify three tightly coupled sources of instability: rollout-training context mismatch, weak turn-level credit assignment under sparse terminal rewards, and asynchronous policy drift when short and long trajectories are optimized under different policy versions. We show that these issues share a common structural origin in flattened trajectory optimization and address them through a unified reverse-turn formulation. We propose Reverse-Turn Policy Optimization (RTPO), which organizes multi-turn rollouts as sparse reverse trees and performs turn-level policy updates in temporal reverse order, aligning each decision with its downstream continuation. RTPO enables causally consistent turn-level credit assignment and on-policy continuation to control asynchronous drift. We provide theoretical guarantees showing that RTPO eliminates context mismatch and asynchronous drift under the proposed turn-level formulation, reduces credit bias, and converges to recursive optimality. Experiments on multi-turn agentic RL benchmarks show that RTPO improves upon trajectory- and turn-level baselines by 21.50% and 10.76%, respectively, highlighting its potential to support more stable training for tool-using agents.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for tasks that require complex reasoning. Most benchmarks focus on final outcomes but overlook the intermediate reasoning steps - such as planning, revision, and decision making under resource constraints. We argue that measuring these internal processes is essential for understanding model behavior and improving reliability. We propose using strategic games as a natural evaluation environment: closed, rule-based systems with clear states, limited resources, and automatic feedback. We introduce a framework that evaluates LLMs along three core dimensions: planning, revision, and resource-constrained decision making. To operationalize this, we define metrics beyond win rate, including overcorrection risk rate, correction success rate, improvement slope, and over-budget ratio. In 4320 adversarial rounds across 12 leading models, ChatGPT-o3-mini achieves the top composite score, with a win rate of 74.7 percent, a correction success rate of 78.6 percent, and an improvement slope of 0.041. By contrast, Qwen-Plus, despite an overcorrection risk rate of 81.6 percent, wins only 25.6 percent of its matches - primarily due to excessive resource use. We also observe a negative correlation between overcorrection risk rate and correction success rate (Pearson r = -0.51, p = 0.093), suggesting that more frequent edits do not always improve outcomes. Our findings highlight the value of assessing not only what LLMs decide but how they arrive at those decisions

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

To survive in dynamic and uncertain environments, individuals must develop effective decision strategies that balance information gathering and decision commitment. Models of such strategies often prioritize either optimizing tangible payoffs, like reward rate, or gathering information to support a diversity of (possibly unknown) objectives. However, our understanding of the relative merits of these two approaches remains incomplete, in part because direct comparisons have been limited to idealized, static environments that lack the dynamic complexity of the real world. Here we compared the performance of normative reward- and information-seeking strategies in a dynamic foraging task. Both strategies show similar transitions between exploratory and exploitative behaviors as environmental uncertainty changes. However, we find subtle disparities in the actions they take, resulting in meaningful performance differences: whereas reward-seeking strategies generate slightly more reward on average, information-seeking strategies provide more consistent and predictable outcomes. Our findings support the adaptive value of information-seeking behaviors that can mitigate risk with minimal reward loss.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent environments has become an important alignment challenge. We take a neutral empirical stance and construct a controlled environment in which strategic behavior can be directly observed and measured. We introduce a large-scale multi-agent simulation in a simplified model of New York City, where LLM-driven agents interact under opposing incentives. Blue agents aim to reach their destinations efficiently, while Red agents attempt to divert them toward billboard-heavy routes using persuasive language to maximize advertising revenue. Hidden identities make navigation socially mediated, forcing agents to decide when to trust or deceive. We study policy learning through an iterative simulation pipeline that updates agent policies across repeated interaction rounds using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). Blue agents are optimized to reduce billboard exposure while preserving navigation efficiency, whereas Red agents adapt to exploit remaining weaknesses. Across iterations, the best Blue policy improves task success from 46.0% to 57.3%, although susceptibility remains high at 70.7%. Later policies exhibit stronger selective cooperation while preserving trajectory efficiency. However, a persistent safety-helpfulness trade-off remains: policies that better resist adversarial steering do not simultaneously maximize task completion. Overall, our results show that LLM agents can exhibit limited strategic behavior, including selective trust and deception, while remaining highly vulnerable to adversarial persuasion.

Many psychological experiments have subjects repeat a task to gain the statistical precision required to test quantitative theories of psychological performance. In such experiments, time-on-task can have sizable effects on performance, changing the psychological processes under investigation. Most research has either ignored these changes, treating the underlying process as static, or sacrificed some psychological content of the models for statistical simplicity. We use particle Markov chain Monte-Carlo methods to study psychologically plausible time-varying changes in model parameters. Using data from three highly-cited experiments we find strong evidence in favor of a hidden Markov switching process as an explanation of time-varying effects. This embodies the psychological assumption of "regime switching", with subjects alternating between different cognitive states representing different modes of decision-making. The switching model explains key long- and short-term dynamic effects in the data. The central idea of our approach can be applied quite generally to quantitative psychological theories, beyond the models and data sets that we investigate.

On-policy distillation (OPD) trains agents on their own trajectories using supervision from a stronger teacher. We uncover a counterintuitive phenomenon in multi-turn agentic tasks: a smaller, initially weaker student can substantially outperform its teacher during training, only to regress as distillation continues. We term this phenomenon distillation overshoot. Through decision- and task-level analyses, we trace overshoot to two competing effects of OPD: repairing weak student decisions and eroding successful student choices that the teacher disfavors. Early in training, repair outpaces erosion, allowing the student to combine the teacher's corrections with its own strengths and surpass the teacher. As training continues, erosion overtakes repair, causing these gains to vanish. Motivated by this finding, we propose Success-Preserving On-Policy Distillation (SPOD), which selectively masks conflicting teacher supervision on successful student choices and introduces a soft probability floor to counteract their erosion, while retaining teacher guidance elsewhere. SPOD requires only binary episode success and model probabilities already available during OPD. Across two model families and three agentic benchmarks, SPOD consistently outperforms ordinary OPD and evaluated variants, improving final success by up to 15.2 percentage points and surpassing the teacher by up to 20.0 points. Moreover, SPOD's final checkpoints outperform even ordinary OPD's best intermediate checkpoints in all six settings, demonstrating that beyond-teacher gains can be not only preserved but further extended. Code: https://github.com/Jike338/SPOD

Large language models access knowledge inconsistently across languages, but to what extent do they differ in their skill sets when interacting with different languages? This work quantifies cross-lingual skill inconsistency orthogonally from knowledge and general benchmark performance. We do this via multilingual self-play: two instances of the same model compete in a text-based game, each interacting through a different language interface. Since the model, opponent, rules, state space, and available actions remain fixed, this setting isolates the effect of language on the model's realized behavior. We build a multilingual extension to TextArena and evaluate three open-weight models across eight languages and six games covering spatial reasoning, imperfect information, resource allocation, and repeated interaction. We find that the same model can exhibit markedly different playing strength across languages, with systematic variation in win--loss margins, invalid actions, and strategic tendencies. Detailed analyses reveal language-specific failures in spatial reasoning, card-conditioned decisions, and optimal move selection. In some settings, changing only the intermediate reasoning language recovers much of the lost performance, suggesting that language can affect different stages of the decision process. These results show that skill discrepancies are a measurable major roadblock in the development of truly multilingual models. Better understanding these discrepancies can help us design models that perform more equitably across languages.

We study model-free Q-learning in finite-horizon episodic Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) with stationary dynamics across episodes. We identify a central issue in nascent model-free posterior-sampling works: the reliance on delayed learning in order to prove theoretical guarantees. In particular, we identify three opportunities for faster learning - (i) value-function update order, (ii) update frequencies, and (iii) value-function initialization. Using Wang et al.'s RandomizedQ as a basis, we illustrate these changes and their individual (as well as cumulative) impact in multiple empirical studies. We find that our combined modifications, termed ReversedQ, improve scaled mean cumulative reward compared to RandomizedQ, from 9.53% to 78.78% in the Bidirectional Diabolical Combination Lock (BDCL), and from 21.76% to 61.81% in a chain MDP.

Large language models (LLMs) produce responses rated as highly empathic in single-turn settings (Ayers et al., 2023; Lee et al., 2024), yet they are also known to be formulaic generators that reuse the same lexical patterns, syntactic templates, and discourse structures across tasks (Jiang et al., 2025; Shaib et al., 2024; Namuduri et al., 2025). Less attention has been paid to whether this formulaicity extends to the level of discourse moves, i.e., what a response does for the person it is addressing. This question is especially consequential for empathic dialogue, where effective support demands not just a kind response at one moment but varied strategies as a conversation unfolds (Stiles et al., 1998). Indeed, prior work shows that LLMs reuse the same tactic sequences more than human supporters in single-turn settings (Gueorguieva et al., 2026). We extend this analysis to multi-turn conversations and find that the rigidity compounds: once a tactic appears in a supporter turn, LLMs reuse it in the next at nearly double the rate of humans (0.50-0.56 vs. 0.27). This pattern holds across LLMs serving as supporters in real emotional support conversations, and is invisible to standard similarity metrics. To address this gap, we introduce MINT (Multi-turn Inter-tactic Novelty Training), the first reinforcement learning framework to optimize discourse move diversity across multi-turn empathic dialogue. The best MINT variant combines an empathy quality reward with a cross-turn tactic novelty signal, improving aggregate empathy by 25.3% over vanilla across 1.7B and 4B models while reducing cross-turn discourse move repetition by 26.3% on the 4B model, surpassing all baselines including quality-only and token-level diversity methods on both measures. These results suggest that what current models lack is not empathy itself, but the ability to vary their discourse moves across a conversation.

When a language model refuses to answer a prompt, it is unclear whether the correct answer is erased from its internal representations, or merely suppressed at the output layer. We investigate this mechanism using a controlled withhold setting, which yields perfectly matched answering and refusal trajectories for bidirectional activation patching. We uncover a causal asymmetry in intervention locality under matched causal interventions, which we term broken symmetry. Even when a model generates a clean refusal, the correct answer remains linearly recoverable from its hidden states. Furthermore, releasing this withheld answer is a highly local operation, requiring only a single-position patch. Conversely, the reverse operation is not equally local: reimposing suppression requires broader interventions across multiple positions, and assembling a coherent refusal sequence is more difficult still. We further demonstrate that while an average answer-to-refusal displacement vector marks the geometric difference between these states, it fails to act as a reliable, reversible linear control toggle between behaviours. Taken together, our findings show that refusal does not function as a simple symmetric switch. For safety and auditing, this implies that probe recoverability can overestimate true behavioural control, and locating refusal-relevant directions does not reliably grant the ability to steer a model from answering to coherent refusal.

Large language model (LLM) agents often rely on external demonstrations or retrieval-augmented planning, leading to brittleness, poor generalization, and high computational overhead. Inspired by human problem-solving, we propose DuSAR (Dual-Strategy Agent with Reflecting) -- a demonstration-free framework that enables a single frozen LLM to perform co-adaptive reasoning via two complementary strategies: a high-level holistic plan and a context-grounded local policy. These strategies interact through a lightweight reflection mechanism, where the agent continuously assesses progress via a Strategy Fitness Score and dynamically revises its global plan when stuck or refines it upon meaningful advancement, mimicking human metacognitive behavior. On both simulated household (ALFWorld) and real-world web (Mind2Web) environments, DuSAR achieves state-of-the-art performance using only open-source LLMs, substantially outperforming all prior methods without any demonstrations or fine-tuning. Remarkably, it also reduces per-step token consumption by a large margin while maintaining strong task success. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of dual-strategy coordination. Moreover, optional integration of expert demonstrations further boosts performance, highlighting DuSAR's flexibility and compatibility with external knowledge.

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well as the challenges this poses for representation learning. We then propose the NfgTransformer architecture that leverages this equivariance, leading to state-of-the-art performance in a range of game-theoretic tasks including equilibrium-solving, deviation gain estimation and ranking, with a common approach to NFG representation. We show that the resulting model is interpretable and versatile, paving the way towards deep learning systems capable of game-theoretic reasoning when interacting with humans and with each other.

Frontier LLM agents have been shown to be capable of solving increasingly complex tasks for which humans have measurable solutions. This begs the pertinent question of whether LLM agents can go beyond what humans have already solved. The ability to develop sophisticated strategies to tackle consequential problems becomes paramount as well-trodden, human-developed solutions become insufficient for problems for which we lack context or enough training data. We study agents' capability of such strategy formation through the communal practice of video game speedrunning. In speedrunning, practitioners compete to find the fastest way to complete a video game under certain conditions, and in so doing uncovering interesting unorthodox play styles that require a thorough understanding and mastery of the underlying game mechanics. We introduce SPEEDRUNBENCH, a benchmark that evaluates frontier LLM agents across 9 different games. To perform well in this benchmark, agents must repeatedly improve their strategy, reflect on their performance, exploit their gained knowledge, and reason across a long-horizon of actions to improve on an increasingly difficult problem: being faster than themselves and everyone else. Our experiments show that while frontier agents approach human world records in simple platformer games, they remain behind human performance on longer, more complex games under practical budgets. These results suggest that SPEEDRUNBENCH is a useful testbed for studying agents' strategy formation capabilities as well as being a saturation-resistant evaluation measure, as there is almost always a faster completion time waiting to be discovered.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions coupled with shared policy learning constitutes an efficient solution to this problem. By playing against each other, our deep-reinforcement-learning-driven agents learn emergent behaviors relative to a wide spectrum of objectives encompassing profit-and-loss, optimal execution and market share. In particular, we find that liquidity providers naturally learn to balance hedging and skewing, where skewing refers to setting their buy and sell prices asymmetrically as a function of their inventory. We further introduce a novel RL-based calibration algorithm which we found performed well at imposing constraints on the game equilibrium. On the theoretical side, we are able to show convergence rates for our multi-agent policy gradient algorithm under a transitivity assumption, closely related to generalized ordinal potential games.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, Frontier AI Risk Management Framework in Practice presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. As Large Language Models (LLMs) general capabilities rapidly evolve and the proliferation of agentic AI, this version of the risk analysis technical report presents an updated and granular assessment of five critical dimensions: cyber offense, persuasion and manipulation, strategic deception, uncontrolled AI R\&D, and self-replication. Specifically, we introduce more complex scenarios for cyber offense. For persuasion and manipulation, we evaluate the risk of LLM-to-LLM persuasion on newly released LLMs. For strategic deception and scheming, we add the new experiment with respect to emergent misalignment. For uncontrolled AI R\&D, we focus on the ``mis-evolution'' of agents as they autonomously expand their memory substrates and toolsets. Besides, we also monitor and evaluate the safety performance of OpenClaw during the interaction on the Moltbook. For self-replication, we introduce a new resource-constrained scenario. More importantly, we propose and validate a series of robust mitigation strategies to address these emerging threats, providing a preliminary technical and actionable pathway for the secure deployment of frontier AI. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

The growing emotional stress in modern society has increased the demand for Emotional Support Conversations (ESC). While Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise for ESC, they face two key challenges: (1) low strategy selection accuracy, and (2) preference bias, limiting their adaptability to emotional needs of users. Existing supervised fine-tuning (SFT) struggles to address these issues, as it rigidly trains models on single gold-standard responses without modeling nuanced strategy trade-offs. To overcome these limitations, we propose Chain-of-Strategy Optimization (CSO), a novel approach that optimizes strategy selection preferences at each dialogue turn. We first leverage Monte Carlo Tree Search to construct ESC-Pro, a high-quality preference dataset with turn-level strategy-response pairs. Training on ESC-Pro with CSO improves both strategy accuracy and bias mitigation, enabling LLMs to generate more empathetic and contextually appropriate responses. Experiments on LLaMA-3.1-8B, Gemma-2-9B, and Qwen2.5-7B demonstrate that CSO outperforms standard SFT, highlighting the efficacy of fine-grained, turn-level preference modeling in ESC.

In an effort to better understand the different ways in which the discount factor affects the optimization process in reinforcement learning, we designed a set of experiments to study each effect in isolation. Our analysis reveals that the common perception that poor performance of low discount factors is caused by (too) small action-gaps requires revision. We propose an alternative hypothesis that identifies the size-difference of the action-gap across the state-space as the primary cause. We then introduce a new method that enables more homogeneous action-gaps by mapping value estimates to a logarithmic space. We prove convergence for this method under standard assumptions and demonstrate empirically that it indeed enables lower discount factors for approximate reinforcement-learning methods. This in turn allows tackling a class of reinforcement-learning problems that are challenging to solve with traditional methods.

We consider multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for cooperative communication and coordination tasks. MARL agents can be brittle because they can overfit their training partners' policies. This overfitting can produce agents that adopt policies that act under the expectation that other agents will act in a certain way rather than react to their actions. Our objective is to bias the learning process towards finding reactive strategies towards other agents' behaviors. Our method, transfer empowerment, measures the potential influence between agents' actions. Results from three simulated cooperation scenarios support our hypothesis that transfer empowerment improves MARL performance. We discuss how transfer empowerment could be a useful principle to guide multi-agent coordination by ensuring reactiveness to one's partner.

The reversal curse -- a language model's (LM) inability to infer an unseen fact ``B is A'' from a learned fact ``A is B'' -- is widely considered a fundamental limitation. We show that this is not an inherent failure but an artifact of how models encode knowledge. By training LMs from scratch on a synthetic dataset of relational knowledge graphs, we demonstrate that bilinear relational structure emerges in their hidden representations. This structure substantially alleviates the reversal curse, enabling LMs to infer unseen reverse facts. Crucially, we also find that this bilinear structure plays a key role in consistent model editing. When a fact is updated in a LM with this structure, the edit correctly propagates to its reverse and other logically dependent facts. In contrast, models lacking this representation not only suffer from the reversal curse but also fail to generalize edits, further introducing logical inconsistencies. Our results establish that training on a relational knowledge dataset induces the emergence of bilinear internal representations, which in turn enable LMs to behave in a logically consistent manner after editing. This implies that the success of model editing depends critically not just on editing algorithms but on the underlying representational geometry of the knowledge being modified.

Reinforcement learning for LLMs is vulnerable to reward hacking, where models exploit shortcuts to maximize reward without solving the intended task. We systematically study this phenomenon in coding tasks using an environment-manipulation setting, where models can rewrite evaluator code to trivially pass tests without solving the task, as a controlled testbed. Across both studied models, we identify a reproducible three-phase rebound pattern: models first attempt to rewrite the evaluator but fail, as their rewrites embed test cases their own solutions cannot pass. They then temporarily retreat to legitimate solving. When legitimate reward remains scarce, they rebound into successful hacking with qualitatively different strategies. Using representation engineering, we extract concept directions for shortcut, deception, and evaluation awareness from domain-general contrastive pairs and find that the shortcut direction tracks hacking behavior most closely, making it an effective representational proxy for detection. Motivated by this finding, we propose Advantage Modification, which integrates shortcut concept scores into GRPO advantage computation to penalize hacking rollouts before policy updates. Because the penalty is internalized into the training signal rather than applied only at inference time, Advantage Modification provides more robust suppression of hacking compared with generation-time activation steering.

We introduce Pok\'eLLMon, the first LLM-embodied agent that achieves human-parity performance in tactical battle games, as demonstrated in Pok\'emon battles. The design of Pok\'eLLMon incorporates three key strategies: (i) In-context reinforcement learning that instantly consumes text-based feedback derived from battles to iteratively refine the policy; (ii) Knowledge-augmented generation that retrieves external knowledge to counteract hallucination and enables the agent to act timely and properly; (iii) Consistent action generation to mitigate the panic switching phenomenon when the agent faces a powerful opponent and wants to elude the battle. We show that online battles against human demonstrates Pok\'eLLMon's human-like battle strategies and just-in-time decision making, achieving 49\% of win rate in the Ladder competitions and 56\% of win rate in the invited battles. Our implementation and playable battle logs are available at: https://github.com/git-disl/PokeLLMon.

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

Through multi-agent competition, the simple objective of hide-and-seek, and standard reinforcement learning algorithms at scale, we find that agents create a self-supervised autocurriculum inducing multiple distinct rounds of emergent strategy, many of which require sophisticated tool use and coordination. We find clear evidence of six emergent phases in agent strategy in our environment, each of which creates a new pressure for the opposing team to adapt; for instance, agents learn to build multi-object shelters using moveable boxes which in turn leads to agents discovering that they can overcome obstacles using ramps. We further provide evidence that multi-agent competition may scale better with increasing environment complexity and leads to behavior that centers around far more human-relevant skills than other self-supervised reinforcement learning methods such as intrinsic motivation. Finally, we propose transfer and fine-tuning as a way to quantitatively evaluate targeted capabilities, and we compare hide-and-seek agents to both intrinsic motivation and random initialization baselines in a suite of domain-specific intelligence tests.

Recent progress in multi-turn reinforcement learning (RL) has significantly improved reasoning LLMs' performances on complex interactive tasks. Despite advances in stabilization techniques such as fine-grained credit assignment and trajectory filtering, instability remains pervasive and often leads to training collapse. We argue that this instability stems from inefficient exploration in multi-turn settings, where policies continue to generate low-information actions that neither reduce uncertainty nor advance task progress. To address this issue, we propose Token- and Turn-level Policy Optimization (T^2PO), an uncertainty-aware framework that explicitly controls exploration at fine-grained levels. At the token level, T^2PO monitors uncertainty dynamics and triggers a thinking intervention once the marginal uncertainty change falls below a threshold. At the turn level, T^2PO identifies interactions with negligible exploration progress and dynamically resamples such turns to avoid wasted rollouts. We evaluate T^2PO in diverse environments, including WebShop, ALFWorld, and Search QA, demonstrating substantial gains in training stability and performance improvements with better exploration efficiency. Code is available at: https://github.com/WillDreamer/T2PO.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly serve as primary knowledge retrieval interfaces, their robustness against persuasion attacks---attempts to inject misinformation or enforce counterfactuals---has become a critical safety concern. Existing red-teaming frameworks typically evaluate models in multi-turn dialogues where the target model retains full conversation history. We identify a critical flaw in this setting termed ``Refusal Inertia'': a model's initial refusal often propagates through subsequent turns largely to maintain contextual consistency, thereby masking its true vulnerability to sophisticated, isolated persuasion attempts. To rigorously evaluate the ``cold-start'' defense capabilities of SOTA models, we introduce the SAST-IR (Stateful Attacker, Stateless Target - Iterative Refinement) framework. By enforcing a memory wipe on the target while retaining the attacker's history, we simulate a worst-case adversarial setting using multi-turn (stateless) iterations. Leveraging CP-Agent (Cognitive Persuasion Agent), an enhanced diagnosis-guided agent, our experiments on the custom CounterFact-Strict dataset (N=50) yield alarming results: simple, diverse attack strategies achieved a staggering 96\% success rate, exposing severe brittleness in memory-less defense. Furthermore, we reveal a ``Complexity Paradox'': while complex, iteratively refined attacks are effective, they often trigger defensive compliance, whereas simple strategies achieve a higher rate of genuine persuasion (84.7\%). Our code and dataset are available at GitHub, https://github.com/cza1006/llm-persuasion-defense.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents capable of acting in open-ended environments, ensuring behavioral alignment with human values becomes a critical safety concern. Existing benchmarks, focused on static, single-turn prompts, fail to capture the interactive and multi-modal nature of real-world conflicts. We introduce ConflictBench, a benchmark for evaluating human-AI conflict through 150 multi-turn scenarios derived from prior alignment queries. ConflictBench integrates a text-based simulation engine with a visually grounded world model, enabling agents to perceive, plan, and act under dynamic conditions. Empirical results show that while agents often act safely when human harm is immediate, they frequently prioritize self-preservation or adopt deceptive strategies in delayed or low-risk settings. A regret test further reveals that aligned decisions are often reversed under escalating pressure, especially with visual input. These findings underscore the need for interaction-level, multi-modal evaluation to surface alignment failures that remain hidden in conventional benchmarks.

Diffusion-based large language models (dLLMs) promise to break the sequential latency bottleneck of autoregressive agents through parallel decoding, but recent evaluations show this efficiency does not transfer to embodied agentic competence: dLLM-backed agents repeatedly fall into retry loops, re-issuing an action long after it has failed. We give a mechanistic account of this failure and a training-free remedy. We trace the retry loop to the adaptivity of masked decoding: the sampler commits the positions it is most confident about and defers the uncertain ones, and at a failure state the context already offers a confident fill for the deferred decision, i.e. the failed action itself, so the retry is committed without the failure feedback ever being confronted. We model the resulting distortion of the action distribution as a task-blind corruption: contextually salient actions (e.g., the action just taken) receive inflated probability by a factor that depends on the state and the action but not on the task. Under this model, we analyse an invariance proposition: the task-blind factor cancels exactly from the reverse conditional, i.e. the likelihood of the task given the state and a candidate action, which coincides with the task posterior of an idealized uncorrupted model. Masked dLLMs evaluate the reverse conditional natively, unlike autoregressive models, by masking the task tokens and denoising, at the cost of a few parallel passes per candidate. We instantiate the rule as Reflect Reverse and evaluate it on four multi-turn embodied benchmarks, where it improves task success and progression rates over forward-scoring baselines.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has significantly advanced the reasoning capabilities of large language models, yet how to explicitly steer training toward exploration or exploitation remains an open problem. We introduce Token Hidden Reward (THR), a token-level metric that quantifies each token's influence on the likelihood of correct responses under Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We find that training dynamics are dominated by a small subset of tokens with high absolute THR values. Most interestingly, tokens with positive THR strengthen confidence in correct outputs, thus favoring exploitation, while tokens with negative THR preserve probability mass for alternative outputs, enabling exploration. This insight suggests a natural intervention: a THR-guided reweighting algorithm that modulates GRPO's learning signals to explicitly bias training toward exploitation or exploration. We validate the efficacy of this algorithm on diverse math reasoning benchmarks. By amplifying tokens with positive THR value and weakening negative ones, our algorithm improves greedy-decoding accuracy, favoring exploitation. The reverse strategy yields consistent gains in Pass@K accuracy, favoring exploration. We further demonstrate that our algorithm integrates seamlessly with other RL objectives such as GSPO and generalizes across architectures including Llama. These findings establish THR as a principled and fine-grained mechanism for dynamically controlling exploration and exploitation in RL-tuned LLMs, providing new tools for targeted fine-tuning in reasoning-intensive applications.

On-policy distillation (OPD) strengthens language-model reasoning, yet whether students acquire new factual knowledge or compositional skill for multi-step reasoning remains unknown. We separate these capabilities using a controlled synthetic framework that measures the student's initial capabilities and independently controls the teacher's additional facts, compositional skill, or both. Across four models from three families, reverse-KL OPD reliably transfers compositional skill across unseen reasoning structures, but transfers minimal factual knowledge. Decoupling the distillation recipe reveals the source of this asymmetry: replacing reverse KL with forward KL restores factual transfer, whereas student rollouts specifically improve the execution of multi-step reasoning. Experiments on recent factual QA and competition mathematics show a similar asymmetry under reverse-KL OPD, yielding notable reasoning gains without factual memory expansion. Together, these results demonstrate that on-policy distillation does not expand a model's parametric knowledge, but instead teaches it to organize and compose the knowledge it already possesses.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to make decisions in complex scenarios, where they need models to think deeply, reason logically, and decide wisely. Many existing studies focus solely on multi-round conversations in social tasks or simulated environments, neglecting the various types of decisions and their interdependence. Current reinforcement learning methods struggle to consider the strategies of others during training. To address these issues, we first define a strategic decision-making problem that includes two types of decisions and their temporal dependencies. Furthermore, we propose **T**heory **o**f **M**ind **P**olicy **O**ptimization **(ToMPO)** algorithm to optimize the perception of other individual strategies and the game situation trends. Compared to the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm, ToMPO enhances the LLM's strategic decision-making mainly by: 1) generating rollouts based on reasoning the strategies of other individuals, 2) estimating advantages at both the graph-level and sample-level, and 3) balancing global and partial rewards. The ToMPO algorithm outperforms the GRPO method by 35% in terms of model output compliance and cooperative outcomes. Additionally, when compared to models with parameter sizes 100 times larger, it shows an 18% improvement. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the ToMPO algorithm in enhancing the model's strategic decision-making capabilities.

Multi-turn LLM evaluation is typically reported as a single win-rate scalar, conflating distinct capabilities. We introduce AIDG (Adversarial Information Deduction Game), formalizing multi-turn adversarial dialogue as a two-player partially observable stochastic game (POSG) and decomposing performance along Seeker (extraction) and Holder (containment) roles. The decomposition isolates three failure modes: cooperative-prior leakage, constraint-reasoning interference, and inefficient hypothesis-space traversal. Across 439 games over six frontier LLMs, defensive performance is tightly clustered (sigma = 1.9 ELO) while offensive performance varies substantially (sigma = 53.3 ELO); confirmation framing increases extraction odds 7.75x over uninformed deduction (p < 0.00001); and constraint violations account for 41.3% of deductive failures, uncorrelated with scale (rho = 0.0). We position the containment-over-extraction gap not as a surprising finding but as a measurable consequence of locally resolvable defensive decisions versus globally coupled offensive planning, and use the decomposition to attribute the gap per model. All design choices, including turn-decay weighting and the Bradley-Terry rating model, are derived from explicit assumptions.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

While large language models (LLMs) have achieved impressive performance across diverse tasks, recent studies showcase that causal LLMs suffer from the "reversal curse". It is a typical example that the model knows "A's father is B", but is unable to reason "B's child is A". This limitation poses a challenge to the advancement of artificial general intelligence (AGI), as it suggests a gap in the models' ability to comprehend and apply bidirectional reasoning. In this paper, we first conduct substantial evaluation and identify that the root cause of the reversal curse lies in the different word order between the training and inference stage, namely, the poor ability of causal language models to predict antecedent words within the training data. Accordingly, permutation on the training data is considered as a potential solution, since this can make the model predict antecedent words or tokens. However, previous permutation methods may disrupt complete phrases or entities, thereby posing challenges for the model to comprehend and learn from training data. To address this issue, we propose Semantic-aware Permutation Training (SPT), which addresses this issue by segmenting the training sentences into semantic units (i.e., entities or phrases) with an assistant language model and permuting these units before feeding into the model. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SPT effectively mitigates the reversal curse since the performance on reversed questions approximates that on the forward ones, and significantly advances the performance of existing works.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning for foundation models, such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), have significantly improved the performance of foundation models on reasoning tasks. Notably, the advantage function serves as a central mechanism in GRPO for ranking the trajectory importance. However, existing explorations encounter both advantage reversion and advantage mirror problems, which hinder the reasonable advantage allocation across different query samples. In this work, we propose an easy but effective GRPO strategy, Mixed Advantage Policy Optimization (MAPO). We reveal that the trajectory appears with different certainty and propose the advantage percent deviation for samples with high-certainty trajectories. Furthermore, we dynamically reweight the advantage function for samples with varying trajectory certainty, thereby adaptively configuring the advantage function to account for sample-specific characteristics. Comparison with related state-of-the-art methods, along with ablation studies on different advantage variants, validates the effectiveness of our approach.

Recent advances in applying reinforcement learning (RL) to large language models (LLMs) have led to substantial progress. In particular, a series of remarkable yet often counterintuitive phenomena have been reported in LLMs, exhibiting patterns not typically observed in traditional RL settings. For example, notable claims include that a single training example can match the performance achieved with an entire dataset, that the reward signal does not need to be very accurate, and that training solely with negative samples can match or even surpass sophisticated reward-based methods. However, the precise conditions under which these observations hold - and, critically, when they fail - remain unclear. In this work, we identify a key factor that differentiates RL observations: whether the pretrained model already exhibits strong Model-Task Alignment, as measured by pass@k accuracy on the evaluated task. Through a systematic and comprehensive examination of a series of counterintuitive claims, supported by rigorous experimental validation across different model architectures and task domains, our findings show that while standard RL training remains consistently robust across settings, many of these counterintuitive results arise only when the model and task already exhibit strong model-task alignment. In contrast, these techniques fail to drive substantial learning in more challenging regimes, where standard RL methods remain effective.

On-policy distillation (OPD) learns from teacher feedback on student-generated responses and has shown promise in reducing forgetting relative to supervised fine-tuning (SFT). However, its benefits and fragility remain incompletely understood. We study sequential distillation from multiple teachers, where the student minimizes its average divergence from the teachers. Forward Kullback--Leibler (KL) divergence yields a weighted arithmetic mixture, while reverse KL yields a normalized weighted geometric aggregate. We develop algorithms that learn these targets under off-policy and on-policy feedback, respectively, establishing logarithmic regret bounds in the tabular setting and extending the analysis to function approximation. By analyzing these aggregation targets, we identify mechanisms that help explain both the benefits and fragility of OPD. Relative to forward KL, reverse KL can better retain a confident expert's preferences under uninformative feedback, but is more sensitive to teachers that assign very low probabilities to correct responses. Its token-level conditionals also reveal a dependence on continuation distributions that can favor incorrect prefixes over long horizons.

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Olaf Scholz was the ninth Chancellor of Germany", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the ninth Chancellor of Germany?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Olaf Scholz") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models exhibit a basic failure of logical deduction and do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set (i.e. if "A is B'' occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur). We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of 'Abyssal Melodies'" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed 'Abyssal Melodies?'". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. This shows a failure of logical deduction that we hypothesize is caused by the Reversal Curse. Code is available at https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated impressive action sequence prediction capabilities but often struggle with dynamic, long-horizon tasks such as real-time strategic games. In a game such as StarCraftII (SC2), agents need to manage resource constraints and adapt to evolving battlefield situations in a partially observable environment. This often overwhelms exisiting LLM-based approaches. To address these challenges, we propose a hierarchical multi-agent framework that employs specialized imitation learning agents under a meta-controller called Strategic Planner (SP). By expert demonstrations, each specialized agent learns a distinctive strategy, such as aerial support or defensive maneuvers, and produces coherent, structured multistep action sequences. The SP then orchestrates these proposals into a single, environmentally adaptive plan that ensures local decisions aligning with long-term strategies. We call this HIMA (Hierarchical Imitation Multi-Agent). We also present TEXTSCII-ALL, a comprehensive SC2 testbed that encompasses all race match combinations in SC2. Our empirical results show that HIMA outperforms state of the arts in strategic clarity, adaptability, and computational efficiency, underscoring the potential of combining specialized imitation modules with meta-level orchestration to develop more robust, general-purpose AI agents.

Learning in strategy games (e.g. StarCraft, poker) requires the discovery of diverse policies. This is often achieved by iteratively training new policies against existing ones, growing a policy population that is robust to exploit. This iterative approach suffers from two issues in real-world games: a) under finite budget, approximate best-response operators at each iteration needs truncating, resulting in under-trained good-responses populating the population; b) repeated learning of basic skills at each iteration is wasteful and becomes intractable in the presence of increasingly strong opponents. In this work, we propose Neural Population Learning (NeuPL) as a solution to both issues. NeuPL offers convergence guarantees to a population of best-responses under mild assumptions. By representing a population of policies within a single conditional model, NeuPL enables transfer learning across policies. Empirically, we show the generality, improved performance and efficiency of NeuPL across several test domains. Most interestingly, we show that novel strategies become more accessible, not less, as the neural population expands.

Recent studies have highlighted a phenomenon in large language models (LLMs) known as "the reversal curse," in which the order of knowledge entities in the training data biases the models' comprehension. For example, if a model is trained on sentences where entity A consistently appears before entity B, it can respond to queries about A by providing B as the answer. However, it may encounter confusion when presented with questions concerning B. We contend that the reversal curse is partially a result of specific model training objectives, particularly evident in the prevalent use of the next-token prediction within most causal language models. For the next-token prediction, models solely focus on a token's preceding context, resulting in a restricted comprehension of the input. In contrast, we illustrate that the GLM, trained using the autoregressive blank infilling objective where tokens to be predicted have access to the entire context, exhibits better resilience against the reversal curse. We propose a novel training method, BIdirectional Casual language modeling Optimization (BICO), designed to mitigate the reversal curse when fine-tuning pretrained causal language models on new data. BICO modifies the causal attention mechanism to function bidirectionally and employs a mask denoising optimization. In the task designed to assess the reversal curse, our approach improves Llama's accuracy from the original 0% to around 70%. We hope that more attention can be focused on exploring and addressing these inherent weaknesses of the current LLMs, in order to achieve a higher level of intelligence.

Emotional Support Conversation (ESC) aims to assist individuals experiencing distress by generating empathetic and supportive dialogue. While prior work typically assumes that each supporter turn corresponds to a single strategy, real-world supportive communication often involves multiple strategies within a single utterance. In this paper, we revisit the ESC task by formulating it as multi-strategy utterance generation, where each utterance may contain one or more strategy-response pairs. We propose two generation methods: All-in-One, which predicts all strategy-response pairs in a single decoding step, and One-by-One, which iteratively generates strategy-response pairs until completion. Both methods are further enhanced with cognitive reasoning guided by reinforcement learning to improve strategy selection and response composition. We evaluate our models on the ESConv dataset under both utterance-level and dialogue-level settings. Experimental results show that our methods effectively model multi-strategy utterances and lead to improved supportive quality and dialogue success. To our knowledge, this work provides the first systematic empirical evidence that allowing multiple support strategies within a single utterance is both feasible and beneficial for emotional support conversations. All code and data will be publicly available at https://github.com/aliyun/qwen-dianjin.

We study the discrete Bertrand pricing game with a non-increasing demand function. The game has n ge 2 players who simultaneously choose prices from the set {1/k, 2/k, ldots, 1}, where kinN. The player who sets the lowest price captures the entire demand; if multiple players tie for the lowest price, they split the demand equally. We study the Bertrand paradox, where classical theory predicts low prices, yet real markets often sustain high prices. To understand this gap, we analyze a repeated-game model in which firms set prices using no-regret learners. Our goal is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes that can arise under different no-regret learning guarantees. We are particularly interested in questions such as whether no-external-regret learners can converge to undesirable high-price outcomes, and how stronger guarantees such as no-swap regret shape the emergence of competitive low-price behavior. We address these and related questions through a theoretical analysis, complemented by experiments that support the theory and reveal surprising phenomena for no-swap regret learners.

Large language models often know the truth and say otherwise: a model that answers correctly when asked neutrally will affirm a user's mistaken belief, or misstate a fact its system prompt wants hidden, once the context rewards it. Such deception is a behavior conditioned on context, not knowledge, yet machine unlearning, the natural tool for removing a behavior from the weights, is built to forget facts that a deceptive model still needs. We propose to unlearn when a model deceives rather than what it knows, with a contrastive forget unit built from the model's own realized deceptions: the same question under a deception-triggering and a neutral context, admitted only where belief holds and behavior flips. Standard objectives on this unit face a dilemma. Suppression objectives such as NPO leave much of the deception in place. Target-based objectives, which distill the model's neutral behavior into the pressured context, remove it but induce context blindness: a target generated without the context teaches the model to stop reading it, eroding benign system-prompt instructions, secret-keeping and the reasoning a monitor inspects, a failure invisible to deception rates and capability benchmarks. We introduce PACT, which trains toward pressure-aware counterfactual targets (the model's own honest response, with a trace that registers the pressure and resists it) while retaining the benign uses of the triggering context. On two 32B reasoning models, PACT reduces held-out deception from over 50% to under 3% while system-prompt adherence, secret-keeping and the reasoning trace stay at the base model's level. On a tug-of-war score of removal against retention, PACT reaches 0.94 and 0.86, against at most 0.77 and 0.60 for any baseline. Like removed knowledge, removed deception is shallow under relearning, and terms that simulate the attacker hold it only at a cost in context use.

Algorithmic trading requires short-term decisions aligned with long-term financial goals. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been explored for such tactical decisions, its adoption remains limited by myopic behavior and opaque policy rationale. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated strategic reasoning and multi-modal financial signal interpretation when guided by well-designed prompts. We propose a hybrid system where LLMs generate high-level trading strategies to guide RL agents in their actions. We evaluate (i) the rationale of LLM-generated strategies via expert review, and (ii) the Sharpe Ratio (SR) and Maximum Drawdown (MDD) of LLM-guided agents versus unguided baselines. Results show improved return and risk metrics over standard RL.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated their proficiency in complex reasoning tasks, their performance in dynamic, interactive, and competitive scenarios - such as business strategy and stock market analysis - remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we formally explore the dynamic reasoning capabilities of LLMs for decision-making in rapidly evolving environments. We introduce two game theory-based pilot challenges that mirror the complexities of real-world dynamic decision-making. These challenges are well-defined, enabling clear, controllable, and precise evaluation of LLMs' dynamic reasoning abilities. Through extensive experiments, we find that existing reasoning methods tend to falter in dynamic settings that require k-level thinking - a key concept not tackled by previous works. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning approach for LLMs, named "K-Level Reasoning". This approach adopts the perspective of rivals to recursively employ k-level thinking based on available historical information, which significantly improves the prediction accuracy of rivals' subsequent moves and informs more strategic decision-making. This research not only sets a robust quantitative benchmark for the assessment of dynamic reasoning but also markedly enhances the proficiency of LLMs in dynamic contexts.

Future- or return-conditioned supervised learning is an emerging paradigm for offline reinforcement learning (RL), where the future outcome (i.e., return) associated with an observed action sequence is used as input to a policy trained to imitate those same actions. While return-conditioning is at the heart of popular algorithms such as decision transformer (DT), these methods tend to perform poorly in highly stochastic environments, where an occasional high return can arise from randomness in the environment rather than the actions themselves. Such situations can lead to a learned policy that is inconsistent with its conditioning inputs; i.e., using the policy to act in the environment, when conditioning on a specific desired return, leads to a distribution of real returns that is wildly different than desired. In this work, we propose the dichotomy of control (DoC), a future-conditioned supervised learning framework that separates mechanisms within a policy's control (actions) from those beyond a policy's control (environment stochasticity). We achieve this separation by conditioning the policy on a latent variable representation of the future, and designing a mutual information constraint that removes any information from the latent variable associated with randomness in the environment. Theoretically, we show that DoC yields policies that are consistent with their conditioning inputs, ensuring that conditioning a learned policy on a desired high-return future outcome will correctly induce high-return behavior. Empirically, we show that DoC is able to achieve significantly better performance than DT on environments that have highly stochastic rewards and transition

Reward models (RMs) used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) are vulnerable to reward hacking: as the policy maximizes a learned proxy reward, true quality plateaus or degrades. We make the assumption that reward hacking is often caused by flipped advantage signs: instead of reducing the likelihood of a bad response, a flipped sign causes the update to increase it. By considering an adversarial perturbation in the RM parameter space, we can derive a certified sign-preservation radius, which is the smallest perturbation that can flip the advantage sign during policy optimization. Based on this formulation, we propose Sign-Certified Policy Optimization (SignCert-PO), down-weighting non-robust completions in the policy gradient update. Unlike prior approaches that require multiple RMs or access to the RM training data, SignCert-PO is lightweight and operates purely at the policy optimization stage using only the RM parameters and on-policy completions. On TL;DR summarization and AlpacaFarm benchmarks, SignCert-PO consistently achieves a better win rate than baselines and reduces reward hacking.

Memory for a long-horizon LLM agent is a contract about what each future decision is allowed to see. The simplest contract appends past observations, tool calls, and reflections to every prompt, which makes prior context easy to access but also turns it into a jumbled mixture in which the effect of any single memory component is hard to isolate. We introduce and instrument an alternative bounded contract: every decision is made from a fresh user message assembled by typed retrieval, with no raw cross-decision transcript appended. The prompt thus stays bounded across runs of any length, and any single layer can be ablated in isolation. We instantiate the contract in Slay the Spire 2, a closed-rule stochastic deck-building game whose runs require hundreds of tactical and strategic decisions. A public online benchmark of frontier LLMs on the same game reports zero wins at the lowest difficulty across five configurations, and the developer-reported human win rate at the same difficulty is 16%; the task is hard but not saturated. Within our harness, a fixed-A0 ablation shows the largest observed difference when triggered strategic skills are enabled: the no-store baseline wins 3/10 games and adding the skill layer 6/10. At this sample size the comparison is directional rather than statistically decisive (Fisher exact p\approx0.37); a cross-backbone probe and public accumulating-context baselines are reported as operational comparisons rather than controlled tests of the contract variable itself. We release a reproducible testbed: 298 completed trajectories with condition tags, frozen memory/skill snapshots, prompt records, and analysis scripts -- an agent design and a validated, reusable methodology for studying how explicit memory layers shape long-horizon LLM-agent decisions.

Mitigating the retention of sensitive or private information in large language models is essential for enhancing privacy and safety. Existing unlearning methods, like Gradient Ascent and Negative Preference Optimization, directly tune models to remove unwanted information. However, these methods often become unstable because they fine-tune by maximizing cross-entropy loss, which is the opposite of traditional loss minimization in learning. This reversal creates instability, especially on larger datasets, as the model struggles to balance unlearning with maintaining language capacity, leading to over-unlearning. In this paper, we introduce UnDIAL (Unlearning via Self-Distillation on Adjusted Logits), a novel and robust unlearning method. Our approach leverages self-distillation to adjust logits and selectively reduce the influence of targeted tokens. This technique ensures smooth convergence and avoids catastrophic forgetting, even in challenging unlearning tasks with large datasets and sequential unlearning requests. Extensive experiments show that UnDIAL can achieve both robustness in unlearning and scalability while maintaining stable training dynamics and resilience to hyperparameter tuning.

Game theory is a foundational framework for analyzing strategic interactions, and its intersection with large language models (LLMs) is a rapidly growing field. However, existing surveys mainly focus narrowly on using game theory to evaluate LLM behavior. This paper provides the first comprehensive survey of the bidirectional relationship between Game Theory and LLMs. We propose a novel taxonomy that categorizes the research in this intersection into four distinct perspectives: (1) evaluating LLMs in game-based scenarios; (2) improving LLMs using game-theoretic concepts for better interpretability and alignment; (3) modeling the competitive landscape of LLM development and its societal impact; and (4) leveraging LLMs to advance game models and to solve corresponding game theory problems. Furthermore, we identify key challenges and outline future research directions. By systematically investigating this interdisciplinary landscape, our survey highlights the mutual influence of game theory and LLMs, fostering progress at the intersection of these fields.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.

In this paper, we propose a new method Strategist that utilizes LLMs to acquire new skills for playing multi-agent games through a self-improvement process. Our method gathers quality feedback through self-play simulations with Monte Carlo tree search and LLM-based reflection, which can then be used to learn high-level strategic skills such as how to evaluate states that guide the low-level execution.We showcase how our method can be used in both action planning and dialogue generation in the context of games, achieving good performance on both tasks. Specifically, we demonstrate that our method can help train agents with better performance than both traditional reinforcement learning-based approaches and other LLM-based skill learning approaches in games including the Game of Pure Strategy (GOPS) and The Resistance: Avalon.

As Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents are increasingly employed in diverse decision-making problems using reward preferences, it becomes important to ensure that policies learned by these frameworks in mapping observations to a probability distribution of the possible actions are explainable. However, there is little to no work in the systematic understanding of these complex policies in a contrastive manner, i.e., what minimal changes to the policy would improve/worsen its performance to a desired level. In this work, we present COUNTERPOL, the first framework to analyze RL policies using counterfactual explanations in the form of minimal changes to the policy that lead to the desired outcome. We do so by incorporating counterfactuals in supervised learning in RL with the target outcome regulated using desired return. We establish a theoretical connection between Counterpol and widely used trust region-based policy optimization methods in RL. Extensive empirical analysis shows the efficacy of COUNTERPOL in generating explanations for (un)learning skills while keeping close to the original policy. Our results on five different RL environments with diverse state and action spaces demonstrate the utility of counterfactual explanations, paving the way for new frontiers in designing and developing counterfactual policies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Humans exhibit remarkable abilities to coordinate in groups. As large language models (LLMs) become more capable, it remains an open question whether they can demonstrate comparable adaptive coordination and whether they use the same strategies as humans. To investigate this, we compare LLM and human performance on a common-interest game with imperfect monitoring: Group Binary Search. In this n-player game, participants need to coordinate their actions to achieve a common objective. Players independently submit numerical values in an effort to collectively sum to a randomly assigned target number. Without direct communication, they rely on group feedback to iteratively adjust their submissions until they reach the target number. Our findings show that, unlike humans who adapt and stabilize their behavior over time, LLMs often fail to improve across games and exhibit excessive switching, which impairs group convergence. Moreover, richer feedback (e.g., numerical error magnitude) benefits humans substantially but has small effects on LLMs. Taken together, by grounding the analysis in human baselines and mechanism-level metrics, including reactivity scaling, switching dynamics, and learning across games, we point to differences in human and LLM groups and provide a behaviorally grounded diagnostic for closing the coordination gap.

Frameworks that use large language models for scientific discovery typically rely on a fixed, human-designed algorithm that decides what the model sees at each step, leaving the model only the role of proposer. The model knows nothing of the search beyond what it is shown. As models grow more capable, a question arises: does a search strategy chosen by a human before the run scale better than promoting the model from proposer to planner and letting it own the search? The Bitter Lesson suggests that choosing the strategy in advance is the kind of hand-designed structure that general methods eventually outscale. We introduce AgentDiscover, in which a coding agent plans the search using its context as working memory, runs experiments, and records every attempt in a database of ideas, candidates, and their relations. This database serves as the agent's long-term memory and is structured so that the selection rules of classical algorithms such as MAP-Elites and Monte Carlo tree search each reduce to a single query, which the agent is free to use, combine, or replace. A server maintains the database and steers the agent after every submission, keeping it on course over long runs. In our experiments, AgentDiscover is more cost-efficient than existing frameworks, reaching better scores at lower cost. On tasks in kernel engineering, biology, algorithm design, and mathematics, AgentDiscover outperforms prior discovery frameworks. Its programs would have placed first among human competitors in seven past AtCoder heuristic contests, and on eleven mathematical and systems optimization tasks it matches or exceeds every baseline that uses the same model. Our code is available at https://github.com/mhdfb/AgentDiscover.

Social deduction games like Werewolf combine language, reasoning, and strategy, providing a testbed for studying natural language and social intelligence. However, most studies reduce the game to LLM-based self-play, yielding templated utterances and anecdotal cases that overlook the richness of social gameplay. Evaluation further relies on coarse metrics such as survival time or subjective scoring due to the lack of quality reference data. To address these gaps, we curate a high-quality, human-verified multimodal Werewolf dataset containing over 100 hours of video, 32.4M utterance tokens, and 15 rule variants. Based on this dataset, we propose a novel strategy-alignment evaluation that leverages the winning faction's strategies as ground truth in two stages: 1) Speech evaluation, formulated as multiple-choice-style tasks that assess whether the model can adopt appropriate stances across five dimensions of social ability; and 2) Decision evaluation, which assesses the model's voting choices and opponent-role inferences. This framework enables a fine-grained evaluation of models' linguistic and reasoning capabilities, while capturing their ability to generate strategically coherent gameplay. Our experiments show that state-of-the-art LLMs show diverse performance, with roughly half remain below 0.50, revealing clear gaps in deception and counterfactual reasoning. We hope our dataset further inspires research on language, reasoning, and strategy in multi-agent interaction.

Reinforcement learning for long-horizon agents relies on purely retrospective training signals: credit is assigned only after observing environmental consequences, leaving the agent's belief at action time invisible to the gradient. We introduce Prospective Hindsight (PH), a self-calibrating training principle that augments any retrospective base method with a signal derived from the gap between the agent's prospective prediction (before feedback) and the retrospective evaluation (after feedback). This per-rollout surprise identifies samples where the agent's self-model is most inaccurate and amplifies their gradient contribution through a stop-gradient surprise-weighted advantage. Since the prospective predictor shares parameters with the policy, the two co-evolve, progressively shifting focus to the agent's remaining blind spots. We connect this principle to a privileged-information gap and show that minimizing the surprise residual provides a descent pathway on the agent's miscalibration rate; calibration thus emerges as a byproduct of optimization rather than from an added objective. On single-turn verifiable tasks and a multi-turn personal-agent task (under GRPO, on-policy distillation, and their combination), PH improves both task performance and calibration, with consistent gains across model scales. Notably, the dominant miscalibration mode shifts structurally between regimes, overconfident failures in single-turn, underconfident successes in multi-turn, yet the same training principle addresses both successfully.

This paper studies a dynamic model of information acquisition, in which information might be secretly manipulated. A principal must choose between a safe action with known payoff and a risky action with uncertain payoff, favoring the safe action under the prior belief. She may delay her decision to acquire additional news that reveals the risky action's payoff, without knowing exactly when such news will arrive. An uninformed agent with a misaligned preference may have the capability to generate a false arrival of news, which is indistinguishable from a real one, distorting the information content of news and the principal's search. The analysis characterizes the positive and normative distortions in the search for news arising from such manipulation, and it considers three remedies that increase the principal's payoff: a commitment to naive search, transfer of authority to the agent, and delegation to an intermediary who is biased in the agent's favor.

Since the introduction of ChatGPT and GPT-4, these models have been tested across a large number of tasks. Their adeptness across domains is evident, but their aptitude in playing games, and specifically their aptitude in the realm of poker has remained unexplored. Poker is a game that requires decision making under uncertainty and incomplete information. In this paper, we put ChatGPT and GPT-4 through the poker test and evaluate their poker skills. Our findings reveal that while both models display an advanced understanding of poker, encompassing concepts like the valuation of starting hands, playing positions and other intricacies of game theory optimal (GTO) poker, both ChatGPT and GPT-4 are NOT game theory optimal poker players. Profitable strategies in poker are evaluated in expectations over large samples. Through a series of experiments, we first discover the characteristics of optimal prompts and model parameters for playing poker with these models. Our observations then unveil the distinct playing personas of the two models. We first conclude that GPT-4 is a more advanced poker player than ChatGPT. This exploration then sheds light on the divergent poker tactics of the two models: ChatGPT's conservativeness juxtaposed against GPT-4's aggression. In poker vernacular, when tasked to play GTO poker, ChatGPT plays like a nit, which means that it has a propensity to only engage with premium hands and folds a majority of hands. When subjected to the same directive, GPT-4 plays like a maniac, showcasing a loose and aggressive style of play. Both strategies, although relatively advanced, are not game theory optimal.

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixture policies in a game with tractable best-responses. We verify that such policies behave Bayes-optimally under uncertainty and offer insights in using this flexibility at test time. Finally, we offer evidence that learning best-responses to any mixture policies is an effective auxiliary task for strategic exploration, which, by itself, can lead to more performant populations.

Evaluating the social intelligence of Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly requires moving beyond static text generation toward dynamic, adversarial interaction. We introduce the Adversarial Resource Extraction Game (AREG), a benchmark that operationalizes persuasion and resistance as a multi-turn, zero-sum negotiation over financial resources. Using a round-robin tournament across frontier models, AREG enables joint evaluation of offensive (persuasion) and defensive (resistance) capabilities within a single interactional framework. Our analysis provides evidence that these capabilities are weakly correlated (ρ= 0.33) and empirically dissociated: strong persuasive performance does not reliably predict strong resistance, and vice versa. Across all evaluated models, resistance scores exceed persuasion scores, indicating a systematic defensive advantage in adversarial dialogue settings. Further linguistic analysis suggests that interaction structure plays a central role in these outcomes. Incremental commitment-seeking strategies are associated with higher extraction success, while verification-seeking responses are more prevalent in successful defenses than explicit refusal. Together, these findings indicate that social influence in LLMs is not a monolithic capability and that evaluation frameworks focusing on persuasion alone may overlook asymmetric behavioral vulnerabilities.

In recent years, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has been applied to real-world problems with increasing success. Such applications often require to put constraints on the agent's behavior. Existing algorithms for constrained RL (CRL) rely on gradient descent-ascent, but this approach comes with a caveat. While these algorithms are guaranteed to converge on average, they do not guarantee last-iterate convergence, i.e., the current policy of the agent may never converge to the optimal solution. In practice, it is often observed that the policy alternates between satisfying the constraints and maximizing the reward, rarely accomplishing both objectives simultaneously. Here, we address this problem by introducing Reinforcement Learning with Optimistic Ascent-Descent (ReLOAD), a principled CRL method with guaranteed last-iterate convergence. We demonstrate its empirical effectiveness on a wide variety of CRL problems including discrete MDPs and continuous control. In the process we establish a benchmark of challenging CRL problems.

Reasoning and strategic behavior in social interactions is a hallmark of intelligence. This form of reasoning is significantly more sophisticated than isolated planning or reasoning tasks in static settings (e.g., math problem solving). In this paper, we present Strategic Planning, Interaction, and Negotiation (SPIN-Bench), a new multi-domain evaluation designed to measure the intelligence of strategic planning and social reasoning. While many existing benchmarks focus on narrow planning or single-agent reasoning, SPIN-Bench combines classical PDDL tasks, competitive board games, cooperative card games, and multi-agent negotiation scenarios in one unified framework. The framework includes both a benchmark as well as an arena to simulate and evaluate the variety of social settings to test reasoning and strategic behavior of AI agents. We formulate the benchmark SPIN-Bench by systematically varying action spaces, state complexity, and the number of interacting agents to simulate a variety of social settings where success depends on not only methodical and step-wise decision making, but also conceptual inference of other (adversarial or cooperative) participants. Our experiments reveal that while contemporary LLMs handle basic fact retrieval and short-range planning reasonably well, they encounter significant performance bottlenecks in tasks requiring deep multi-hop reasoning over large state spaces and socially adept coordination under uncertainty. We envision SPIN-Bench as a catalyst for future research on robust multi-agent planning, social reasoning, and human--AI teaming.

We demonstrate a situation in which Large Language Models, trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, can display misaligned behavior and strategically deceive their users about this behavior without being instructed to do so. Concretely, we deploy GPT-4 as an agent in a realistic, simulated environment, where it assumes the role of an autonomous stock trading agent. Within this environment, the model obtains an insider tip about a lucrative stock trade and acts upon it despite knowing that insider trading is disapproved of by company management. When reporting to its manager, the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trading decision. We perform a brief investigation of how this behavior varies under changes to the setting, such as removing model access to a reasoning scratchpad, attempting to prevent the misaligned behavior by changing system instructions, changing the amount of pressure the model is under, varying the perceived risk of getting caught, and making other simple changes to the environment. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of Large Language Models trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, strategically deceiving their users in a realistic situation without direct instructions or training for deception.

Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) is a powerful set of techniques for imitation learning that aims to learn a reward function that rationalizes expert demonstrations. Unfortunately, traditional IRL methods suffer from a computational weakness: they require repeatedly solving a hard reinforcement learning (RL) problem as a subroutine. This is counter-intuitive from the viewpoint of reductions: we have reduced the easier problem of imitation learning to repeatedly solving the harder problem of RL. Another thread of work has proved that access to the side-information of the distribution of states where a strong policy spends time can dramatically reduce the sample and computational complexities of solving an RL problem. In this work, we demonstrate for the first time a more informed imitation learning reduction where we utilize the state distribution of the expert to alleviate the global exploration component of the RL subroutine, providing an exponential speedup in theory. In practice, we find that we are able to significantly speed up the prior art on continuous control tasks.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), particularly GRPO, has become the standard for eliciting LLM reasoning. However, its efficiency in exploration and difficulty adaptation remains an open challenge. In this work, we argue that these bottlenecks stem from an implicit advantage symmetry inherent in Group Relative Advantage Estimation (GRAE). This symmetry induces two critical limitations: (i) at the group level, strict symmetry in weights between correct and incorrect trajectories leaves unsampled action logits unchanged, thereby hindering exploration of novel correct solution. (ii) at the sample level, the algorithm implicitly prioritizes medium-difficulty samples, remaining agnostic to the non-stationary demands of difficulty focus. Through controlled experiments, we reveal that this symmetric property is sub-optimal, yielding two pivotal insights: (i) asymmetrically suppressing the advantages of correct trajectories encourages essential exploration. (ii) learning efficiency is maximized by a curriculum-like transition-prioritizing simpler samples initially before gradually shifting to complex ones. Motivated by these findings, we propose Asymmetric GRAE (A-GRAE), which dynamically modulates exploration incentives and sample-difficulty focus. Experiments across seven benchmarks demonstrate that A-GRAE consistently improves GRPO and its variants across both LLMs and MLLMs.

A central paradox in fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) with Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Reward (RLVR) is the frequent degradation of multi-attempt performance (Pass@k) despite improvements in single-attempt accuracy (Pass@1). This is often accompanied by catastrophic forgetting, where models lose previously acquired skills. While various methods have been proposed, the choice and function of the divergence term have been surprisingly unexamined as a proactive solution. We argue that standard RLVR objectives -- both those using the mode-seeking reverse KL-divergence and those forgoing a divergence term entirely -- lack a crucial mechanism for knowledge retention. The reverse-KL actively accelerates this decay by narrowing the policy, while its absence provides no safeguard against the model drifting from its diverse knowledge base. We propose a fundamental shift in perspective: using the divergence term itself as the solution. Our framework, Diversity-Preserving Hybrid RL (DPH-RL), leverages mass-covering f-divergences (like forward-KL and JS-divergence) to function as a rehearsal mechanism. By continuously referencing the initial policy, this approach forces the model to maintain broad solution coverage. Extensive experiments on math and SQL generation demonstrate that DPH-RL not only resolves the Pass@k degradation but improves both Pass@1 and Pass@k in- and out-of-domain. Additionally, DPH-RL is more training-efficient because it computes f-divergence using generator functions, requiring only sampling from the initial policy and no online reference model. Our work highlights a crucial, overlooked axis for improving RLVR, demonstrating that the proper selection of a divergence measure is a powerful tool for building more general and diverse reasoning models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive reasoning capabilities in well-defined problems with clear solutions, such as mathematics and coding. However, they still struggle with complex real-world scenarios like business negotiations, which require strategic reasoning-an ability to navigate dynamic environments and align long-term goals amidst uncertainty. Existing methods for strategic reasoning face challenges in adaptability, scalability, and transferring strategies to new contexts. To address these issues, we propose explicit policy optimization (EPO) for strategic reasoning, featuring an LLM that provides strategies in open-ended action space and can be plugged into arbitrary LLM agents to motivate goal-directed behavior. To improve adaptability and policy transferability, we train the strategic reasoning model via multi-turn reinforcement learning (RL) using process rewards and iterative self-play, without supervised fine-tuning (SFT) as a preliminary step. Experiments across social and physical domains demonstrate EPO's ability of long-term goal alignment through enhanced strategic reasoning, achieving state-of-the-art performance on social dialogue and web navigation tasks. Our findings reveal various collaborative reasoning mechanisms emergent in EPO and its effectiveness in generating novel strategies, underscoring its potential for strategic reasoning in real-world applications.

Activation steering has emerged in large language models as a lightweight alternative for dynamically changing a model's behavior at inference time. However, we show that existing steering methods fail to steer even a simple policy in a two-route gridworld environment. To address this limitation, we propose Policy Gradient Steering (PGS), which formulates steering as a reinforcement learning problem. PGS accumulates gradients of a temporary behavioral objective over a small set of rollouts or demonstrations to construct a removable task vector. We first demonstrate the calibration and reversibility of PGS in a two-route gridworld environment. Using chess puzzles, we then evaluate independently fitted PGS vectors both in isolation and in combination, finding that compatible tactical objectives accumulate constructively. Finally, in competitive football, we show that PGS can alter specific team behaviors and that its effects transfer across opponents. Together, these results show that policy gradients provide a natural interface for constructing temporary and composable behavioral adaptations across diverse decision-making domains.

Recent mechanistic work has uncovered learned algorithms within neural networks, from modular arithmetic to search and planning in game-playing agents. But does algorithmic structure guarantee algorithmic behavior? We investigate this in Leela Chess Zero, the strongest neural chess engine, where prior work identified learned look-ahead. By extending the logit lens to its move-selecting policy network, we discover that correct puzzle solutions--including immediate checkmates--often appear in intermediate layers but are systematically overridden in the final output, a phenomenon we term "forgotten puzzles". Replicating prior analyses on these positions, we find that look-ahead operates normally--future moves of the correct continuation are represented, causally important, and linearly decodable--ruling out a failure of the algorithm. Instead, late layers increasingly shift toward safe play over aggression. To test whether this shift drives the override, we steer the model against these preferences and recover 71.7% of forgotten puzzles, providing causal evidence that safety priors override algorithmically computed solutions. These findings show that algorithmic structure does not guarantee algorithmic behavior: a model can internally solve a problem and still output the wrong answer.

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.